高级管理学案例讨论(PDF版)
高级管理学-案例分析
GE 是一家庞大的、全球化的集团企业，是一家多元化的科技、媒体和金融服务公司，致力于为客户解决世界上最棘手的问题。
GE 的产品和服务范围广阔，从飞机发动机、发电设备、水处理和安防技术，到医疗成像、商务和消费者金融、媒体，客户遍及全球 100 多个国家，拥有 30 多万员工。
在 20 世纪风云突变的最后 20 年间，许多大公司在严峻的全球经济竞争中像多米诺骨牌一样纷纷倒下，它们的总裁也像走马灯一样不停地交换。
韦尔奇就任 GE 掌门人时，该公司业绩表现并不佳，股票市值在近 10 年中几乎下降了一半。
公司内部矛盾重重，弊端丛生，显得老态龙钟、日渐衰落,GE 迫切需要变革！1.速度问题，即人们常说的“大企业病”，它的症状是官僚主义盛行，行动迟缓，应变能力低。
2.组织结构紊乱，管理层次过多，沟通不畅。
3.教条主义盛行，员工思想僵化，创新不足。
蓝皮书的要旨明白无误，令人沮丧：你不必思量；那些比你更精明的人已经为你思量好了。
4.公司业务散乱，战略宗旨不明确。
通用有太多松散杂乱的企业。
从长远看，这些企业不会成功。
1.个人阻力(1) 利益上的影响。
变革从结果上看可能会威胁到某些人的利益。
员工面临失去权力的威胁。
(2)心理上的影响。
变革意味着原有的的平衡系统被打破。
对未来不确定性的耽忧会造成人们心里上的倾斜，进而产生心里上的变革阻力。
2.团体阻力(1)组织机构变动的影响。
组织机构变革可能会打破原来的管理层级和职能机构，这就必然会触及某些小团体的利益和权力。
(2) 人际关系调整的影响。
组织变革，组织成员之间的关系随之改变。
随着利益差距的拉大，这些人必然会对组织的变革产生抵触情绪。
韦尔奇所面对的问题是如何将一个老态龙钟、日渐衰落的通用电气集团从颓势中扭转过来，爆发出强大的活力，甚至成为全球最有价值的公司。
外部宏观社会经济环境恶劣，许多公司破产倒闭；内部组织机构官僚化，效率低下这迫切要求通用实行变革。
因此，韦尔奇一上任就进行了大刀阔斧的变革 。
管理学案例分析（超全有答案）（合集5篇）
管理学案例分析（超全有答案）（合集5篇）第一篇：管理学案例分析(超全有答案)一、管理与管理者案例1 甜美的音乐马丁吉他公司成立于1833年，位于宾夕法尼亚州拿撒勒市被公认为世界上最好的乐器制造商之一，就像Steinway的大钢琴、Rolls Royce的轿车，或者Buffet的单簧管一样，马丁吉他每把价格超过10 000美元，却是你能买到的最好的东西之一。
这家家族式的企业历经艰难岁月，已经延续了六代。
目前的首席执行官是克里斯琴·弗雷德里克·马丁四世，他秉承了吉他的制作手艺。
他甚至遍访公司在全世界的经销商，为它们举办培训讲座。
很少有哪家公司像马丁吉他一样有这么持久的声誉，那么，公司成功的关键是什么？一个重要原因是公司的管理和杰出的领导技能，它使组织成员始终关注像质量这样的重要问题。
马丁吉他公司自创办起做任何事都非常重视质量。
即使近年来在产品设计、分销系统以及制造方法方面发生了很大变化，但公司始终坚持对质量的承诺。
公司在坚守优质音乐标准和满足特定顾客需求方面的坚定性渗透到公司从上到下的每一个角落。
不仅如此，公司在质量管理中长期坚持生态保护政策。
因为制作吉他需要用到天然木材，公司非常审慎和负责地使用这些传统的天然材料，并鼓励引入可再生的替代木材品种。
基于对顾客的研究，马丁公司向市场推出了采用表面有缺陷的天然木材制作的高档吉他，然而，这在其他厂家看来几乎是无法接受的。
马丁公司使新老传统有机地整合在一起。
虽然设备和工具逐年更新，雇员始终坚守着高标准的优质音乐原则。
所制作的吉他要符合这些严格的标准，要求雇员极为专注和耐心。
家庭成员弗兰克·亨利·马丁在1904年出版的公司产品目录的前言里向潜在的顾客解释道：“怎么制作具有如此绝妙声音的吉他并不是一个秘密。
它需要细心和耐心。
细心是指要仔细选择材料，巧妙安排各种部件。
关注每一个使演奏者感到惬意的细节。
所谓耐心是指做任何一件事不要怕花时间。
管理学案例分析(超全有答案)完整版
管理学案例分析(超全有答案)完整版一、案例一：创新管理案例分析案例背景：某公司是一家传统制造企业，近年来市场竞争日益激烈，企业面临业绩下滑的困境。
为了扭转局面，公司决定进行创新管理，以提升企业的竞争力。
案例分析：1. 创新管理理念：公司领导层认识到创新是企业发展的核心动力，决定将创新管理作为企业战略的重要组成部分。
他们强调，创新不仅包括产品创新，还包括管理创新、市场创新等方面。
2. 创新管理体系：公司成立了创新管理委员会，负责制定创新战略、评估创新项目、分配创新资源等。
同时，公司还建立了创新激励机制，鼓励员工积极参与创新活动。
3. 创新项目实施：公司根据市场需求和自身优势，选择了一批具有潜力的创新项目进行实施。
在项目实施过程中，公司注重跨部门合作，充分发挥各部门的专业优势，提高项目成功率。
4. 创新成果：通过创新管理，公司成功推出了一系列具有市场竞争力的新产品，提高了市场份额。
同时，公司还优化了管理流程，降低了运营成本，提高了企业整体效益。
二、案例二：人力资源管理案例分析案例背景：某公司是一家快速发展的互联网企业，随着业务规模的扩大，公司面临人才短缺的问题。
为了解决这一问题，公司决定加强人力资源管理，提高员工满意度和企业竞争力。
案例分析：1. 人才招聘与选拔：公司制定了科学的招聘流程，通过多渠道招聘优秀人才。
同时，公司还建立了完善的选拔机制，确保选拔出最适合公司发展的人才。
2. 培训与发展：公司重视员工培训，为员工提供多种培训机会，提升员工的专业技能和综合素质。
同时，公司还关注员工职业发展，为员工制定个性化的职业规划。
3. 绩效考核与激励：公司建立了公平、公正的绩效考核体系，对员工的工作表现进行评估。
根据考核结果，公司对优秀员工进行奖励，激发员工的工作积极性。
4. 企业文化塑造：公司注重企业文化建设，倡导积极向上的价值观，营造和谐的工作氛围。
通过企业文化塑造，公司提高了员工的归属感和满意度，降低了员工流失率。
高级管理学案例分析
杰克•韦尔奇的改革案例1.我从效率的改进进行分析（1）组织效率的改进企业的管理结构从垂直化管理改为扁平化管理，在扁平化的管理下一是分权管理成为一种普遍趋势，金字塔状的组织结构是与集权管理体制相适应的，而在分权的管理体制之下，各层级之间的联系相对减少，各基层组织之间相对独立，扁平化的组织形式能够有效运作；二是企业快速适应市场变化的需要。
传统的组织形式难以适应快速变化的市场环境，为了不被淘汰，就必须实行扁平化。
韦尔奇认为未来的成功将属于那些“精简敏捷”的组织，减少了过多的管理等级，在这种组织下组织结构流畅、简洁，可以快速适应环境的变化，提高了组织效率。
（2）激励效率的改进“激励机制”是在组织系统中，激励主体系统运用多种激励手段并使之规范化和相对固定化，而与激励客体相互作用、相互制约的结构、方式、关系及演变规律的总和。
激励机制是企业将远大理想转化为具体事实的连接手段。
好的激励机制对员工的某种符合组织期望的行为具有反复强化、不断增强的作用，在这样的激励机制作用下，组织不断发展壮大，不断成长。
而有些激励机制尽管激励机制设计者的初衷是希望通过激励机制的运行，能有效的调动员工的积极性，实现组织的目标。
但是，这些激励机制本身不健全，或者不具有可行性，都会对一部分员工的工作积极性起抑制作用和削弱作用，达不到激励的作用。
杰克•韦尔奇通过以下两个方面对激励机制进行改革进而提高激励效率1.给员工平等地位发挥他们的主动性韦尔奇认为管理者要和员工达成一片，使公司以最快的速度发展就是唯一的目标，但不要给员工制定太多的目标，韦尔奇希望员工能够发挥主动性，出谋划策促进公司发展。
他鼓励他们勇敢地展示自己，谈出自己的看法，争取上司的赏识。
杰克•韦尔奇将员工定义为社会人，考虑到他们的情感，与他们经常聚餐讨论彼此的想法，不仅增进了管理者和员工的感情而且可以从员工角度了解公司中存在的问题以及员工想要解决的办法。
2.业绩评估和奖励制度GE每个部门都有一个反映每个员工工作情况的图表，这是一个动态的评估，每个人都知道自己所处的位置。
管理学案例讨论
经过我们小组的讨论过后，我们得出了案例的症结所在，主要在于主要决策人过于集权，难以从繁琐的一般事务中解放出来以及员工没有工作积极性和对公司的忠诚性。
我们总结得出的结论是：伟业公司当初的中小型企业管理的模式不适应扩大规模后的伟业集团。
对于伟业集团在经营管理上遇到的问题，我们得出的解决方案如下：第一，集权分权问题。
在我们小组看来，主要决策人过于集权，难以从繁琐的一般性事务中解脱出来，所以应该分权，但分权不是随意地放权，分权是指决策指挥权在组织层级系统中较低管理层次上的分散。
组织高层将其一部分决策指挥权分配给下级组织机构和部门的负责人，使他们充分行使这些权利，支配组织的某些资源，并在其工作职责范围内自主地解决某些问题。
一个组织内部要实行专业化分工，就必须分权。
否则，组织便无法运转。
怎么分权呢？要根据公司的情况最大限度地分权，影响分权程度的因素有组织规模、组织的地理分布、决策重要性、低层管理者的素质、组织所处在的成长阶段、企业文化和环境等。
伟业集团已经成长为大中型企业，地处乡镇，决策非常重要，低层管理者素质有待提高，组织正处于高速发展阶段，企业文化不突出，所处环境并不复杂。
基于此再进行适当分权。
分权的途径有：分派职责、委任职权、建立责任。
同时实行上级监督、公开政权的制度。
如1000元以下现金支出，总经理批示，不用请示董事长，同时财务部要及时反馈信息。
第二，决策风险问题。
如何进行科学的决策？随着公司越做越大，刘董要做的决策越来越复杂，且都是不确定性决策。
理性决策具有局限性，它受到个人能力有限、偏见、信息质量、决策者偏好以及方法和问题混为一体的限制。
因此刘董个人要做出理性决策是非常不容易的事。
这个时候就需要群体决策来改变这种情况，使公司做出的决策更准确、更合理、方案更多、结果更容易让人接受，这样就一定程度减轻刘董的压力。
刘董应该要重整授权机构，减轻高级管理者的压力，让更多的管理中层更多的参与决策。
一个项目的决策，应把相关人员召集起来，让他们先发言，最后再决策。
(高级管理学讨论资料)Evolution and revolution as organizations grow
