货币国际化条件文献综述
人民币国际化的背景、路径与实践-2019年精选文档
人民币国际化的背景、路径与实践自2008年全球经济金融危机以来，全球经济形势一直低迷，时至今日仍然没有走出困境。
美债危机、欧债危机更是对主要的发达经济体造成了严重的冲击。
面对复杂严峻的全球经济形势，中国如何自处已成为一个重大的问题。
人民币国际化的提议适时地提了出来，成为中国乃至世界关注的焦点。
一、人民币国际化的背景早在全球金融危机伊始，美国就想尽办法要收拾自己一手造成的烂摊子，包括贸易政策的调整、促使人民币升值等，但效果不明显，最终美国还是不得不采取印钞票的办法，即所谓的“量化宽松货币政策”，利用美元是主要的国际货币，通过印制美元，来让全世界为其债务买单。
2008年9月，美国第三大投行雷曼兄弟倒闭之后，美联储采取了第一次量化宽松货币政策，购买了房地美和房利美将近6 000亿美元的债券，防止美国金融危机扩大；2010年4月，欧债危机的爆发使得全球经济形势再次陷入低迷，美国第二次推出量化宽松货币政策；2012年9月，为进一步刺激经济复苏，美国第三次实施量化宽松货币政策。
美国的量化宽松货币政策引起了全世界的警惕，在包括G20在内的国际会议中，有许多要求改革当前以美元为主导的国际货币体系的倡议，呼吁建立“世界货币”。
但是由于各国意见并不统一，尤其是建立新的国际货币必然要有美国的支持才能推行下去，而美国显然会反对任何实质上动摇美元统治地位的改革，所以建立“世界货币”更多地只是停留在理论假设层面。
由于无法在多边会谈中达成共识，各国只能采取自己的对策应对，比如中国就采取了提高非美元国际货币在外汇储备中比例的办法，尤其是欧元。
但是不久，欧债危机爆发，而且愈演愈烈。
开始欧洲央行还能坚持不扩大货币发行，但在意大利的马里奥?德拉吉成为新的欧洲中央银行行长以后，推出所谓“长期融资操作”政策，本质上同美国的“量化宽松货币政策”一样，都是扩大自己的货币供给，利用其国际货币的地位，把自身的危机转嫁到全世界。
事实上，除了美国和欧盟，英国、日本等主要经济体也早已开始实行宽松的货币政策。
浅议人民币国际化的新常态_丁振辉
理论探讨HAINAN FINANCE Monthly襊丁振辉（中国工商银行博士后科研工作站，北京100032）浅议人民币国际化的新常态一、引言和文献综述人民币国际化一直是国内学术界研究的焦点和重点问题，也是涉及理论研究和实践研究的交叉话题，余永定（2011）指出人民币国际化已经进入快车道，但是目前推行的人民币国际化路线图还存在不少问题，例如以人民币结算为突破口导致美元外汇储备不断增加[1]。
甄峰（2014）从人民币国际化的国内外环境入手，提出基于货币职能的人民币国际化发展路径，但是他认为即使全方位推动人民币在官方储备、国际清算和国际债券中的国际化发展，近期仍难冲击美元地位，这为我们研究人民币国际化提供了一条有益的思路[2]。
聂召、李明（2014）也认为人民币国际化的进展超过预期，在跨境贸易与投资的人民币结算、离岸人民币市场建设及双边本币货币协议方面已取得显著进展，虽然从短期来看人民币面临的挑战依然严峻，但是从长期，特别是结合中国经济的发展看，人民币国际化有望步入正轨[3]。
除此之外，周宇（2012）谈到了人民币国际化的两难困境，他主要认为资本项目开放是人民币国际化的前提，但是如果贸然开放资本市场，则又可能削弱中国经济发展的基础进而削弱人民币国际化的基础[4]，如尹继志（2014）从货币互换和吴斌（2014）从中资银行国际化的角度对人民币国际化进行了总结，提出了人民币国际化的新的发展情景[5-6]。
笔者发现，随着中国经济的持续发展和国家对人民币国际化战略路径逐渐形成，中国的人民币国际化进程正在逐渐加快。
中国是世界第二大经济体，是世界第一大出口国和第二大贸易国，在世界经济格局中占有重要地位。
在经济危机的背景下，中国逐渐成为推动世界经济复苏的重要力量。
尽管中国在世界经济中的影响力巨大，但这种“影响力”或许不体现在人民币的国际货币地位上，就目前来看人民币国际化程度不仅低于美元和欧元这样的主流国际货币，甚至低于日元、新元等次区域货币，人民币国际化程度与中国在世界经济中的重要程度并不对称。
人民币国际化现实条件及路径选择分析研究共3篇
人民币国际化现实条件及路径选择分析研究共3篇人民币国际化现实条件及路径选择分析研究1随着中国在全球经济中的地位不断提升，人民币的国际化成为一个备受关注的话题。
本文将探讨人民币国际化的现实条件以及路径选择。
一、现实条件1.中国经济实力的提升中国是全球最大的制造业国家，同时也是全球第二大经济体。
中国经济实力的提升为人民币国际化提供了坚实的基础。
2.国际贸易规模的扩大中国是全球最大的贸易国之一，外贸规模不断扩大，这为人民币国际化提供了更多的机会。
目前，人民币已成为中国对外贸易的重要结算货币，但在全球范围内，人民币的地位还有待提升。
3.国际金融市场的竞争人民币国际化不仅仅是一种经济和货币制度的变化，更是一种国际金融市场的竞争。
全球其他货币的竞争也给人民币的国际化创造了良好的现实条件。
二、路径选择1.金融市场的开放要推动人民币国际化，必须让人民币在国际金融市场上得到更广泛的应用，这需要中国进一步开放金融市场。
例如，放宽外汇管制，加速金融机构的国际化进程，吸引更多的外资流入中国金融市场。
2.国际货币体系的改革国际货币体系的改革是推动人民币国际化的重要途径。
需要推动世界金融体系从以美元为主导货币向多极化演变，推动人民币逐步成为国际储备货币。
3.区域货币合作的加强在推进人民币国际化的过程中，需要加强与亚洲和其他国家的货币合作。
例如，推进人民币区域清算机制，推动人民币与亚洲其他货币直接交易，构建一个更加紧密的亚洲货币合作区。
4.完善金融基础设施人民币国际化需要支持的金融基础设施是高效、稳定、安全的支付清算体系，例如，借助于跨境支付体系，优化人民币的跨境支付和结算机制。
结论综上所述，人民币国际化是中国国际经济发展的必由之路。
在现实条件的支撑下，我们应该采取多种途径，加强国际货币体系的改革，完善金融基础设施，加强与亚洲和其他国家的货币合作，推进中国金融市场的国际化进程，推动人民币国际化向更深入、更广泛、更多元化方向发展人民币国际化是中国经济发展的必由之路，在全球化和国际化的背景下，推动人民币国际化将有助于提升中国在全球经济体系中的地位和影响力。
人民币国际化具备的条件
•人民币国际化具备的条件•1：宏观条件：•第一,强大的经济规模。
中国的GDP总量在2009年排名第三,超过了德国,2010年超过了日本成为全球第二大经济体。
中国的GDP总量占世界GDP的比重的不断提高,而且增加速度越来越快, •第二,不断扩大的贸易规模。
一国货币国际化的一个重要功能就是作为国际性的支付手段,而货币国际性支付手段主要运用在国际贸易中,特别是一国货币的国际化与其出口贸易直接相关。
从贸易总量上看, 2009年我国商品出口占全球出口份额的8·7%,仅仅次于德国的9·5%,位列第二;而商品进口占全球进口份额的6·7%,仅次于美国的14·2%和德国的7·4%,位列第三。
特别值得注意的是,我国和世界主要新兴市场国家的贸易往来规模在逐渐增大同时增速较快。
总之,目前我国对外交易占全球国际交易的比重已经足够大,交易对象国众多,对世界贸易具有足够的影响力•第三：强大的政治、军事实力。
中国现在在国际的政治地位不断提高,具有较高的话语权,同时也体现了其军事实力的强大,因为强大的军事实力才是其强大政治实力的保证。
•2：微观条件：•第一：充足的清偿手段。
中国的外汇储备总量世界第一,有着良好的信誉以应付随时可能发生的汇兑要求,使得中国国际收支保持动态平衡,同时也维持外汇市场和汇率的相对稳定。
•第二：合理的汇率体制。
2005年7月21日,我国改革人民币汇率形成机制,开始实行以市场供求为基础、参考“一篮子”货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度。
人民币不再钉住美元,形成更富有弹性的汇率机制,这为人民币国际化进一步创造了有利条件。
近期虽然人民币大幅升值,央行货币委员会在2010年10月召开的第三季度例会上仍然强调,下一阶段,将进一步完善人民币汇率形成机制,重在坚持以市场供求为基础,参考“一篮子”货币进行调节,增强汇率弹性。
调节国际收支的政策措施(一)外汇缓冲政策外汇缓冲政策，是指一国政府为对付国际收支不平衡，把外汇储备作为缓冲体，通过中央银行在外汇市场上买卖外汇，来消除国际收支不平衡所形成的外汇供求品，从而使收支不平衡所产生的影响仅限于外汇储备的增减，而不致导致汇率的急剧变动和进一步影响本国的经济。
人民币国际化相关的文献综述
人民币国际化相关的文献综述国际国内关于货币国际化的研究，国外研究起步相对较早，理论也相对较成熟。
国内研究基本从20世纪80年代末90年代初才开始，国内的研究主要围绕人民币国际化这一主题展开。
一、国外文献综述由于国外学者对货币国际化的研究较早，理论也相对较成熟。
通过对国际货币形成的历史的研究和探讨，通过对国际货币使用情况和国际货币格局变化的分析，西方学者对国际货币的一些特性和影响进行了归纳和总结，并主要从不同的角度对货币国际化的条件和影响两方面进行了探讨。
(一)货币国际化的定义、特性以及条件Cohen(1971)最早从货币职能的角度定义国际货币,他认为国际货币的职能是货币国内职能在国外的扩展。
部门和官方机构出于各种各样的目的将一种货币的使用扩展到该货币发行国以外时,这种货币就发展到了国际货币的层次。
Hartmann (1998)进一步发展了Cohen的定义,他对国际化货币的不同职能进行了分类:作为支付手段,国际化货币在国际贸易和资本交易中被私人用作媒介货币,在外汇市场干预中被官方用作干预工具；作为记账单位,国际化货币被用于商品贸易和金融交易的计价,被官方部门用于确定汇率平价；作为价值储藏手段,国际化货币形成的金融资产是构成私人部门资产组合的主要部分,也是构成官方储备资产的源泉`。
蒙代尔（2003）则从货币流通范围的角度给出了货币国际化的定义,他认为,当货币流通范围超出法定的流通区域,该货币就国际化了。
判断一国货币是否国际化,一般主要有以下几个标准:(1)该国货币自由兑换在国际交易支付中所占的比重；(2)该国货币是否发挥执行价格标准,国际清算货币的作用；(3)该国货币在国际投资中所占的比重；(4)该国货币是否发挥国际储备资产的职能(国际储备货币)；(5)该国货币在国际借贷活动中所占的比重；(6)该国货币是否具有国际干预货币的作用；(7)该国货币是否在世界范围内发挥价值尺度。
最早涉及货币国际化条件的研究来自于Grassman(1973)。
人民币国际化外文文献及文献综述
