2016年对外经济贸易大学翻译硕士考研参考书,考研招生目录,考研经验,历年真题,复试分数线

2016年对外经济贸易大学翻译硕士考研招生目录，考研参考书，历年真题笔记贸大英语翻译基础书目推荐1、庄绎传，《英汉翻译简明教程》。

北京：外语教学与研究出版社，2002。

2、叶子南，《高级英汉翻译理论与实践》。

北京：清华大学出版社，2001。

3、中国日报（China Daily）：英语点睛：新词新译4、王恩冕，《大学英汉翻译教程》，对外经济贸易大学出版社，第三版，2010。

5、金融时报官方网站：双语时评。

6、网站：/7、外贸、金融、经济学、世贸组织等英语专业术语。

8、张曦，《口语与口译300题》，上海交通大学出版社。

9、金焕荣，《商务英语翻译》，苏州大学出版社。

10、赵军锋，《商务英语口译》，高等教育出版社，2009.11、2015年度国家领导人出席的国际会议：演讲稿中英对照。

12、三笔、二笔相应题材的文章。

百科知识和汉语写作书目推荐1、卢晓江.《自然科学史十二讲》.中国轻工业出版社（2007）（矿大）2、叶朗.《中国文化读本》.北京：外语教学与研究出版社（2008）3、杨月蓉.《实用汉语语法与修辞》.重庆：西南师范大学出版社（1999）（北大）4、金元浦.《中国文化概论》.北京：中国人民大学出版社（2007）5、庄锡昌.《西方文化史》.北京：高等教育出版社（2011）6、林青松.《中国文学与中国文化知识应试指南》.南京：东南大学出版社（2005）7、张元忠.张东风.《经济应用文写作与评析》.武汉：华中科技大学出版社（2008）9、俞纪东.《经济写作》.上海：上海财经大学出版社10、张文.《外贸文秘写作全书》.中华工商联合出版社11、郑孝敏.《商务应用文》.东北财经大学出版社12、柯琳娟.《公司（企业）常用文书写作格式与范本》.企业管理出版社13、邵龙青.《财经应用写作》.东北财经大学出版社14、伟业管理咨询公司编著.《商务文书模板速查手册》.中国言实出版社（贸大）15、李玉珊.《商务文案写作》.高等教育出版社16、岳海翔.《商务文书写作要领与范文》.中国言实出版社17、岳海翔.《企划文书写作要领与范文》.中国言实出版社18、程裕祯.《中国文化要略》.外语教学与研究出版社19、朱维之，《外国文学史》（欧美卷），南开大学出版社。

20、《高中语文基础知识手册》，文学与文化部分。

21、张岱年，《中国文化概论》。

北京：北京师范大学出版社，2004、2010。

22、夏晓鸣，《应用文写作》。

上海：复旦大学出版社，201023、《不可不知的2000/3000/5000个常识》24、李国正主编的《百科知识考点精编与真题解析》25、世界历史地理及年度国际国内重大事件，包括文学及经济类畅销书籍，与名著有关的影视剧作，年鉴、周年纪念日等。