Mainiero, L. and Tromley, C. Developing Managerial Skills in Organizational Behavior: Exercises, Cases, and Readings (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall) (2d ed. 1994), pp. 322-329.Evolution and Revolution as Organizations GrowLarry E. GreinerA small research company chooses too complicated and formalized an organization structure for its young age and limited size. It flounders in rigidity and bureaucracy for several years and is finally acquired by a larger company.Key executives of a retail store chain hold on to an organization structure long after it has served its purpose, because their power is derived from this structure. The company eventually goes into bankruptcy.A large bank disciplines a "rebellious" manager who is blamed for current control problems, when the underlying cause is centralized procedures that are holding back expansion into new markets. Many younger managers subsequently leave the bank, competition moves in, and profits are still declining.The problems of these companies, like those of many others, are rooted more in past decisions than in present events or outside market dynamics. Historical forces do indeed shape the future growth of organizations. Yet management, in its haste to grow, often overlooks such critical developmental questions as: Where has our organization been? Where is it now? And what do the answers to these questions mean for where we are going? Instead, its gaze is fixed outward toward the environment and the future--as if more precise market projections will provide a new organizational identity.Companies fail to see that many clues to their future success lie within their own organizations and their evolving states of development. Moreover, the inability of management to understand its organization development problems can result in a company becoming "frozen" in its present stage of evolution or, ultimately, in failure, regardless of market opportunities.My position in this article is that the future of an organization may be less determined by outside forces than it is by the organization's history. In stressing the force of history on an organization, I have drawn from the legacies of European psychologists (their thesis being that individual behavior is determined primarily by previous events and experiences, not by what lies ahead). Extending this analogy of individual development to the problems of organization development, I shall discuss a series of developmental phases through which growing companies tend to pass. But, first, let me provide two definitions:1. The term evolution is used to describeprolonged periods of growth where nomajor upheaval occurs in organizationpractices.2. The term revolution is used to describethose periods of substantial turmoil inorganization life.As a company progresses through developmental phases, each evolutionary period creates its own revolution. For instance, centralized practices eventually lead to demands for decentralization. Moreover, the nature of management's solution to each revolutionary period determines whether a company will move forward into its next stage of evolutionary growth. As I shall show later, there are at least five phases of organizationdevelopment, each characterized by both an evolution and a revolution.KEY FORCES IN DEVELOPMENTDuring the past few years a small amount of research knowledge about the phases of organization development has been building. Some of this research is very quantitative, such as time-series analyses that reveal patterns of economic performance over time.1 The majority of studies, however, are case-oriented and use company records and interviews to reconstruct a rich picture of corporate development.2 Yet both types of research tend to be heavily empirical without attempting more generalized statements about the overall process of development.A notable exception is the historical work of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in his book Strategy and Structure.3 This study depicts four very broad and general phases in the lives of four large U.S. companies. It proposes that outside market opportunities determine a company's strategy, which in turn determines the company's organization structure. This thesis has a valid ring for the four companies examined by Chandler, largely because they developed in a time of explosive markets and technological advances. But more recent evidence suggests that organization structure may be less malleable than Chandler assumed; in fact, structure can play a critical role in 1 See, for example, William H. Starbuck, "Organizational Metamorphosis," in Promising Research Directions, edited by R. W. Millman and M. P. Hottenstein (Tempe, Arizona, Academy of Management, 1968), p. 113.2 See, for example, the Grangesberg case series, prepared by C. Roland Christensen and Bruce R. Scott, Case Clearing House, Harvard Business School.3Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M.I.T. Press, 1962).influencing corporate strategy. It is this reverse emphasis on how organization structure affects future growth which is highlighted in the model presented in this article.From an analysis of recent studies,4five key dimensions emerge as essential for building a model of organization development:1. Age of the organization.2. Size of the organization.3. Stages