尼克松访华演讲 英汉对照
尼克松总统英文演讲稿
尼克松总统英文演讲稿第一篇：尼克松总统英文演讲稿晚上好!亲爱的同胞们：Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.今晚，我想与各位探讨一个问题，这是所有美国人和全球无数人所深切关注的一个问题——越南战争。
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy.The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.我认为，在关于越南战争一事上，大家的观点出现了严重分歧的一个重要原因在于：很多美国民众对我们的政府所宣扬的政策已失去了信心。
当前情况下，除非美国人民真正认清政策本质，否则不能也不应该被要求去支持涉及战争与和平等重大问题的政策。
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.所以，今晚，我想借此机会回答一些问题，一些萦绕在你们许多人脑海中的问题。
尼克松访华演讲--英汉对照
Speech at a Welcoming BanquetMr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say to them than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, and the American people are a great people. If our tow peoples enemies, the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other, neither of us seeks domination over the other, and neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.Chairman Mao has written,“So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the world rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years are too long, seize the day, and seize the hour!”This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Zhou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people that can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.Richard M. Nixon1972欢迎宴上的致辞——美国前总统尼克松的经典演讲总理先生，我要感谢您作的如此盛情和意味深长的讲话。
尼克松访华演讲
尼克松访华演讲1972, US president Richard M. Nixon visited China, below was his Speech at a Welcoming Banquet Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say to them than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, and the American people are a great people. If our two peoples are enemies, the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the change for world peace is immeasurably increased.What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a newworld?There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other, neitherof us seeks domination over the other, and neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands andrule the world.Chairman Mao has written, “So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the wo rld rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years a re too long, seize the hour!”This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Zhou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people that can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.总理先生，我要感谢您好作的如此盛情和意味深长的讲话。
尼克松演讲英文原稿
Richard M. Nixon: The Great Silent MajorityGood evening, my fellow Americans.Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first placeHow has this administration changed the policy of the previous AdministrationWhat has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in VietnamWhat choices do we have if we are to end the warWhat are the prospects for peaceNow let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as thepeacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war. The great question is: How can we win America's peaceWell, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.Now many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end itIn January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.For the United States this first defeat in our nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said,"We want to see a stable Government there," carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence." We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we're going to stay there." President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicatedthat we're willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements.I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where Im now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.Let me read from that letter to you now:Dear Mr. President:I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of fouryears of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.Well, now, who's at fault It's become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi 's deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to preventfuture Vietnams.We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we're an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, . policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.The defense of freedom is everybody's business -- not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams's orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they've been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. And most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all . combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which Im sure you will understand. As Ive indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was anunderstanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam.I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary -- a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reachthat conclusion and to advocate that point of view.But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world.And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now wont matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now wont matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then wont matter.I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand -- North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: This is the war to end wars. His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which -- to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated -- the goal of a just and lasting peace.As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.Thank you and good night.。
