《薄煤层开采新技术》PPT课件
UBB公司薄煤层开采技术
UBB Report: A Failure of Basic Coal Mine Safety Practiceshe report to the Governor by the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel led by J.Davitt McAteer on the Upper BigBranch explosion is subtitled A Failure of Basic Coal Mine S afetyPractices . This investigation, one of several, is thorough, but not entirely exhaustive because there are still questions which remain, in part,because of the force of the explosion destroyed much of the evidence. Twenty-nine miners died and one was seriously injured as the enor-mously powerful blast rocketed through two and one-half miles of underground workings nearly 1,000feet beneath the surface of the rugged mountains along the Coal River. The disaster has grave conse-quences for a mining company, for a community, and, most importantly,for the family members who lost men dear to them.The blast was actually a series of explosions created as the com-pressed air on the leading edge of the force caused the coal dust to become airborne. In this way, the explosion generated its own fuel with the air and dust mixture behav-ing like a line of gunpowder carrying the blast forward in multiple direc-tions toward the outside of the mine,deeper into the tailgate and along the longwall face toward Headgate 22, Tailgate 22, and 9 North.The line of explosion raced out of the Tailgate and through Crossover 21. While the main force was con-centrated in the track entry, it also spread through the crosscuts to the left and right as it encountered fresh coal dust. Once it crossed the con-nector, it traveled down the longwall headgate to North, up the 6 North belt entry and 7 North belt and onto Headgate 22, where it reached its strongest levels. When the force reached the end of the entry onHeadgate 22, it reversed course and raced back out, obliterating every-thing in its path.In the chapter entitled Events Leading up to the Explosion , the low volume of air in the mine was described by several witnesses. The subject of questionable anemome-ter readings taken underground is documented. There were problems with significant water accumula-tions. Accurate air readings and water levels in those key ventilation entries would provide a valuable his-tory of conditions in a critical part of the mine in the days and weeks prior to the explosion.There was some confusion in the Command Center after the explo-sion to which an entire chapter of the report is given. In the Command Center at UBB, the report says that “many things did not work well.” For example, notetaking was spotty and as a result, Command Center offi-cials failed to create an adequate written record to indicate how events transpired. Interviews with officials indicated that the phone calls to the Command Center from underground either were not recorded or were recorded munication from the media and families of the missing miners fil-tered into the Command Center and decisions were influenced by these events. The suggestion was made to use a digital recorder for phone calls which had been used during emer-gency response drills, but this sug-gestion was rejected. S ome mine rescue protocols were not carried out.A whole chapter is devoted to coal dust and rock dust. The senior mem-ber of the two-man dust crew indi-cated that on nights when he was not pulled off his dusting duties to do other jobs, he drove a motor that pulled or pushed a big orange trackduster with two pods that held about a ton and a half of rock dust. Mines the size of UBB typically use track-mounted tank or pod dusters about the size of