of evolution.4. Stages of revolution.5. Growth rate of the industry.I shall describe each of these elements separately, but first note their combined effect as illustrated in Exhibit I.Note especially how each dimension influences the other over time; when all five elements begin to interact, a more complete and dynamic picture of organizational growth emerges.After describing these dimensions and their interconnections, I shall discuss each evolutionary/revolutionary phase of development and show (a) how each stage of evolution breeds its own revolution, and (b) how management solutions to each revolution determine the next state of evolution.Age of the OrganizationThe most obvious and essential dimension for any model of development is 4 I have drawn on many sources for evidence: (a) numerous cases collected at the Harvard Business School; (b) Organization Growth and Development, edited by William H. Starbuck (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), where several studies are cited; and (c) articles published in journals, such as Lawrence E. Fouraker and John M. Stopford, "Organization Structure and the Multinational Strategy," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1968, p. 47; and Malcolm S. Salter, "Management Appraisal and Reward Systems," Journal of Business Policy, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1971.the life span of an organization (represented as the horizontal axis in Exhibit I).All historical studies gather data from various points in time and then make comparisons. From these observations, it is evident that the same organization practices are not maintained throughout a long time span. This makes a most basic point management problems and principles are rooted in time. The concept of decentralization, for example, can have meaning for describing corporate practices at one time period but loses its descriptive power at another.The passage of time also contributes to the institutionalization of managerial attitudes. As a result, employee behavior becomes not only more predictable but also more difficult to change when attitudes are outdated.Size of the OrganizationThis dimension is depicted as the vertical axis in Exhibit I. A company's problems and solutions tend to change markedly as the number of employees and sales volume increase. Thus time is not the only determinant of structure; in fact, organizations that do not grow in size can retain many of the same management issues and practices over lengthy periods. In addition to increased size, however, problems of coordination and communication magnify, new functions emerge, levels in the management hierarchy multiply, and jobs become more interrelated.Stages of EvolutionAs both age and size increase, another phenomenon becomes evident: the prolonged growth that I have termed the evolutionary period. Most growing organizations do not expand for two years and then retreat for one year; rather, those that survive a crisis usually enjoy four to eight years of continuous growth without a major economic setback or severe internal disruption. The term evolution seems appropriate for describing these quieter periods because only modest adjustments appear necessary for maintaining growth under the same overall pattern of management.Stages of RevolutionSmooth evolution is not inevitable; it cannot be assumed that organization growth is linear. Fortune's "500"list, for example, has had significant turnover during the last 50 years. Thus we find evidence from numerous case histories which reveals periods of substantial turbulence spaced between smoother periods of evolution.I have termed these turbulent times the periods of revolution because they typically exhibit a serious upheaval of management practices. Traditional management practices, which were appropriate for a smaller size and earlier time, are brought under scrutiny by frustrated top managers and disillusioned lower-level managers. During such periods of crisis, a number of companies fail--those unable to abandon past practices and effect major organization changes are likely either to fold or to level off in their growth rates.The critical task for management in each revolutionary period is to find a new set of organization practices that will become the basis for managing the next period of evolutionary growth. Interestingly enough, these new practices eventually sow their own seeds of decay and lead to another period of revolution. Companies therefore experience the irony of seeing a major solution in one time period become a major problem at a later date.Growth Rate of the IndustryThe speed at which an organization experiences phases of evolution and revolution is closely related to the market environment of its industry. For example, a company in a rapidly expanding market will have to add