上市公司盈利能力分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

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企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across IndustriesAbstractFirms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the fund s available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied upin current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surv eyed firms across key components of working capital management by usi ng the CFO magazine’s annual Working CapitalManagement Survey. We discover that significant differences exist b etween industries in working capital measures across time.In addition.w e discover that these measures for working capital change significantl y within industries across time.IntroductionThe importance of efficient working capital management is indisputa ble. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commi tments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). Th e objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viabilit y relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory.a nd payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in b ringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back towa rd optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency.A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capita l management is the recurrent attention being given to the applicatio n of Six Sigma®methodology. Six S igma®methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies.inefficiencies and erroneous tra nsactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma®reduces Days Sale s Outstanding (DSO).accelerates the payment cycle.improves customer sati sfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories including Jennifertwon’s(2002) report of a 15percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding.resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Cenrer.Furthermore bad debts declined from 3.4millin to $6000000.However.Waxer’s(2003)study of multiple firms employing Six Sig ma®finds that it is really a “get rich slow”technique with a r ate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range.Even in a business using Six Sigma®methodology. an “optimal”level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impa ct firm credit policy.inventory management.and bill-paying activities. S ome firms may be better suited to minimize receivables and inventory. while others maximize payables. Another aspect of “optimal”is the extent to which poor financial results can be tied to sub-optimal pe rformance.Fortunately.these issues are testable with data published by CFO magazine. which claims to be the source of “tools and informati on for the financial executive.”and are the subject of this resear ch.In addition to providing mean and variance values for the working capital measures and the overall metric.two issues will be addressed in this research. One research question is. “are firms within a p articular industry clustered together at consistent levels of working capital measures?For instance.are firms in one industry able to quickl y transfer sales into cash.while firms from another industry tend to have high sales levels for the particular level of inventory . The other research question is. “does working capital management perform ance for firms within a given industry change from year-to-year?”The following section presents a brief literature review.Next.the r esearch method is described.including some information about the annual Working Capital Management Survey published by CFO magazine. Findings are then presented and conclusions are drawn.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the f inance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores.should have been anticipated because the co rporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for e ight of the last ten years of its corporate life.As part of a stud y of the Fortune 500s financial management practices. Gilbert and Rei chert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects.wh ile inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the compa nies.More recently. Farragher. Kleiman and Sahu (1999) find that 55 p ercent of firms in the S&P Industrial index complete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding account s receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any curre nt asset accounts or liability accounts across industries.Thus.mixed ev idence exists concerning the use of working capital management techniq ues.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the s ubject of many articles over the years (e.g. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1 996).with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management.Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tend ency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low l evels of current liabilities. Simultaneously investigating accounts rece ivable and payable issues.Hill. Sartoris.and Ferguson (1984) find diffe rences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received.while payors view paymen t as the postmark date.Additional WCM insight across firms.industries.a nd time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of value creation that incorporate effective short-term financial management acti vities.However.these models are generic models and do not consider uni que firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located in may have more influence on th at company’s fortunes than overall GNP”(2002. 507).In fact. a car eful review of this 627-page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industr y factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In-House Credit Card”(128) and nothing on WC M stability over time. This research will attempt to fill this void by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided ver y few recent reports about working capital management. The most relev ant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) article on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effect ive supply chain management by Hadley (2004).Research Method The CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group.was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management co nsulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global l ist of clients. The original survey reports several working capital b enchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an a nnual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations”value located on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). T his value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “days of working capital”(DWC) value is based on the d ollar amount in each of the aggregate.equally-weighted receivables.inven tory.and payables accounts. The “days of working capital”(DNC) repr esents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount fromvendor until the sale to the customer.the collection of the receiva bles. and payment receipt.Thus.it reflects the companys ability to fin ance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firm and industry val ues for days sales outstanding (A/R).inventory turnover.and days payabl es outstanding (A/P).Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –2000 period .Across the nearly 1.000 firms in the survey.cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion ef ficiency”(CCE).averages 9.0 percent.Incorporating a 95 percent confide nce interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and invent ories less payables divided by daily sales.averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6).because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days).In all ins tances.the standard deviation is relatively small.suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO report s.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management Perfo rmanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its ing the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-s ix industries that had at least eight companies included in the rank ings each year.In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean ove rall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best avera ge ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assume s that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the ent ire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleum in dustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital man agement rankings.In fact.the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later i n this paper).Furthermore.the petroleum industry had the lowest standar d deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry.which ranked secon d in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst work ing capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-s econd in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures ConclusionsThe research presented here is based on the annual ratings of wo rking capital management published in CFO magazine. Our findings indic ate a consistency in how industries “stack up”against each other over time with respect to the working capital measures.However.the wor king capital measures themselves are not static (i.e.. averages of wo rking capital measures across all firms change annually); our results indicate significant movements across our entire sample over time. O ur findings are important because they provide insight to working cap ital performance across time. and on working capital management across industries. These changes may be in explained in part by macroecono mic factors Changes in interest rates.rate of innovation.and competitio n are likely to impact working capital management. As interest rates rise.there would be less desire to make payments early.which would stretch accounts payable.accounts receivable.and cash accounts. The ra mifications of this study include the finding of distinct levels of WCM measures for different industries.which tend to be stable over ti me. Many factors help to explain this discovery. The improving econom y during the period of the study may have resulted in improved turn over in some industries.while slowing turnover may have been a signal of troubles ahead. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. Our study takes places over a short time frame during a generally impr oving market. In addition. the survey suffers from survivorship bias –only the top firms within each industry are ranked each year and the composition of those firms within the industry can change annua lly.Further research may take one of two lines.First.there could bea study of whether stock prices respond to CFO magazine’s publication of working capital management rating.Second,there could be a study of which if any of the working capital management components relate to share price performance.Given our results,there studies need to take industry membership into consideration when estimating stock price reaction to working capital management performance.对整个行业中营运资金管理的研究格雷格Filbeck.Schweser学习计划托马斯M克鲁格.威斯康星大学拉克罗斯摘要:企业能够降低融资成本或者尽量减少绑定在流动资产上的成立基金数额来用于扩大现有的资金。

