Knowledge and Social Capital
雅思作文20个比较容易搞错的不可数名词
雅思作文20个比较容易搞错的不可数名词1. Employment 不可数 find employment对应： employment opportunities2. Work 表示“工作”的时候不可数，find work对应： job 可数名词3. Information 不可数， search for information对应：figures可数名词4. Equipment 不可数， electrical equipment对应：facilities可数名词5. Research 不可数， scientific research6. Capital 不可数，foreign capital对应： funds 可数名词7. Knowledge 不可数，acquire knowledge8. Architecture 不可数， classical architecture对应： buildings 可数名词9. Pollution 不可数，air pollution对应：pollutants 可数名词10. Software 不可数，word-processing software对应：software packages11. Aid 不可数， financial aid12. News不可数, breaking news对应： news stories13. training不可数, staff training对应：courses14. travel不可数, air travel对应：trips15. Advice不可数, practical advice对应：ideas16. Waste不可数, toxic waste对应：Landfills17. Progress不可数, social progress对应：advances18. Labour不可数, manual labour对应：workers19. Access不可数, internet access20. Transport不可数, means of transport21 workforce 不可数对应： workers22 Advertising 不可数对应：advertisements, or mercials 23 Well-being不可数(自动识别)。
知识管理和知识资本讲义.pptx
何谓知识管理（续）
The majority of Knowledge Management implementations are unsatisfactory as inappropriate, standardised approaches are forced upon the varying predicament of the uninformed by the uninformed.
这是一种以多对少（或对一）的活动，人 们通过这个过程收集已知的相关信息。这 种知识行为可以是隐性的，也可以是显性 的。
This is carried out for the team by the individual researcher or a small group.
这一步骤由个体的研究者或小组完成，其服 务对象是一个团队。
Step 1 - Scanning (2) 第一步：审视（2）
Helped by 促进因素
多数知识管理执行方案之所以不尽如人意，是因为其制定和 执行者的无知。由于为不同的窘境所迫，他们采取了千人一 面这样欠妥的方式。
AUTOPOIETICS 自我创生性
SOCIAL CAPITAL Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology
Annu.Rev.Sociol.1998.24:1–24Copyright ©1998by Annual Reviews.All rights reservedSOCIAL CAPITAL:Its Origins andApplications in Modern Sociology Alejandro Portes Department of Sociology,Princeton University,Princeton,New Jersey 08540KEY WORDS:social control,family support,networks,sociabilityA BSTRACTThispaper reviews the origins and definitionsof social capital in the writings of Bourdieu,Loury,and Coleman,among other authors.It distinguishes foursources of social capital and examines their dynamics.Applications of the concept in the sociological literature emphasize its role in social control,infamilysupport,and in benefits mediated by extrafamilial networks.I provideexamples of each of these positive functions.Negative consequences of thesame processes also deserve attention for a balanced picture of the forces at play.I review four such consequences and illustrate them with relevant ex-amples.Recent writings on social capital have extended the concept from an individual asset to a feature of communities and even nations.The final sec-tionsdescribe this conceptual stretch and examine its limitations.I argue that,as shorthand for the positive consequences of sociability,social capitalhas a definite place in sociological theory.However,excessive extensions of the concept may jeopardize its heuristic value.Alejandro Portes:Biographical SketchAlejandroPortes is professor of sociology at Princeton University andfaculty associate of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs.He for-merly taught at Johns Hopkins where he held the John Dewey Chair in Artsand Sciences,Duke University,and the University of Texas-Austin.In 1997he heldthe Emilio Bacardi distinguished professorship at the University ofMiami.In the same year he was elected president of the American Sociologi-cal Association.Born in Havana,Cuba,he came to the United States in 1960.He was educated at the University of Havana,Catholic University of Argen-tina,and Creighton University.He received his MA and PhD from the Uni-versity of Wisconsin-Madison.0360-0572/98/0815-0001$08.001A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b yS w i ssAca dem icLi bra ryC onsor t iaon3/24/9.F orpe rsonaluseo nl y.Portes is the author of some 200articles and chapters on national devel-opment,international migration,Latin American and Caribbean urbaniza-tion,and economic sociology.His most recent books include City on the Edge,the Transformation of Miami (winner of the Robert Park award for best book in urban sociology and of the Anthony Leeds award for best book in urban anthropology in 1995);The New Second Generation (Russell Sage Foundation 1996);Caribbean Cities (Johns Hopkins University Press);and Immigrant America,a Portrait.The latter book was designated as a centen-nial publication by the University of California Press.It was originally pub-lished in 1990;the second edition,updated and containing new chapters on American immigration policy and the new second generation,was published in 1996.Introduction During recent years,the concept of social capital has become one of the most popular exports from sociological theory into everyday language.Dissemi-nated by a number of policy-oriented journals and general circulation maga-zines,social capital has evolved into something of a cure-all for the maladies affecting society at home and abroad.Like other sociological concepts that have traveled a similar path,the original meaning of the term and its heuristic value are being put to severe tests by these increasingly diverse applications.As in the case of those earlier concepts,the point is approaching at which so-cial capital comes to be applied to so many events and in so many different contexts as to lose any distinct meaning.Despite its current popularity,the term does not embody any idea really new to sociologists.That involvement and participation in groups can have positive consequences for the individual and the community is a staple notion,dating back to Durkheim’s emphasis on group life as an antidote to anomie and self-destruction and to Marx’s distinction between an atomized class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-itself.In this sense,the term social capital simply recaptures an insight present since the very beginnings of the disci-pline.Tracing the intellectual background of the concept into classical times would be tantamount to revisiting sociology’s major nineteenth century sources.That exercise would not reveal,however,why this idea has caught on in recent years or why an unusual baggage of policy implications has been heaped on it.The novelty and heuristic power of social capital come from two sources.First,the concept focuses attention on the positive consequences of sociability while putting aside its less attractive features.Second,it places those positive consequences in the framework of a broader discussion of capital and calls atten-tion to how such nonmonetary forms can be important sources of power and in-fluence,like the size of one’s stock holdings or bank account.The potential fungi-bility of diverse sources of capital reduces the distance between the sociologi-2PORTESA n n u . 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F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .cal and economic perspectives and simultaneously engages the attention of policy-makers seeking less costly,non-economic solutions to social problems.In the course of this review,I limit discussion to the contemporary reemer-gence of the idea to avoid a lengthy excursus into its classical predecessors.To an audience of sociologists,these sources and the parallels between present so-cial capital discussions and passages in the classical literature will be obvious.I examine,first,the principal authors associated with the contemporary usage of the term and their different approaches to it.Then I review the various mechanisms leading to the emergence of social capital and its principal appli-cations in the research literature.Next,I examine those not-so-desirable con-sequences of sociability that are commonly obscured in the contemporary lit-erature on the topic.This discussion aims at providing some balance to the fre-quently celebratory tone with which the concept is surrounded.That tone is es-pecially noticeable in those studies that have stretched the concept from a property of individuals and families to a feature of communities,cities,and even nations.The attention garnered by applications of social capital at this broader level also requires some discussion,particularly in light of the poten-tial pitfalls of that conceptual stretch.Definitions The first systematic contemporary analysis of social capital was produced by Pierre Bourdieu,who defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or po-tential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”(Bourdieu 1985,p.248;1980).This initial treatment of the concept appeared in some brief “Provisional Notes”published in the Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales in 1980.Because they were in French,the article did not gar-ner widespread attention in the English-speaking world;nor,for that matter,did the first English translation,concealed in the pages of a text on the sociol-ogy of education (Bourdieu 1985).This lack of visibility is lamentable because Bourdieu’s analysis is arguably the most theoretically refined among those that introduced the term in contem-porary sociological discourse.His treatment of the concept is instrumental,fo-cusing on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of participation in groups and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of cre-ating this resource.In the original version,he went as far as asserting that “the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible”(Bourdieu 1985,p.249).Social networks are not a natural given and must be constructed through investment strategies oriented to the institutionalization of group relations,usable as a reliable source of other benefits.Bourdieu’s definition makes clear that social capital is decomposable into two elements:first,the social relationship itself that allows individuals to SOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 3A n n u . 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F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .claim access to resources possessed by their associates,and second,the amount and quality of those resources.Throughout,Bourdieu’s emphasis is on the fungibility of different forms of capital and on the ultimate reduction of all forms to economic capital,defined as accumulated human labor.Hence,through social capital,actors can gain di-rect access to economic resources (subsidized loans,investment tips,protected markets);they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with experts or individuals of refinement (i.e.embodied cultural capital);or,alternatively,they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials (i.e.institu-tionalized cultural capital).On the other hand,the acquisition of social capital requires deliberate invest-ment of both economic and cultural resources.Though Bourdieu insists that the outcomes of possession of social or cultural capital are reducible to economic capital,the processes that bring about these alternative forms are not.They each possess their own dynamics,and,relative to economic exchange,they are characterized by less transparency and more uncertainty.For example,trans-actions involving social capital tend to be characterized by unspecified obliga-tions,uncertain time horizons,and the possible violation of reciprocity expec-tations.But,by their very lack of clarity,these transactions can help disguise what otherwise would be plain market exchanges (Bourdieu 1979,1980).A second contemporary source is the work of economist Glen Loury (1977,1981).He came upon the term in the context of his critique of neoclassical theories of racial income inequality and their policy implications.Loury ar-gued that orthodox economic theories were too individualistic,focusing exclu-sively on individual human capital and on the creation of a level field for com-petition based on such skills.By themselves,legal prohibitions against em-ployers’racial tastes and implementation of equal opportunity programs would not reduce racial inequalities.The latter could go on forever,according to Loury,for two reasons—first,the inherited poverty of black parents,which would be transmitted to their children in the form of lower material resources and educational opportunities;second,the poorer connections of young black workers to the labor market and their lack of information about opportunities:The merit notion that,in a free society,each individual will rise to the level justified by his or her competence conflicts with the observation that no one travels that road entirely alone.The social context within which individual maturation occurs strongly conditions what otherwise equally competent in-dividuals can achieve.This implies that absolute equality of opportunity,…is an ideal that cannot be achieved.(Loury 1977,p.176)Loury cited with approval the sociological literature on intergenerational mobility and inheritance of race as illustrating his anti-individualist argument.However,he did not go on to develop the concept of social capital in any detail.4PORTESA n n u . 