企业风险管理【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文外文翻译

译文

标题：企业风险管理

资料来源:风险管理杂志作者：斯蒂芬．P．达西从20世纪70年代开始，财务风险开始成为公司一项重要的不确定的资源，此后不久，处理财务风险的工具被开发出来。这些新的工具允许财务风险被一种相似的方式管理，而这种不参杂风险的管理方式已经维持了数十年。1972年，世界上主要的发达国家结束了一直让汇率保持稳定数十年的布雷顿森林体系协定。布雷顿森林体系的解体引起了汇率的不稳定。由于外汇汇率的变化，从事国际贸易的公司的资产负债表和经营业绩开始波动。这种不稳定性影响了许多公司的表现。同时在20世纪70年代，石油输出国组织（欧佩克）组织开发的协议要求降低生产提高产品价格，使得石油价格开始上涨。后来，在这十年中，美联储将重点放在打击通货膨胀上（石油价格上涨的结果），而不是稳定利率，结果导致其迅速上涨，并加剧了美国的利率波动。因此，外汇汇率、价格和利率的变动引起的财务风险成为一个主要的关注重心。

虽然财务风险主要关心的问题已经在20世纪80年代形成一个机构体系，但是并没有在这一方面开始运用标准的风险管理工具和技术，导致失败的原因是人为的将风险分类为纯粹风险和投机风险。由于固定资产的收益，外币计价的投资和经营成果都会受到通货膨胀或者外汇汇率的影响，使得风险增加，这就是所谓的投机风险。风险管理者在他们所经营的领域，形成一个其专业特有的风险领域，称之为纯粹风险。当出现一个新的风险领域，并没有将其扩大吸收进他们的领域。这样做，需要将学习财务工具知识和远离风险的费用由保险公司负责并支付。这已经是个大胆的行动，但一个创新的思想家会支持发展风险管理。这次失败对于风险管理领域组织来说是昂贵的。随着企业风险管理的出现，传统的风险管理人员将被推到一个更为广泛的结合了财务风险管理和其他形式的风险分析的舞台。因此，拒绝扩大财务风险并不能阻止风险管理者了解财务风险管理，它只是推迟了几十年。

以后，期货及其基于非财务资产交易之前的很长一段时间适应处理他们的财务风险。掉期交易在1981年货币转化第一次被公布的时候被引进了。然而，

没过多久，金融风险开始影响到各种各样的金融风险管理生产产品，以帮助企业应对财务风险。在1972年5月，首次提出外汇期货。1975年10月，利率期货开始交易了。美国政府债券期权在1982年10月进行了介绍。期权外汇汇率在1982年12月开始被应用。额外的期货、掉期交易和期权，相当于各产品随即组合。这些工允许金融机构及其他财务风险管理在纯粹风险中应用。

不幸的是，这些工具并不是总是能够方便、有效的应用。财务风险管理没有处理的问题一般都是来自传统的风险管理部门的问题，这其中，许多的管理标准并不是应该出现在这个区域的。仅在1994年，由于利率的意外上升，在金融衍生行业发生了以下损失(Smithson, 1998)：

智利国民铜贸易公司损失了2.07亿美元；

吉布森礼品公司损失了2000万美元；

保洁公司损失了1.57亿美元；

美国美德损失了700万美元；

空气化工产品公司损失了6000万美元；

联邦纸业损失了1900万美元；

卡特彼勒损失了1300万美元。

更严重的损失包括滥用衍生工具(Jorion, 2001, Holton, 1996)：

1995年，英国霸菱银行的倒闭导致了基于日经225指数和日本债券的期货和期权损失了13亿美元；

奥兰治县1994年因融资利率合同亏损了18亿美元；

达亿瓦公司因未经授权的衍生品交易损失了11亿美元；

住友商事公司因为隐蔽的铜交易和铜交易的领导者损失了18亿美元。

在许多情况下，这些损失是由于没有遵循共同的风险管理方式进行财务风险管理，例如没有由一个独立机构验证交易的可行性，不设置潜在的损失或失败的限制，以了解该组织面临的风险。令人担心的是监督的正常水平，如果在这些领域行使监督，会使那些人才远离他们公司。因此，他们被引诱到他们既不了解也不会接受的风险领域。

试想，由公司新聘请一个传统的风险经理，声称能够提供保险策略，通过自我筹资战略，使目前供应商的收费变为原来的一半。如果这个风险经理要采取方式控制风险管理的资金，并去处理和报告所有关于这个基金及金融交易的