1960年尼克松肯尼迪辩论英汉
1960年尼克松肯尼迪辩论英汉第一篇：1960年尼克松肯尼迪辩论英汉美国裹足不前（1960年总统辩论：肯尼迪—尼克松）肯尼迪：我说过，我已经为这个国家服务了14年，我在战时去保卫美国，我把我的一切奉献给我的祖国。
如果我在这次竞选中失败了，我要继续在参议院为建设一个强大的美国而奋斗。
我之所以要参加竞选，是因为我看到了美国在今年有很大的发展机会，有在国内和全世界大展宏图的机会，有重新把美国建设成一个朝气蓬勃、蒸蒸日上的社会的机会。
我认为，共和党在美国仍然裹足不前，在世界也裹足不前。
我们今天仅使用了美国50%的钢铁生产能力。
我在1958年出现了经济衰退，我在1954年出现了经济衰退。
如果我们仍然裹足不前，如果我们任命的大使和华盛顿的其他官员不能意识到现在处于革命性的阶段，那么美国就不会保持它的实力。
如果我们失败了，自由的事业也就失败了。
我认为下一任美国总统有责任让这个国家重新运转起来，发展我们的经济，向美国人民明确美国的目标和未完成的事业。
然后，在全世界尽可能任命最优秀的人才，大使要会讲驻在国的语言，不是看他的政治捐献，而看他会不会讲驻在国的语言。
我认为这个党——共和党——的25年的领导一直裹足不前，它反对罗斯福和其他总统提出的所有计划，如最低工资、住房、经济增长、开发美国自然资源和田纳西大峡谷等计划。
我认为，如果我们能有一个坚信运转、坚信发展的党，那么我们就能重新树立起我们在世界的地位——强大的国防、高速的经济增长、对我们人民的公正、确保宪法权利，让人民相信我们说到做到，然后，在全世界重新建立像富兰克林·罗斯福总统所创建的拉丁美洲那样的环境（译者注：当时的拉丁美洲是美国的势力范围，是美国的“后院”）。
罗斯福总统在拉丁美洲人的眼里是个好邻居，因为他在美国就是个好邻居，因为他们看到的我们是一个充满同情心、互相关爱、推动国家前进的社会。
我相信，作为民主党领袖的我有责任提醒美国人民，1960年是决定性的一年，我们不能再裹足不前了，我们不能再屈居第二了。
尼克松演讲英文原稿
R i c h a r d M.N i x o n:T h e G r e a t S i l e n t M a j o r i t y Good evening, my fellow Americans.Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?What choices do we have if we are to end the war?What are the prospects for peace?Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office.I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on thefuture of peace and freedom in America, and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war. The great question is: How can we win America's peace?Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.Now many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the waythe war has been conducted.But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.For the United States this first defeat in our nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said,"We want to see a stable Government there," carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence." We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we're going to stay there."?President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace --in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we're willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of thepeople of South Vietnam to determine their own future.At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement.Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I?m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.Let me read from that letter to you now:Dear Mr. President:I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.Well, now, who's at fault? It's become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi 's deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report onanother front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we're an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: ?When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, . policyshould be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.?Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.The defense of freedom is everybody's business -- not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams's orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they've been able to take over combatresponsibilities from our American troops.Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. And most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all . combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I?m sure you will understand. As I?ve indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixedtimetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in. The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam,they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam.I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for ajust peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary -- a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagreewith the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, ?Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.?Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want toend this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world. And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won?t matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now won?t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won?t matter.I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate todo so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat.Because let us understand -- North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that. Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: ?This is the war to end wars.? His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which -- to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated -- the goal of a just and lasting peace.As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.Thank you and good night.。