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F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .He seems to have run across the idea in the context of his polemic against or-thodox labor economics,but he mentions it only once in his original article and then in rather tentative terms (Loury 1977).The concept captured the differen-tial access to opportunities through social connections for minority and nonmi-nority youth,but we do not find here any systematic treatment of its relations to other forms of capital.Loury’s work paved the way,however,for Coleman’s more refined analy-sis of the same process,namely the role of social capital in the creation of hu-man capital.In his initial analysis of the concept,Coleman acknowledges Loury’s contribution as well as those of economist Ben-Porath and sociolo-gists Nan Lin and Mark Granovetter.Curiously,Coleman does not mention Bourdieu,although his analysis of the possible uses of social capital for the ac-quisition of educational credentials closely parallels that pioneered by the French sociologist.1Coleman defined social capital by its function as “a vari-ety of entities with two elements in common:They all consist of some aspect of social structures,and they facilitate certain action of actors—whether per-sons or corporate actors—within the structure”(Coleman 1988a:p.S98,1990,p.302).This rather vague definition opened the way for relabeling a number of dif-ferent and even contradictory processes as social capital.Coleman himself started that proliferation by including under the term some of the mechanisms that generated social capital (such as reciprocity expectations and group en-forcement of norms);the consequences of its possession (such as privileged access to information);and the “appropriable”social organization that pro-vided the context for both sources and effects to materialize.Resources ob-tained through social capital have,from the point of view of the recipient,the character of a gift.Thus,it is important to distinguish the resources themselves from the ability to obtain them by virtue of membership in different social structures,a distinction explicit in Bourdieu but obscured in Coleman.Equat-ing social capital with the resources acquired through it can easily lead to tau-tological statements.2Equally important is the distinction between the motivations of recipients and of donors in exchanges mediated by social capital.Recipients’desire toSOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 51The closest equivalent to human capital in Bourdieu’s analysis is embodied cultural capital,which is defined as the habitus of cultural practices,knowledge,and demeanors learned through exposure to role models in the family and other environments (Bourdieu 1979).2Saying,for example,that student A has social capital because he obtained access to a large tuition loan from his kin and that student B does not because she failed to do so neglects the possibility that B’s kin network is equally or more motivated to come to her aid but simply lacks the means to do.Defining social capital as equivalent with the resources thus obtained is tantamount to saying that the successful succeed.This circularity is more evident in applications of social capital that define it as a property of collectivities.These are reviewed below.A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .gain access to valuable assets is readily understandable.More complex are the motivations of the donors,who are requested to make these assets available without any immediate return.Such motivations are plural and deserve analy-sis because they are the core processes that the concept of social capital seeks to capture.Thus,a systematic treatment of the concept must distinguish among:(a )the possessors of social capital (those making claims);(b )the sources of social capital (those agreeing to these demands);(c )the resources themselves.These three elements are often mixed in discussions of the concept following Coleman,thus setting the stage for confusion in the uses and scope of the term.Despite these limitations,Coleman’s essays have the undeniable merit of introducing and giving visibility to the concept in American sociology,high-lighting its importance for the acquisition of human capital,and identifying some of the mechanisms through which it is generated.In this last respect,his discussion of closure is particularly enlightening.Closure means the existence of sufficient ties between a certain number of people to guarantee the obser-vance of norms.For example,the possibility of malfeasance within the tightly knit community of Jewish diamond traders in New York City is minimized by the dense ties among its members and the ready threat of ostracism against vio-lators.The existence of such a strong norm is then appropriable by all members of the community,facilitating transactions without recourse to cumbersome legal contracts (Coleman 1988a:S99).After Bourdieu,Loury,and Coleman,a number of theoretical analyses of social capital have been published.In 1990,WE Baker defined the concept as “a resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests;it is created by changes in the relationship among actors”(Baker 1990,p.619).More broadly,M Schiff defines the term as “the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations among people and are in-puts or arguments of the production and/or utility function”(Schiff 1992,p.161).Burt sees it as “friends,colleagues,and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital”(Burt 1992,p.9).Whereas Coleman and Loury had emphasized dense net-works as a necessary condition for the emergence of social capital,Burt high-lights the opposite situation.In his view,it is the relative absence of ties,la-beled “structural holes,”that facilitates individual mobility.This is so because dense networks tend to convey redundant information,while weaker ties can be sources of new knowledge and resources.Despite these differences,the consensus is growing in the literature that so-cial capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of mem-bership in social networks or other social structures.This is the sense in which it has been more commonly applied in the empirical literature although,as we will see,the potential uses to which it is put vary greatly.6PORTESA n n u . 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F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .Sources of Social CapitalBoth Bourdieu and Coleman emphasize the intangible character of social capital relative to other forms.Whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads,social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships.To possess social capital,a person must be related to others,and it is those others,not himself,who are the actual source of his or her advan-tage.As mentioned before,the motivation of others to make resources avail-able on concessionary terms is not uniform.At the broadest level,one may dis-tinguish between consummatory versus instrumental motivations to do so.As examples of the first,people may pay their debts in time,give alms to charity,and obey traffic rules because they feel an obligation to behave in this manner.The internalized norms that make such behaviors possible are then ap-propriable by others as a resource.In this instance,the holders of social capital are other members of the community who can extend loans without fear of nonpayment,benefit from private charity,or send their kids to play in the street without concern.Coleman (1988a:S104)refers to this source in his analysis of norms and sanctions:“Effective norms that inhibit crime make it possible to walk freely outside at night in a city and enable old persons to leave their houses without fear for their safety.”As is well known,an excessive emphasis on this process of norm internalization led to the oversocialized conception of human action in sociology so trenchantly criticized by Wrong (1961).An approach closer to the undersocialized view of human nature in modern economics sees social capital as primarily the accumulation of obligations from others according to the norm of reciprocity.In this version,donors pro-vide privileged access to resources in the expectation that they will be fully re-paid in the future.This accumulation of social chits differs from purely eco-nomic exchange in two aspects.First,the currency with which obligations are repaid may be different from that with which they were incurred in the first place and may be as intangible as the granting of approval or allegiance.Sec-ond,the timing of the repayment is unspecified.Indeed,if a schedule of repay-ments exists,the transaction is more appropriately defined as market exchange than as one mediated by social capital.This instrumental treatment of the term is quite familiar in sociology,dating back to the classical analysis of social ex-change by Simmel ([1902a]1964),the more recent ones by Homans (1961)and Blau (1964),and extensive work on the sources and dynamics of reciproc-ity by authors of the rational action school (Schiff 1992,Coleman 1994).Two other sources of social capital exist that fit the consummatory versus instrumental dichotomy,but in a different way.The first finds its theoretical underpinnings in Marx’s analysis of emergent class consciousness in the in-dustrial proletariat.By being thrown together in a common situation,workers learn to identify with each other and support each other’s initiatives.This soli-SOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 7A n n u . 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F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .darity is not the result of norm introjection during childhood,but is an emer-gent product of a common fate (Marx [1894]1967,Marx &Engels [1848]1947).For this reason,the altruistic dispositions of actors in these situations are not universal but are bounded by the limits of their community.Other members of the same community can then appropriate such dispositions and the actions that follow as their source of social capital.Bounded solidarity is the term used in the recent literature to refer to this mechanism.It is the source of social capital that leads wealthy members of a church to anonymously endow church schools and hospitals;members of a suppressed nationality to voluntarily join life-threatening military activities in its defense;and industrial proletarians to take part in protest marches or sym-pathy strikes in support of their fellows.Identification with one’s own group,sect,or community can be a powerful motivational force.Coleman refers to extreme forms of this mechanism as “zeal”and defines them as an effective an-tidote to free-riding by others in collective movements (Coleman 1990,pp.273–82;Portes &Sensenbrenner 1993).The final source of social capital finds its classical roots in Durkheim’s ([1893]1984)theory of social integration and the sanctioning capacity of group rituals.As in the case of reciprocity exchanges,the motivation of donors of socially mediated gifts is instrumental,but in this case,the expectation of re-payment is not based on knowledge of the recipient,but on the insertion of both actors in a common social structure.The embedding of a transaction into suchstructure has two consequences.First,the donor’s returns may come not8PORTESFigure 1Actual and potential gains and losses in transactions mediated by social capitalA n n u . 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F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .directly from the recipient but from the collectivity as a whole in the form of status,honor,or approval.Second,the collectivity itself acts as guarantor that whatever debts are incurred will be repaid.As an example of the first consequence,a member of an ethnic group may endow a scholarship for young co-ethnic students,thereby expecting not re-payment from recipients but rather approval and status in the collectivity.The students’social capital is not contingent on direct knowledge of their benefac-tor,but on membership in the same group.As an example of the second effect,a banker may extend a loan without collateral to a member of the same relig-ious community in full expectation of repayment because of the threat of com-munity sanctions and ostracism.In other words,trust exists in this situation precisely because obligations are enforceable,not through recourse to law or violence but through the power of the community.In practice,these two effects of enforceable trust are commonly mixed,as when someone extends a favor to a fellow member in expectation of both guaranteed repayment and group approval.As a source of social capital,en-forceable trust is hence appropriable by both donors and recipients:For recipi-ents,it obviously facilitates access to resources;for donors,it yields approval and expedites transactions because it ensures against malfeasance.No lawyer need apply for business transactions underwritten by this source of social capi-tal.The left side of Figure 1summarizes the discussion in this section.Keeping these distinctions in mind is important to avoid confusing consummatory and instrumental motivations or mixing simple dyadic exchanges with those em-bedded in larger social structures that guarantee their predictability and course.Effects of Social Capital:Recent Research Just as the sources of social capital are plural so are its consequences.The em-pirical literature includes applications of the concept as a predictor of,among others,school attrition and academic performance,children’s intellectual de-velopment,sources of employment and occupational attainment,juvenile de-linquency and its prevention,and immigrant and ethnic enterprise.3Diversity of effects goes beyond the broad set of specific dependent variables to which social capital has been applied to encompass,in addition,the character and meaning of the expected consequences.A review of the literature makes it pos-sible to distinguish three basic functions of social capital,applicable in a vari-ety of contexts:(a )as a source of social control;(b )as a source of family sup-port;(c )as a source of benefits through extrafamilial networks.SOCIAL CAPITAL:ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS 93The following review does not aim at an exhaustive coverage of the empirical literature.That task has been rendered obsolete by the advent of computerized topical searches.My purpose instead is to document the principal types of application of the concept in the literature and to highlight their interrelationships.A n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .As examples of the first function,we find a series of studies that focus on rule enforcement.The social capital created by tight community networks is useful to parents,teachers,and police authorities as they seek to maintain dis-cipline and promote compliance among those under their charge.Sources of this type of social capital are commonly found in bounded solidarity and en-forceable trust,and its main result is to render formal or overt controls unnec-essary.The process is exemplified by Zhou &Bankston’s study of the tightly knit Vietnamese community of New Orleans:Both parents and children are constantly observed as under a “Vietnamese microscope.”If a child flunks out or drops out of a school,or if a boy falls into a gang or a girl becomes pregnant without getting married,he or she brings shame not only to himself or herself but also to the family.