读《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》
论阿尔都塞的意识形态国家机器理论及对当代中国的启示
论阿尔都塞的意识形态国家机器理论及对当代中国的启示作者：王晨晨来源：《青年时代》2020年第04期摘要：阿尔都塞是二十世纪最具影响力的意识形态理论解释者，他在《意识形态与意识形态的国家机器》（研究笔记）一书中提出意识形态国家机器的新概念，对后世产生了深远影响。
本文运用文本研究的方法，探讨了意识形态国家机器的概念、功能和作用，以期对当代中国加强意识形态国家机器的建设有所启示。
关键词：阿尔都塞;《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》（研究笔记）;意识形态国家机器。
一、阿尔都塞的意识形态理论意识形态这一概念最早出现于19世纪初，由法国思想家特拉西提出。
1814年，特拉西出版了《意识形态的要素》，特拉西用这个概念建立了一个“观念科学”，它主要来研究人的心灵和认知等方面的内容。
1845年，马克思和恩格斯在撰写的《德意志意识形态》中，使用了这一概念，并使其内涵发生了变化，主要是指具有一定社会经济和政治观点的总和，反映了某个社会的经济基础、政治制度以及人民之间的关系，这种意识形态是通过统治阶级从上而下的向全体社会成员提出，它具有一些虚假性。
后来，列宁重新定义意识形态的概念，他认为，在阶级斗争中，意识形态主要代表统治阶级的利益，如果对意识形态批判，它必然会使统治阶级的利益受到侵犯。
阿尔都塞的意识形态理论可以分为两个不同的阶段，第一阶段以《保卫马克思》为标志，第二阶段以《意识形态和意识形态的国家机器》（研究笔记）为标志。
在第一阶段，阿尔都塞主要从认识论的角度来探讨意识形态。
首先，他关注科学与意识形态的区别。
阿尔都塞指出，科学反映的是对于现实和社会历史的真理性认识，它不代表并反映任何一个阶级的利益。
另一方面，意识形态一种则是“虚假意识”，它不是谬误，不能反映社会历史进程的真实情况，总是体现某阶级的利益。
第二，意识形态是一种实践。
阿尔都塞指出，实践并不是什么，它是通过对某种物质进行加工使其成为某种产品。
阿尔都塞认为，实践主要包括社会实践、政治实践和意识形态实践。
意识形态与意识形态国家机器
意识形态与意识形态国家机器引言意识形态一直以来都是社会与政治领域中一个重要的概念。
在国家政策制定和社会运作中，意识形态常常扮演着至关重要的角色。
特定的意识形态可以通过各种渠道在社会中传播和灌输，形成意识形态国家机器的效果。
本文将探讨意识形态的概念以及意识形态国家机器的形成原因和影响。
意识形态的概念意识形态一词最早由法国社会学家阿尔蒙德·德·杜尔凯姆提出，他将其定义为一种系统化的思想体系，旨在解释现象、指导行动并传播价值观念。
意识形态的核心思想是通过价值观念的传播和塑造来影响个体和群体的思维方式和行为。
不同的意识形态常常具有不同的价值观念和目标，这些差异可以在社会和政治层面上产生深远的影响。
意识形态国家机器的形成原因意识形态国家机器是指国家机构和组织在制定政策和推动意识形态传播方面的作用。
它的形成原因可以从以下几个方面来理解：1. 统一思想，巩固国家权威在一个国家中，政府往往需要在政策制定和实施过程中获得广泛的支持和认可。
通过塑造和推广特定的意识形态，政府能够统一人民的思想，巩固国家的权威。
这种统一思想的力量可以使人们更加团结并追随国家的领导。
2. 创造社会秩序，维护社会稳定意识形态国家机器还可以通过引导和教育人们的行为，创造出一种符合国家利益和社会稳定的社会秩序。
例如，在某些国家中，政府可能会通过意识形态传播来推动公民遵守法律，尊重社会规范，并维护社会和谐。
这有助于提升社会的稳定性和发展。
3. 塑造国家形象，推动经济发展通过特定的意识形态传播，政府可以塑造国家的形象，推动国内外投资和经济发展。
例如，一些国家可能会通过强调自由市场经济、创新和科技发展等价值观念，吸引外国资本和技术进入。
这种意识形态国家机器在激励和推动经济发展方面发挥着重要作用。
意识形态国家机器的影响意识形态国家机器对社会和个体产生了深远的影响，包括：1. 形塑个体意识和行为意识形态通过灌输特定的价值观念和信仰，对个体的意识和行为产生影响。
意识形态与国家机器(英文版)
Ideology and Ideological State ApparatusesNotes towards an Investigation)O N T H E R E P R O D U C T I O N O F T H E C O N D I T I O N SO F P R O D U C T I O N[1]I must now expose more fully something which was briefly glimpsed in my analysis when I spoke of the necessity to renew the means of production if production is to be possible. That was a passing hint. Now I shall consider it for itself.As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year.[2] The ultimate condition of production is therefore the reproduction of the conditions of production. This may be 'simple' (reproducing exactly the previous conditions of production) or 'on an extended scale' (expanding them). Let us ignore this last distinction for the moment.What, then, is the reproduction of the conditions of production ?Here we are entering a domain which is both very fam-1. This text is made up of two extracts from an ongoing study. The sub-title 'Notes towards an Investigation' is the author's own. The ideas expounded should not be regarded as more than the introduction to a discussion.2. Marx to Kugelmann, 11 July 1868, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, p. 209.page 128iliar (since Capital V olume Two) and uniquely ignored. The tenacious obviousnesses (ideological obviousnesses of an empiricist type) of the point of view of production alone, or even of that of mere productive practice (itself abstract in relation to the process of production) are so integrated into our everyday 'consciousness' that it is extremely hard, not to say almost impossible, to raise oneself to the point of view of reproduction. Nevertheless, everything outside this point of view remains abstract (worse than one-sided: distorted) -- even at the level of production, and, a fortiori, at that of mere practice.Let us try and examine the matter methodically.To simplify my exposition, and assuming that every social formation arises from a dominant mode of production, I can say that the process of production sets to work the existing productive forces in and under definite relations of production.It follows that, in order to exist, every social formation must reproduce the conditions of its production at the same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce. It must therefore reproduce:1. the productive forces,2. the existing relations of production.Reproduction of the Means of ProductionEveryone (including the bourgeois economists whose work is national accounting, or the modern 'macro-economic' 'theoreticians') now recognizes, because Marx compellingly proved it in Capital Volume Two, that no production is possible which does not allow for the reproduction ofthe material conditions of production: the reproduction of the means of production.The average economist, who is no different in this thanpage 129the