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题:T hei n ternat i onal i za t ion oft heRMB,capit a lm a r ke tope nn es s,an dfi na ncia l reformsinC hi na作者: Aizenman,Joshua期刊: BOFIT DiscussionPapers卷: 4；期: 1；页: 4-26；年份:2015T hei n ternat i onaliz a ti ono f t heRMB,capi t almarke t openne s s,andfi n an c ialre f orm s inChina AbstractThis paper provides an overview of Chinese financial and trade integrationinrecentdecades,andthechallengesfacingChinainthecomingyears.Chinahadbee napr i meexampleof e xport-ledg row t h,benefi t in g fromle a r ni n g b y doing,andby adoptingforeignknow-how,supportedbyacomplexindustrialpolicy.Whiletheresultant growth has been spectacular, it comes with hidden but growing costs and distortions. The Chinese exported growth path has been challenged by its ownsuccess,and the Global Financial Crisis forced China toward rebalancing, which is a workinprogress.Refle c ti ng onth e int e r na ti on alizati onoft heCNY,one e xpect s t he rapid accelera ting of the commercial internationalization of the CNY. In contrast, there areno clear-cut reasons to rush with the full CNY financial internationalization: The gains from CNY financial internationalization areoverrated.Keywords: export led growth, CNY internationalization,mercantilism,financialintegration,FDI.This paper overviews the Chinese financial and tradeintegration in recent decades. We start by evaluating the history of Chinese growth-cum-financialpolicies,arguingthattheexport-ledgrowthofChina was a highly successful policy, as hasbeenvividlyillustratedbytheunprecedentedcatchingupofChinesesizewiththeU.S.[either in current dollar or adjusted for PPP]. Yet, the remarkable success ofthisprocess sowed its end, and the need for China to rebalance its economy.Lookingforward,wepointoutthelogicofsequencing financial reforms. Whileone expects the rapid acceleration of commercial internationalization of the CNY, and thegrowing useofCNYinthesphereofChinesecommercialandoutwardFDItransactions,there are no c lear-c utrea s onstorus h witht h efullCNYint e rnat i onali z a t ion.Cha nc es a rethat the gains from a rapid CNY financial internationalization are overrated,and ignoringthedownsidesofthisprocesswouldbe to Chinese (and probably global)peril.1The buoyant2000sChi na has been a prime example of export-le d growth, benefi t ing from l ea r ningby doing, and by adopting foreign know-how, supported by a complexindustrial policy.Thispolicyhas beencharacterizedbycontrolledopenness,and internal financial repression. The financial repression has taxed the saving interestrate,allowing prime borrowers, including the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE),el a stic ac c ess t o c h eap a nd sus t ai n able funding. FDI has be en w e lcome, subjec tt o China'srulesofthegame.TheserulesleveragedthecarrotofChinesemarketsizeandchea plabor,inducingtheforeigninvestortooperateinChinainjointventure partnership with Chinese producers (Holmes et al. 2013). The outcome has beenrapidlearning by doing and transfer of know-how and the rapid climb of China onthela dde rof i ndus t ria l sophistic a ti on,chal l eng i ngfor e ignproduc e rsint he Chine s eand third-country markets down theroad.1Arguably, a modem version of mercantilism has been at work (Aizenman and Lee 2007, 2008). The rapid growth and the growing trade and currentaccountsurpluses as a fraction of the GDP has occurred in tandem with massive hoardingofinternational reserves (IR) combined with massive sterilization of expendingtrade surplusesandfinancialinflows.Thesepoliciesaimedatdelayingandslowingthere al appreciation associated with successful rapid growth. While the resultant growthhas beenspectacular,itcomeswithhidden,butgrowing,costsanddistortions.Figure1,inthe top panel, provides diamond chart snapshots of Chinese generalized trilemma configuration: Financial integration (leftward from the diamond's center),Monetaryindependence (vertically upward from the diamond's center),Exchange rate stability(rightwardfromthediamond'scenter),andIR/GDP(verticallydownwardfromthe diamond's center). The first three scales are capturing Mundell's openeconomy trilemmaconfigurations,normalizedbetween0and1(Aizenman,Chinn,andIto2010).TheIR/GDP aim sa tcapturin g t heg row ing useofinte rna ti ona lr e se rve s t obuffer against financial instability. The chart exhibits the remarkable stability ofthe Chineseexchangerateduringthe1990sandthe2000s,bufferedbyrapidincreasesin IR/GDP, while maintaining controlled financial integration and monetary independence.Figure1alsoputsChineseexperiencein thecontext oftheaverage exp e rience of e mergin g As i a [ excl u din g Chi na] and emerging Latin A me r i cadu ri ngthe same decades (the middle and the lower panel, respectively). The charts validate thegreaterfocusofChineseexperienceonexchangerate stabilityandIR hoarding,while overall maintaining limited financial integration relative to otheremergingmarkets.In t he r un-up t o the fina nc ial cris i s, t h e world e c onomy was c hara c terizedby enormouscurrent-accountimbalances(Figure2).China's surplus alone was0.7%ofworldGDPin2008,whiletheUnitedStateshadadeficitofmorethan1%ofworld GDP that year. The current account balances of the world's surplus countries(e.g.,China, Germany, Japan, oil exporters) exceeded 2.5% of global GDP in2008,co-fundin g the curre nt accoun t ba lanc e s of t he world's de ficit co unt rie s, mostly t heUnited States, non-Asian emerging markets, and the Euro area excluding Germany.In the early 2000s, some suggested large imbalances could be sustained forthe foreseeable future. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2005) argued anAsian periphery, primarily China, could pursue a development strategy ofexport-ledgrowth supported by undervalued exchange rates and capital controls for rgecurrentaccountsurplusesandofficialcapitaloutflowsinthe form of accumulated reserve asset claims on the United States would characterize theAsian peripheryforperhapsadecadeormore.Moreover,thestrategywasa"win"forthecenter(e.g.,theUnitedStates)aswell,sincevirtuallyunlimiteddemandforits financialassetswouldallowitt orunlargecurrentaccountdeficits,livingbeyonditsmeans foryears.At some point, the Asian periphery would grow sufficiently to graduate to the center. It would then undertakefinancial liberalization and adopt greater exchange-rate flexibility. But when that happened, another set of developing countries w oul d st e p fo rw ard t o b ecome th e new p e riph e ry, pursuin g the s ame e x port-l e dgrowth strategy against the center as had China and the Asian periphery, andbefore them,post-warEuropeandJapan.Asaresult,globalimbalances,withtheperiphery running large current-account surpluses and the center large current-accountdeficits,wouldbearegularfeatureoftheinternationalmonetarysystemforyears to come.D ool eye t al.(2005)pro vi deda n asse t ma r ket i nte rp ret a tion of the w in-winvie w ofglobalimbalances:U.S.deficitssuppliedinternationalcollateraltopoorercountrie s ontheperipheryeagertoundertakecapitalformation;thecollateralfreedthemfroma reliance on inefficient domestic financialmarkets.2The modem mercantilist view, embraced by Aizenman and Lee (2007, 2008)andothe rs, provided a less s a ng ui ne i nt e r pret a tion for the persistent globa l im b alancesthat emergedinthe2000s.WhileAizenmanandLee(2007)confirmedthatthehoarding ofinternationalreservesthataccompaniedcurrent-accountsurpluseswasdominatedbya precautionary motive prior to 2001, a finding consistent with Aizenman andMarion's(2003) earlier interpretations, there appeared to be a regime changeafterward.A i z enm an and Lee (2008) poi nt ed to t he g rowingimport a nc e of mone t ar ymercantilismasthemainreasonfortheregimechange. Accordingly, following theAsiancrisisof1997-8,whichmitigatedChinese competitiveness in the late 1990s,and the Chinese accession to the WTO in early 2000s, China intensified itsdrivetoward export-led growth. Like earlier mercantilist efforts to expand exportmarketsand accumulate gold described by Adam Smith (1776), after the year 2000,countries suchasChinastartedpushingexportstopromotegrowth,rackingupcurrent-account surpluses and growing stockpiles of internationalreserves. The numberswere impressive. On the eve of the financial crisis, China's real GDP growth had reachedabout 14% (Fig. 3), its current-account surplus had grown to 10% of GDP, and its international reserves had reached almost 45% of GDP prior to the crisis, peakingatabout 50% in 2010 (Fig. 3). However, unlike Dooley's et al. (2003,2005)win-winviewofglobalimbalancesbufferedbyinternationalreservehoarding,Aizenmanand Lee (2008) noted that modemmercantilism could lead to unintendedadverse consequences,suchascompetitivehoarding.Thisconcernisinlinewiththefin dings ofCheungand Q i a n(2009)andA i z enm anetal.(2014)supporti ng re g i o nal r ivalryinhoardi ng internationalreserves.The view that large East-West global imbalances could be sustained for along period was not shared by everyone. Eichengreen (2007) and Feldstein (2008),for example,arguedtheAsianperipherywasnotmonolithic;somememberofthe periphe r y m ightabandonfix e dex c hang e ra t esag a instt he doll a rso one rt ha nla t er,either willingly or in response to speculative pressures, thereby reducingEast-West globalimbalances.ObstfeldandRogoff(2005) alsosawlargeimbalancesas unsustainable, and worried whether they would unwind gradually or abruptly.Alfaro,Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2011) observed that global imbalances wherepoorercountri e s fin a n c ed ric h e r ones we r e drive n ma inl y by government deci s i o ns a nd officialcapitalflows,sinceprivatefundstendedtomoveintheoppositedirection,attractedbyhig hergrowthratesinpoorercountries. Theyraisedconcerns aboutthe global efficiency and sustainability of thesetrends.Aizenman and Sun (2010) also raised doubts that large global imbalancescouldbe sustaina bl e. They argued that wit h C hi na growing a t tri pl e the r a t e of theUn i ted States,theU.S.current-accountdeficitsneededtoabsorbChina'ssurplusesincomingyears, intheabsenceofotherbigcountrieswillingtorunlargedeficits,wouldbe unrealistically high and hence self-limiting in the not-too-distantfuture.2The global financial crisis and China'sadjustmentThe global financial crisis of the late2000s put an abrupt end tothe happy-go-luckyattitudetoU.S.andChineseimbalances.Inthe U.S., the private sectorwasforcedtodeleverageandreduceditsdemandforimports.Othercrisis-hit developed countries also cut back on imports. As China experienced weaker exportdemand,ittookseriouslytheIMF's callformorerelianceon domestic spending to sustain growth. It