(Zhou &Bankston 1996,p.207)The same function is apparent in Hagan et al’s (1995)analysis of right-wing extremism among East German beling right-wing extremism a sub-terranean tradition in German society,these authors seek to explain the rise of that ideology,commonly accompanied by anomic wealth aspirations among German adolescents.These tendencies are particularly strong among those from the formerly communist eastern states.That trend is explained as the joint outcome of the removal of social controls (low social capital),coupled with the long deprivations endured by East Germans.Incorporation into the West has brought about new uncertainties and the loosening of social integration,thus allowing German subterranean cultural traditions to re-emerge.Social control is also the focus of several earlier essays by Coleman,who laments the disappearance of those informal family and community structures that produced this type of social capital;Coleman calls for the creation of for-mal institutions to take their place.This was the thrust of Coleman’s 1992presidential address to the American Sociological Association,in which he traced the decline of “primordial”institutions based on the family and their re-placement by purposively constructed organizations.In his view,modern soci-ology’s task is to guide this process of social engineering that will substitute obsolete forms of control based on primordial ties with rationally devised ma-terial and status incentives (Coleman 1988b,1993).The function of social capital for social control is also evident whenever the concept is discussed in conjunction with the law (Smart 1993,Weede 1992).It is as well the central focus when it is defined as a property of collectivities such as cities or nations.This latter approach,associated mainly with the writings of political scientists,is discussed in a following section.The influence of Coleman’s writings is also clear in the second function of social capital,namely as a source of parental and kin support.Intact families and those where one parent has the primary task of rearing children possess 10PORTESA n n u . R e v . S o c i o l . 1998.24:1-24. D o w n l o a d e d f r o m a r j o u r n a l s .a n n u a l r e v i e w s .o r g b y S w i s s A c a d e m i c L i b r a r y C o n s o r t i a o n 03/24/09. F o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y .。
Audit fees and social captial 审计费用与社会资本
THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association Vol.90,No.2DOI:10.2308/accr-50878 2015pp.611–639Audit Fees and Social CapitalAnand JhaYu ChenTexas A&M International UniversityABSTRACT:We examine the impact of social capital on audit fees.We find that firmsheadquartered in U.S.counties with high social capital pay lower audit fees.Socialcapital measures the level of mutual trust in a region.Our results suggest that auditorsjudge the trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered andcharge a premium when they trust the firm less.The basis of our results is theexamination of more than28,000audit fees for more than5,000firms spanning theperiod of2000to2009.The results are robust to controlling for a large number of firm-level and county-level characteristics.Keywords:audit fees;social capital;client risk;audit effort.JEL Classifications:M42;M14.I.INTRODUCTIONI n a seminal paper,Simunic(1980)considers afirm’s audit fees to be dependent on theauditor’s effort and the expected losses from litigation.Subsequently,researchers have investigated the impact of numerous variables as possible determinants of audit fees (Causholli,De Martinis,Hay,and Knechel2010).These variables are expected to affect either the auditor’s effort or litigation risk,both of which affect the audit fees.Prior research has not investigated the possible impact of the clientfirm’s local social environment,which is the focal point of this study.Our purpose is to use a well-understood setting to investigate the role of social capital on economic decisions,a topic that is much less understood.Social capital is often defined as the mutual trust in society.We propose that the social capital in the county where a U.S.firm is headquartered can have an impact on how much the auditors trust the managers of thefirm.As we discuss below,auditors arguably have less trust when afirm is headquartered in a county with low social capital.We argue that this lack of trust will increase the auditor’s effort and his or her fear of litigation and,therefore,will increase fees.We test this idea by exploiting the variation in social capital at the county level in the United States. Using the zip code of thefirm’s headquarters,we gather data for variables proxying for the county-levelWe thank Michael L.Ettredge(editor),John Harry Evans III(senior editor),and two anonymous referees for their valuable feedback.We also thank the participants at the2013FMA Annual Conference,2012AAA Annual Meeting, and2012Research Seminar at Texas A&M International University for their suggestions.Editor’s note:Accepted by Michael L.Ettredge.Submitted:November2012Accepted:July2014Published Online:July2014611social capital for each firm-year.We then conduct a regression analysis that examines the association between audit fees and the level of social capital where the firm is headquartered.In our analysis,we control for firm characteristics based on the audit-fee literature and also include a large set of controls at the county level.We find that audit fees are significantly lower in high social-capital counties.Our results are also economically significant because we find that a firm that is headquartered in a county with social capital in the 75th percentile pays about 12percent less in audit fees compared to a firm headquartered in a county with social capital in the 25th percentile,ceteris paribus .According to Simunic (1980),audit fees can increase due to more audit work and/or more expected losses.To further investigate which particular element drives up audit fees,we examine the impact of social capital on the auditor’s report lag,which is a proxy for the auditor’s effort,and on the firm’s litigation risk,which is a proxy for the auditor’s expected losses.We find that auditors take more time to sign off on their report for low social-capital clients.Furthermore,the probability of litigation involving the auditor is also higher in low social-capital counties.We also conduct two tests of moderating effects that examine whether the influence of social capital is stronger under certain environments.First,we investigate whether the effect of social capital is stronger when the audit office is located closer to the client.The idea is that the auditors might have more confidence in their judgment of the client’s trustworthiness when they reside closer.We find results consistent with our expectation because when the auditors are either located within a 100-kilometer (62.13miles)radius of the client or in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA)as the client,the effect of social capital on audit fees is tripled compared to when they are further away.Second,we investigate if the effect of social capital is stronger for the year 2004and subsequent years,when auditing became more complex due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).We find that,indeed,social capital’s effect is stronger post-2004.Based on prior literature (Guiso,Sapienza,and Zingales 2004,2008b ;Grullon,Kanatas,and Weston 2010),we argue that these two additional results give us greater confidence that our results are causal instead of correlational.Taken together,these results provide strong evidence that auditors take into consideration the social capital of where the firms are headquartered in assessing their audit fees.We note here that our results do not necessarily suggest that auditors are violating professional guidelines that require that they exercise ‘‘professional skepticism ’’in auditing their clients.Rather,the results suggest that the extent of the skepticism can vary based on where their clients are headquartered.Our results can be interpreted as indicating that auditors are prudent in their assessments because the social environment affects the quality of the financial reporting (Kang,Han,Salter,and Yoo 2010;McGuire,Omer,and Sharp 2012).Jha (2013),in particular,finds that when a firm is headquartered in a low social-capital county,the financial report’s quality is poor.Specifically,the accrual management,real earnings management,propensity to commit financial fraud,and the ‘‘fogginess ’’of financial reports are all high.Prudence should dictate that auditors take into account the poor quality of reporting that can generally be expected of clients located in low social-capital counties,and that auditors be more skeptical in those cases.Our results are also consistent with the experimental and archival studies that show that auditors consider the integrity of the management when deciding how much effort to exert in auditing,and how much to charge their client (Beaulieu 2001).By showing that the social capital where the firm is headquartered affects audit fees,our study makes an important contribution to the auditing literature.It shows that the social environment where the firm is headquartered can affect its relation with auditors and,consequently,the audit fees.This is a new way of looking at the auditor and client’s relation.Although the audit-fee literature is extensive,no studies we know of have investigated the possible impact of the social environment on how much the auditors charge.More broadly,our study contributes to an emerging strand of accounting literature that documents the effect of the social environment on managerial decisions (Hilary and Hui 2009;McGuire et al.2012).We show that the social environment not only affects managerial decisions,but also the relations612Jha andChen The Accounting ReviewMarch 2015with other stakeholders,such as auditors.Further,this study is among the few in the accounting literature to examine the role of social capital on thefirm’s behavior.Although the concept of social capital is extensively studied in sociology,economics,management,and political science,the role of social capital in accounting settings is largely unexplored.Our study raises the possibility that other accounting decisions might be affected by the level of social capital where thefirm is headquartered.II.BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENTWhat is Social Capital?Following Woolcock(2001),we define social capital as the norms and the networks that facilitate collective action.A high social-capital region has individuals with a greater propensity to honor an obligation and a greater mutual trust within a much denser network,all of which facilitate collective action.The predominant approach in the economics literature is to view social capital as a‘‘norm’’that facilitates cooperation.Guiso et al.(2004)define social capital as the mutual level of trust and altruistic tendency in a society.Fukuyama(1997)defines social capital as‘‘the existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them.’’Portes(1998)defines social capital as the propensity to honor obligations.Guiso, Sapienza,and Zingales(2008a)provide a more comprehensive definition of social capital as‘‘the set of beliefs and values that foster cooperation.’’In contrast to the‘‘norm’’approach,many studies,particularly in the management literature,model social capital as a set of networks from which benefits are derived(Payne,Moore,Griffis,and Autry 2011).Atfirst glance,these approaches appear as two distinct ways of viewing social capital.In fact,the distinction is not clear.The network definition also implicitly incorporates norms.A strong social network enhances the punishment for deviant behavior and encourages good behavior(Coleman1994; Spagnolo1999).A vigorous network fosters greater trust over time among its members and creates a culture that is more conducive to cooperation.Fukuyama(1997)notes that in a dense network,there are repeated games in which people rely on each other.Over time,this leads to a code of conduct in the society that encourages the propensity to honor obligations and develop mutual trust.Portes(1998) argues that,over time,these morals get passed from one generation to another and get internalized into society.Consequently,people feel obligated to behave in a certain way.Putnam(2001)provides a more detailed analysis of this view.Because of the difficulty of disentangling the effect due to norms versus a network,we do not make this distinction;instead,we focus on the common aspects of both the norms and the network views,following the Woolcock(2001)definition.Social capital gained popularity after Coleman(1988)laid its theoretical foundation by drawing parallels with other types of capital,such asfinancial,physical,and human.Since then,a large body of the literature in different disciplines,such as economics,political science,and management,has examined the impact of social capital(Putnam2000;Woolcock2010;Payne et al. 2011).Documenting the dramatic rise in understanding the role of social capital,Woolcock(2010) notes that in the early1980s,the phrase‘‘social capital’’was used in scholarly articles less than100 times a year,and by2008,it was used16,000times a year.This research shows that social capital is negatively associated with opportunistic behavior such as corruption(La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer,and Vishny1997),crime(Buonanno,Montolio,and Vanin2009),and transaction costs associated withfinancial exchanges,such as buying stocks and getting loans(Guiso et al.2004). How Can Social Capital Affect Audit Fees?Managers Are More Likely to be Honest in High Social-Capital RegionsThe social norms of high social-capital regions induce managers to behave more honestly.A classic stream of literature supports the view that social norms affect individuals’decisions Audit Fees and Social Capital613The Accounting