火灾自动报警系统毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献
公寓建筑物的防火安全设计中英文翻译
外文文献：THE FIRE SAFETY DESIGN OF APARTMENT BUILDINGSIn most fire engineered buildings, intervention of the fire brigade is not usually considered.The fire brigade provides the last line of attack on a fire, and usually the last opportunity tofind and rescue occupants. The intervention of the fire brigade is highly dependent on themreceiving an alarm or notification of a fire.The role of the fire brigade is important in an apartment fire as they can:Fight, suppress and extinguish the firePerform search and rescue operationsExternally rescue occupantsControl evacuation via the EWIS system or liftsPerform first aidReassure occupantsFor the fire brigade to perform their jobs properly they require:Adequate site accessAdequate water suppliesSuitably located fire system control centres and indicator panelsControls for liftsProtection from structural failure for an appropriate length of timeThe Australian and New Zealand building codes and standards provide design criteria for theabove requirements. Successful fire brigade intervention can be achieved with pre-planning,early alarm, rapid response and the provision of sufficient labour and equipment to deal withthe hazard (Beck et al, 1992).The time for the fire brigade to arrive and extinguish the fire is influenced by the followingcomponents:Time to detection of fire. Either by automatic systems or people (Buchanan, 1996).Time to notification of fire brigade (Buchanan, 1996).Fire brigade travel time (Buchanan, 1996).Access and search time for all floors (Buchanan, 1996).Fire brigade setup timeFire attack time (Buchanan, 1996).The Fire Engineering Guidelines (FCRC, 1996) contains a “Fire Brigade Communicationand Response” model which provides guidance on assessing the response of the fire brigade.The following fire brigade times are 95th percentile times taken from the FEG (FCRC, 1996).In a non-evacuation strategy, the fire brigade maybe relied upon to suppress and extinguish the fire. Therefore notification and arrival times are crucial.The arrival of the fire brigade may also be crucial in an emergency strategy where they arerequired to communicate with the occupants or assist the evacuation. If communication withoccupants is vital to the emergency strategy, appropriately trained wardens should takecharge prior to the arrival of the fire brigade.The intervention of the fire brigade needs to be negotiated with the approval authority orAuthority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) and fire brigade. The times for intervention need to beagreed upon by all relevant stakeholders.The activities of the fire brigade can be aided through sensible designs and architecture. Forexample, location of hydrants, hose reels and fire indicator panels should be designed suchthat they assist the operations of the fire brigade.Some of the problems faced by the fire brigade during a fire are: fighting the fire whilstassisting the evacuation, access to the fire floor being restricted with evacuating occupantsand reduced effectiveness due to fatigue after climbing stairs.8 B UILDING AND E GRESS C HARACTERISTICSThe building and egress characteristics are two of the most influential variables on the evacuation strategy and fire safety measures provided in a building. The primarybuildingand egress characteristics that influence the fire safety design are:Building heightNumber of exitsExit widthsEgress distanceBuilding construction and passive protectionRefuge floors and/or refuge areasLifts8.1Building HeightIn Australia and New Zealand the building height is major determinant of the fire safetysystems. When buildings are greater than 25m in effective height, there is a significant increase in the prescriptive requirements specified by the Building Code of Australia.The 25m building height limit is partly based on the limits of ladder access, and the ability ofthe fire brigade to rescue occupants and fight the fire externally. In Australian buildingsgreater than 25m, the prescriptive requirements require the buildings to be sprinkler protected and to have pressurised escape paths.The fire safety matrix presented in this report considers three building heights, with theheight limits being based on the BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC. It should be noted that the guidelines presented in the matrix do not strictly apply to these limits, and it is the responsibility of the fire engineer and approval authority to determine if an adequate level of safety has been achieved.The building height limits that have been considered are:Buildings less than 3 storeys. These buildings are characterised by unprotected escape paths and travel distances generally meeting code requirements. The buildings have short travel distances and external rescue is generally possible.Buildings greater than 3 storeys, less than 25m high. These buildings are characterised by having protected stairs, lifts and external rescue being possibleBuildings greater than 25m high. These buildings are characterised by havingprotected stairs, lifts, relatively long travel distances and limited external rescue options.8.2Number of Exits, Exit Width and Egress DistanceThe Building Code of Australia and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC comprehensively cover the number of exits, minimum exit widths and maximum egress distances for apartment buildings. If the egress characteristics of a building are not fire engineered from first principles, then it is recommended that the code requirements be used as default values.The following is a summary of the Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) requirements. The summary applies to Class 2 buildings (BCA) and SR Purpose Group buildings (Acceptable Solutions to NZBC).8.2.1 Acceptable Solutions to NZBCPrescriptive egress requirements for SR purpose groups.The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC maximum egress distances are for SR purpose groups. The open path distance is calculated from the furthermost point inside theapartment.Open path lengths and horizontal safe path lengths can be increased by:15% where heat detectors are installed50% where sprinklers are installed100% where smoke detectors are installed100% where the occupant density does not exceed 0.05 people/m28.2.2 Building Code of AustraliaThe clauses for the number of exits, exit-travel distances and the dimensions of exit paths,extracted from the BCA, are located in Appendix B.In summary:All buildings require at least one exit. Buildings over 25m high require two exits. The maximum allowable exit travel distance may govern the number of exits.The maximum travel distance from a sole-occupancy unit is 6m, to a point where travel in different directions to two exits is available. The maximum distance between alternative exits is 45m.The minimum width of an exit is 1.0m or 1.8m in a passageway. The minimum width of the exit increases when occupant numbers are in excess of 100 on a storey.8.3Building Construction and Passive ProtectionAll apartment buildings will have a fire resistance rating for building structure and fire barriers. This fire resistance can either be determined from the relevant Building Code or through a fire engineering analysis.Passive protection is one of the most important elements in the prevention of fire spread and limiting fire size. By breaking up the building into vertical and horizontal compartments, the fuel is broken down into smaller units that will reduce the potential fire size. Passive protection is also essential in preventing and limiting smoke spread through the building.In the context of this report, the main objective for passive protection is to limit the fire and smoke to the apartment of fire origin or at least the floor of fire origin. This will reduce the threat to other occupants in the building, and provide enough time forthem escape, or for the fire brigade to suppress the fire.The compartment and structural fire resistance rating of an apartment can be determined from the time equivalence formula. By using this method, an apartment should be designed to contain a fire until complete burn out. This should therefore ensure the fire does not spread beyond the apartment of origin.Fire separation and compartmentation relies on doors, walls, floors, ceilings, glazing, smoke dampers and construction units (Bukowski et al, 1999). For effective passive protection these factors need to be inspected, tested and maintained regularly. It is recommended that selfclosers be used on doors that open into common areas, to prevent fire and smoke spread from apartments to common areas or escape paths. There is very little literature on the reliability of passive protection (Bukowski et al, 1999). A survey of experts has estimated the reliability of passive protection to be 95% for construction with no openings, and 90% for construction with openings and with self-closers (FCRC, 1996). Similarly, a Delphi group study in the UK estimated the reliability of masonry and gypsum construction to have a reliability of 81% and 69% respectively (Bukowski et al, 1999).The fire safety matrix makes a distinction between low and high passive protection. This distinction is used to demonstrate different relative levels of safety between an occupant in an adjacent apartment and one who is in a corridor. If an occupant is in a corridor, at a minimum, they will have one wall and one door (assuming it is closed or has a self-closer) separating them from the fire. If the occupant remains in their room they will have two walls and two doors (assuming it is closed or has a self-closer) separating them from the fire and hence a higher level of protection. The door from the apartment of fire origin door could be either open or closed, which increases the risk to occupants in the corridor and hence the term low protection is used.8.4Stair RequirementsIn an emergency, the primary means of egress in multi-storey occupancies are stairs. Different building codes have different requirements for the number of stairs and the width of stairs (Refer Section 8.2 and Appendix B).The Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) requires apartment buildings (Class 3) to have at least one exit from every storey and two exits where the building exceeds 25m. However, the maximum travel distances from the door of an apartment permitted by the prescriptive requirements are:6m to an exit, or a point from which travel in different directions to two exits is available, or20m from a single exit serving the storey at the level of egress to a road or open space.Therefore, even though two exits are required in apartment buildings greater than 25m high, in many cases to meet travel distances specified by the BCA, two stairs will be necessary.The minimum number of exits, in the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991), are based on the number of beds (ie the occupant load) in the apartment building. For apartments with less than 100 beds two exits are required. For apartments with over 100 beds two exits are required, plus an additional exit for every 100 beds or part thereof greater than 100.The objective of two stairs is to provide an alternative means of egress if one exit is blocked. Having multiple stair shafts can also reduce egress distances and allow occupants to change egress routes depending on the conditions.The three main factors building codes use to determine if two or more stairs are required, are the number of occupants, the number of floors and the characteristics of the occupants. Some of the additional areas that should be considered in determining the stair requirements are:Fire brigade utilisation and rescue operationsSprinkler protectionFire resistance rating of exit pathsSmoke control systems in the exit pathsEmergency planTo determine the relative effectiveness of a single stair, Hagiwara et al (1997) have proposed a probabilistic model based on the expected number of occupants unable toescape. The model provides a basis for evaluating a single stair against the building code based on:The probability of a fire occurrence in the roomThe probability the fire develops into a hazardous fireThe probability the door is left openThe efficiency of rescue by the fire brigadeThe degree of protection of the escape routeSingle stair buildings are permitted in the UK provided certain conditions are met. Clause 3.18 of Approved Document B (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000) states:3.18 Every dwelling should have access to alternative escape routes so that a person confronted by the effects of an outbreak of fire in another dwelling can turn away from it and make safe escape. However, a single escape route from dwelling entrance door is acceptable if either:(a) the dwelling is separated from the common stair and:(i) every dwelling is separated from the