最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照
巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(首封)

概述导言1. 巴塞尔银行监管委员会(以下简称委员会)现公布巴塞尔新资本协议(BaselII,以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。
第三稿的公布是构建新资本充足率框架的一项重大步骤。
委员会的目标仍然是在今年第四季度完成新协议,并于2006年底在成员国开始实施。
2. 委员会认为,完善资本充足率框架有两方面的公共政策利好。
一是建立不仅包括最低资本而且还包括监管当局的监督检查和市场纪律的资本管理规定。
二是大幅度提高最低资本要求的风险敏感度。
3. 完善的资本充足率框架,旨在促进鼓励银行强化风险管理能力,不断提高风险评估水平。
委员会认为,实现这一目标的途径是,将资本规定与当今的现代化风险管理作法紧密地结合起来,在监管实践中并通过有关风险和资本的信息披露,确保对风险的重视。
4. 委员会修改资本协议的一项重要内容,就是加强与业内人士和非成员国监管人员之间的对话。
通过多次征求意见,委员会认为,包括多项选择方案的新框架不仅适用于十国集团国家,而且也适用于世界各国的银行和银行体系。
5. 委员会另一项同等重要的工作,就是研究参加新协议定量测算影响分析各行提出的反馈意见。
这方面研究工作的目的,就是掌握各国银行提供的有关新协议各项建议对各行资产将产生何种影响。
特别要指出,委员会注意到,来自40多个国家规模及复杂程度各异的350多家银行参加了近期开展的定量影响分析(以下称简QIS3)。
正如另一份文件所指出,QIS3的结果表明,调整后新框架规定的资本要求总体上与委员会的既定目标相一致。
6. 本文由两部分内容组成。
第一部分简单介绍新资本充足框架的内容及有关实施方面的问题。
在此主要的考虑是,加深读者对新协议银行各项选择方案的认识。
第二部分技术性较强,大体描述了在2002年10月公布的QIS3技术指导文件之后对新协议有关规定所做的修改。
第一部分新协议的主要内容7. 新协议由三大支柱组成:一是最低资本要求,二是监管当局对资本充足率的监督检查,三是信息披露。
巴塞尔新资本协议第三版(中文版)-232页

巴塞尔委员会Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision征求意见稿(第三稿)巴塞尔新资本协议The NewBasel Capital Accord 中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译目录概述 (10)导言 (10)第一部分新协议的主要内容 (11)第一支柱:最低资本要求 (11)信用风险标准法 (11)内部评级法(Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches) (12)公司、银行和主权的风险暴露 (13)零售风险暴露 (14)专业贷款(Specialised lending) (14)股权风险暴露(Equity exposures) (14)IRB法的实施问题 (15)证券化 (15)操作风险 (16)第二支柱和第三支柱:监管当局的监督检查和市场纪律 (17)监管当局的监督检查 (17)市场纪律 (18)新协议的实施 (18)朝新协议过渡 (18)有关前瞻性问题 (19)跨境实施问题 (20)今后的工作 (20)第二部分: 对QIS3技术指导文件的修改 (21)导言 21允许使用准备 (21)合格的循环零售风险暴露(qualifying revolving retail exposures,QRRE)..22住房抵押贷款 (22)专业贷款(specialised lending, SL) (22)高波动性商业房地产(high volatility commercial real estate ,HVCRE).23信用衍生工具 (23)证券化 (23)操作风险 (24)缩写词 (26)第一部分:适用范围 (28)A.导言 (28)B.银行、证券公司和其他附属金融企业 (28)C.对银行、证券公司和其他金融企业的大额少数股权投资 (29)D.保险公司 (29)E.对商业企业的大额投资 (30)F.根据本部分的规定对投资的扣减 (31)第二部分:第一支柱-最低资本要求 (33)I. 最低资本要求的计算 (33)II.信用风险-标准法(Standardised Approach) (33)A.标准法 — 一般规则 (33)1.单笔债权的处理 (34)(i)对主权国家的债权 (34)(ii)对非中央政府公共部门实体(public sector entities)的债权 (35)(iii)对多边开发银行的债权 (35)(iv) 对银行的债权 (36)(v)对证券公司的债权 (37)(vi)对公司的债权 (37)(vii)包括在监管定义的零售资产中的债权 (37)(viii) 对居民房产抵押的债权 (38)(ix)对商业房地产抵押的债权 (38)(x)逾期贷款 (39)(xi)高风险的债权 (39)(xii)其他资产 (40)(xiii) 资产负债表外项目 (40)2.外部评级 (40)(i)认定程序 (40)(ii)资格标准 (40)3.实施中需考虑的问题 (41)(i)对应程序(mapping process) (41)(ii)多方评级结果的处理 (42)(iii)发行人评级和债项评级(issuer versus issues assessment) (42)(iv)本币和外币的评级 (42)(v)短期和长期评级 (43)(vi)评级的适用范围 (43)(vii)被动评级(unsolicited ratings) (43)B. 标准法—信用风险缓释(Credit risk mitigation) (44)1.主要问题 (44)(i)综述 (44)(ii) 一般性论述 (44)(iii)法律确定性 (45)2.信用风险缓释技术的综述 (45)(i)抵押交易 (45)(ii) 表内净扣(On-balance sheet netting) (47)(iii)担保和信用衍生工具 (47)(iv) 期限错配 (47)(v) 其他问题 (48)3.抵押品 (48)(i)合格的金融抵押品 (48)(ii) 综合方法 (49)(iii)简单方法 (56)(iv) 抵押的场外衍生工具交易 (57)4.表内净扣 (57)5.担保和信用衍生工具 (58)(i)操作要求 (58)(ii)合格的担保人/信用保护提供者的范围 (60)(iii)风险权重 (60)(iv)币种错配 (60)(v)主权担保 (61)6.期限错配 (61)7.与信用风险缓释相关的其他问题的处理 (62)(i)对信用风险缓释技术池(pools of CRM techniques)的处理 (62)(ii) 第一违约的信用衍生工具 (62)(iii)第二违约的信用衍生工具 (62)III. 信用风险——IRB法 (62)A.概述 (62)B.IRB法的具体要求 (63)1.风险暴露类别 (63)(i) 公司暴露的定义 (63)(ii) 主权暴露的定义 (65)(iii) 银行暴露的定义 (65)(iv) 零售暴露的定义 (65)(v)合格的循环零售暴露的定义 (66)(vi) 股权暴露的定义 (67)(vii)合格的购入应收账款的定义 (68)2.初级法和高级法 (69)(i)公司、主权和银行暴露 (69)(ii) 零售暴露 (70)(iii) 股权暴露 (70)(iv) 合格的购入应收账款 (70)3. 在不同资产类别中采用IRB法 (70)4.过渡期安排 (71)(i)采用高级法的银行平行计算资本充足率 (71)(ii) 公司、主权、银行和零售暴露 (72)(iii) 股权暴露 (72)C.公司、主权、及银行暴露的规定 (73)1.公司、主权和银行暴露的风险加权资产 (73)(i)风险加权资产的推导公式 (73)(ii) 中小企业的规模调整 (73)(iii) 专业贷款的风险权重 (74)2.风险要素 (75)(i)违约概率 (75)(iii)违约风险暴露 (79)(iv) 有效期限 (80)D.零售暴露规定 (82)1.零售暴露的风险加权资产 (82)(i) 住房抵押贷款 (82)(ii) 合格的循环零售贷款 (82)(iii) 其他零售暴露 (83)2.风险要素 (83)(i)违约概率和违约损失率 (83)(ii) 担保和信贷衍生产品的认定 (83)(iii) 违约风险暴露 (83)E.股权暴露的规则 (84)1.股权暴露的风险加权资产 (84)(i)市场法 (84)(ii) 违约概率/违约损失率方法 (85)(iii) 不采用市场法和违约概率/违约损失率法的情况 (86)2. 风险要素 (87)F. 购入应收账款的规则 (87)1.违约风险的风险加权资产 (87)(i)购入的零售应收账款 (87)(ii) 购入的公司应收账款 (87)2.稀释风险的风险加权资产 (89)(i)购入折扣的处理 (89)(ii) 担保的认定 (89)G. 准备的认定 (89)H.IRB法的最低要求 (90)1.最低要求的内容 (91)2.遵照最低要求 (91)3.评级体系设计 (91)(i)评级维度 (92)(ii) 评级结构 (93)(iv) 评估的时间 (94)(v)模型的使用 (95)(vi) 评级体系设计的记录 (95)4.风险评级体系运作 (96)(i) 评级的涵盖范围 (96)(ii) 评级过程的完整性 (96)(iii) 推翻评级的情况(Overrides) (97)(iv) 数据维护 (97)(v)评估资本充足率的压力测试 (98)5. 公司治理和监督 (98)(i)公司治理(Corporate governance) (98)(ii) 信用风险控制 (99)(iii) 内审和外审 (99)6. 内部评级的使用 (99)7.风险量化 (100)(i)估值的全面要求 (100)(ii) 违约的定义 (101)(iii) 重新确定帐龄(Re-ageing) (102)(iv) 对透支的处理 (102)(v) 所有资产类别损失的的定义 (102)(vi) 估计违约概率的要求 (102)(vii) 自行估计违约损失率的要求 (104)(viii) 自己估计违约风险暴露的要求 (104)(ix) 评估担保和信贷衍生产品成熟性效应的最低要求 (106)(x)估计合格的购入应收账款违约概率和违约损失率的要求 (107)8. 内部评估的验证 (109)9. 监管当局确定的违约损失率和违约风险暴露 (110)(i)商用房地产和居民住房作为抵押品资格的定义 (110)(ii) 合格的商用房地产/居民住房的操作要求 (110)(iii) 认定金融应收账款的要求 (111)10.认定租赁的要求 (113)11.股权暴露资本要求的计算 (114)(i)内部模型法下的市场法 (114)(ii) 资本要求和风险量化 (114)(iv) 验证和形成文件 (116)12.披露要求 (118)IV.信用风险--- 资产证券化框架 (119)A.资产证券化框架下所涉及交易的范围和定义 (119)B. 定义 (120)1. 银行所承担的不同角色 (120)(i)银行作为投资行 (120)(ii) 银行作为发起行 (120)2. 通用词汇 (120)(i) 清收式赎回(clean-up call) (120)(ii) 信用提升(credit enhancement) (120)(iii) 提前摊还(early amortisation) (120)(iv) 超额利差(excess spread) (121)(v)隐性支持(implicit support) (121)(vi) 特别目的机构(Special purpose entity (SPE)) (121)C. 确认风险转移的操作要求 (121)1.传统型资产证券化的操作要求 (121)2.对合成型资产证券化的操作要求 (122)3.清收式赎回的操作要求和处理 (123)D. 对资产证券化风险暴露的处理 (123)1.最低资本要求 (123)(i)扣减 (123)(ii) 隐性支持 (123)2. 使用外部信用评估的操作要求 (124)3. 资产证券化风险暴露的标准化方法 (124)(i) 范围 (124)(ii) 风险权重 (125)(iii) 对于未评级资产证券化风险暴露一般处理方法的例外情况 (125)(iv) 表外风险资产的信用转换系数 (126)(v)信用风险缓释的确认 (127)(vi) 提前摊还规定的资本要求 (128)(viii)对于非控制型具有提前摊还特征的风险暴露的信用风险转换系数的确定 (130)4.资产证券化的内部评级法 (131)(i)范围 (131)(ii) KIRB定义 (131)(iii) 各种不同的方法 (132)(iv) 所需资本最高限 (133)(v) 以评级为基础的方法 (133)(vi) 监管公式 (135)(vii)流动性便利 (137)(viii) 合格服务人现金透支便利 (138)(ix) 信用风险缓释的确认 (138)(x) 提前摊还的资本要求 (138)V. 操作风险 (139)A. 操作风险的定义 (139)B. 计量方法 (139)1.基本指标法 (139)2.标准法 (140)3.高级计量法(Advanced Measurement Approaches ,AMA) (141)C.资格标准 (142)1.一般标准 (142)2.标准法 (142)3. 高级计量法 (143)D.局部使用 (147)VI.交易账户 (148)A.交易账户的定义 (148)B.审慎评估标准 (149)1.评估系统和控制手段 (149)2.评估方法 (149)3.计值调整(储备) (150)C.交易账户对手信用风险的处理 (151)D.标准法对交易账户特定风险资本要求的处理 (152)1.政府债券的特定风险资本要求 (152)2.对未评级债券特定风险的处理原则 (152)3. 采用信用衍生工具套做保值头寸的专项资本要求 (152)4.信用衍生工具的附加系数 (153)第三部分:监督检查 (155)A.监督检查的重要性 (155)B.监督检查的四项主要原则 (155)C.监督检查的具体问题 (161)D:监管检查的其他问题 (167)第四部分:第三支柱——市场纪律 (169)A.总体考虑 (169)1.披露要求 (169)2.指导原则 (169)3.恰当的披露 (169)4. 与会计披露的相互关系 (169)5.重要性(Materiality) (170)6.频率 (170)B.披露要求 (171)1.总体披露原则 (171)2.适用范围 (171)3.资本 (173)4.风险暴露和评估 (175)(i)定性披露的总体要求 (175)(ii)信用风险 (175)(iii)市场风险 (183)(iv)操作风险 (184)(v)银行账户的利率风险 (184)附录1 创新工具在一级资本中的上线为15% (185)附录2 标准法-实施对应程序 (186)附录3 IRB法风险权重的实例 (190)附录4 监管当局对专业贷款设定的标准 (193)附录5 按照监管公式计算信用风险缓释的影响 (207)附录 6 (211)附录7 损失事件分类详表 (215)附录8 (220)概 述导言1.巴塞尔银行监管委员会(以下简称委员会)现公布巴塞尔新资本协议(Basel II, 以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。
