破窗理论英文版
人类心里的神奇效应
破窗效应破窗效应(Break Pane Law)所谓“破窗效应”，是关于环境对人们心理造成暗示性或诱导性影响的一种认识。
“破窗效应”理论是指：如果有人打坏了一幢建筑物的窗户玻璃，而这扇窗户又得不到及时的维修，别人就可能受到某些暗示性的纵容去打烂更多的窗户。
发现问题就要及时矫正和补救。
美国斯坦福大学心理学家菲利普·辛巴杜(Philip Zimbardo)于1969年进行了一项实验，他找来两辆一模一样的汽车，把其中的一辆停在加州帕洛阿尔托的中产阶级社区，而另一辆停在相对杂乱的纽约布朗克斯区。
停在布朗克斯的那辆，他把车牌摘掉，把顶棚打开，结果当天就被偷走了。
而放在帕洛阿尔托的那一辆，一个星期也无人理睬。
后来，辛巴杜用锤子把那辆车的玻璃敲了个大洞。
结果呢，仅仅过了几个小时，它就不见了。
以这项实验为基础，政治学家威尔逊和犯罪学家凯琳提出了一个“破窗效应”理论，认为：如果有人打坏窗户玻璃，而又得不到及时的维修，别人就可能去打烂更多的窗户。
久而久之，这些破窗户就给人造成一种无序的感觉。
结果在这种公众麻木不仁的氛围中，犯罪就会滋生、繁荣。
刻板效应所谓刻板效应，又称刻板印象、社会定型，是指对某人或某一类人产生的一种比较固定的、类化的看法。
是还没有进行实质性的交往，就对某一类人产生了一种不易改变的、笼统而简单的评价，这是我们认识他人时经常出现的现象。
有些人总是习惯于把人进行机械的归类，把某个具体的人看作是某类人的典型代表，把对某类人的评价视为对某个人的评价，因而影响正确的判断。
刻板印象常常是一种偏见，人们不仅对接触过的人会产生刻板印象，还会根据一些不是十分真实的间接资料对未接触过的人产生刻板印象，例如：老年人是保守的，年轻人是爱冲动的；北方人是豪爽的，南方人是善于经商的等等。
刻板效应的表现多种多样。
比如，有的领导者认为爱挑毛病的人一定是“刺儿头”，沉默寡言的人一定城府很深；活泼好动的人一定办事毛糙，性格内向的人一定老实听话；青年人单纯幼稚、容易冲动，老年人经验丰富、保守、稳重。
4C营销理论——中英文单词
4C营销理论（The Marketing Theory of 4Cs）4R营销理论（The Marketing Theory of 4Rs）4P营销理论（The Marketing Theory of 4Ps）感性营销（Sensibility Marketing）利基营销（Niche Marketing）交叉营销（Cross Marketing）知识营销（Information Marketing）文化营销（Cultural Marketing）服务营销(Services Marketing)体验营销(Experience Marketing)定制营销(Customization Marketing)色彩营销（Color Marketing）绿色营销(Green Marketing)关系营销(Relationship Marketing)合作营销(The Co Marketing Solution)伙伴营销(Partnership Marketing)一对一营销(One-to-One Marketing)差异化营销(Difference Marketing)大市场营销（Big Marketing）个性化营销(Personalization Marketing)堡垒式营销（Focalization Marketing）数据库营销（Data base Marketing）服务分销策略（Services Distribution Strategy）服务促销策略（Services Sales Promotion Strategy）整合营销传播（Integrated Marketing Communications, IMC)水坝式经营（Dam Operation）战略营销联盟(Strategic Marketing Union)网络数据库营销（Internet Data base Marketing）“整时营销”与“晚盈利”（Profit by Timing Marketing and Lag Profit Marketing) 管理篇目标管理（Management by Objectives, MBO）标杆瞄准（Benchmarking)开明管理（Open Management）宽容管理（Allowance Management）危机管理（Crisis Management）标杆管理（Benchmarking Management）人格管理（Character Management）品牌管理（Brand Management）变革管理（Change Management）沟通管理（Communication Management）走动管理（Management by Walking Around，MBWA）价值管理（Value Management）钩稽管理（Innovation and Practice Management）能本管理(Capacity Core Management)绩效管理（Managing For Performance）赋权管理（Delegation Management）灵捷管理（Celerity Management）物流管理(Logistics Management/Physical Distribution ) (Physical Distribution为传统意义上的物流)知识管理（Knowledge Management）时间管理（Time-Management）互动管理（Interactive Management）T型管理(T Management)预算管理（Budget Management）末日管理（End Management）柔性管理(Soft Management)例外管理（Exception Management）K型管理(K Management)EVA管理(Economic Value Added, EVA)5S管理法（5S ：Seiri、Seiten、Seigo、Seiketsu、Shitsuke）零缺陷管理（Zero Defects）一分钟管理（One Minute Management）供应链管理（Supply Chain Management, SCM）客户关系管理（Customer Relationship Management，CRM）产品数据管理(Product Data Management, PDM)过程质量管理法（Process of Quality Management）管理驾驶舱（Cockpit of Management）OEC管理法(Over All Every Control and Clear)数字化管理(Digital Management)海豚式管理(Management as Porpoise)丰田式管理（Toyota- Management）跨文化管理（Span-Culture Management）蚂蚁式管理（Style of Ant Management）购销比价管理（Purchase by Grade Management）企业内容管理（Enterprise Content Management）企业健康管理（Health of Enterprise Management）薪酬外包管理（Salary Epibolic Management）戴明的质量管理(William Edwards Dem’s Quality Management)六西格玛管理法(Six Sigma)倒金字塔管理（Handstand Pyramidal Management）变形虫式管理(Amoeba Management)定律篇木桶定律（Cannikin Law）墨菲定律(Moffe's Law)羊群效应（Sheep-Flock Effect）帕金森定律（Parkinson's Law）华盛顿合作定律(Washington Company Law)手表定律（Watch Law）蘑菇定律（Mushroom Law）鲇鱼效应（Weever Effect）飞轮效应（Flywheel Effect）光环效应（Halo Effect）马太效应（Matthew Effect）蝴蝶效应（Butterfly Effect）多米诺效应（Domicile Effect）皮格马利翁效应（Pygmalion Effect）彼德原理(The Peter Principle)破窗理论（Break Pane Law）路径依赖（Path Dependence）奥卡姆剃刀（Occam's Razor）博弈论(Game Theory)定位法则（Orientation Law）80/20原理（80/20 Law）X理论-Y理论（Theory X- Theory Y）超Y理论（Exceed theory Y）综合篇7S模型（Principle of 7S）ABC分析法（ABC-Analysis）SWOT分析(SWOT Analysis)波士顿矩阵法（Boston Matrix Analysis）新7S原则(Principle of New 7S)PDCA循环（PDCA Cyc）平衡记分卡(Balanced Score Card)品管圈（Quality Control Circle，QCC）零库存（In-Time Inventory）顾客份额（Constituency Share）业务流程重组(Business Process Reengineer)动态薪酬（Dynamic Salary）管理审计（Managed Audit）管理层收购（Management Buy-out）逆向供应链(Reverse Supply Chain)宽带薪酬设计（Broad Band Salary Design）员工持股计划（Employee Stock Ownership Plan，ESOP）人力资源外包（Epiboly HR）360度绩效反馈(360-Degree Performance Feedback)人力资源价值链（Human Resource Value Chain）柯氏模式（Kirkpatrick Model）归因模型(Attribution Model)期望模型（Expectancy Model）五力模型(The Five-force Model)安东尼模型（Anthony Model）CS经营战略（Customer Satisfaction）532绩效考核模型（532 Performance Appraisal Model）101℃理论（101℃Theory）双因素激励理论（Dual Stimulant Theory）注意力经济（The Economy of Attention）灵捷竞争（Adroitly Compete）德尔菲法（Delphi Technique）执行力(Execution)领导力(Leadership)学习力（Learning Capacity）企业教练（Corporate Coach）首席知识官（Chief Knowledge Officer）第五级领导者（Fifth Rank Leader）智力资本（Intellect Capital）智能资本(Intellectual Capital)高情商团队（High EQ Team）学习型组织（Learning Organization）知识型企业（Knowledge Enterprise）高智商企业（Knowledge-Intensive Enterprise）灵捷组织（Adroitly Organization）虚拟企业（Virtual Enterprise，VE）4Cs营销理论(The Marketing Theory of 4Cs)随着市场竞争日趋激烈，媒介传播速度越来越快，4Ps理论越来越受到挑战。
