分众调研报告
开设分公司调研报告
开设分公司调研报告开设分公司调研报告为了进一步扩大公司的业务范围和提高市场份额，本公司决定开设一家分公司。
为了确定合适的地点和相关条件，我们进行了一次全面的调研。
调研过程中，我们首先考虑了市场需求和竞争环境。
通过对目标市场的调查研究，我们发现该地区的需求量较大且市场规模可观。
同时，竞争对手数量相对较少，市场空白部分较多，有利于我们快速占领市场份额。
其次，我们着重考虑了地理位置和交通便利性。
通过分析该地区的经济发展趋势和政策环境，我们确定了若干适合我们分公司的地点。
我们选择了一个距离城市中心较近且交通便利的地方，便于员工和客户的到访。
然后，我们调查了人力资源和劳动力市场。
通过分析该地区的人口结构和就业情况，我们发现该地区的劳动力资源丰富，有助于我们快速招聘到合适的员工。
此外，该地区的人均工资水平相对较低，可以降低公司的人力成本。
最后，我们考虑了分公司营运成本和税务政策。
通过与当地政府和财务部门的沟通，我们了解到该地区有一系列的优惠政策和税收减免措施，有利于降低分公司的运营成本。
综上所述，基于市场需求、地理位置、人力资源和税务政策等因素的考虑，我们决定在该地区开设分公司。
我们相信，这个决策能够满足公司的战略目标，推动业务的快速发展。
在开设分公司之后，我们打算通过积极的市场营销和产品创新，快速占领市场份额，并逐步扩大公司在该地区的影响力。
同时，我们将不断优化运营管理，提高工作效率，为客户提供更好的服务和产品。
希望分公司能够尽快投产，并为公司的未来发展做出积极的贡献。
我们相信，在全体员工的共同努力下，我们能够取得更大的成功！。
分支机构调研报告
分支机构调研报告分支机构调研报告随着社会不断地进步，越来越多人会去使用报告，我们在写报告的时候要避免篇幅过长。
那么什么样的报告才是有效的呢？以下是小编收集整理的分支机构调研报告，欢迎大家借鉴与参考，希望对大家有所帮助。
目前，我国总分支机构税收征管所涉及的政策规定主要有：《增值税暂行条例》及其实施细则、《中华人民共和国企业所得税法》及实施细则、《关于企业所属机构间移送货物征收增值税问题的通知》（国税发[1998]137号）、《关于进一步加强汇总纳税企业所得税管理的通知》（国税发[20xx]185号）、《关于纳税人以资金结算网络方式收取货款增值税纳税地点问题的通知》（国税函[20xx]802号）、《关于连锁经营企业有关税收问题的通知》（财税[20xx]1号）、《关于跨地区经营汇总纳税企业所得税征收管理暂行办法的通知》（国税发〔20xx〕28号）等。
这些规范性文件虽然对总分支机构的纳税问题做出了具体规定，但由于总分支机构管理的复杂性，征纳双方容易发生争议。
本文通过对总分支机构征管中存在问题的分析，探讨管理对策，并提出审计思路。
一、总分支机构税收征管中存在的问题1、纳税人税法遵从意识不强自身重视程度不够主要表现有：①不主动及时办理税务登记手续；②办理税务登记后不申报纳税，或者虽申报纳税但申报信息不真实；③一些总机构利用自身的财务人员或与税务代理所、会计师事务所等中介机构合谋，针对税收征管漏洞，为其总分支机构经营进行不合理的纳税筹划，以达到少缴税或不缴税的目的；④造假账或者进行账外经营，甚至由分支机构直接向购货方收取货款，并截流提成款，私设小金库，直接造成税款流失；⑤不按规定提供“总机构已汇总纳税的证明”等。
2、税务机关日常监管不力管理重视程度不够主要表现为：分支机构所在地税务机关忽视分支机构的税源潜力，管户人员缺位，日常监管措施薄弱，不能经常、有效地对分支机构实施实地巡查，对分支机构是否实际从事生产经营、是否存在涉税异常变化等具体情况不清楚；而总机构所在地税务机关也难以全面掌握分支机构的真实经营状况，管理上是“有心无力”。
分众传媒楼宇液晶电视媒体广告7城市效果分析报告
周到达频次(Frequency)
18-55岁人群
到达频次
4.08
个人月收入3000+收入人群 6.11
数据来源：电话访问CATI 基数：所有被访者
19
- 调查当月广告到达率 -
广告到达率列表
% 100
80
60
40
丰新美米东 田加宝其风 皇坡莲林本
上携 海程 通网
N E C
2
调研背景回顾
研究背景回顾
❖ CTR作为国内最大的一家媒体和产品研究公司，致力于对各类媒体的研究， 尤其是新兴媒体的研究。
❖ 楼宇内液晶电视媒体自开发以来，CTR就一直关注该新兴媒体的效果，为 更加深入地了解该媒体的效果，以及目标受众对液晶电视的关注情况， CTR开展了一次针对该媒体的全面效果调研，为楼宇液晶电视建立与传统 的电视媒体类似的量化评估体系。
8
研究方法简述
✓ 楼宇液晶电视媒体的千人成本，及与电视媒体的比较 ✓ 楼宇液晶电视媒体的到达率 ✓ 楼宇液晶电视媒体受众的人群特征(年龄、收入、生活形态、
消费态度、职业等) ✓ 受众对此媒体形式的评价和看法，以及希望观看的广告类型 ✓ 受众对播放广告的记忆状况、记忆点回忆等 ✓ 播放广告的信息传达、理解，以及受众对广告的评价等
人流测算
电话访问
楼 宇 拦 截 访 问
9
北京
- 目标受众人群特征 - 受众对媒体的评价 -
目标受众特征 - 年龄
%
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0 24岁及以下
数据来源：楼宇拦截访问 基数：所有被访者
25－29岁
30－39岁
40－49岁 50岁及以上 12
涉众分析报告
涉众分析报告引言涉众分析是项目管理中的一项重要工作，它通过识别和分析涉众（Stakeholder）的利益、需求和期望，帮助项目团队了解并满足涉众的期望，提高项目成功的可能性。
本报告旨在对某项目进行涉众分析，并提供相应的分析结果。
项目背景在开始涉众分析之前，我们首先对项目的背景进行简要介绍。
本项目是一款手机应用开发项目，旨在为用户提供便捷的在线购物体验。
该应用将具备浏览商品、下单、支付、评价等功能，预计将在六个月内开发完成。
涉众识别为了全面了解该项目的涉众，我们进行了涉众识别的工作。
通过与项目团队、相关利益方以及其他相关方的沟通和讨论，我们确认了以下涉众：1.用户：包括普通用户和经销商，他们是该应用的最终使用者，并且对应用的功能和易用性有较高的期望。
2.项目团队成员：包括开发人员、测试人员、设计师等，他们是项目的执行者，对项目的成功与否有直接影响。
3.投资者：项目的资金提供者，对项目的执行进展和投资回报有着高度关注。
4.竞争对手：与本项目存在竞争关系的其他公司，他们的举动可能对项目的执行和市场竞争力产生影响。
5.政府监管部门：负责监管相关应用开发和在线交易的政府机构，可能对项目的合规性和法律风险产生重要影响。
涉众分析在涉众识别的基础上，我们进行了涉众分析，旨在了解不同涉众的需求和利益，并对项目进行风险评估。
以下是我们对不同涉众进行的分析：用户需求与期望：用户希望该应用具备以下特点和功能： - 界面友好、易用性高，便于浏览、搜索和购买商品。
- 在线支付安全可靠，支持多种支付方式。
- 提供准确的商品信息和价格，并有完善的售后服务。
- 能够及时获取购物优惠活动和推荐商品。
- 用户评价和反馈能够得到及时回应和处理。
风险评估：如果应用的功能不符合用户的期望，用户可能会选择使用其他类似的应用。
因此，项目团队应高度关注用户反馈，及时改进和优化应用功能，确保用户满意度。
项目团队成员需求与期望：项目团队成员期望能够开展有效的项目开发工作，包括以下方面：- 清晰明确的项目目标和工作计划。
调研企业小组分工情况报告
调研企业小组分工情况报告1. 引言本报告是针对调研企业股份有限公司小组成员在调研过程中的分工情况进行总结和评估。
通过对小组成员的分工情况的详细记录和分析，旨在评估团队的协作效果，发现存在的问题，并提出改进建议，以便更好地完成调研任务。
2. 调研任务及要求调研任务是对目标企业的市场地位、竞争对手、运营状况等方面进行深入研究，总结出关键信息和数据，为公司决策提供有价值的参考。
针对这一任务，小组成员被要求完成以下分工：- 组长：负责协调小组成员的工作，安排会议和调研行程，并负责最后的整体总结和报告撰写。
- 市场调研员：负责调研目标企业的市场地位，包括市场规模、竞争态势、市场份额等方面的数据分析和整理。