average capitalist, knows that each year it is essential to foresee what is needed to replace what has been used up or worn out in production: raw material, fixed installations (buildings), instruments of production (machines), etc. I say the average economist = the average capitalist, for they both express the point of view of the firm, regarding it as sufficient simply to give a commentary on the terms of the firm's financial accounting practice.But thanks to the genius of Quesnay who first posed this 'glaring' problem, and to the genius of Marx who resolved it, we know that the reproduction of the material conditions of production cannot be thought at the level of the firm, because it does not exist at that level in its real conditions. What happens at the level of the firm is an effect, which only gives an idea of the necessity of reproduction, but absolutely fails to allow its conditions and mechanisms to be thought.A moment's reflection is enough to be convinced of this: Mr X, a capitalist who produces woollen yarn in his spinning-mill, has to 'reproduce' his raw material, his machines, etc. But he does not produce them for his own production -- other capitalists do: an Australian sheep farmer, Mr Y, a heavy engineer producing machine-tools, Mr Z, etc., etc. And Mr Y and Mr Z, in order to produce those products which are the condition of the reproduction of Mr X's conditions of production, also have to reproduce the conditions of their own production, and so on to infinity -- the whole in proportions such that, on the national and even the world market, the demand for means of production (for reproduction) can be satisfied by the supply.In order to think this mechanism, which leads to a kind of 'endless chain', it is necessary to follow Marx's 'global' procedure, and to study in particular the relations of the circulation of capital between Department I (production ofpage 130means of production) and Department II (production of means of consumption), and the realization of surplus value, in Capital, V olumes Two and Three.We shall not go into the analysis of this question. It is enough to have mentioned the existence of the necessity of the reproduction of the material conditions of production.Reproduction of Labour-PowerHowever, the reader will not have failed to note one thing. We have discussed the reproduction of the means of production -- but not the reproduction of the productive forces. We have therefore ignored the reproduction of what distinguishes the productive forces from the means of production, i.e. the reproduction of labour power.From the observation of what takes place in the firm, in particular from the examination of the financial accounting practice which predicts amortization and investment, we have been able to obtain an approximate idea of the existence of the material process of reproduction, but we are now entering a domain in which the observation of what happens in the firm is, if not totally blind, at least almost entirely so, and for good reason: the reproduction of labour power takes place essentially outside the firm.How is the reproduction of labour power ensured?It is ensured by giving labour power the material means with which to reproduce itself: by wages. Wages feature in the accounting of each enterprise, but as 'wage capital',[3] not at all as a condition of the material reproduction of labour power.However, that is in fact how it 'works', since wages represents only that part of the value produced by the expendi-3. Marx gave it its scientific concept: variable capital.page 131ture of labour power which is indispensable for its reproduction: sc. indispensable to the reconstitution of the labour power of the wage-earner (the wherewithal to pay for housing, food and clothing, in short to enable the wage earner to present himself again at the factory gate the next day -- and every further day God grants him); and we should add: indispensable for raising and educating the children in whom the proletarian reproduces himself (in n models where n = 0, 1, 2, etc. . . .) as labour power.Remember that this quantity of value (wages) necessary for the reproduction of labour power is determined not by the needs of a 'biological' Guaranteed Minimum Wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti ) alone, but by the needs of a historical minimum (Marx noted that English workers need beer while French proletarians need wine) -- i.e. a historically variable minimum.I should also like to point out that this minimum is doubly historical in that it is not defined by the historical needs of the working class 'recognized' by the capitalist class, but