Review March2015(Milgram,Bickman,and Berkowitz 1969;Cialdini,Kallgren,and Reno 1991).This stream of literature argues that human beings develop a set of ideals for how they should behave based on what they see around them.When a person deviates from these ideals,there is a sense of guilt and,therefore,a cost.Managers might take this cost into account when making decisions (Akerlof 2007).Social norms are also self-enforcing (Hilary and Huang 2013)because there is a desire to conform to a group’s expectations—partly by nature (Akerlof 2007;Hilary and Huang 2013)and partly because deviations are costly (Coleman 1994;Portes 1998).The dense networks in high social-capital regions also encourage honest behavior from managers.In the context of managerial reporting behavior,a dense network means that stakeholders,such as institutional investors,bankers,and managers,are more likely to interact regularly with each other.More frequent interactions among these parties lead to greater information exchange and,therefore,more effective monitoring (Wu 2008),which subsequently leads to more truthful and forthcoming financial reporting.Auditors Factor in the Manager’s Honesty in the Fees They ChargeThe two most important determinants of audit fees are the auditor’s effort and the litigation risk (Simunic 1980;Venkataraman,Weber,and Willenborg 2008).Both are likely to be lower in a high social-capital environment,thus driving down the fees the auditors charge.Social capital arguably affects auditor effort via the audit planning process.Examining entire populations of accounts is too costly,so auditors need to balance the costs and benefits of audit procedures.During the planning process,auditors identify more risky areas and spend more resources on those areas to reduce the audit risk.If auditors feel that management is more prone to misbehavior,then they conduct more substantive procedures to ensure that the financial statements are fairly presented (Beaulieu 2001).In contrast,if auditors trust their clients more,then they place greater reliance on internal controls and perform fewer substantive procedures to reduce their effort.When a firm is located in a high social-capital county,its managers are likely to be more forthcoming and honest in their financial reports,as discussed earlier and as documented in Jha (2013).If the firm’s auditors have this perception,then they will trust the client to a greater extent and thereby reduce their total effort.1Auditors also hire third parties to assess the integrity of management,review past financial information,and communicate with previous auditors (Rittenberg,Johnstone,and Gramling 2012).In a high social-capital county,because of its dense network and the honest reputation of its citizens,the auditor can obtain such evidence more easily,and probably with more precision.For example,the auditor might much more easily obtain a higher quality and quantity of audit evidence from banks,suppliers,customers,and other stakeholders in a high social-capital county.Therefore,the auditor is likely to expend less effort in obtaining sufficient and appropriate audit evidence,resulting in lower audit fees.Auditors also perceive a higher lawsuit risk when firms are located in low social-capital counties because these firms are more likely to misbehave,and third parties might have less favorable opinions about the management.The fear of litigation risk can increase the audit fees because the cost of litigation relative to the audit fees can be severe.An example in Dye (1993)is illustrative:‘‘Max Rothenberg &Company performed an audit review for $600for 1136Tenants’Corporation,but because of alleged deficiencies in the conduct of its engagement,was found liable for $232,278.30.’’A report from the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP)notes that between 1996and 2008,the six largest auditing firms paid approximately $5.16billion to settle 1The idea that auditors adjust their extent of auditing according to how much they trust their clients is not new.Shaub (1996)notes that ‘‘trust is inherent in the audit process.’’He argues that auditors assess higher inherent risk and control risk when they trust their client less.614Jha andChen The Accounting ReviewMarch 2015lawsuits(ACAP2008).Given the concern about the risk and the cost associated with litigation relative to the fees charged,auditors are likely to take into consideration the trustworthiness of their client,even if the impact of the trust is only at the margin.The discussion above suggests that in a low-trust environment,the auditor’s effort and the litigation risk are both higher.Therefore,auditors likely will exert more effort and demand higher audit fees forfirms located in low social-capital counties.Conversely,they will exert less effort and demand lower audit fees if afirm is headquartered in a high social-capital county.2Based on the above discussion,we propose the following hypothesis:H:Ceteris paribus,thefirms headquartered in a high social-capital county pay lower audit fees.This hypothesis rests on the idea that thefirms headquartered in high social-capital counties have corporate cultures that are high in social capital.This concept is based on the recent accounting andfinance literature on social environment and corporate decisions(Hilary and Hui 2009;Grullon et al.2010).As in these studies,we borrow from the psychology literature and argue thatfirms hire and retain employees who share their own values and that employees prefer to work forfirms that share their own values(Vroom1966;Tom1971;Holland1976;McGuire et al.2012). Over time,assuming that the key employees reside close to thefirm’s headquarters,these shared values mean that the culture of the headquarters also reflects the culture of its location.Therefore,if the county where thefirm is headquartered has low social capital,then the auditor is likely to have less trust in managers employed at thefirm’s headquarters.3III.RESEARCH METHOD AND DATAEmpirical ModelTo test our hypothesis,we use a multivariate regression in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the audit fees charged by the external auditor.The key variable of interest is the social capital of the county where thefirm is headquartered:LNðAUDIT FEEÞ¼b0þb1SOCIAL CAPITALþb2LNASSETSþb3DEBTþb4ROAþb5BIG4þb6LOSSþb7FISCAL YEAR ENDþb8DAYS TO SIGNþb9PUBLIC EXCHNGþb10UNQUALIFED OPINIONþb11GOING CONCERNþb12INHERENT RISKþb13LITIGATIONþb14AUDITOR CHANGEþb15SEGMENTSþb16COUNTY PRESENCEþb17LARGE SCALEþb18SPECIALISTþb19AUDITOR COMPETITIONþb20COST OF LIVINGþb21RELIGIOSITYþb22DIST FROM SECþb23RURALþb24INCOMEþb25POPGþb26LNPOPþb27LITERACYþIndustry IndicatorsþYear Indicatorsþe:ð1ÞThe variables are defined in detail in Appendix A.Our unit of analysis is afirm-year, where the subscript it is suppressed for expositional ease.Thefirm-level control variables are2We acknowledge that the county in which the auditor resides might also matter.We address this issue in additional analyses later in the paper.3Firms can change their headquarters over time,and this change could add noise to our method.Although this noise is possible,firms seem to rarely change their headquarters.For example,Pirinsky and Wang(2006)find only118 changes in headquarters in a sample of5,000firms spanning15years.Audit Fees and Social Capital615The Accounting Review March2015based on Hay,Knechel,and Wong (2006),who include controls for the size,complexity,inherent risk,profitability,leverage,auditor type,auditor report lag,and the busy season for audits.We expect audit fees to be higher for large,complex,and risky firms,when the firm is audited by the Big 4audit firms and when the audit is conducted in a busy season.Because Fung,Gul,and Krishnan (2012)find that the city-level industry specialization of the auditors and their economies of scale have an impact on audit fees,we also add a measure for the city-level industry specialization and economies of scale.We also control for the extent of the audit market competition in the county,as in Newton,Wang,and Wilkins (2013),and the number of clients’geographic segments.Although the key managers who influence financial reporting are located in the firm’s headquarters,the employees in other geographic locations also have an effect on the accounting information systems and the firm’s financial reports.We control for this effect by including the number of geographic segments in our model.And,consistent with Fung et al.(2012),we add industry indicator variables based on the two-digit SIC code,as well as year indicator variables,to control for the impact from changes in the financial reporting regulations.Because recent finance and accounting research shows that the religiosity in a county has a significant impact on the firm’s financial reporting quality (Grullon et al.2010;McGuire et al.2012),we control for religiosity at the county level.We control for other related county-level characteristics,including the cost of living in the county,the distance from the nearest regional Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)office,the population density,the county population,the population growth,the income per capita,and the literacy rate.We expect audit fees to be lower for firms that are located in religious counties because misconduct is expected to be lower in these counties.We also expect audit fees to be higher where the cost of living index is higher.The impact of the distance from the SEC is unclear.Firms further away from the SEC are likely to have more financial reporting irregularities,which results in higher audit fees.But firms further away from the SEC are also less prone to scrutiny by the SEC,reducing litigation risk and lowering audit fees.4To control for the possibility that the error terms might be correlated,we cluster the standard errors at the county level.Because we cluster at the county level,we automatically control for clustering at the firm level (Bertrand,Duflo,and Mullainathan 2004;Dinc 2005;Cameron and Miller 2011).5,6In our main regression,we do not control for corporate governance characteristics,such as the characteristics of the board and the relative power of management compared to the shareholders,because doing so would severely limit our sample size.However,we do control for them in our robustness tests,and our results continue to hold.Because our entire sample is from the U.S.,we automatically control for differences in legal origin,laws,and institutions.Measure of Social CapitalWe construct a social-capital index for each county following the steps in Rupasingha and Goetz (2008).They use two measures of norms and two measures of networks,and conduct a principal component analysis to construct an index for each county for the years 1997,2005,and 4Given that we have a large set of control variables,we check for multicollinearity by measuring the variance inflation factor (VIF).Because the VIFs of the explanatory variables are well below 10,and the average VIF of the explanatory variables is 2.42,multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem.5In our case,the firms are nested in the counties.Therefore,we have a nested level of clustering.In such a case,‘‘cluster-robust standard errors are computed at the most aggregate level of clustering ’’(Cameron and Miller 2011,7).6However,our main results continue to hold if we (1)cluster at the firm level,(2)adopt two-way clustering (firm and year or county and year)(Petersen 2009;Gow,Ormazabal,and Taylor 2010),or (3)use the Huber-White standard error without clustering.616Jha andChen The Accounting ReviewMarch 20152009.The social-capital index for each county and the underlying data used to construct the index are available at the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development(NERCRD).7 As far as we know,the Rupasingha and Goetz(2008)approach to measuring social capital is the most comprehensive measure of social capital at the county level.Putnam(2007)uses their measure of social capital as an alternative measure for individual trust.Besides Putnam(2007), many authors in different disciplines have used Rupasingha and Goetz’s(2008)index or followed their approach,including S.Deller and M.Deller(2010)and Hopkins(2011).Following Rupasingha and Goetz(2008),the two measures of social norms we use are voter turnout in presidential elections and the census response rate.Higher values for these variables represent higher social capital.The literature has used both of these measures,either independently or as a component of a social-capital index.For example,Guiso et al.(2004)use participation in referenda in Italy as a measure of social capital,Alesina and La Ferrara(2000)use participation in a presidential election as a component in the construct of a social-capital index,and Knack(2002) uses the census response rate as a measure of social capital.The two measures of networks are the number of social and civic associations and the number of nongovernment organizations(NGO)in counties.Social and civic associations include physical fitness facilities,public golf courses,religious organizations,sports clubs,managers and promoters, political organizations,professional organizations,business associations,and labor organizations in the county,but we exclude NGOs with an international focus.Both of these measures are normalized by the population in the county.The literature also uses these two measures independently as measures of social capital(Knack2002;Hopkins2011).Because the measures of the norms and the network are highly correlated,8we follow Rupasingha and Goetz(2008)by conducting a principal component analysis to construct an index of social capital for each county for the years1997,2005,and2009.We extract thefirst component as a measure of the social capital.9We then linearly interpolate the data tofill in the years1998to2004 and2006to2008,10following the same approach as Hilary and Hui(2009)and many other studies.11 Appendix A provides a more detailed description of how we construct the social-capital measures.We present the variation in social capital at the county level in Figure1for the year2000.For brevity,we do not present thefigures for2005and2009because they are similar.The correlation between the2000and the2009social-capital index is0.91.This is consistent with the idea that unlike physical and human capital,social capital is‘‘sticky’’(Anheier and Gerhards1995).When constructing the social-capital index,we assume that all types of association memberships increase the general trust in the society.We acknowledge that not all researchers agree with this view.In the context of social capital,the common approach is to view associations as one of two types:those that act like‘‘bridges’’between groups,such as religious organizations, civic and social associations,bowling centers,physicalfitness facilities,public golf courses,and sports clubs;and those that strengthen the‘‘bonding’’between members within a group,such as 7The data is available upon request from Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development(NERCRD)at:http://aese./nercrd.8For example,the correlation between the voter turnout in the election and number of organizations in the county is0.30in2005.9The eigenvalues of thefirst component for1997,2005,and2009are2.06,1.94,and1.84,respectively.The eigenvalues of the other components are less than1except in2009,when the second component has an eigenvalue of1.03.To maintain consistency between the years,we use only thefirst component for each year and consider it thesocial-capital index.10The results continue to hold when we use Rupasingha and Goetz’s(2008)index and test for only those years for which their index is available.11The use of linear interpolation tofill in the missing values of the in-between years is a common practice in the prior literature(Kumar,Page,and Spalt2011;Alesina and La Ferrara2000).Audit Fees and Social Capital617The Accounting Review March2015。