this one. From the effi-cient use of track duster at a mine the size of UBB would have required drilling a borehole midway in the mine and not far from the working sections to allow a speedy delivery of bulk rock dust to refill the tank dusters. There was no such borehole at UBB. The age and poorly main-tained conditions of the dusting equipment, coupled with the fact that UBB did not have an estab-lished rock dust crew that adhered to a schedule like that of a produc-tion crew, indicated that rock dust-ing was not a priority at Upper Big Branch in the early days of 2010.This was illustrated by the fact that between March-April pre-shift reports indicated that of the 561rock dustings requested, only 65dustings were subsequently noted,or 11.6 percent of the time it was requested. Tests conducted by MS HA after the disaster support miners testimony that the UBB mine was poorly dusted. An analysis of 1,803 dust samples taken after the explosion, MS HA found that 78.92percent were out of compliance withthe federal standard.Small methane ignitions did not have to turn into a major explosion if the mine operators adhered to basic safety measures, such as maintain-ing adequate ventilation systems,removing explosive coal dust from mining operations, spreading required amounts of rock dust, and ensuring that water sprays on mining equipment are kept in good repair and function properly. The forensic soot and dust sampling that took place at UBB indicated there simply was not enough rock dust applied.One of the surviving miners,S tanley S tewart, who had been heading underground at the time of the explosion, said as he emerged from the mine he could see air “still whooshing out…it was still strong.”S tewart estimated that the wind blew for at least two minutes. The footprint left behind in the Upper Big Branch mine and the testimony of survivors supports the theory that the explosion started with methane and fed on coal dust as it tore through the mine. The report says that both evidence in the mine and testimonial evidence suggest that Massey Energy’s management failed to properly ventilate UBB because they did not have adequate resources, knowledge, and/or capa-bility to develop a sound, workable ventilation plan to address the par-ticular circumstances of UBB. The ventilation system for a mine with a history of methane infusions, such as those experienced at Upper Big Branch, must be capable of remov-ing even a large gas inundation. The troubled ventilation system at UBB was incapable of providing suffi-cient air to sections and to the long-wall, and certainly was not robust enough to handle a massive influx of natural gas or methane.In addition, the company did notplace enough emphasis on rock dusting and maintenance of equip-ment, even full compliance with fed-eral and state rock dusting stan-dards may not have prevented the initial ignition on the tail of the long-wall. However, a well-dusted mine would have put the brakes on a propagating explosion and the death toll would have been signifi-cantly less.Furthermore, investigators exam-ining the shearer on the head and tail drums found numerous missing plugs and poorly maintained water sprays. These sprays, when working properly, are vital to safe longwall operation. Effective water sprays create a mist that extinguish sparks generated when the cutting bits on the shearer strike rock adjacent to the coal seam; dilute or douse methane ignitions created when sparks come in contact with explo-sive methane gas; knock down dust generated by the shearers cutting action; and keep