0破窗效应
思考问题
破窗效应
破窗效应，是关于环境对人们心理造成暗 示性或诱导性影响的一种认识。指如果有 人打坏了一幢建筑物的窗户玻璃，而这扇 窗户又得不到及时的维修，别人就可能受 到某些暗示性的纵容去打烂更多的窗户。
破窗效应 - 效应表现
日常生活中也经常有这样的体会：桌上的财物，敞开的大 门，可能使本无贪念的人心生贪念；对于违反公司程序或 廉政规定的行为，有关组织没有进行严肃处理，没有引起 员工的重视，从而使类似行为再次甚至多次重复发生；对 于工作不讲求成本效益的行为，有关领导不以为然，使下 属员工的浪费行为得不到纠正，反而日趋严重等等。一间 房子如果窗户破了，没有人去修补，隔不久，其他的窗户 也会莫名其妙地被人打破；一面墙上如果出现一些涂鸦没 有清洗掉，很快墙上就布满了乱七八糟、不堪入目的东西。 而在一个很干净的地方，人们会很不好意思扔垃圾，但是 一旦地上有垃圾出现，人们就会毫不犹豫地随地乱扔垃圾， 丝毫不觉得羞愧。这就是“破窗效应”的表现。
破窗效应 - 简介
破窗效应（英语：Broken windows theory）是犯罪学的一 个理论，该理论由詹姆士· 威尔逊（James Q. Wilson）及乔 治· 凯林（George L. Kelling）提出，并刊于 《The Atlantic Monthly》1982年3月版的一篇题为 《Broken Windows》的文章。此理论认为环境中的不良现 象如果被放任存在，会诱使人们仿效，甚至变本加厉。 以一幢有少许破窗的建筑为例，如果那些窗不被修理好， 可能将会有破坏者破坏更多的窗户。最终他们甚至会闯入 建筑内，如果发现无人居住，也许就在那里定居或者纵火。 又或想像一条人行道有些许纸屑，不久后就会有更多垃圾， 最终人们会视若理所当然地将垃圾顺手丢弃在地上。因此 破窗理论强调着力打击罪行，以“零容忍”的态度面对罪 案。 [1]
破窗：Broken Windows, Broken Business
《破窗：Broken Windows,Broken Business》1982年面世的“破窗理论”，原文是“Broken window”。
望文生义，这个理论形容的是整栋建筑物里一扇破掉的玻璃窗。
从资料统计的角度来说，这实在是件微不足道的小事。
如果拿这一点来大做文章，在过去是要被别人嘲笑的，因为这实在有些小题大做，过于偏激和荒谬。
用这个标准去衡量一个伟大的企业，也好像有点吃不到葡萄就说葡萄酸的感觉。
然而破窗理论最简单的解释就是事情无论大小，凡事皆不可掉以轻心。
任何的小事都有可能让企业发生天翻地覆的变化，所以不应该放过任何一个看来无伤大雅的漏洞。
你的企业有麦当劳大吗？麦当劳也会出问题，而且问题的主因，同样是这本书所要讨论的——破窗。
《破窗：Broken Windows,Broken Business》一书的作者是迈克尔.莱文，他是美国最著名的媒体专家，共出版了17本着作。
他的作品也经常在《纽约时报》、《洛杉矶时报》、《时代周刊》等处发表，并在洛杉矶创办了莱文咨询事务所，同时也往来全美各高校及企业发表演说。
本书由Warner Business Books于2005年出版，简体中文版则由中信出版社于2006年9月出版。
“破窗理论”最早是由两个犯罪学家提出来的，目的是将他应用在刑事司法领域，希望人们多关注那些情节轻微的犯罪行为。
“破窗理论”认为一切的漏洞或错误先露的往往只是冰上一角，对破窗视若无睹只能助长负面因素的孕育和形成，日积月累后果则是你始料未及的。
“破窗理论”理论的大规模实践发生在12年后的纽约市，当时检察官出生的行政市长和检察局长充分利用“破窗理论”让人们的心态发生变化，形成对遵纪守法打击犯罪的重视和认知，成功的改善了纽约市的治安。
同样的对企业来说，无论市从事生产和经营活动，或提供各种服务得以生存的重要因素，再得到客户的认知。
而“破窗理论”强调的也就是这些常被忽略的认知力量。
顾客对企业形成认知的过程可长可短，但只需要一个小瑕疵，就足够可以破坏辛苦建立起来的任职。
心理学效应
破窗效应破窗效应(Break Pane Law)破窗效应：及时矫正和补救正在发生的问题。
破窗效应的由来美国斯坦福大学心理学家菲利普·辛巴杜(Philip Zimbardo)于1969年进行了一项实验，他找来两辆一模一样的汽车，把其中的一辆停在加州帕洛阿尔托的中产阶级社区，而另一辆停在相对杂乱的纽约布朗克斯区。
停在布朗克斯的那辆，他把车牌摘掉，把顶棚打开，结果当天就被偷走了。
而放在帕洛阿尔托的那一辆，一个星期也无人理睬。
后来，辛巴杜用锤子把那辆车的玻璃敲了个大洞。
结果呢，仅仅过了几个小时，它就不见了。
以这项实验为基础，政治学家威尔逊和犯罪学家凯琳提出了一个“破窗效应”理论，认为：如果有人打坏了一幢建筑物的窗户玻璃，而这扇窗户又得不到及时的维修，别人就可能受到某些暗示性的纵容去打烂更多的窗户。
久而久之，这些破窗户就给人造成一种无序的感觉。
结果在这种公众麻木不仁的氛围中，犯罪就会滋生、繁荣。
破窗效应的表现我们日常生活中也经常有这样的体会：桌上的财物，敞开的大门，可能使本无贪念的人心生贪念；对于违反公司程序或廉政规定的行为，有关组织没有进行严肃处理，没有引起员工的重视，从而使类似行为再次甚至多次重复发生；对于工作不讲求成本效益的行为，有关领导不以为然，使下属员工的浪费行为得不到纠正，反而日趋严重。
等等。
一间房子如果窗户破了，没有人去修补，隔不久，其他的窗户也会莫名其妙地被人打破；一面墙上如果出现一些涂鸦没有清洗掉，很快墙上就布满了乱七八糟、不堪入目的东西。
而在一个很干净的地方，人们会很不好意思扔垃圾，但是一旦地上有垃圾出现，人们就会毫不犹豫地随地乱扔垃圾，丝毫不觉得羞愧。
这就是“破窗效应”的表现。
制度化建设在企业管理中已经是老生常谈了。
但是，现实的情况往往是制度多，有效的执行少。
长此以往，企业的发展会很尴尬。
对公司员工中发生的“小奸小恶”行为，管理者要引起充分的重视，适当的时候要小题大做，这样才能防止有人效仿，积重难返。
破窗效应英语
破窗效应英语In the realm of sociology, the concept of "Broken Windows" represents a profound understanding of how minor signs of disorder in a community can lead to a larger breakdown of social norms and the decline of public welfare. The theory, coined by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in their 1982 article "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," posits that visible signs of neglect, such as broken windows, graffiti, and litter, send a subliminal message to community members that no one cares about the quality of their environment. This, in turn, encourages further acts of vandalism, crime, and general disrespect for public spaces.The theory suggests that when such signs of disrepair are promptly addressed and repaired, it sends a strong message to the community that their environment is valued and cared for. This, in turn, fosters a sense of community pride and responsibility, leading to a decrease in criminal activity and an overall improvement in the quality of life. The implications of the Broken Windows theory are far-reaching, extending beyond the realm of criminal behaviorto encompass areas such as education, workplace productivity, and even personal health. In the context of education, for instance, a disorganized classroom or school environment can contribute to a decrease in student engagement and academic performance. Similarly, in the workplace, a messy or disorganized office can lead to decreased productivity and a negative work culture.The