会计理论论文 (3)

Other tests of CFO turnover
1.Some other tests of CFO turnover which are reported on Appendix show similar results in Table 4 and Table 5.
2.Appendix reports on addititional tests of the interaction between the CEO and CFO turnover (reclassify any voluntary CEO turnover as forced if it occurred within one year of a forced CFO turnover)
3.Some earnings management may be unaviodable or optimal.
5.2 Hazard analysis of CEO turnover
(competing-risks hazard models)
Implication: In all models,earnings management is positively and significantly related to the hazard rate for forced CEO turnover,and insignificantly related to the hazard rate in voluntary turnovers.
6. Possible explanations 7. Conclusion

1. Introduction

This paper examines whether internal controls work to discipline one type of self-serving managerial activity—managing earnings. Our results indicate that earnings management increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover in the subsequent year. In contrast, it has no significant effect on voluntary turn- overs.
The result of Analysis of Variance

Firm performance(46%—52%) plays a very important role in a board’s decision to fire its CEO. But earnings management(15%—26%) also is important, with an impact that is approximately. One-third to one-half that of firm performance.
5.1 Multinomial logistic regressions
Implication: The coefficents reported in Table indicate that earnings management is an determinant of forced CEO turnover.
6.1. Poor firm performance

Our results are consistent with previous findings that CEOs are more likely to be ousted in poorly performing firms (e.g., see Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Gorton, Huang, and Kang, 2009). Indeed, 229 of the 324 forced turnovers (for which we have data on abnormal accruals) . In our sample have negative industry-adjusted returns in the 12-month period before the ouster. This raises the question of whether the forced turnovers we observe occur primarily when performance is poor and CEOs try to make poor earnings look better .


1. Introduction
2. Earnings management and forced ouster 3. Data 4. Forced vs. voluntary CEO turnovers: univariate comparisons

5. Earnings management and CEO turnover: multivariate tests
Hale Waihona Puke Baidu
The result of Analysis of Variance
Given that the CEO retains her position at time t1, a one-standard-deviation increase in the earnings management variable is associated with a 17% to 36% increase in the hazard of forced CEO turnover using the coefficients in Models1–4. While a one-standard-deviation increase in the industry-adjusted firm return variable is associated with a 41% to 47% decrease in the hazard of forced CEO turnover.
5.3 Earnings management and CEO job tenure (Tobit regression model)
I m p l i c a t i o n s : The CEO job tenure is negatively and significantly related to earnings management.
1.The probability of force turnover ouster is not highly sensitive to low levels of earnings management.
2.It's primarily when managers aggressively manage earnings that they face a substantially higher likehood of ouster
3. Data——3.2 Earnings management

We measure earnings management as the absolute value of abnormal accruals. Eq.(1)


Eq.(2)
Abnormal accrual
4. Forced vs. voluntary CEO turnovers: univariate comparisons

2. Earnings management and forced ouster

A representative manager can engage in earnings management (e) to generate personal benefits B(e), where B’(e)＞0. we postulate that managers are fired if they manage earnings beyond some threshold level . the probability of getting fired is π(e, x, g）=Pr{e≥ ｜x, g}. Managers earn quasi-rents from the job C＞0. personal net benefits = B(e) -π(e, x, g)C B’(e) = π’(e, x, g)C， π’(e, x, g) ＞0


6.5. Do ousted CEOs suffer career consequences?
6.6. Corporate governance and the cost of earnings management 6.7. How is earnings management costly to shareholders?

1. Introduction

Two primary contributions: 1) At least some boards move proactively to replace managers who manage earnings aggressively, whether or not the manipulations become severe enough to attract public attention. 2） This evidence highlights a previously underappreciated determinant of forced CEO turnover.
Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management
Sonali Hazarika, Jonathan M.Karpoff, Rajarishi Nahata
Reported by: 王倩、廖芯谊、陈正霞
Framework
5.Earnings management and CEO turnover

5.1
Multinomial logistic regression


5.2
5.3 5.4
Hazard analysis of CEO turnovuer
Earnings management and CEO job tenure CFO turnover
盈余管理 被迫离职 率的增长
Plot the percentage increase in the implied probability of forced turnover compared to the lowest level of earnings management
Implications of panel A and panel B
The results are similar.
6. Possible explanations

6.1. Poor firm performance 6.2. Endogeneity 6.3. Earnings restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and publicity 6.4. Do managers risk ouster only when they inflate earnings?


盈余管理
离职率的 拟合值
We use Model 2 of Table 3 to calculate the fitted value of probability of forced turnover for all firm-years,and group the fitted value by earning management decile.


3. Data——3.1 CEO turnover
18,516 firmyears without CEO turnover At the end of Peak 2004, there were 1,302 incumbent CEOs holding office and who could leave their positions in future years..
5.4 CFO turnover
(competing-risk hazard regression)
Implication: Earnings management is positively and significantly related to the hazard rate for forced CFO turnover,and insignificantly related to the hazard rate in voluntary turnovers.