马克思英文简介_英文简历模板
马克思英文简介卡尔·海因里希·马克思,马克思主义的创始人之一，被称为全世界无产阶级和劳动人民的伟大导师。
下面是小编为你整理的马克思英文简介，希望对你有用!卡尔·海因里希·马克思简介Karl Heinrich Marx (German: Karl Heinrich Marx, May 5, 1818 - March 14, 1883), one of the founders of Marxism, the organizer and leader of the first international A great mentor for the proletariat and working people all over the world. The spiritual leader of the proletariat, the pioneer of the international communist movement.Marx is a great German thinker, politician, philosopher, economist, revolutionist and sociologist. The main works are "Capital", "Communist Manifesto" and so on.Marx founded the well-known philosophical thought as historical materialism, its greatest wish is for the individual's comprehensive and free development. Marx founded the great economic theory. In his personal terms, his great work is "Capital", and Marx established his principles of elaboration as "Critique of Political Economy". Marx believes that this is the "political economy principle" thing, this is the "essence", and later people can continue to study on this basis.Marx argues that the demise of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are equally unavoidable. He and Engels co-founded the Marxist doctrine, is considered to guide the working people around the world to achieve the socialist and communist great ideals of the struggle of the theoretical weapons and action guide.卡尔·海因里希·马克思人物生平Early schoolMarx was born on May 5, 1818 in the German Federal Prussian kingdom Rhine province (belonging to the German Rhineland-Palatinate) Terry City, a lawyer family. His grandfather Rabbin Marc Levy was a Jewish law jurist, his father, Hirsch Karl Marx, later renamed Heinrich Marx, born in 1782, with Dutch Jewish woman Henriette Presborck married, gave birth to many children, but found in a document of the heir, only Karl Marx and three daughters Sofia, Emir, Luisa survived.In October 1830, Marx entered Trier Middle School. After graduating from high school, enter the University of Bonn, 18 years after the transfer to the University of Berlin to study the law, but most of his focus is on the philosophy and history. In 1840, the Prussian New King Frederick William IV ascended the throne, persecuted Liberal Democrats, demanding that all publications must pass a rigorous review, the university lost academic freedom, and the new king appointed the University of Berlin professor FWvon Schelling would review the , But the position of Marx's scholar in philosophy is higher than the theological position can not be accepted by the anti-Hegelian professor, so Marx will be sent to the doctoral thesis to the Saxony - Weimar - Eisenach Grand Duchy of the University of Jena ( Jena) examines doctoral qualifications. In 1841 Marx applied for a degree from the distinction between the natural philosophy of Democritus and the natural philosophy of Epicurus, and successfully received the PhD in the University of Jena from the unanimous approval of the committee. After graduation as "Rheinland" editor, met in the history of Marx thought quite famous "forest theft problem".Revolutionary careerAt the beginning of the nineteenth century, the industrialrevolution swept through Germany, which promoted the development of the economy of the country's Junke landlords, and also exacerbated the extreme poverty of the lower working people. Hunger drives the poor to pick up dead branches in the forest, picking wild fruits, and some even break the hunting grounds and ranches. Although the 1826 "Prussian Penal Code" on the unauthorized logging and theft of trees severely punished, but the incident is still increasing. And many people do so in order to be sent to the detention center to receive a prison rations, it is hunger and homeless to force people to violate the forest management regulations.In 1836, there were 150,000 people who were subject to criminal penalties in Prussia, accounting for 77 per cent of all criminal cases. In the face of this rather serious social situation, the Prussian rulers did not find the root of the problem and the solution to the problem from the social system level. Instead, it introduced a tougher bill that would pick up dead branches in the forest, Some other violations of the forest management regulations have also been upgraded to theft and criminal penalties. According to the record of the Sixth Rheinland Parliament in 1841, in October the following year, the article "Debate on the Forest Burglary Law" was written to condemn the legislature's favor of the interests of the owners of the trees, to deprive the poor of the right to pick up dead branches, To put forward their own view of forest legislation.The Prussian government was very angry at the views expressed by the Rheinische Zeitung, who immediately sent a seizure of the Rheinland newspaper to force it to stop printing. Marx angrily resigned from the editorial duties of the newspaper. Marx did not regret his own actions, on the contrary, herecognized the government's ugly. He is looking for the opportunity to continue to resolutely fight against the government.1843 "Rheinische" issue license was revoked by King Prussia, because Marx published in the newspaper criticized the Russian czar article, triggering the dissatisfaction of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, King of Prussia received a protest after the arrest of the ban Reported that Marx was unemployed. During this period, Marx met Friedrich Engels. Engels is the owner of the factory owner is very much appreciate the idea of Marx, often money to sponsor Marx's activities and life, Marx to do learning seriously serious but life with nature, often delayed to the newspaper to the manuscript, Engels often help Marx's work and pens Some articles.married familyFebruary 14, 1814, Yanni Marx was born in Teller a famous family. Yanni Marx (February 12, 1814 - December 2, 1881, formerly known as Johanna "Jenny" · Bernard Jolie von Weston Warren (Johanna "Jenny" Bertha Julie von Westphalen) is A German sociologist, who is only a few minutes away from the home of Marx.In the late summer of 1836, at the University of Bonn, the first year of the study of Marx, back to Terrier to his girlfriend to marry him. Yanni and 18-year-old Marx agreed for life. In accordance with the custom at that time, this is unprecedented. Aristocratic birth, the daughter of Yan Ni, was recognized as the most beautiful girl and the "Queen of the Queen", many handsome aristocratic youth dumping, suitors who lack some people, no doubt, you can conclude a glory Wealthy marriage. But she is contempt for all the traditional concept of society,without the knowledge of their parents to promise to a citizen of the community, she can not predict and Marx's future life how to live. Marx thought that he could not marry Yanni in front of his father, Yan Ni's father, as a temporary adviser. So at first he could only reveal his secret to his father. He believes that his father will be in front of the parents of Jenny for a successful pro-ready for a variety of preparations.In October 1836, Marx moved from the University of Bonn at home near the University of Berlin at home, which meant that they were to be loyal to each other for a long time. In Berlin, because of the feelings of the mind and "love" and the love and the suspense and anxiety, once influenced the Marx wholeheartedly into learning. He had told his father frankly that he had "fallen into the real tranquility" because he was far from the Moose Valley and was far from his "infinite beauty of Jenny". Troubled him is not a guessing heart, because he had never had the slightest doubt on the love of Jenny, but because of the thought of her and long years in the long years of separation, so that he felt very heavy mood.So, 18-year-old Marx wrote writing poetry, poems to express their feelings and feelings. Most of Marx's poems are singing Yanni and pouring himself into her, but there are many of them that express their own thoughts and aspirations and desire to make a difference.On April 15, 1841, Marx received a Ph.D. degree in advance. Young philosopher had just arrived in Trill, hastened to his most beloved home, the doctoral thesis personally sent to the hands of Jenny's father. Yan Ni and Marx after years of separation, had intended to immediately get married. But there is a doctoral thesis and can not be used as a basis for subsistence, so he andYanni had to cancel the idea of marriage, continue to wait. Beginning in April 1842, Marx began writing for the "Rheinische Zeitung". In October 1842, the shareholders of the Rheinland newspaper appointed Marx as editor, and in March 1843, Marx was forced to withdraw from the editorial board of the Rheinburger. And then with Arnold Luger in consultation with the work on the joint publication of the plan. Then on June 19, 1843 he went to Croznach (Yanni after her father died in March 1842 and his mother moved to this place), and waited for him for seven years, was born 1814 born in the German aristocratic (Baron) family of Jenny von Westphalia married. From their private agreement to life together, Yanni waited for a long seven years. In the past seven years, in addition to her had a few times with the fiance of Marx had a few times together, only from the distant with their thoughts and letters to accompany him. She wrote in a letter to Marx: "How brilliant is your image in front of me, how magnificent it is! How far is it from my heart that you can always be by my side, my heart, How is the joy of joy for your beating, my heart, what is anxious to follow you on the way you follow ... ... everywhere I am with you, walking in front of you, but also with you I hope that I can fill the road where you are going, and clear all the obstacles that will stop you from moving forward. "At the same time, she has to struggle with her aristocratic relatives.After the wedding, Marx and Jenny then set off a short wedding trip. In the autumn of 1843, the young Marx and his wife set foot on the exile journey to Paris. During this period he proceeded to study political economy, the French social movement and the French history, and eventually led to its becoming a communist.At the end of October 1843, Marx and Yanni came to Paristogether, and they came to Luga for two months earlier to organize and publish the magazine "German and French Yearbook". At this point, they opened a life full of hardship and self-sacrifice.Because of Marx's outstanding contribution to the cause of communism and to the landlords and bourgeoisians ruthlessly expose and criticize, so that all the conservative forces to exclude him, expelled him. He had to carry a small home around the transfer of their difficulties sometimes difficult to imagine the point of life. At the end of March 1850, with the death of London in London, Jenny wrote a letter to a friend Joseph Weiderme, depicting her life at that time: "Because here the nurse is too high wages, although I often have a bad chest , But still their own children to feed the poor children from my body sucked so much sadness and anxiety, so he has been frail, day and night to endure severe pain.He has been born since the night, Can fall asleep for two or three hours, and recently with violent ventilation, so the child struggles all day on the death line, because of these pains, he desperately sucked milk, so that my breasts were injured and cracked; blood often flow One day, I was holding him sitting, suddenly the female landlord came, I paid her five pounds of arrears, but we have no money at hand.Then came the two bailiffs, Will be my meager home - bed clothes and so on - and even my poor children's cradle and the better toys are seized. They threatened me to say two hours later to all West and I have to sleep with the shivering children sleep light board. "Marx and Yanni symbiotic four women and two children, for the above reasons, only three daughters (ie eldest daughter Jenny Marx, second daughter Laura Marx, Three daughter Elena Marx) grew up [at that time thanks to Helen de Mute Lin Heng, Yanni if thereis no such a loyal assistant, it is difficult to imagine her and her children later how to go down] TheIn this situation, Yan Ni is still deeply in love with Marx. In addition to her mother and housewife's responsibility, in addition to worry about the daily life, but also take on a lot of other work. Yanni is an indispensable secretary to Marx, and almost all manuscripts of Marx - most of which are hard to recognize - must be clearly written by her before being sent to a printing or publishing house.And publishers and editorial office negotiations, some cumbersome procedures, it is difficult to deal with the affairs, must write the situation, many by her agent. Marx was not the kind of person who was easily present in his mouth, but when Yanni left him for a few months because of his mother's death, he wrote in her letter: "Deep passion Because of the close proximity of its object The performance of the daily habits, and in the next resort under the influence of magic will grow up and re-have its inherent strength of my love is the case.As long as we are forced for the space, I immediately understand that time in my Love is like a sun and rain in the plant - to grow.I love you, as long as you stay away from me, it will show its true colors, like a giant face. In this love focused on all my energy and all the feelings. ... ... if I can put your gentle and pure heart close to his heart, I will be silent, not for a cry. I can not kiss you with lips, but have to resort to the text, to the text to convey the kiss. "The love of Marx and Jenny's dusk is more intense. 