美军城市作战战争回顾

Urban Warfare



城市作战



January -February 2005 MILITARY REVIEW






2005年一月至二月，战争回顾



A city is the greatest challenge to any tactical force. In cities the red zone — the space separating friendly from enemy forces — compresses. The zone is often thousands of meters in open battle, but only tens of meters in the urban maze of densely aggregated buildings, streets, and back alleys. The traditional advantages of fighting outside the red zone disappear as cities compel soldiers to fight the enemy close. The - nature of the urban jungle fragments forces. Short lines of sight limit the effective ranges of organic weapons and allow the enemy to “hug” U.S. forces, obviating the effective use of precision-guided weapons launched from aerial platforms. Compartmented urban terrain lessens to a significant degree the advantages of superior situational awareness and electronic-communications dominance.



城市对任何一个善于作战的部队来说都是一个巨大的挑战！城市中的红色区域，即被压缩在敌军与友军之间的区域。简而言之，就是用于隔离友军部队与敌军部队的区域。这种隔离区域在开阔的野外战场中可达数千米，但在城市这样由聚集密度如此之大的建筑物，街道，死胡同所组成的错综复杂的迷宫中仅仅只有十几米，当城市的环境迫使士兵们与敌军近距离作战时，传统作战方法中即在红色区域外作战的战法失去了优势！



城市错综复杂的环境像热带雨林一样。它天然形成的间隔区域使部队分散开来。复杂的环境使得视野变短。这限制了军队成建制武器的有效射程范围。并且使得敌军有机会靠近美军，这便排除了使用从航空武器平台上发射精确制导武器的作战方法。城市中间隔分离的地形很大程度上减弱了上级指挥人员对战场形势的了解和电子通讯装备的有优势。



Soldiers and Marines fight and occasionally die in brutal, close, and intimate tactical combat in cities, and every tactical action has strategic consequences. Each time a soldier or Marine dies, the United States loses another bit of strategic initiative, and probabilities for success diminish. Each soldier’s death raises public clamor to bring U.S. soldiers and Marines home. Only a fool would conclude the enemy is unaware of these connections.



士兵们和海军陆战队队员们在残忍的，近距离的城市战术行动中战斗，有时甚至死亡。每次战术行动都对战略有影响。每当一个士兵或海军陆战队队员战死。整个美国就会在战略上进一步丧失主动权，同时取得战争胜利的可能性进一步减小。每个士兵的死讯都会激起公众更高的撤军呼声。只有白痴才会下结论认为敌人不知道这之间的联系。



Physical, intellectual, and psychological fitness. As the battlefield be

comes more uncertain and lethal, it also becomes lonelier and enormously frightening for those obliged to fight close. Most recent American campaigns have been fought in unfamiliar and horrifically惊悸的desolate terrain and weather. We must pay greater attention to selecting, bonding, and psychologically and physically preparing close-combat soldiers to perform well in this new era of war. Modern science offers promising solutions. Soldiers can be better tuned psychologically to endure the stresses of close combat. Written tests, assessments, role-playing exercises, and careful vetting reduces the percentage of soldiers who suffer from stress disorders after coming off the firing line.



身体，智力，心理上的适应性：当战场的形势变得越来越不确定，威胁越来越致命的时候，被迫在城市中近距离作战的士兵们会感到更加的孤独与恐惧。近期大多数由美军发动的战役都是在不熟悉的令人惊恐的荒芜的地形和不良的天气下发生的。我们必须花大力气贯注那些对准备参加城市近距离作战士兵们的挑选，组合及心理和身体的战前准备。以期望他们能在新的地域作战行动中表现得更好。现代科学技术提供给军事最有希望的解决方案。士兵们可以更好的调整自己的心理状态以忍受城市中近距离作战行动所带来的紧张的情绪。做测试，作评估，角色扮演练习以及小心的治疗可以减少那些从火线上撤回的士兵中遭受因紧张而变得思维混乱的人的数量。



The biological sciences offer , that older, more mature soldiers will be able to endure the physical stresses of close combat for longer periods, which is important because experience supports that older men make better close-combat soldiers. They are more stable in crisis situations, less likely to be killed or wounded, and far more effective in performing the essential tasks that attend close-in killing.