parts of the long-wall machinery cool as it cuts through coal and rock. Of the 23sprays on the head drum visible to investigators, nine were plugged; of the 30 sprays on the Tail Drum visi-ble to investigators, seven were totally missing. S ome other sprays were found to have been rendered ineffective because, in an effort to unclog them, the nozzle openings had been widened. When investiga-tors tested the water sprays on the longwall, there was not enough water pressure on the tail drum to even produce a reading.UBB pumped water into the mine from the nearby Coal River and from the underground wells nearby.Modest efforts were made to design a new filter to screen out sediment,but like other maintenance tasks,the filters were neglected, and testi-mony with physical evidence indicat-TUBB ReportShearer Tailgate Cutting Drum Sandstone Top and Floor Heavinged that the screen and sock filters were frequently plugged so much that the sprays were clogged. If all the water sprays had been properly maintained and functioning, and if rock dust had been properly applied, any ignition of methane that occurred would likely have been extinguished at its source, says the report.An interesting chapter in thereport entitled The Massey Way describes the culture at Massey Energy. This chapter concludes,“This history of inadequate commit-ment to safety coupled with a win-dow dressing safety program and a practice of spinning information to Massey’s advantage works against the public statement put forth by the company that the April 5, 2010explosion was a tragedy that couldnot have been anticipated or pre-vented.”The report concludes that “ulti-mately, the responsibility for the explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine lies with the management of Massey Energy. The company broke faith with its workers by frequently and knowingly violating the law and blatantly disregarding mine safety practices while creating a publicperception. This operation unheed-ed industry safety standards. The story of Upper Big Branch is a cau-tionary tale of hubris. A company that was a towering presence in the Appalachian coalfields operated its mines in a profoundly reckless man-ner, and 29 coal miners paid with their lives for the corporate risk-tak-ing. The April 5, 2010 explosion was not something that happened out ofthe blue, an event that could not have been anticipated or prevented.It was, to the contrary, a completely predictable result for a company that ignored basic safety standards and put too much faith in its own mythology.”Editor’s Note:The photographs below were taken at UBB but are not part of this report.The Role of MSHA at UBBhe role of MSHA is not over-looked and a chapter is devot-ed to this. According to the report, “despite MSHA’s consider-able authority and resources, its col-lective knowledge and experience,the disaster at the Upper Big Branch mine is proof positive that the agency failed in its duty as the watch dog for coal miners.”The report draws attention to the fact that high-ranking MSHA offi-cials apparently were aware that the agency was falling short in its responsibilities. On March 25,2010, less than two weeks beforethe disaster, MSHA Chief Joe Main submitted a required report to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, which outlined wide-spread lapses in enforcement. An audit of 25 field offices during 2009conducted by MSHA’s Accountability Office found incom-plete inspections, failure to monitor mines liberating high amounts of methane, and inadequate supervi-sory actions. Auditors found that in 