财务报表分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

财务报表分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTSWe need to use financial ratios in analyzing financial statements.—— The analysis of comparative financial statements cannot be made really effective unless it takes the form of a study of relationships between items in the statements. It is of little value, for example, to know that, on a given date, the Smith Company has a cash balance of $1oooo. But suppose we know that this balance is only -IV per cent of all current liabilities whereas a year ago cash was 25 per cent of all current liabilities. Since the bankers for the company usually require a cash balance against bank lines, used or unused, of 20 per cent, we can see at once that the firm's cash condition is exhibiting a questionable tendency.We may make comparisons between items in the comparative financial statements as follows:1. Between items in the comparative balance sheeta) Between items in the balance sheet for one date, e.g., cash may be compared with current liabilitiesb) Between an item in the balance sheet for one date and the same item in the balance sheet for another date, e.g., cash today may be compared with cash a year agoc) Of ratios, or mathematical proportions, between two items in the balance sheet for one date and a like ratio in the balance sheet for another date, e.g., the ratio of cash to current liabilities today may be compared with a like ratio a year ago and the trend of cash condition noted2. Between items in the comparative statement of income and expensea) Between items in the statement for a given periodb) Between one item in this period's statement and the same item in last period's statementc) Of ratios between items in this period's statement and similar ratios in last period's statement3. Between items in the comparative balance sheet and items in the comparative statement of income and expensea) Between items in these statements for a given period, e.g., net profit for this year may be calculated as a percentage of net worth for this yearb) Of ratios between items in the two statements for a period of years, e.g., the ratio of net profit to net worth this year may-be compared with like ratios for last year, and for the years preceding thatOur comparative analysis will gain in significance if we take the foregoing comparisons or ratios and; in turn, compare them with:I. Such data as are absent from the comparative statements but are of importance in judging a concern's financial history and condition, for example, the stage of the business cycle2. Similar ratios derived from analysis of the comparative statements of competing concerns or of concerns in similar lines of business What financialratios are used in analyzing financial statements.- Comparative analysis of comparative financial statements may be expressed by mathematical ratios between the items compared, for example, a concern's cash position may be tested by dividing the item of cash by the total of current liability items and using the quotient to express the result of the test. Each ratio may be expressed in two ways, for example, the ratio of sales to fixed assets may be expressed as the ratio of fixed assets to sales. We shall express each ratio in such a way that increases from period to period will be favorable and decreases unfavorable to financial condition.We shall use the following financial ratios in analyzing comparative financial statements:I. Working-capital ratios1. The ratio of current assets to current liabilities2. The ratio of cash to total current liabilities3. The ratio of cash, salable securities, notes and accounts receivable to total current liabilities4. The ratio of sales to receivables, i.e., the turnover of receivables5. The ratio of cost of goods sold to merchandise inventory, i.e., the turnover of inventory6. The ratio of accounts receivable to notes receivable7. The ratio of receivables to inventory8. The ratio of net working capital to inventory9. The ratio of notes payable to accounts payableIO. The ratio of inventory to accounts payableII. Fixed and intangible capital ratios1. The ratio of sales to fixed assets, i.e., the turnover of fixed capital2. The ratio of sales to intangible assets, i.e., the turnover of intangibles3. The ratio of annual depreciation and obsolescence charges to the assetsagainst which depreciation is written off4. The ratio of net worth to fixed assetsIII. Capitalization ratios1. The ratio of net worth to debt.2. The ratio of capital stock to total capitalization .3. The ratio of fixed assets to funded debtIV. Income and expense ratios1. The ratio of net operating profit to sales2. The ratio of net operating profit to total capital3. The ratio of sales to operating costs and expenses4. The ratio of net profit to sales5. The ratio of net profit to net worth6. The ratio of sales to financial expenses7. The ratio of borrowed capital to capital costs8. The ratio of income on investments to investments9. The ratio of non-operating income to net operating profit10. The ratio of net operating profit to non-operating expense11. The ratio of net profit to capital stock12. The ratio of net profit reinvested to total net profit available for dividends on common stock13. The ratio of profit available for interest to interest expensesThis classification of financial ratios is permanent not exhaustive. -Other ratios may be used for purposes later indicated. Furthermore, some of the ratios reflect the efficiency with which a business has used its capital while others reflect efficiency in financing capital needs. The ratios of sales to receivables, inventory, fixed and intangible capital; the ratios of net operating profit to total capital and to sales; and the ratios of sales to operating costs and expenses reflect efficiency in the use of capital.' Most of the other ratios reflect financial efficiency.B. Technique of Financial Statement AnalysisAre the statements adequate in general?