从生物科学的角度来看，那些年龄更大，更为成熟的士兵将有能力忍受长期在城市中近距离作战所带来的紧张。因为经验是很重要的。它可以使老兵成为更好的近距离作战的士兵。经验使得他们在处理紧急情况时更加的稳定，所以他们受伤或者死亡的可能性相对较小。并且能够更加有效的完成近战搏杀的基本任务。



War is a thinking man’s game. Senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded it is better to out-think than out-equip the enemy. They tell us that wars are won by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions — tasks that demand the ability to under-stand the changing nature of war. Yet increasingly, military leaders subordinate this ability to the more pressing demands of routine day-to-day operations. Today’s military has become so overstretched i

t is too busy to learn at a time when the value of learning has never been greater.



战争是有理性人的游戏。从伊拉克和阿富汗返回的高级军官曾做出如下结论：与其装备上超过敌人不如在作战思想上超越敌人。他们告诉我们想取得战争的胜利要靠缔结同盟，利用非军事优势的杠杆作用，觉察意图，建立信任，转变观念，及运用洞察力。这些都是作战任务中所要求掌握的能力，以便了解战争变化多端的本质。然而，越来越多的军官把对这种能力的培养列在次于每日紧迫的战术行动的位置上。今天军事行动已经如此频繁，以至于士兵们疲于应付战斗没有时间学习，而学习的价值在此刻恰恰显得尤为重要。



We ask soldiers and Marines to make judgments and command decisions that in previous wars were reserved for senior officers. A corporal standing guard in Baghdad or Fallujah can make a decision that affects the strategic outcome of an entire campaign. In Afghanistan, sergeants decided where to deliver precision munitions. Their decisions had enormous consequences for the strategic mission, yet the intellectual preparation of these junior leaders is no more advanced today than during the Cold War. Thankfully, these soldiers’ innate creativity, innovativeness, and initiative belie their lack of formal intellectual preparation. Even so, it seems clear they could do even better if service institutions educated them earlier and with greater rigor.



我们要求士兵和海军陆战队队员们做出判断和指挥的决定，而这些权力在以前的战争中是由级别较高的军官掌握的。现在一个在巴格达或费鲁杰站岗的的下士做出的一个决定可以在战略上影响到整个战役的结果。在阿富汗，一个士官可以决定在什么地方精确地投送军需品。他们的决定对整个战略任务有着巨大的影响。然而，这些初级指挥官们在智力方面的战前准备与冷战期间相比没有任何提高。但感到欣慰的是这些士兵们天生的创造力，革新力和主动性掩饰了他们所欠缺的正规的智力方面的战前准备。所以，很显然，如果服役机构能够更早更严格的教育他们，他们可以做得更好。



Today’s close-combat soldiers or Marines need more time to develop to peak fighting efficiency than their predecessors did. Years, not months, are required to produce a close-combat soldier with the skills and attributes to perform the increasingly more difficult and dangerous tasks that wait in the future. At least a year is necessary for small units to develop the collective skills necessary to fight as teams.



今天参加城市近距离作战的士兵和海军陆战队队员们与他们的前辈比起来需要更多的时间来发展到作战效率的顶点。培养出一个掌握近战作战技巧并且能够在未来执行危险程度与困

难程度都与日俱增的任务的士兵，需要好几年时间而不只是几个月。至少必须要一年的时间才能使一个作战小组具备在战场上以一个小组展开作战的必要的正确的作战技巧。



Cultural awareness. Many past enemies have remarked on the naiveté of U.S. soldiers new to close combat. Thanks to the oceans that surround the United States, we are relatively well protected and have rarely faced massive invasions or traumatic intrusions into our homeland. That explains why many U.S. soldiers in a firefight at first do not believe someone unknown really wants to kill them. American soldiers like to befriend strangers and even enemies. German and Japanese veterans were astounded at how quickly American soldiers sought to bond with them and forgive their aggressions once the battle ended. Children in particular were often the objects of this innate propensity to make friends.