21 of the 25 field offices, supervi-sors failed to conduct in-depth reviews to make sure enforcement levels and actions were in accor-dance with the agency’s policies and procedures. In 20 field offices, the auditors found inadequate evalua-tion of the gravity and negligence of the health and safety violations issued against operators. In 15offices, auditors found that inspec-tors failed to adequately document findings so that enforcement actions would be able to withstand legal challenges.The Upper Big Branch mine was a gassy mine, liberating about 1 mil-lion cubic feet of methane per 24-hour period, and as a result was sub-ject to federal spot inspections.More significantly, the UBB mine had experienced at least three major methane-related events. The first occurred in January 1997, another in July 2003, and a third in February 2004. All took place in longwall mining sections. Witnesses, too,and investigators of the 1997 inci-dent included a number of individu-als who remain employed by MSHA,the West Virginia Office of Miners’Health Safety and Training, and Massey Energy. MSHA technical experts who investigated the 2003and 2003 outbursts indeed did rec-ommend special precautions, but officials at MSHA’s Mt. Hope District Office did not compel UBB manage-ment to implement those recom-mendations.The Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel found four fail-ures of MSHA. One, disregarding the documented risk of methane out-bursts at UBB. Two, overlooking the deadly potential of a precarious ven-tilation system. Three, neglecting to use its regulatory authority to force technological improvements to advance miners safety. Four, allow-ing the U.S. mine safety system to deteriorate.TThe State Responsibility at UBBhe West Virginia Office of Miners Health Safety and Training (WV OMHST) was also criticized in the report. Records indi-cate that, even with the limited staffing and resources, state mine inspectors spent a considerable amount of time at UBB. Inspectors were on site for at least 70 days in 2009 and for another 15 days in the three months preceding the April 5,2010 explosion. They wrote more than 330 violations and assessed $154,600 in penalties.One of the state inspectors with 16years of experience with the agency,and 35 years in the mining industry,had some strong opinions as to how the state might have been able to do a better job at UBB, says the report.“A couple of guys should be assigned to that mine,” he said. “It’s a very expensive mine, very large mine, just to be able to go in all directions at one time, every couple or three weeks or something. That’s my opinion.” The inspector was referring to the physi-cal area that had to be examined,rather than the coal production. He admitted that quarterly inspections were not always completed and appeared to have limited knowledge about UBB’s ventilation system. He also did not appear to have a great knowledge about MSHA’s action with regard to ventilation at UBB.The state official does not have dedicated ventilation specialist inspectors, and as the result, instead of offering an independent layer ofsafety for miners, West Virginia, like most other states, relies on MSHA to flag ventilation problems in mines,usually following the federal lead as to whether ventilation systems meet code.As for rock dusting, the state inspector said he did not write many cleaning and dusting violations, but during his last quarterly inspection,he wrote violations for cleaning and dusting on Four and Five Ellis belts,Four North Belts head areas, areas from the longwall