common stair by a protected lobby or common corridor (see diagram 12), and(ii) the travel distance limitations in Table, on escape in one direction only, are observed; Effectively, this means that the required number of stairs is not a function of the building height, provided travel distances and other building requirements are met. Therefore, it is possible to have tall single stair apartment buildings. Figure 2 shows the maximum travel distances and stair requirements of Approved Document B (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000).Some of the important requirements for single stair buildings is the provision of openable vents and/or automatic opening vents in the stairs and the corridors. These vents provide a means of venting the stairs of smoke, for both occupants and fire brigade.8.5Refuge Floors and AreasRefuge floors and areas provide rest locations for escaping occupants, a safe area for both disabled and able-bodied occupants and a staging area for the fire brigade. The BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC do not prescribe refuge floors, however they are prescribed in the Hong Kong building code (Lo and Will, 1997). In a fire engineered apartment building refuge floors may be justifiable if the building was an ultra high-rise building, with excessive travel distance via stairs.Refuge areas are more commonly used in Australia and New Zealand to provide safe areas for disabled occupants. In apartment buildings a common emergency strategy is for disabled occupants is to remain in their apartments until assistance arrives.8.5.1Refuge floorsThe Building Code of Australia and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC do not specify refuge floors for apartment buildings. However, they are prescriptive requirements for highrise buildings in the Hong Kong Code of Practice (Lo and Will, 1997).The functions of refuge floors (Lo and Will, 1997) are to:Act as a relief area for the evacuees in a fire situationAct as a sub-base for fire fighting purposesAct as a command point for the rescue personnel to assist the evacuation of the buildingProvide a place for disabled or partially disabled occupants to wait for assistance before being evacuatedAllow occupants to move to an alternative staircaseAllow smoke separation at the refuge level in the stair caseLo and Will (1997) also state that refuge floors can psychologically assist occupants under escape conditions. Refuge floors can psychologically relieve occupants by:Reassuring them that the height of escape is not too onerousProviding an area for cognitive and decision controlSeeing the presence of fire brigade personnelRefuge floors can also be used as a safe area where lifts are controlled andco-ordinated for egress. Passenger lifts not used on the fire floor can be used at the refuge floor to evacuate occupants (Lo and Will, 1997). High-rise buildings are usually broken up into low-rise, midrise and high-rise sections, with lifts that serve each section separately. To assist in rescue operations, lifts that do not serve the fire floor can be used for rescue and mobilisation of fire brigade personnel and equipment. The arguments against refuge floors (Lo and Will, 1997) are that:They provide an additional cost to the building owner in terms of building costand non-utilised spaceIt can be difficult to maintain and enforce the use of refuge floorsThere are already protected escape routesUnless people have difficulty in escaping they are unlikely to remain on the refuge floorFor residential buildings, Lo and Will (1997) believe that refuge floors may be necessary to provide an area of safety if conditions become untenable due to longpre-movement times.Another approach to using refuge floors is to reduce the effective height of high-rise buildings (Teh, 1994). Since the height is directly proportional to egress time, the provision of adequately protected refuge areas can reduce the effective buildingheight. Therefore once occupants have reached a refuge floor they can be considered to be safe. To achieve this The (1994) proposes the following requirements:Additional provisions to prevent smoke infiltration (smoke stopping of allvertical shafts)All lifts connecting to the refuge floor to be accessible through smoke lobbiesThe refuge floor must be accessible at all times and capable of accommodatingthe projected number of peopleA substantial part of the refuge floor is to be natural vented or capable of being naturally vented (ideally the refuge area should be a part of an external area)The design and layout of exit stairs should discharge occupants into the refuge floor before they proceed further downPressurisation of exit stairs can be separated into vertical zones to avoid failuresof the system affecting the whole stairRefuge floors in apartment buildings may assist the evacuation of occupants, but requirements of refuge floors need to be assessed against: other fire safety measures, the cost of a refuge floor and the emergency strategy. With the provision of sprinklers, compartmentation and smoke control, the need for a refuge floor in apartment buildings is questionable. Apartment buildings are generally fire separated between individual units, at each floor level and between escape paths. The areas that are fire separated from each other could be designed as refuge areas reducing the need for an entire refuge floor. Occupants also have option to remain in their apartments, where they have access to fresh air from windows.The cost of a refuge floor also needs to be considered in conjunction with the cost of other fire safety systems. The opportunity cost of a refuge floor is the: loss of rental space, loss of real estate and cost of maintaining the floor. These cost could easily outweigh the cost of a sprinkler system that may provide a higher level protection.In high-rise buildings fires, where smoke control systems have failed, a refuge floor withadequate natural cross ventilation, could have assisted occupant egress. The World Trade Centre bombing (Fahy and Proulx, 1996) and the MGM Grand fire (NFPA,1982a) are two possible cases where injury and fatalities may have been avoided, if the occupants were able to get to a refuge floor with adequate ventilation. In these two fires, exits were compromised by smoke and occupants were evacuating through poor conditions.In ultra high-rise buildings, defined as greater than 40 storeys (Lo and Will, 1997), refuge floors could be of some assistance for disabled, elderly and other occupants who need assistance to evacuate. However, these occupants may be better served through refuge areas on each floor or by the occupants remaining in their apartments. Lo and Will (1997) argue that refuge areas do not have the same psychological benefits for the escaping occupants, as a refuge floor, and therefore are not as effective.8.5.2Refuge areasThe Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) require refuge areas in apartment buildings greater than 58m high with intermediate floors. These refuge areas are to be located at intervals of no greater than 3 floors in the vertical safe paths, be at least 800mm wide and have an area of no less than 2m2. Guidance on refuge areas is also provided in British Standard BS5588 - Part 8, 1998 (BSI, 1988).The NFPA Life Safety Code (Cote, 1997) requires people with severe mobility impairment to have at least two means of accessible egress. One method to achieve this is through the provision of a compliant refuge area.The effectiveness of refuge areas is highly dependent on the design details. Someof details that need to be considered are fire exposure, reliability of the smoke control system, outside wind and temperature condition. Without pressurisationall refuge areas can be subject to lethal failure (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993).In many cases, the people needing the refuge areas may be unable to reach the area before their pathways become untenable (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993)The organisation and human behaviour problems involved with refuge areas are more complex (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993).The operation of a sprinkler system eliminates the life threat to all occupants and can provide superior protection for people with disabilities as compared to arefuge area. (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993)Klote (1993) found pressurisation of refuge areas could be significantly influenced by, opening and closing of doors, window breakage and external wind pressures. Generally, refuge areas can be effectively pressurised by a direct pressurisation system or an indirect pressurisation system using lift shafts. But an indirect pressurisation system using the stairwell may not be effective or appropriate (Klote, 1993).8.6LiftsThe use of lifts or elevators for emergencies is not a new concept, but they are typically only used with fire brigade assistance. In general, occupants are told not to use lifts in a fire. However, the fire brigade has often used lifts to rescue people and mobilise equipment. Lifts have also been used in hospitals to move non-ambulatory patients.The use of lifts for fire fighting and assisting rescue operations provides an efficient means of moving people and equipment. This is particularly important in high-rise buildings, where moving equipment takes time and uses valuable resources. An example of this was the First Interstate Bank, where lifts were not used, and a fire on the 12th floor required 100 men to carry equipment up the stairs (Degenkolb, 1991). The BCA requires buildings with an effective height greater then 25m to have one or more lifts, fitted as an emergency lift (Performance Requirement EP3.2, BCA, 1996). This is to facilitate the activities of the fire brigade and other emergency service personnel. In addition to this, stretcher facilities must be provided in at least one of those emergency lifts, or in a non emergency lift where the effective building height is greater than 12m.The British Standard BS 5588 – Part 8 1988 (BSI, 1988), provides guidance on the use of lifts for evacuation of disabled people. BS 5588 Part 8 provides guidance on the design of lifts used for evacuations as well as the management of evacuation lifts, and examples of fire plan strategies in buildings with evacuation lifts.The some of the problems with the use of lifts for egress are:Pressurisation of shafts is not necessarily effective for smoke control (Klote et al, 1993)Lift components can be affected by heat, smoke and water (Klote et al, 1993)Power failure (Klote et al, 1993)Potential of lifts opening onto the fire floorThe evacuation needs to be controlled and co-ordinated and the number of occupants entering the lift needs to be regulatedLift shafts can act as chimneys exposing occupants to heat and smoke.Occupants have been told for the last 20 years not to use lifts in a fire (Klote et al, 1993)Pressure differentials in lift shafts can vary with building geometry and at different floors (Klote, 1983)Lift microprocessor controls are very sensitive to heat (Semple, 1993)Fire brigade shutting off the power can be a problem. Batteries will only run for a limited length of time (Semple, 1993).Malfunctions in an emergency could lead to litigation (Semple, 1993).There is limited opportunity for rescue of people trapped between floors (Pauls et al, 1991)The some of the other reasons why lifts are unsafe stated in the ASME Elevator Code and Handbook A17.1 (Cote, 1997) are:Occupants may push a button and waste valuable time waiting for a lift that may not arriveLifts can not start until the car and hoistway (lift shaft) doors are closed. Overcrowding may prevent these doors from closingA lift occupant could press the incorrect buttonNormal functioning of lifts such as high or low call reversal may occur at the fire FloorThe NFPA Life Safety Code (Cote, 1997) does not recognise lifts as a typical means of escape, but it does allow their use under certain circumstances. If a lift complies with Section 7-4 of the Code, it is permitted as a second means of egress, provided:The building and surrounding structure is protected throughout by an automatic sprinkler systemThe building is subject to an occupancy of no more than 90 peoplePrimary egress discharges directly to the outsideThere are no high hazard content areas in the building or attached structures100% of the egress capacity shall be provided independent of the liftsAn evacuation plan is implemented specifically including the liftThe most immediate application for the use of lifts, in the evacuation of apartment buildings, is for the evacuation of disabled and elderly occupants and the evacuation of low occupancy high-rise apartments.The escape times for lift egress can be calculated from the following formula (Klote et al,1993)Klote et al (1993) found that the use of lifts for egress