Action%20Inaction%20and%20Regret[2]

Action/Inaction and Regret:The Moderating Effect of Closeness1S hu L i and Z hu-Y uan L iang2Institute of PsychologyChinese Academy of SciencesBeijing,ChinaKahneman&Tversky(1982)demonstrated that actions are regretted more thaninactions.It was conjectured that(a)when action shared the same closeness asinaction but was neither to approach nor to retreat the desired outcome,the actionwas seen as futile so that it would evoke stronger reactions of regret;and(b)closeness moderated the effect of action such that the effect was stronger when theacting target was closer to a good outcome,but weaker when the acting target wasfurther away from a good outcome.A total of5regret-triggering problems werepresented to150undergraduates who rated actors’intensity of regret.Thefindingssupport that closeness is the moderator of the increased regret effect.In a classic regret experiment by Kahneman and Tversky(1982),partici-pants were presented with a hypothetical vignette describing two individuals (George and Paul)who experienced the same bad outcome,which was arrived at in different ways.In one case,George switched to stock in Company A from Company B(a decision to act);and in the other,Paul considered switching to stock in Company B,but decided to keep his stock in Company A(a decision not to act).Both found that they would have been better off(by$1,200)had they owned stock in Company B.Kahneman and Tversky(1982)demonstrated that when asked to predict feelings of regret,participants believed that bad outcomes following actions (e.g.,losing money after switching from one stock to another)would lead to deeper regret than would identical bad outcomes following inactions(e.g., losing money after deciding to retain the stock one has already).They argued 1This research was initiated while thefirst author was teaching at Nanyang Technological University and completed while working at the Institute of Psychology,Chinese Academy of Sciences.The paper was supported partially by the Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70671099). The authors thank the anonymous referee for his or her helpful comments on the initial version of the manuscript;and Chua Libing,Leong Wan Bin,and Leong Yew Bin for their help in data collection.2Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Li Shu,Center for Social and Economic Behavior,Institute of Psychology,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100101 China.E-mail:lishu@ or s.li@807Journal of Applied Social Psychology,2007,37,4,pp.807–821.©2007Copyright the AuthorsJournal compilation©2007Blackwell Publishing,Inc.808LI AND LIANGthat differential mutability—where action is altered more readily than is inaction—mediates this regret effect.They reasoned that it was easier to imagine George not taking action than it was to imagine Paul taking action. In other words,George was expected to experience more regret because actions are more likely to be mutated than are inactions.In addition,the norm theory that was proposed by Kahneman and Miller (1986)states further that when something departs from that which is consid-ered normal,counterfactual thinking will come into play to move the abnor-mal action back to a more normal one.Actions are considered more abnormal than are inactions because it is easier to imagine maintaining the status quo than to imagine causing the status quo to change.Consequently, regrets attributed to actions will evoke greater affect.Since the original study(Kahneman&Tversky,1982),several investiga-tions have assessed the effects of the action–inaction dichotomy on various inferences.Several researchers have claimed that negative outcomes produce greater regret when they result from actions,rather than from failure to act (Gleicher et al.,1990;Kahneman&Tversky,1982;Landman,1987).It is worth noting that the action–inaction dichotomy discussed by Kahneman and Tversky does not specify the direction of whether the action is moving toward or away from the desired outcome and,in the process,becoming nearer or further away from the desired outcome.Kahneman and Tversky’s(1982)early regret studies took“closeness”into account in terms of time(e.g.,Mr.Thomas comes closer than does Mr.Crane to catching hisflight in theirflight problem)and numerical distance(e.g., Peter“comes close”to winning the prize in their lottery problem).For example,participants in theflight problem are presented with a scenario describing two individuals who arrive at the airport30minutes after the scheduled departure time of theirflights.Mr.Crane is told that hisflight left on time.Mr.Thomas is told that hisflight was delayed and left only5 minutes ago.The results showed that4%felt that Mr.Crane would be more upset,while96%felt that Mr.Thomas would be more upset.The explanation provided by Kahneman and Tversky(1982)is not one related to closeness,but one related to counterfactual thinking.According to Kahneman and Miller(1986),it