- 竞争对手分析员：负责调研目标企业的竞争对手，包括竞争对手的产品、定位、市场份额等方面的数据分析和整理。
- 运营分析员：负责调研目标企业的运营状况，包括财务状况、生产状况、销售状况等方面的数据分析和整理。
3. 分工情况与评价3.1 组长作为小组的组长，负责协调小组成员的工作、安排会议和调研行程，并最终负责整体总结和报告的撰写工作。
组长积极主动，在安排会议和行程时与小组成员充分沟通，确保每个成员都明确自己的任务。
在报告撰写方面，组长充分整合小组成员的研究结果，展现了较强的组织能力和团队协作能力。
3.2 市场调研员市场调研员负责调研目标企业的市场地位，包括市场规模、竞争态势、市场份额等方面的数据分析和整理。
市场调研员在调研过程中展现出较好的数据分析能力和调研能力，通过收集和整理大量的市场数据，对目标企业的市场状况有了全面深入的了解。
3.3 竞争对手分析员竞争对手分析员负责调研目标企业的竞争对手，包括竞争对手的产品、定位、市场份额等方面的数据分析和整理。
竞争对手分析员通过对竞争对手的调研，收集了大量的关于竞争对手的信息，并对竞争对手的优势、劣势和市场地位进行了全面详尽的分析。
3.4 运营分析员运营分析员负责调研目标企业的运营状况，包括财务状况、生产状况、销售状况等方面的数据分析和整理。
分支机构调研报告范文
分支机构调研报告范文分支机构调研报告范文报告编号：XXXXX时间：XXXX年XX月XX日尊敬的领导：我根据最近一段时间的调研工作，撰写了分支机构调研报告，报告内容如下：一、调研目的和背景本次调研旨在了解分支机构的运营情况、业务发展情况以及存在的问题和挑战，为进一步提升分支机构的工作效率和业绩提供基础数据和参考意见。
二、调研方法1. 问卷调查：对分支机构的员工进行问卷调查，了解他们对分支机构运营状况和存在问题的看法和建议。
2. 现场观察：对分支机构的现场工作环境和流程进行观察，了解工作流程和效率等情况。
3. 数据分析：通过对分支机构的数据进行收集和分析，得出分支机构的业务发展情况和存在的问题。
三、调研结果1. 运营状况：分支机构的运营状况良好，业务发展逐年增长，客户满意度较高。
2. 存在问题：a)分支机构的运营成本较高，且存在资源分配不均衡的问题。
b)部分员工对业务了解不够全面，需要进一步提升专业知识和技能。
c)分支机构缺乏创新意识，需要提高创新能力，推出更多具有竞争力的产品和服务。
3. 建议和对策：a)优化资源配置，降低运营成本。
b)开展培训和继续教育，提升员工的专业素质。
c)注重创新，加强研发和推出有市场需求的新产品。
四、总结本次调研结果显示，分支机构运营状况良好，但仍存在一些问题和挑战。
我们将根据调研结果提出的建议和对策，进一步完善分支机构的运营模式和业务流程，提高工作效率和竞争力。
以上是本次分支机构调研报告的主要内容，请您审阅。
如有需要，我将进一步提供详细数据和分析报告。
特此报告。
XXX日期：XXXX年XX月XX日。
浑水对分众传媒的调研报告
Note: You should assume we have a short position in FMCN as of this report – prior to reading this reportsee important disclaimer on the last page (page 9).FMCN: Reiterating Strong SellMuddy Waters, LLCFebruary 9, 2012 Muddy Waters was Right about FMCN’s LCD Network Overstatement;Independent Verification Counted Cardboard Posters Instead of LCDsWeak Attempt at Jedi Mind Trick ExposedIn our November 21, 2011 report on FMCN, we accused management of fraudulently overstating the size of its LCD Network. FMCN had previously defined the LCD Network as a “network of flat-panel television displays.” FMCN first vehemently denied our charges that it overstated the LCD Network size, and then independently “verified” that its previously reported number of 185,174 LCD Network displays was correct. However, over 30,500 of those “verified” displays are not LCD televisions at all – rather, they are mere cardboard posters. Not only does this mean that FMCN management was brazenly lying to investors in the wake of our report, but the lies sharply call into question the veracity of FMCN’s reported financials. We estimate that each LCD television generates monthly revenue seven times that of a cardboard poster. Separately, on November 29, 2011 we pointed out that FMCN had previously grossly lied about the size of its movie theater advertising network. FMCN’s recent attempt to explain away that lie is almost as ridiculous as its conflation of cardboard with LCDs. The implication for investors is that if the inputs to the financials (network sizes) are lies, then why wouldn’t the outputs (revenue and profit) also be lies? As the old saying goes, “garbage in, garbage out.”Muddy Waters was Right All AlongIndependent “verification” proves Muddy Waters was correct when we concluded FMCN lied about the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network. In order for FMCN to meet its disclosed numbers, it had to include approximately 30,500 cardboard posters in its LCD display network count. In other words, per FMCN’s own verified data, over 15% of FMCN’s LCD network consists not of LCDs – but of cardboard.FMCN’s prior disclosures on its network make no allowance for cardboard displays. FMCN wrote the following in its 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 20-Fs:“Our L CD d isplay n etwork, w hich r efers t o o ur n etwork o f f lat-‐paneltelevision d isplays p laced…”11 2010 20-F pp. 38-9, 2009 20-F p. 36, 2008 20-F p. 35, 2007 20-F p.33.FMCN has made it unambiguous that “LCD” means Liquid Crystal – not Light Cardboard – Display. At least that was the case before Muddy Waters exposed FMCN’s fraud.