decreases building evacuation times by between 10 and 50%. Greater evacuation efficiency occurs as the height of the building increases. The time-savings are a result of using a combination of lifts and stairs for evacuation. A similar result was found by Andersson and Wadensten (2000), in their simulations of the One Canada Square building at Canary Wharf in London, where they found that lifts improved the evacuation procedures in the building.The following are 13 criteria for safe lift egress design proposed by Chapman (1994)1. The building be fully sprinkler protected2. Lift shafts should be pressurised3. Lift lobbies on all floors should be enclosed4. Lift lobbies should be pressurised5. Lift and lobby pressurisation intakes should be in a smoke free location6. All lift lobbies should be protected by smoke detectors7. Lift systems should be made water resistant8. When a power failure occurs all lifts should return to their designated level9. All lifts should be able to be operated from a designated emergency power generator10. All lift lobbies should have access to a pressurised stair, without the occupants having to pass through a fire area11. All lift cars should have a means of two way communication12. All lift lobbies should have a means of two way communication13. A program specifying the priority of lift response during a fire should be developed.For lifts to be effective in evacuations, some other design concepts that should be considered are:Smoke and fire separation of lift machine room and lift shaft (Klote, 1993, Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Analogue addressable detection system linked to lift control to prevent lift stopping on fire floors and to prioritise floors for evacuation (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Automatically recall lift if a fault is detected (Klote, 1993, Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Wardens or security staff to direct evacuations, reassure occupants and prioritise who uses the lifts, and also to control occupant numbers in the lifts (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Provide a system to prevent the lift stopping on floors where heat is detected, or providing fire rated lobbies on all floors (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Higher levels of protection for lift system, if building is non sprinkler protected (Klote et al, 1995)Load weighting device, so lift bypasses all other calls when fully loaded (Fox,1991)Lifts connected to alarm panel and sent to the top floor in an emergency and only responding to calls in the down direction (Fox, 1991)Have machine room close to ground level, therefore if occupants are trapped in the lift the time to access machine room is reduced (Gatfield, 1991).Reduce lobby sizes to prevent storage of combustible materials. BS5588 Part 5。
外文翻译及原文
译文译文：：建筑建筑防火设计防火设计防火设计拉格夫拉格夫摘要：这篇论文主要研究建筑的防火设计，火作用于建筑与重力荷载,风荷载,地震力等作用于建筑物结构上有很大不同。
火是由人类活动或者机械故障，建筑物内的电器引起的1.1.介绍介绍介绍其他论文，考虑建筑物的设计的重力荷载，风和地震等一系列问题。
建筑物针对这些负载的影响的设计是相当大的程度上涵盖了工程的标准参照了建筑法规。
几乎在同一程度上，万一发生火灾，事实并非如此。
相反，正是如澳大利亚建筑法那样的法规明确了建筑防火安全的标准，如用as3600,as4100的方法确定耐火构件。
本文的目的就是要从工程角度考虑建筑设计消防安全，（如目前所做的风力或地震等其他荷载），同时将这种方法应用于当前规范要求的环境之中。
首先需要指出的是，设计一幢防火大楼只考虑建设结构或者是否有足够的结构性是远远不够的。
这是因为火可以直接通过烟雾和热量影响住户，还可以蔓延增加严重性，而其它对楼房的影响不具备这一特征。
尽管有这些评论，本文的大部分重点仍将集中于建筑结构的设计问题。
本文将选择一栋大楼的两种情况作为讨论的对象。
图1所示的多层办公楼利用了转换结构，跨过了一条铁路路轨。
这是在假定了广泛的轨道交通利用这些轨道基础上，考虑到了运费和内燃机车。
我们将从从消防安全角度考虑第一种情况，即转换结构。
这是被称为情况1，其中的关键问题是: 哪一级耐火要求用这种转换结构？这种转换结构又如何确定？这种情况已经选定，因为它显然不属于大多数建筑法规的正常的监管范围。
我们需要的是一项工程性的而不是指令性的解决办法。
第二种火灾形势（称为情况2）相应的消防局内不同层次的建设和涵盖了建筑法规。
选择这种情况是因为它将促成工程学方法的讨论以及如何把这些建设规章相衔接,因为两种工程和指令性的办法皆是可行的。
2.火灾的独特性2.火灾的独特性火灾的独特性介绍2.1介绍设计师无法控制风和地震等"自然"的现象，因而只能根据历史记载更合理的选择建筑物的位置，或者提高建筑的负荷能力。
建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献
建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献原文：Fire Safety Design of Indoor Pedestrian Streets of Large Commercial BuildingAbstractIndoor pedestrian streets in China developed rapidly in recent years. The current national fire safety standards do not give clear requirements on fire protection design. Fire safety design departments have difficulties in controlling the design, so there are many problems in the fire protection design to be solved. Based on structure characteristics and application status of large-scale commercial buildings, focusing on various existing difficulties in the indoor pedestrian streets fire protection design process, this thesis defines indoor pedestrian streets fire design ideas, and puts forward fire safety measures that should be taken in the interior pedestrian streets in the layout, fire separation, fire facilities, etc.Key words:large-scale commercial buildings; indoor pedestrian streets; fire safety measures 1. IntroductionWith the diversification of market demands and diversity of business modes, the traditional commercial buildings for shopping only are gradually transformed into multifunctional large commercial buildings in various forms, which integrate hopping, dining, entertainment, culture, arts and other consumer functions. While the indoor pedestrian streets can not only improve environment application conditions and climate adaptability, but also integrate the space and functions of connected commercial buildings, which greatly improves space efficiency.Indoor pedestrian streets is shown in Fig.1.However, its unique function and structure brings many problems in fire zone separation, evacuation, smoke exhaust and other aspects in fire protection design. Now there is no domestic specific regulation for indoor pedestrian streets design. It is not only a theoretical topic of academic research, but also an urgent practical problem to solve that how to avoid the blindness in fire design of indoor pedestrian streets, proper handling and solving all the process, and ensuring fire safety of indoor pedestrian streets. Combining the problems encountered in engineering practice, I建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献make analysis on fire design of indoor pedestrian streets and put forward fire prevention measures that should be taken.Fig. 1.Indoor Pedestrian streets2. Difficulties in fire design of indoor pedestrian streetsAs there are entrances set in shops on both sides of indoor pedestrian streets, the customers can flow in the shops through the pedestrian streets. In addition, the commercial buildings on both sides of indoor pedestrian streets vary in forms, with not only small shops in tight rows, but also large supermarkets and main shops, both enclosed space, and open or semi-open circulated space. Therefore, the fire safety design difficulties mainly exist in the following aspects:(1) In accordance with current fire design specifications, indoor pedestrian streets as a limited interior space, the closed space surrounded by buildings should comply with the relevant provisions of the atrium, and fire compartment area should be calculated by overlying the connected areas of upper and lower floors. If using roller shutters or walls to separate fire compartments, it will undoubtedly undermine the effect of architectural design, but not separating will result in over-large compartment area, exceeding regulatory requirements.(2) Evacuation distance from indoor outdoor pedestrian streets to a safe outdoor place often exceeds the specified safe evacuation distance.(3) Fire escapes of the shops are set in the pedestrian streets, and evacuation must be done through the indoor pedestrian streets.(4) The smoke design of current national fire safety design specifications is not applicable for indoor pedestrian streets. Designers often design natural smoke exhaust by referring to specifications on the requirements of atrium natural smoke exhaust, but there are some problems which can not be overlooked: first, due to "laminarization" phenomenon, for the建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献ceiling with clearance height greater than 12m, whether natural smoke exhaust windows can produce real effects; second, in many cases, indoor pedestrian streets also burdens safe evacuation of the shops , which meets atrium smoke exhaust design requirements of current fire protection standards. Whether it can ensure the evacuation safety of people in indoor pedestrian streets.(5) Although the indoor pedestrian streets is used for people passage,some problems may appear in the operation of commercial buildings: first, various temporary booths or stands set in the indoor pedestrian streets will not only increase the fire load, but also affect the safe evacuation; second, to protect the shopping environment from the outdoor weather conditions, in the course of business operation some commercial buildings open the smoke exhaust outlets and set doors and windows at the entrances and on the top of the indoor pedestrian streets, which changes the conditions of safe evacuation and smoke exhaust, posing a fire hazard.3.Indoor pedestrian streets fire design ideasThe biggest difference of indoor pedestrian streets from the outdoor one lies in the roof, so it does not have equal safety of outdoor street. The people evacuated from the shops on both sides have to pass the pedestrian streets before reaching a safe location outdoors. So pedestrian streets is a transition area and an additional part of the evacuation passage. Ideally, the people in an indoor pedestrian streets can enjoy equal safety conditions of outdoors during evacuation. Therefore, the question whether indoor pedestrian streets can serve as an evacuation safe zone, will directly affect the business layout and building fire safety design. For this purpose, I put forward the following design ideas:(1) Control the fire within the shops, to avoid it spreading to the indoor pedestrian streetsWhen fire occurs in shops on the side, try to control the fire in a small range as possible, in particular, to avoid fire and smoke spreading to the indoor pedestrian streets. Usually this can be done by taking active and passive fire protection measures.Separate fire compartment reasonably.Separate the shops that face the pedestrian streets using certain fire-resistant dividers to separate the fire, to limit the spread of fire within the shop. In the shops, automatic fire alarm system, smoke exhaust system and建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献automatic sprinkler systems shall be installed to timely detect the fire, control early fire and smoke spread, and limit the spread of fire from the shops into the pedestrian streets.Indoor pedestrian streetss should have sufficient width, to ensure that even though the fire spreads out of the shops, it will not reach the other side of the pedestrian streets.(2) Avoid the pedestrian streets from being the route of fire spreadIn order to avoid indoor pedestrian streetss from being the route of fire spread, ensure that the floor, wall, and ceiling material will not lead to the spread of the fire. Non-combustible material can be considered; load-bearing structure should have sufficient fire resistance to ensure the safety of evacuation and fire fighting and rescue.Measures should be taken to limit the spread of smoke in the pedestrian streets. The ideal condition of smoke control is that, the smoke exhaust systems in the shops can start in time and exhaust the smoke effectively, to prevent the smoke from spreading into the pedestrian streets. However, considering that the fire in the shops may go out of control, or the smoke exhaust systems in the shops do not start in time or start effectively, or the fire uncontrolled by the fire extinguishing system will soon nullify the indoor exhaust system, etc.there are possibilities that the smoke in the shops spreads to the pedestrian streets. And sometimes unavoidably there are small amounts of combustible that can produce smoke when fire occurs, so it is necessary to install smoke exhaust system in the pedestrian streets.To prevent movable combustible in the pedestrian streets, such as holiday decorations, temporary stands,etc.from causing fire, it should be considered to install automatic sprinkler system or automatic scanning and positioning fire extinguishing system in the corridor and larger atrium of the indoor pedestrian streets.(3) Ensure that people within the indoor pedestrian streets can be quickly evacuated to the outsideThe people detained in the shops and pedestrian streets may not be familiar with building and evacuation routes. Even if the building provides relatively safe evacuation routes and fire exits independent of the pedestrian streets, it should also be considered due to unfamiliarity people may evacuate through the pedestrian streets, resulting in extended time of evacuation. Indoor pedestrian streets, after all, does not have the equal safety of outdoors, so measures should be taken in favor of quick evacuation.