by the historical needs imposed by the proletarian class struggle (a double class struggle: against the lengthening of the working day and against the reduction of wages).However, it is not enough to ensure for labour power the material conditions of its reproduction if it is to be reproduced as labour power. I have said that the available labour power must be 'competent', i.e. suitable to be set to work in the complex system of the process of production. The development of the productive forces and the type of unity historically constitutive of the productive forces at a given moment produce the result that the labour power has to be (diversely) skilled and therefore reproduced as such. Diversely: according to the requirements of the socio-technical division of labour, its different 'jobs' and 'posts'.How is this reproduction of the (diversified) skills ofpage 132labour power provided for in a capitalist regime? Here, unlike social formations characterized by slavery or serfdom this reproduction of the skills of labour power tends (this is a tendential law) decreasingly to be provided for 'on the spot' (apprenticeship within production itself), but is achieved more and more outside production: by the capitalist education system, and by other instances and institutions.What do children learn at school? They go varying distances in their studies, but at any rate they learn to read, to write and to add -- i.e. a number of techniques, and a number of other things as well, including elements (which may be rudimentary or on the contrary thoroughgoing) of 'scientific' or 'literary culture', which are directly useful in the different jobs in production (oneinstruction for manual workers, another for technicians, a third for engineers, a final one for higher management, etc.). Thus they learn know-how.But besides these techniques and knowledges, and in learning them, children at school also learn the 'rules' of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is 'destined' for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination. They also learn to 'speak proper French', to 'handle' the workers correctly, i.e. actually (for the future capitalists and their servants) to 'order them about' properly, i.e. (ideally) to 'speak to them' in the right way, etc.To put this more scientifically, I shall say that the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for thepage 133workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in words'.In other words, the school (but also other State institutions like the Church, or other apparatuses like the Army) teaches 'know-how', but in forms which ensure subjection to the ruling ideology or the mastery of its 'practice'. All the agents of production, exploitation and repression, not to speak of the 'professionals of ideology' (Marx), must in one way or another be 'steeped' in this ideology in order to perform their tasks 'conscientiously' -- the tasks of the exploited (the proletarians), of the exploiters (the capitalists), of the exploiters' auxiliaries (the managers), or of the high priests of the ruling ideology (its 'functionaries'), etc.The reproduction of labour power thus reveals as its sine qua non not only the reproduction of its 'skills' but also the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology or of the 'practice' of that ideology, with the proviso that it is not enough to say 'not only but also', for it is clear that it is in the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power.But this is to recognize the effective presence of a new reality: ideology.Here I shall make two comments.The first is to round off my analysis of reproduction.I have just given a rapid survey of the forms of the reproduction of the productive forces, i.e. of the means of production on the one hand, and of labour power on the other.But I have not yet approached the question of the reproduction of the relations of production. This is a crucial question for the Marxist theory of the mode of production.page 134To let it pass would be a theoretical omission -- worse, a serious political error.I shall therefore discuss it. But in order to obtain the means to discuss it, I shall have to make another long detour.The second comment is that in order to make this detour, I am obliged to re-raise my old question: what is a society ?I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D S U P E R S T R U C T U R EOn a number of occasions[4] I have insisted on the revolutionary character of the Marxist conception of the 'social whole' insofar as it is distinct from the Hegelian 'totality'. I said (and this thesis only repeats famous