巴塞尔协议三

The Basel III Capital Framework:a decisive breakthroughHervé HannounDeputy General Manager, Bank for International Settlements1BoJ-BIS High Level Seminar onFinancial Regulatory Reform: Implications for Asia and the PacificHong Kong SAR, 22 November 2010IntroductionTen days ago, the Basel III framework was endorsed by the G20 leaders in South Korea. Basel III is the centrepiece of the financial reform programme coordinated by the Financial Stability Board.2 This endorsement represents a critical step in the process to strengthen the capital rules by which banks are required to operate. When the international rule-making process is completed and Basel III has been implemented domestically, we will have considerably reduced the probability and severity of a crisis in the banking sector, and by extension enhanced global financial stability.The title of my intervention, “The Basel III Capital Framework: a decisive breakthrough”, sounds like a military metaphor, which may be surprising in the context of a speech on banking regulation. But indeed, the supervisory community had to fight a fierce battle to require more capital and less leverage in the financial system in the face of significant resistance from some quarters of the banking industry.I will highlight nine key breakthroughs in Basel III, from a focus on tangible equity capital to a reduced reliance on banks’ internal models and a greater focus on stress testing, that will increase the safety and soundness of banks individually and the banking system more broadly.1This speech was prepared together with Jason George and Eli Remolona, and benefited from comments by Robert McCauley, Frank Packer, Ilhyock Shim, Bruno Tissot, Stefan Walter and Haibin Zhu.2Basel III: towards a safer financial system, speech by Mr Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS, at the 3rd Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 15 September 2010Restricted3Thirty years of bank capital regulation11/2010G20 endorsement of Basel III06/2004Basel II issued 12/1996Market risk amendmentissued 07/1988Basel Iissued 01/2019Full implementation of Basel III12/1997 Market risk amendmentimplemented 12/1992Basel I fullyimplemented 12/2009Basel III consultative document issued 12/2006Basel II implemented 07/2009Revised securitisation & trading book rulesissued 12/2007Basel II advanced approaches implemented 01/2013Basel III implementation begins12/2011Trading book rules implementedTo understand the importance of the Basel III reforms and where we are headed in terms of capital regulation, I think it is instructive if we briefly look back to see where we have come from.Basel I, the first internationally agreed capital standard, was issued some 22 years ago in 1988. Although it only addressed credit risk, it reflected the thinking that we continue to subscribe to today, namely, that the amount of capital required to protect against losses in an asset should vary depending upon the riskiness of the asset. At the same time, it set 8% as the minimum level of capital to be held against the sum of all risk-weighted assets.Following Basel I, in 1996 market risk was added as an area for which capital was required. Then, in 2004, Basel II was issued, adding operational risk, as well as a supervisory review process and disclosure requirements. Basel II also updated and expanded upon the credit risk weighting scheme introduced in Basel I, not only to capture the risk in instruments and activities that had developed since 1988, but also to allow banks to use their internal risk rating systems and approaches to measure credit and operational risk for capital purposes. What could more broadly be referred to as Basel III began with the issuance of the revised securitisation and trading book rules in July 2009, and then the consultative document in December of that year. The trading book rules will be implemented at the end of next year and the new definition of capital and capital requirements in Basel III over a six-year period beginning in January 2013. This extended implementation period for Basel III is designed to give banks sufficient time to adjust through earnings retention and capital-raising efforts.Restricted5The Basel III reform of bank capital regulationCapital ratio =Capital Risk-weighted assets Enhancing risk coverage ●Securitisation products●Trading book●Counterparty credit riskNew capital ratios●Common equity●Tier 1●Total capital●Capital conservation buffer Raising the quality of capital ●Focus on common equity ●Stricter criteria for Tier 1●Harmonised deductions from capital Macroprudential overlay Mitigating procyclicality●Countercyclical bufferLeverage ratio Mitigating systemic risk(work in progress)●Systemic capitalsurcharge for SIFIs●Contingent capital●Bail-in debt●OTC derivativesIn my remarks today I will try to illustrate the fundamental change introduced by Basel III, that of marrying the microprudential and the macroprudential approaches to supervision. Basel III builds upon the firm-specific, risk based frameworks of Basel I and Basel II by introducing a system-wide approach. I will structure my remarks around these two approaches and, in so doing, will demonstrate how Basel III is BOTH a firm-specific, risk based framework and a system-wide, systemic risk-based framework.I. Basel III: a firm-specific, risk-based frameworkLet us look first at the microprudential, firm-specific approach, and consider in turn the three elements of the capital equation: the numerator of the new solvency ratios, ie capital, the denominator, ie risk-weighted assets, and finally the capital ratio itself.A. The numerator: a strict definition of capitalRegarding the numerator, the Basel III framework substantially raises the quality of capital. Basically, in the old definition of capital, a bank could report an apparently strong Tier 1 capital ratio while at the same time having a weak tangible common equity ratio. Prior to the crisis, the amount of tangible common equity of many banks, when measured against risk-weighted assets, was as low as 1 to 3%, net of regulatory deductions. That’s a risk-based leverage of between 33 to 1 and 100 to 1. Global banks further increased their leverage by infesting the Tier 1 part of their capital structure with hybrid “innovative” instruments with debt-like features.In the old definition, capital