公共资源的悲剧(Hardin,英汉对照)

公有资源的悲剧by Garrett Hardin

In 1974 the general public got a graphic illustration of the "tragedy of the commons" in satellite photos of the earth. Pictures of northern Africa showed an irregular dark patch, 390 square miles in area. Ground-level investigation revealed a fenced area inside of which there was plenty of grass. Outside, the ground cover had been devastated.

1974年，广大公众在一张地球卫星图片中看到了“公有资源的悲剧”的一个图例。北非的图片中有一块不规则的黑色区域，面积为390平方英里。地面调查发现了一个被围起来的区域，里面有丰富的草。在它的外面，地被植物已经被毁坏。

The explanation was simple. The fenced area was private property, subdivided into five portions. Each year the owners moved their animals to a new section. Fallow periods of four years gave the pastures time to recover from the grazing. They did so because the owners had an incentive to take care of their land. But outside the ranch, no one owned the land. It was open to nomads and their herds. Though knowing nothing of Karl Marx, the herdsmen followed his famous advice of 1875: "... to each according to his needs." Their needs were uncontrolled and grew with the increase in the number of animals. But supply was governed by nature, decreasing drastically during the drought of the early seventies. The herds exceeded the natural "carrying capacity" of their environment, soil was compacted and eroded, and "weedy" plants, unfit for cattle consumption, replaced good plants. Many cattle died, and so did humans.

原因很简单。围起来的地区是私有财产，被分成五个部分。财产所有者每年把他们的牛羊转移到一个新的部分。四年的休耕期使草场得以恢复。他们这么做的原因是，所有者有保护其土地的动机。但是，在农场的外面，土地是无主的，草场是对所有牧民和他们的牧群敞开的。虽然牧民根本不知道卡尔?马克思，却听从他1875年的教导：“……按需分配。”他们的需要不受控制，随牛羊数量增加。但是，供给受大自然支配。70年代早期的干旱使供给急剧减少，牧群的规模超过了环境的“自然承受能力”，土壤干结并遭到腐蚀，不适合家畜的“杂草”取代了好的植物。很多牛羊死掉，人也是如此。

The rational explanation for such ruin was given more than 150 years ago. In 1832 William Forster Lloyd, a political economist at Oxford University, looking at the recurring devastation of common (i.e., not privately owned) pastures in England, asked: "Why are the cattle on a common so puny and stunted? Why is the common itself so bare-worn, and cropped so differently from the adjoining inclosures?"

150年前，这样的毁灭就有了合理的解释。1832年，牛津大学的政治经济学家William Forster Lloyd，看到英格兰公共（即没有被私人拥有的）草场以在被毁坏，他问道：“为什么公共草场上的牛羊是那么瘦小？为什么公共草场本身那么贫瘠？种植方式如此不同于与之相邻的被圈起来的土地呢？”

Lloyd's answer assumed that each human exploiter of the common was guided by self-interest. At the point when the carrying capacity of the commons was fully reached, a herdsman might ask himself, "Should I add another animal to my herd?" Because the herdsman owned his animals, the gain of so doing would come solely to him. But the loss incurred by overloading the

Lloyd的回答是，利用公共资源的人都受私利引导。当达到公共资源的最大承受能力时，一个牧民也许问自己，“我应该扩大我的牧群吗？”牧民拥有自己的牲畜，扩大牧群的利益全归他自己。但是，过度放牧带来的损失将由全体牧民共同分担。因为归私人的利益将

pasture would be "commonized" among all the herdsmen. Because the privatized gain would exceed his share of the commonized loss, a self-seeking herdsman would add another animal to his herd. And another. And reasoning in the same way, so would all the other herdsmen. Ultimately, the common property would be ruined. 超过他分担的共同损失，这个只顾自己的牧民就会不断扩大他的牧群。同理，所有牧民都会这么做。最终，公共财产将被毁坏。

Even when herdsmen understand the long-run consequences of their actions, they generally are powerless to prevent such damage without some coercive means of controlling the actions of each individual. Idealists may appeal to individuals caught in such a system, asking them to let the long-term effects govern their actions. But each individual must first survive in the short run. If all decision makers were unselfish and idealistic calculators, a distribution governed by the rule "to each according to his needs" might work. But such is not our world. As James Madison said in 1788, "If men were angels, no Government would be necessary." That is, if all men were angels. But in a world in which all resources are limited, a single nonangel in the commons spoils the environment for all.