(Based on strong evidence Muddy Waters still believes FMCN separately double counted another 32,500 Digital 2.0 displays from the poster frame segment as “LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens” under the LCD Network segment in order to get to its “verified” number.)We reiterate. In order to rebut Muddy Waters’s conclusion that FMCN overstated the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network, FMCN had to include 30,500 of the cardboard objects shown in the below picture (from FMCN’s website):Therefore, even putting aside the issue of whether FMCN double-counted some (actual) LCDs, FMCN overstated the size of its LCD Commercial Display Network. Muddy Waters was correct from the beginning.FMCN attempted to pull a Jedi mind trick by referring to the roughly 30,500 cardboard posters as “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices.” It strikes us that only a management with a significant degree of contempt for its shareholders would attempt to pass off a piece of cardboard as an LCD television. However, this is the same management that: •told investors its movie theater network was 17.6x the number of movie theatersin existence in China. (We discuss management’s almost-as-ridiculousjustification for this lie infra.)•traded in and out of Allyes, causing substantial losses to shareholders while generating tens of millions in profit for insiders and their friends (explaining that such insider gains were necessary to incentivize management, including soon-to-join members).• claimed to have acquired six SMS advertising companies that it in fact did not.2•Took Olympus style acquisition write downs of $1.1 billion on $1.6 billion in acquisitions.FMCN’s management either believes that investors are stupid, or that its Jedi powers are overwhelming.Muddy Waters was 100% correct that FMCN deliberately overstated the size of its LCD network. In FMCN’s responses to our reports, FMCN management has purposely deceived shareholders and analysts by including cardboard posters in the LCD count. We intend to bring this outrage to the attention of the SEC, but in the meantime we suggest FMCN now describe this network in its filings and communications as the “LCD and Cardboard Display Network.”Hidden in Plain Sight – How FMCN Used Cardboard Posters to Make its LCD NumberRemember when we asked whether independent verification in China is better than toilet paper?3 FMCN has provided its own resounding response of “NO!”On January 6th, 2012 FMCN announced that Ipsos Marketing Company completed a full count of FMCN’s LCD display network, and that FMCN currently has 185,174 displays in the network.4The problem is that 30,542 of these LCD displays aren’t LCDs at all – they’re just simple cardboard posters. FMCN ludicrously labeled these posters “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices” in five of its responses to our first report.5 In addition to cardboard having no meaningful characteristics in common with an LCD,6 a cardboard poster can hardly be called a “device.”2 FMCN claimed to have acquired parties to VIE agreements with these handset advertisers, but for numerous reasons outlined in our November 21st report, this explanation does not hold water.3 MW December 9, 2011 report reiterating Strong Sell on FMCN.4 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1645519&highlight=5 2011: November 22 & 29, December 14 & 22; January 6, 2012.6 It’s arguably noteworthy that both contain carbon atoms.