-Before attempting comparative analysis of given financial statements we wish to be sure that the statements are reasonably adequate for the purpose. They should, of course, be as complete as possible. They should also be of recent date. If not, their use must be limited to the period which they cover. Conclusions concerning 1923 conditions cannot safely be based upon 1921 statements.Does the comparative balance sheet reflect a seasonable situation? If so, it is important to know financial conditions at both the high and low points of the season. We must avoid unduly favorable judgment of the business at the low point when assets are very liquid and debt is low, and unduly unfavorable judgment at the high point when assets are less liquid and debt likely to be relatively high.Does the balance sheet for any date reflect the estimated financial condition after the sale of a proposed new issue of securities? If so, in order to ascertain the actual financial condition at that date it is necessary to subtract the amount of the security issue from net worth, if the. issue is of stock, or from liabilities, if bonds are to be sold. A like amount must also be subtracted from assets or liabilities depending upon how the estimated proceeds of the issue are reflected in the statement.Are the statements audited or unaudited? It is often said that audited statements, that is, complete audits rather than statements "rubber stamped" by certified public accountants, are desirable when they can be obtained. This is true, but the statement analyst should be certain that the given auditing film's reputation is beyond reproach.Is working-capital situation favorable ?-If the comparative statements to be analyzed are reasonably adequate for the purpose, the next step is to analyze the concern's working-capital trend and position. We may begin by ascertaining the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. This ratioaffords-a test of the concern's probable ability to pay current obligations without impairing its net working capital. It is, in part, a measure of ability to borrow additional working capital or to renew short-term loans without difficulty. The larger the excess of current assets over current liabilities the smaller the risk of loss to short-term creditors and the better the credit of the business, other things being equal. A ratio of two dollars of current assets to one dollar of current liabilities is the "rule-of-thumb" ratio generally considered satisfactory, assuming all current assets are conservatively valued and all current liabilities revealed.The rule-of-thumb current ratio is not a satisfactory test ofworking-capital position and trend. A current ratio of less than two dollars for one dollar may be adequate, or a current ratio of more than two dollars for one dollar may be inadequate. It depends, for one thing, upon the liquidity of the current assets.The liquidity of current assets varies with cash position.-The larger the proportion of current assets in the form of cash the more liquid are the current assets as a whole. Generally speaking, cash should equal at least 20 per cent of total current liabilities (divide cash by total current liabilities). Bankers typically require a concern to maintain bank balances equal to 20 per cent of credit lines whether used or unused. Open-credit lines are not shown on the balance sheet, hence the total of current liabilities (instead of notes payable to banks) is used in testing cash position. Like the two-for-one current ratio, the 20 per cent cash ratio is more or less a rule-of-thumb standard.The cash balance that will be satisfactory depends upon terms of sale, terms of purchase, and upon inventory turnover. A firm selling goods for cash will find cash inflow more nearly meeting cash outflow than will a firm selling goods on credit. A business which pays cash for all purchases will need more ready money than one which buys on long terms of credit. The more rapidly the inventory is sold the more nearly will cash inflow equal cash outflow, other things equal.Needs for cash balances will be affected by the stage of the business cycle. Heavy cash balances help to sustain bank credit and pay expenses when a period of liquidation and depression depletes working capital and brings a slump in sales. The greater the effects of changes in the cycle upon a given concern the more thought the financial executive will need to give to the size of his cash balances.Differences in financial policies between different concerns will affect the size of cash balances carried. One concern may deem it good policy to carry as many open-bank lines as it can get, while another may carry only enough lines to meet reasonably certain needs for loans. The cash balance of the first firm is likely to be much larger than that of the second firm.The liquidity of current assets varies with ability to meet "acid test."- Liquidity of current assets varies with the ratio of cash, salable securities, notes and accounts receivable (less adequate reserves for bad debts), to total current liabilities (divide the total of the first four items by total current liabilities). This is the so-called "acid test" of the liquidity of current condition. A ratio of I: I is considered satisfactory since current liabilities can readily be paid and creditors risk nothing on the uncertain values of merchandise inventory. A less than 1:1 ratio may be adequate if receivables are quickly collected and if inventory is readily and quickly sold, that is, if its turnover is rapid andif the risks of changes in price are small.The liquidity of current assets varies with liquidity of receivables. This may be ascertained by dividing annual sales by average receivables or by receivables at the close of the year unless at that date receivables do not represent the normal amount of credit extended to customers. Terms of sale must be considered in judging the turnover of receivables. For example, if sales for the year are $1,200,000 and average receivables amount to $100,000, the turnover of receivables is $1,200,000/$100,000=12. Now, if credit terms to customers are net in thirty days we can see that receivables are paid promptly.Consideration should also be given market conditions and the stage of the business cycle. Terms of credit are usually longer in farming sections than in industrial centers. Collections are good in prosperous times but slow in periods of crisis and liquidation.Trends in the liquidity of receivables will also be reflected in the ratio of accounts receivable to notes receivable, in cases where goods are typically sold on open account. A decline in this ratio may indicate a lowering of credit standards since notes receivable are usually given to close overdue open accounts. If possible, a schedule of receivables should be obtained showing those not due, due, and past due thirty, sixty, and ninety days. Such a, schedule is of value in showing the efficiency of credits and collections and in explaining the trend in turnover of receivables. The more rapid the turnover of receivables the smaller the risk of loss from bad debts; the greater the savings of interest on the capital invested in receivables, and the higher the profit on total capital, other things being equal.Author(s): C. O. Hardy and S. P. Meech译文:财务报表分析A.财务比率我们需要使用财务比率来分析财务报表,比较财务报表的分析方法不能真正有效的得出想要的结果,除非采取的是研究在报表中项目与项目之间关系的形式。