began promoting greater domestic consumption andinvestmentwith thehelp of a domestic credit boom. It also pursued fiscal stimulus and alloweditsreal exchangeratetoappreciate(Fig.4).It attemptedtodiversify itsholdingsof dollar-denominated reserve assets by creating a sovereign wealth fund and encouraging outward foreign directinvestment.Sta nda rd macroeconomi c mode l s can acc ountfor th e reduc t ion i n globa l imbalances in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis. Financial frictionsand householdde-leveragingreduceimportdemandaswellasaggregatedemandin crisis-hit countries, reducing their current-account deficits. If weak demandimpacts manycountries,therearefewtotakeuptheslack.Countrieswithlarge current-account s urpl uses, such as China, faced co l lapsing d em a nd for theirexpor t sand experienced declining current-account surpluses. Policies that stimulatedomestic demandtomakeupfortheexportshortfallcanreducecurrent-accountsurpluseseven more. In Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Marion (2013), we explore panel regressions asaway to highlight important correlationsbetween currentaccountbalances andec on omic vari a bles, both before a nd a f ter the financial crisi s. T he r es ults indicatea structuralchangepost-crisis.ThedeclineinChina'sreservestockpile post-crisis isshownto bedrivenbyanewwaveofoutwardforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)into developed economies as China seeks higher-yielding real foreign assets.Thesedevelopments suggest that China'ssmaller current-account surpluses andmoremo de r a terese r veaccumul a ti o nmaybecomea l onge r-term no rmasl o w e r g l ob al growthforcesChinatorelymoreondomesticdemandtoexpanditsecono my,andasthehighcostofholdinginternationalreservespushesChinatoplaceevenmore emphasis on outwardFDI.We assembled panel data on current-account balances and othereconomicvariables for a group of developed and developing countries over theperiod1980-2012.TheestimationdrawsontheempiricalframeworkinChinnandPrasad(2003) and Gruber and Kamin (2007). The specification also includes the U.S.demandvariable(measuredbytheU.S.current-accountdeficitasapercentofGDP)usedinAizenmanandJinjarak(2009)tocapturethe notionthattheU.S.actedasa"demander of last resort" for the exports of China and othercountries, enabling themto run big current-account surpluses over part of the sampleperiod.The estimates confirm that a structural change has taken place post-crisis.After the onset of the financial crisis, the United States no longer plays such an important roleas"demanderoflastresort"fortheexportsofothercountries. Its private and publi c se c torshav eh adtounder g osubstantialadj us t m ents,making t hemle s sable t oabsorb the world's exports. The U.S. private sector has had to de-leverage in response tothenegativewealtheffectsofdecliningrealestateandportfoliovaluations.These privat e and public sector adjustments post-crisis have required the U.S. to retreatfrom its role as "demander of last resort" for the world'sexports.P ri or t o the fina nc ia l cri s i s, the c ur rent accounts of sur pl us c ou ntr ie s a r epositively and significantly associated with the increase in international reserves,trade,andthein-creaseintheU.S.current-accountdeficit.Afterthefinancialcrisis,thefirst two correlations are insignificant and the correlation with U.S. demand reverses sign;it is now negative and significant. The role of the U.S. as a "demander of last resort"isdiffer e nt after2006.The GFC vividly illustrated the limits of the export-led growth; the Chineseexport-ledgrowthpathhasbeenchallengedbyitsownsuccess. The spectacular growth of China in the 2000s was unprecedented for a large economy-theU.S./Chinamarket size in current U.S. dollars dropped from 8 in 2000, to about 2 in 2010 [ Fig.5].TheEconomistproj e ct e din2014t ha tby2022,Chin a'ssiz e in c urrentU.S.dolla rswoulde xceedthatoftheU.S.AsChinaapproachesthe U.S.size,itsabilitytokeepexport-led growth was diminished substantially by the lackluster growth of the U.S and the Eurozone, inducing lower growth of China, and promoting it to embarkoninternalrebalancing.3Internal rebalancing: Challenges andopportunitiesWhile China's growth has been spectacular, it comes with hidden, but growing,costs and distortions. The GFC and the need to rebalance the growth strategy, andthe greater recognition of the demographic transitions facing leading countries in generalandChinainparticular,puttotheforeChina'sgreater exposure to tail risks. We review in this section several manifestations of theserisks.Chinese financial repression has resulted in the taxing of privatesaving,transferringthemviathestatebankingsystemandother means to the SOE.Subsidizing the cost of SOE capital helped in facilitating fast Chinese growth inthe earlierdecadesofthetakeoff,yetitcomeswiththecostoftheSOE'soverinvestment bias,i nduc ing fa s t e rdi mi n ishingma r ginal produ ctivityo f theSOE,a ndre s ul t ingingrowing quasi-public contingentliabilities.The other side of financial repression has been the fragmentation offinancial intermediation,wheresmallprivatefirmsarenotservedadequatelybytheofficial ba nks,butbyshadowbanking.Thedrawbackisthatthesmall andmediumprivate secto r, which over t ime provides b r ig hte r future gr o wth pros pe cts t han th e SOE,fac es much higher real interest rates and greater rollover risks. The outcome hasbeen growingproductivitygapsinfavoroftheprivaterepressedfirms(Lardy(2008),Song et al.