1972年尼克松访华说了什么？竟然让翻译愣在原地，让总理开怀大笑
如果要问1972年有什么引爆世界话题的事，那必定属于尼克松访华。
尼克松访华不仅意味着中美关系的破冰，更意味中国的对外交往，进入了一个新的阶段和时期。
尼克松访华在1972年尼克松访华时，周总理等国家领导人进行了热烈的欢迎。
在这期间还发生了不少有意思的小故事，其中有一件发生在2月28日，也就是《联合公报》发表的当天， 尼克松说了一句话。
这句话不仅让翻译愣在原地，进而害羞起来，而且也让总理哈哈大笑。
那么，尼克松说了什么呢？他又为什么要说这样一句话？随着世界格局的风云变幻，中美两个原先打过一架的国家，也逐渐握手言和。
经过几年时间的互相试探，美国当局终于决定在1972年，前往中国进行访问。
1972年2月21日，“空军一号”专机，在美国境内起飞。
飞机里搭载着尼克松夫妇，以及美国各种领导高层，他们此行的目的是大洋彼岸的中国。
飞机上，尼克松频频看向窗外，他对这次访华充满了期待。
而大洋彼岸的中国也对尼克松访问，充满了期待与重视，于中国而言，不管最后结果如何，美国此举也能让中国打破外交封锁。
为了确保万无一失，中国不仅制定好了晚宴的标准，而且还安排了有经验的翻译员章含之，作为本次外事的翻译。
章含之章含之是著名民主人士章士钊的养女。
1953年，章含之凭借自己优异的成绩，被保送至北京外国语学院。
在外国语学院中，章含之努力学习英语知识。
经过几年的学习，章含之成为了英语系的研究生，并于1960年毕业。
毕业后，章含之便留在了北京外国语学院，成为了一名英语老师。
对章含之来说，人生最高光的时刻，应该是在1963年。
1963年年底，毛主席七十岁生日那天，毛主席除了邀请亲属，还特意邀请了几位湖南老乡，去赴家宴。
章士钊作为毛主席几十年的好朋友，同时还有同乡人这个身份，自然而然也受到了邀请。
毛主席按照赴宴的规定，可以带一名子女一起参加生日宴。
由此，章士钊就带着章含之，一起去往毛主席的生日宴会。
也就是在这次宴会上，章含之有幸成为了毛主席的英语老师。
尼克松访华演讲英文版
speech---Richard M. Nixon1972, US president Richard M. Nixon visited China, below was his Speech at a Welcoming BanquetMr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say to them than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, and the American people are a great people. If our two peoples are enemies, the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the change for world peace is immeasurably increased.In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterised our talks on this week, let us recognize at the outset those points: we have times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principle. But while we can not close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.So, let us, in these next five years, start along march together, not in lockstep, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice, in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to determine its own form of government, free of outside inference of domination. The world watches. The world listens. The world waits to see what we’ll do. What is the world? In a personal sense, I think of my eldest daughter whose birthday is today. As I think of her, I think of all the children in the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, most of whom were born since the date of the foundation of the People’s Repulic of China.What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other, neither of us seeks domination over the other, and neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.Chairman Mao has written, “So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the world rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years are too long, seize the hour!”This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Zhou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people that can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.总理先生，我要感谢您好作的如此盛情和意味深长的讲话。
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Speech at a Welcoming Banquet
Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say to them than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.
As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, and the American people are a great people. If our tow peoples enemies, the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.
What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?
There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other, neither of us seeks domination over the other, and neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.
Chairman Mao has written,“So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the world rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years are too long, seize the day, and seize the hour!”
This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.
In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Zhou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people that can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.
Richard M. Nixon
1972
欢迎宴上的致辞
——美国前总统尼克松的经典演讲总理先生，我要感谢您作的如此盛情和意味深长的讲话。
此时此刻，通过电讯的奇迹，在观看在聆听我们的讲话的人数是空前的。
也许，我们在这里的演讲不会长留于人们心中，但我们在这里做的是能改变世界。
正如你在酒词中说讲的，中国人民是伟大的人民，美国人民是伟大的人民。
如果我们两国相互敌视，那么我们共同拥有的这个世界的前途就会暗淡无光。
但是，如果我们能找到相互合作的共同立场，那么实现和平的机会就将无法估量的大大增加。
我们将给我们的孩子留下什么遗产呢？他们注定是要因为那些曾祸患旧世界的仇恨而死亡呢？还是因为我们缔造一个新世界的远见而活下去？
我们没有要成为敌人的理由。
无论我们那一方都不企图侵占对方的领土;无论哪一方都不企图控制对方；无论哪一方都不企图伸手去主宰这个世界。
毛主席写过：“多少事，从来急，天地转，光阴迫。
一万年太久，只争朝夕。
”
现在正是只争朝夕的时候，是我们两国人们去攀登伟大事业的高峰——缔造一个全新的，更美好的世界的时候。
本着这种精神，我请求诸位同我一起举杯，为毛主席，为周总理，为能为全世界人民带来友谊与和平的中美两国人民之间的友谊，干杯。
尼克松
1972
（本文为1972年尼克松访华时的祝酒词）。