propositions of historical materialism) that Marx conceived the structure of every society as constituted by 'levels' or 'instances' articulated by a specific determination: the infrastructure, or economic base (the 'unity' of the productive forces and the relations of production) and the superstructure, which itself contains two 'levels' or 'instances': the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.).Besides its theoretico-didactic interest (it reveals the difference between Marx and Hegel), this representation has the following crucial theoretical advantage: it makes it possible to inscribe in the theoretical apparatus of its essential concepts what I have called their respective indices of effectivity. What does this mean?It is easy to see that this representation of the structure of every society as an edifice containing a base (infrastruc-4. In For Marx and Reading Capital, 1965 (English editions 1969 and 1970 respectively).page 135ture) on which are erected the two 'floors' of the superstructure, is a metaphor, to be quite precise, a spatial metaphor: the metaphor of a topography (topique ).[5] Like every metaphor, this metaphor suggests something, makes some thing visible. What? Precisely this: that the upper floors could not 'stay up' (in the air) alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base.Thus the object of the metaphor of the edifice is to represent above all the 'determination in the last instance' by the economic base. The effect of this spatial metaphor is to endow the base with an index of effectivity known by the famous terms: the determination in the last instance of what happens in the upper 'floors' (of the superstructure) by what happens in the economic base.Given this index of effectivity 'in the last instance', the 'floors' of the superstructure are clearly endowed with different indices of effectivity. What kind of indices ?It is possible to say that the floors of the superstructure are not determinant in the last instance, but that they are determined by the effectivity of the base; that if they are determinant in their own (as yet undefined) ways, this is true only insofar as they are determined by the base.Their index of effectivity (or determination), as determined by the determination in the last instance of the base, is thought by the Marxist tradition in two ways: (1) there is a 'relative autonomy' of the superstructure with respect to the base; (2) there is a 'reciprocal action' of the superstructure on the base.We can therefore say that the great theoretical advantage of the Marxist topography, i.e. of the spatial metaphor of5. Topography from the Greek topos : place. A topography represents in a definite space the respective sites occupied by several realities: thus the economic is at the bottom (the base), the superstructure above it.page 136the edifice (base and superstructure) is simultaneously that it reveals that questions of determination (or of index of effectivity) are crucial; that it reveals that it is the base which in the last instance determines the whole edifice; and that, as a consequence, it obliges us to pose the theoretical problem of the types of 'derivatory' effectivity peculiar to the superstructure, i.e. it obliges us to think what the Marxist tradition calls conjointly the relative autonomy of the superstructure and the reciprocal action of the superstructure on the base.The greatest disadvantage of this representation of the structure of every society by the spatial metaphor of an edifice, is obviously the fact that it is metaphorical: i.e. it remains descriptive.It now seems to me that it is possible and desirable to represent things differently. NB, I do not mean by this that I want to reject the classical metaphor, for that metaphor itself requires that we go beyond it. And I am not going beyond it in order to reject it as outworn. I simply want to attempt to think what it gives us in the form of a description.I believe that it is possible and necessary to think what characterizes the essential of the existence and nature of the superstructure on the basis of reproduction. Once one takes the point of view of reproduction, many of the questions whose existence was indicated by the spatial metaphor of the edifice, but to which it could not give a conceptual answer, are immediately illuminated.My basic thesis is that it is not possible to pose these questions (and therefore to answer them) except from the point of view of reproduction.I shall give a short analysis of Law, the State and Ideology from this point of view. And I shall reveal what happens both from the point of view of practice and production