1880, may suffer from liver cancer, she with amazing restraint ability, endured great pain. In this scared of the years, Marx took care of his wife, not left or right in order to make her happy, Marx in 1881in July and August, accompanied her to France to see the eldest daughter and a few grandson. In the fall of 1881, due to anxious and insomnia, excessive physical exertion, Marx was ill. He is suffering from pneumonia, life is dangerous, but he still can not forget the yanni. Their little daughter talked about her parents' life, "I will never forget the scene of the morning." He felt that he was much better and had gone to the mother's room. Young people, like a pair of young men and women who are beginning to live together, are not like a sick man and a dying old woman, unlike a man who is about to farewell.December 2, 1881, Yan Ni sleepy. This is the biggest blow that Marx has never suffered. On the day of his death, Engels said: "Moore (from India, who describes the dark skin) is also dead." In the next few months, he accepted the doctor's advice, to the mild climate to rest. But no matter where they can not forget Yan Ni, could not stop grief. He wrote to the best friend, "By the way, you know that few people are more disgusted than I am sad, but if I do not admit that I miss my wife at all times - she is the best of my life Everything is inseparable - that 's how I'm lying. "How awesome these words are.January 11, 1883, came the sudden death of the eldest daughter of the bad news, Marx's condition increased. At noon on March 14, 1883, Marx resigned peacefully. On March 17, 1883, Marx was buried next to the grave of Haget's Cemetery, Jenny.Great friendshipIn 1844 September, Engels visited Paris, the two sides began to study the scientific socialism, and formed a deep friendship. Marx wrote the "Economic Philosophy Manuscript", the manuscript until 1933 was discovered and published, known as the "1844 economic philosophy manuscript." In 1845, Marxparticipated in the preparation of "forward magazine", in which the authoritarianism of Germany made a sharp criticism. The Prussian government was very dissatisfied and asked the French government to expel Marx. In the autumn of the same year, Marx was beaten by the French government rogue, deported, forced to come to Brussels, Belgium. In December 1845, Marx declared his departure from Prussian nationality.And then Engels completed with the "German ideology." The book criticizes Hegel's dialectics and analyzes the incompleteness of Feuerbach materialism, which for the first time systematically expounded the historical materialism they founded and made clear that the proletariat seized power The historical task laid the initial theoretical foundation for socialism from fantasy to science. At the beginning of 1846, Marx and Engels established the Brussels Communist Communications Commission. In 1847, Marx and Engels were invited to the righteous alliance. In June 1847, the reorganization of the alliance and renamed the communist alliance, Marx and Engels drafted the alliance program "Communist Manifesto." Since then the revolution of 1848 swept through Europe, also spread to Belgium. In March 1848, Marx was expelled by the Belgian authorities. At the invitation of the French new government, the Marxist couple returned to Paris, France, Engels arrived in Paris.In April 1848, under the auspices of the German proletariat, Marx and Engels returned to Prussia Cologne and founded the "New Rheinische Zeitung". Followed by almost all editors or judicial arrests, or deportation. On May 16, 1849, Marx received a deportation order from the Prussian authorities. May 19, published in the red ink published "New Rheinische" the last one No. 301 published. In early June, Marx came to Paris. He wasforced to choose or be imprisoned in Brittany, France, or was forced to expel again. In August, Marx was expelled from the French government to London, England. From the Prussian stationed in the British spy report that Marx seems to never scratch the beard, Marx is still in the UK by the Prussian government to monitor.In London, Marx spent the most difficult day of his life. In five years, Marx because of economic and debt problems, mental anxiety, suffering from the poor mood of the disease, four children in three deaths. But during this period, Marx wrote his most important work - "Capital" (Volume 1). Marx is thought to be rich, economically poor and poor, and the great economist who has a thorough study of the capitalist economy is itself poor, and his life is almost in poverty. Marx did not have a fixed job, and the family's economic origins was mainly due to his extremely unstable and extremely meager royalties, coupled with the persecution and blockade of the bourgeoisie, which had always plagued the Marxist family with hunger and survival. To death. In the life of the displaced, he is often empty, clean clothes, struggling in the dilemma of the struggle. If not Engels in economic long-term selfless assistance, Marx can not engage in leading the international proletarian movement and concentrate on theoretical creation.From the letter to Engels on February 27, 1852, we saw the plight of the world famous theorist, Marx wrote: "A week I have reached the point of great pain: because the coat into the pawn shop, I can not And then go out, because not to credit, I can not eat meat. "Soon wrote to Engels talked:" My wife is sick, little Yanni disease, Linheng suffering from a nerve heat, the doctor I can not please , And now can not please, because there is nomoney to buy medicine. Eight to ten days since the home to eat bread and potatoes, whether today can get these, but also a problem. "Hungry poverty and housework trivia, troubled Marx, he Feeling angry and irritable, unable to concentrate and wisdom to carry out theoretical creation. On the plight of Marx, Engels as their own difficulties. "I will send you five pounds in early February," he wrote in a letter to Marx. "You can receive this number every month, even if I do not have a debt to the new year." ... of course, you do not because I promised to pay 5 pounds a month in the difficult time no longer write to me to ask for money, because as long as possible, I must do so. "At this time Engels in the door - Engels The company is just an ordinary small clerk, the income is very low.Engels later made the company's care, the monthly salary has improved. From 1860 onwards, the support of Marx increased to 10 pounds per month, but also often "other" to give some funding. From 1851 to 1869, Marx received a total of £ 3121 remittances of Engels. For Engels at the time, it was a matter of course. It is precisely because of the generosity of Engels, so that Marx relentlessly survived, to be engaged in long-term scientific writings, writing for the "capital" for extensive and in-depth economic research. Just as Lenin said: "If not Engels sacrificed himself and continue to give funding, Marx not only can not be written as" capital "and is bound to die from poverty." Engels's selfless dedication, Marx was very moved, and very disturbed, in 1867 Wrote to Engels' letter: "frankly told you that my conscience is often as heavy as the dream of the devil, because your excellence is mainly for me to waste in business, only to let them deserted, and But also to share all my trivial worries. "This is the words of Marx's heart. The concern of Marx and his family life,Engels is meticulous. Marx's life is suffering from hardships, whenever Marx suffered setbacks and blows, thoughts and feelings with grief and depression, Engels always think of ways to soothe, he has become a Marx to avoid the storm of life in the harbor, Marx arrived in this harbor, Quiet and happy. Poverty and suffering have claimed the four children of Marx.In April 1855, Marx's favorite son, Edgar, died, which gave Marx a heavy blow, and he felt he could not support it. In the letter to Engels, Marx talked about the infinite sadness: "In these days, I have been able to bear all this terrible pain, because always miss you, miss your friendship, always hope that the two of us also To make some meaningful things together in the world. "Engels brought the couple to Manchester, in Engels's careful arrangements and care, the Marx and the couple spent the most difficult moments of life. Engels is a "supernumerary" member of Marx's house, and every time he goes to Marx's house, the whole family is as happy as the holidays, and Marx's daughters see Engels as "the second father". Of course, the Marx family of Engels on the health concerns, it is worrying. In 1857 July, when Engels was sick, Marx wrote a letter of comfort: "Dear Engels, you can believe that no matter how unfortunate we are, my wife and I are more concerned about your recent health situation than our own. "Two old comrades in the work of different places, often communicate with each other ideas, without reservation to talk about personal life and political life in the emotions, in their more than 1,000 communications, we see the two comrades Deep Yi Benedict, a few days can not get each other letters, each other to each other up. In his letter to Engels, Marx wrote, "Dear Engels, are you crying or laughing, sleeping or awake? In the last three weeks, I sent a variety of letters to Manchester, but Did notreceive a reply, but I believe are sent to. "Similarly, if you can not hear a few days of Marx's audio, Engels will be issued" even the gun "like questioning" old Moore, old Moore, big beard old Do you have anything to do? What are you doing, what are you doing? Are you sick or falling into the abyss of your political economy? "They are doing nothing Said, nothing to talk about. And the friendship between Engels, Marx made a high degree of evaluation, February 20, 1866 to Engels in the letter said: "This friendship between us is how happy, you have to know that I am any relationship Have not made such a high evaluation. "Engels and Marx's noble friendship, for the human to establish a brilliant example, the two great great friendship to tell the world: based on common faith and the pursuit of the foundation of friendship, is evergreen, unbreakable.Old age and deathSeptember 28, 1864, Marx participated in the first international congress, was elected to the leadership committee. He drafted the Declaration on the Establishment of the International, the Provisional Constitution and other important documents. September 14, 1867, "Capital" first volume published. After the two volumes for the death of Marx, by Engels finishing its legacy, respectively, in 1885, published in 1894. In October 1870 Marx reunited with Engels in London. As many countries were expelled and exiled everywhere, he claimed to be "the world's citizens".On December 2, 1881, Yanni Marx died. March 14, 1883 at 2:33 pm, the great thinker of Marx died in London, at the age of 65 years old. And later with Yanni buried in the northern suburbs of London Haget cemetery. Engels published the tomb speech, about 20 people attended the funeral.。
当代中国社会的声望分层_职业声望与社会经济地位指数测量
二 、数据资料及研究方法
(一) 数据资料 本文采用数据是中国社会科学院社会学研究所“当代中国社会结
构变迁研究”课题组于 2001 年 11 - 12 月在全国 12 个省及直辖市 (北
77
社会学研究
2005. 2
京 、上海 、浙江 、江苏 、山东 、黑龙江 、河北 、河南 、江西 、四川 、贵州 、内蒙) 73 个区县收集的问卷调查数据 。调查采用多阶段复合抽样方法 ,调查 对象为 16 - 70 岁人口 ,获取的有效样本为 6193 个 。经加权处理后 ,此 调查数据的样本分布在基本的人口信息和主要的个人社会经济背景信 息方面与第五次全国人口普查数据的分布极为接近 ,这表明此数据有 很好的代表性 。① 在此次调查样本中 ,有 5. 4 %是在校学生 。由于在校 生还未完成学业步入社会 ,无法对他们进行职业 、收入水平等相关因素 的归类 ,从而也不能进行社会声望地位的测量 。因此 ,本文进行社会声 望测量的数据排除了在校生样本 ,实际测量样本数量为 5860 个 。本文 中的所有数据分析都采用了加权数据 。
(二) 职业声望测量 西方社会学家发展出许多职业声望测量技术 ,而国内研究者大多
采用较为简化的测量方法 ,如 :列出几十类职业 ,让被调查者评价 ,并赋 予分值 ,计算出各个职业的平均得分 (许欣欣 ,2000 ;蒋来文等 ,1991 ;蔡 禾 、赵钊卿 ,1995 ; 叶南客 ,1997 ; 李强 、宋时歌 ,1998 ,等) 。这种测量方 法有一个局限 ,即测量的职业种类不能太多 ,如果列出过多职业 ,将使 被调查者进行职业评价时感到困难或厌烦 ,降低调查资料的效度 。但 是 ,如果列出的职业种类太少 ,又达不到研究职业声望的目的 。为了解 决这一问题 ,本研究采用了林南和叶晓兰 (Lin & Ye ,1997) 设计的分组 职业声望测量方法 。本研究共选择了 81 种职业进行声望测量 。这 81 个职业随机分为 8 组 ,每组共 11 个职业 ,其中一个职业 ———小学教师 ———在每一组中都出现 ,另外 10 个职业每组不同 。所有的被调查者也 被分为 8 组 ,每组被调查者只需评价一组职业 (即 11 个职业) ,把 11 个 职业进行高低等级排列 ,排在最高的职业赋值 1 ,排在最低的职业赋值 11 。为了把 8 组职业评价整合在一起进行比较 ,把每一组都出现的职 业 ———小学教师 ———作为参照职业 ,对各个职业的得分进行标准化转 换 ,转换后的得分再重新赋值 ,使各职业得分在 0 - 100 分之间 。最终 取得的职业声望得分经过了两次标准化转换 。第一次标准化转换是为 了把每个组中的 11 个职业的得分排列整合起来 ,转换成为 81 个职业 统一的得分排列 。标准化转换的公式是 :
课程名称中英文对照参考表
外国文学作选读Selected Reading of Foreign Literature现代企业管理概论Introduction to Modern Enterprise Managerment电力电子技术课设计Power Electronics Technology Design计算机动画设计3D Animation Design中国革命史China’s Revolutionary History中国社会主义建设China Socialist Construction集散控制DCS Distributed Control计算机控制实现技术Computer Control Realization Technology计算机网络与通讯Computer Network and CommunicationERP/WEB应用开发Application ＆ Development of ERP/WEB数据仓库与挖掘Data Warehouse and Data Mining物流及供应链管理Substance and Supply Chain Management成功心理与潜能开发Success Psychology & Potential Development信息安全技术Technology of Information Security图像通信Image Communication金属材料及热加工Engineering Materials & Thermo-processing机械原理课程设计Course Design for Principles of Machine机械设计课程设计Course Design for Mechanical Design机电系统课程设计Course Design for Mechanical and Electrical System 创新成果Creative Achievements课外教育Extracurricular education。