“When I use a word’” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather ascornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean –neither more nor less.”7On January 6, 2012, FMCN filed the 2nd amendment to its 2010 20-F. In the amendment, FMCN discusses the inclusion of the “LCD 1.0 picture frame devices” in its LCD network size count. FMCN then tells us in the amended 20-F that these are really just cardboard posters. There are numerous references to this surprising fact throughout the filing, but the most telling is:Advertisements on our poster frame network and LCD 1.0 picture frame deviceson our LCD display network consist of full-color glossy advertising postersdesigned and provided by our advertising clients.8Note that in the above disclosure, FMCN is stating that the “LCD display network” contains cardboard posters. In other words, FMCN has valmorphanized9 cardboard into LCD. Who does that???!!!FMCN’s excuse for why it gets to call cardboard by the name “LCD” is similarly laughable. FMCN claims it used the cardboard posters instead of LCDs in these 30,500 locations because adequate power to run LCD televisions was unavailable.10 (Interestingly this problem only occurs in the well-developed Tier 2 cities of Tianjin,7 Humpty Dumpty quote and illustration from Carroll, Lewis Through the Looking Glass (1872).8 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 46.9 /define.php?term=valmorification10 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 42, and see FMCN November 29, 2011 press releaseKunming, and Shijiazhuang,11 which have a combined population of 29.4 million12) Because these posters were installed by the LCD division, which really, really wanted to put TVs in there but (goshdarnit!) wasn’t able to, FMCN think it’s justifiable to label the posters “LCD 1.0” “devices” and include them in the LCD network count.FMCN missed its opportunity to make clear that it had cardboard posters in its LCD count prior to:•calling Muddy Waters’s conclusion that FMCN overstates its LCD Network size “unfounded”,13•spending shareholder money on two “verifications” of its LCD network size when management knew that at least 30,500 of the “LCDs” were really cardboard, and thus contradicted FMCN’s own well-established definition of “LCD”, and •threatening to sue Muddy Waters.14Putting the above behavior aside, FMCN’s purported reason for installing cardboard posters instead of LCD TVs (lack of adequate power) is obviously yet another lie.A 17-inch LCD consumes peak power of approximately 20 watts.15 A typical elevator will draw upward of 50,000 watts during operation.16 (20 watts is 0.04% of 50,000 watts.) Moreover, even a tiny elevator (5’ x 5’) would require a 40-watt light bulb to light its interior.17How on God’s great earth could FMCN not find adequate power for an LCD television in either the elevator or elevator lobby? Are these posters in mine shafts?It is unreasonable to believe that FMCN’s LCD division, with