comprised various elements with a complex set of minimums and maximums for each element. We had Tier 1 capital, innovative Tier 1, upper and lower Tier 2, Tier 3 capital, each with their own limits which were sometimes a function of other capital elements. The complexity in the definition of capital made it difficult to determine what capital would be available should losses arise. This combination of weaknesses permitted tangible common equity capital, the best form of capital, to be as low as 1% of risk-weighted assets.In addition to complicated rules around what qualifies as capital, there was a lack of harmonisation of the various deductions and filters that are applied to the regulatory capital calculation. And finally there was a complete lack of transparency and disclosure on banks’ structure of capital, making it impossible to compare the capital adequacy of global banks.As we learned again during the crisis, credit losses and writedowns come directly out of retained earnings and therefore common equity. It is thus critical that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high-quality capital base. This is why the new definition of capital properly focuses on common equity capital.The concept of Tier 1 that we are familiar with will continue to exist and will include common equity and other instruments that have a loss-absorbing capacity on a “going concern” basis,3 for example certain preference shares. Innovative capital instruments which were permitted in limited amount as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be permitted and those currently in existence will be phased out.Tier 2 capital will continue to provide loss absorption on a “gone concern” basis1 and will typically consist of subordinated debt. Tier 3 capital, which was used to cover a portion of a bank’s market risk capital charge, will be eliminated and deductions from capital will be harmonised. With respect to transparency, banks will be required to provide full disclosure and reconciliation of all capital elements.The overarching point with respect to the numerator of the capital equation is the focus on tangible common equity, the highest-quality component of a bank’s capital base, and therefore, the component with the greatest loss-absorbing capacity. This is the first breakthrough in Basel III.B. The denominator: enhanced risk coverageRegarding the denominator, Basel III substantially improves the coverage of the risks, especially those related to capital market activities: trading book, securitisation products, counterparty credit risk on OTC derivatives and repos.In the period leading up to the crisis, when banks were focusing their business activities on these areas, we saw a significant increase in total assets. Yet under the Basel II rules, risk-weighted assets showed only a modest increase. This point is made clear in the following chart showing the increase in both total assets and risk-weighted assets for the 50 largest banks in the world from 2004 to 2010. This phenomenon was more pronounced for some countries and regions than for others.3Tier 1 capital is loss-absorbing on a “going concern” basis (ie the financial institution is solvent). Tier 2 capital absorbs losses on a “gone concern” basis (ie following insolvency and upon liquidation).Restricted9I. Firm specific framework (microprudential)B. The denominator: enhanced risk coverage1. From 2004 to 2009, total assets at the top 50 banks have increased at a more rapid pace than risk weighted assets2. The need to monitor the relationship between risk weighted assets and total assets which varies greatly across countriesand underscores the importance of consistent implementation of theglobal regulatory standards across jurisdictionsFor global banks the enhanced risk coverage under Basel III is expected to cause risk-weighted assets to increase substantially. This, combined with a tougher definition and level of capital, may tempt banks to understate their risk-weighted assets. This points to the need in future to monitor closely the relationship between risk-weighted assets and total assets with a view to promoting a consistent implementation of the global capital standards across jurisdictions.Risk weighting challengesLet me now focus for a moment on the challenges of getting the risk weights right in a risk-based framework.Many asset classes may appear to be low-risk when seen from a firm-specific perspective. But we have seen that the system-wide build-up of seemingly low-risk exposures can pose substantial threats to broader financial stability. Before the recent crisis, the list of apparently low-risk assets included highly rated sovereigns, tranches of AAA structured products, collateralised repos and derivative exposures, to name just a few. The leverage ratio will help ensure that we do not lose sight of the fact that there are system-wide risks that need to be underpinned by capital.The basic approach of the Basel capital standards has always been to attach higher risk weights to riskier assets. The risk weights themselves and the methodology were significantly enhanced as we moved from Basel I to Basel II, and they have now been further refined under Basel III. Nonetheless, as the crisis has made clear, what is not so risky in normal times may suddenly become very risky during a systemic crisis. Something that looks risk-free may turn out to have rather large tail risk.Focusing a bit more on exposures with low risk weights, let me cite a few examples to illustrate the difficulty of getting the risk weights correct.Sovereigns: the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 has shown that the zero risk weightassumption for AAA and AA-rated sovereigns under the standardised approach of Basel II did not account for the dramatic deterioration in the fiscal and debt positionsof major advanced economies. These exposures are still considered as low-risk but certainly not totally risk-free.∙ OTC derivatives (under CSAs) and repos: the Lehman and Bear Stearns failuresdemonstrated that the very low capital charge on OTC derivatives and repos did not capture the systemic risk associated with the interconnectedness and potential cascade effects in these markets.