on the one hand, and from that of reproduction on the other.page 137T H E S T A T EThe Marxist tradition is strict, here: in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire (and in all the later classical texts, above all in Marx's writings on the Paris Commune and Lenin's on State and Revolution ), the State is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus. The State is a 'machine' of repression, which enables the ruling classes (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the 'class' of big landowners) to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to capitalist exploitation).The State is thus first of all what the Marxist classics have called the State apparatus. This term means: not only the specialized apparatus (in the narrow sense) whose existence and necessity I have recognized in relation to the requirements of legal practice, i.e. the police, the courts, the prisons; but also the army, which (the proletariat has paid for this experience with its blood) intervenes directly as a supplementary repressive force in the last instance, when the police and its specialized auxiliary corps are 'outrun by events'; and above this ensemble, the head of State, the government and the administration.Presented in this form, the Marxist-Leninist 'theory' of the State has its finger on the essential point, and not for one moment can there be any question of rejecting the fact that this really is theessential point. The State apparatus, which defines the State as a force of repressive execution and intervention 'in the interests of the ruling classes' in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat, is quite certainly the State, and quite certainly defines its basic 'function'.page 138From Descriptive Theory to Theory as suchNevertheless, here too, as I pointed out with respect to the metaphor of the edifice (infrastructure and superstructure), this presentation of the nature of the State is still partly descriptive.As I shall often have occasion to use this adjective (descriptive), a word of explanation is necessary in order to remove any ambiguity.Whenever, in speaking of the metaphor of the edifice or of the Marxist 'theory' of the State, I have said that these are descriptive conceptions or representations of their objects, I had no ulterior critical motives. On the contrary, I have every grounds to think that great scientific discoveries cannot help but pass through the phase of what I shall call descriptive 'theory '. This is the first phase of every theory, at least in the domain which concerns us (that of the science of social formations). As such, one might and in my opinion one must -- envisage this phase as a transitional one, necessary to the development of the theory. That it is transitional is inscribed in my expression: 'descriptive theory', which reveals in its conjunction of terms the equivalent of a kind of 'contradiction'. In fact, the term theory 'clashes' to some extent with the adjective 'descriptive' which I have attached to it. This means quite precisely: (1) that the 'descriptive theory' really is, without a shadow of a doubt, the irreversible beginning of the theory; but (2) that the 'descriptive' form in which the theory is presented requires, precisely as an effect of this 'contradiction', a development of the theory which goes beyond the form of 'description'.Let me make this idea clearer by returning to our present object: the State.When I say that the Marxist 'theory' of the State available to us is still partly 'descriptive', that means first and fore-page 139most that this descriptive 'theory' is without the shadow of a doubt precisely the beginning of the Marxist theory of the State, and that this beginning gives us the essential point, i.e. the decisive principle of every later development of the theory.Indeed, I shall call the descriptive theory of the State correct, since it is perfectly possible to make the vast majority of the facts in the domain with which it is concerned correspond to the definition it gives of its object. Thus, the definition of the State as a class State, existing in the repressive State apparatus, casts a brilliant light on all the facts observable in the various orders of repression whatever their domains: from the massacres of June 1848 and of the Paris Commune, of Bloody Sunday, May 1905 in Petrograd, of the Resistance, of Charonne, etc., to the mere (and relatively anodyne) interventions of a 'censorship' which has banned Diderot's La Réligieuse or a play by Gatti on Franco; it casts light on all the direct or indirect forms of exploitation and extermination of the masses of