Social Capital and Social Quilts Network Patterns of Favor Exchange
Social Capital and Social Quilts:Network Patterns ofFavor Exchange∗Matthew O.Jackson,Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer,and Xu Tan†June2010,Revision:August7,2011Forthcoming in the American Economic ReviewAbstractWe examine the informal exchange of favors in societies such that any two individ-uals interact too infrequently to sustain exchange,but such that the social pressure ofthe possible loss of multiple relationships can sustain exchange.Patterns of exchangethat are locally enforceable and renegotiation-proof necessitate that all links are“sup-ported”:any two individuals exchanging favors have a common friend.In symmetricsettings,such robust networks are“social quilts”:tree-like unions of completely con-nected subnetworks.Examining favor exchange networks in75villages in rural India,wefind high levels of support and identify characteristics that correlate with support.Keywords:Social Networks,social capital,favor exchange,support,social quilts, renegotiation-proofJEL Classification Codes:D85,C72,L14,Z131IntroductionHuman beings rely on cooperation with others for their survival and growth.Although some forms of cooperation and behavior are enforced by social,religious,legal,and political in-stitutions that have emerged throughout history,much of development,growth,and basic∗We gratefully acknowledgefinancial support from the NSF under grants SES–0647867,SES–0752735, and SES–0961481.The data were gathered in collaboration with Abhijit Banerjee,Arun Chandrasekhar, and Esther Duflo,whom we thank for making the data analysis here possible.We are also grateful to the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab(J-PAL)and the Centre for Microfinance at the Institute for Financial Management and Research in Chennai(CMF at IFMR)for support and help in the data collection. We thank Scott Altman,Nicolas Carayol,Avner Grief,Ian Jewitt,Mihai Manea,Markus Mobius,Larry Samuelson,Sudipta Sarangi,Giancarlo Spagnolo,and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.†All three authors are at the Department of Economics,Stanford University,Stanford,California 94305-6072USA.Jackson is also an external faculty member at the Santa Fe Institute.Emails:jack-sonm@,trodrig@,and xutan@.day-to-day functioning relies on a society’s ability to“informally”encourage cooperative behavior.This sort of informal enforcement of cooperation ranges from basic forms of quid-pro-quo(or tit-for-tat in game theory parlance)to more elaborate forms of social norms and culture,all of which must function without enforceable contracts or laws.1Indeed,con-tracting costs are prohibitive for many day-to-day favors that people exchange,ranging from offering advice to a colleague,a small loan to a friend,or emergency help to an acquaintance. Such informal favor exchange and cooperative behaviors,in one form or another,underly much of the literature on social capital.Although there is a large literature on social capital,there is a paucity of work that provides careful foundations for how social structure relates to such favor exchange and cooperative behavior.Moreover,as we show here,favor networks do not necessarily exhibit the suggested patterns predicted by some of the previous literature.These points are related to each other since some standard network measures have emerged loosely from the literature discussing the role of networks in fostering cooperation.In particular,the importance of social pressures on fostering cooperation has deep roots in the sociology literature including seminal work by Georg Simmel(1950),James S.Coleman(1988)and more recently by David Krackhardt(1996),among others(see the literature discussion below).Standard measures of network clustering and transitivity have grown in part out of those works.Clustering measures examine the extent to which two friends of a given agent are friends of each other. In the data on favor exchange networks in rural India that we examine here,clustering is on the order of ten to thirty percent.A puzzle emerges as to why one sees that level of clustering,and not some other higher level,and even whether clustering is really the appropriate measure for capturing social pressures.In contrast,the concept of“support”that emerges from our theoretical analysis measures the number of pairs of friends that have some other friend in common.As we shall see in the data,support is several times higher than clustering,and indeed this distinction is consistent with the theory presented here.2 To be specific,in this paper we provide a game theoretic foundation for social enforce-ment of informal favor exchange,and also examine network patterns of favor exchange from 75rural villages.In particular,we consider settings where simple bilateral quid-pro-quo enforcement is insufficient to sustain favor exchange.Some bilateral interactions may be infrequent enough that they fail to allow natural self-enforcement of cooperation or favor ex-change.However,when such interactions are embedded in a network of interactions whose functioning can be tied to each other,then individuals canfind it in their interest to co-1In fact,the term“ostracism”(which has Greek origins based on a practice of banishments that originated in the Athenian democracy)has come to embody the idea of individuals cutting ties with members of society who do not perform properly.2This does not imply that clustering might not emerge from other models of favor exchange,and clustering remains an important network statistic-but one that is conceptually distinct from support.Also,numbers of friends in common are reported in various network case studies(e.g.,for an early discussion see James A.Barnes(1954)),which is a form of support-for which our theory now provides a foundation.Friends in common have also been used in modeling network formation(e.g.,see Matthew O.Jackson and Brian W. Rogers(2007))and prediction of relationships(e.g.,see David Liben-Nowell and Jon Kleinberg(2007)).operate given(credible)threats of ostracism or loss of multiple relationships for failure to behave well in any given relationship.We provide complete characterizations of the net-work patterns of favor exchange that are sustainable by a form of equilibrium satisfying two robustness criteria.The setting that we examine is such that opportunities for one agent to do a favor for another agent arrive randomly over time.Providing a favor is costly,but the benefit outweighs the cost,so that it is efficient for agents to provide favors over time.However, it could be that the cost of providing a favor today is sufficiently high that it is not in an agent’s selfish interest to provide the favor even if that means that he or she will not receive favors from that person again.Thus,networks of relationships are needed to provide sufficient incentives for favor exchange,and it may be that an agent risks losing several relationships by failing to provide a favor.We characterize the network structures that correspond to robust equilibria of favor exchanges.The criteria that we examine are twofold:first,the threats of which relationships will be terminated in response to an agent’s failure to deliver a favor must be credible.Credibility is captured by the game theoretic concept of“renegotiation-proofness”.3After an agent has failed to deliver a favor,that relationship is lost,but which additional relationships are lost in the continuation equilibrium,must be such that there is not another equilibrium continuation that all agents prefer to the given continuation.This sort of renegotiation-proofness rules out unreasonable equilibria such as the“grim-trigger”sort of equilibrium where once anyone fails to provide a single favor the whole society grinds to a halt and nobody provides any favors in the future.At that point, it would be in the society’s interest to return to some equilibrium where at least some favors are provided.Renegotiation-proof equilibria can be complex,but have some nice intuitions underlying their structure as we explain in detail.The second criterion that we impose is a robustness condition that we call“robustness against social contagion.”It is clear that to sustain favor exchange,an agent must expect to lose some relationships if the agent fails to deliver a favor.Those lost relationships can in turn cause other agents to lose some of their relationships since the incentives to provide favors change with the network structure. This can lead to some fragility of a society,as one agent’s bad behavior can ripple through the society.The robustness against social contagion requires that the ripple effects of some agent’s bad behavior be confined to that agent’s neighbors and not propagate throughout the network.In symmetric settings,the combination of renegotiation-proofness and robustness require a unique type of network configuration of favor exchanges.We call those configurations “social quilts.”A social quilt is a union of small cliques(completely connected subnetworks), where each clique is just large enough to sustain cooperation by all of its members and where the cliques are laced together in a tree-like pattern.One of our main theoretical results shows that configurations of favor exchange that are sustained in robust equilibria are precisely the3Although there are several definitions in the literature for infinitely repeated games,our games have a structure such that there is a natural definition which has an inductive structure reminiscent of that of Jean Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna(1993).social quilts.We then extend the model to allow heterogeneity in the cost,value,and arrival rates of favors to various individuals.In the more general setting,we prove that any robust equilibrium network must exhibit a specific trait:each of its links must be“supported”. That is,if some agent i is linked to an agent j,then there must be some agent k linked to both of them.This is related to,but quite distinct from,various clustering measures.With the theoretical underpinnings in hand,we then examine social networks in75vil-lages in southern rural India.4Using these data5we can examine the networks of various forms of social interaction including specific sorts of favor exchange.In line with the theoret-ical predictions,wefind that the number of favor links that have this sort of social support is in the range of eighty percent in these villages.Moreover,the level of support is significantly higher than what would arise if links were formed at random(even with some geographic bias to formation),and significantly higher than levels of clustering.We analyze various aspects of the levels of support and alsofind that it is significantly higher for favor relationships than other sorts of relationships.Our research contributes to the understanding of informal favor exchange as well as social networks in several ways:•We provide an analysis of repeated interactions where individual’s decisions are influ-enced by the network pattern of behavior in the community,and this provides new insights into repeated games on networks.•Our model includes dynamic choices of both favor provision and relationships and provides new insights into the co-evolution of networks and behavior,and in particular into the phenomenon of ostracism.6•Our analysis suggests a new source of inefficiency in informal risk and favor sharing, showing why individuals may have to limit the number of relationships in which they take part.•A by-product of our analysis is an operational definition of social capital that is more specific and tighter than many existing definitions,and it makes tight predictions about how relationships in a society must be organized.4Although we apply some of ourfindings to favor relationships in Indian Villages,such informal favor exchange is clearly not limited to developing countries.For example,a recent New York Times/CBS News poll(reported in the New York Times,December152009)found that53percent of surveyed unemployed workers in the U.S.had borrowed money from friends or family as a result of being unemployed.5These data are particularly well-suited for our study as they provide network structure for various favor relationships,and moreover have this for many separate villages.We are not aware of any other data set having these attributes.In particular,in these data we have information about who borrows rice and kerosene from whom,who borrows small sums of money from whom,who gets advice from whom,who seeks emergency medical aid from whom,and a variety of other sorts of relationships,as well as gps data.6As we shall see,ostracism has further consequences in terms of lost relationships,beyond those directly involving the individual being punished.•We identify a necessary property of such favor exchange networks that we call“support”and show how this is distinguished from clustering measures.