（平时关注网站、报刊）翻译硕士英语书目推荐1、单选：外贸函电真题，《巅峰突破8级词汇巧学速记》2、改错：（改错只要弄懂了错误类型其实很送分的）3、阅读：FT(原文，要重视，打印出来认真看，下个app多看)4、王关富《商务英语阅读》（里面很多经贸词汇不错）、专八阅读练习、外国报刊阅读练习5、写作：《十天突破雅思写作》2016年攻读对外经济贸易大学英语翻译硕士英语翻译基础模拟试题对外经济贸易大学2016年硕士研究生入学考试科目代码：357科目名称：英语翻译基础Part1.Put the English phrases into Chinese and vice visa.Then choose ten of them to explain in according language.30pts.1.信息不对称2.plaintiff3.贸易顺差4.chattel mortgage5.negotiable share6.Nominal GNP7.市场均衡8.吉尼系数9.external diseconomy10.指令经济11.paradox of value12.interest rate ceiling13.本金14.SBIC15.bill of entry16.Creditor17.shipping documents18.exclusive sales19.出口申报单20.general agent21.generalized system of preferences22.索赔23.revolving letter of creditPIT25.gross for net26.certificate of deposit27.convertible security28.DPI29.financial standing30.SAARCPart two:put the flowing passage into Chinese.Choose one of them to translate.(60 pts)Passage1Market manipulation has become standard operating procedure in policy circles around the world.All eyes are now on China’s attempts to cope with the collapse of a major equity bubble.But the efforts of Chinese authorities are hardly unique.The leading economies of the West are doing pretty much the same thing–just dressing up their manipulation in different clothes.Take quantitative easing,first used in Japan in the early2000s,then in the United States after2008,then in Japan again beginning in2013,and now in Europe.In all of these cases,QE essentially has been an aggressive effort to manipulate asset prices.It works primarily through direct central-bank purchases of long-dated sovereign securities,thereby reducing long-term interest rates,which,in turn,makes equities more attractive.Whether the QE strain of market manipulation has accomplished its objective–to provide stimulus to crisis-torn,asset-dependent economies–is debatable:Current recoveries in the developed world,after all,have been unusually anemic.But that has not stopped the authorities from trying.In their defense,central banks make the unsubstantiated claim that things would have been much worse had they not pursued QE.But,with now-frothy manipulated asset markets posing new risks of financial instability,the jury is out on that point as well.China’s efforts at market manipulation are no less blatant.In response to a31% plunge in the CSI300(a composite index of shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges)from its June12peak,following a145%surge in the preceding12months, Chinese regulators have moved aggressively to contain the damage.Official actions run the gamut,including a$480billion government-supportedequity-market backstop under the auspices of the China Securities Finance Corporation,a$19billion pool from major domestic brokerages,and an open-ended promise by the People’s Bank of China(PBOC)to use its balance sheet to shore up equity prices.Moreover,trading was suspended for about50%of listed securities (more than1,400of2,800stocks).Unlike the West’s QE-enabled market manipulation,which works circuitously through central-bank liquidity injections,the Chinese version is targeted more directly at the market in distress–in this case,equities.Significantly,QE is very much a reactive approach–aimed at sparking revival in distressed markets and economies after they have collapsed.The more proactive Chinese approach is the policy equivalent of attempting to catch a falling knife–arresting a market in free-fall. There are several other noteworthy distinctions between China’s market manipulation and that seen in the West.First,Chinese authorities appear less focused on systemic risks to the real economy.That makes sense,given that wealth effects are significantly smaller in China,where private consumption accounts for just36%of GDP–only about half the share in more wealth-dependent economies like the US.Moreover,much of the sharp appreciation in Chinese equity values was veryshort-lived.Nearly90%of the12-month surge in the CSI300was concentrated in the seven months following the start of cross-border investment flows via the so-called Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect in November2014.As a result,speculators had little time to let the capital gains sink in and have a lasting impact on lifestyle expectations.Second,in the West,post-crisis reforms typically have been tactical,aimed at repairing flaws in established markets,rather than promoting new markets.In China, by contrast,post-bubble reforms have a more strategic focus,given that theequity-market distress has important implications for the government’s capital-market reforms,which are viewed as crucial to its strategy of structural rebalancing.Long saddled with a bank-centric system of credit intermediation,the development of secure and stable equity and bond markets is a high priority in China’s effort to promote a more diversified business-funding platform.The collapse of the equity bubble calls that effort into serious question.Finally,by emphasizing a regulatory fix,and thereby keeping its benchmark policy rate well above the dreaded zero bound,the PBOC is actually better positioned than other central banks to maintain control over monetary policy and not become ensnared in the open-ended provision of liquidity that is so addictive for frothy markets.And,unlike in the West,China’s targeted equity-specific actions minimize the risk of financial contagion caused by liquidity spillovers into other asset markets.With a large portion of China’s domestic equity market still closed,it is hard to know when the correction’s animal spirits have been exhausted.While the government has assembled considerable firepower to limit the unwinding of a spectacular bubble,the overhang of highly leveraged speculative demand is disconcerting.Indeed,in the12 months ending in June,margin financing of stock purchases nearly tripled as a share of tradable domestic-equity-market capitalization.While Chinese equities initially bounced14%off their July8low,the8.5%plunge on July27suggests that that may have been a temporary respite.The likelihood of forced deleveraging of margin calls underscores the potential for a further slide once full trading resumes.More broadly,just as in Japan,the US,and Europe,there can be no mistaking what prompted China’s manipulation:the perils of outsize asset bubbles.Time and again, regulators and policymakers–to say nothing of political leaders–have been asleep at the switch in condoning market excesses.In a globalized world where labor income is under constant pressure,the siren song of asset markets as a growth elixir is far too tempting for the body politic to resist.Speculative bubbles are the visible manifestation of that temptation.As the bubbles burst–and they always do–false prosperity is exposed and the defensive tactics of market manipulation become both urgent and seemingly logical.Therein lies the great irony of manipulation:The more we depend on markets,the less we trust them.Needless to say,that is a far cry from the“invisible hand”on which the efficacy of markets rests.We claim,as Adam Smith did,that impersonal markets ensure the most efficient allocation of scarce capital;but what we really want are markets that operate only on our terms.Passage2CAREER MASTERCLASS GET PROMOTEDMould yourself.Reaching the top isn’t just about results;it’s about fitting in with those who are already