营运资金的管理对上市公司盈利能力的影响【外文翻译】

营运资金的管理对上市公司盈利能力的影响【外文翻译】

外文翻译The relationship between working capital management and profitability of listed companiesMaterial Source: Electronic copy available athttp://ss / Author: Ioannis LazaridisAbstractIn this paper we investigate the relationship of corporate profitability and working capital management. We used a sample of 131 companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period of 2001-2004. The purpose of this paper is to establish a relationship that is statistical significant between profitability, the cash conversion cycle and its components for listed firms in the ASE. The results of our research showed that there is statistical significance between profitability, measured through gross operating profit, and the cash conversion cycle. Moreover managers can create profits for their companies by handling correctly the cash conversion cycle and keeping each different component (accounts receivables, accounts payables, inventory) to an optimum level.IntroductionCapital structure and working capital management are two areas widely revisited by academia in order to postulate firms’ profitability. Working capital management have been approached in numerous ways. Other researchers studied the impact of optimum inventory management while other authors studied the management of accounts receivables in an optimum way that leads to profit maximisation1. According to Deloof 2 (2003) the way that working capital is managed has a significant impact on profitability of firms. This result indicates that there is a certain level of working capital requirements which potentially maximises returns.Other work on the field of working capital management focuses on the routines employed by firms. This research showed that firms which focus on cash management were larger, with fewer cash sales, more seasonality and possibly more cash flow problems. While smaller firms focused more on stock management and less profitable firms were focused on credit management routines. It is suggestedthat high growth firms follow a more reluctant credit policy towards their customers, while they tie up more capital in the form of inventory. Meanwhile accounts payables will increase due to better relations of suppliers with financial institutions which divert this advantage of financial cost to their clients.According to Wilner (2000) most firms extensively use trade credit despite its apparent greater cost, and trade credit interest rates commonly exceed 18 percent5. In addition to that he states that in 1993 American firms extended their credit towards customers by 1.5 trillion dollars. Similarly Deloof (2003) found out through statistics from the National Bank of Belgium that in 1997 accounts payable were 13% of their total assets while accounts receivables and inventory accounted for 17% and 10% respectively. Summers and Wilson (2000) report that in the UK corporate sector more than 80% of daily business transactions are on credit terms6.There seems to be a strong relation between the cash conversion cycle of a firm and its profitability. The three different components of cash conversion cycle (accounts payables, accounts receivables and inventory) can be managed in different ways in order to maximise profitability or to enhance the growth of a company. Sometimes trade credit is a vehicle to attract new customers. Many firms are prepared to change their standard credit terms in order to win new customers and to gain large orders.In addition to that credit can stimulate sales because it allows customers to assess product quality before paying8. Therefore it is up to the individual company whether a ‘marketing’ approach should be followed when managing the working capital through credit extension. However the financial department of such a company will face cash flow and liquidity problems since capital will be invested in customers and inventory respectively. In order to have maximum value, equilibrium should be maintained in receivables-payables and inventory. According to Pike & Cheng (2001) credit management seeks to create, safeguard and realise a portfolio of high quality accounts receivable. Given the significant investment in accounts receivable by most large firms, credit management policy choices and practices could have important implications for corporate value9. Successful management of resources will lead to corporate profitability, but how can we measure management success since a period of ‘credit granting’ might lead to increased sales and market share whilst accompanied by decreased profitability or the opposite? Since working capital management is best described by the cash conversion cycle we will try to establish a link between profitability and management of the cash conversion cycle. This simple equationencompasses all three very important aspects of working capital management. It is an indication of how long a firm can carry on if it was to stop its operation or it indicates the time gap between purchase of goods and collection of sales. The optimum level of inventories will have a direct effect on profitability since it will release working capital resources which in turn will be invested in the business cycle, or will increase inventory levels in order to respond to higher product demand. Similarly both credit policy from suppliers and credit period granted to customers will have an impact on profitability. In order to understand the way working capital is managed cash conversion cycle and its components will be statistically analysed. In this paper we investigate the relationship between working capital management and firms’ profitability for 131 listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 2001-2004. The purpose of this paper is to establish a relationship that is statistical significant between profitability, the cash conversion cycle and its components for listed firms in the ASE (Athens Stock Exchange). The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the variables used as well as the chosen sample of firms. Results of the descriptive statistics accompanied with regression modelling relating profitability (the dependent variable) against other independent variables including components of the cash conversion cycle, in order to test statistical significance. Finally the last section discusses the findings of this paper and comes up with conclusions related with working capital management policies and profitability.2. Data Collection and Variables(i) Data CollectionThe data collected were from listed firms in the Athens Stock Exchange Market. The reason we chose this market is primarily due to the reliability of the financial statements. Companies listed in the stock market have an incentive to present profits if those exist in order to make their shares more attractive. Contrary to listed firms, non listed firms in Greece have less of an incentive to present true operational results and usually their financial statements do not reflect real operational and financial activity. Hiding profits in order to avoid corporate tax is a common tactic for non listed firms in Greece which makes them less of a suitable sample for analysis where one can draw inference, based on financial data, for working capital practices.For the purpose of this research certain industries have been omitted due to their type of activity. We followed the classification of NACE10 industries fromwhich electricity and water, banking and financial institutions, insurance, rental and other services firms have been omitted. The original sample consisted of about 300 firms which narrowed down to 131 companies. The most recent period for which we had complete data was 2001-2004. Some of the firms were not included in the data due to lack of information for the certain period. Finally the financial statements were obtained from the ICAP SA11 database. Our analysis uses stacked data for the period 2001-2004 which results to 524 total observations.(ii) VariablesAs mentioned earlier in the introduction the cash conversion cycle is used as a measure in order to gauge profitability. This measure is described by the following equation:Cash Conversion Cycle = No of Days A/R12 + No of Days Inventory – No of Days A/P13 (1)In turn the components of cash conversion cycle are given below:No of Days A/R = Accounts Receivables/Sales*365 (2)No of Days Inventory = Inventory/Cost of Goods Sold*365 (3)No of Days A/P = Accounts Payables/Cost of Goods Sold*365 (4)Another variable chosen for the model specification is that of company size measured through the natural logarithm of sales. Shares and participation to other firm are considered as fixed financial assets. The variable I we use which is related to financial assets is the following:Fixed Financial Assets Ratio = Fixed Financial Assets/Total Assets (5) This variable is used since for many listed companies financial assets comprise a significant part of their total assets. This variable will be used later on in order to obtain an indication how the relationship and participation of one firm to others affects its profitability. Another variable used in order to perform regression analysis later on, includes financial debt measured through the following equation: Financial Debt Ratio = (Short Term Loans + Long Term Loans)/Total Assets (6) This is used in order to establish relation between the external financing of the firm and its total assets.Finally the dependent variable used is that of gross operating profit. In order to obtain this variable we subtract cost of goods sold from total sales and divide the result with total assets minus financial assets.Gross Operating Profit = (Sales –COGS14)/(Total Assets –Financial Assets(7)The reason for using this variable instead of earnings before interest tax depreciation amortization (EBITDA) or profits before or after taxes is because we wa nt to associate operating ‘success’ or ‘failure’ with an operating ratio and relate this variable with other operating variables (i.e cash conversion cycle). Moreover we want to exclude the participation of any financial activity from operational activity that might affect overall profitability, thus financial assets are subtracted from total assets.3. Descriptive StatisticsThe following table gives the descriptive statistics of the collected variables. The total of observations sums to n = 524. On average 16.8% of total assets are financial assets (including participation to other subsidiaries). Total sales have a mean of 118.9 million euros while the median is 31.9 million. The firms included in our sample had an average of 2.58% net operating profit. The credit period granted to their customers ranged at 148 days on average (median 130 days) while they paid their creditors in 96 days on average (median 73 days). Inventory takes on average 136 days to be sold (median 104 days). Overall the average cash conversion cycle ranged at 188 days (median 165 days).。