(2014)).AnothercostofChinesepoliciesmaybethecollateraldamageofmercantilism,th e rapi dr i s eof c os tlyhoardinginternat i onal r e s e r vesi n t i me s of ru nni ng l a rge currentaccountsurpluses,asreflectedinFig.3.AccordingtotheStateAdministrationofForei gnExchange(SAFE),China'sexternalfinancial assets at the end of 2013were about U.S. $6 trillion, of which international reserves were about 2/3 (U.S.$3.9trillion), the outbound direct investment (ODI) about 10%, securities investmentabout4%,a nd otherinv es t m ent a t a bout20%.T hecountry's e xt e rnalli a bility p ositio nwasU.S.$4trillion,outofwhichFDIinChinawas$2.35trillion,60%oftotalliability.Theinvestmentins ecuritiesandotheraspectstookup10%and30%,respectively.Therefore, China's net external financial assets in 2013 was about U.S. $2 trillion.3Yet, the real net return on these assets was, at best, close to zero, or evennegative.This reflects two fundamental factors. The first is the low real return onChinese internationalreserves(2/3ofitsgrossexternalassets),whichinturnreflectsboththe low nominal interest rate on internationalreserves and the real exchangerate appreciationofChina.ThesecondisthehighreturnontheinwardFDI,about60%ofC hineseexternalliabilities.ThelowreturnonChineseforeignassetsisbadnews,especially considering the rapid aging of China's population. This is in contrasttoJapan, where thesizable return on Japan's foreign asset position helps in buffering thefuture income of its rapidly grayingpopulation.The policy stance of China during and after the GFC may mitigate down theroad thehiddencostsofChinesefinancialrepression.First,China embarked on dive rs i f yingit shol dingsof dol la rI Rbyc h anne l ings ur plus e sintoas ove reignwea l thfund (SWF) and encouraging outward foreign direct investment in tangibleassets,offeringmuchhigherexpectedreturns.4TheoutcomehasbeengrowingFDIinthe r esource sectors and infrastructure services globally, especially inunderserviced developingcountriesandemergingmarketsinAfricaandLatinAmerica.Inaway,China joine d the trend o f other EMs, as de t ected in Aizenma n and Pasricha(2013),noting that EMs eased outflows of capital more in response to higher stockprice appreciation,higherappreciationpressuresin the exchange market, higher IR/GDP,and higher REERvolatility.The GFC and its aftermath also induced rapid Chinese internalbalancing,reduci n g t he sco pe of future hoarding. Sinc e the c risis, China's c urrent-a c c oun tsurplusfellfrom10%ofGDP(2007)to2.3%in2012,2%in2013.Thedropin2009alonewas thelargestrecordedinthelast30years.Thishashappenedintandemwith a drop in U.S deficits. The U.S. current-account deficit was about 6% of U.S. GDPin2006; it fell to 2.7% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2012. China's smallercurrent-accounts ur pluse s,amore m ode r a t eI R sta nc e,and a ll ow in gf asterrea la pp re ciation m ay becomea newnormal,aslowerglobalgrowthforcesChinatorelymoreondomesticdemand, while the high cost of holding IR and the secular rise in real wages in China pushes China to place even more emphasis on outward FDI (Aizenman,Jinjarak,Marion2013).These developments are in line with Feenstra and Hong (2010), whoraised questions about the efficacy and sustainability of export-led growth in China as the way to increase future employment. They calculated that export growth overthe periodoffastgrowthduring2000-2005couldexplaintheentireincreaseinChina'semploymentoverthatperiod,butcomparableemploymentgainscouldhavebeen achiev ed by growing domesticdemand.Channeling IR into foreign equity, SWF investment, and outward FDI supportedbytargetedloansandswaplinesmaybepartofChineserebalancing,aiming at securing a higher rate of return on its net foreign asset position. Arguably, it mayalso signaltheswitchfromexport-ledgrowthstrategytooutwardFDI(Ramasamyetal.2012) and e xport of infras t ructur e proje c ts a n d servi c es, possibly bu ndl ed w i t hexporting Chinese finance, Chinese labor services, and high-end capital goods.5This outward FDI drive has been part of a more comprehensive Chinese effect to promote the internationalization of the RMB (CNY), the focus of the nextsection.4The internationalization of theRMBOver t h e p as t fi ve y e ars, China h as stron g ly intensi f ied its eff or ts to internalizethe RMB. This agenda has been one of the main aspects of the country'seconomic policy,asexpressedinthe12thFive-YearPlan(2011-2015).Theplansupportsthe expansion of the cross-border use of RMB and the gradual realization ofcapitalaccount convertibility. The plan also supports the development of HK as amajoroffs hor e RMB market. T he internationaliz a