建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献The pedestrian streets should not be used for purposes other than human passage. There should be no arrangement of fixed commercial stalls or obstacles impeding the evacuation, and adequate width should be maintained to meet the evacuation needs and to avoid being overcrowded, which will affect the speed of evacuation.If the exit of shop connects directly to the indoor pedestrian streets, and extends to a safe place outside via the pedestrian streets, the distance from the exit of shop to the exit of the pedestrian streets should be controlled without being too long.As a main channel for safe evacuation, the pedestrian streets should have good emergency lighting and evacuation instructions to ensure smooth evacuation in case of fire. For indoor pedestrian streets with more complex or longer evacuation routes, emergency lighting should be strengthened, intelligent evacuation signs should be set, and fire emergency broadcast system should be allocated, to guide the evacuation in order.(4)Create favorable conditions for external fire fighting and rescueEven if the pedestrian streets is equipped with automatic fire extinguishing system, it does not rule out the case for various reasons fire occurs and spreads, which will need fire fighting service and rescue. Basic fire fighting and rescue measures are:Overall planning and rational setting of commercial building’s fire track create favorable external conditions for the fire brigade to perform rescue, and facilitate quick access for fire engines to the inside or fire site of commercial building.If the indoor pedestrian streets is relatively long, indoor pedestrian streets entrances should be set on the first floor at certain intervals for firefi ghters’ access. Fire rescue operation site should be set on the side of the building more than 24m in height, and window entrance for firefighters should be set on each floor on the wall where fire operation is performed. For the convenience of access to water, in addition to setting the fire hydrant within the shops, the fire hydrant and hose reel should also be set up within the pedestrian streets4.Indoor pedestrian streets fire protection measuresEach layer of indoor pedestrian streets, through the atrium gallery and escalator are connected with each other, creating an open, transparent continuous interior space. This open建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献and transparent settings,the commercial building shopping personnel can easily recognize direction,on emergency evacuation is very beneficial,but also insightful space indoor pedestrian streets has enough smoke storage space, slowing the smoke sedimentation velocity. But because the evacuation through indoor pedestrian streets to via staircases were evacuated, so need to ensure indoor pedestrian streets fire bining the stated fire safety design ideas, I propose the following fire protection measures:4.1. LayoutRational design of indoor pedestrian streets layout has a positive significance in reducing fire hazards to people and property, reducing economic losses and facilitating fire rescue.To reduce fire risk, commercial buildings should not operate or store commodities with fire risk properties classified as A and B, and no food stands should not be set on the pedestrian streets. To prevent the fire in the shops or in the pedestrian streets from spreading to or along the pedestrian streets, the pedestrian streets width shall meet requirements of fire prevention distance, 8m at least. The pedestrian streets should not be longer than 300m. If it is longer than 300m, open passage with width not less than 6m should be set at places within 300m, in order to facilitate the evacuation, and to delay and prevent the spread of fire, working as a fire barrier.The exits of shops on sides should connect directly to the pedestrian streets, and the exits connecting the shops and the pedestrian streets can be designed as fire escapes. The distance from the shop exit to a nearest outdoor place of safety should not be greater than 60m, in order to facilitate safe evacuationLoop fire engine track should be set around the commercial buildings. If there are difficulties, fire engine tracks with width not less than 6m should be set on two long sides of the building. If the length of the build ing’s outer boundary is greater than 150m or the total length is greater than 220m, a track through the building should be set. To facilitate fire engines’ access, do not set obstacles at the entrance of the street, or set seats, landscape, and other facilities in the street. Do not affect fire fighting or the passage of fire engines. Set fire track signs on the ground, in which there should be no obstacles or open doors & windows or steps, etc.建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献4.2. Fire separation(1) For non-food shops, shop building area should not exceed 300 m2, and the pedestrian streets and shops should be separated with 1.0h window-type spray cooling system protective tempered glass for fire separation; if the building area is more than 300 m2, 2.0h type one should be used.(2) The shop door that opens to the indoor pedestrian streets should be able to automatically shut down when fire occurs, and it should be sealed well to prevent the smoke entering into the interior pedestrian streets. The door should meet the fire resistance of not less than 1.0h.A space no less than 500mm should be left between the top of the door and the ceiling as smoke accumulating space. It is recommended to use a two-way spring door with electromagnetic absorber, so that the doors automatically close in case of emergency power-off due to fire. And ensure that both sides can be opened and automatically closed after opening.(3) The fire resistance of the walls between the shops with building area less than 300m2 should not be lower than 2.0h; for shops greater than 300m2, use walls with fire resistance not less than 3.0h to separate the adjacent shops; the walls should be built to the bottom of the upper floor. The horizontal distance between the door and window openings on both sides of the walls should be no less than 2.0m.(4) Fire damper which can be automatically closed at 70 should be set in the air conditioner and ventilation pipe through the fire wall of the shop, and smoke damper which can be automatically closed at 280 should be set in the smoke exhaust pipe.4.3. Fire fighting facilities(1) Fire extinguishing system: automatic sprinkler system should be set in the pedestrian streets corridor, and fast response sprinklers should be used. For atrium area fixed fire monitor system should be used. Fire hydrant and hose reel should be set at intervals of 50m in the indoor pedestrian streets.(2) Fire detection and alarm system: point-type smoke detectors should be set in the pedestrian streets corridor; beam line smoke detectors can be set at the top of the pedestrian streets.建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献(3) Smoke system: natural draft system can be used in the pedestrian streets. Sufficient natural draft windows should be arranged in the ceiling, exhausting the smoke in the street timely by reliable linkage starting. The area of natural draft windows should be no less than 20% of the pedestrian streets surface.(4) The emergency lighting and evacuation signs: centralized power and centralized control type should be used. Light-type evacuation signs which can maintain a visual continuity should be set on the ground the evacuation routes of the pedestrian streets. The evacuation signs should use safe voltage, and the intervals of ground evacuation signs should be no greater than 5m.5.ConclusionIndoor pedestrian streets in China developed rapidly in recent years. The current national fire safety standards do not give clear requirements on fire protection design. Fire safety design departments have difficulties in controlling the design , so there are many problems in the fire protection design to be solved. Basically, the proposed fire safety measures are able to meet the current needs of using indoor pedestrian streets, which are also realistic and can provide new ideas for indoor pedestrian streets fire safety design. Only reasonable measures can reduce fire risk, to ensure fire safety of indoor pedestrian streets.Reference[1] GB50016-2006.Code of design on building fire protection and prevention.[2] Fire Bureau of Ministry of Public Security, Handbook of Fire Protection[M]. Science and Technology Publishing of Shanghai.2007.[3] HUO Ran,YUAN,HongYong Performance based fire prevention analysis and design ofbuildings[M]. Science and Technology Publishing of Anhui,2003.[4] NFPA Life Safety Code, NFPA (Fire) 101, National Fire Protean, Association, 2005.译文：大型商业综合体室内步行街消防安全设计建筑消防安全中英文对照外文翻译文献摘要近几年中国的室内步行街发展迅速。
机械工程及自动化专业外文翻译--消防系统运行可靠性的估计
外文原文：Estimates of the Operational Reliability of Fire Protection Systems For the past three years，the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working to develop a new encryption standard to keep government information secure．The organization is in the final stages of an open process of selecting one or more algorithms，or data-scrambling formulas，for the new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and plans to make a decision by late summer or early fall．The standard is slated to go into effect next year．Richard W. Bukowski, P.E.Senior EngineerMST Building and Fire Research LaboratoryGaithersburg, MD 20899-8642 USAEdward K. Budnick, P.E., and Christopher F. Scheme1Vice President Chemical EngineerHughes Associates, Inc Hughes Associates, Inc. Baltimore, MD 21227-1652USA Baltimore, MD 2 1227-1652USABACKGROUNDFire protection strategies are designed and installed to perform specific functions. For example, a fire sprinkler system is expected to control or extinguish fires: To accomplish this, the system of sprinklers must open, and the required amount of water to achieve control or extinguishment must be delivered to the fire location. A fire detection system is intended to provide sufficient early warning of a fire to permit occupant notification and escape, fire services notification, and in some cases activation of other fire protection features (e.g., special extinguishing systems, smoke management systems). Both system activation (detection) and notification (alarm) must occur toachieve early warning. Construction compartmentation is generally designed to limit the extent of fire spread as well as to maintain the build ing’s structural integrity as well as tenability along escape routes for some specified period of time. In order to accomplish this, the construction features must be fire “rated” (based on standard tests) and the integrity of the features maintained.The reliability of individual fire protection strategies such as detection, automatic suppression, and construction compartmented is important input to detailed engineering analyses associated with performance based design. In the context of safety systems, there are several elements of reliability, including both operational and performance reliability. Operational reliability provides a measure of the probability that a fire protection system will operate as intended when needed. Performance reliability is a measure of the adequacy of the feature to successfully perform its intended action under specific fire exposure conditions. The former is a measure of component or system operability while the latter is a measure of the adequacy of the system design.The scope of this study was limited to evaluation of operational reliability due primarily to the form of the reported data in the literature. In addition to this distinction between operational and performance reliability, the scope focused on unconditional estimates of reliability and failure estimates in terms of fail-dangerous outcomes. A discussion of these terms is provided later in the paper.STUDY SCOOPThis paper provides a review of reported operational reliability and performance estimates for (1) fire detection, (2) automatic suppression, and to a limited extent (3) construction compartmentation. In general, the reported estimates for fire detection are largely for smoke detection fire alarm systems; automatic sprinklers comprise most of the data for automatic suppression, and compartmentation includes compartment fire resistance and enclosure integrity. It should be noted that in some cases the literature did not delineate beyond t he general categories of “fire detection” or “automatic suppression,” requiring assumptions regarding the specific type of fire protection system.Several studies reported estimates of reliability for both fire detection and automatic sprinkler system strategies. However, very little information was found detailing reliability estimates for passive fire protection strategies such as compartmentation. A limited statistical based analysis was performed to provide generalized information on the ranges of such