企业财务状况评价外文文献及翻译

企业财务状况评价外文文献及翻译

企业财务状况评价外文文献及翻译摘要本文通过对国内外财务状况评价相关外文文献的调研和翻译,总结了不同学者对企业财务状况评价的方法和指标,以及其对企业经营决策和风险管理的影响。

同时,还分析了现有文献中的研究局限,并提出了相应的进一步研究方向。

引言企业财务状况的评价在企业经营决策和风险管理中具有重要的作用。

随着全球经济的不断发展,企业财务状况评价的方法和指标也得到了不断的完善和更新。

本文旨在通过对国内外相关文献的调研和翻译,探讨企业财务状况评价的相关内容。

方法本文通过检索相关数据库和学术期刊,筛选了一批与企业财务状况评价相关的外文文献。

然后,进行了文献综述和内容翻译,并总结出其中的关键信息和研究成果。

结果1. 企业财务状况评价方法根据文献翻译和分析,目前学者们在企业财务状况评价方面主要采用以下方法:- 财务比率分析:通过对企业财务报表的比率分析,评估企业的偿债能力、盈利能力、运营效率等方面的状况。

- 资产负债表分析:通过对企业资产负债表的分析,揭示企业的资产结构、债务水平和净资产价值等方面的情况。

- 现金流量分析:通过对企业现金流量表的分析,探讨企业的现金流入流出情况以及可持续性问题。

- 经验判断和专家评估:通过对企业经营情况的判断和专家的评估,综合考虑多个因素对企业财务状况的影响。

2. 企业财务状况评价指标研究发现,在企业财务状况评价中,常用的指标包括:- 流动比率:反映企业短期偿债能力的指标。

- 速动比率:更加严格地评估企业短期偿债能力的指标。

- 盈利能力指标:如净利润率、毛利率等,用于评估企业的盈利水平。

- 储蓄比率:评估企业的盈利再投资能力的指标。

- 负债比率:反映企业债务水平和承担风险的指标。

3. 对企业经营决策和风险管理的影响学者们的研究表明,企业财务状况评价对企业经营决策和风险管理有重要影响。

合理评估企业财务状况可以帮助企业制定更加科学的经营决策,提高企业效益和竞争力。

同时,对企业财务状况的评价还可以帮助企业及时发现和应对潜在的经营风险,降低经营风险带来的不确定性。

激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响外文文献翻译

激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响外文文献翻译

文献信息:文献标题:Impact of Aggressive Working Capital Management Policy on Firms’ Profitability(激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响)国外作者:Mian Sajid Nazir,Talat Afza文献出处:《The IUP Journal of Applied Finance》,2009,Vol.15,PP19-30 字数统计:英文2669单词,14456字符;中文4407汉字外文文献:Impact of Aggressive Working Capital Management Policyon Firms’ ProfitabilityIntroductionThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions, particularly investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation decisions. However, short-term assets and liabilities are important components of total assets and need to be carefully analyzed. Management of these short-term assets and liabilities warrants a careful investigation since the working capital m anagement plays an important role in a firm’s profitability and risk as well as its value (Smith, 1980). Efficient management of working capital is a fundamental part of the overall corporate strategy in creating the shareholders’ value. Firms try to keep an optimal level of working capital that maximizes their value (Deloof, 2003; Howorth and Westhead, 2003 and Afza and Nazir, 2007).In general, from the perspective of Chief Financial Officer (CFO), working capital management is a simple and straightforward concept of ensuring the ability of the organization to fund the difference between the short-term assets and short-term liabilities (Harris, 2005). However, a ‘Total’ approach is desired as it can cover all thecompany’s activities relating to vendor, cu stomer and product (Hall, 2002). In practice, working capital management has become one of the most important issues in the organizations where many financial executives are struggling to identify the basic working capital drivers and an appropriate level of working capital (Lamberson, 1995). Consequently, companies can minimize risk and improve the overall performance by understanding the role and drivers of working capital management.A firm may adopt an aggressive working capital management policy with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, or it may also be used for the financing decisions of the firm in the form of high level of current liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities. Excessive levels of current assets may have a negative effect on the firm’s profitability, whereas a low level of current assets may lead to a lower level of liquidity and stockouts, resulting in difficulties in maintaining smooth operations (Van Horne and Wachowicz, 2004).The main objective of working capital management is to maintain an optimal balance between each of the working capital components. Business success heavily depends on the financial executives’ ability to effectively manage receivables, inventory, and payables (Filbeck and Krueger, 2005). Firms can reduce their financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion projects by minimizing the amount of investment tied up in current assets. Most of the financial managers’ time and efforts are allocated towards bringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back to optimal levels (Lamberson, 1995). An optimal level of working capital would be the one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency. It requires continuous monitoring to maintain proper level in various components of working capital, i.e., cash receivables, inventory and payables, etc.In general, current assets are considered as one of the important components of total assets of a firm. A firm may be able to reduce the investment in fixed assets by renting or leasing plant and machinery, whereas the same policy cannot be followed for the components of working capital. The high level of current assets may reduce the risk of liquidity associated with the opportunity cost of funds that may have been invested in long-term assets. Though the impact of working capital policies onprofitability is highly important, only a few empirical studies have been carried out to examine this relationship. This study investigates the potential relationship of aggressive/conservative policies with the accounting and market measures of profitability of Pakistani firms using a panel data set for the period 1998-2005. The present study is expected to contribute to better understand these policies and their impact on profitability, especially in emerging markets like Pakistan.Research MethodologyVariables Used in the StudyThis study uses aggressive investment policy as used by Weinraub and Visscher (1998), who analyzed working capital policies of 126 industrial firms in the US market. Aggressive Investment Policy (AIP) results in minimal level of investment in current assets versus fixed assets. In contrast, a conservative investment policy places a greater proportion of capital in liquid assets with the opportunity cost of less profitability. If the level of current assets increases in proportion to the total assets of the firm, the management is said to be more conservative in managing the current assets of the firm. In order to measure the degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment policy, the following ratio was used:where a lower ratio means a relatively aggressive policy.On the other hand, an Aggressive Financing Policy (AFP) utilizes higher levels of current liabilities and less long-term debt. In contrast, a conservative financing policy uses more long-term debt and capital and less current liabilities. The firms are more aggressive in terms of current liabilities management if they are concentrating on the use of more current liabilities which put their liquidity on risk. The degree of aggressiveness of a financing policy adopted by a firm is measured by working capital financing policy, and the following ratio is used:where a higher ratio means a relatively aggressive policy.The impact of working capital policies on the profitability has been analyzed through accounting measures of profitability as well as market measures of profitability, i.e., Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. These variables of return are calculated as:Tobin’s q compares the value of a company given by financial markets with the value of a company’s assets. A low q (between 0 and 1) means that the cost to replace a firm’s assets is greater than the value of its stock. This implies that the stock is undervalued. Conversely, a high q (greater than 1) implies that a firm’s stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets, which implies that the stock is overvalued. It is calculated as:where Market Value of Firm (MVF) is the sum of book value of long plus short term and market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the current market price of the stock in a particular year.Control VariablesIn working capital literature, various studies have used the control variables along with the main variables of working capital in order to have an apposite analysis of working capital management on the profitability of firms (Lamberson, 1995; Smith and Begemann, 1997; Deelof, 2003; Eljelly, 2004; Teruel and Solano, 2005 and Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). On the same lines, along with working capital variables, the present study has taken into consideration some control variables relating to firms such as the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its financial leverage. The size of the firm (SIZE) has been measured by the logarithm of its totalassets, as the original large value of total assets may disturb the analysis. The growth of firm (GROWTH) is measured by variation in its annual sales value with reference to previous year’s sales[(Sales t –Sales t –1)/Sales t –1]. Moreover, the financial leverage (LVRG) was taken as the debt to equity ratio of each firm for the whole sample period. Some studies, like Deloof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms, also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable; however, this variable cannot be included in the present study because of unavailability of data, as most of the firms do not disclose full information in their financial