is easier for Mr.Thomas to carry out counterfactual thinking because he only needs to imagine making up5 minutes,while Mr.Crane must construct a scenario in which he makes up half an hour.Thus,a preferred alternative is more available for Mr.Thomas than for Mr.Crane,which makes Mr.Thomas’s experience more upsetting.It is conjectured that some factors that affect the content of real-life regrets are eliminated in studies of hypothetical regret.One such factor is that closeness is likely to influence how much regret an individual will experience. When an action is moved closer to a positive outcome,it is associated with anincrease in ratings of regret intensity.When an action is moved away from a positive outcome,it is associated with a decrease in ratings of regret intensity.In the present research,the concept of closeness embodies a static relation based only on position or proximity,rather than a dynamic relation,involving movement toward or away from an outcome.From such a closeness prospect,the action described in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982)classic stock-switching problem is somewhat special in the sense that it shares the same closeness as the inaction,but neither approach nor retreat is the desired outcome (see Figure 1for an illustration).The action made then is more likely seen as a futile one.It would be reasonable or plausible to infer that,in such a case,it is the futile effort but not the mutability that evokes stronger reactions of regret.That is,people simply regret wasting time,energy,and so forth.In the past decade,researchers have come to discover that actions do not always lead to more regret.For example,Gilovich and Medvec (1994,1995)demonstrated that failures to act were more regretted than were actions in the long term and showed the existence of an inaction effect for long-term regrets:When looking back,people experience the most regret over paths not taken.Byrne and McEleney (2000)examined the finding that the focus on actions in the short term switches to inactions in the long term.Their experiments showed that this temporal switch occurs only for particular situations.Zeelenberg,van den Bos,van Dijk,and Pieters (2002)showed that the action effect was not as robust as has been suggested by the overwhelming amount of replications reported in previous articles.They suggested that,depending on the valence of prior outcomes,inaction might result in more regret than action.Inman and Zeelenberg (2002)examined the consequences of repeat purchasing (i.e.,maintaining the status quo)versus switching in the context of information regarding the reason for the decision (e.g.,prior consumption episode,brand history),and argued that there were situations ActionMoving away Action Moving toward DesiredResultAction Futile effortInactionStaying putFigure 1.Graphical illustration of closeness of inaction or actions leading to a desired outcome ACTION/INACTION AND REGRET 809810LI AND LIANGin which repeat purchasing may cause as much or even more regret than switching.Roese,Hur,and Pennington(1999)argued that regulatory focus moderates action versus inaction effects and thus can account for some conflicting reports in the literature.Promotion goals are associated with counterfactuals centering on inactions,whereas prevention goals are associ-ated with counterfactuals focusing on actions.However,little attention has been paid to date on testing the futility of effort notion in terms of closeness.In addition,there has been no attempt made so far to construct a model of how action typically implies effort. Failure plus expended effort is more psychologically costly than is inaction (no effort).The question addressed in this paper is whether actions with futile effort are regretted more than inactions.Therefore,the following is hypothesized:Hypothesis1.Individuals will experience stronger regret withaction than with inaction(action effect;Kahneman&Tversky,1982).Hypothesis2.Closeness will moderate the effect of action suchthat the effect will be stronger when the acting target is closer toa good outcome,but weaker when further away from a goodoutcome.Moreover,N’gbala and Branscombe(1997)argued that actions may not be fundamentally more mutable than inactions(see Davis,Lehman, Wortman,Silver,&Thompson,1995;Gavanski&Wells,1989;Seelau, Seelau,Wells,&Windschitl,1995).When actions are perceived as instru-mental or causal for achieving a more positive outcome,inaction,in contrast to action,is more likely to be perceived as abnormal.The school-related achievements(e.g.,failing or passing a test)context employed by N’gbala and Branscombe exemplifies such situations,where action is perceived as normal and inaction is perceived as abnormal.That is,because action(i.e.,studying) is perceived as instrumental in getting good grades,a person who fails a test after not studying(i.e.,inaction)will be advised to study just as a person who fails after studying(i.e.,action)will