theory also has implications for personal health and well-being. For instance, living in a neighborhood with visible signs of disrepair and neglect can contribute to feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, leading to increased stress levels and even mental health issues. Conversely, living in a clean, well-maintained environment can promote feelings of safety and security, leading to improved mental health and overall well-being.The Broken Windows theory reminds us that the smallest of actions can have a significant impact on the larger community. By taking ownership of our environments, whether it's our neighborhoods, workplaces, or personal spaces, we can send a powerful message that we value the quality of our lives and the lives of those around us. By addressingsmall signs of disrepair and neglect promptly, we canfoster a sense of community pride and responsibility that leads to a safer, more vibrant, and healthier society.**破窗效应的力量：环境无序对社区福祉的影响**在社会学领域，“破窗效应”这一概念深刻揭示了社区中微小失序现象如何导致社会规范的更大崩溃和公共福利的下降。
破窗理论
破窗理论：Break Pane Law
破窗理论：
在日常生活
一个房子如果窗户破了，没有人去修补，隔不久，其它的窗户也会莫名其妙地被人打破;一面墙，如果出现一些涂鸦没有被清洗掉，很快的，墙上就布满了乱七八糟、不堪入目的东西;一个很干净的地方，人们不好意思丢垃圾，但是一旦地上有垃圾出现之后，人就会毫不犹疑地抛，丝毫不觉羞愧。
破窗理论1
也称“破窗谬论”，源于一个叫黑兹利特的学者在一本小册子中的一个譬喻（也有人认为这一理论是法国19世纪经济学家巴斯夏作为批评的靶子而总结出来的，见其著名文章《看得见的与看不见的》）。
这位黑兹利特说，假如小孩打破了窗户，必将导致破窗人更换玻璃，这样就会使安装玻璃的人和生产玻璃的人开工，从而推动社会就业。
在这里，学者是为了说明孩童的行为与政府的行为所能产生的后果，从而彻底地否定凯恩斯主义的政府干预政策。
“破窗理论”就是典型的“破坏创造财富”。
把这样的谬论放之于洪灾，放之于地震，放之于战争，好像都很合适。
破窗理论2
也叫破窗效应(Break Pane Law)
一扇窗户被打破，如果没有修复，将会导致更多的窗户
被打破，甚至整栋楼被拆毁。
由美国政治学家威尔逊和犯罪学家凯琳观察总结的“破窗理论”指出环境可以对一个人产生强烈的暗示性和诱导性。
破窗理论 broken windows_The police and neighborhood safety
The police and neighborhood safetyBROKEN WINDOWSby JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L.KELLINGJames Q. Wilson is Shattuck Professor of Government at Harvard and author ofThinking About Crime. George L. Kelling, formerly director of the evaluationfield staff of the Police foundation, is currently a research fellow at the John FKennedy School of Government Harvard.In the mid-1970s, the state of New Jersey announced a "Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program," designed to improve the quality of community life in twenty-eight cities. As part of that program, the state provided money to help cities take police officers out of their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. The governor and other state officials were enthusiastic about using foot patrol as a way of cutting crime, but many police chiefs were skeptical. Foot patrol, in their eyes, had been pretty much discredited. It reduced the mobility of the police, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and it weakened headquarters control over patrolOfficers.Many police officers also disliked foot patrol, but for different reasons: it was hard work, it kept them outside on cold, rainy nights, and it reduced their chances for making a “good pinch.” In some departments, assigning officers to foot patrol had been used as a form of punishment. And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates; it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.Five years after the program started, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D. C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone, that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars.These findings may be taken as evidence that the skeptics were right -- foot patrol has no effect on crime; it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.But how can a neighborhood be "safer" when the crime rate has not gone down -- in fact, may have gone up? Finding the answer requires first that we understand what most often frightens people in public places. Many citizens, of course, are primarily frightened by crime, especially crime involving a sudden, violent attack by a stranger. This risk is very real, in Newark as in many large cities. But we tend to overlook or forget another source of fear -- the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violentpeople, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people:panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.What foot-patrol officers did was to elevate, to the extent they could, the level of public order in theseneighborhoods. Though the neighborhoods were predominantly black and the foot patrolmen were mostlywhite, this "order-maintenance" function of the police was performed to the general satisfaction of bothparties.One of us (Kelling) spent many hours walking with Newark