employees rapidly; hence, the need for new organization structures to accommodate large staff increases is accelerated. While evolutionary periods tend to be relatively short in fast-growing industries, much longer evolutionary periods occur in mature or slowly growing industries.Evolution can also be prolonged, and revolutions delayed when profits come easily. For instance, companies that make grievous errors in a rewarding industry can still look good on their profit and loss statements; thus they can avoid a change in management practices for a longer period. The aerospace industry in its infancy is an example. Yet revolutionary periods still occur, as one did in aerospace when profit opportunities began to dry up. Revolutions seem to be much more severe and difficult to resolve when the market environment is poor.PHASES OF GROWTHWith the foregoing framework in mind, let us now examine in depth the five specific phases of evolution and revolution. As shown in Exhibit II, each evolutionary period is characterized by the dominant management style used to achieve growth, while each revolutionary period is characterized by the dominant management problem that must be solved before growth can continue. The patterns presented in Exhibit II seem to be typical for companies in industries with moderate growth over a long time period: companies in faster growing industries tend to experience all five phases more rapidly, while those in slower growing industries encounter only two or three phases over many years.It is important to note that each phase is both an effect of the previous phase and a cause for the next phase. For example, the evolutionary management style in Phase 3 of the exhibit is "delegation," which grows out of, and becomes the solution to, demands for greater "autonomy" in the preceding Phase 2 revolution. The style of delegation used in Phase 3, however, eventually provokes a major revolutionary crisis that is characterized by attempts to regain control over the diversity created through increased delegation.The principal implication of each phase is that management actions are narrowly prescribed if growth is to occur. For example, a company experiencing an autonomy crisis in Phase 2 cannot return to directive management for a solution--it must adopt a new style of delegation in order to move ahead.Phase 1: Creativity . . .In the birth stage of an organization, the emphasis is on creating both a product and a market. Here are the characteristics of the period of creative evolution:• The company's founders are usually technically or entrepreneuriallyoriented, and they disdain managementactivities; their physical and mentalenergies are absorbed entirely inmaking and selling a new product.• Communication among employees is frequent and informal.• Long hours of work are rewarded by modest salaries and the promise ofownership benefits.• Control of activities comes from immediate marketplace feedback: themanagement acts as the customersreact.. . . & the leadership crisis: All of the foregoing individualistic and creative activities are essential for the company to get off the ground. But therein lies the problem. As the company grows, larger production runs require knowledge about the efficiencies of manufacturing. Increased numbers of employees cannot be managed exclusively through informal communication; new employees are not motivated by an intense dedication to the product or organization. Additional capital must be secured, and new accounting procedures are needed for financial control.Thus the founders find themselves burdened with unwanted management responsibilities. So they long for the "good old days"' still trying to act as they did in the past. And conflicts between the harried leaders grow more intense.At this point a crisis of leadership occurs, which is the onset of the first revolution. Who is to lead the company out of confusion and solve the managerial problems confronting it? Quite obviously, a strong manager is needed who has the necessary knowledge and skill to introduce new business techniques. But this is easier said than done. The founders often hate to step aside even though they are probably temperamentally unsuited to be managers. So here is the first critical development choice--to locate and install a strong business manager who is acceptable to the founders and who can pull the organization together.Phase 2: Direction . . .Those companies that survive the first phase by installing a capable business manager usually embark on a period of sustained growth under able and directive leadership. Here are the characteristics of this evolutionary period:• A functional organization structure is introduced to separate manufacturingfrom marketing activities, and jobassignments become more specialized.• Accounting systems for inventory and purchasing, are introduced.