statements. Finally, since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’s profitability (Lamberson, 1995), this phenomenon has been controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the GDPGR variable, which measures the real annual GDP growth in Pakistan for each of the study year from 1998 to 2005.Statistical AnalysisThe impact of aggressive and conservative working capital policies on the profitability of the firms has been evaluated by applying the panel data regression analysis. The performance variables (ROA and Tobin’s q) as well as the TCA/TA and TCL/TA along with the control variables were regressed using the SPSS software. The following regression equations are run to estimate the impact of working capital policies on the profitability measures.where,TCA/TA=Total current assets to total assets ratioTCL/TA i=Total current liabilities to total assets ratioROA i=Return on assetsTobin’s q i=V alue of qSIZE i=Natural log of firm sizeGROWTH i=Growth of salesLVRG i=Financial leverage of firmsGDPGR i=Real Annual GDP growth rate of Pakistanα=Intercept; andε=Error term of the modelSample and DataThe sample of the study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). KSE has divided the non-financial firms into various industrial sectors based on their nature of business. In order to be included in the sample, a firm must be in business for the whole study period. Also, firms should neither have been delisted by the KSE nor merged with any other firm during the whole window period. New incumbents in the market during the study period have also not been included in the sample. Furthermore, firms must have complete data for the period 1998-2005. Firms with negative equity during the study period have also been excluded. Thus, the final sample consists of 204 non-financial firms from 17 various industrial sectors.This study used annual financial data of 204 non-financial firms for the period 1998-2005. The panel data set was developed for eight years and for the 204 sampled firms which produced 1,632 year-end observations. The required financial data for the purpose of the study was obtained from the respective companies’annual reports and publications of State Bank of Pakistan. The data regarding annual average market prices was collected from the daily quotations of KSE.AnalysisTable 1 presents the results of regression model in which the impact of working capital investment policy on the performance measurements has been examined. The F-values of regression models run are found statistically significant, whereas Durbin-Watson statistics of more than 1.8 indicate less correlation among the independent variables of the regressions models. The t-statistics of working capital investment policy is positive and statistically significant at 1% level for Return on Assets and Tobin’s q. The positive coefficient of TCA/TA indicates a negative relationship between the degree of aggressiveness of investment policy and return on assets. As the TCA/TA increases, the degree of aggressiveness decreases, and return on assets increases. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between the relative degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment policies of firms and both performance measures, i.e., ROA and Tobin’s q. This similarity in market and accounting returns confirms the notion that investors do not believe in the adoption of aggressive approach in the working capital management, hence, they do not give any additional weight to the firms on KSE.Table 2 reports regression results for working capital financing policy and the performance measures. The F-value of regression models and Durbin-Watson statistics indicate similar results as reported in Table 1. The negative value of coefficient for TCL/TA also points out the negative relationship between the aggressiveness of working capital financing policy and return on assets. The higher the TCL/TA ratio, the more aggressive the financing policy, that yields negative return on assets. However, surprisingly, the relationship between Tobin’s q and working capital financing policy has been established as positive and statistically significant. Investors were found giving more weight to the firms which are adopting an aggressive approach towards working capital financing policy and having higher levels of short-term and spontaneous financing on their balance sheets.The control variables used in the regression models are natural log of firm size, sales growth, real GDP growth and the average leverage. All the control variables have their impact on the performance of the firms. Firms’size causes the returns of the firms to be increased and it is found to be statistically significant. Moreover, GROWTH and LVRG are found to be significantly associated with the book-based returns on assets which confirm the notion that leverage and growth are strongly correlated with the book value-based performance measures (Deloof, 2003 and Eljelly,2004). Real GDP growth may not affect the returns based on book values; however, investors may react positively to a positive change in the level of economic activity which is in accordance with the findings of Lamberson (1995).The above results contradict the findings of Gardner et al. (1986), Deloof (2003), Eljelly (2004) and Teruel and Solano (2005); however, they are in accordance with Afza and Nazir (2007) and produced a negative relationship between the aggressiveness of working capital policies and accounting measures of profitability. Managers cannot create value if they adopt an aggressive approach towards working capital investment and working capital financing policy. However, if firms adopt aggressive approach in managing their short-term liabilities, investors give more value to those firms. The degree of aggressiveness of working capital policies adopted helps only in creating shareholders’wealth through increased market performance, whereas accounting performance cannot be increased by being aggressive in managing the working capital requirements. The results of this study are somewhat different from those conducted in the developed economies. Pakistan is one of the emerging economies and Pakistani markets are not fully transparent and efficient to fully absorb the impact of information. The study results confirm this state of Pakistani markets.ConclusionThe present study investigates the relationship between the aggressive/conservative working capital asset management and financing polices and its impact on profitability of 204 Pakistani firms divided into 16 industrial groups by KSE for the period 1998-2005. The impact of aggressive/conservative working capital investment and the financing policies has been examined using panel data regression models between working capital policies and profitability. The study finds a negative relationship between the profitability measures of firms and degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment and financing policies. The firms report negative returns if they follow an aggressive working capital policy. These results were furthervalidated by examining the impact of aggressive working capital policies on market measures of profitability, which was not tested before. The results of Tobin’s q were in line of the accounting measures of profitability and produced almost similar results for working capital investment policy. However, investors were found giving more value to those firms that are more aggressive in managing their current liabilities.The study used a new measure of profitability, i.e., Tobin’s q and panel data regression analysis, to investigate the relationship between working capital management and firm returns in Pakistan. The findings of the present study are expected to contribute significantly to finance literature. The results of the present study are in contradiction to those of some earlier studies on the issue. This phenomenon may be attributed to the inconsistent and volatile economic conditions of Pakistan. The reasons for this contradiction may further be explored in future researches.The study also suggests some policy implications for the managers and prospective investors in the emerging market of Pakistan. Firms with more aggressive policy towards working capital may not be able to generate more profit. So, as far as the book value performance is concerned, managers cannot generate more returns on assets by following aggressive approach towards short-term assets and liabilities. On the other hand, investors are found giving more value to the firms that adopt an aggressive approach towards working capital financing policies. The market value of firms using high level of current liabilities in their financing is more than the book value. The investors believe that firms with less equity and less long-term loans would be able to perform better than the others. However, there are various other factors like agency problem which may play a pivotal role in such cases, and so these factors may further be explored in future.中文译文:激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响简介企业融资文章历来侧重于研究长期财务决策,特别是投资、资本结构、股利和公司估值决策。