estimates and related uncertainties. This latter effort was limited to evaluation of reported data on detection and suppression. Insufficient data were identified on compartmentation reliability to be included.This paper addresses elements of reliability as they relate to fire safety systems. The literature search that was performed for this analysis is reviewed and important findings and data summarized. The data found in the literature that were applicable to sprinkler and smoke detection systems reliability were analyzed, with descriptive estimates of the mean values and 95 percent confidence intervals for the operational reliability of these in situ systems reported.ELEMENTS OF RELIABILITY ANALYSISThere is considerable variation in reliability data and associated analyses reported in the literature. Basically, reliability is an estimate of the probability that a system or component will operate as designed over some time period..During the useful or expected life of a component, this time period is “reset” each time a component is tested and found to be in working order. Therefore, the more often systems and components are tested and maintained, the more reliable they are. This form of reliability is referred to as unconditional.Unconditional reliability is an estimate of the probability that a system will operate “on demand.” A conditional reliability is an estimate that two events of concern, i.e., a fire and successful operation of a fire safety system occur at the same time.Reliability estimates that do not consider a fire event probability are unconditional estimates.Two other important concepts applied to operational reliability are failed-safeand failed- dangerous. when a fire safety system fails safe, it operates when no fire event has occurred. A common example is the false alarming of a smoke detector. A fire safety system fails dangerous when it does not function during a fire event. In this study, the failed-dangerous event defines the Operational probability of failure (1-reliability estimate). A sprinkler system not operatingduring a fire event or an operating system that does not control or extinguish a fire are examples of this type of failure. The overall reliability of a system depends on the reliability of individual components and their corresponding failure rates, the interdependencies of the individual components that compose the system, and the maintenance and testing of components and systems once installed to veriy operability. All of these factors are of concern in estimating operational reliability.Fire safety system performance is also of concern when dealing with the overall concept of reliability. System performance is defined as the ability of a particular system to accomplish the task for which it was designed and installed. For example, the performance of a fire rated separation is based on the construction component’s ability to remain intact and provide fire separation during a fire. The degree to which these components prevent fire spread across their intended boundaries defines system performance.Performance reliability estimates require data on how well systems accomplish their design taskunder actual fire events or full scale tests. Information on performance reliability could not be discerned directly from many of the data sources reviewed as part of this effort due to the form of the presented data, and therefore, it is not addressed as a separate effect.The cause of failure for any type of system is typically classified into several general categories: installation errors, design mistakes, manufacturing/equipment defects, lack of maintenance, exceeding design limits, and environmental factors. There are several approaches that can be utilized to minimize the probability of failure. Such methodsinclude (1) design redundancy, (2) active monitoring for faults, (3) providing the simplest system (i.e., the least number of components) to address the hazard, and (4)a well designed inspection, testing, and maintenance program.These reliability engineering concepts are important when evaluating reliability estimates reported in the literature. Depending on the data used in a given analysis, the reliability estimate may relate to one or more of the concepts presented above. The literature review conducted under the scope of this effort addresses these concepts where appropriate. Most of the information that was obtained from the literature in support of this paper were reported in terms of unconditional operational reliability, i.e., in terms of the probability that a fire protection strategy will not fail dangerous.LITERATURE REVIEWA literature search was conducted to gather reliability data of all types for fire safety systems relevant to the protection strategies considered: automatic suppression, automatic detection, and compartmentation. The objective of the literature search was to obtain system-specific reliability estimates for the performance of each type of fire safety system as a function of generic occupancy type (e.g., residential, commercial, and institutional).Sources of information included national fire incident database reports, US Department of Defense safety records, industry and occupancy specific studies, insurance industry historical records and inspection reports documented in the open literature, and experimental data. Reports on experimental work and fire testing results were utilized only when fire detection, automatic suppression, or compartmentation strategies were explicitly evaluated. Tests of systems used for qualification, approval, or listing were also reviewed for information on failure modes. Published data from the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were included.General StudiesSeveral broad based studies were identified that reported reliability estimates for fire detection and fire suppression systems as well as construction compartmentation. These included (1) the Warrington Fire Research study [1996] in the United Kingdom, (2) the Australian Fire Engineering Guidelines [Fire Code Reform Center, 19961,(3) a compilation of fire statistics for Tokyo, Japan [Tokyo Fire Department, 19971,and (4)results from a study of in situ performance of fire protection systems in Japan [Watanabe, 19791.The Warrington Fire Research study addressed the reliability of fire safety systems and the interaction of their components. A Delphi methodology was used to develop discrete estimates of the reliability of detection and alarm systems, fire suppression systems, automatic smoke control systems, and passive fire protection (e.g., compartmentation).The Australian Fire Engineering Guidelines were developed as the engineering code of practice supporting the new performance-based Building Code of Australia. Following the methods in this guide, building fire safety performance is evaluated for mouldering, flaming non-flashover, and flaming flashover fires. The performance (ie., probability of detecting, extinguishing or controlling a fire event) of fire safety systems is predicted, accounting explicitly for the operational reliability of the particular system. Reliability estimates from an expert panel rather than from actual data are provided in the Guideline for this purpose.Finally, operational reliability data were reported in two separate studies in Japan. One study involved evaluation of fire incident reports from the city of Tokyo during the period from 1990 to 1997 [Tokyo Fire Department 1997 The other study involved review of fire incident reports throughout Japan during an earlier time period ending in 1978 [Watanabe 19791.Table 1 provides a summary of the reliability estimates provided in these studies.Significant differences exist in the individual reliability estimates depending on the parameters used to develop these estimates. Depending on the required accuracy in predicting future operational performance of fire protection systems, dependence on the range of estimates from these studies could significantly alter the results. In addition, the uncertainty associated with a single estimate of reliability or the existence of potentially important biases in the methods used to derive these estimates may limit their direct usefulness in addressing either operational or performance reliability of fire protection systems.Table 1. Published Estimates for Fire Protection Systems Operational Reliability(Probability of Success (YO))NA= Not AddressedReview of Available Reliability DataDue to the limited applicability of the reliability estimates published in the general literature, the literature review was extended in an effort to (1) develop an improved understanding of the elements of each of the three strategies under consideration that influence reliability, and (2) identify and evaluate quantitative data regarding individual system operability and failure rates.Automatic Suppression Systems (i.e., sprinkler systems)Table 2 provides a summary of reported operational reliability estimates from several studies that evaluated actual fire incidents in which automatic sprinklers were present. As a group, these studies vary significantly in terms of the reporting time periods, the types of occupancies, and the level of detail regarding the types of fires and the sprinkler system design.The estimates presented in Table 2 generally indicate relatively high operational reliability for automatic sprinkler systems. While some of the references include fire “control” or “extinguishment” as part of the reliability assessment, the reported data were not consistent. Therefore, operational reliability was assumed to be limited to sprinkler operation. The estimates also indicate a range of values, suggesting that it would be inappropriate to assign single value for sprinkler system reliability without attention to biases in the data sources and general uncertainty associated with combining data from different databases.中文译文：消防系统运行可靠性的估计前言在过去三年中，（美国）国家标准与技术局（NIST）已在研究开发一种新的加密标准，以确保政府的信息安全。
文献翻译
loss is serious. So the introduction of the fire surveillance system based on infrared or color image processing is activated in order to reduce this national loss. [1]-[5] There are advantages of infrared image processing for fire surveillance. One thing is that the monitoring is possible regardless of the illumination and climate condition. Another thing is that the data format of infrared image is simple. Color image has three kinds of pixel data. Therefore, the infrared camera based methods to enhance the reliability are much studied. [1]-[3] Mainly, the spatial domain analysis method and frequency analysis method are studied as the image processing algorithm of fire alarm vision system which quantifies the dynamic II. Flame algorithm characteristics of the flame and detection detects the fire. The spatial The flame area of infrared image the phenomenon that domain analysis method has muchhas less computation load than the pixel values change in large to the processing moving action frequency analysis method. The due real-time is of the flame and it has high luminance. On the other hand, the important for field applications. In this paper, the spatial luminance of the concrete object or rock is high in theof infrared domain analysis algorithm using the luminance variation of This work was supported by the Research-year Program Kongju
消防工程毕业设计_防排烟_自动报警_开题报告_外文翻译
第1章
1.1
该工程为某医院住院楼。占地面积2650.8m2，建筑面积45120m2.地下1层，地上18层，建筑总高69.5m，建筑物抗震设防烈度6度，建筑耐久年限100年（一级），整栋建筑为框剪结构。
存档编号
xx大学
North China UniversityofWater Resources and Electric Power
毕 业 设 计
题目某高层建筑消防系统设计
学院xxx学院
专业消防工程
摘
本文为一栋医院楼的防排烟系统和自动报警系统设计书。本工程为一栋医院的病房楼，地下一层，地上十八层，建筑总高度69.5米属于一类建筑。本次消防系统设计包括对建筑物内走道和大厅的机械排烟系统设计，电梯厅、楼梯间和前室的机械加压送风系统设计，每个楼层的火灾报警、广播系统、消防电话系统、联动系统。
本建筑按照现行规范为自动报警一级保护对象，系统采用控制中心报警系统，按照要求划分了报警区域和探测区域，根据规范要求各层均布置智能型烟感探头、消防广播系统；出口处设有智能型声光报警器、手动报警按钮；按照要求在消防电梯前室、设备间、泵房、值班室、控制室等部位设置消防电话分机。消防控制室设在一层东侧并且可以直通楼外。整个控制系统包括控制主机、消防电话盘、消防广播盘、多线控制盘，并在每层设置楼层显示器。整个系统可以监控各处报警信号，并由主机处理后续的联动控制过程。
The building is defined as first-level protection object and is divided into several different alarm zones and detection zones in accordance with the Code for Design Automatic Fire AlarmSystem, andit is designed to be protected by controlcenteralarmsystem. Thedocumentcontainsthe arrangement of intelligent smoke detector, fire radio system,intelligent sound and light alarm equipment, manual alarm button. Fire telephone extensionsare installedin the fire elevator room, equipment room, pump room, duty room, control room and other parts accordance withrequirements. Thefire control room located at the east of the first floor and has a door to outside of thebuilding. Thewhole control system is consisted by a control host,afire telephonepanel,afire radiopaneland amulti-linecontrol panel.Also,there isa firemonitorwhich isset at each floor. Theentire system couldsupervisethe various alarm signals, and then process subsequent linkage controlprocess.