∙ Senior tranches of securitisation exposures: financial engineering produced AAA-rated tranches of complex products, such as the super-senior tranches of ABS CDOs. These proved much more risky than what would be expected from a AAA exposure. The preferential risk weight of 7% for those super-senior tranches was too low, and the risk weight has now been raised to 20%.For assets with medium risk weights, one could cite the following examples: ∙ Residential mortgages: 35% risk weight under the standardised approach. For highest-quality mortgages: 4.15% risk weight (IRB approach)∙ Highly rated corporates: 20% risk weight under the standardised approach. For best-quality corporates: 14.4% risk weight (IRB approach)∙ Highly rated banks: 20% risk weight (standardised approach)For assets with high risk weights, the following examples can be considered:∙ HVCRE (high volatility commercial real estate)∙ Mezzanine tranches of ABS/CDOs∙ Hedge fund equity stakes: 400% risk weight ∙ Claims on unrated corporates: 100% risk weight Restricted3I. Firm specific framework (microprudential)●●B. The denominator: risk weighting challengesWeak correlation between risk-weights and crisis-related losses Low risk-weights may have contributed to the build-up of system wide risksThe chart above shows how different asset classes fared during the crisis. Relative to their Basel II risk weights, equity stakes in hedge funds, claims on corporates and some retailexposures experienced modest losses during the crisis. By contrast, mortgages, highly rated banks, AAA-rated CDO tranches and sovereigns inflicted rather heavy losses on banks. These cases show that there is a rather weak correlation between risk weights and crisis-related losses during periods of system-wide stress. Moreover, we have also discovered that low risk weights can lead to an excessive build-up of system-wide risks. Recognising this problem, the Basel Committee has now introduced a backstop simple leverage ratio, which will require a minimum ratio of capital to total assets without any risk weights. I will come back to this later.The trading book and securitisationsTwo areas the crisis has revealed as needing enhanced risk coverage are the trading book and securitisations. Here capital charges fell short of risk exposures. Basel II focused primarily on the banking book, where traditional assets such as loans are held. But the major losses during the 2007–09 financial crisis came from the trading book, especially the complex securitisation exposures such as collateralised debt obligations. As shown in the table below, the capital requirements for trading assets were extremely low, even relative to banks’ own economic capital estimates. The Basel Committee has addressed this anomaly.Restricted15Trading assetsand marketriskcapitalrequirements¹The revised framework now requires the following:∙Introduction of a 12-month stressed VaR capital charge; ∙Incremental risk capital charge applied to the measurement of specific risk in credit sensitive positions when using VaR; ∙Similar treatment for trading and banking book securitisations; ∙Higher risk weights for resecuritisations (20% instead of 7% for AAA-rated tranches); ∙ Higher credit conversion factors for short-term liquidity facilities to off-balance sheetconduits and SIVs (the shadow banking system); andMore rigorous own credit analyses of externally rated securitisation exposures with less reliance on external ratings.As a result of this enhanced risk coverage, banks will now hold capital for trading book assets that, on average, is about four times greater than that required by the old capital requirements. The Basel Committee is also conducting a fundamental review of the market risk framework rules, including the rationale for the distinction between banking book and trading book. This is the second Basel III breakthrough: eradicate the trading book loophole, ie eliminate the possibility of regulatory arbitrage between the banking and trading books.Counterparty credit risk on derivatives and reposThe Basel Committee is also strengthening the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk on OTC derivatives and repos by requiring that these exposures be measured using stressed inputs. Banks also must hold capital for mark to market losses (credit valuation adjustments – CVA) associated with the deterioration of a counterparty’s credit quality. The Basel II framework addressed counterparty credit risk only in terms of defaults and credit migrations. But during the crisis, mark to market losses due to CVA (which actually represented two thirds of the losses from counterparty credit risk, only one third being due to actual defaults) were not directly capitalised.C. Capital ratios: calibration of the new requirementsWith a capital base whose quality has been enhanced, and an expanded coverage of risks both on- and off-balance sheet, the Basel Committee has made great strides in strengthening capital standards. But in addition to the quality of capital and risk coverage, it also calibrated the capital ratio such that it will now be able to absorb losses not only in normal times, but also during times of economic stress.To this end, banks will now be required to hold a minimum of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets in tangible common equity versus 2% under Basel II. In addition, the Basel Committee is requiring a capital conservation buffer – which I will discuss in just a moment – of 2.5%. Taken together, this means that banks will need to maintain a 7% common equity ratio. When one considers the tighter definition of capital and enhanced risk coverage, this translates into roughly a sevenfold increase in the common equity requirement for internationally active banks. This represents the third breakthrough.Restricted18I. Firm-specific framework (microprudential)C. Capital ratio: the new requirementsIncreases under Basel III are even greater when one considersthe stricter definition of capital and enhanced risk-weighting10.588.567.02.54.5Basel IIINewdefinition andcalibration Equivalent to around 2% for an average international bank underthe new definition Equivalent to around 1% for an averageinternational bank under the new definition Memo:842Basel II RequiredMinimum Required Minimum Required Conservationbuffer Minimum Total capital Tier 1 capital Common equityCapital requirementsAs a percentageof risk-weightedassets Third breakthrough: an average sevenfold increase in the common equityrequirements for global banksThis higher level of capital is calibrated to absorb the types of losses associated with crises like the previous one.The private sector has complained that these new requirements will cause them to curtail lending or increase the cost of borrowing. In