its expertise honed from installing and maintaining over 100,000 real LCDs, could not find power sources for 30,500 LCDs in three Tier 2 cities. The real reason FMCN counted 30,500 cardboard posters in the LCD network is that Muddy Waters caught the company with its pants down, and management is now trying to lie its way out of trouble.So yes, when an independent report (supposedly) verifying the size of a flat-panel television network includes over 30,500 cardboard posters in its count, the report’s contents are as valueless as non-commercial excrement. Excrement, along with a study concluding FMCN didn’t overstate its network size, is better contained in soft colorless toilet paper.11 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1634311&highlight=12 13 /phoenix.zhtml?c=190067&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1632858&highlight=14 See FMCN’s January 6th and 9th press releases explaining that its acquisition of a ginseng farm was nothing more than a (dodgy) tax shelter.15 /en_US/product-and-parts/detail.page?&LegacyDocID=MIGR-7193016 /downloads/10KTechGuide.pdf17 Assuming a lighting requirement of 15 lumens / sq. ft. (375 lumens), one would need a General Electric A15 incandescent 40-watt light bulb, which produces 415 lumens.We believe that the post-MW report conflation of cardboard with LCD amounts to securities fraud and a violation of GAAP segment reporting principles (carried over from SFAS 131) – we see no Humpty Dumpty defense available under 10(b)-5. In any event, those points are for Deloitte, the SEC, and courts hearing investor class actions to ultimately decide.Movie Theater Count – A Coverup Almost as RidiculousOn November 29, 2011, we showed that FMCN in 2007 and 2008 20-F filings claimed to have 27,164 movie theaters in its network when the potential size of the market (per government statistics) was only 1,545 theaters. In other words, FMCN claimed to have market share of 1,758.2%.Here is how FMCN worded (emphasis added) its obviously false movie theater count disclosure in 2008:The cost of revenue for our movie theater and traditional outdoor billboardnetwork increased 101% from $28.5 million in 2007 to $57.3 million in 2008. The increase is primarily attributable to:…3) increased leasing costs associated withtime we rent on movie theater screens as a result of an increase in the number oftheaters we lease in our network from 10,930 in 2007 to 27,164 in 2008. Following our exposure of this lie, here is management’s tortured attempt to explain it away:Prior to 2009, we calculated the size of its movie theater network by calculatingthe number of screens on which each of its advertisers had purchased advertising and then summing the screen count for each advertiser to produce an aggregatenumber of screens. 18Per this revisionist definition, management wants investors to believe that FMCN previously defined “theater” as Σ(customers x screens purchased).19 Oh but there would be so many questions unanswered if this were true! For instance, would there be a new “theater” each time a customer re-purchased time on the same screen; or, is each “theater” all customer-buys on that screen, and if so, over what period?Management offered this explanation because they twice assumed investors are stupid – first when FMCN claimed to have 27,164 theaters, and then when management thought it could redefine the plain English meaning of “theater.” Chairman Jiang, investors aren’t