switch to Headgate 22, and the Headgate 22 section belt.After the explosion, based on extensive tests, investigators deter-mined that inadequate rock dusting was a significant contributing factorto the size and intensity of the explo-sion. Unfortunately, the WV OMHST failed to recognize that the mine was not adequately rock dusted, in part,because inspectors relied on visual inspections. Perhaps inspectors rec-ognized the need for rock dusting, but did not grasp the severity of the prob-lem at UBB. More likely, the officials did not connect the dots so as to see the complete picture and recognize the overall heightened danger pre-sented by each independent viola-tion. The report concluded that state mine inspectors failed to recognize faulty ventilation and inadequate rock dusting because they lack suffi-cient training to develop specialized expertise in ventilation, because they do not have an adequate inspectionforce and because they rely on visual inspections rather than scientific testing to determine whether rock dusting is complaint with state law.The report says there are within the WV OMHST many dedicated, commit-ted, and safety conscientious inspec-tors and supervisors who are not afraid to issue citations or provide tough enforcement. However, the overwhelming scope of the job, the economic circumstances of a boom-ing coal industry, the pressure to get along, the recognition of the impor-tance of mining jobs within the state are factors that place immense pres-sures on state inspectors, pressures which make the regulatory enforce-ment process difficult to carry out.TExplosion Force Bent Roofbolt Plate and Shows DirectionExplosion Underground Bent the TrackUBB Report: Findings and Recommendationhe report has 11 findings including the following:• The disaster at UBB was man-made and could have been prevent-ed;• The mine explosion occurred because of failures of three basic safety practices with regard to venti-lation, rock dusting standards, prop-er maintenance of safety features on mine machinery;• Twenty-first century coal mine safety practices have failed to keep up with twenty-first century produc-tion practices;• The pre-shift/on-shift exanima-tion system has in many instances become a meaningless exercise;• MSHA and WV OMHST inspectors and their supervisors must craft enforcement strategies which match the compliance approach of the mining company;• Federal and state mine safety laws allow mine operators to use administrative or judicial review to avoid or delay paying citations and penalties;• The emergency response at U BB raised concerns about how decision-making was conducted in the Command Center and the manner in which mine rescue teams were deployed;• Investigations of major mining disasters must be conducted in an open, independent, and transparent manner;• SCSR training BB miners received was not effective;• The prevalence of coal workers’pneumoconiosis among the deceased U BB miners is both sur-prising and troubling.The report also contains 52 rec-ommendations and among them are the following:• Each mine should be required to maintain and continuously update records of the amount of rock dust purchased and used daily;• WV OMHST and MSHA should undertake reorganization on their ventilation approval system;• “Black box” technology must be instituted for mining equipment,including shearers, continuous min-ers, roof bolters, shuttle cars,motors, conveyors, and shields,proving information regardingmethane, oxygen, carbon monoxide,and coal dust levels;• There must immediate implemen-tation of a