an effort to address some of the industry’s concerns, the Basel Committee has agreed upon extended transitional arrangements that will allow the banking sector to meet the higher capital standards through earnings retention and capital-raising.The new standards will take effect on 1 January 2013 and for the most part will become fully effective by January 2019.D. Capital conservationA fourth key breakthrough of Basel III is that banks will no longer be able to pursue distribution policies that are inconsistent with sound capital conservation principles. We have learned from the crisis that it is prudent for banks to build capital buffers during times of economic growth. Then, as the economy begins to contract, banks may be forced to use these buffers to absorb losses. But to offset the contraction of the buffer, banks could have the ability to restrict discretionary payments such as dividends and bonuses to shareholders, employees and other capital providers. Of course they could also raise additional capital in the market.In fact, what we witnessed during the crisis was a practice by banks to continue making these payments even as their financial condition and capital levels deteriorated. This practice, in effect, puts the interest of the recipients of these payments above those of depositors, and this is simply not acceptable.To address the need to maintain a buffer to absorb losses and restrict the ability of banks to make inappropriate distributions as their capital strength declines, the Basel Committee will now require banks to maintain a buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. This buffer must be held in tangible common equity capital.As a bank’s capital ratio declines and it uses the conservation buffer to absorb losses, the framework will require banks to retain an increasingly higher percentage of their earnings and will impose restrictions on distributable items such as dividends, share buybacks and discretionary bonuses. Supervisors now have the power to enforce capital conservation discipline. This is a fundamental change.II. Basel III: A system-wide, systemic risk-based frameworkOverviewReturning to the theme of my discussion, Basel III is not only a firm-specific risk-based framework, it is also a system-wide, systemic risk-based framework. The so-called macroprudential overlay is designed to address systemic risk and is an entirely new way of thinking about capital.This new dimension of the capital framework consists of five elements. The first is a leverage ratio, a simple measure of capital that supplements the risk-based ratio and which constrains the build-up of leverage in the system. The second is steps taken to mitigate procyclicality, including a countercyclical capital buffer and, although outside a strict discussion of capital, efforts to promote a provisioning framework based upon expected losses rather than incurred losses. The third element of the macroprudential overlay is steps to address the externalities generated by systemically important financial institutions through higher loss-absorbing capacity. The fourth is a framework to address the risk arising from systemically important markets and infrastructures. In particular, I am referring to the OTC derivatives markets. And finally, the macroprudential overlay aims to better capture systemic risk and tail events in the banks’ own risk management framework, including through risk modelling, stress testing and scenario analysis.ratioA. LeverageIn the lead up to the crisis many banks reported strong Tier 1 risk based ratios while, at the same time, still being able to build up high levels of on and off balance sheet leverage.In response to this, the Basel Committee has introduced a simple, non-risk-based leverage ratio to supplement the risk-based capital requirements. The leverage ratio has the added benefit of serving as a safeguard against model risk and any attempts to circumvent the risk-based capital requirements.The leverage ratio will be a measure of a bank’s Tier 1 capital as a percentage of its assets plus off balance sheet exposures and derivatives.For derivatives, regulatory net exposure will be used plus an add-on for potential future exposure. Netting of all derivatives will be permitted. In so doing, the Basel Committee has successfully solved the difficulty resulting from the divergence between the main accounting frameworks. (Bank leverage is significantly lower under US GAAP than under IFRS due to the netting of OTC derivatives allowed under the former. Given that banks may hold offsetting contracts, US GAAP allows banks to report their net exposures while IFRS does not allow netting. As a result, the size of a bank‘s total assets can vary significantly based on the treatment of this one accounting item.)The leverage ratio will also include off-balance sheet items in the measure of total assets. These off-balance sheet items, including commitments, letters of credit and the like, unless they are unconditionally cancellable, will be converted using a flat 100% credit conversion factor.To highlight the importance of the leverage ratio we need look no further than the increase in total assets in the years leading up to the crisis versus the increase in risk-weighted assets. It is obvious that balance sheets were being leveraged, but the risk-based framework failed tocapture this dynamic, as suggested by the following chart depicting risk-weighted and totalassets for the top 50 banks.Restricted5II. System-wide approach (macroprudential)A. Leverage ratiothe importance of the banking sector building up additional capital defences in periods where the risks of system-wide stress are growing markedly.While some in the financial community are sceptical about the usefulness of a leverage ratio, the Basel Committee’s Top-down Capital Calibration Group recently completed a study that showed that the leverage ratio did the best job of differentiating between banks that ultimately required official sector support in the recent crisis and those that did not.This leads me to the fifth breakthrough: Basel III is a framework that remains risk-based but now includes – through the Tier 1 leverage ratio – a backstop approach that also captures risks arising from total assets. The risk-based and leverage ratios reinforce each other.For all of these reasons, public policymakers and legislators must resist the intense lobbying effort of the industry to water down the leverage ratio to merely a Pillar 