the people (imperialist wars); it casts light on that subtle everyday domination beneath which can be glimpsed, in the forms of political democracy, for example, what Lenin, following Marx, called the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.And yet the descriptive theory of the State represents a phase in the constitution of the theory which itself demands the 'supersession' of this phase. For it is clear that if the definition in question really does give us the means to identify and recognize the facts of oppression by relating them to the State, conceived as the repressive State apparatus, this 'interrelationship' gives rise to a very special kind of obviousness, about which I shall have something to say in a moment: 'Yes, that's how it is, that's really true!'[6]6. See p. 158 below, On Ideology.page 140And the accumulation of facts within the definition of the State may multiply examples, but it does not really advance the definition of the State, i.e. the scientific theory of the State. Every descriptive theory thus runs the risk of 'blocking' the development of the theory, and yet that development is essential.That is why I think that, in order to develop this descriptive theory into theory as such, i.e. in order to understand further the mechanisms of the State in its functioning, I think that it is indispensable to add something to the classical definition of the State as a State apparatus.The Essentials of the Marxist Theory of the StateLet me first clarify one important point: the State (and its existence in its apparatus) has no meaning except as a function of State power. The whole of the political class struggle revolves around the State. By which I mean around the possession, i.e. the seizure and conservation of State power by a certain class or by an alliance between classes or class fractions. This first clarification obliges me to distinguish between State power (conservation of State power or seizure of State power), the objective of the political class struggle on the one hand, and the State apparatus on the other.We know that the State apparatus may survive, as is proved by bourgeois 'revolutions' in nineteenth-century France (1830, 1848), by coups d'état (2 December, May 1958), by collapses of the State (the fall of the Empire in 1870, of the Third Republic in 1940), or by the political rise of the petty bourgeoisie (1890-95 in France), etc., without the State apparatus being affected or modified: it may survive political events which affect the possession of State power.page 141Even after a social revolution like that of 1917, a large part of the State apparatus survived after the seizure of State power by the alliance of the proletariat and the small peasantry: Lenin repeated the fact again and again.It is possible to describe the distinction between State power and State apparatus as part of the 'Marxist theory' of the State, explicitly present since Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire and Class Struggles in France.To summarize the 'Marxist theory of the State' on this point, it can be said that the Marxist classics have always claimed that (1) the State is the repressive State apparatus, (2) State power and State apparatus must be distinguished, (3) the objective of the class struggle concerns State power, and in consequence the use of the State apparatus by the classes (or alliance of classes or of fractions of classes) holding State power as a function of their class objectives, and (4) theproletariat must seize State power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois State apparatus and, in a first phase, replace it with a quite different, proletarian, State apparatus, then in later phases set in motion a radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the end of State power, the end of every State apparatus).In this perspective, therefore, what I would propose to add to the 'Marxist theory' of the State is already there in so many words. But it seems to me that even with this supplement, this theory is still in part descriptive, although it does now contain complex and differential elements whose functioning and action cannot be understood without recourse to further supplementary theoretical development.The State Ideological ApparatusesThus, what has to be added to the 'Marxist theory' of the State is something else.page 142Here we must advance cautiously in a terrain which, in fact, the Marxist classics entered long before us, but without having systematized in theoretical form the decisive advances implied by their experiences and procedures. Their experiences and procedures were indeed restricted in the main to the terrain of political practice.In fact, i.e. in their political practice, the Marxist classics treated the State as a more complex reality than the definition of it given in the 'Marxist theory of the State', even when it has been supplemented as I have just suggested. They recognized this complexity in their practice, but they did not express it in a corresponding theory.