ti on proc ess w a s put into e ffec t through severalchannels.Afterthefinancialcrisisin2008,Chinaembarkedonlargebilateral currency swap agreements with other countries, such as Argentina, Belarus, Iceland,New Zealand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and others (Table 1). This has beendonein tandem with the unprecedented provisions of swap lines among the OECDcount r ies, and t he more s elect i ve provi s ion of four s w ap l ine s by t he U.S. FEDt oselected emerging markets (Table1).Comparing the bilateral swap lines offered bythe U.S. FED and the PBOC reveals key differences. Most of the swap lines offered by China have beentodeveloping and emerging market countries, whereas most of the bilateral swaplinesoffered by the U.S. FED and the ECB are between the OECD countries, andfour emerging markets:Brazil, SouthKorea, Mexico, and Singapore. Aizenman and Pasticha(2010)pointedoutthattheselectioncriteriaexplainingtheU.S.FEDsupply ofbilat eralswaplinestoemergingmarketswereclosefinancialandtradeties,ahighdegree of financial openness, and a relatively good sovereign credit history. Chances arethatsimilarfactorsaccountforChinesesupplyofRMBbilateralswaplinestoagrow ing list of developing and emerging markets, as has been vividly illustratedbyGarcia-HerreroandXia(2013).6Thisstrategyblendsverywellwiththetrade internationalizationoftheR MBinthecontextofthebroaderout-wardFDIstrategy ofChina,andisinlinewiththechannelingofChinesenetforeignassetpositionint o out w ard FDI-cum-cr e dit s tr at eg y.Other pillars of the internationalization of the RMB include, since 2009, apilot program that allows RMB settlement of trade with foreign partners, limited initially to fivecities(Shanghai,Guangzhou,Shenzhen,Zhuhai,andDongghuan),andtothe tradeofChi neseresidentswithHongKong,Macao,andASEANcountries.This esta b lished the fi rst l egal framew ork fo r usingRMB to settl e c urr e ntaccounttransactions.Fromsixprovincesin2010,itwasexpandedto20provincesandci ties inmainlandChinaandgeographicallyextendedtotradewiththerestofthe world.Since October 2010, offshore entities were allowed to open nonresident RMBbanksettlement accounts (NRAs) with onshore banks and use these accounts (NRAs) forla w ful c ross-bo r der RMB bus i n ess (Formichella and Toti 2013).While it may be premature to provide a comprehensiveassessment oftheinternationalizationdrive,ithasalreadydeliveredarapid increase in trade/credit RMB internationalization, the use of RMB in trade and investment settlement, andintradecredit.TheCNYisusedinaboutone-thirdofChina'sexternaltradesettlement.A t the e n d of 2014, CNY S W I F T share w a s a bo ut 2.1% of g l obal v olume, withtheU.S.dollarat44%[followedbytheEuro with28%,thesterlingwith8%andtheJapanese yen with 2.7 per cent]. One expects the settlement share of the CNY will keep increasing rapidly, as there is ample room for further internationalization of theuse of the RMB in trade settlements.7 The rapid trade internationalization of theRMB,however, does not imply the desirability or the necessity of the RMBfinancial internationalization, a process that would require much deeper financial liberalization. We turn now to look more closely at what past experience may suggest aboutthe liberalization process.An ideal global currency supporting commercial and financial transactions may have the following virtues: liquid, safe, and convertible subject to lowtransactioncosts,supportedbyliquidanddeepglobalbondmarkets,andsuppliedin"sufficientquantity".Supplyingtheglobalcurrencyalsoentailstheprovisionofaglobalpublic good, granting the suppliers the benefit of the "exorbitant privilege." At timesof globalperil,thepublicgoodismanifestedbywillingnesstoprovideglobalinsurance ata"r ea son a blecost."(Gourinc ha sand Rey2005,2007;Jea n ne2012).Asof2015,the CNY hasnot yet met yet these conditions.The CNY remainsmostly non-convertible, lacking a vibrant and deep global bond market.Should China rush the CNY's financial internationalization process? There isno clear reason torush,astheeconomicgainsfromCNYinternationalization maybe overrated. Ch anc es are that Chin a's f inan c ial int e grati o n w i ll keep increasi ng overtime. A major force inducing the weakening of financial controls has beentrade misinvoicing, which has been commonly used for overcoming capital control, forcing overtimedeeperfinancialintegration.Yet,thisisnotareasontomovemuchfastertoward full convertibility without dealing with domestic sources of futurefinancialinsta bi lit y,i nduc ingunde rf undedliabilities,weakeni ng balance s heets ofe xpo sed banks,financialrepression,andthelike.Reducingthefinancial repression wouldreduce vulnerabilities associated with greater convertibility. Past experience suggests that financial internationalization before dealing with domestic financialdistortionsincreases the exposure to financial crises. Frequently, these crises reduce growths ha rpl y (see Korea 1997-8, Japan 1990s, Eurozone 2010s).The economic gains from upgrading the CNY into a global