智能住宅安防报警和远程控制系统中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文资料对照外文翻译基于单片机的智能住宅安防报警和远程控制系统摘要：为了对偷盗，抢劫和意外事故进行有效的监控和警告，统一使用单片机AT89C51的控制技术和红外探测技术，设计了一种无线防盗报警器，它包括硬件和软件两部分;硬件部分是由红外线感应器，发送和接收模块，单片机，声光报警等组成；软件部分是由主程序和音乐子程序组成。
采用C或汇编语言编写的源程序，在Keilc51平台上进行翻译和调试后，下载到单片机AT89C51芯片，并根据焊接在PCB板上的此单片机和其他主要设备设计一个电路。
对于电源，闭路循环控制开关，当有人入侵红外线发射区，产生声光报警，表示已经达到设计要求，这个项目展示了智能化住宅防盗报警，紧急报警，火灾报警器，有毒气体泄漏远程自动声音报警及远程控制系统，它是基于89C51单片机。
该系统可自动报警，自动致电警方热线电话号码。
它可用于语音报警，并显示发生报警的地址。
它可以设置和修改用户的密码。
它可以进行录制和语音提示。
它可用于电话远程控制电源。
该报警系统设计创新，具有多功能，成本低，可靠性高等诸多特点。
随着时代的不断进步，人们对自己的居住环境安全提出了更高的要求，不仅在生活，特别是在安全方面，一定要注意这些频繁发生的意外。
现在，许多区域已安装了智能报警系统，从而大大提高居住区的安全率，因为红外线是一种黑色的光，使用无线发射和接收，无需独立的布线，它具有很强的保密性和保密性，从而在安全，安保部分等安全领域的应用应该有很大的优势。
关键词：红外传感；发射；接收；单片机；警告一、简介随着计算机技术和控制技术及通信技术的发展，人民生活水平日益改善。
人民的生活条件已经发生了变化，例如产生了居住环境的安全和如何使他们生活得更加舒适等问题。
因此，智能化的住宅建筑的自动控制的出现顺应了时代的要求。
智能化小区必须有安全防范，防盗报警，火灾报警器，有毒气体泄漏自动报警和紧急呼叫等功能。
关键设备电源的远程控制是能够实现的。
土木工程建筑外文翻译外文文献高层建筑的消防安全设计
土木工程建筑外文翻译外文文献高层建筑的消防安全设计Fire Safety Design for High-rise BuildingsKeywords: fire safety, high-rise buildings, means of escape, fire resistant materials, fire detection and alarm systems, fire suppression systems, fire risk assessment, emergency plans1. Introduction2. Means of Escape3. Fire Resistant Materials4. Fire Detection and Alarm SystemsEarly detection of a fire is crucial to allow for the safe evacuation of occupants. High-rise buildings should be equipped with fire detection and alarm systems, including smoke detectors, heat detectors, and manual call points. These systems should be interconnected and monitored to ensure prompt notification of a fire.5. Fire Suppression Systems6. Fire Risk AssessmentBefore occupancy, a fire risk assessment should be conducted to identify potential fire hazards and ensure appropriate fire safety measures are in place. This assessment should considerthe building's use, occupant load, and fire resistance ofconstruction materials. Regular fire risk assessments shouldalso be conducted to address any changes in building use or occupancy.7. Emergency PlansHigh-rise buildings should have well-defined emergency plans that outline the actions to be taken in the event of a fire. These plans should include procedures for evacuating occupants, contacting emergency services, and isolating fire-affected areas. Regular drills and training sessions should be conducted to familiarize occupants with the emergency procedures.8. ConclusionFire safety design is critical in high-rise buildings to protect the lives of occupants and minimize property damage. Designers and engineers should consider means of escape, fire resistant materials, fire detection and alarm systems, fire suppression systems, fire risk assessments, and emergency plans when designing a high-rise building. By implementing these measures effectively, the risk of fire-related incidents can be significantly reduced.。
自动化专业外文翻译--自主灭火机器人的设计与构造
毕业设计（论文）外文翻译外文题目 Design and Construction of an Autonomous Fire Fighting robot 译文题目自主灭火机器人的设计与构造外文出处国际电机及电子学工程师联合会ICIET 2007 学生学院信息科学与工程学院专业班级自动化校内指导教师专业技术职务教授校外指导老师专业技术职务自主灭火机器人的设计与构造1Kashif AltafAisha Akbar, Bilal IjazCOMSATS信息工程学院电机工程学系，伊斯兰堡，巴基斯坦国立科学技术大学机电工程系，拉瓦尔品第，巴基斯坦kashifaltafl@摘要：在人工参与可能是太危险的情况下使用机器人的需求正在日益增长。
部署机器人灭火就是这样的应用之一。
本文是基于一个目的在于仿真现实世界场景的比赛机器人的结构。
本文将讨论一个完全自主的灭火机器人的设计，这个机器人能够在基于迷宫导航的线跟踪而专门设计的蓝色竞技场上通过利用荧光线构成的迷宫来导航。
在竞技场上有少许在机器人导航时必须避免的障碍，是为了机器人的设计包括壁障。
该机器人将跟踪白线，检测火焰抵达竞技场中不同位置的的蜡烛前并用风扇吹灭它。
这个机器人实施的理念为差动式驱动控制，避障，环境遥感，电子电路设计和迷宫导航（线追踪）。
机器人使用的传感器是光敏电阻器（交互式数字），并且机器人是由ATmega16微处理器控制的。
该机器人设计符合所订定的规则，并参加国家工程机器人竞赛（自然环境研究理事会），2005年，巴基斯坦。
1.引言国家工程机器人竞赛是由巴基斯坦的国立科学技术大学机电工程系主办的一年一度国家级机器人竞赛。
每年，机电一体化工程的第六学期学生的本学期项目包括由4-5个人组成的团体制作一个自主的机器人参加这个国家的盛事。
每一年，自然环境研究理事会的主题是不同的，2005年自然环境研究理事会的主题是消防。
在本次比赛中，不同的团队准备的机器人要在图1所示的平面布置图中互相竞争。
毕业设计论文 外文文献翻译 土木工程 给排水 公寓建筑物的防火安全设计
本科毕业论文外文文献及译文文献、资料题目：The Fire Safety Design Of ApartmentBuilding文献、资料来源：Journal of Asian Architecte andAuilding Engineering文献、资料发表（出版）日期：院（部）：市政与环境工程学院专业：班级：姓名：学号：指导教师：翻译日期：外文文献：THE FIRE SAFETY DESIGN OF APARTMENT BUILDINGSIn most fire engineered buildings, intervention of the fire brigade is not usually considered.The fire brigade provides the last line of attack on a fire, and usually the last opportunity tofind and rescue occupants. The intervention of the fire brigade is highly dependent on themreceiving an alarm or notification of a fire.The role of the fire brigade is important in an apartment fire as they can:Fight, suppress and extinguish the firePerform search and rescue operationsExternally rescue occupantsControl evacuation via the EWIS system or liftsPerform first aidReassure occupantsFor the fire brigade to perform their jobs properly they require:Adequate site accessAdequate water suppliesSuitably located fire system control centres and indicator panelsControls for liftsProtection from structural failure for an appropriate length of timeThe Australian and New Zealand building codes and standards provide design criteria for theabove requirements. Successful fire brigade intervention can be achieved with pre-planning,early alarm, rapid response and the provision of sufficient labour and equipment to deal withthe hazard (Beck et al, 1992).The time for the fire brigade to arrive and extinguish the fire is influenced by the followingcomponents:Time to detection of fire. Either by automatic systems or people (Buchanan, 1996).Time to notification of fire brigade (Buchanan, 1996).Fire brigade travel time (Buchanan, 1996).Access and search time for all floors (Buchanan, 1996).Fire brigade setup timeFire attack time (Buchanan, 1996).The Fire Engineering Guidelines (FCRC, 1996) contains a “Fire Brigade Communicationand Response” model which provides guidance on assessing the response of the fire brigade.The following fire brigade times are 95th percentile times taken from the FEG (FCRC, 1996).In a non-evacuation strategy, the fire brigade maybe relied upon to suppress and extinguish the fire. Therefore notification and arrival times are crucial.The arrival of the fire brigade may also be crucial in an emergency strategy where they arerequired to communicate with the occupants or assist the evacuation. If communication withoccupants is vital to the emergency strategy, appropriately trained wardens should takecharge prior to the arrival of the fire brigade.The intervention of the fire brigade needs to be negotiated with the approval authority orAuthority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) and fire brigade. The times for intervention need to beagreed upon by all relevant stakeholders.The activities of the fire brigade can be aided through sensible designs and architecture. Forexample, location of hydrants, hose reels and fire indicator panels should be designed suchthat they assist the operations of the fire brigade.Some of the problems faced by the fire brigade during a fire are: fighting the fire whilstassisting the evacuation, access to the fire floor being restricted with evacuating occupantsand reduced effectiveness due to fatigue after climbing stairs.8 B UILDING AND E GRESS C HARACTERISTICSThe building and egress characteristics are two of the most influential variables on the evacuation strategy and fire safety measures provided in a building. The primarybuildingand egress characteristics that influence the fire safety design are:Building heightNumber of exitsExit widthsEgress distanceBuilding construction and passive protectionRefuge floors and/or refuge areasLifts8.1Building HeightIn Australia and New Zealand the building height is major determinant of the fire safetysystems. When buildings are greater than 25m in effective height, there is a significant increase in the prescriptive requirements specified by the Building Code of Australia.The 25m building height limit is partly based on the limits of ladder access, and the ability ofthe fire brigade to rescue occupants and fight the fire externally. In Australian buildingsgreater than 25m, the prescriptive requirements require the buildings to be sprinkler protected and to have pressurised escape paths.The fire safety matrix presented in this report considers three building heights, with theheight limits being based on the BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC. It should be noted that the guidelines presented in the matrix do not strictly apply to these limits, and it is the responsibility of the fire engineer and approval authority to determine if an adequate level of safety has been achieved.The building height limits that have been considered are:Buildings less than 3 storeys. These buildings are characterised by unprotected escape paths and travel distances generally meeting code requirements. The buildings have short travel distances and external rescue is generally possible.Buildings greater than 3 storeys, less than 25m high. These buildings are characterised by having protected stairs, lifts and external rescue being possibleBuildings greater than 25m high. These buildings are characterised by havingprotected stairs, lifts, relatively long travel distances and limited external rescue options.8.2Number of Exits, Exit Width and Egress DistanceThe Building Code of Australia and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC comprehensively cover the number of exits, minimum exit widths and maximum egress distances for apartment buildings. If the egress characteristics of a building are not fire engineered from first principles, then it is recommended that the code requirements be used as default values.The following is a summary of the Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) requirements. The summary applies to Class 2 buildings (BCA) and SR Purpose Group buildings (Acceptable Solutions to NZBC).8.2.1 Acceptable Solutions to NZBCPrescriptive egress requirements for SR purpose groups.The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC maximum egress distances are for SR purpose groups. The open path distance is calculated from the furthermost point inside theapartment.Open path lengths and horizontal safe path lengths can be increased by:15% where heat detectors are installed50% where sprinklers are installed100% where smoke detectors are installed100% where the occupant density does not exceed 0.05 people/m28.2.2 Building Code of AustraliaThe clauses for the number of exits, exit-travel distances and the dimensions of exit paths,extracted from the BCA, are located in Appendix B.In summary:All buildings require at least one exit. Buildings over 25m high require two exits. The maximum allowable exit travel distance may govern the number of exits.The maximum travel distance from a sole-occupancy unit is 6m, to a point where travel in different directions to two exits is available. The maximum distance between alternative exits is 45m.The minimum width of an exit is 1.0m or 1.8m in a passageway. The minimum width of the exit increases when occupant numbers are in excess of 100 on a storey.8.3Building Construction and Passive ProtectionAll apartment buildings will have a fire resistance rating for building structure and fire barriers. This fire resistance can either be determined from the relevant Building Code or through a fire engineering analysis.Passive protection is one of the most important elements in the prevention of fire spread and limiting fire size. By breaking up the building into vertical and horizontal compartments, the fuel is broken down into smaller units that will reduce the potential fire size. Passive protection is also essential in preventing and limiting smoke spread through the building.In the context of this report, the main objective for passive protection is to limit the fire and smoke to the apartment of fire origin or at least the floor of fire origin. This will reduce the threat to other occupants in the building, and provide enough time forthem escape, or for the fire brigade to suppress the fire.The compartment and structural fire resistance rating of an apartment