[7]I should like to attempt a very schematic outline of this corresponding theory. To that end, I propose the following thesis.In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into account not only the distinction between State power and State apparatus, but also another reality which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) State apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I shall call this reality by its concept: the ideological State apparatuses.What are the ideological State apparatuses (ISAs)?They must not be confused with the (repressive) State apparatus. Remember that in Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains: the Government, the Admin-7. To my knowledge, Gramsci is the only one who went any distance in the road I am taking. He had the 'remarkable' idea that the State could not be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but included, as he put it, a certain number of institutions from 'civil society ': the Church, the Schools, the trade unions, etc. Unfortunately, Gramsci did not systematize his institutions, which remained in the state of acute but fragmentary notes (cf. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, 1971, pp. 12, 259, 260-3; see also the letter to Tatiana Schucht, 7 September 1931, in Lettre del Carcere, Einaudi, 1968, p. 479. English-language translation in preparation.page 143istration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which constitute what I shall in future call the Repressive State Apparatus. Repressive suggests that the State Apparatus in。
阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论及其当代启示
阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论及其当代启示作者：亢云洁来源：《青年与社会》2020年第01期摘要：阿尔都塞从生产关系再生产角度进行分析，深刻揭示了维持资本主义生产关系再生产的主要方式即意识形态国家机器。
阿尔都塞详尽阐述以学校为代表的教育意识形态国家机器，并将其认定为占据当代资本主义国家主导地位的意识形态国家机器，具有重大的理论意义和实践价值。
当前，中国特色社会主义建设进入新时代，意识形态工作面临许多新问题，通过对阿尔都塞的意识形态国家机器理论进行研究，可以给我国意识形态工作提供借鉴和参考。
关键词：意识形态;阿尔都塞;教育;国家一、意识形态国家机器理论的基本内容（一）意识形态国家机器的涵义在《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》一文中，阿尔都塞提出的“意识形态国家机器”这个概念引起了人们的重视。
他认为意识形态国家机器是一个确定数量的实在，它们以特殊的、专门化机构的形式出现在直接的观察者面前。
在阿尔都塞看来，意识形态的本质功能就是再生产。
这一典型代表现体在劳动力的再生产过程之中。
在阿尔都塞看来，劳动力再生产不仅仅是劳动者所要依赖的物质条件再生产，还应该生产出劳动者工作所需要的职位、生产的技能和承担的社会角色。
而对统治阶级来说，劳动者身上最重要的特点就是能够服从之前的秩序、并且能够具有高超精湛的技术和能够顺从地投入生产。
因此，意识形态就是使劳动力认同目前的现有秩序，并且使统治阶级对被统治阶级的统治变得更加理直气壮。
（二）意识形态国家机器与镇压性国家机器的区别在意识形态的研究中，他把国家机器分为镇压性的国家机器和非镇压性的国家机器。
镇压性的国家机器包括政府、行政机关、军队、警察、法庭和监狱等多个机构。
非镇压性的国家机器就是意识形态国家机器，这两种国家机器都可以用来维护国家的政权。
两种国家机器联手合作，共同维护着统治阶级的利益和社会的稳定。
镇压性的国家机器是用暴力的手段发挥作用，而意识形态国家机器则以更加隐蔽的方式长期对人们进行思想渗透。
意识形态的想象功能与实践力量--读阿尔都塞《意识形态和意识形态
意识形态的想象功能与实践力量读阿尔都塞《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》石佳**石佳，中国社会科学院大学（研究生院）马克思主义学院博士研究生。
【内容提要】阿尔都塞的意识形态理论在批判继承马克思意识形态 理论的基础上，创造性地将经济、政治与意识形态并列为人类社会的三 类实践。
在完成意识形态理论自足性的同时，用“询唤”概念阐释了 意识形态的作用机制。
在阿尔都塞看来，意识形态是想象性与实践性的 勾连，而这样的纠缠互映存在鲜明的符号学意义。
阿尔都塞的意识形态 理论具有鲜明的马克思主义革命性和实践性立场，并对当下中国的理论 界充满启发意义。
【关键词】意识形态实践性想象性符号阿尔都塞对文学及文化研究最有影响力的贡献便来自其意识形态理论。
在马克思主义发展史中，阿尔都塞是详细地研究资本主义意识形态的理论 家，并提出“意识形态国家机器”的独创理论。
文集《列宁和哲学》收录 了阿尔都塞最富洞见和争议性的若干论文，其中，《意识形态和意识形态国 家机器》最能体现其理论锋芒，也引起了理论界对于意识形态问题的广泛 讨论。
在这篇论文中，阿尔都塞分别从否定和肯定两个方面切入对意识形态厂马克思主义哲学论丛■O^Az-u-------------------------------------------------------------------2019年第2轉总第31辑的结构功能的讨论。
一方面，他认为“意识形态表述了个人与其实在生存条件的想象关系”①，意识形态作为一种否定性的幻觉或暗示，既虚伪地表现了人类生存的实在界的境况，又深刻体现出实在界本身的异化；另一方面，他又认为意识形态由于总是存在于国家机器及其各种实践之中，意识形 态的存在就是物质的存在，所以意识形态相应地就具备了物质实践性。
一阿尔都塞意识形态理论的逻辑路径：想象性与实践性的符号学碰撞（一）一种对于生存现状的想象性关系阿尔都塞在《保卫马克思》一书前面大部分文章中虽然已经大量使用了意识形态这一概念，但他却鲜有集中且系统的论证。
阿尔都塞的“意识形态国家机器”理论述评概要
阿尔都塞的“意识形态国家机器”理论述评阿尔都塞的“意识形态国家机器”理论述评【作者】陈炳辉在西方马克思主义关于国家理论的问题上，阿尔都塞最有影响的是提出了“意识形态国家机器”的理论。
阿尔都塞并没有系统地探讨国家问题，没有形成自己的系统的国家学说。
他在早期著作中几乎没有谈到国家的问题，只是到后期才涉足马克思主义的国家理论。
1970年，他在法共机关刊物《思想》杂志上，发表了题为《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》的论文，提出了“意识形态国家机器”的理论，这一理论一经提出，就引起了很大的反响，由此也奠定了阿尔都塞在西方马克思主义国家学说上的一席之地。
一、“意识形态国家机器”的提出与马克思、恩格斯和列宁各自所处的时代相比较，现代发达的资本主义国家许多方面都发生了变化，其中一个重大的突出的变化，就是国家的意识形态职能大大地增强了，意识形态对维护现存的资本主义国家、现有的资本主义社会制度，起了极大的作用。
西方发达的资本主义国家，虽然仍旧保持着强大的镇压性国家机器来维持自己的统治，但是事实上它们更多地借助各种意识形态的方式，同化人民大众的思想意识，消除人们的积极反抗的意识，从而保证了自己的安稳统治。
意识形态发挥了暴力镇压也无法起到的作用。
现代资本主义国家的这一变化，不能不引起西方马克思主义理论家们对国家问题的重新思考。
马克思主义国家学说强调国家是暴力机器，强调国家的镇压职能，与此形成强烈对比的是，西方马克思主义的国家学说则强调国家的意识形态的职能，重视意识形态因素在国家中的作用，这是西方马克思主义国家学说的一个共同点。
最早把对现代资本主义国家问题的考察的视角转到意识形态方面来的，是意大利的著名思想家葛兰西。