computerized, real-time electronic personnel recording sys-tem to formerly identify and locate all personnel underground;• Each mine must be required to institute a “Communication and Information Recording Center” to provide instantaneous communica-tion to MSHA state agencies, com-pany officials, and state and county emergency management officials regarding safety and health;• Current monitors for methane,carbon monoxide, and coal dust must be upgraded to include memo-ry chips;• Operators must be required to use real-time continuous monitoring for explosive methane gas and res-pirable dust;• Mechanized rock dusting must be conducted in all portions of under-ground mines;• Operators must assess the ade-quacy of rock dust through direct readout explosibility meters;• The system for writing violationsshould be converted from paper and pencil to a computerized system and digital photographs should be used;• Regulatory agencies should use ventilation simulation models as part of their plan approval process;• MSHA and NIOSH should develop an approved rescue vehicle;• Federal and state agencies should undertake an aggressive campaign to undermine the “safety myths” or inaccuracies that emerged during the U BB investiga-tion;• Existing laws and regulations must be stringently and effectively enforced;• When either state or federal agen-cies recognize a significant or per-sistent problem at a mine,the agency should coordinate their responses;• The mining industry, MSHA, and West Virginia should adopt the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command Model to improve coordination;• Protocols should be established and followed with regard to mine rescue and recovery;• MSHA and West Virginia should require digital recording of the activ-ities and communications in a mine emergency Command Center;• WV OMHST, NIOSH, MSHA, and the mining industry should adopt before the end of 2011 rules to reduce the permissible exposure limit (PEL) for coal mine dust to 0.09mg/m3 and reduce the PEL for crys-talline silica to 0.05 mg/m3; and mandate continuous dust monitor-ing.It should be noted that 17 individ-uals invoked the Fifth Amendment right and declined to be interviewed by investigators examining the explosion at UBB. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides an indi-vidual from self-incrimination. Self-incrimination includes act or decla-rations either as testimony at trial or prior to trial by which one implicates himself in a crime. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the govern-ment from requiring a person to be a witness against himself involuntarily or to furnish evidence against him-self.TForensic soot and dust sampling has indicated that soot and coke created by the explosion and burning of coal dust shows the le vels of burn, low to high.There are sections where no burn is indicated where one would expect the explosion and burn to have taken place, ie.., across the # 7 North connector. When the explosion reaches extremely high speeds, a phenomenon occurs where there is no burn because the explosion is traveling too fast to create a burn. At UBB, 1,803 samples were collected by teams of at least 30 individuals. A large number of samples showed high flame and coke. Th e report says that there was simply not enough rock dust applied at UBB.。
《煤矿开采技术》课件
地下开采的工艺流程包括矿床开拓、采准、切割和回采四个阶段。其中，回采是核心阶段，采准和切割是为回采服务的准备阶段。
总结词
地下开采的工艺流程包括矿床开拓、采准、切割和回采四个阶段。矿床开拓是整个开采过程中的基础，目的是为了建立通往地下的运输通道。采准是在开拓的基础上，为回采工作准备好场地，安装设备，为回采提供必要的条件。切割是在采准的基础上，将矿体切割成适合回采的矿块或矿段。回采是整个工艺流程的核心阶段，通过回采可以获得煤炭资源。
安全培训教育
对从业人员进行安全生产培训教育，提高员工的安全意识和技能水平。