•We examine data that include many sorts of interactions and cover75different villages, andfind that the networks exhibit substantial and significant distinctions between our measure of support and standard measures of clustering.1.1Related LiteratureAs mentioned above,there is a large literature on social capital that studies the ability of a society to foster trust and cooperation among its members.7Although that literature is extensive and contains important empirical studies and many intuitive ideas,it has struggled in providingfirm theoretical foundations and the term“social capital”has at times been used very loosely and as a result has lost some of its bite.8Part of the contribution of our paper is to provide an explicit modeling of how societies can enforce cooperative favor exchange and how this is linked to the social network structure within a society.In this way,our paper provides a concrete definition of social capital that is embedded in three components:a notion of equilibrium that embodies notions of ostracism and social expectations of individual behaviors,implications of this for resulting social network structure,and individual payoffs from the resulting behaviors.Coleman(1988)discusses closure in social networks,emphasizing the ability of small groups to monitor and pressure each other to behave.Here we provide a new argument for, and a very specific variety of,closure.A specific form of minimal clique structures emerge because of a combination of renegotiation-proofness and a local robustness condition,rather than for informational,monitoring,or pressuring reasons.Minimal sized cliques offer credible threats of dissolving in the face of bad behavior,and in terms of minimal contagion for a society.Our analysis also formalizes this in terms of support and contrasts it with clustering.The most closely related previous literature in terms of the theoretical analysis of a repeated game on a network is a series of papers that study prisoners’dilemmas in network settings,including Werner Raub and Jeroen Weesie(1990),S.Nageeb Ali and David ler (2009),Steffen Lippert and Giancarlo Spagnolo(2011),and Maximilian Mihm,Russell Toth, Corey Lang(2009).9In particular,Raub and Weesie(1990)and Ali and Miller(2009)show how completely connected networks shorten the travel time of contagion of bad behavior7For example,see George C.Homans(1958),Glenn Loury(1977),Pierre Bourdieu(1986),Coleman(1988, 1990),Michael Woolcock(1998),Partha Dasgupta(2000),Robert D.Putnam(1993,1995,2000),Edward L. Glaeser,David Laibson,and Bruce Sacerdote(2002)Luigi Guiso,Paola Sapienza,and Luigi Zingales(2004), Guido Tabellini(2009),among others.8See Joel Sobel(2002)for an illuminating overview and critique of the literature.9Other studies of network structure and cooperative or various forms of risk-sharing behavior and the relationship to social network structures include Marcel Fafchamps and Susan Lund(2003),Joachim De Weerdt and Stefan Dercon(2006),Yann Bramoull´e and Rachel Kranton(2007),Francis Bloch,Garance Genicot,and Debraj Ray(2007,2008),Dean Karlan,Markus Mobius,Tanya Rosenblat and Adam Szeidl (2009),and Felipe Balmaceda and Juan F.Escobar(2011).which can quicken punishment for deviations.Although cliques also play a prominent role in some of those papers,it is for very different reasons.In those settings,individuals do not have information about others’behaviors except through what they observe in terms of their own interactions.Thus,punishments only travel through the network through contagious behavior(or word-of-mouth),and the main hurdle to enforcing individual cooperation is how long it takes for someone’s bad behavior to come to reach their neighbors through chains of contagion.10Our analysis is in a very different setting,where individuals have complete information.The quilts in our setting emerge because they do not lead to large contagions but instead compartmentalize the damage from an individual’s defection.Moreover,the quilts consist of minimal sized cliques because only those sorts of implicit punishments are immune to renegotiation.Matthew Haag and Roger Lagunoff(2004)provide another reason favoring small cliques: heterogeneity.In their analysis large differences in preferences can preclude cooperative behavior,and so partitioning a group into more homogeneous subgroups can enable coop-erative behavior which might not be feasible otherwise.Although our reasoning behind cliques comes from different sources,when we examine heterogeneous societies we dofind assortativity in who exchanges favors with whom.Here,it is not because of direct reciprocity considerations,but because robustness requires balanced cliques and so agents need to have similar valuations of favors in order for their cliques to be critical.In this way,we provide new insights into homophily,where relationships of agents are biased towards others who have similar characteristics in terms of their values and arrival rates of favors.Finally,our analysis of the data not only provides support for the support measure, but also uncovers significant differences between different sorts of relationships,as might be expected based on the different ways in which links might form across applications(e.g., see Matthew O.Jackson(2008)).Here we add a new angle to this understanding,finding statistically distinct patterns of support in various sorts of favor and social networks.These suggest some interesting questions for future research.2A Model of Favor Exchange2.1Networks,Favors,and PayoffsAfinite set N={1,...,n}of agents are connected in a social network described by an undirected11graph.Given that the set of agents N isfixed throughout the analysis,we represent a network,generically denoted g,simply by the set of its links or edges.Let g N be the set of all links(so the set of all subsets of N of size2),and let G={g|g⊂g N}be the set of all possible networks.For simplicity,we write ij to represent the link{i,j},and10That approach builds on earlier work by Avner Greif(1989),Michihiro Kandori(1992),Glenn Ellison (1994),Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Andrew Postlewaite(1995)among others,who studied the ability of a society to sustain cooperation via threats of contagions of bad behavior.11This is not necessary for the analysis,and we comment later on possible extensions to directed networks.so ij ∈g indicates that i and j are linked under the network g .We write g −ij to denote the network obtained from g by deleting a link ij .For an integer k ,0≤k ≤n (n −1)/2,let G k be the set of all networks that have exactly k links,so that G k ={g ∈G :|g |=k }.The neighbors of agent i are denoted N i (g )={j |ij ∈g }.We follow a convention that rules out self-links,and so all agents in N i (g )are distinct from i .The degree of agent i in the network g is the number of his or her neighbors denoted by d i (g )=|N i (g )|.Time proceeds in discrete periods indexed by t ∈{0,1,...}and in any given period,there is a chance that an agent will need a favor from a friend or will be called upon to grant a favor to a friend.In particular,an agent i who is connected to an agent j (so that ij ∈g )anticipates a probability p >0that j will need a favor from i in period t and a probability p that i will need a favor from j .It is assumed that at most one favor will be needed across all agents in any given period,and so we require that n (n −1)p ≤1,and we allow the sum to be less than one to admit the possibility that no favor is needed in a given period.This is a proxy for a Poisson arrival process,where the chance that two favors are needed precisely at the same moment is 0.By letting the time between periods be small,the chance of more than one favor being called upon in the same period goes to 0.Thus,when applying the model it is important to keep in mind that periods are relatively small compared to the arrival rate of favors.A restriction of this formulation is that p does not depend on the network structure.More generally,the chance that i needs a favor from j will depend on many things including how many other friends i has.We characterize the equilibrium networks for the more general case in Section 5.We begin with the current case since it more clearly provides the basic intuitions,but the results have very intuitive analogs for the general case that are easy to describe once we have presented the simpler case.Doing a favor costs an agent an amount c >0and the value of the favor to an agent is an amount v >c .Receiving a “favor”can embody many things including getting advice,borrowing a good,borrowing money,or receiving some service.The important aspect is that the value of a favor to the receiving agent exceeds the cost to the providing agent,so that it is ex ante Pareto efficient for agents to exchange favors over time.However,we examine settings where it is impossible (or too costly)for agents to write binding contracts to perform favors whenever called upon to do so.This applies in many developing countries,and also in developed countries where it is prohibitively costly and complex to write complete contracts covering the everyday sort of favors that one might need from friends.Thus,we examine self-enforcing favor exchange.Agents discount over time according to a factor 0<δ<1.Thus,if there were just two agents who always performed favors for each other,then they would each expect a discounted stream of utility of p (v −c )1−δ.The more interesting case from a network perspective is the one that we examine,where c >δp (v −c )1−δ.In this case,favor exchange between two agents in isolation is not sustainable.When called upon to perform a favor,the agent sees a cost that exceeds the future value of potential favor exchange(in isolation)and so favor exchange cannot be sustained between two people alone,but must be embedded in a larger context in order to be sustained.Sustaining favor exchange between two individuals requires a high enough frequency of arrival coupled with a high enough marginal benefit from a favor and sufficient patience.In a marriage,there are generally sufficiently many opportunities for each spouse to help the other out with some task or need that bilateral favor exchange can be sustained.However,in other contexts, where such needs are rarer-such as a need to borrow cash due to an emergency,or a need for medical advice,etc.,one might need a multilateral setting to sustain favor exchange.A society is described by(N,p,v,c,δ).2.2The GameThe favor exchange game is described as follows:•The game begins with some initial network in place,denoted g0.•Period t begins with a network g t−1in place.•Agents(simultaneously)12announce the links that they are willing to retain:L i⊂={ij|j∈L i and i∈L j}.N i(g t−1).The resulting network is gt.With probability2pk t need for a(single)favor •Let k t be the number of links in gtarises and with probability1−2pk t there is no need for a favor in the period.If a favor is needed,then it could apply to any link in gwith equal likelihood and then goteither direction.If a favor is needed,then let i t denote the agent called upon to do the.favor and j t the agent who needs the favor,where i t j t∈gt•Agent i t chooses whether or not to perform the favor.If the favor is performed theni t incurs the cost c and agent j t enjoys the benefit v.Otherwise no cost or benefit isincurred.−i t j t if the need for a favor arose and it was not •The ending network,denoted g t,is gtperformed,and is gotherwise.tPeople make two sorts of choices:they can choose with whom they associate and they can choose to do favors or not to do favors.Opportunities for favor exchange arise randomly, as in a Poisson game,and people must choose whether to act on favors as the need arises. Choices of which relationships to maintain,however,can be made essentially at any time. In the model this is captured by subdividing the period into link choices and favor choices, 12Given the equilibrium refinements that we use,whether or not the link choices are simultaneous is effectively irrelevant.so that agents have a chance to adjust the network after any favor choice,and before the next potential favor arises.This structure embodies several things.First,favor relationships can either be sustained or not.Once a favor is denied,that relationship cannot be resuscitated.Thus,at any point in time an agent’s decision is which relationships to maintain.This simplifies the analysis in that it eliminates complicated forms of punishment where various agents withhold favors from an agent over time,but then eventually revert to providing favors.It can be motivated on various behavioral(e.g.,emotional)or pro-social grounds and effectively it acts as a sort of refinement of the set of all possible punishments that might occur,as it requires that one of the ostracizing agents be the one who failed to get the favor.Eventually,one would like to extend the analysis to situations where after some period of time forgiveness is possible, but this simplification allows us to gain a handle on sustainable network structures as the problem is already complex,and it appears that much of the intuition carries over to the moreflexible case,but that is a subject for further research.Second,we do not consider the formation of new links,but only the dissolution of links. This embodies the idea that the formation of new relationships is a longer-term process and that decisions to provide favors and/or ostracize an agent can be taken more quickly and are shorter term actions.It is important to note that we cover the case where society starts with the complete network,so we do not a priori restrict the links that might be formed, and so our results do make predictions about which networks can be formed/sustained in a society.The important wedge that we impose is that an agent who has lost a relationship cannot(quickly)replace it with a newly formed one.One other aspect of the model is important to mention.Agents do not exchange money for favors even though,hypothetically,favor exchange could be monetized.Of course we do not see monetization of all favors in reality,as when a colleague asks to borrow a book we tend not to charge her or him a rental fee;but that empirical observation does not explain why we do not charge our friends and acquaintances for every favor that we perform.One explanation is a behavioral one:that monetizing favors would fundamentally change the way in which people perceive the relationship,and this explanation is consistent with people no longer viewing a monetized relationship as a long run relationship.More discussion of this point is given by David M.Kreps(1997).The specifics of why at least some favors are not monetized is outside of our scope.For now,we consider a complete information version of the game,in which all agents observe all moves in the game at every node.We discuss limited information variations in Section7.An agent i’s expected utility from being in a network g that he or she expects to existforever13isu i(g)=d i(g)p(v−c)1−δ13This applies at any point within the period other than at the a time at which the agent is called to receive or produce a favor.。