• Incentives, budgets, and workstandards are adopted.• Communication becomes more formal and impersonal as a hierarchy of titlesand positions builds• The new manager and his keysupervisors take most of theresponsibility for instituting direction,while lower-level supervisors aretreated more as functional specialiststhan as autonomous decision-makingmanagers,. . . & the autonomy crisis. Although the new directive techniques channel employee energy more efficiently into growth, they eventually become inappropriate for controlling a larger, more diverse and complex organization. Lower-level employees find themselves restricted by a cumbersome and centralized hierarchy. They have come to possess more direct knowledge about markets and machinery than do the leaders at the top; consequently, they feel torn between following procedures and taking initiative on their own.Thus the second revolution is imminent as a crisis develops from demands for greater autonomy on the part of lower-level managers. The solution adopted by most companies is to move toward greater delegation. Yet it is difficult for managers who were previously successful at being directive to give upresponsibility. Moreover, lower-level managers are not accustomed to making decisions for themselves. As a result, numerous companies flounder during this revolutionary period, adhering to centralized methods while lower-level employees grow more disenchanted and leave the organization.Phase 3: Delegation . . .The next era of growth evolves from the successful application of a decentralized organization structure. It exhibits these characteristics:• Much greater responsibility is given to the managers of plants and marketterritories.• Profit centers and bonuses are used to stimulate motivation.• The top executives at headquarters restrain themselves to managing byexception, based on periodic reportsfrom the field.• Management often concentrates on making new acquisitions which can belined up beside other decentralizedunits.• Communication from the top is infrequent, usually by correspondence,telephone, or brief visits to fieldlocations.The delegation stage proves useful for gaining expansion through heightened motivation at lower levels. Decentralized managers with greater authority and incentive are able to penetrate larger markets, respond faster to customers, and develop new products.. . . & the control crisis: A serious problem eventually evolves. however, as top executives sense that they are losing control over a highly diversified field operation. Autonomous field managers prefer to run their own shows without coordinating plans, money. technology, and manpower with the rest of the organization. Freedom breeds a parochial attitude.Hence, the Phase 3 revolution is under way when top management seeks to regain control over the total company. Some top managements attempt a return to centralized management, which usually fails because of the vast scope of operations. Those companies that move ahead find a new solution in the use of special coordination techniques.Phase 4: Coordination . . .During this phase, the evolutionary period is characterized by the rise of formal systems for achieving greater coordination and by top executives taking responsibility for the initiation and administration of these new systems. For example:• Decentralized units are merged into product groups.• Formal planning, procedures are established and intensively reviewed.• Numerous staff personnel are hired and located at headquarters to initiatecompanywide programs of control andreview for line managers.• Capital expenditures are carefully weighed and parceled out across theorganization.• Each product group is treated as an investment center where return oninvested capital is an importantcriterion used in allocating funds.• Certain technical functions, such as data processing, are centralized atheadquarters, while daily operatingdecisions remain decentralized.• Stock options and company-wide profit sharing are used to encourage identitywith the firm as a whole.All of these new coordination systems prove useful for achieving growth through more efficient allocation of a company's limited resources. They prompt field managers to look beyond the needs of their local units. While these managers still have much decisionmaking responsibility, they learn to justify their actions more carefully to a "watchdog" audience at headquarters.. . . & the red tape crisis: But a lack of confidence gradually builds between line and staff, and between headquarters and the field. The proliferation of systems and programs begins to exceed its utility; a red-tape crisis is created. Line managers, for example, increasingly resent heavy staff direction from those who are not familiar with local conditions. Staff people, on the other