that stupid – if you occasionally took some buy-side investors’ questions on the earnings worship calls, you’d probably know that.2018 2nd Amended 2010 20-F, filed January 20, 2012, p. 43.19 We’re not 100% sure we understand how FMCN purports to have calculated “theaters” – trying to figure the equation out is a bit like trying to determine the GPS coordinates for Narnia.20 As we pointed out on p. 18 of our November 21, 2011 report, FMCN has not taken any buy-side questions since its Q1 2007 call.What These Lies Mean for Investors’ MoneySince our initial report, we’ve heard some investors and analysts downplay the significance of these lies,21 and instead dissemble by focusing on the great numbers FMCN is reporting. However, because the lies about the number of LCD televisions and movie theaters in the network were used to support growth in reported revenues and profits, one has to wonder whether reported numbers are real. This is particularly true because we estimate that the average LCD television generates monthly revenue seven times that of a cardboard poster. Why would FMCN lie about the inputs to the numbers without also lying about the outputs?Our concern about whether FMCN’s core business numbers are accurate is most acute because FMCN’s LCD and cardboard display network business is opaque in the two areas that matter most – advertisement ASPs and location lease costs.FMCN’s LCD and cardboard display network business model is highly opaque on the revenue side. FMCN’s rate card is irrelevant to the revenues that FMCN generates because most customers receive a substantial discount from the rate card. The problem is that it is impossible to independently determine the discount levels.In the course of our research, we determined that the minimum discount offered to customers for Tier 1 advertisements is approximately 65% off the rate card. We believe that there are customers that receive Tier 1 ad discounts of more than 90% off the rate card. Further, we found that the discounts on Tier 2 ads are greater than those of Tier 1. We also found that most Tier 3 and 4 ads are usually free.There is no way to independently determine the weighted average discount by tier. It is therefore impossible to independently determine FMCN’s ASP. You have to take management at its word. We don’t.The screen location lease costs vary widely, and it is impossible to independently verify FMCN’s reporting of these numbers. In our research of location costs in Shanghai Class A office buildings, we found that FMCN pays anywhere from approximately $50 (RMB 300) per screen per month to $1,500 (RMB 10,000) per screen per month. Presumably the screens in residential buildings cost less, but we found it difficult to develop a reliable blended estimate. Because screen location lease costs can vary by orders of magnitude between similar locations, they cannot be independently verified. Thus, you have to take management at its word. Again, we don’t.21 We heard one second hand account of a conversation between an investor and an analyst with a major bank. We were told that during the conversation, the analyst claimed to have previously noted that the theater count was implausible, yet the analyst never became concerned about FMCN as a result.This management has demonstrated time and again that it should not be taken at its word. Further, the over the top nature of these lies paints the picture of a management who views its investors and