foot-patrol officers to see how they defined"order" and what they did to maintain it. One beat was typical: a busy but dilapidated area in the heart ofNewark, with many abandoned buildings, marginal shops (several of which prominently displayed knives and straight-edged razors in their windows), one large department store, and, most important, a trainstation and several major bus stops. Though the area was run-down, its streets were filled with people,because it was a major transportation center. The good order of this area was important not only to thosewho lived and worked there but also to many others, who had to move through it on their way home, tosupermarkets, or to factories,The people on the street were primarily black; the officer who walked the street was white. The people were made up of "regulars" and "strangers." Regulars included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer -- call him Kelly -- knew who the regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely understood rules. Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at the main intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to, bothering, or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a dispute erupted between a businessman and a customer, the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the customer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, Kelly would ask him if he had any means of support and what his business was; if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood might have different rules, but these, everybody understood, were the rules for this neighborhood. If someone violated them the regulars not only turned to Kelly for help but also ridiculed the violator. Sometimes what Kelly did could be described as "enforcing the law," but just as often it involved taking informal or extralegal steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order. Some of the things he did probably would not withstand a legal challenge.A determined skeptic might acknowledge that a skilled foot-patrol officer can maintain order but still insist that this sort of "order" has little to do with the real sources of community fear -- that is,with violent crime. To a degree, that is true. But two things must be borne in mind. First, outside observers should not assume that they know how much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neighborhoods stems from a fear of "real" crime and how much from a sense that the street is disorderly, a source of distasteful worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interviewers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that order.Second, at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in abuilding is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true innice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur o n a large scalebecause some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking morewindows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.)Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing thebroken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood upon a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in theBronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were afamily -- father, mother, and young son -- who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began -- windows were smashed, parts torn off,upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the 'vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people whoordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves law-abiding.Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx -- its anonymity, the frequency with which cars areabandoned and things are stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring" -- vandalism beginsmuch more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that privatepossessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhereonce communal barriers -- the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility -- are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares."We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.At this point it is not inevitable that serious crime will flourish or violent attacks on strangers will occur. But many residents will think that crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. "Don’t get involved." For some residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their "home" but "the place where they live." Their interests are elsewhere; they are cosmopolitans. But it will matter greatly to other people, whose lives derive meaning and satisfaction from local attachments rather than worldly involvement; for them, the neighborhood will cease to exist except for a few reliable friends whom they arrange to meet.Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark and the prostitutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps violently. That muggings will occur.Among those who often find it difficult to move away from this are the elderly. Surveys of citizenssuggest that the elderly are much less likely to be the victims of crime than younger persons, and some have inferred from this that the well-known fear of crime voiced by the elderly' an exaggeration: perhapswe ought not to design special programs to protect older persons; perhaps we should even try to talk themout of their mistaken fears. This argument misses the point. The prospect of a confrontation with anobstreperous teenager or a drunken panhandler can be as fear-inducing for defenseless persons as theprospect of meeting an actual robber; indeed, to a defenseless person, the two kinds of confrontation areoften indistinguishable. Moreover, the lower rate at which the elderly are victimized is a measure of thesteps they have already taken -- chiefly, staying behind locked doors -- to minimize the risks they face.Young men are more frequently attacked than older women, not because they are easier or more lucrative targets but because they are on the streets more.Nor is the connection between disorderliness and fear made only by the elderly. Susan Estrich, of the Harvard Law School, has recently gathered together a number of surveys on the sources of public fear. One, done in Portland, Oregon, indicated that three fourths of the adults interviewed cross to the other side of a street when they see a gang of teenagers; another survey, in Baltimore, discovered that nearly half would cross the street to avoid even a single strange youth. When an interviewer asked people in a housing project where the most dangerous spot was, they mentioned a place where young persons gathered to drink and play music, despite the fact that not a single crime had occurred there. In Boston public housing projects, the greatest fear was expressed by persons living in the buildings where disorderliness and incivility, not crime, were the greatest, Knowing this helps one understand the significance of such otherwise harmless displays, as subway graffiti. As Nathan Glazer has written, the proliferation of graffiti, even when not obscene, confronts the subway rider with the "inescapable knowledge that the environment he must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the mind suggests."In response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs, but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring; to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."The process we call urban decay has occurred for centuries in every city. But what is happening today is different in at least two important respects. First, in the period before, say, World War II, city dwellers --because of money costs, transportation difficulties, familial and church connections -- could rarely move away from neighborhood problems. When movement did occur, it tended to be along public-transit routes. Now mobility has become exceptionally easy for all but the poorest or those who are blocked by racial prejudice. Earlier crime waves had a kind of built-in self-correcting mechanism: the determination of a neighborhood or community to reassert control over its turf. Areas in Chicago, New York, and Boston would experience crime and gang wars, and then normalcy would return, as the families for whom no alternative residences were possible reclaimed their authority over the streets.Second, the police in this earlier period assisted in that reassertion of authority by acting, sometimes violently, on behalf of the community. Young toughs were roughed up, people were arrested "on suspicion" or for vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed. "Rights" were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the serious professional criminal, who avoided violence and could afford a lawyer.This pattern of policing was not an aberration or the result of occasional excess. From the earliest days ofthe nation, the police function was seen primarily as that of a night watchman: to maintain order againstthe chief threats to order -- fire, wild animals, and disreputable