hand, complain about uncooperative and uninformed line managers. Together both groups criticize the bureaucratic paper system that has evolved. Procedures take precedence over problem solving, and innovation is dampened. In short, the organization has become too large and complex to be managed through formal programs and rigid systems. The Phase 4 revolution is underway.Phase 5: Collaboration . . .The last observable phase in previous studies emphasizes strong interpersonal collaboration in an attempt to overcome the red-tape crisis. Where Phase 4 was managed more through formal systems and procedures, Phase 5 emphasizes greater spontaneity in management action through teams and the skillful confrontation of interpersonal differences. Social control and self-discipline take over from formal control. This transition is especially difficult for those experts who created the old systems as well as for those line managers who relied on formal methods for answers.The Phase 5 evolution, then, builds around a more flexible and behavioral approach to management. Here are its characteristics:• The focus is on solving problemsquickly through team action.• Teams are combined across functions for task-group activity.• Headquarters staff experts are reduced in number, reassigned, and combinedin interdisciplinary teams to consultwith, not to direct, field units.• A matrix-type structure is frequently used to assemble the right teams for theappropriate problems.• Previous formal systems are simplified and combined into single multipurposesystems.• Conferences of key managers are held frequently to focus on major problemissues.• Educational programs are utilized to train managers in behavioral skills forachieving better teamwork and conflictresolution.• Real-time information systems are integrated into daily decision making.• Economic rewards are geared more to team performance than to individualachievement.• Experiments in new practices are encouraged throughout theorganization.. . . & the ? crisis: What will be the revolution in response to this stage of evolution? Many large U.S. companies are now in the Phase 5 evolutionary stage, so the answers are critical. While there is little clear evidence, I imagine the revolution will center around the "psychological saturation" of employees who grow emotionally and physically exhausted by the intensity of teamwork and the heavy pressure for innovative solutions.My hunch is that the Phase 5 revolution will be solved through new structure and programs that allow employees to periodically rest, reflect, and revitalize themselves. We may even see companies with dual organization structures: a "habit " structure for getting the daily work done, and a "reflective" structure for stimulating perspective and personal enrichment. Employees could then move back and forth between the two structures as their energies are dissipated and refueled.One European organization has implemented just such a structure. Five reflective groups have been established outside the regular structure for the purpose of continuously evaluating five task activities basic to the organization. They report directly to the managing director, although their reports are made public throughout the organization. Membership in each group includes all levels and functions, and employees are rotated through these groups on a six-month basis.Other concrete examples now in practice include providing sabbaticals for employees, moving managers in and out of "hot spot " jobs, establishing a four-day workweek, assuring job security, building physical facilities for relaxation during the working day, making jobs more interchangeable, creating an extra team on the assembly line so that one team is always off for reeducation, and switching into longer vacations and more flexible working hours.The Chinese practice of requiring executives to spend time periodically on lower-level jobs may also be worth a nonideological evaluation. For too long U.S. management has assumed that career progress should be equated with an upward path toward title, salary, and power. Could it be that some vice presidents of marketing might just long for, and even benefit from, temporary duty in the field sales organization? IMPLICATIONS OF HISTORYLet me now summarize some important implications for practicing managers. First, the main features of this discussion are depicted in Exhibit III,which shows the specific management actions that characterize each growth phase. These actions are also the solutions which ended each preceding revolutionary period.In one sense, I hope that many readers will react to my model by calling it obvious and natural for depicting the growth of an organization. To me this type of reaction is a useful test of the model's validity.But at a more reflective level I imagine some of these reactions