currencycompetingwiththeU.S.dollarandtheeuroarethere,butthesizeofthesegainsdoesnotmatc h the risk of moving too fast: estimates range from 1% GDP (Gourinchas and Rey2005)to a much lower fraction. The U.S. Treasury may borrows cheaply because ofdemandfrom official reserve managers, but these gains are broadly shared withAustralia,Canadaandthelikethroughtheportfoliobalanceeffect: lower U.S. yields spread across global bond markets (Genberg et al. 2005; Bauer and Neely 2014; Rogers etal.2014).Therearealsocosts,includingthelossofmonetaryautonomyand financialstability,associatedwithgreaterandmorevolatiledemandforCNYbonds.An internation al currency also makes a country more susceptible to externalmonetaryshocks.Intimesofperil,thesupplieroftheinternationalcurrencymaybeinducedtoprovideglobal insurance.Evenifothercountriesmerelyanchorto RMB,thislimits theabilityofChinatomanageitsexchangerate.Furthermore,thegainsfromcap ital mobilityand capitalaccountconvertibilityto the real economy are overrated.Ec ono mi ct heorydo e sn o tp r edictlar g eb e nefit s fro m ex t ernal f inanci n g;som e model spredict potential large costs. The empirical evidence fails to show consistentsizable effects (Gourinchas and Jeanne2006).Useful future steps that would increase over time the feasibility ofsmoother financialliberalizationincludereducingfinancialrepression,reformingthebanking s yste m,andre d ucingtheprefe r e nt ia l tre a tmentofSOE.Improvi n g t hefunding of thesmallandme diumsizeprivatefirmswouldhelp,aswellasallowingtheChinese corporatesectorcontrolledacc essto external borrowing, and greater outward FDI.The odds for a smoother transition are higher with gradual sequencing than withacold-turkey financial liberalization. Chances are that the calls in China for fasterCNYinternat i onal i z a ti on havea l s oa n i ntern a lpol i ti c aleconomy di me ns i on.8While mov ing fasterondomesticfinancialreformsremainsanessentialandnecessarysteptowardthe financialinternationalizationoftheCNY,movingtoofastcomeswithits own moral hazard costs, as has been vividly illustrated by past financialcrises(Hellmann et al. 2000, Frankel2012).5Loo ki ngforwardPrior to the global financial crisis, observers noted the possibility ofconvergingtoward a multi-polar global currencies structure. A possible tri-polar configuration would include the U.S. dollar, dominating the U.S. sphere of influence in theAmericas; the euro, dominating the EU sphere of influence; and theCNY-anchoredsystem, dominating eastern Asia. In principle, a multi-polar configuration isless stable than a unipolar stable configuration, yet it may be more stable than an unstable unipolar configuration; a multi-polar sys- tem may better fit the underlyingforces shaping the global redistribution of power. Para- doxically, the GFC vividly illustratedboththesusceptibilityoftheglobaleconomytoin-stabilitypropagatedfromtheU.S.,and the remaining dominance of the U.S. dollar as "a safe haven" at times ofglobalturbulence. While the wish of China to internalize the CNY is。
《2024年货币国际化影响因素的实证研究》范文
《货币国际化影响因素的实证研究》篇一一、引言随着经济全球化的深入发展，货币国际化成为了一个备受关注的话题。
货币国际化指的是一种货币在国内外被广泛接受并用作国际交易、支付和储备的过程。
本篇论文将探讨货币国际化的影响因素，以实证研究为基础，通过收集数据和分析，揭示影响货币国际化的关键因素。
二、文献综述过去的研究表明，货币国际化的影响因素主要包括经济实力、政治稳定性、货币政策、金融市场发展水平等。
经济实力是货币国际化的基础，一个国家的经济实力越强，其货币在国际市场上的接受度就越高。
政治稳定性对于货币国际化也具有重要影响，政治稳定的环境有利于提高投资者信心，促进货币国际化。
此外，货币政策和金融市场发展水平也是影响货币国际化的关键因素。
三、研究方法本研究采用实证研究方法，通过收集相关数据，运用统计分析软件进行分析。
具体数据来源包括国际货币基金组织、世界银行等国际组织的数据库以及相关国家的统计年鉴。
分析方法包括描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分析等。
四、实证结果1. 经济实力通过回归分析，我们发现一国经济实力与该国货币国际化程度呈正相关关系。
具体而言，国内生产总值（GDP）、人均GDP 等经济指标对货币国际化具有显著影响。
经济实力越强的国家，其货币在国际市场上的接受度越高。
2. 政治稳定性政治稳定性对货币国际化的影响也得到了实证研究的支持。
政治稳定的环境有利于提高投资者信心，降低风险，从而促进货币国际化。
通过对比不同国家的政治风险指数与货币国际化程度，我们发现政治风险较低的国家，其货币国际化程度相对较高。
3. 货币政策货币政策对货币国际化的影响主要体现在汇率和利率方面。
汇率稳定、利率适中的国家，其货币在国际市场上的接受度较高。
此外，货币政策透明度和可信度也是影响货币国际化的重要因素。
4. 金融市场发展水平金融市场发展水平对货币国际化的影响不可忽视。
一个发达的金融市场能够为国际交易和投资提供便利，降低交易成本，提高投资者信心。
人民币国际化的进程发展分析-人民币-金融-毕业论文
---文档均为word文档，下载后可直接编辑使用亦可打印---摘要2008年，人民币正式开启其国际化道路。
以后的十多年，它在许多领域进行了改革和创新，并且成果显著。
截至2013年5月，人民币在全球支付货币中排名第十三位，市场份额仅为百分之零点八。
截至2018年，人民币目前是全球第五大支付货币，占百分之一点六。
而在剔除边境贸易之后，排名会下降三个名次。
这与中国世界第二大经济体的身份是不符合的。
本文认为当前人民币国际化的路径存在一定的制度缺陷和障碍，在现有制度安排下，根据国内经济现状，我们将详细讨论人民币国际化面临的问题。
结论是，在人民币国际化进程中有效解决问题的必要性就是不能通过直接手段直接去干预刺激人民币国际化。
并通过借鉴国际发达国家货币国际化的经验，以为实现最终人民币国际化奠定基础结论。
关键词：人民币国际化金融市场国际货币An Analysis of the Development Process of RMB InternationalizationAbstractIn 2008, The yuan formally opened its international road. . Over the past decade or so, it has carried out reforms and innovations in many fields and achieved remarkable results. As of May 2013, the renminbi ranked 13th among the world's payment currencies, with a market share of only 0.8 percent. As of 2018, the renminbi is currently the fifth largest payment currency in the world, accounting for 1.6%. After excluding border trade, the ranking will fall by three places. This is inconsistent with China's status as the world's second-largest economy. This paper holds that there are some institutional defects and obstacles in the current path of RMB internationalization, and under the existing institutional arrangements, the root According to the current situation of domestic economy, we will discuss the problems of RMB internationalization in detail.The necessity of effectively solving the problem in the process of RMB internationalization is that it can not directly intervene to stimulate RMB internationalization by direct means. By drawing lessons from the experience of currency internationalization in international developed countries, this paper lays the foundation conclusion for the final internationalization of RMB.Keywords:RMB; internationalization; financial market;international currency.