细节，但是提供详细的信息给该公司呢？

在这种情况下，尽管有明显的节约成本，但没有一家公司会无视其监督的过程，或者提供这种明显节约成本为基础的绩效奖金的人。传统的风险管理已经开发出一系列的检查和制衡的方式，以防止这种明显的滥用职权。财务风险管理开始并没有这样的专业知识水平。这种事件的原因之一是因为传统的风险管理人员退位投机风险的领域，许多组织都暴露出了灾难性的损失。

无论是冒险风险、金融风险或任何其他形式的风险，风险的基本规则是：如果你不完全了解风险，不管报告声称有多少利润，你都不要去参与。不幸的是，这一基本规则，不断的被人们所侵犯。高额投资回报的承诺吸引了众多个人投资者参与欺诈性的投资方案。很不幸，许多企业也掉进了这个陷阱。

20世纪90年代中期的损失，让各组织的领导意识到财务风险管理的重要性。那些开发出来处理财务风险的金融工具是很复杂的，往往只能够被那些在金融领域的公司所了解。因此，用这些工具来管理金融风险和管理其他风险的做法不相协调。这种缺乏协调性，导致了大量的问题，包括从传统的风险管理中使用不同的术语、风险和不同的目标采取不同的发展措施。例如，传统的风险经理经常集中在最大可能的损失，最大的损失合理预期可能发生。若果损失超过了该公司的应付能力，那么采取一些措施来应对这些风险，通过常用的风险转移到其他方、控制步骤或其他方法来减少损失。采用这一种方法而不是财务风险经理开发出来的措施称为风险价值（VaR）。此值表示损失，该公司预期会发生在选定的时间间隔（例如，每天）选定的时间百分比。因此，在1%的水平的每日的风险价值是可以预期到每100天出现的损失。这不是最大的损失，但是有可能发生的损失，所以它不提供同等水平的信息作为可能的最大损失。在5%的水平，预计到20天发生一次，每日风险价值是小于1%的价值。风险价值表示什么损失，而不是可能发生的损失。即使在时间框架是不同的，可能是传统的风险经理处理损失的概率在该年度的基础上，或在保险合同有效期内，而风险价值往往是基于每天或每周的价格走势。

外文文献译文原文

Title: Enterprise Risk Management

Material Source: Journal of Risk Management Author: Stephen P. D'Arcy Beginning in the 1970s, financial risk became an important source of uncertainty for firms and, shortly thereafter, tools for handling financial risk were developed. These new tools allowed financial risks to be managed in a similar fashion to the ways that pure risks had been managed for decades. In 1972 the major developed countries ended the Bretton Woods agreement which had kept exchange rates stable for three decades. The result of ending the Bretton Woods agreement was to introduce instability in exchange rates. As foreign exchange rates varied, the balance sheets and operating results of corporations engaging in international trade began to fluctuate. This instability affected the performance of many firms. Also during the 1970s, oil prices began to rise as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) developed agreements to reduce production to raise prices. Later in the same decade, a policy shift by the U. S. Federal Reserve to focus on fighting inflation (a result of oil price increases) instead of stabilizing interest rates led to a rapid rise, and increasing volatility, of interest rates in the United States. Thus, volatility in foreign exchange rates, prices and interest rates caused financial risk to become an important concern for institutions.

Although financial risk had become a major concern for institutions by the early 1980s, organizations did not begin to apply the standard risk management tools and techniques to this area. The reasons for this failure were based on the artificial categorization of risk into pure risk and speculative risk (D'Arcy, 1999). Since fixed income assets, investments denominated in foreign currency and operating results that were affected by inflation or foreign exchange rates all had the possibility of a gain, they represented speculative risk. Risk managers had built a wall around their specialty, called pure risk, within which they operated. When a new risk area emerged, they did not expand to incorporate it into their domain. To do so would have required learning about financial instruments and moving away from the type

of risks commonly covered by insurance. This would have been a bold move, but one that the innovative thinkers who developed risk management would have espoused. This failure was costly to organizations, and to the risk management field. With the emergence of enterprise risk management, traditional risk managers will be pushed into a wider arena of risk analysis, one that incorporates financial risk management and other forms of risk analysis. Thus, the refusal to expand into financial risks did not prevent risk managers from having to learn about financial risk management, it simply delayed it by a few decades.