安全检查与隐患排查
定期进行安全检查和隐患排查，及时发现并处理存在的安全隐患。
应急救援预案
制定应急救援预案，配备相应的应急救援设备和人员，确保在发生事故时能够及时有效地进行救援。
地下开采技术
地下开采技术是指通过在地下矿层进行挖掘，以获取煤炭资源的一种技术。其特点包括开采效率高、资源利用率高、对环境影响较小等。
综采工艺
在极薄煤层中，采用爆破方式采煤，需要注意安全管理和顶板控制。
爆破采煤工艺
根据煤层厚度和地质条件，选择适合的采煤机，确保采煤效率和安全性。
采煤机选择
A
B
C
D
随着矿井深度增加，地温、地压、岩石力学等条件变得更加复杂，开采难度和危险性增加。
深部矿井面临的问题
采用强度高、耐久性好的支护材料和方法，确保巷道的稳定性和安全性。
总结词：地下开采的安全管理是保障作业人员生命安全和身体健康的重要措施，包括建立健全安全管理制度、加强安全培训和检查等方面。
采矿新技术PPT文档共15页
31、园日涉以成趣，门虽设而常关。 32、鼓腹无所思。朝起暮归眠。 33、倾壶绝余沥，窥灶不见烟。
34、春秋满四泽，夏云多奇峰，秋月 扬明辉 ，冬岭 秀孤松 。 35、丈夫志四海，我愿不知老。
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26、要使整个人生都过得舒适、愉快，这是不可能的，因为人类必须具备一种能应付逆境的态度。——卢梭
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27、只有把抱怨环境的心情，化为上进的力量，才是成功的保证。——罗曼·罗兰
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28、知之者不如好之者，好之者不如乐之者。——孔子
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29、勇猛、大胆和坚定的决心能够抵得上武器的精良。——达·芬奇
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30、意志是一个强壮的盲人，倚靠在明眼的跛子肩上。——Fra bibliotek本华谢谢！
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《煤矿开采技术》课件
总结
煤矿安全生产技术的发展对煤矿生产安全起到了至关重要的 作用，只有不断完善安全管理体系、加强通风与气体控制、 防治地质灾害、推动信息化建设，才能有效预防煤矿事故， 保障矿工安全生产。
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第四章 煤矿环境保护技术
煤矿环境影响评 价
在煤矿项目建设之前，必须进行环境影响评价，评估项目 对周围环境的影响程度。煤矿开采会对水资源、土地和空 气等环境产生一定影响，因此评价标准和方法至关重要。
海洋煤矿开采技术
海底煤矿资源 的开发现状和
挑战
分析海底煤矿资源 的潜力和挑战
海洋煤矿环境 保护和可持续
发展策略
探讨海洋煤矿开采 对环境的影响和可
持续发展路径
海底煤矿采矿 技术的突破与
创新
介绍海底煤矿采矿 技术的最新进展
01 煤矿采空区治理的重要性和难点
解析煤矿采空区治理的关键问题
02 采空区治理的技术手段和方法
煤矿开采技术国际合作与交流
中国煤矿开采 技术的国际影
响力
合作项目覆盖多个 国家
煤矿开采技术 国际交流与合
作的意义
共同推动行业发展
国际煤矿技术 合作项目介绍
技术交流促进全球 进步
煤矿开采技术趋势展望
未来煤矿开采技术 发展趋势分析
智能化设备广泛应用
绿色环保理念深入人心
技术创新不断推进
煤矿开采技术创新 与突破点预测
煤矿通风与气体控制
煤矿通风系统 的设计原理
重点优化矿井内空 气流动，确保矿工
安全
煤矿爆炸事故 防范措施
采取爆破控制技术， 预防爆炸事故
煤矿气体监测 与预警技术
实时监测有毒气体 浓度，防止中毒事
故发生
薄煤层安全高效开采技术(PPT123页)
国有重点煤矿薄煤层的开采情况
1985～1997年国有重点煤层薄煤矿开采情况如表。
从表中可以看出，国有重点煤矿中薄煤层回采煤量的比例总的 倾势是下降的，特别是在1993年以后，国有重点煤矿开展建设安全 高效矿井活动，机械化、综合机械化生产的比例不断上升，综合机械 化生产煤量不断上升的时候，薄煤层的产量和产量所占比例却是不 断下降的，而且薄煤层工作面的平均月产量也是下降的.。
掘进率高，工作面接替紧张； 长壁机械化工作面投入产出比高，单产、工效及 经济效益低。 由于薄煤层开采的特殊性。造成薄煤层长壁机械 化开采开展缓慢，目前主要以炮采和机采为主。薄煤层 机械化开采较成熟的工艺主要有长壁式开采、螺旋钻机 开采、连续采煤机房柱式开采、急倾斜煤层钢丝锯开采。
1.3 薄煤层开采条件
使用滚筒采煤机的综合机械化开采技术是大局部厚度在 1．0 m以上薄煤层的技术途径，这是因为滚筒采煤机的适应 性强。但是，目前我国的滚筒采煤机最薄可采到1·1～1．2 nl 厚，最小厚度采到1．0 m的滚筒采煤机正处在研究中。
煤层越薄，滚筒采煤机的装煤效果越不好，要靠刮板输 送机协助装煤。
大同煤业集团有限责任公司下属晋华宫 矿综采三队2003年使用国产薄煤层滚筒式 MG200/450-WD采煤机,最高日产量为6766 t, 最高月产量为160309 t,年产量101万t,创国 产薄煤层同类型设备产量新纪录。
2.3 中国薄煤层开采技术现状
中国薄煤层的开采经历了三个开展阶段：
20世纪50年代主要使用炮采工艺；
20世纪60年代开始使用深截深截煤机掏槽,爆 破落煤,平面环行式薄煤层输送机运煤,人工装煤, 木支护顶板,回柱绞车放顶；
20世纪70年代以来,鸡西、淄博等矿区在改装 爬底式薄煤层采煤机的基础上,1974年开始研新型 薄煤层采煤机；
煤矿开采生产技术PPT课件
+
主排水泵
+ 供电系统：高压双回路电网 矿井地面变电所 井筒 井下中央变电所 采区变电所 工作面用 电点
+ 专线供电点：主要通风机、井底水泵房、掘进工 作面局部通风机等
+
消防 洒水、喷雾、防尘水幕、采掘
+ 供水 防尘 工作面机械设备供水系统
+ 供水线路：水池 井筒 井底车场
+ 运输 大巷 采区上下山 区段集中巷
面(也称回采工作面)。
(3)回采工作： 在采场内，为采取煤炭所进行的一系列工作，
称为回采工作。把煤从整体煤层中破落下来，称为破煤。把破落
下来的煤炭装入采场中的运输工具内，称为装煤。煤炭运出采场
的工序，称为运煤。煤炭采出后，被废弃的空间，称为采空区。
为了减轻矿山压力对采场的作用，以保证回采工作顺利进行。在
机。
+ 支护——液压自移支架
+ 采空区处理——全部垮落法
+ 1、事故现场行动原则
+ 及时报告、积极抢救、安全撤离、妥善避灾。
+
过滤式
+ 2、自救器
化学
+
隔绝式
+
压缩氧
使用：取罩 开盖 戴口具 夹鼻夹 套头带 戴帽子
3、躲避硐
+ 瓦斯、煤尘爆炸 + 煤与瓦斯突 + 火灾 + 水灾 + 冒顶
+
口对口吹气法
+ 破煤——单滚筒采煤机
+ 装煤——采煤机
+ 运煤——工作面刮板输送机，顺槽转载机
+
和胶带输送机。
+ 支护——单体液压支柱牵引＋部铰接顶梁
采矿新技术(2)薄煤层采掘新技术
“坐在办公室采煤” 梦想成真
2019年5月龙矿集团望田煤业13108首个薄煤层智能化工作 面成功投产
第三节 薄煤层巷道综掘技术
随着采煤机械化和综合机械化的发展，大大提高了 采掘工作面的开采强度和推进速度，只有实现掘进 机械化，才能满足采掘平衡的要求。
巷道施工方法主要有钻爆掘进和综合机械化掘进两 种，综合机械化掘进又分为悬臂式掘进机掘进和全 断面岩巷掘进机掘进 。
1.2 国内外薄煤采煤机(爬底板)
为有效利用薄煤层高度空间，增加电机功率，设计人员 将采煤机机身从刮板输送机上方移至煤壁侧，采煤机机身一 侧由放在煤层底板上的滑靴支撑，一侧由导向装置支撑；为 便于司机操作，在机身的采空侧引出厚度较小的电控或操纵 装置；形成了薄煤层爬底板采煤机。
这种结构存在以下不足：（1）对底板的平整度要求较 高，不容许有割煤台阶存在；（2）运行阻力较大，应适当 提高牵引力；（3）采煤机滚筒卧底量很小，如操作不当， 采煤机导向装置容易与溜槽发生别卡、甚至自锁情况。（4） 牵引齿轨设在煤壁侧，影响了装煤效果。
掘锚一体化