behavior. Solving crimes was viewed not as a police responsibility but as a private one. In the March, 1969, Atlantic, one of us (Wilson) wrote abrief account of how the police role had slowly changed from maintaining order to fighting crimes. Thechange began with the creation of private detectives (often ex-criminals), who worked on a contin-gency-fee basis for i n dividuals who had suffered losses. In time, the detectives were absorbed intomunicipal police agencies and paid a regular salary; simultaneously, the responsibility for prosecutingthieves was shifted from the aggrieved private citizen to the professional prosecutor. This process was notcomplete in most places until the twentieth centuryIn the 1960s, when urban riots were a major problem, social scientists began to explore carefully theorder-maintenance function of the police, and to suggest ways of improving it -- not to make streets safer(its original function) but to reduce the incidence of mass violence. Order-maintenance became, to adegree, coterminous with "community relations." But, as the crime wave that began in the early 1960scontinued without abatement throughout the decade and into the 1970s, attention shifted to the role of thepolice as crime-fighters. Studies of police behavior ceased, by and large, to be accounts of theorder-maintenance function and became, instead, efforts to propose and test ways whereby the police could solve more crimes, make more arrests, and gather better evidence. If these things could be done, social scientists assumed, citizens would be less fearful.A great deal was accomplished during this transition, as both police chiefs and outside experts emphasized the crime-fighting function in their plans, in the allocation of resources, and in deployment of personnel. The police may well have become better crime-fighters as a result. And doubtless they remained aware of their responsibility for order. But the link between order-maintenance and crime-prevention, so obvious to earlier generations, was forgotten.That link is similar to the process whereby one broken window becomes many. The citizen who fears the ill-smelling drunk, the rowdy teenager, or the importuning beggar is not merely expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization -- namely, that serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot-patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police-citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen. And he can never be certain what that will be -- a request for directions, a plea for help, an angry denunciation, a teasing remark, a confused babble, a threatening gesture.In a car, an officer is more likely to deal with street people by rolling down the window and looking at them. The door and the window exclude the approaching citizen; they are a barrier. Some officers take advantage of this barrier, perhaps unconsciously, by acting differently if in the car than they would onfoot. We have seen this countless times. The police car pulls up to a corner where teenagers are gathered.The window is rolled down. The officer stares at the youths. They stare back. The officer says to one,"C'mere." He saunters over, conveying to his friends by his elaborately casual style the idea that he is not intimidated by authority. "What's your name?" "Chuck." "Chuck who?" "Chuck Jones." "What'ya doing,Chuck?" "Nothin'." "Got a P.O. [parole officer?'' "Nah." "Sure?" "Yeah." "Stay out of' trouble, Chuckie."Meanwhile, the other boys laugh and exchange comments among themselves, probably at the officersexpense. The officer stares harder. He cannot be certain what is being said, nor can he join in and, bydisplaying his own skill at street banter prove that he cannot be "put down." In the process, the officer haslearned almost nothing, and the boys have decided the officer is an alien force who can safely bedisregarded even mocked.Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer. Such exchanges give them a sense ofimportance, provide them with the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what isworrying them (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense of having "done something" about theproblem). You approach a person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily than you do a personin a car. Moreover, you can more easily retain some anonymity if you draw an officer aside for a privatechat. Suppose you want to pass on a tip about who is stealing handbags, or who offered to sell you astolen TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean in the window is to convey a visible signal that you are a "fink."The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must accommodate them. And therein lies the problem.Should police activity on the street be shaped in important ways, by the standards of the neighborhood rather than by the rules of the state? Over the past two decades, the shift of police from order-maintenance to law-enforcement has brought them increasingly under the influence of legal restrictions, provoked by media complaints and enforced by court decisions and departmental orders. As a consequence, the order-maintenance functions of the police are now governed by rules developed to control police relations with suspected criminals This is, we think, an entirely new development. For centuries, the role of the police as watchmen was judged primarily not in terms of its compliance with appropriate procedures but rather in terms of its attaining a desired objective. The objective was order, an inherently ambiguous term but a condition that people in a given community recognized when they saw it. The means were the same as those the community itself would employ, if its members were sufficiently determined, courageous, and authoritative. Detecting and apprehending criminals, by contrast, was a means to an end, not an end in itself; a judicial determination of guilt or innocence was the hoped-for result of the law-enforcement mode. From the first, the police were expected to follow rules defining that process, though states differed in how stringent the rules should be. The criminal-apprehension process was always understood to involve individual rights, the violation of which was unacceptable because it meant that the violating officer would be acting as a judge and jury -- and that was not his job. Guilt or innocence was to be determined by universal standards under special procedures.Ordinarily, no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of neighborhood order. That is true not only because most cases are handled informally on the street but also because no universal standards are available to settle arguments over disorder, and thus a judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police officer. Until quite recently in many states, and even today in some places, the police make arrests on such charges as "suspicious person" or "vagrancy" or "public drunkenness" -- charges with scarcely any legal meaning. These charges exist not because society wants judges to punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an officer to have the legal tools to removeundesirable persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets havefailed.Once we begin to think of all aspects of police work as involving the application of universal rules underspecial procedures, we inevitably ask what constitutes an "undesirable person" and why we should"criminalize" vagrancy or drunkenness. A strong and commendable desire to see that people are treatedfairly makes us worry about allowing the police to rout persons who are undesirable by some vague orparochial standard. A growing and not-so-commendable utilitarianism leads us to doubt that any behaviorthat does not "hurt" another person should be made illegal. And thus many of us who watch over thepolice are reluctant to allow them to perform, in the only way they can, a function that everyneighborhood desperately wants them to perform.This wish to "decriminalize" disreputable behavior that "harms no one" -- and thus remove the ultimatesanction the police can employ to maintain neighborhood order -- is, we think, a mistake. Arresting asingle drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is.But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entirecommunity. A particular rule that seems to make sense in the individual case makes no sense when it ismade a universal rule and applied to all cases. It makes no sense because it fails to take into account the connection between one broken window left untended and a thousand broken windows. Of course,agencies other than the police could attend to the problems posed by drunks or the mentally ill, but inmost communities -- especially where the 'deinstitutionalization" movement has been strong -- they donot.The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes one person moreundesirable than another, but how do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question. We are not confident that there is a satisfactory