are more hindsight than foresight. Those experienced managers who have been through a developmental sequence can empathize with it now, but how did they react when in the middle of a stage ofevolution or revolution? They can probably recall the limits of their own developmental understanding at that time. Perhaps they resisted desirable changes or were even swept emotionally into a revolution without being able to propose constructive solutions. So let me offer some explicit guidelines for managers of growing organizations to keep in mind.Know where you are in the developmental sequence.Every organization and its component parts are at different stages of development. The task of top management is to be aware of these stages; otherwise. it may not recognize when the time for change has come, or it may act to impose the wrong solution.Top leaders should be ready to work with the flow of the tide rather than against it; yet they should be cautious, since it is tempting to skip phases out of impatience. Each phase results in certain strengths and learning experiences in the organization that will be essential for success in subsequent phases. A child prodigy, for example, may be able to read like a teenager, but he cannot behave like one until he ages through a sequence of experiences.I also doubt that managers can or should act to avoid revolutions. Rather, these periods of tension provide the pressure, ideas, and awareness that afford a platform for change and the introduction of new practices.Recognize the limited range of solutions.In each revolutionary stage it becomes evident that this stage can be ended only by certain specific solutions; moreover, these solutions are different from those which were applied to the problems of the preceding revolution. Too often it is tempting to choose solutions that were tried before, which makes it impossible for a new phase of growth to evolve.Management must be prepared to dismantle current structures before the revolutionary stage becomes too turbulent. Top managers, realizing that their own managerial styles are no longer appropriate, may even have to take themselves out of leadership positions. A good Phase 2 manager facing Phase 3 might be wise to find another Phase 2 organization that better fits his talents, either outside the company or with one of its newer subsidiaries.Finally, evolution is not an automatic affair; it is a contest for survival. To move ahead, companies must consciously introduce planned structure that not only are solutions to a current crisis but also are fitted to the next phase of growth. This requires considerable self-awareness on the part of top management, as well as great interpersonal skill in persuading other managers that change is needed.Realize that solutions breed new problems.Managers often fail to realize that organizational solutions create problems for the future (i.e., a decision to delegate eventually causes a problem of control). Historical actions are very much determinants of what happens to the company at a much later date.An awareness of this effect should help managers to evaluate company problems with greater historical understanding instead of "pinning the blame" on a current development. Better yet, managers should be in a position to predict future problems, and thereby to prepare solutions and coping strategies before a revolution gets out of hand.。
经典管理案例讨论(总2页)
经典管理案例讨论(总2页) -CAL-FENGHAI.-(YICAI)-Company One1-CAL-本页仅作为文档封面，使用请直接删除蓝太阳公司的管理有什么问题?王强通过一番努力，终于应聘上向往已久的蓝太阳保健品公司。
王强觉得这个工作来之不易，其销售才能也能得到充分发挥，因此工作得特别努力，每天都拜访好几家新客户，甚至在每天回家以后都花大量时间在报纸上收集客户信息。
一个月过去了，王强的工作状态越来越差，做事越来越打不起精神，在蓝太阳工作了近两个月之后，王强向公司提出了辞职申请。
由于公司人才流失严重，严重影响了公司的业绩。
为了招聘到优秀的人才，公司花费大量精力和金钱。
王强是本次招聘的新员工中的佼佼者，在公司的表现也很突出，为什么刚刚开始上手就要提出辞职呢？人力资源部钟经理一改以往的习惯做法，决心尽最大努力留住王强。
在同王强的深谈中，钟经理了解到了王强辞职的原因，同时，也意识到了公司管理中所存在的严重问题。
原来，王强在进公司之前了解到，在蓝太阳，不论是新业务员，还是老业务员，底薪和提成都一视同仁，提成均按销售额的5%，相比其他几家应聘的公司，蓝太阳的薪酬制度还是比较有竞争优势并且比较公平。
王强的销售能力出类拔萃，蓝太阳的品牌颇有影响，因此，王强相信自己能够干得很开心，获得高报酬。
但慢慢地，王强发现，尽管自己每天不停地打电话、跑客户，但是销售业绩在公司的业绩公告栏上还是远远地落在两位老业务员后面。
第一个月工资发下来，老员工比王强多出十几倍，王强很难受，也很苦恼。
本来，新员工的业绩低一些纯属正常，没什么大惊小怪，可是，仔细观察下来发现，原来公司的两部客户咨询电话都放在两位老员工的办公桌上，每当有客户咨询电话，都被两位老员工据为己有。
由于蓝太阳自身有许多广告，因此客户咨询电话非常多。
老员工只要坐在办公室，守住电话，便可以掌握大量的新的优质客户，而像王强这一批新进员工则只有自己开发新客户。
王强愤愤地说：客户资源是公司的，现在都被两位员工据为己有，我们新员工即使这么努力，业绩与每天坐在办公室的老员工们相比，还是相去甚远，当然只有另谋生路。
高级管理学教学案例
高级管理学教学案例简介本文档旨在提供一份高级管理学教学案例，帮助学生深入理解和应用管理学的核心概念和理论，培养他们的管理能力和技巧。
案例背景选择一个具有挑战性和现实意义的管理案例，以让学生面临真实的管理困境和挑战。
案例应涉及以下方面的内容：1. 公司或组织的背景和行业环境；2. 公司或组织面临的问题或挑战；3. 管理团队的思考和决策过程；4. 决策的结果和对公司或组织的影响。
研究目标通过研究和分析案例，学生应能够：1. 理解和运用管理学的核心概念和理论；2. 分析和识别管理团队面临的问题和挑战；3. 制定和评估可行的解决方案；4. 领导和管理团队的思考和决策过程；5. 预测和评估决策的影响和结果。
教学方法为了帮助学生全面理解和分析案例，可以采用以下教学方法：1. 小组讨论：将学生分成小组，让他们共同分析和讨论案例，分享自己的观点和意见。
2. 角色扮演：让学生扮演案例中的管理团队成员，通过角色扮演的方式模拟真实的管理环境和情境。
3. 辩论：安排学生就案例中的问题或决策展开辩论，培养他们的分析和表达能力。
4. 视频案例分析：使用相关的视频案例，让学生观看和分析案例中的管理挑战和决策过程。