文化意识:许多过去的敌人在评论新参加城市近距离作战的美国士兵时都觉得他们很天真。感谢海洋将美利坚合众国包围着。这样的地理环境使得我们被相对较好的保护起来，使得我们极少面对大规模的入侵及外族入侵家园所造成的创伤。这就解释了为什么在一场交火战斗中，美国士兵在一开始就不相信会有一个与他们素不相识的人正试图杀死他们。美国士兵们喜欢和陌生人交朋友甚至是和敌人交朋友。二战中，德国和日本的老兵们很吃惊地看到在战争一结束，美国士兵很快就能和他们打成一片，并且忘记他们曾经的侵略行径。特别是和儿童交朋友更是美国士兵天生的倾向。　



Unfortunately, the gulf between West and East has never been greater than that between American soldiers and Iraqis. A barrier of cultural differences between American and Islamic societies blocks the American soldier’s proclivity to connect with alien societies. Few soldiers speak Arabic or have spent any time in Arab countries or even in the presence of Middle Eastern peoples.Close-combat forces cannot again be sent into a tactical environment where they are forced to fight as complete strangers. In the war in Iraq, Iraq’s strategic center of gravity is the will of the Iraqi people. Our soldiers cannot hope to win such a war without better knowledge of how the enemy thinks and acts.



不幸的是，美国士兵与伊拉克人的隔阂远比东西方之间的不同大出很多。美国与伊斯兰社会两种不同文化之间的屏障阻碍了美国士兵与伊斯兰社会交流的倾向。很少有士兵会说阿拉伯语或是曾经在阿拉伯国家生活过一段时间，甚至是曾经见过中东地区的人。城市近战部队不能再次被迫使投入另一个完全陌生的战术环境中去作战。在伊拉克战争中，战略重心是消灭伊拉克人的抵抗意志。我们的士兵不可能在不更好了解敌人如何思考和

行动的知识前就希冀取得战争的胜利。



Every American soldier should receive cultural and language instruction, not to make him a linguist but to make him a diplomat in uniform who has the sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with indigenous citizens on the street. Soldier acculturation is too important to be relegated to last　minute briefings before deployment. The military should devise, monitor, and assess acculturation policy as a joint responsibility.



每个美国士兵都应该接受文化和语言方面的指导。目地不是为了把他们培养成为语言学家。而是在于把他们培养成为穿着军装的具有外交手腕和政治敏感性又掌握语言学家技巧的并且可以理解并能够在街上与当地人进行交谈的人。让士兵们进行文化适应是非常的重要，这是不能委托于军事行动开始前的简报的。军队应该将战场企图，战场监督以及对文化适应政策的评估作为一个共同的责任。



The military spends millions to create urban combat sites to train soldiers how to kill an enemy in cities. Urban sites optimized to teach small units how to coexist with and cultivate trust among indigenous peoples might be equally useful。Such centers could expose young soldiers to a simulated Middle Eastern urban crisis, perhaps near a mosque or busy marketplace. Expatriate role-players could incite local mobs to violence. The services and joint agencies, with State Department, CIA, or allied observers calling the shots during an exercise, would provide an interagency and international presence.



军方花费数百万美元用于建立城市近战训练基地去训练士兵们如何在城市中杀死敌人。而教导小规模分队在城市环境中以最优化的方式与当地人共存并建立信任的方法或许也一样有效。这样的训练中心可以使年轻的士兵亲临一个模拟的中东城市冲突中，或许邻近一个清真寺或是一个繁忙的集市，派遣进去的角色扮演人员可以在其中煽动当地暴徒们使用武力发动攻击。这个士兵训练服务联盟机构会同国务院、中情局以及其他同盟国的观察员们将在整个训练期间操纵训练任务。当这需要一个跨机构的多国人员的参与。