be advised to study more or to study differently.Inaction will not be considered a counterfactual means of improving the outcome of the person who studied but failed.To test this precisely,the following is hypothesized:Hypothesis3.Inaction will be perceived as abnormal whenaction is causally linked to school-related achievements,andthus will evoke greater regret than will action(inaction effect;N’gbala&Branscombe,1997).ACTION/INACTION AND REGRET811 The following experiment is designed to examine whether action will arouse more regret than inaction(or vice versa)and whether closeness is the mod-erator of the increased regret effect when it occurs.MethodParticipantsParticipants were150Singaporean undergraduates(84female,66male; M age=22.4years)from Nanyang Technological University and National University of Singapore.The students participated as volunteers.Stimuli and DesignA total offive regret problems involving a failure to reach a desired outcome were prepared(see Appendix).The problems were presented in questionnaire form.The order of presentation of thefive regret-triggering scenarios was counterbalanced by using two different versions.The scenarios were presented in reverse order from one version to the other.The presentation of the options offered by each scenario in each version was randomized.Half of the participants were assigned randomly to respond to each of the two versions.Adopting Feldman,Miyamoto,and Loftus’(1999)method,participants rated each actor’s emotional experience(i.e., intensity of regret)following actions or inaction by circling a number on the 7-point scale,which ranged from1(very slight regret)to7(very strong regret).Results and Discussion4D Problem and Goal-Betting ProblemThe4D3Problem concerns a judgment of experienced intensity of regret following people’s action or inaction when they failed to shade the winning number of6669.The Goal-Betting Problem is similar to the4D Problem:It concerns a judgment of experienced intensity of regret evoked by people’s action or inaction when they failed to bet the total number of goals scored (i.e.,6goals)in a particular soccer match.34D,released by Singapore pools,is a form of betting that is conducted by shading four digits on a betting slip.These two regret-triggering scenarios have a feature in common.That is,five levels of closeness (1to 5stands away from a desired outcome,which presumably expresses the idea of “coming close”)were manipulated within each action group.There are two levels that were designed to approach and two levels that were designed to retreat from the desired outcome (i.e.,winning #6669in the 4D Problem and ending with 6goals in the Goal-Betting Problem),with reference to the position of the inaction (i.e.,stick to #6665in the 4D Problem and stick to 3goals in the Goal-Betting Problem).An action level (3stands away from a desired outcome)that shared the same closeness as the inaction was designed as neither to approach nor to retreat from the desired outcome (i.e.,the person who shaded different numbers before coming back to his initial decision of buying #6665in the 4D Problem;and the person who debated between buying 4goals and 2goals,but finally decided to buy the initial 3goals in the Goal-Betting Problem).Such an action was analogous to what Kahneman and Tversky (1982)used in their Stock-Switching Problem.Mean ratings of regret (1=very slight regret to 7=very strong regret )by inaction (3stands away from a desired outcome)and action across the five conditions of closeness (1stand away from a desired outcome vs.2stands away vs.3stands away vs.4stands away vs.5stands away)for these two problems are shown in Figures 2and3.12345671 standaway 2 stands away 3 stands away 4 stands away 5 stands awayCloseness to Desired OutcomeR e g r e t R a t i n gFigure 2.4D Problem.Mean ratings of regret (1=very slight regret to 7=very strong regret )by inaction (stick to #6665)and action across the five conditions of closeness (1stand away/bet #6668vs.2stands away/bet #6666vs.3stands away/change and bet #6665vs.4stands away/bet #6663vs.5stands away/bet #6661)to the desired outcome (winning #6669)812LI AND LIANGRepeated-measures ANOVAs conducted on the rating data within the action condition indicate that there was an effect of the closeness,with more intense regret being obtained for the acting target closer to the desired outcome than for the acting target further away from the desired outcome:4D Problem,F (4,596)=84.40,p <.001;and Goal-Betting Problem,F (4,596)=174.59,p <.001.Tests of within-subjects contrasts indicate that more intense regret was obtained for the acting target closer to the desired outcome (4D Problem:1stand away,M =5.51;2stands away,M =4.18;3stands away,M =4.37;and Goal-Betting Problem:1stand away,M =5.43;2stands away,M =3.98;3stands away,M =3.89)than for the nonacting one (4D Problem:inaction–3stands away,M =3.33;and Goal-Betting Problem:inaction–3stands away,M =2.84;p