企业偿债能力外文文献_企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献

企业偿债能力外文文献_企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献

企业偿债能力外文文献_企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency. Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise. On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement. Similarly, acompany's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower .Harris et al. Well, Eriotis etc. as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation. Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact on the real estate debt capital structure of listed companies.Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares. According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings more For financing first will consider retained earnings. Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow moredebt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio. rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, to select 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth.Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estate companies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small). The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises. The actual controller of the listedcompanies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0.040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies. The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control ben(转自:wWw.CspEnGbo 蓬勃范文网:企业偿债能力外文文献_企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献)efits, do not want to dilute their control over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses. In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2.3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations.Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors in various industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capitalstructure. The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory.At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostly used multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult to reflect. base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function, currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications. Therefore, in this paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structurefactors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises.Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio. Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities. Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow). reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listedcompanies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce the proportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA. growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the main indicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk. Therefore, listed companies should be radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that the total debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to moreserious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system.译文企业偿债能力外文文献_企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献导读:能够有效保障他们利益的关键还得看公司的偿债能力,提高一个公司的偿债能力,一个公司的偿债能力越强也就越容易产生工程投资所需的现金,一个公司的短期偿债能力越强那么短期资产负债率也就越低,长期偿债能力越强那么长期资产负债率也就越低,HarrisEriotis等表示短期偿债能力和长期偿债能力与总资产负债率具有显著,本文用速动比率和现金流量债务比分别表示短期偿债能力和长期偿债能力来研究对上市公司,上市公司偿译文介绍虽然债权人可以通过制定各种保护性条款来保障自己的利益,但都是一些辅助性的措施,能够有效保障他们利益的关键还得看公司的偿债能力。