can be determined from the time equivalence formula. By using this method, an apartment should be designed to contain a fire until complete burn out. This should therefore ensure the fire does not spread beyond the apartment of origin.Fire separation and compartmentation relies on doors, walls, floors, ceilings, glazing, smoke dampers and construction units (Bukowski et al, 1999). For effective passive protection these factors need to be inspected, tested and maintained regularly. It is recommended that selfclosers be used on doors that open into common areas, to prevent fire and smoke spread from apartments to common areas or escape paths. There is very little literature on the reliability of passive protection (Bukowski et al, 1999). A survey of experts has estimated the reliability of passive protection to be 95% for construction with no openings, and 90% for construction with openings and with self-closers (FCRC, 1996). Similarly, a Delphi group study in the UK estimated the reliability of masonry and gypsum construction to have a reliability of 81% and 69% respectively (Bukowski et al, 1999).The fire safety matrix makes a distinction between low and high passive protection. This distinction is used to demonstrate different relative levels of safety between an occupant in an adjacent apartment and one who is in a corridor. If an occupant is in a corridor, at a minimum, they will have one wall and one door (assuming it is closed or has a self-closer) separating them from the fire. If the occupant remains in their room they will have two walls and two doors (assuming it is closed or has a self-closer) separating them from the fire and hence a higher level of protection. The door from the apartment of fire origin door could be either open or closed, which increases the risk to occupants in the corridor and hence the term low protection is used.8.4Stair RequirementsIn an emergency, the primary means of egress in multi-storey occupancies are stairs. Different building codes have different requirements for the number of stairs and the width of stairs (Refer Section 8.2 and Appendix B).The Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) requires apartment buildings (Class 3) to have at least one exit from every storey and two exits where the building exceeds 25m. However, the maximum travel distances from the door of an apartment permitted by the prescriptive requirements are:6m to an exit, or a point from which travel in different directions to two exits is available, or20m from a single exit serving the storey at the level of egress to a road or open space.Therefore, even though two exits are required in apartment buildings greater than 25m high, in many cases to meet travel distances specified by the BCA, two stairs will be necessary.The minimum number of exits, in the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991), are based on the number of beds (ie the occupant load) in the apartment building. For apartments with less than 100 beds two exits are required. For apartments with over 100 beds two exits are required, plus an additional exit for every 100 beds or part thereof greater than 100.The objective of two stairs is to provide an alternative means of egress if one exit is blocked. Having multiple stair shafts can also reduce egress distances and allow occupants to change egress routes depending on the conditions.The three main factors building codes use to determine if two or more stairs are required, are the number of occupants, the number of floors and the characteristics of the occupants. Some of the additional areas that should be considered in determining the stair requirements are:Fire brigade utilisation and rescue operationsSprinkler protectionFire resistance rating of exit pathsSmoke control systems in the exit pathsEmergency planTo determine the relative effectiveness of a single stair, Hagiwara et al (1997) have proposed a probabilistic model based on the expected number of occupants unable toescape. The model provides a basis for evaluating a single stair against the building code based on:The probability of a fire occurrence in the roomThe probability the fire develops into a hazardous fireThe probability the door is left openThe efficiency of rescue by the fire brigadeThe degree of protection of the escape routeSingle stair buildings are permitted in the UK provided certain conditions are met. Clause 3.18 of Approved Document B (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000) states:3.18 Every dwelling should have access to alternative escape routes so that a person confronted by the effects of an outbreak of fire in another dwelling can turn away from it and make safe escape. However, a single escape route from dwelling entrance door is acceptable if either:(a) the dwelling is separated from the common stair and:(i) every dwelling is separated from the common stair by a protected lobby or common corridor (see diagram 12), and(ii) the travel distance limitations in Table, on escape in one direction only, are observed; Effectively, this means that the required number of stairs is not a function of the building height, provided travel distances and other building requirements are met. Therefore, it is possible to have tall single stair apartment buildings. Figure 2 shows the maximum travel distances and stair requirements of Approved Document B (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000).Some of the important requirements for single stair buildings is the provision of openable vents and/or automatic opening vents in the stairs and the corridors. These vents provide a means of venting the stairs of smoke, for both occupants and fire brigade.8.5Refuge Floors and AreasRefuge floors and areas provide rest locations for escaping occupants, a safe area for both disabled and able-bodied occupants and a staging area for the fire brigade. The BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC do not prescribe refuge floors, however they are prescribed in the Hong Kong building code (Lo and Will, 1997). In a fire engineered apartment building refuge floors may be justifiable if the building was an ultra high-rise building, with excessive travel distance via stairs.Refuge areas are more commonly used in Australia and New Zealand to provide safe areas for disabled occupants. In apartment buildings a common emergency strategy is for disabled occupants is to remain in their apartments until assistance arrives.8.5.1Refuge floorsThe Building Code of Australia and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC do not specify refuge floors for apartment buildings. However, they are prescriptive requirements for highrise buildings in the Hong Kong Code of Practice (Lo and Will, 1997).The functions of refuge floors (Lo and Will, 1997) are to:Act as a relief area for the evacuees in a fire situationAct as a sub-base for fire fighting purposesAct as a command point for the rescue personnel to assist the evacuation of the buildingProvide a place for disabled or partially disabled occupants to wait for assistance before being evacuatedAllow occupants to move to an alternative staircaseAllow smoke separation at the refuge level in the stair caseLo and Will (1997) also state that refuge floors can psychologically assist occupants under escape conditions. Refuge floors can psychologically relieve occupants by:Reassuring them that the height of escape is not too onerousProviding an area for cognitive and decision controlSeeing the presence of fire brigade personnelRefuge floors can also be used as a safe area where lifts are controlled andco-ordinated for egress. Passenger lifts not used on the fire floor can be used at the refuge floor to evacuate occupants (Lo and Will, 1997). High-rise buildings are usually broken up into low-rise, midrise and high-rise sections, with lifts that serve each section separately. To assist in rescue operations, lifts that do not serve the fire floor can be used for rescue and mobilisation of fire brigade personnel and equipment. The arguments against refuge floors (Lo and Will, 1997) are that:They provide an additional cost to the building owner in terms of building costand non-utilised spaceIt can be difficult to maintain and enforce the use of refuge floorsThere are already protected escape routesUnless people have difficulty in escaping they are unlikely to remain on the refuge floorFor residential buildings, Lo and Will (1997) believe that refuge floors may be necessary to provide an area of safety if conditions become untenable due to longpre-movement times.Another approach to using refuge floors is to reduce the effective height of high-rise buildings (Teh, 1994). Since the height is directly proportional to egress time, the provision of adequately protected refuge areas can reduce the effective buildingheight. Therefore once occupants have reached a refuge floor they can be considered to be safe. To achieve this The (1994) proposes the following requirements:Additional provisions to prevent smoke infiltration (smoke stopping of allvertical shafts)All lifts connecting to the refuge floor to be accessible through smoke lobbiesThe refuge floor must be accessible at all times and capable of accommodatingthe projected number of peopleA substantial part of the refuge floor is to be natural vented or capable of being naturally vented (ideally the refuge area should be a part of an external area)The design and layout of exit stairs should discharge occupants into the refuge floor before they proceed further downPressurisation of exit stairs can be separated into vertical zones to avoid failuresof the system affecting the whole stairRefuge floors in apartment buildings may assist the evacuation of occupants, but requirements of refuge floors need to be assessed against: other fire safety measures, the cost of a refuge floor and the emergency strategy. With the provision of sprinklers, compartmentation and smoke control, the need for a refuge floor in apartment buildings is questionable. Apartment buildings are generally fire separated between individual units, at each floor level and between escape paths. The areas that are fire separated from each other could be designed as refuge areas reducing the need for an entire refuge floor. Occupants also have option to remain in their apartments, where they have access to fresh air from windows.The cost of a refuge floor also needs to be considered in conjunction with the cost of other fire safety systems. The opportunity cost of a refuge floor is the: loss of rental space, loss of real estate and cost of maintaining the floor. These cost could easily outweigh the cost of a sprinkler system that may provide a higher level protection.In high-rise buildings fires, where smoke control systems have failed, a refuge floor withadequate natural cross ventilation, could have assisted occupant egress. The World Trade Centre bombing (Fahy and Proulx, 1996) and the MGM Grand fire (NFPA,1982a) are two possible cases where injury and fatalities may have been avoided, if the occupants were able to get to a refuge floor with adequate ventilation. In these two fires, exits were compromised by smoke and occupants were evacuating through poor conditions.In ultra high-rise buildings, defined as greater than 40 storeys (Lo and Will, 1997), refuge floors could be of some assistance for disabled, elderly and other occupants who need assistance to evacuate. However, these occupants may be better served through refuge areas on each floor or by the occupants remaining in their apartments. Lo and Will (1997) argue that refuge areas do not have the same psychological benefits for the escaping occupants, as a refuge floor, and therefore are not as effective.8.5.2Refuge areasThe Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) require refuge areas in apartment buildings greater than 58m high with intermediate