2 instrument. Giving in to this lobbying would increase the exposure of taxpayers to future bank failures and hurt long-term growth over a full credit cycle since sustainable credit growth cannot be achieved through excessive leverage.B. Countercyclical capital bufferWe have learned that procyclicality, which is inherent in banking, has exacerbated the impact of the crisis. While we will not eliminate cyclicality, what we would like to do is prevent its amplification through the banking sector, particularly that caused by excessive credit growth. This can be achieved through the new countercyclical capital buffer.As the volume of loans grows, if asset price bubbles burst or the economy subsequently enters a downturn and loan quality begins to deteriorate, banks will adopt a very conservative stance when it comes to the granting of new credit. This lack of credit availability only serves to exacerbate the problem, pushing the real economy deeper into trouble with asset prices declining further and the level of non-performing loans increasing further. This in turn causes bank lending to become scarcer still. These interactions highlights of stress, but it helps to ensure that by leading to the build-up of ed in each of the jurisdictions in which the bank has credit exposures.th breakthrough in Basel III.As you know, there is considerable work being done by the Financial Stability Board on how tions, ework for identifying SIFIs and a study of the magnitude of se to the global financial ically infrastructures. This is clearly illustrated ring and trade reporting on OTC derivatives. Derivative counterparty credit exposures to central counterparty clearing The countercyclical capital buffer not only protects the banking sector from losses resulting from periods of excess credit growth followed by period credit remains available during this period of stress. Importantly, during the build-up phase, as credit is being granted at a rapid pace, the countercyclical capital buffer may cause the cost of credit to increase, acting as a brake on bank lending.Each jurisdiction will monitor credit growth in relation to measures such as GDP and, using judgment, assess whether such growth is excessive, there system-wide risk. Based on this assessment they may put in place a countercyclical buffer requirement ranging from 0 to 2.5%. This requirement will be released when system-wide risk dissipates.For banks that are operating in multiple jurisdictions, the buffer will be a weighted average of the buffers appli To give banks time to adjust to a buffer level, jurisdictions will preannounce their countercyclical buffer decisions by 12 months.The introduction of a countercyclical capital charge to mitigate the procyclicality caused by excessive credit growth is the six C. Systemically important financial institutions: additional loss-absorbing capacityto design the best framework for the oversight of systemically important financial institu or SIFIs.4 It is broadly recognised that systemically important banks should have loss-absorbing capacity beyond the basic Basel III standards. This can be achieved by a combination of a systemic capital charge, contingent bonds that convert to equity at a certain trigger point and bail-in debt.Although the work on SIFIs is incomplete at this time, the Basel Committee has committed to complete by mid-2011 a fram additional loss absorbency that global systemically important banks should have. Also by mid-2011, the Basel Committee will complete its assessment of going-concern loss absorbency in some of the various contingent capital structures.What is clear, and this is the seventh breakthrough, is that SIFIs need higher loss-absorbing capacity to reflect the greater risks that they po system. A systemic capital surcharge is the most straightforward, but not the only way to achieve this.D. Systemically important markets and infrastructures (SIMIs): the case of OTCderivativesJust as there are systemically important financial institutions, there are also system important markets and systemically important market by the case of OTC derivatives. In particular, the Lehman failure demonstrated that the very low capital charge on OTC derivatives did not capture the systemic risk associated with the interconnectedness and potential cascade effects in these markets.To address the problem of interconnectedness as it relates to derivatives, the Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board have endorsed central clea4 Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions , FSB Recommendations and Time Lines, 20 October 2010.。
巴塞尔协议3全文

巴塞尔协议3全文协议概述巴塞尔协议3全文》是一项针对全球银行业的监管框架协议。
该协议旨在提高银行业的资本充足性、风险管理和监管合规性,以确保金融体系的稳定性和可持续性。
协议的目的是通过制定一系列规则和标准,为银行业提供更加合理的风险管理和资本充足性要求。
它的实施将帮助银行更好地应对金融风险,并在面临未来金融危机的情况下保持稳定。
参与巴塞尔协议3的国家包括世界各地的重要经济体。
这些国家通过协议中设定的规定和指导方针来监管本国的金融机构,以确保其与全球标准的一致性。
巴塞尔协议3还提供了一种合作平台,使得各国金融监管机构能够共同努力,共享信息和经验,加强跨国合作。
除国家和金融机构外,巴塞尔协议3还涉及到许多相关方面,包括金融监管机构、国际金融组织和市场参与者等。
这些相关方面在协议的实施和监管过程中发挥着重要作用,共同维护金融体系的稳定和可持续发展。
巴塞尔协议3全文详细规定了资本充足性的计算方法、风险权重的确定、流动性风险管理、杠杆比率要求等内容。
它为银行业提供了明确的指导和规定,帮助银行更好地管理风险、提高资本充足性,并促进金融体系的稳定和健康发展。
请注意,本文档是《巴塞尔协议3全文》的概述,不涵盖具体内容的细节和实施细则。
如需了解详细信息,请参考原始文件或相关授权出版物。
巴塞尔协议3全文请注意,本文档是《巴塞尔协议3全文》的概述,不涵盖具体内容的细节和实施细则。
如需了解详细信息,请参考原始文件或相关授权出版物。
巴塞尔协议3全文协议内容协议内容本文详细描述《巴塞尔协议3全文》的具体内容,包括风险管理框架、资本要求、流动性要求、杠杆率要求等方面的规定。
请注意,本回答仅为简要描述《巴塞尔协议3全文》的主要内容,具体细节请参阅正式协议文本以获得准确信息。
本文讨论《巴塞尔协议3全文》的实施和应用,包括监管机构的角色、时间表、合规要求等方面的内容。
巴塞尔协议3的实施是为了确保银行业的稳定和健康。
监管机构在实施过程中扮演着重要的角色,他们负责监督银行的资本充足率以及监管流程的合规性。
巴塞尔新资本协议内容

巴塞尔新资本协议内容1. 引言巴塞尔新资本协议〔Basel III〕是国际银行监管委员会〔Basel Committee on Banking Supervision〕于2024年12月发布的一项重要的国际银行监管标准。
巴塞尔新资本协议旨在加强全球金融体系的稳定性,标准银行资本的充足性和质量要求,使银行更好地应对金融危机和经济衰退的风险。
2. 资本要求巴塞尔新资本协议对银行的资本要求进行了调整,以确保银行具备足够的资本来承当风险。
根据协议,银行应根据其风险暴露量和资产质量维持一定的资本充足率。
2.1 核心资本充足率〔Common Equity Tier 1〕核心资本充足率是核心资本与风险加权资产〔Risk-Weighted Assets〕之比。
核心资本包括普通股股本和公积金等,是银行最高质量的资本。
2.2 全部资本充足率〔Total Capital Ratio〕全部资本充足率是全部资本与风险加权资产之比。
全部资本包括核心资本和附属资本〔Additional Tier 1 Capital〕以及附属资本以上的资本。
2.3 杠杆比率〔Leverage Ratio〕杠杆比率是核心资本与非风险加权资产之比。
杠杆比率旨在防止银行通过高度杠杆化来获取不合理的利润,进一步增强银行的资本充足性。
3. 资产质量要求为了确保银行管理良好的贷款组合,巴塞尔新资本协议对银行的资产质量提出了相关要求。
3.1 不良资产〔Non-performing Assets〕巴塞尔新资本协议规定了银行对不良资产的计提和管理要求。
银行需要对其不良资产进行适当的准备金计提,并采取合理的措施加以管理和处置。
3.2 资本缺口覆盖比例〔Capital Shortfall Coverage Ratio〕资本缺口覆盖比例是银行核心资本与预计亏损的资本缺口之比。
银行应保持足够的核心资本来覆盖预计亏损的资本缺口。
4. 流动性要求巴塞尔新资本协议还对银行的流动性进行了相关要求,以确保银行能够在经济困难时期获得充足的资金。
common,equity,tier,1,巴塞尔协议iii