there.Know your business leaders inside out:their working styles,past successes and failures and how these have shaped their e every interaction to show you’re one of them.Ditch the details.Always talk about outcomes and benefits over process and activity. Leaders want to know what they’re getting from you,not what you’re up to.Get personal.Position your promotion as the answer to your manager’s problems. Does the department lack strategic focus?Being able to delegate would free up the boss for vital planning.Is it product knowledge he worries about?Run training sessions.Take criticism on board.If you disagree,make minor(but visible)adjustments to show you’re willing to change.Save up successes.Build credibility over time by consistently exceeding expectations, but schedule big triumphs to coincide with your review as a well-timed reminder of your brilliance.Focus,focus,focus.Of your activity,80%should be directly in line with business priorities.Leave anything that upsets the balance to your staff and forget the rest.No one will notice.Show devotion.Ooze commitment to the cause and those at the top will want you in a role where your energy can influence others.Not a true crusader?Fake it with vibrant language(‘energised’，‘inspired’,thrilled’)and a big smile.Bring proof.Demonstrate your contribution to the business with indisputable facts. Qualitative data is good;quantitative is better;results presented in£,$and€are bestof all.Stick at it.Staying power is one of the most important but least recognized attributes of successful leaders.If you don’t make promotion this time,don’t give up.Capture the insights,adapt and come back stronger.From Management Today,January2012Passage3Analysis:Japan's lost decade still a risk for U.S.economy As the U.S.economy slouches toward another recession and confidence in policymakers erodes,investors are coming to grips with the notion that the country may already be several years into a Japan-style lost decade.If so,the years ahead could be a very tough slog.U.S.households,unlike those in Japan,have higher debts and lower savings,while massive deficits have sapped political support for the type of robust government spending Japan relied upon.In short:in a prolonged period of anemic growth,the U.S.economy may have a slimmer margin for error."I'm more convinced we are headed in that direction,"said Scott Mather, portfolio manager at PIMCO,the world's largest bond fund with$1.2trillion in assets under management."We might have an even harder time than Japan did."Not all economists believe the United States will repeat the Japanese experience, but markets have been flashing warning signs.Three years after the United States'housing bubble burst,10-year Treasury yields are struggling to stay above2percent,while stocks have declined every month since April.Japan's10-year yield has not closed above2percent since1999and the Nikkei is 77percent below a peak hit in1990before a commercial real estate bubble burst.U.S.economic output through the second quarter of2011has yet to surpass the level seen before the crisis hit in2008and may not do so soon;economists polled by Reuters give the country nearly one-in-three odds of falling back into recession over the next year."The financial turmoil of the last three or four months has been the markets coming to terms with a period of prolonged slow growth,"said Andrew Scott, professor of economics at London Business School."With households paying down debt and not consuming,it's hard to see where growth will come from."Passage4Analysis:Japan's lost decade still a risk for U.S.economy As the U.S.economy slouches toward another recession and confidence in policymakers erodes,investors are coming to grips with the notion that the country may already be several years into a Japan-style lost decade.If so,the years ahead could be a very tough slog.U.S.households,unlike those in Japan,have higher debts and lower savings,while massive deficits have sapped political support for the type of robust government spending Japan relied upon.In short:in a prolonged period of anemic growth,the U.S.economy may have a slimmer margin for error."I'm more convinced we are headed in that direction,"said Scott Mather, portfolio manager at PIMCO,the world's largest bond fund with$1.2trillion in assets under management."We might have an even harder time than Japan did."Not all economists believe the United States will repeat the Japanese experience, but markets have been flashing warning signs.Three years after the United States'housing bubble burst,10-year Treasury yields are struggling to stay above2percent,while stocks have declined every month since April.Japan's10-year yield has not closed above2percent since1999and the Nikkei is 77percent below a peak hit in1990before a commercial real estate bubble burst.U.S.economic output through the second quarter of2011has yet to surpass the level seen before the crisis hit in2008and may not do so soon;economists polled by Reuters give the country nearly one-in-three odds of falling back into recession over the next year."The financial turmoil of the last three or four months has been the markets coming to terms with a period of prolonged slow growth,"said Andrew Scott, professor of economics at London Business School."With households paying down debt and not consuming,it's hard to see where growth will come from."Passage5As consumers keep an ever-tighter grip on their money,this hoary old marketing wheeze is enjoying a new lease of life.The idea is you tempt prospects in with deep discounts,then after a while ramp up the prices and hope they stick around.Groupon, the group-buying internet business,is based entirely on this idea.But do loss leaders work?There are plenty of reasons why they might not.People get wise to it.If you receive an insurance renewal quote that is twice what you paid last year,it is the work of moments to get on a comparison website and find a better deal.If you then call the original insurer and point this out,chances are it will back down and immediately offer to match the lower price.If enough of its customers don’t bother,then this temporary discount might seem like a good strategy, but it makes loyal customers feel jaundiced.This has happened to me and now I watch my insurance company’s every move.Loss leaders attract the wrong kind of customer.This,reportedly,is what many Groupon customers are finding.They aren’t gaining repeat business but merely filling capacity with permanent bargain-hunters.These people may not return,but even if they do you may not want them.It’s a well-observed phenomenon in many businesses that the less customers want to pay,the more trouble they cause.It’s illogical,captain.Perhaps most importantly,there is a basic logical flaw inthe loss-leader philosophy,as it assumes customers will come to you for a cheap deal but won’t leave you for another one.Unless there is something unique and amazing about your service that can only be understood when experienced,this is unlikely.Most of the time,users of the loss leader make the same error as a man who persuades his lover to divorce her husband and marry him,conveniently forgetting that his paramour has given proof positive that she’s prepared to cheat on her spouse. Part three:put the following passage into English.(60pts.)Passage1我们面临一系列“两难”问题。