目录1 引言 (1)2 人民币国际化的发展进程分析 (2)2.1人民币国际化的进程 (2)2.1.1 人民币国际化的历程与现状 (2)2.1.2 人民币国际化的历程的特点 (3)2.2 人民币在国际化过程中遇到的问题 (4)2.2.1 人民币在国际化发展进程中遇到的国内问题 (4)2.2.2 人民币在国际化发展进程中遇到的国际问题 (5)2.3 针对人民币国际化发展进程中遇到的问题的对策 (7)2.3.1 借鉴其它国家货币国际化的经验 (7)2.3.2 解决人民币国际化发展进程中遇到的问题应采取的对策 (8)结论 (11)谢辞 (12)参考文献 (13)1 引言人民币国际化是指人民币走出国门并且能够在国外流通的过程，并成为世界上公认的世界货币。
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货币国际化条件文献综述作者：王琼来源：《时代经贸》2013年第22期【摘要】本文从货币国际化的基础条件，一国货币成为国际计价货币、国际交换媒介货币、国际价值储藏货币的条件等四个方面对一国货币成为国际货币的条件的相关文献进行了梳理。
以此为人民币成为国际货币提供经验借鉴。
并在此基础上提出在新形势下还应考虑政府政策推进与国家间金融合作在人民币国际化中的作用。
【关键词】货币国际化；国际计价货币；国际交易媒介货币；国际价值储藏货币引言美国次贷危机使得当前以美元和浮动汇率为代表的国际货币体系受到人们的拷问；欧债危机也挑战了欧元区整体的稳定性，使其在全球货币体系当中的角色受到挑战。
反观此次金融危机中，中国的金融体系保持着相对的稳健和安全，人民币国际化获得一个较好的时间窗口。
一国货币国际化是一个渐进的过程，需要具备各种主客观条件，本文拟对有关货币国际化条件的相关文献进行归纳总结，以期对人民币国际化的实施提供借鉴。
一、货币国际化的基础条件Andrew（1961）指出国家经济实力的强弱决定了货币国际竞争能力的高低和作为国际货币周期的长短。
Page（1977）提出，一国较大的贸易规模将有助于本国货币国际化的实现；Eichengreen，Frankel（1996）与 Hartmann（1998）的研究表明，一国的经济规模与一国货币国际化是正相关的关系。
Ewe-chee，Lim（2006）认为大规模经济体的货币容易形成规模经济效应，较大的外汇交易量可以有效降低交易成本，有利于该国货币国际化。
Rey（2001）一国与外国的贸易规模越大，那么该国的货币越有可能成为国际货币。
Philipp Hartmann和Otmar Issing（2002）认为经济规模、经济实力及对外开放度直接影响货币的国际使用。
Rasual Shams （2005）指出在全球贸易中占有最大份额的国家的货币更有可能承担国际货币的职能。
Philipp Hartmann和Otmar Issing（2002）也指出成熟的金融市场为一种货币发挥功能提供潜力保障和制度支持，发达的金融市场通过降低交易成本、增强流动性来刺激货币在更广阔的范围内使用。
Ewe-chee，Lim（2006）通过经验分析得出美国的国际货币地位正是以纽约的具有深度、高流动性和多样化的金融市场为支撑的。
Galati Gavriele、Wooldridge Philip（2006）运用均值---方差分析方法，对比研究了美元、欧元的竞争决定因素，认为美国在金融市场的发达状况是美元比欧元更胜一筹的重要原因。
Mundell（2002）提出一国货币能否成为国际货币主要取决于人们对该货币的信心。
综上所述，在一国货币实现国际化需要具备的基础条件主要有强大的政治经济实力和对外贸易规模、稳定的币值及发达的金融市场。
二、一国货币成为国际计价货币的条件国际计价货币或记账货币（invoice currency）是指在国际贸易中用于报价并标明贸易双方债权债务数量、发挥记账单位职能的货币。
在国际贸易中，商品计价通常采用以下三种货币计价方式：生产者货币计价（PCP）；当地货币计价（LCP）；工具货币计价（VCP）。
国外学者对于国际计价货币的选择进行了较早的研究。
从产品的差异性的角度来看，McKinnon（1969）认为贸易商品的差异性将影响计价货币的选择，对于高度异质的商品一般以出口国货币计价（PCP）；但在差异性较低的初级产品交易中，生产者多是价格的被动接受者，计价结算多使用单一的国际货币，McKinnon 认为人们出于以美元为中心的国际货币体系的认可，美元成为大部分商品交易的工具货币（VCP）。
Grassman（1976）的研究表明大多数发达国家之间的贸易和机械制品等差别化较大的货物的贸易，计价货币的选择倾向于出口国货币（PCP），而发达国家与发展中国家间的贸易则倾向于选择发达国家的货币作为计价货币。
Goldberg和Tile（2008）认为在产品替代程度高的产业中，为限制产品价格波动，竞争厂商间会有使用同一货币的倾向。
从一国货币价值的稳定性的角度来看，Magee和Rao（1980）认为国际贸易如果发生在较低通货膨胀率的发达国家和较高通货膨胀率的发展中国家之间，往往发达国家的货币充当计价货币，另外贸易双方也有可能选择第三国货币来计价（VCP）。
Tavlas（1997）认为具有较低的通货膨胀率和汇率波动率较小的货币将作为计价货币的首选。
Donnenfeld和Haug（2003）通过对加拿大的实证研究认为汇率风险与进口方货币计价（LCP）正相关，与其它两种方式计价方式负相关，但是Wilander（2006）对瑞典的研究则表明汇率的波动与进口方货币计价（LCP）负相关。
Johnson和Pick（1997）及Friberg（1998）在考虑出口企业利润函数的基础上认为不同国家汇率的波动会影响到出口国计价货币的选择。
从进出口企业对计价货币的选择来看，Bilson（1983）通过进出口方在价格和计价货币选择的讨价还价模型分析了贸易双方以出口商货币计价（PCP）的激励机制。
Otani（2003）的研究指出，垄断型出口企业有计价货币的选择权，当其利润函数是汇率的凸函数时，会选择本国货币定价（PCP），当利润函数是汇率的凹函数时，会选择进口国货币定价（LCP）。
Bacehetta、Philippe、Eric van Wincoop（2005）认为出口商在出口国的市场占有率即市场份额与其以本国货币计价（PCP）的比例成正相关关系。
Goldberg和Tile（2008）通过使用讨价还价的博弈模型进行分析，结果表明计价币种的选择取决于出口商与进口商的谈判力度。
还有学者从宏观角度来研究国际计价货币的选择，Giovannini（1988）系统的研究了宏观经济波动如何影响生产者利润最大化及计价货币的选择。
Goldberg和Tile（2008）则认为对于需求价格弹性较高的产品有使用单一货币计价的羊群效应存在。
并在考虑产业特征和宏观经济因素情况下，发现国际计价货币的选择有“从众”倾向：商品的替代性越强，价格变化导致的销售量变化就越大，“从众”选择计价货币的现象也越明显。
三、一国货币成为国际交换媒介货币的条件从交易成本的角度来看国际媒介货币的选择。
Swoboda（1969）认为交易成本低的货币将成为交易媒介，交易成本低的原因在于该货币在外汇市场上有较大的交易量和较高的流动性以及汇率波动较小。
Krugman（1980）在假定交易成本随交易规模递减的条件下得出了国际收支规模在全球占主导地位国家的货币将成为媒介货币的结论。
Rey（2001）通过引入三国一般均衡模型认为具有最大开放度和最低交换成本的货币将成为国际货币。
部分学者还从货币搜寻的角度来考查交换媒介货币的形成。
Chrystal（1984）认为在银行间外汇市场上，国际媒介货币将大大降低人们兑换货币的搜寻成本。
并进一步说明从外汇交易的初始状态出发，在交易商初始兑换中，需求量最大的货币会自然成为媒介货币。
Matsuyama，Kiyotaki和Matsui（1991）通过在均衡选择理论中运用进化博弈论方法，发现一国的经济规模越大，其货币越有可能成为媒介货币，两国经济一体化程度越高，其货币在市场越有可能共存，经济的开放度是决定中心媒介货币的关键变量。
还有学者从“历史惯性”的角度来考察媒介货币的选择和使用。
Swoboda（1969）和Tavlas （1991）的研究揭示：一种货币一旦在国际范围内成为交易媒介，则其受欢迎程度将是具有历史惯性。
Krugman（1980）指出处于媒介地位的货币受到惯性的支持，即便该国家的商业地位已经下降，它的货币仍会继续发挥作用。
Ogawa 和Sasaki（1998）使用1986 年至1993 年间季度数据对模型参数进行估计的研究发现：其他国际货币对美元的边际替代性是相当之低的，美元作为国际货币的地位享有很强的惯性。
在Eichengreen（1998）的研究发现，美国时滞变量回归系数为0.8，英国和日本为0.7，这也证明了历史惯性的作用。
Fukuda和Ono（2006）的研究也证实媒介货币的使用具有较强的历史惯性和趋同性，并强调了惯性对美元成为工具货币具有重要作用。
四、一国货币成为价值储藏手段的条件根据Hartmann（1998）的观点，作为价值储藏手段的国际货币的两种用途：货币替代和投资（私人用途）、国际储备（官方用途）。
Ogawa（2001）美元的交易媒介方面的强势地位加上美元惯性优势使得象日元这样的货币只有在价值贮藏功能方面才能与美元进行竞争。
Siegfried（2003）通过研究指出相关企业在发行债券时选择币种的考虑因素主要包括外汇波动风险、监管差别化、对冲操作和市场属性等因素。
Menzie Chinn 和Jeffre Frankel（2008）研究了各国央行国际储备的影响因素，其中显著的变量包括发行国的经济总量、通货膨胀率、汇率的波动方差大小和发行国的金融市场大小。
五、文献综述的启示从上述对货币国际化条件的研究的文献来看，对货币国际化的条件的研究已经取得了很多的成果，这为我们进行人民币国际化研究奠定的扎实的理论基础。
但是已有的研究都侧重于从经济角度来分析一国货币实现国际货币职能的条件，对国家政治、经济合作对一国货币成为国际货币的作用关注较少，而在探讨人民币国际化的过程中，政府的政策推动和金融合作是各国顺利推进货币国际化的重要因素。
因此，有必要在研究人民币实现货币国际化的经济条件外，研究政策推进与国家金融合作对货币国际化的影响，从而对人民币国际化问题进行更全面、深入的研究。
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