analysts as gullible and worthy of contempt. We believe that the opacity of FMCN’s business model offers far too great of an opportunity for this management, with its demonstrated track record of lying and self-dealing, to play games with the numbers.AcknowledgementWhile we were satisfied that FMCN was double-counting the LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens to make its reported LCD network screen count, we had not caught FMCN’s admission that it needed to count over 30,500 cardboard posters in order to make its number. (The key information was largely buried in the recently filed 2nd amendment to FMCN’s 2010 20-F.)The credit for this observation belongs to published author and Seeking Alpha contributor Matt Berry. (Interestingly, Mr. Berry’s book is a guide to righteous behavior. We have expressed a copy of Mr. Berry’s book to Chairman Jiang.)22In an article published on February 6th, Mr. Berry called FMCN out on the LCD screens and the ridiculous explanation the company offered for its movie theater lie. We were impressed by both Mr. Berry’s analysis and use of sarcasm – particularly in equating FMCN’s conflation of cardboard and LCDs to conflating Ferraris and bicycles. Mr. Berry, our hat is off to you.WARNING: A printout of this Report is not a CRT Display22 Mr. Berry authored The Mechanics of Virtue: A Cynic’s Guide to Righteous Behavior, CreateSpace (Dec. 2009).DisclaimerUse of Muddy Waters LLC’s research is at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. 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分众策略包装分析报告
分众策略包装分析报告一、引言分众策略包装是企业营销中的重要环节之一。
通过精心设计和包装自己的产品或服务，企业能够有效地吸引目标客户群体，并增加销售量。
本报告旨在通过分析分众策略包装在企业营销中的作用、相关市场趋势和最佳实践，为企业制定以分众策略包装为核心的营销策略提供指导。
二、分众策略包装的作用1. 吸引目标客户群体：企业根据目标客户特征设计与之相符的包装，能够吸引目标客户的注意力，并创造品牌认知。
2. 增加产品的辨识度：通过独特的包装设计和与品牌形象一致的视觉元素，产品能够在竞争激烈的市场中脱颖而出，提升辨识度。
3. 传递品牌信息：包装是品牌的有力代言人，通过巧妙地融入品牌的元素和信息，可以让消费者更好地了解品牌的特点和价值观。
三、分众策略包装的市场趋势1. 个性化包装设计：消费者对个性化产品越来越追求，个性化包装设计能够满足他们的需求，并与目标客户群体产生共鸣。
2. 可持续包装材料：环保意识的增强使得消费者对环保包装材料的需求不断提高，采用可持续材料的包装设计能够塑造企业良好的形象。
3. 数字化包装体验：随着科技的不断发展，数字化包装体验正在成为一种趋势。
例如，利用增强现实技术为包装设计增加交互性和趣味性，提升消费者的体验感。
四、最佳分众策略包装实践1. 深入了解目标客户群体：通过市场调研和消费者洞察，了解目标客户的喜好、需求和购买习惯，以便根据其特征进行包装设计。
2. 激发情感共鸣：通过包装设计传递情感和故事，与目标客户产生情感共鸣，从而建立更强的品牌认知和忠诚度。
3. 突出产品的独特卖点：包装设计应凸显产品的独特卖点，突出与竞争对手的区别，以吸引消费者的关注。
4. 注重可持续发展：采用环保材料和包装设计，符合可持续发展理念，能够树立企业的社会责任形象。
五、结论分众策略包装在企业营销中发挥着重要的作用。
通过深入了解目标客户群体、抓住市场趋势和采用最佳实践，企业能够打造具有辨识度和品牌价值的包装设计，提升品牌认知度和销售量。
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-分众传媒创业投资管理调查报告指导老师：汤临佳组长：吴文意组员：陈慧超沈璐丹刘惠标傅成风小组分工目录一、“分众传媒”简介 (3)二、面临问题与解决方法 (3)三、创业成功因素 (4)四、市场规模 ........................................................................... .. (5)五、商业模式 ........................................................................... .. (6)六、swot分析法 ........................................................................... (7)七、我们的收获与感想 (9)一、“分众传媒”简介分众传媒（focus media），中国领先的数字化媒体集团，创建于2003年，产品线覆盖商业楼宇视频媒体、卖场终端视频媒体、公寓电梯媒体（框架媒介）、户外大型led彩屏媒体、电影院线广告媒体等多个针对特征受众、并可以相互有机整合的媒体网络。
分众传媒覆盖了中国超过3亿的都市主流群体，以独创的商业模式、媒体传播的分众性、生动性赢得了业界的高度认同。
2005年7月分众传媒成功登陆美国纳斯达克，成为海外上市的中国纯广告传媒第一股，并以1.72亿美元的募资额创造了当时的ipo纪录。
2007年12月24日，分众传媒正式被计入纳斯达克100指数，成为第一个被计入纳斯达克100指数的中国广告传媒股。
分众传媒的成立仅源于电梯边的一张张贴，ceo江南春便锁定上海最顶级的50栋商业楼宇安装液晶显示屏。
从此，分众传媒在某种意义上颠覆了人们传统的媒体观，成为中国传媒业和广告业的一匹黑马，在仅仅的3年里，分众传媒便在斯达克成功上市。
二、面临问题与解决方法2.1、资金问题在创业的过程中，分众传媒很快就碰到知名的瓶颈，那就是资金问题。
到2003年5月份的时候，分众传媒控制的中高档写字楼已经扩大到100多栋，急需大量的后续资金。
在发展过程中，分众成功地摸索出了自己的资本战略思想和方法模式，构建出适应于自身的资本战略结构，使其在新媒体这个没有硝烟的战场中处于不败之地。