floors. These refuge areas are to be located at intervals of no greater than 3 floors in the vertical safe paths, be at least 800mm wide and have an area of no less than 2m2. Guidance on refuge areas is also provided in British Standard BS5588 - Part 8, 1998 (BSI, 1988).The NFPA Life Safety Code (Cote, 1997) requires people with severe mobility impairment to have at least two means of accessible egress. One method to achieve this is through the provision of a compliant refuge area.The effectiveness of refuge areas is highly dependent on the design details. Someof details that need to be considered are fire exposure, reliability of the smoke control system, outside wind and temperature condition. Without pressurisationall refuge areas can be subject to lethal failure (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993).In many cases, the people needing the refuge areas may be unable to reach the area before their pathways become untenable (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993)The organisation and human behaviour problems involved with refuge areas are more complex (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993).The operation of a sprinkler system eliminates the life threat to all occupants and can provide superior protection for people with disabilities as compared to arefuge area. (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993)Klote (1993) found pressurisation of refuge areas could be significantly influenced by, opening and closing of doors, window breakage and external wind pressures. Generally, refuge areas can be effectively pressurised by a direct pressurisation system or an indirect pressurisation system using lift shafts. But an indirect pressurisation system using the stairwell may not be effective or appropriate (Klote, 1993).8.6LiftsThe use of lifts or elevators for emergencies is not a new concept, but they are typically only used with fire brigade assistance. In general, occupants are told not to use lifts in a fire. However, the fire brigade has often used lifts to rescue people and mobilise equipment. Lifts have also been used in hospitals to move non-ambulatory patients.The use of lifts for fire fighting and assisting rescue operations provides an efficient means of moving people and equipment. This is particularly important in high-rise buildings, where moving equipment takes time and uses valuable resources. An example of this was the First Interstate Bank, where lifts were not used, and a fire on the 12th floor required 100 men to carry equipment up the stairs (Degenkolb, 1991). The BCA requires buildings with an effective height greater then 25m to have one or more lifts, fitted as an emergency lift (Performance Requirement EP3.2, BCA, 1996). This is to facilitate the activities of the fire brigade and other emergency service personnel. In addition to this, stretcher facilities must be provided in at least one of those emergency lifts, or in a non emergency lift where the effective building height is greater than 12m.The British Standard BS 5588 – Part 8 1988 (BSI, 1988), provides guidance on the use of lifts for evacuation of disabled people. BS 5588 Part 8 provides guidance on the design of lifts used for evacuations as well as the management of evacuation lifts, and examples of fire plan strategies in buildings with evacuation lifts.The some of the problems with the use of lifts for egress are:Pressurisation of shafts is not necessarily effective for smoke control (Klote et al, 1993)Lift components can be affected by heat, smoke and water (Klote et al, 1993)Power failure (Klote et al, 1993)Potential of lifts opening onto the fire floorThe evacuation needs to be controlled and co-ordinated and the number of occupants entering the lift needs to be regulatedLift shafts can act as chimneys exposing occupants to heat and smoke.Occupants have been told for the last 20 years not to use lifts in a fire (Klote et al, 1993)Pressure differentials in lift shafts can vary with building geometry and at different floors (Klote, 1983)Lift microprocessor controls are very sensitive to heat (Semple, 1993)Fire brigade shutting off the power can be a problem. Batteries will only run for a limited length of time (Semple, 1993).Malfunctions in an emergency could lead to litigation (Semple, 1993).There is limited opportunity for rescue of people trapped between floors (Pauls et al, 1991)The some of the other reasons why lifts are unsafe stated in the ASME Elevator Code and Handbook A17.1 (Cote, 1997) are:Occupants may push a button and waste valuable time waiting for a lift that may not arriveLifts can not start until the car and hoistway (lift shaft) doors are closed. Overcrowding may prevent these doors from closingA lift occupant could press the incorrect buttonNormal functioning of lifts such as high or low call reversal may occur at the fire FloorThe NFPA Life Safety Code (Cote, 1997) does not recognise lifts as a typical means of escape, but it does allow their use under certain circumstances. If a lift complies with Section 7-4 of the Code, it is permitted as a second means of egress, provided:The building and surrounding structure is protected throughout by an automatic sprinkler systemThe building is subject to an occupancy of no more than 90 peoplePrimary egress discharges directly to the outsideThere are no high hazard content areas in the building or attached structures100% of the egress capacity shall be provided independent of the liftsAn evacuation plan is implemented specifically including the liftThe most immediate application for the use of lifts, in the evacuation of apartment buildings, is for the evacuation of disabled and elderly occupants and the evacuation of low occupancy high-rise apartments.The escape times for lift egress can be calculated from the following formula (Klote et al,1993)Klote et al (1993) found that the use of lifts for egress decreases building evacuation times by between 10 and 50%. Greater evacuation efficiency occurs as the height of the building increases. The time-savings are a result of using a combination of lifts and stairs for evacuation. A similar result was found by Andersson and Wadensten (2000), in their simulations of the One Canada Square building at Canary Wharf in London, where they found that lifts improved the evacuation procedures in the building.The following are 13 criteria for safe lift egress design proposed by Chapman (1994)1. The building be fully sprinkler protected2. Lift shafts should be pressurised3. Lift lobbies on all floors should be enclosed4. Lift lobbies should be pressurised5. Lift and lobby pressurisation intakes should be in a smoke free location6. All lift lobbies should be protected by smoke detectors7. Lift systems should be made water resistant8. When a power failure occurs all lifts should return to their designated level9. All lifts should be able to be operated from a designated emergency power generator10. All lift lobbies should have access to a pressurised stair, without the occupants having to pass through a fire area11. All lift cars should have a means of two way communication12. All lift lobbies should have a means of two way communication13. A program specifying the priority of lift response during a fire should be developed.For lifts to be effective in evacuations, some other design concepts that should be considered are:Smoke and fire separation of lift machine room and lift shaft (Klote, 1993, Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Analogue addressable detection system linked to lift control to prevent lift stopping on fire floors and to prioritise floors for evacuation (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Automatically recall lift if a fault is detected (Klote, 1993, Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Wardens or security staff to direct evacuations, reassure occupants and prioritise who uses the lifts, and also to control occupant numbers in the lifts (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Provide a system to prevent the lift stopping on floors where heat is detected, or providing fire rated lobbies on all floors (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994)Higher levels of protection for lift system, if building is non sprinkler protected (Klote et al, 1995)Load weighting device, so lift bypasses all other calls when fully loaded (Fox,1991)Lifts connected to alarm panel and sent to the top floor in an emergency and only responding to calls in the down direction (Fox, 1991)Have machine room close to ground level, therefore if occupants are trapped in the lift the time to access machine room is reduced (Gatfield, 1991).Reduce lobby sizes to prevent storage of combustible materials. BS5588 Part 5。
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火灾自动报警系统毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献nal electronic fire alarm system relies on sensors to automatically detect a fire and trigger an alarm。
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certain physical quantities within the sensor change。
allowing for the n of infrared n。
This type of sensor can operate at room temperature and iscommonly used in us ns such as surveillance systems and fire n devices.In summary。
infrared n aids play a crucial role in us industries and ns。
While there are different types of sensors available。
each with their own advantages and ns。
it is important to consider factors such as sensitivity。
wavelength。
and temperature requirements when selecting the appropriate sensor for a specific n.The sensitivity of the n is very high and the response speed is quick。
nally。
it is not dependent on the infrared n wavelength and can only detect the background n limit。
making it a very convenient n。
This article presents the design of a passive infrared n aid。
The article mainly elaborates on the principle of the infrared n aid。
the content of the hot release。
and the characteristics of the electric detector alarm circuit。
as well as the BISS0001 signal processor and 555 timers。
Finally。
the hardware electric circuit for the hot release infrared n alarm apparatus is designed and completed.With the widespread use of fire in modern households。
electricity n has increased。
and the frequency of home fires has risen。
In the event of a fire。
it is often difficult to control the flames due to a lack of firefighting equipment and panicked individuals。
This can lead to significant loss of life and property。
Therefore。
it is important to understand the characteristics of household fires and take preventative measures.Preventing domestic fires and cing fire losses is of great practical significance。
To achieve this。
it is essential to have proper fire n measures in place。
These measures include installing smoke detectors。
having fire extinguishers readily available。
and educating family members on fire safety.In n to preventative measures。
it is important to understand the characteristics of household fires。
These fires often start in the kitchen due to cooking accidents or electrical ns。
They can also occur in bedrooms due to faulty wiring or the improper use of heating devices。
Understanding these factors can help individuals take proactive steps to prevent fires from occurring.Overall。
preventing domestic fires and minimizing fire losses requires a n of preventative measures and an understanding of the characteristics of household fires。
By taking these steps。
individuals can protect their families and homes from the devastating effects of fires.In modern urban families。
many people lack common sense when it comes to home security and fire n。
This can lead to devastating consequences。
including the n of homes and even loss of life。
To prevent household fires。
it is important for people to understand the main causes of fires and learn how to protect themselves in case of an emergency.Every year in the United Kingdom。