common,equity,tier,1,巴塞尔协议iii篇一:巴塞尔协议第三版核心中英文词汇梳理巴塞尔协议第三版核心词汇I. 巴三六大目标一、更严格的资本定义(Increased Quality of Capital): 1.一级资本金包括:(1) 核心一级资本,(也叫普通股一级资本,common equity tier 1 capital):只包括普通股(common equity)和留存收益(retained earning),巴三规定,少数股东权益(minority interest)、递延所得税(deferred tax)、对其他金融机构的投资(holdings in other financial institutions) 、商誉(goodwill)等不得计入核心一级资本。
(2) 其他一级资本:永久性优先股(non-cumulative preferred stock)等二、更高的资本充足要求(Increased Quantity of Capital)1.核心一级资本充足率(common equity tier 1 capital):最低4.5%。
2.一级资本充足率:6%3.资本留存缓冲(capital conservation buffer):最低2.5%,由普通股(扣除递延税项及其他项目)构成,用于危机期间(periods of stress)吸收损失,但是当该比率接近最低要求将影响奖金和红利发放(earning distributions)4.全部核心一级资本充足率(核心一级资本+资本留存缓冲):最低7%5.总资本充足率(minimum total capital):8%6.总资本充足率+资本留存缓冲最低要求:10.5%7.逆周期资本缓冲(counter-cyclical buffer)0—0.25%:在信贷增速过快(excessive credit growth),导致系统范围内风险积聚时生效。
巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版

概述导言1. 巴塞尔银行羁系委员会(以下简称委员会)现宣布巴塞尔新资本协议(Basel II, 以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。
第三稿的宣布是构建新资本富足率框架的一项重大步调。
委员会的目标仍然是在今年第四季度完成新协议,并于2006年底在成员国开始实施。
2. 委员会认为,完善资本富足率框架有两方面的大众政策利好。
一是创建不但包罗最低资本并且还包罗羁系政府的监视查抄和市场规律的资本治理划定。
二是大幅度提高最低资本要求的风险敏感度。
3. 完善的资本富足率框架,旨在促进勉励银行强化风险治理能力,不停提高风险评估水平。
委员会认为,实现这一目标的途径是,将资本划定与当今的现代化风险治理作法紧密地结合起来,在羁系实践中并通过有关风险和资本的信息披露,确保对风险的重视。
4. 委员会修改资本协议的一项重要内容,就是增强与业内人士和非成员国羁系人员之间的对话。
通过多次征求意见,委员会认为,包罗多项选择方案的新框架不但适用于十国团体国度,并且也适用于世界各国的银行和银行体系。
5. 委员会另一项同等重要的事情,就是研究到场新协议定量测算影响阐发各行提出的反馈意见。
这方面研究事情的目的,就是掌握各国银行提供的有关新协议各项发起对各行资产将产生何种影响。
特别要指出,委员会注意到,来自40多个国度范围及庞大水平各异的350多家银行到场了近期开展的定量影响阐发(以下称简QIS3)。
正如另一份文件所指出,QIS3的结果表明,调解后新框架划定的资本要求总体上与委员会的既定目标相一致。
6. 本文由两部分内容组成。
第一部分简朴介绍新资本富足框架的内容及有关实施方面的问题。
在此主要的考虑是,加深读者对新协议银行各项选择方案的认识。
第二部分技能性较强,大要描述了在2002年10月宣布的QIS3技能指导文件之后对新协议有关划定所做的修改。
第一部分新协议的主要内容7. 新协议由三大支柱组成:一是最低资本要求,二是羁系政府对资本富足率的监视查抄,三是信息披露。
【规则修订】巴塞尔协议III?流动性监管新规

【规则修订】巴塞尔协议III 流动性监管新规编者语:巴塞尔银行监管委员会于2013年1月推出了新修订的《巴塞尔协议III:流动性覆盖率和流动性风险监测工具》,体现了国际流动性监管改革的最新发展趋势。
本文介绍了巴塞尔协议III流动性风险监管改革及其修订的背景,对流动性监管新规的内容进行了比较分析和评价。
文/巴曙松(国务院发展研究中心金融研究所副所长);尚航飞(天津市北辰区人民政府);朱元倩(北京大学&中国银行业监督管理委员会博士后)流动性风险监管改革是巴塞尔协议III系列改革的重要组成部分。
在2010版巴塞尔协议III流动性监管规则的基础上,经过两年的实践和研究,巴塞尔银行监管委员会(BCBS,以下简称巴塞尔委员会)于2013年1月推出了新的流动性监管规则,即《巴塞尔协议III:流动性覆盖率和流动性风险监测工具》,从多个角度对巴塞尔协议III的流动性监管规则进行了修订。
本文将在跟踪巴塞尔协议III流动性监管改革动态的基础上,为我国流动性风险的监管改革提出对策建议。
一、巴塞尔协议III流动性监管规则修订的背景2007年全球金融危机爆发之前,巴塞尔资本协议主要秉承资本充足管理的理念,但危机中流动性风险对国际银行体系的破坏性使得该理念受到了挑战,流动性风险所体现出的强传染性和冲击力使各国监管当局认识到流动性风险监管的重要性,如何提升流动性风险监管并避免类似的金融危机再度发生随即成为了人们关注的焦点。
在对既有流动性监管制度进行深刻反思和总结各国监管实践的基础上,巴塞尔委员会于2008年9月公布了《流动性风险管理和监管的原则》,该文件以稳健的监管为核心理念,提出了银行业流动性风险管理和监督必须遵守的17项原则。
随后,巴塞尔委员会相继在2009年12月和2010年4月公布了《流动性风险计量、标准和检测的国际框架》的征求意见稿和正式文稿,并基于国际组织和各国监管机构对新监管指标影响的评估结果作了一些调整,最终于2010年12月出台的《巴塞尔协议III:流动性风险计量、标准和检测的国际框架》,确立了全球统一的流动性风险监管指标:短期监管指标(LCR,流动性覆盖率)和长期监管指标(NSFR,净稳定融资比例)。
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Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards12 September 2010At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010. These capital reforms, together with the introduction of a global liquidity standard, deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda and will be presented to the Seoul G20 Leaders summit in November.The Committee's package of reforms will increase the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%. In addition, banks will be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%. This reinforces the stronger definition of capital agreed by Governors and Heads of Supervision in July and the higher capital requirements for trading, derivative and securitisation activities to be introduced at the end of 2011.Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Chairman of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, said that "the agreements reached today are a fundamental strengthening of global capital standards." He added that "their contribution to long term financial stability and growth will be substantial. The transition arrangements will enable banks to meet the new standards while supporting the economic recovery." Mr Nout Wellink, Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and President of the Netherlands Bank, added that "the combination of a much stronger definition of capital, higher minimum requirements and the introduction of new capital buffers will ensure that banks are better able to withstand periods of economic and financial stress, therefore supporting economic growth."Increased capital requirementsUnder the agreements reached today, the minimum requirement for common equity, the highest form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the current 2% level, before the application of regulatory adjustments, to 4.5% after the application of stricter adjustments. This will be phased in by 1 January 2015. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other qualifying financial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% over the same period. (Annex 1 summarises the new capital requirements.)The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed that the capital conservation buffer above the regulatory minimum requirement be calibrated at 2.5% and be met with common equity, after the application of deductions. The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions. This framework will reinforce the objective of sound supervision and bank governance and address the collective action problem that has prevented some banks from curtailing distributions such as discretionary bonuses and high dividends, even in the face of deteriorating capital positions.A countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% - 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital will be implemented according to national circumstances. The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth. For any given country, this buffer will only be in effect when there is excess credit growth that is resulting in a system wide build up of risk. The countercyclical buffer, when in effect, would be introduced as an extension of the conservation buffer range.These capital requirements are supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures described above. In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.Systemically important banks should have loss absorbing capacity beyond the standards announced today and work continues on this issue in the Financial Stability Board and relevant Basel Committee work streams. The Basel Committee and the FSB are developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt. In addition, work is continuing to strengthen resolution regimes. The Basel Committee also recently issued a consultative document Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability. Governors