即使牧民理解其行为的长期后果，如果没有某种强迫手段制约每个人的行为，他们通常也无力防止此类破坏。理想主义者会向陷入这样一个体系中的个人发出呼吁，请求他们让长期后果主导他们的行为。但是，每个人都必须首先在短期内生存。如果所有决策者都是无私的和理想化的计算者，“按需所取”的准则支配的收入分配也许是可行的，但我们的世界不是这样的。正如James Madison在1788所说，“如果人是天使，那么，不需要政府。”即是说，倘若所有的人都是天使。但是，在所有资源都有限的世界上，一个不是天使的人就可以破坏所有人的环境。

The spoilage process comes in two stages. First, the nonangel gains from his "competitive advantage" (pursuing his own interest at the expense of others) over the angels. Then, as the once noble angels realize that they are losing out, some of them renounce their angelic behavior. They try to get their share out of the commons before competitors do. In other words, every workable distribution system must meet the challenge of human self-interest. An unmanaged commons in a world of limited material wealth and unlimited desires inevitably ends in ruin. Inevitability justifies the epithet tragedy, which I introduced in 1968.

破坏过程分两个阶段。首先，这个不是天使的人从他的“竞争优势”（损人利己）中获利。然后，一旦高尚的天使认识到他们正在走向失败，他们中的一些人就会放弃他们的天使行为，努力抢在竞争者之前得到他们在这个公共资源中的份额。换句话说，每一种可行的收入分配体制都必须接受人类的私利挑战。在物质财富有限和人的欲望无限的世界上，一个没有管理的公社必然逐步走向毁灭。这个必然性说明我在1968年提出的悲剧这个称呼是恰当的。

Whenever a distribution system malfunctions, we should be on the lookout for some sort of commons. Fish populations in the oceans have been decimated because people have interpreted the "freedom of the seas" to include an unlimited right to fish them. The fish were, in effect, a commons. In the seventies, nations began to assert their sole right to fish out to two hundred miles from shore (instead of the traditional three miles). But these exclusive rights did not

每当收入分配体制出故障时，我们就应该警惕某种类型的公共资源。海洋中的鱼群被大批捕杀，原因是人们把“公海自由”解释为不受限制的捕鱼权。事实上，鱼是公共资源。在70年代，一些国家开始宣布距海岸线200海里（而不是传统的3海里）以内的专属捕捞权。但是，这些专有权并没有消除公共资源问题。它们只不过把公共资源问题限制

eliminate the problem of the commons. They merely restricted the commons to individual nations. Each nation still has the problem of allocating fishing rights among its own people on a noncommonized basis. If each government allowed ownership of fish within a given area, so that an owner could sue those who encroach on his fish, owners would have an incentive to refrain from overfishing. But governments do not do that. Instead, they often estimate the maximum sustainable yield and then restrict fishing either to a fixed number of days or to a fixed aggregate catch. Both systems result in a vast overinvestment in fishing boats and equipment as individual fishermen compete to catch fish quickly. 在个别国家之内。每个国家仍旧有在其人民中分配捕鱼权的问题。如果每个政府允许私人拥有一定水域内的鱼，从而所有者能够控告那些侵犯者，那么，所有者就会有动机避免过分捕捞。但是，政府并不这么做。相反，政府通常估计最大可持续产量，然后限制捕捞，固定捕鱼的天数或固定捕捞总量。由于渔民们比的是捕鱼的速度，这两个体制都造成在渔船和设备方面的过多投资。

Some of the common pastures of old England were protected from ruin by the tradition of stinting, the limitation of each herdsman to a fixed number of animals (not necessarily the same for all). Such cases are spoken of as "managed commons," which is the logical equivalent of socialism. Viewed this way, socialism may be good or bad, depending on the quality of the management. As with all things human, there is no guarantee of permanent excellence. The old Roman warning must be kept constantly in mind: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"Who shall watch the watchers themselves?"

古代英格兰有限制每个牧民的牲畜数量（不一定每个人的牧群都相同）的传统，这一传统保护了有些公共草场。此类情况被称为“有管理的公共资源，”逻辑上等于社会主义。从这个角度看，社会主义可以是好的，也可以是坏的，视管理质量而定。像所有人类事务那样，永久的优点是没有保证的。必须时刻牢记古罗马人的警告：Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?“谁来监督监督者本人呢？”

Under special circumstances even an unmanaged commons may work well. The principal requirement is that there be no scarcity of goods. Early frontiersmen in the American colonies killed as much game as they wanted without endangering the supply, the multiplication of which kept pace with their needs. But as the human population grew larger, hunting and trapping had to be managed. Thus, the ratio of supply to demand is of critical importance.