Forwards, futures and options had all been traded based on non-financial assets long before they were adapted to deal with financial risk. Swaps were not introduced until 1981, when the first currency swap was announced (Smithson, 1998). However, it did not take long after financial risk began to affect institutions for a wide array of financial risk management products to be generated to help corporations deal with financial risk. Foreign exchange futures were first offered in May, 1972. Interest rate futures began trading in October, 1975. Options on U.S. Treasury bonds were introduced in October, 1982. Options on foreign exchange rates were introduced in December, 1982. Additional futures, swaps and options, as well as combination products, quickly followed. These tools allowed financial institutions and other corporations to manage financial risk in the much the same fashion that they used for pure risks.

Unfortunately, these tools were not always used wisely or effectively. Since financial risk management was generally not handled by the traditional risk management department, many of the standards for managing risk were not followed in this area. In 1994 alone, due to an unexpected rise in interest rates, the following losses from derivatives occurred (Smithson, 1998):

Codelco, Chile's national copper trading company, lost $207 million

Gibson Greetings lost $20 million

Procter and Gamble lost $157 million

Mead lost $7 million

Air Products lost $60 million

Federal Paper lost $19 million

Caterpillar lost $13 million

Even more serious losses from the misuse of derivatives include (Jorion, 2001, Holton, 1996):

Barings Bank went bankrupt in 1995 as a result of $1.3 billion in losses in futures and options trading based on the Nikkei 225 and Japanese bonds Orange County lost $1.8 billion in 1994 from leveraged interest rate contracts Daiwa lost $1.1 billion from unauthorized derivatives trading

Sumitomo lost $1.8 billion from concealed trading in copper and derivatives on copper by the head trader

In many cases, these losses occurred due to the failure to follow common risk management practices, such as not having transactions verified by an independent authority, not setting limits to potential losses or failure to understand the risks to which the organization was exposed. The fear was that the normal level of oversight, if exercised in these areas, would drive a person with extraordinary talent away from their firm. Thus, they were lured into risk areas they neither understood nor would have accepted.

Imagine the approach that would have been taken if a traditional risk manager, newly hired by a firm, claimed to be able to provide insurance coverage through a self funding strategy at half the price that the current providers were charging. What if this risk manager wanted to take control of the funds for managing risks and wanted to be the person in charge of handling, and reporting, all monetary transactions involving this fund, but would not provide details about the fund to the company? Despite the apparent cost savings, I doubt that any firm would be foolish enough to disregard its oversight process in this situation, or to provide this person with performance bonuses based on the apparent cost savings. Traditional risk management has developed a series of checks and balances to prevent such obvious abuses. Financial risk management did not initially have this level of expertise. One reason for this failure is because traditional risk managers abdicated the area of speculative risk, exposing many organizations to disastrous losses.

The basic rule of risk taking, whether it is hazard risk, financial risk or any other form of risk, is that if you do not fully understand a risk, you do not engage in it, regardless of what profits are claimed or reported. This basic rule is, unfortunately violated by individuals consistently. Promises of impressive returns entice many individual investors to participate in fraudulent investment schemes. Unfortunately, many corporations fell into this trap as well.

The losses of the mid-1990s led organizations to realize the importance of financial risk management. The financial instruments that were developed to deal with financial risk were complex, and often only understood by those in the financial areas of the firm. Thus, the use of these tools to manage financial risk was generally not coordinated with the approach used to manage other risks. This lack of coordination resulted in a number of problems, including the development of a different terminology from that used in traditional risk management, different measures of risk and different goals. For example, traditional risk managers frequently focus on the probable maximum loss, the largest loss that could reasonably be expected to occur. If that loss exceeds the ability of the firm to cope with, then steps are taken to manage that risk, by transferring some of the risk to other parties, by reducing loss severity through loss control steps or other standard practices. Instead of adopting this approach, financial risk managers developed a measure termed the Value-at-Risk (VaR). This value indicates the loss that the firm would expect to have occur over the selected time interval (for example, daily) the selected percentage of the time. Thus, the daily VaR at the 1% level is the loss that can be expected to occur once every 100 days. This is not the largest loss that is likely to occur, so it does not provide the same level of information as probable maximum loss. The daily VaR at the 5% level, which is expected to occur once every 20 days, is smaller than the 1% value. VaR indicates what losses to expect, not what losses could occur. Even the time frame is different, as the traditional risk manager is likely dealing with loss probabilities over an annual basis, or over the term of an insurance contract, while VaR is often based on daily or weekly price movements.