评估方式为了有效评估学生对案例的理解和应用能力，可以采用以下评估方式：1. 个人写作：要求学生以个人写作的形式分析和总结案例，评估他们对管理学概念和理论的理解和应用能力。
2. 小组展示：要求学生以小组展示的形式呈现他们对案例的分析和解决方案，评估他们的团队协作和表达能力。
3. 口头答辩：安排学生对案例中的问题或决策进行口头答辩，评估他们的逻辑思维和沟通能力。
总结通过教学案例的方式，学生将更好地理解和应用管理学的核心概念和理论，提升他们的管理能力和思维水平。
同时，教师也需要通过有效的评估方式，及时了解学生对案例的理解和应用情况，以便进行针对性的指导和辅导。
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案例讨论一一、鞋匠和裁缝的携手30多年前的温州，还是个贫穷的海滨小城。
生活在乐清县柳市镇的南存辉和胡成中，有着同样艰辛的童年。
从六七岁开始，南存辉就挑着米糠，提着鸡蛋上街卖。
胡成中的童年也有捡剩番薯吃、捡菜梗腌的记忆。
入学后，二人在柳市小学同一个班级。
胡成中长南存辉两岁，活泼外向，任体育委员，南存辉学习成绩好，性格稍内向，任班长。
不久，二人同样因为家境困难而辍学并继承父业。
13岁那年，南存辉父亲在一次劳动中脚被水泵砸伤，卧床不起。
从此，作为家中长子的南存辉每天挑工具箱早出晚归开始补鞋，一晃就是三年。
14岁的胡成中，也同样辍学随父学起了裁缝，16岁时，远离家乡当起了供销员，也就是加入了后来被誉为是温州私有经济萌芽前奏的“十万供销大军”。
南存辉补鞋的这三年，柳市的低压电器生产正酝酿着一场革命。
有一天，他正低头补鞋，听到有人叫自己，抬起头一看，是胡成中。
胡成中告诉他，自己不再做裁缝了，而是改行推销电器，第一趟生意就赚了2000多元。
这让南存辉又羡慕又嫉妒：2000多元？自己要补多少双鞋才赚得回来？于是他也动心改行做电器生意。
有两种选择，一是建厂自己生产电器，一是当推销员，背着订单走访，拿到订单后再返回温州找厂生产。
而无论选择哪一种，对于南存辉来说都有难以估量的困难：自己建厂，他没有技术；当推销员，自己当鞋匠，一直没有离开过柳市，对外面的情况根本不熟悉。
思来想去，还是自己建厂难度稍小一些。
南存辉将自己的想法和三位朋友聊了一下，得到认同，于是大家一起出资，在柳市镇租下了一间门面，前面开店，后面办厂。
可这个厂不容易办呀，4个人当中没有一个懂电器生产的。
这一点，南存辉早就想好了。
他花一笔钱，从市场上买回一些电器，几个人关起门来研究，拆了装，装了又拆，仔细地画好图纸。
不几天，照葫芦画瓢，他们也竟然生产出了自己的产品。
一个月下来，南存辉算了一笔账，除掉前期投入的成本，以单纯经营来看，他赚了35元。
几个合伙人都感到气馁，前期投入没有收回，一个月只赚35元，才相当一个国营厂工人的月工资。
他们可是4个人呀，如果去搞推销，少说也可以赚350元。
有人萌生了退意。
此时，父母也一再给南存辉施压，要求他关掉门面，回去补鞋。
南存辉补鞋，每天还可以赚10元，生意好的时候可以赚20元，一个月下来少说也能赚到300以上。
这个收入水平能够将一家人的生活维持在相当高的水平。
现在开店，将以前攒下的钱搭进去，什么也没有赚到。
南存辉的想法不同。
做生意，有赚有亏，自己在什么都不懂的情况下开张，第一个月没有亏本，还能赚到35元，至少让他明白了一点：在这一行，自己可以立足。
可几个合伙人并不认同他的观点，纷纷退股。
说是退股，因为当初大家也没什么投入，加上没有赚到钱，实在也没什么好退的，只是声明不再干了，各奔前程而去。
南存辉从此独自支撑局面。
这时，胡成中的情况不错。
他搞推销绩效赚了点钱，也有了一定的渠道。
但在推销过程中他认清一个事实，推销这个职业不被人尊重，产品又不受自己控制，前途不看好。
如果自己办厂就不一样了，销售利润肯定比推销员高。
胡成中和一位朋友商量，加上弟弟也算一份，办起了求精开关厂，正式向工商部门注册了（不像南存辉，因为不够注册资金的下限，开的是地下厂）。
厂子是办了起来，但他们遇到一个问题，三个人都是推销员，只懂在外跑生意，既不懂生产也不懂管理，更没有技术。
他们那时根本不可能知道世界上还有授权经营这种经营模式。
在柳市，像胡成中这样的厂很多，不懂技术不怕，弄出一大堆废品照样可以卖钱。
可胡成中坚决不肯出次品、劣品，而他们又生产不出正品，时间不长，厂子便陷入了绝境。
那位朋友股东退股了。
胡成中并不想让这间厂垮掉，就想到了南存辉，希望两人合作，将厂子办得大一些。
这是一个较好的创业模式。
南存辉有管理天赋，对技术也肯钻研，他主内抓生产管理是最好选择。
胡成中呢，善于交际，喜欢在外面跑，又有推销经验，还有一定的客户资源，负责业务同样具有优势，两人的合作可谓珠联璧合、优劣互补。
1984年，胡成中找到南存辉，两人一拍即合，各自投资1.5万元，共同经营求精开关厂。
南存辉抓生产及管理确实有一套，胡成中等在外跑业务，推销的是自家的产品，底气足了，业务更顺畅了。
经营中，两人更进一步认识到，质量是关键，品牌是保障。
他们想创自己的品牌，便由胡成中出面，三次到上海，物色一个技术好的工程师，结果找到了上海人民电器厂的退休工程师王中江。
来到温州后，王中江提出，要抓质量就一定得有一个测试实验室。
胡成中大包大揽，当即表示同意。
南存辉精细一些，问建这样一个实验室需要多少钱，王中江说，需要30万。
两位老板目瞪口呆。
当时他们的总资产还不足10万，流动资金只有1万，去哪里拿30万建一个测试实验室？这笔投资何时才能收回来？为了此事，两位老板第一次出现了意见分歧。
因为胡成中坚持，南存辉也出于老同学的情面，最终同意了，靠借高利贷创办了这间实验室。
此时是柳市电器最滥的时候，大量的劣质产品进入市场。
劣质产品因材料、做工及工序等方面成本低，价格也低；优质产品则不同，别的不说，投资30万元的实验室便会在产品造价中有所体现，价格自然要高一些。
在市场上，求精开关厂虽然有质量优势，却没有价格优势，经营状况远远不如别人。
这是求精开关厂最艰难的时期。
后来，当越来越多的用户感到受了温州人劣次品的骗，胡成中见缝插针，接过这些市场，推出自己的优质产品。
尤其在后来全国抵制柳市电器时，胡成中仍然保有着自己的客户。
由于求精开关厂抓质量闻名，市里也想树立这样的典型，对他们予以扶持。
当整个柳市电器遭遇巨大质量危机时，求精开关厂迎来了大发展的机会。
90年代初，中央、省、市三级工作组进驻柳市打击假冒伪劣，很快发现在充斥着劣质品的柳市电器市场竟然还有家企业拥有自己的测试实验室，这样的企业不扶持还扶持谁？借助这次机会，求精开关厂迅速成为电器生产的一线企业。
到1991年，求精开关厂已经发展成为固定资产200万元、年产值1030万元的行业领头羊。
可以说，正是早年的品质意识，让求精开关厂在柳市低压电器企业的第一波淘汰赛中胜出。
这是非常关键的第一步。
然而，随着企业的发展，这两位珠联璧合的同学兼好友之间的矛盾也越来越深，共苦的岁月度过了，同甘的岁月却难以持续。
有关两人间的矛盾，《正泰报》副总编廖毅在《走近南存辉》一书中写道：“我在与朋友（胡成中）合作前开过6年的前店后厂，对企业的内部管理、生产调配等比较熟悉，这位朋友是跑码头、搞推销起家的，对外交往很有一套。
我们最初的合作是一种有益的互补。
但在企业发展到一定程度后，一些小小的分歧就不可避免地出现了。
有人说，民营企业难过但必须过的三个关是分银饷、排座次、论荣辱。
刚开始，这种问题并不明显。
渐渐地，企业有了一定实力和知名度后，地方政府为了鼓励发展经济，要给企业领导评个先进、给个奖励什么的。
企业是两个人办的，评谁好呢？我们想出了一个两全其美的办法，叫做‘厂长轮流做’，也就是今年我当厂长，你当法人代表，明年你当厂长，我当法人代表。
较好地解决了这些问题。
”温州著名本土经济学家马津龙那个时候就已经认识了这两位后来的温州民企大腕。
他回忆说，当时南、胡二人递给他的名片上，都印着“厂长”头衔，马津龙觉得奇怪，他们给他的解释是“轮着当”。
后来，马津龙评价：“都是要当老大的人呀！”据悉，那个时候二人的性格差异就已经显现出来了。
胡成中喜欢热闹，总想抓住各种机会，而南存辉沉静稳重，主张专一，提倡“将一壶水烧好”。
平心而论，一个企业做到1000多万的产值，在当时的温州乃至中国，确实很不错了。
但在与国外企业的交往中，南存辉明显感到了自身的差距。
有个定居美国的亲戚力主南存辉向外发展。
南存辉提出把国内企业交由胡成中全权管理，自己先到美国考察一段时间，如果条件许可便考虑在国外建立公司。
但这一想法并没有得到合作伙伴的赞同，个中细节非三言两语所能说清。
以后的事情，正如我们已经知道的，南存辉没有去成美国，双方选择了分开发展的道路。
而促成他们“分手”的竟是当时的县委书记。
南存辉说：“当时，乐清县委书记姓郑，和我们俩关系都很好，也很关心我们企业的发展，对求精开关厂的情况了如指掌。
有一天，他打电话问我在哪里，我说在家。
他说，晚上到你家吃饭。
郑书记来了，和他一起来的还有我的那位朋友。
席间，郑书记说，我看你们既然谈不到一起，还不如分开试试。
让我为你们做娘舅，分家！”天下没有不散的宴席。
1991年，求精分设为求精一厂、求精二厂，总资产200万左右，产值做到1000多万，双方也各有亲戚、朋友进入管理层，南存辉与胡成中在一些经营决策问题上开始偶有争议。
1992年，南、胡二人正式友好分手。
胡成中创办了德力西，立志“赶超德国西门子”。
南存辉和弟弟等亲戚朋友一起，创办了正泰。
二、正泰后来居上，既生瑜何生亮？上世纪90年代，是民营低压电器难得的黄金时代。
他们抓住了国家几次电网改造的机会，迅猛成长。
柳市镇出来的经销商，遍布祖国大地每一个角落。
相比以前国有企业的“坐商”方式，他们热情、灵活、能吃苦，来自柳市的低压电器，通过他们，源源不断输往全国。
与此同时，柳市形成了低压电器的产业集群，各种配套企业纷纷建立，原来的以国有企业为主的六大低压电器生产基地没落了，柳市获得了“中国低压电器之都”的称誉。
1991年之后短短四年，南存辉大施股权“魔法”，利用温州民间资本充裕、正泰品牌逐渐树立等势头，借相互持股或以正泰控股的形式组建温州第一家股份合作制企业集团正泰集团，快速向上下游高技术含量产品延伸。
到1994年南存辉组建正泰集团的时候，身价就从分手时的100万到超过2000万元。
之后，德力西也组建了浙江德力西集团。
1996年以前，德力西一直走在正泰前头。
那时候，德力西的广告语“着着领先，德力西电器”，在乐清耳熟能详，德力西的LOGO经常出现在政府会议的烟灰缸和文化用品上，那个时候，德力西是乐清的招牌。
1996年以后，正泰销售额首超德力西。
近几年，德力西与正泰在低压电器领域的差距加大，目前，德力西低压电器的销量大约不到正泰的二分之一。
在施耐德进入柳市镇以前，柳市低压电器行业已经流传了很多关于南、胡二人“斗法”的故事。
正泰在柳市镇的总部大楼还没有动土，德力西闻讯，特意在正泰对面建了一幢更高的楼。
最近几年，“东方不亮，西方亮”成了胡成中的口头禅。
因为正泰占据低压电器老大位置多年，胡成中在多个场合表现出对昔日战友南存辉“不服气”的心态。
《民营经济》周刊曾对温州20个企业经理人进行访问，调查范围是包括正泰、德力西等电器企业在内的20家企业，调查内容之一是“你最欣赏的温州民营企业老板是哪一个”。
通过问卷调查，在20位民营企业经理中，有8个人把正泰的南存辉选为自己最喜欢的老总，德力西集团的胡成中只得了一票。
《民营经济》解释说，1票实质上就是零票，因为参加调查的企业本身就拥有一票。