具体而言就是，分众的资本战略不用脆弱而“ 原始” 的“ 券商一银行一信托”金融链条筹集周转现金，因而也不受国内整顿金融秩序的影响，而是积极利用风险投资，获得了软银、高盛、鼎辉等的风险投资，成功融资。
2.2、产品吸引力不足如何能吸引消费者的注意力，使自己的广告信息突破混杂的广告环境成为广告主在制定媒体投放策略时需要考虑的重要问题。
而与传统媒体的广泛覆盖率相比，分众以高科技为依托，在形式和内容上都对碎片化的消费者生活和消费形态迎合，具有很强的针对性，有助于广告主广告信息在混杂的广告环境中脱颖而出。
2.3、如何凭借其偏低的投资成本，获得广告主青睐。
现在，广告主的广告投入已由粗放型向集约型转变，他们愿意选择性价比较高的媒体进行广告投放。
相对于传统媒体，分众广告成本较为低廉，这使得广告主愿意进行广告投放尝试。
2.4、发展中的兼顾不暇问题分众成长初期的实力决定其不可能在广告市场面面俱到，而江南春创业的新模式更是将分众的发展“ 局限” 在某一细分的市场。
于是，分众创造的楼宇电视把目光瞄准了传统媒体所不能充分覆盖的中高收入人群，把自己定位于面向中高收入人群的新媒体。
其核心理念就是面向一个特定的有清晰特征的群体，而这个群体恰恰是某些商品与品牌的消费主力或重度消费群。
三、创业成功因素3.1、广告创业市场的逐渐成熟2003年5月，江南春注册成立分众传媒控股有限公司，并出任首席执行官。
这一年，也是中国广告业又一个高速发展的年头。
2003年底，广告公司达到6．64万户，比上年底增加0．89万户，增长15．67％，占广告经营单位总数的65．19％；从业人员达到59．26万人，增加8．50万人，增长16．76％，占总人数的68．01％；营业额达到444．84亿元，增加49．19亿元，增长12．43％。
在所有被统计的行业中，广告投放均有明显增长。
其中，房地产广告投放又创新高，达到159.15亿元，其增长幅度达到56.97%，药品、酒类、烟草、服饰广告的发展也十分突显。
随着城乡居民收入的可支配收入的增长，这些方面的消费还会快速增长，从而进一步拉动经济发展。
可以预见，今后几年，广告的投放仍会保持快速增长。
广告投放连年增加，要求广告业的服务不断扩大规模，提高水平。
广告媒介为了广告营业额的最大化，也改变观念，积极寻求并欢迎广告代理。
有些广告主为了便于操控，也愿意寻求单一的代理公司。
这种情况造成广告专业服务需求不断增长，吸引着更多的人投身广告业。
一些业务熟练，与客户关系密切的业务人员，也纷纷另起炉灶，求得更大发展。
这些都促使广告公司及其从业人员不断增加，业务不断发展。
3.2、把握住广告业的主流发展趋势广告主对媒介的选择呈现多元化态势，户外媒体成为新宠，2002年从广告额的投放来看，服务性行业对于户外广告比较偏重。
一些国有大型服务性机构是投放户外广告最多的广告主，如电信运营商、金融机构等，他们分布在各地的分公司是各地户外广告的主要投放对象；另外，由于本地广告主在服务提供上的地域限制，户外广告自然成为其吸引当地居民的首选媒介。
3.3、创新性产品及开发计划◆媒体定位：1.精确锁定中高收入群体出入场所，重度覆盖20-50岁间核心消费人群，准确传播品牌咨询。
2.精确锁定人流量高密集度场所，填补有效媒体空缺，影响消费主要决策者，唤醒受众的消费需求，有效引导消费者的购买方向。
3.使客户的媒体推广投资更加精准、有效，避免浪费在无效人群。
◆媒体开发主要位置：电梯内或电梯等候厅内，每天滚动播放60次◆硬件设施：在电梯口采用17英寸液晶电脑，在较大空间内采用42英寸pdp◆后续开发的产品与服务有：商务楼宇联播网、卖场终端联播网、公寓电梯联播网（框架）、商旅人士联播网、城市彩屏联播网、银幕巨阵影院广告四、市场规模中国最大的品牌信息综合传播平台，中国最大的数字媒体集团，成功将品牌及商业理念推广至40余个国家和地区，2010年营业额约80亿人民币，仅次于央视的中国第二大媒体集团。
覆盖全国110余城市98000余栋媒体资源。
分众传媒创业已将近五年，现在，它控制着全国十大城市100座顶级商务楼宇的94％，楼宇联播网覆盖全国75个城市的近40000个网点，液晶屏数量将超过85000块，每天所覆盖的消费者数量在4000万至4500万之间。
篇二：调研报告正文目录1.1 调查目的 ........................................................................... (1)1.2 调查成员 ........................................................................... (2)1.3 调查时间安排及分工 (2)24.调研方法 ........................................................................................................3 调研发现 .................................................................... (3)4.1.校园传媒具有发展潜力，前景良好 (3)4.2.在校大学生对校园传媒的认可度高 (4)4.3.在校大学生在生活中一定程度上受到校园传媒的影响 (5)4.4.校园传媒存在的一些问题 (6)45 局限性 ........................................................................... .................................6 结论与建议 ........................................................................... . (6)5.1 清晰市场定位,明确发展方向 (6)5.2 形成专业团队和管理机制 (6)5.3 在内容和形式上不断创新 (7)5.4 注重沟通与互动 ........................................................................... (7)1.执行摘要1.1.调查目的大学生消费市场在市场规模上、购买力等方面对适销对路的产品有着极大的吸引力，同时大学生在消费方面也表现着很好的品牌认知度、品牌传播力和品牌忠诚度。
一些精明的商家也认识到高校市场的重要性，开始进行大型校园商业活动的运作。
但是学校作为一个特殊的社会空间，其特定的教学要求和行政性的管理模式对商业推广起到了极大的阻碍。
不论是募集直销或促销员，还是到校方做系列公关活动以获取资源，程序繁琐且不说，其被动性是不言而喻的。
另一方面有的商家虽然在各高校进行大型活动，但是由于宣传方法、途径的问题而得不到充分的回报，校园的各类传播渠道多为零散民间组织，难以形成一个完整的传播体系。
通常商业的推广行为进入校园，往往面临着投入巨大却仍到达率低下、效果不佳的尴尬境遇。
校园市场存在已久，但是正规的广告公司由于不熟悉校园市场，很难切中学生群体的消费要点。
专业的校园传媒公司的出现，是企业加大校园市场投入催生出来的结果。
目前没有一家公司能够占据领导地位，全部都限于当地的业务开展，校园营销领域正处在“圈地运动”时期，有着巨大的发展空间。
正是看中了这个市场空当，我们的团队决定做一个专业的校园文化传媒，致力于打造企业和校园的完全沟通平台，根据客户需求及市场调查分析及区域划分，为客户提供个性的校园渠道服务方案。
本次问卷调查主要是为了了解校园媒体的常见形式和发展现状、在校大学生对校园媒体的态度及认可情况、以及校园媒体的优势和不足之处。
以便为后期决策提供数据支撑。
1.2.调查成员本次调查由河南工业大学管理学院市场营销专业08级谢瑞明、孙红磊、王静、左胜兰共同完成。
1.3.调查时间安排及分工2.调研方法本次调查主要采取随机抽样调查，运用发放调查问卷和人员访谈的方式，发放问卷80份，回收有效问卷70份。
3.调研发现3.1.校园传媒具有发展潜力，前景良好就调查分析来看，21世纪是物质生活和精神生活丰富多彩的时代，这个时代的大学生们已经不再满足于宿舍、教师、图书馆这三点一线的单调生活。