s <.001).However,within-subjects contrasts show that,in the 4D Problem,there was no regret difference between the acting target far away from the desired outcome (inaction–4stands away,M =3.47;inaction–5stands away,M =3.28)and the nonacting target (inaction–3stands away,M =3.33,ns ).In the Goal-Betting Problem,more intense regret was observed for the nonacting target (inaction–3stands away,M =2.96)than for the acting target far away from the desired outcome (inaction–4standsaway,12345671 standaway 2 stands away 3 stands away 4 stands away 5 stands awayCloseness to Desired OutcomeR e g r e t R a t i n gFigure 3.Goal-Betting Problem.Mean ratings of regret (1=very slight regret to 7=very strong regret )by inaction (stick to 3goals)and action across the five conditions of closeness (1stand away/bet 5goals vs.2stands away/bet 4goals vs.3stands away/change and bet 3goals vs.4stands away/bet 2goals vs.5stands away/bet 1goal)to the desired outcome (ending with 6goals)ACTION/INACTION AND REGRET 813814LI AND LIANGM=2.54;inaction–5stands away,M=2.38),F(1,149)=6.74,p<.01;and F(1,149)=14.01,p<.001,respectively.Skirt-Designing Problem and Goalkeeper ProblemThe Skirt-Designing Problem involves regretful designers who,in antici-pation of this year’s fashion trend(which turns out to favor the full-length skirt),failed to come up with the newest fashion designs for skirts.The Goalkeeper Problem involves regretful goalkeepers who failed to prevent the ball from going into the goal by saving the penalty.The present two regret-triggering problems differ from the previous ones in that only three levels of closeness(1to3stands away from a desired outcome)were manipulated within the action condition.The alleged futile actors are the designer who changed his mind with variations of longer and shorter skirts before coming back to his initial decision of the knee-length skirt;and the goalkeeper who shifted to the left side,then to the right side,but was back in the same position(center)as the shot was taken.Mean ratings of regret(1=very slight regret to7=very strong regret)by inaction(2stands away from the desired outcome)and action across the three conditions of closeness(1stand away from the desired outcome vs.2 stands away vs.3stands away)are presented in Figures4and5,respectively. Repeated-measures ANOVAs conducted on the rating data within the action condition indicate that there was an effect of closeness,with action closer to the desired outcome arousing more regret than action far away from the desired outcome:Skirt-Designing Problem,F(2,298)=26.18,p<.001;and Goalkeeper Problem,F(2,298)=22.99,p<.001.Tests of within-subjects contrasts indicate that action closer to the desired outcome aroused stronger regret(Skirt-Designing Problem:action–1stand away,M=4.67;action–2 stands away,M=4.17;and Goalkeeper Problem:action–1stand away, M=5.53;action–2stands away,M=4.68)than did inaction(Skirt-Designing Problem:inaction–2stands away,M=3.14;and Goalkeeper Problem:inaction–2stands away,M=4.37;p s<.05),but action far away from the desired outcome failed to arouse stronger regret(Skirt-Designing Problem:action–3stands away,M=3.43;and Goalkeeper Problem: action–3stands away,M=4.27)than did inaction(Skirt-Designing Problem: inaction–2stands away,M=3.14;and Goalkeeper Problem:inaction–2 stands away,M=4.37,ns).Thefindings of the4D Problem,the Goal-Betting Problem,the Skirt-Designing Problem,and the Goalkeeper Problem were consistent with the present notion,in the sense that more intense regret was obtained for the12345671 stand away2 stands away3 stands awayCloseness to Desired OutcomeR e g r e t R a t i n gFigure 4.Skirt-Designing Problem.Mean ratings of regret (1=very slight regret to 7=very strong regret )by inaction (stick to knee-length)and action across the three conditions of closeness (1stand away/15cm below knees vs.2stands away/change and adopt knee-length vs.3stands away/15cm above knees)to the desired outcome (ending with full-length skirt)1234567 1 stand away 2 stands away 3 stands awayCloseness to Desired OutcomeR e g r e t R a t i n gFigure 5.Goalkeeper Problem.Mean ratings of regret (1=very slight regret to 7=very strong regret )by inaction (did not move)and action across the three conditions of closeness (1stand away/dive to the right vs.2stands away/shift and position unchanged vs.3stands away/dive to the left)to the desired outcome (the ball flew to the right side of the goal)ACTION/INACTION AND REGRET 815816LI AND LIANGacting target closer to the desired outcome than for the acting target far away from the desired pared with the nonacting target,equal or even weaker intense regret was observed for the acting target far away from the desired outcome.Suchfindings provide support for Hypothesis2,but not for Hypothesis1.Exam ProblemThe hypothetical scenario of the Exam Problem was borrowed from N’gbala and Branscombe’s(1997)example of school-related achievements. The action manipulation in the Exam