葛兰西通过文化的领导权的理论，说明了统治阶级是如何通过文化的领导权，同化了人民大众的思想意识，控制了市民社会，从而揭示了现代资本主义国家是暴力强制和文化控制相结合的重要特征。
阿尔都塞的“意识形态国家机器”的理论，就是在葛兰西的文化领导权理论的影响下提出的，是对葛兰西的文化领导权理论的进一步的发展。
阿尔都塞的“意识形态”理论
阿尔都塞的“意识形态”理论“意识形态”（ideology）是马克思主义哲学的一个重要概念，在马克思主义哲学的发展过程中,产生了诸多对“意识形态”这一概念的阐释。
其中，西方马克思主义哲学家路易·阿尔都塞在其意识形态理论中对这一概念作出了在当今最具有影响力的解释。
以下通过对卢克·费雷特的《文化的政治：论意识形态的文章》一文的梳理，理清阿尔都塞的“意识形态”和“意识形态国家机器”两大重要概念，以及意识形态的“唤问”功能这一核心观点。
路易·皮埃尔·阿尔都塞（Louis Pierre Althusser，1918年10月16日-1990年10月23日）一、阿尔都塞意义上的“意识形态”（一）“意识形态”的“无意识”性阿尔都塞在《马克思主义与人道主义》一文中首次阐述了他的意识形态概念，他给“意识形态”下的第一个定义是：“意识形态是一个（具有自己的逻辑与严密性的）表述体系（依赖于该体系的现象、神话、观念或概念等），它被认为是一种历史存在并且在特定社会中具有某种作用……作为一种表述体系，意识形态区别于科学，其中实践-社会职能比理论职能（认识的职能）更重要。
”在马克思和恩格斯的理论中，社会是由经济基础、上层建筑以及意识形态三个基本层面组成的结构的总和，而阿尔都塞在马克思和恩格斯的“社会”概念中增加了“科学”（首要是“历史唯物主义科学”）这一第四层面。
因此，阿尔都塞在上述定义中将意识形态描述成一种偏向于“实践-社会职能”而非“理论职能”的表述体系，是为了表明在资本主义社会中有两种根本不同的话语形式在起作用，即：为我们提供关于社会的真实认识的“科学”；以及，不为我们提供此种认识的“意识形态”。
故而在阿尔都塞看来，意识形态具有一种社会职能，但这种职能并不产生对社会历史真实状况的认识。
阿尔都塞认为，马克思和恩格斯在谈论意识形态时大量运用的“意识的形式”这一概念是一种前科学的语言。
他认为，不同于“意识的形式”这一概念的表层涵义，马克思和恩格斯所探讨的“意识形态”与“意识”之间几乎没有什么关系，相反，它是一个极端无意识的现象。
阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论及其当代启示
阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论及其当代启示【摘要】阿尔都塞的国家机器理论探讨了政治权力的运作机制，其中意识形态扮演关键角色。
意识形态的影响使国家机器成为意识形态的执行者，而国家机器在当代社会也经历了演变，对意识形态的影响程度进一步增加。
当代社会中，国家机器对意识形态的影响日益显现，同时国家机器理论也带来了一些当代启示，如政治权力的分散管理和意识形态的包容性。
阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论的重要性在于揭示政治实践中的权力运作机制，与当代社会的政治现实相辅相成。
对未来发展而言，我们需要思考如何在理论和实践中平衡政治权力和意识形态的关系，以促进社会的可持续发展和稳定。
【关键词】阿尔都塞、意识形态、国家机器理论、当代启示、政治现实、未来发展、影响、演变、重要性。
1. 引言1.1 阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论及其当代启示阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论是20世纪法国马克思主义学者路易·阿尔都塞提出的理论框架。
该理论认为国家机器不仅是政治权力的组织方式，更是对社会的强制性组织和管理。
意识形态则是国家机器运行的重要组成部分，通过意识形态的塑造和传播，国家机器能够巩固自身的统治地位。
当代社会中，国家机器已经不再是单纯的政治机构，而是一个庞大的体系，包括政府、媒体、教育机构等各种组织。
这些机构可以通过意识形态的渗透和宣传来影响人们的思想和行为。
随着信息技术的发展，国家机器也在不断演变和升级，其控制和监督能力日益增强。
在当代社会中，国家机器对意识形态的影响更加深远和广泛。
政府通过各种手段控制和引导民众的思想，塑造符合其统治需要的意识形态。
这种控制不仅仅局限于政治领域，还涉及经济、文化等各个方面。
阿尔都塞意识形态国家机器理论对当代社会具有重要的启示。
我们需要认识到国家机器的存在和影响，审视其对意识形态的塑造和操纵。
只有深入理解和抵制国家机器的控制，才能实现个体思想的自由和社会的进步。
2. 正文2.1 阿尔都塞的国家机器理论阿尔都塞的国家机器理论认为，国家是统治阶级为维护自身利益而建立的一种权力机构。
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读《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》
宋立宁
( 北京师范大学文学院，北京 100075 )
【摘 要】《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》进一步发展了马克思主义的意识形态理论，并提出了“意识形态国家机器”的理念，认为个体意识必须融入社会意识，意识形态是一个时代或社会的自我意识。
本文作者认为意识形态不能等同于统治阶级的意识形态，而社会的意识不仅仅包括统治阶级的意识，还包括其它阶层和个体的意识【关键词】意识形态；个体意识；社会意识；社会形态
阿尔都塞在《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》中进一步发展了马克思主义的意识形态理论，并提出了“意识形态国家机器”的理念，这篇文章的阅读是一个非常艰难的工程，在我费尽心力的理解了其中部分艰涩概念的同时，也对其中的部分观点有不同的看法，在这里姑且表达自己对于这篇文章的粗浅思考吧。
阿尔都塞认为意识形态在维系社会生活、阶级统治和社会形态上都发挥着非常重要的作用，用简单易懂的话来说，意识形态融合在我们出生以来接收的一切信息之中，对我们造成潜移默化并持续不断的影响，将我们塑造成符合意识形态的样子，统治者因此具有统治阶级的思想，被统治者也因此能够理所当然并以为自己是心甘情愿的接受统治。
在这个方面来说，意识形态成为一种国家机器，如果说军队、警察等国家机器是通过硬性的方式维护国家稳定，那么意识形态就是通过软性的方式让人们接受国家的统治，通过学校、宗教、媒体等等渠道，进行一种类似于“催眠”、“洗脑”的教育与宣传，在维护统治的方面作用甚至比军队更加重要。
阿尔都塞的意识形态类似于一种催眠的幻觉，让人作为一个个体，而在意识形态中认为自己是主体，从而愉快自觉的履行自己的任务，他将意识形态与“无意识”并列，人们并不能意识到它的存在，而不知不觉间已经被他所同化，正是这一点让我有些不敢苟同，因为如果这样来看，人作为一个个体的主观能动性无意被削弱了，而且这样的话人岂不是带有一种无法避免的悲剧感吗？
这种悲剧感正是我难以接受的，因为在阿尔都塞的理论之中，人在意识形态面前似乎是毫无还手之力——意识形态是无意识的，如果连意识到它都无法做到，当然更无法决定面对他的态度和应对。
似乎人一出生——或者更进一步的说，在出生之前，就已经被注定了日后要接受的意识形态，而无法做出自主的选择，沉浸在虚妄的幻觉之中。
这固然会维持社会的稳定和统治的稳固，但作为人这个个体而言，却一直被蒙蔽在虚假的幸福之中，无法看清真相，或许真相其实并不重要也没有意义，但作为人来说想要把握自己的生活是最基本的追求，千百年来人类正是为了这个而不断的努力、不断的发展，如果这一切始终仍笼罩在意识形态的幻境之中，人从来不曾清醒，岂不是太过悲哀了吗？
意识形态是如何将人从个体变为主体呢？我姑且用比较通俗简单的方法转述阿尔都塞的描写，意识形态向人发出质询——这时人尚且是作为一个个体而存在的，在人回应了意识形态的质询，合乎意识形态的规范时，他便被意识形态所接收，成为其中的一部分，也从个体转变成了主体。
但是必须承认的是并不是每一个人都会回应意识形态的质询，必然有人拒
绝回应，保留自己的个体性，不融入意识形态之中，这样的人确实存在，但作为不被意识形态所承认个体，他们往往无法融入社会，会被社会上所排斥，进而很难在这个社会上生存下去。
这是因为阿尔都塞将意识形态与社会意识大体上合并了，并且他提出意识形态是没有历史的，亦即认为意识形态无论在什么社会形态下都是存在的，但这里有一个矛盾，从远古到现在社会形态不断发生改变，从奴隶制到封建社会，又到资本主义社会，再到社会主义社会，如果按照阿尔都塞的理论，意识形态塑造统治阶级和被统治阶级的意识，使他们无意识中接受自己的地位，那么社会形态应该十分稳固。
但是另一方面，意识形态始终与阶级相联系，而在社会中绝不会只存在一个阶级，因此意识形态也是阶级斗争的场所，甚至与现实中的战场交锋、统治阶级改变相比，新生阶级的意识形态在它还未成为统治阶级时已经存在，而被推翻的旧阶级的意识形态也不会马上消失，他们会在意识形态的领域继续斗争，因此意识形态领域的阶级斗争可以说比现实中物质上的斗争更加持久也更加激烈，是无时无刻不在进行的。
从上述分析来看，关于意识形态与人的个体性之间的矛盾，或者可以发现阿尔都塞有所欠缺的地方。
意识形态是一个时代或社会的自我意识，但阿尔都塞将意识形态很大程度上等同于统治阶级的意识形态，而社会的意识不仅仅包括统治阶级的意识，还包括其它阶层和个体的意识。
个体总可以划分入不同的阶层或阶级之中，也就是说统一阶级内部的个体意识和该阶级的意识确实有很大的共同性，但首先我们不能就此将两者等同，其次社会上区别于统治阶级的其它阶级仍然存在，因此统治阶级的意识形态——也即阿尔都塞在文章中所描述的意识形态，进行质询的时候不可能得到全部社会成员的回应。
《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》这篇文章无疑是在哲学范畴之中的，其中揭示的道理深刻反映了社会生活的实际样貌，但正如我在上面提到的，阿尔都塞的意识形态理论带来了个人主体性的悲剧，哲学是窥见真实的学问，但真实未必就是美好，作为一个普通人，或者活在蒙蔽之中未尝不是一种幸福。
这点感慨并不深刻，也不太符合这篇文章探讨的内容，但这确实是我读过阿尔都塞先生的《意识形态和意识形态国家机器》后的真是感想。
参考文献：
[1]路易·阿尔都塞.意识形态和意识形态国家机器[J].La Pensée,1970,6,151.[2]邓细芳.阿尔都塞意识形态理论评析[D].华中师范大学,2008.
作者简介：宋立宁，女，就读于北京师范大学文学院汉语言文学专业，擅长中国古典文学研究，中西比较文化研究。