在特殊情况下，甚至没有管理的公共资源也会运行得很好。主要条件是，不存在物品的稀缺性。美洲殖民地的早期开拓者可以随意猎杀动物，而不会危及供给，因为这些动物的繁殖赶得上他们的需要。但是，随着人口增长，猎捕活动必须受到限制。因此，供给对需求的比率变得十分重要。

The scale of the commons (the number of people using it) also is important, as an examination of Hutterite communities reveals. These devoutly religious people in the northwestern United States live by Marx's formula: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." (They give no credit to Marx, however; similar language can be found several places in the Bible.) At first glance Hutterite colonies appear to be truly unmanaged commons. But appearances are

正如对哈特派信徒（Hutterite）社会的研究所揭示的那样，公社的规模（使用它的人数）也是重要的。生活在美国西北部的这些虔诚地信奉宗教的人民，按照马克思的教导生活：“各尽所能，按需所取。”（不过，他们并不相信马克思。类似的语句可以在圣经中找到多处。）乍看，哈特派信徒社会似乎是真正的没有管理的公社。但是，这是一

deceiving. The number of people included in the decision unit is crucially important. As the size of a colony approaches 150, individual Hutterites begin to undercontribute from their abilities and overdemand for their needs. The experience of Hutterite communities indicates that below 150 people, the distribution system can be managed by shame; above that approximate number, shame loses its effectiveness. 个骗人的外表。包括在一个决策单位之内的人数十分重要。当一个群体的规模接近150人时，个别哈特派信徒不再尽其能，而有过度需要。哈特派信徒社会的经验说明，在150人之内，分配体制能够用羞耻心来管理；超过这个近似数字，羞耻心失去其效力。

If any group could make a commonistic system work, an earnest religious community like the Hutterites should be able to. But numbers are the nemesis. In Madison's terms nonangelic members then corrupt the angelic. Whenever size alters the properties of a system, engineers speak of a "scale effect." A scale effect, based on human psychology, limits the workability of commonistic systems.

如果任何群体能够使一个公有制运行，像哈特派信徒这样的最真诚宗教社会就应该也能够做到。但是，人数是复仇女神。用Madison的话说，不是天使的成员将迫使天使堕落。每当规模改变一个系统的性质时，工程师就会说到“规模效应。”基于人类的心理，规模效应限制公有制的可行性。

Even when the shortcomings of the commons are understood, areas remain in which reform is difficult. No one owns the earth's atmosphere. Therefore, it is treated as a common dump into which everyone may discharge wastes. Among the unwanted consequences of this behavior are acid rain, the greenhouse effect, and the erosion of the earth's protective ozone layer. Industries and even nations are apt to regard the cleansing of industrial discharges as prohibitively expensive. The oceans are also treated as a common dump. Yet continuing to defend the freedom to pollute will ultimately lead to ruin for all. Nations are just beginning to evolve controls to limit this damage.

即使认识到了公共资源的缺陷，仍有难以改革的领域。无人拥有地球大气。所以，它被当作了公共垃圾场，每个人都可以倾倒废物。这类行为的有害后果是酸雨、温室效应和保护地球臭氧层免遭腐蚀。一些产业乃至国家都倾向于认为，工业排放物的清洁成本太高。海洋也被当作公共垃圾场。然而，继续为污染的自由进行辩护将最终导致全体毁灭。一些国家刚刚已经开始限制这个破坏。

The tragedy of the commons also has arisen in the savings and loan crisis. The federal government created this tragedy by forming the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. FSLIC relieved S&L depositors of worry about their money by guaranteeing that it would use taxpayers' money to repay them if an S&L went broke. In effect, the government made the taxpayers' money into a commons that S&Ls and their depositors could exploit. S&Ls had the incentive to make overly risky investments, and depositors did not have to care because they did not bear the cost. This, combined with faltering federal surveillance of the S&Ls, led to widespread failures. The losses were "commonized" among the nation's taxpayers, with serious consequences to the federal budget.

公共资源的悲剧还出现在储蓄和贷款危机之中。通过建立联邦储蓄和贷款保险公司，联邦政府制造了这个悲剧。如果中小金融联合会（S&Ls）破产，联邦储蓄和贷款保险公司担保用纳税人的钱偿还存款人，从而免除了S&L 存款人的担心。事实上，政府把纳税人的钱变成了S&Ls和它们的存款人都可以利用的公共资源。S&Ls有进行风险过高的投资的动机，存款人也无须担心，因为他们并不承担这么做的代价。加之联邦政府对S&Ls监管不力，这造成了普遍的破产。损失由这个国家的纳税人共同承担，给联邦预算带来了严重后果。

Congestion on public roads that don't charge tolls is another example of a government-created tragedy of the commons. If roads were privately owned, owners would charge tolls and people would take the toll into account in deciding whether to use them. Owners of private roads would probably also engage in what is called peak-load pricing, charging higher prices during times of peak demand and lower prices at other times. But because governments own roads that they finance with tax dollars, they normally do not charge tolls. The government makes roads into a commons. The result is congestion.

不收费的公路上的拥挤是政府制造的另一例公共资源悲剧。如果道路是私有的，所有者就会收费，人们就会在是否使用它们的决策中把费用考虑进去。私有道路的所有者还可能执行所谓的高峰定价，在需求高峰期收取较高的价格，在其他时间收取较低的价格。但是，因为政府拥有的是用纳税人的钱修建的道路，它们通常不收费。政府把道路变成了公共资源。