and Heads of Supervision endorse the aim to strengthen the loss absorbency of non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.Transition arrangementsSince the onset of the crisis, banks have already undertaken substantial efforts to raise their capital levels. However, preliminary results of the Committee's comprehensive quantitative impact study show that as of the end of 2009, large banks will need, in the aggregate, a significant amount of additional capital to meet these new requirements. Smaller banks, which are particularly important for lending to the SME sector, for the most part already meet these higher standards.The Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed on transitional arrangements for implementing the new standards. These will help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy. The transitional arrangements, which are summarised in Annex 2, include:National implementation by member countries will begin on 1 January 2013. Member countries must translate the rules into national laws and regulations before this date. As of 1 January 2013, banks will be required to meet the following new minimum requirements in relation to risk-weighted assets (RW As):3.5% common equity/RW As;4.5% Tier 1 capital/RW As, and8.0% total capital/RW As.The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements will be phased in between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. On 1 January 2013, the minimum common equity requirement will rise from the current 2% level to 3.5%. The Tier 1 capital requirement will rise from4% to 4.5%. On 1 January 2014, banks will have to meet a 4% minimum common equity requirement and a Tier 1 requirement of 5.5%. On 1 January 2015, banks will have to meet the 4.5% common equity and the 6% Tier 1 requirements. The total capital requirement remains at the existing level of 8.0% and so does not need to be phased in. The difference between the total capital requirement of 8.0% and the Tier 1 requirement can be met with Tier 2 and higher forms of capital.The regulatory adjustments (ie deductions and prudential filters), including amounts above the aggregate 15% limit for investments in financial institutions, mortgage servicing rights, and deferred tax assets from timing differences, would be fully deducted from common equity by 1 January 2018.In particular, the regulatory adjustments will begin at 20% of the required deductions from common equity on 1 January 2014, 40% on 1 January 2015, 60% on 1 January 2016, 80% on 1 January 2017, and reach 100% on 1 January 2018. During this transition period, the remainder not deducted from common equity will continue to be subject to existing national treatments.The capital conservation buffer will be phased in between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018 becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. It will begin at 0.625% of RW As on 1 January 2016 and increase each subsequent year by an additional 0.625 percentage points, to reach its final level of 2.5% of RWAs on 1 January 2019. Countries that experience excessive credit growth should consider accelerating the build up of the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. National authorities have the discretion to impose shorter transition periods and should do so where appropriate.Banks that already meet the minimum ratio requirement during the transition period but remain below the 7% common equity target (minimum plus conservation buffer) should maintain prudent earnings retention policies with a view to meeting the conservation buffer as soon as reasonably possible.Existing public sector capital injections will be grandfathered until 1 January 2018. Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-common equity Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital will be phased out over a 10 year horizon beginning 1 January 2013. Fixing the base at the nominal amount of such instruments outstanding on 1 January 2013, their recognition will be capped at 90% from 1 January 2013, with the cap reducing by 10 percentage points in each subsequent year. In addition, instruments with an incentive to be redeemed will be phased out at their effective maturity date.Capital instruments that no longer qualify as common equity Tier 1 will be excluded from common equity Tier 1 as of 1 January 2013. However, instruments meeting the following three conditions will be phased out over the same horizon described in the previous bullet point: (1) they are issued by a non-joint stock company 1 ; (2) they are treated as equity under the prevailing accounting standards; and (3) they receive unlimited recognition as part of Tier 1 capital under current national banking law.Only those instruments issued before the date of this press release should qualify for the above transition arrangements.Phase-in arrangements for the leverage ratio were announced in the 26 July 2010 press release of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision. That is, the supervisory monitoring period will commence 1 January 2011; the parallel run period will commence 1January 2013 and run until 1 January 2017; and disclosure of the leverage ratio and its components will start 1 January 2015. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments will be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.After an observation period beginning in 2011, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The revised net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary.The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. It seeks to promote and strengthen supervisory and risk management practices globally. The Committee comprises representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is the governing body of the Basel Committee and is comprised of central bank governors and (non-central bank) heads of supervision from member countries. The Committee's Secretariat is based at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.Annex 1: Calibration of the Capital Framework (PDF 1 page, 19 kb)Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements (PDF 1 page, 27 kb)Full press release (PDF 7 pages, 56 kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Non-joint stock companies were not addressed in the Basel Committee's 1998 agreement on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital as they do not issue voting common shares.最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。