智能掘锚机：集快速掘进、护盾防护、超前钻探与疏 放、同步锚护、智能导向、封闭除尘、智能检测、故 障诊断等功能于一体的多功能煤矿巷道快速掘进装备， 契合安全高效与智能化的发展要求，实现同步掘锚。
第四代掘护锚一体机机作业情况
顶锚杆支护作业
帮锚杆支护作业
第二排锚杆施工
整机效果及应用
掘护锚一体机使用情况
1 掘进机+桥式胶带转载机+可伸缩胶带输送机作业线
主要适用于巷道坡度变化大、掘进巷道长度较短 的条件
2 掘进机+桥式胶带转载机+刮板输送机作业线
3 掘进机+梭车作业线
煤矿开采新工艺新技术PPT课件
岩巷掘进综掘机布置断面图
北翼轨道大巷掘进机布置断面图(锚锚)
截割头 操作台 电缆
巷 道 中 心 线
3300
R400
2800
2228
2000
履带 铲板
120
80500
100
底
1m 腰线
板
3900 4900 5060 5300
6
• 《山海经》是先秦古籍，是一部富于神话 传说的最古老的地理书。它主要记述古代 地理、物产、神话、巫术、宗教等，也包 括古史、医药、民俗、民族等方面的内容。 除此之外，《山海经》还以流水帐方式记 载了一些奇怪的事件，对这些事件至今仍 然存在较大的争论。
• 共有18卷，《山经》5卷 ，《海经》8卷 • 全书共31000字
7
《天工开物》
• 《天工开物》初刊于1637年（明崇祯十年）。 《天工开物》是世界上第一部关于农业和手工业 生产的综合性著作，是中国古代一部综合性的科 学技术著作，有人也称它是一部百科全书式的著 作，作者是明朝科学家宋应星。
• 《天工开物》对中国古代的各项技术进行了系统 地总结，构成了一个完整的科学技术体系。收录 了农业、手工业、工业――诸如机械、砖瓦、陶 瓷、硫磺、烛、纸、兵器、火药、纺织、染色、 制盐、采煤、榨油等生产技术。尤其是机械，更 是有详细的记述。
3
折氏西域记：屈茨（新疆库车）北二
百里有山，夜则火光，昼则但烟，人取此山 石炭，冶此山铁，恒充三十国用。
明煤产北 碎煤产南
4
煤的发现与利用
发 现 和 利 用 煤 的 历 史 较 早 。
5
《山海经》称煤为石涅
• 石涅
•
黑石脂的别名。《山海经·西山经》：“西南三百里曰 女牀之山 ，
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2、刨煤机的适用范围
在比较稳定的地质条件下，开采薄煤层或1.8～2.0ｍ以下煤层，刨煤机是一种 相当经济和有效的采煤机械。这一点，无论从西德、美国等国外经验，还是根 据我国使用刨煤机的情况来看都得到了充分的证明。
比较稳定的地质条件，是指煤层中没有较大的断层构造，煤层的倾角一般在 25°以下，工作面没有太大起伏，煤不粘顶等。刨煤机不仅可以成功地用于薄 煤层开采，而且中厚煤层的开采也有不少高产的例子。例如德国在1.5～1.8ｍ 的煤层中使用刨煤机开采，平均日产原煤在2312～4899ｔ之间。在较厚的煤层 中，刨煤机工作面的最高工效可达37ｔ/工。我国的新汶矿业集团华丰煤矿在大 倾角厚煤层倾斜分层开采中采用国产刨煤机开采，平均采高2.1ｍ，煤层平均倾 角31º，5个月共产煤11.84万ｔ，平均月产超过2万ｔ。
1、刨煤机的特点 近年来，刨煤机得到了不断改进和发展，性能日益
完善。归纳起来，现代刨煤机具有以下的特点： 1）结构简单，操作和维护方便； 2）人员不必跟机移动作业，改善了工人的安全条
件及劳动强度，这对于薄煤层开采尤其重要； 3）采出的原煤块率较高，粉尘量少； 4）充分利用地压采煤，能耗较低； 5）采用浅截深开采，煤层中的瓦斯释放均匀，尤
近年来，刨煤机技术的开发取得了很大的进展，国产刨煤机在一些局矿的成功 使用以及采用德国DBT公司生产的刨煤机主机与国内设备配套使用，在我国铁法、 晋城、西山等地取得的一些成功经验，使国内同行对采用刨煤机开采薄煤层有 了许多新的认识。
二、 滚筒采煤机
、种类
煤层的开采先后出现了多种多样形式的采煤机。如今采煤机大 都向适应能力强，自动化程度高的方向发展，并取得了很大的 成就。当前适合于薄煤层开采的采煤机有下列四种：
a.适应能力强，尤其是煤层厚度变化较大的工作面；
b.对煤层顶、底板起伏变化适应能力强，在复杂的 地质条件下，可以通过大的装机功率强行通过；
c.适用于含有夹矸的煤层回采，煤层中若含有矸石 滚筒采煤机可以直接切割矸石回采，不影响回采的 时间和产量；
d.对工作面的长度要求较低，尤其与刨煤机相比更为突出。
薄煤层开采新技术
XXX学院 XXX
第一节 我国薄煤层开采现状
一、我国薄煤层开采现状 我国的煤炭资源丰富，储存量大，且赋存多样化，
根据我国煤层厚度划分，厚度0.8～1.3m属于薄煤 层，小于0.8m属于极薄煤层。我国煤炭储量中薄煤 层的可采储量约为60多亿ｔ，约占全国煤炭总储量 的18%。然而据1996年统计，我国薄煤层的产量只 占全国煤炭总产量的7.32%，而且这个比例还在呈 逐步下降的趋势。
我国薄煤层的开采经历了几个发展阶段。20世纪50年代薄煤层开采主要使用 炮采工艺。60年代开始使用深截煤机掏槽，爆破落煤；70年代薄煤层机组得 到较大发展，分别研制出不同类型的刨煤机，包括钢丝绳牵引刨煤机、全液 压驱动刨煤机和刮斗刨煤机等。
目前，我国薄煤层开采的机械化程度还比较低，大多还是采用炮采，产量低、 事故多、工人的工作环境恶劣。薄煤层采煤机作为薄煤层开采机械，由于受其 本身结构的限制，0.8ｍ已是其开采下限，而且维修、操作不便，工人需在极低 的工作面条件下跟机作业。1974年研制成功BM-100型薄煤层滚筒采煤机。在20 世纪80～90年代，我国曾研制了多种型号的刨煤机（包括滑行刨煤机和拖钩刨 煤机），以解决薄煤层的开采问题，并在一些局矿的使用中取得了不俗的成绩。
工作面的煤尘大，块煤产出率低，经济效益不高，同时工作面设备多，通风阻 力大，严重影响着工人的身心健康。
工作空间小。
三、刨煤机的特点和适用范围
刨煤机是以刨头为工作机构，采用刨削方式破煤的采煤机械，可用在长壁采煤 工作面实现破煤、装煤和运煤。刨头由安装在采煤工作面两端的驱动装置通过 刨链在工作面全长上往复牵引，刨刀以给定的刨削深度将煤从煤壁上刨落下来， 通过刨头的犁形斜面将刨落下来的煤装入输送部，然后由输送部将煤运出采煤 工作面。刨煤机通常可分为6个基本部分，即：刨煤部、输送部、液压系统、喷 雾系统、电气控制装置和辅助装置。
90年代，天府矿务局和徐州矿务局，分别从俄罗斯和乌克兰引进了螺旋钻采煤 机，2003年新汶矿业集团也引进了2台三钻头的螺旋钻采煤机，用于薄与极薄煤 层的开采，使一些用传统采煤工艺不能开采的薄煤层、极薄煤层得到有效开采 利用。然而由于推广的力度不够大，以及用户对这种形式的采煤机种也有一个 逐步认识的过程，因此国内使用刨煤机的工作面还不多。
第一种是MDY—150型采煤机，此机适采高为1.2~2.5m，煤质中 硬 （ f=2-3 ） ， 顶 板 稳 定 的 煤 层 ， 并 且 煤 质 较 软 ， 倾 角 在 025·之间；
第 二 种 为 BM—100 型 采 煤 机 ， 它 的 适 应 高 度 为 0.9-1.3m ， f≤2.5，顶板中等稳定的煤层，倾角也在0-25·之间；
总之滚筒采煤机具有适应能力强、切割效益高、对地质条件要求不高等特点， 特别适用薄煤层自动虾工作面开采，尤其是当煤层赋存条件变化大、断层多时， 滚筒采煤机的优势更为明显，它可以直接切割顶、底板强行通过，免去了搬家 的工序，提高了回采效益。
3、滚筒采煤机的缺点
滚筒采煤机的系统复杂，一般都是采用液压控制，制造困难，造价高，维修不 方便，工人不容易掌握；
第三种为MLS3P—170矮型双滚筒采煤机，该机适合采高为1.22.2m，f=2-3之间，顶板中等稳定，底板不能过于松软，倾角 在0-30·之间；
第四种是K—103型爬底板式薄煤层采煤机，该机适应与0.61.2m厚薄煤层的开采，煤质中等稳定以下，倾角小于35·。
2、滚筒采煤机的优点
滚筒采煤机与其他采煤机相比具有它独特的优势：
目前，全世界已经有20多个国家的煤矿在使用刨煤机，刨煤机的总使用台数已 超过1000台，日产万吨的刨煤机工作面也不乏其例。近年来，随着刨煤机功率 的不断增大，以及大规格、高强度矿用圆环链的采用，刨煤机刨削硬煤的能力 得到不断提高。德国的刨煤机功率已达2×400ｋＷ和2×800ｋＷ，刨链直径可 达Φ38ｍｍ和Φ42ｍｍ，这就使得刨煤机的适用范围不断扩大，随着技术的进 步，刨煤机开采硬煤和极硬煤层已不再是困难的事情。