Problem was the simplest:One acting target approached(studied History only)and the other retreated from (studied Geography only)the desired outcome(passing History exam).Inac-tion was designed not to study either Geography or History before the exam. According to N’gbala and Branscombe,in this case,inaction is more likely to be mutated than are actions.That is,it is easier to recommend action to Student B(i.e.,“If only Student B had studied before the exams”)than to recommend inaction to Student A or Student C.As a result,Student B was expected to experience more regret.Mean ratings of regret(1=very slight regret to7=very strong regret)by inaction(2stands away from a desired outcome)and action across the two conditions of closeness(1stand away from a desired outcome vs.3stands away)are presented in Figure6.Repeated-measures ANOVAs conducted on the rating data within the action condition indicate that there was an effect of the closeness,with more intense regret being obtained for the acting target closer to the desired outcome(action–1stand away,M=5.78)than for the acting target far away from the desired outcome(action–3stands away, M=2.83),F(1,149)=166.52,p<.001.Tests of within-subjects contrasts indicate that participants experienced stronger regret with action closer to the desired outcome(action–1stand away,M=5.78)than with inaction (inaction–2stands away,M=2.58,p<.001),but they experienced equally weak regret with action far away from the desired outcome(action–3stands away,M=2.83)and with inaction(inaction–2stands away,M=2.58,ns). Thus,data analyses did not offer support for the two hypotheses(Hypotheses 1and3)concerning the action–inaction effect,but did offer support for Hypothesis2.Kahneman and Tversky(1982)suggested that actions or commissions are more abnormal and possess a greater potential for evoking stronger emo-tional reactions than do inactions or omissions.For this reason,actions are hypothesized to be more mutable than inactions and,as a consequence,will be more regretted.Since then,a central hypothesis about regret in the socialcognition literature has been that actions are regretted more than are inac-tions (Feldman et al.,1999).The present experiment demonstrates that,in essence,action is not always perceived as more regret than inaction.The effect of action will be moderated by closeness.When actions were moved closer to a good outcome,partici-pants reported stronger regrets produced by actions than by inaction.When actions were moved away from a good outcome,inactions were,contrary to prior research findings,at least as intensely regretted as actions or even more regretted.This is true,regardless of whether the action was seen as more mutable (as suggested by Kahneman &Tversky,1982;Miller,Turnbull,&McFarland,1990)or the inaction was seen as more mutable (as suggested by N’gbala &Branscombe,1997).All of the regret-triggering scenarios (except the Exam Problem)were designed so that there was an action with futile effort that neither approached nor retreated from the desired outcome,but shared the same closeness as the inaction.Such an attempt provided a replication of the finding of previous studies that action regrets are more intense than are inaction regrets.A “futile-effort”account was suggested by the present research,but no attempt has been made to test it conceptually.In order to pit a futile-effort account against a mutability or abnormality account,a follow-up experiment might further our understanding about how futility influences the intensity of the 12345671 stand away2 stands away3 stands awayCloseness to Desired OutcomeR e g r e t R a t i n gFigure 6.Exam Problem.Mean ratings of regret (1=very slight regret to 7=very strong regret )by inaction (did not study Geography or History before exam/2stands away from desired outcome)and action across the two conditions of closeness (1stand away/studied only History vs.3stands away/studied only Geography)to the desired outcome (passing History exam)emotion that a person is expected to experience as a result of a waste of time, energy,or money perceived.ReferencesByrne,R.M.J.,&McEleney,A.(2000).Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act.Journal of Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory,and Cognition,26,1318–1331.Davis,C.G.,Lehman,D.R.,Wortman,C.B.,Silver,R.C.,&Thompson, S.C.(1995).The undoing of traumatic life events.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,21,109–124.Feldman,J.,Miyamoto,J.,&Loftus E.F.(1999).Are actions regretted more than inactions?Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 78,232–255.Gavanski,I.,&Wells,G.L.(1989).Counterfactual processing of normal and exceptional events.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,25,314–325.Gilovich,T.,&Medvec,V.H.(1994).The temporal pattern to the experience of regret.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,67,357–365. 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