answer, except to hope that by their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority That limit, roughly, is this --the police exist to help regulate behavior, not to maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood. Consider the case of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, one of the largest public-housing projects in the country. It is home for nearly 20,000 people, all black, and extends over ninety-two acres along South State Street. It was named after a distinguished black who had been, during the 1940s, chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority. Not long after it opened, in 1962, relations between project residents and the police deteriorated badly The citizens felt that the police were insensitive or brutal; the police, in turn, complained of unprovoked attacks on them. Some Chicago officers tell of times when they were afraid to enter the Homes. Crime rates soared.Today, the atmosphere has changed. Police-citizen relations have improved -- apparently, both sides learned something from the earlier experience. Recently, a boy stole a purse and ran off. Several young persons who saw the theft voluntarily passed along to the police information on the identity and residence of the thief, and they did this publicly, with friends and neighbors looking on. But problems persist, chief among them the presence of youth gangs that terrorize residents and recruit members in the project. The people expect the police to "do something" about this, and the police are determined to do just that.But do what? Though the police can obviously make arrests whenever a gang member breaks the law, a gang can form, recruit, and congregate without breaking the law. And only a tiny fraction of gang-related crimes can be solved by an arrest; thus, if an arrest is the only recourse for the police, the residents' fears。
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Broken Window Theory
破窗理论
●What’s the “Broken Window Theory”?
The “Broken Window Theory” is well known in the criminal justice world. Its basis is that the environment in which we live impacts our behavior. For example, people will feel more inclined to break the law in an area that is run down and dirty, hence the term “broken window.” Criminals feel less threatened and people seem to expect crime in this environment.在刑事司法的世界"破窗理论"是众所周知的。
它的基础是我们所生活的环境会影响我们的行为。
例如，违法盛行而又脏乱的地区人们会更倾向于违法，因此就有了破窗的概念。
犯罪分子感觉威胁少并且在这种环境中人们更倾向于犯罪。
The definition from the Wikipedia is described as follows:
The broken windows theory is a criminological theory of the norm setting and signaling effect of urban disorder and vandalism (故意毁坏东西的行为) on additional crime and anti-social behavior.
The theory states that monitorig and maintaining urban environments in a well-ordered condition may stop further vandalism as well as an escalation into more serious crime.
一个房子如果窗户破了，没有人去修补，隔不久，其它的窗户也会莫名其妙地被人打破；一面墙，如果出现一些涂鸦没有被清洗掉，很快的，墙上就布满了乱七八糟、不堪入目的东西；一个很干净的地方，人们不好意思丢垃圾，但是一旦地上有垃圾出现之后，人就会毫不犹疑地抛，丝毫不觉羞愧。
●For Examples
•Are you more or less likely to wear safety glasses when others around you aren’t wearing them? 当你周围的人都不戴安全眼镜时你是戴还是不戴呢?
•How about housekeeping? Does a dirty, messy jobsite impact how people work?
那么现场的清理和整洁呢？一个脏乱差的工作现场是否会影响人们的工作
呢？
•Do you tend to follow traffic when other cars are speeding? 当其它汽车超速行驶的时候你是否也要跃跃欲试呢？
●The origin
The theory was introduced in a 1982 article by social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. Since then it has been subject to great debate both within the social sciences and in the public debate. The theory has been used as a motivation for several reforms in criminal policy.
The broken windows theory has received support from several empirical studies. At the same time it has also been the subject of a large body of criticism.
Conclusion“破窗原理”的启示
Now think of a worksite where “little things” are neither addressed nor corrected. These little things add up and have a major impact on our –and our workers’ – decision-making.现在想一想工作现场，"小事情"既不解决也不纠正。
那么这些小事累加起来，就会对我们自己，我们的同伴以及我们的决策产生重大的影响。
Unfortunately, when we talk about the little things, we’re accused of “nitpicking.” After all, there are m uch bigger things to worry about. That’s always going to be true. But by gaining control over the little things, by proactively setting the stage – and the standard –for a safe workplace, we may actually have that much less to worry about in the long run.不幸的是，当我们谈论某些小事情，我们就被认为是"挑剔"。
毕竟，这里还有更多更大的事情值得我们担心。
这都是事实。
但是通过说服别人去控制这些小事情，通过前瞻性的策略以及标准来营造一个安全的工作环境，我们有理由相信会长治久安。