上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料

本份文档包含:关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献出处:Abor J; Bokpin A. Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policy. Studies in Economics and Finance. 2015; 27(3):180-194.Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policyAbor J; Bokpin AAbstractPurpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach - This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17-year period, 1990-2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation. Findings - A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well-developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy. Originality/value - The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.Keywords: International; Dividends; Corporate finance;1. IntroductionThe impact of investment and financing decisions on firm value has been the focus of extensive research since [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the "separation principle". The theory asserts that in a perfect capital market, the value of the firm is independent of the manner in which its productive assets are financed. In fact someauthors like [12] Barnes et al.(1981) support their view. However, others have contrasted the findings of the earlier studies suggesting that investment, financing, and dividend policy are related ([30] Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; [46] McCabe, 1979;[5] Anderson, 1983). This is predicated on the assumption that Modigliani and Miller's ideal world does not exist. Financial markets are not perfect given taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and uncertain inflation in the market place. According to [13] Bier man and Hass (1983), management usually addresses the dividend target payout level in the context of forecasting the firm's sources and use of funds. Considering prospective investment opportunities and the internal cash generation potential of the firm, both capital structure and dividend policy are chosen to ensure that sufficient funds are available to undertake all desirable investments without using new equity ([14] Black, 1976). But what constitutes a "desirable" investment? If it is one that has an expected return greater than the cost of funds that finance it, and if the cost of retained earnings is different from the cost of new equity capital, then dividend policy, capital structure, and investment strategy are necessarily jointly determined ([15] Black and Schools, 1974).Dividend payout policy is an important corporate issue and may be closely related to, and interacts with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. A proper understanding of dividend policy is critical for many other areas such as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting ([2] Allen and Michael, 1995). Firms' dividend decisions could also be influenced by their profit level, risk, and size. Though dividend policy has been identified as a major corporate decision faced by management, it remains one of the puzzles in corporate finance ([52] Obi, 2001). There has been emerging consensus that there is no single explanation of dividends. [19] Brook et al.(1998) agree that, there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal.Attention of empirical research has been at ascertaining the relationship between investment opportunities, corporate financing and dividend payout ([54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991; [6] Aviation and Booth, 2003). However, these findings have failed toestablish any clear link concerning this issue. Most of these studies tend to focus on developed markets. Little is, however, known about how investment opportunities and corporate finance influence dividend payout policy of emerging markets. This present study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets tend to exhibit different dividend behavior from those of developed markets like the US. This may be a result of the differences in levels of efficiency and institutional arrangements between developed markets and emerging markets. It is, therefore, useful to improve our understanding of the issue from an emerging market perspective.The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout. The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it considers a large-scale dataset covering 34 emerging market countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on dividend policy. It also reviews the existing literature on the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study and also details the model specification used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 includes the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Overview of literatureSince the publication of the dividend irrelevance theory by [47] Miller and Modigliani (1961), a lot of studies have been conducted in the area of determinants of dividend payout the world over. The dividend irrelevance theory is possible in a perfect and efficient market where stockholders are perfectly rational and there are no taxes and transaction costs. The theory, however, pointed out the importance of investment as being the main issue. Miller and Modigliani framework has thus formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout policy in general. Their framework is rich enough to encompass both dividends and repurchase, as the only determinant of a firm's value is its investment policy ([3] Allen and Michael, 2002). It is arguably said a company's overriding goal is to maximize shareholder wealth ([18]Berkley and Myers, 1996; [16] Block and Hart, 2000), but to [16] Block and Hart (2000) this concept is not a simple task as management cannot directly influence the price of a share but can only act in a manner consistent with the desires of investors. In the view of [61] Woods and Randall (1989), shareholder wealth is generally accepted as the aggregate market value of the common shares, which in turn is assumed to be the present value of the cash flows which will accrue to shareholders, discounted at their required rate of return on equity. These cash flows include dividend and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation except for its high volatility. Firms must, therefore, make important decisions over and over again about how much cash the firm should give back to its shareholders and probably what form it should take.Black (1976) observed that the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together. This attests to the much controversy that surrounds dividend policy. The dividend puzzle revolves around figuring out why companies pay dividends and investors pay attention to dividend. To [18] Berkley and Myers (1996), dividend policy is seen as a trade-off between retaining earnings on one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on the other. The theoretical principles underlying the dividend policy of firms range from information asymmetries, tax-adjusted theory to behavioral factors. The information asymmetries encompass several aspects, including the agency cost, free cash flow hypothesis, and signaling models.Tax-adjusted models presume that investors require and secure higher expected returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The consequence of tax adjusted theory is the division of investors into dividend tax clientele and the clientele effect is responsible for the alterations in portfolio composition ([49] Modigliani, 1982). To [45] Marsalis and Truman (1988), investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm dividend policy. They conclude that as tax liability increases, the dividend payment decreases while earnings reinvestment increases and vice versa.Shareholders typically face the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in the face of separation of ownership and control. The problem of information asymmetry is evident in conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. It holds that insiders such as managers have more information about the firm's cash flow than the providers of the funds. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial control ([39] Jensen and Heckling, 1976) and also in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor managerial activities ([57] Heifer and Vishnu, 1986). [27] Fame and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems can be resolved by the payment of large dividend to shareholders.According to the free cash flow model, [37] Jensen (1986) explains that finance available after financing all positive net present value projects can result in conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Clearly, dividends and debt interest payment decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite consumption. Firms with higher levels of cash flow should have higher dividend payout and/or higher leverage.The signaling theory suggests that corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting quality message across has a lower cost than other alternatives ([48] Miller and Rock, 1985; [8] Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This was developed initially for the labor market but its usefulness has been felt in the financial markets. [7] Aero (1970) defines signaling effect as a unique and specific signaling equilibrium in which a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective employer. The signaling theory suggests that dividends are used to signal managements' private information regarding the future earnings of the firm. Investors often see announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecast of future earnings changes ([34] Healy and Pileup, 1988). Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity ([11] Baker et al., 1985; [54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991).2.1 Investment opportunities and dividend payoutThe investment opportunities available to the firm constitute an important component of market value. The investment opportunity set of a firm affects the way the firm is viewed by managers, owners, investors, and creditors ([43] Caliper and Tremble, 2001). The literature has given considerable attention in recent years to examining the association between investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices, including financing, dividend, and compensation policies ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992;[29] Giver and Giver, 1993; [41] Caliper and Tremble, 1999; [40] Jones and Sharma, 2001; [1] Abbott, 2001). According to [40] Jones (2001), investment opportunity set represents a firm's investment or growth options but to [51] Myers (1977) its value depends on the discretional expenditures of managers. [51] Myers (1977) further explains investment opportunity as a yet-to-be realized potentially profitable project that a firm can exploit for economic rents. Thus, this represents the component of the firm's value resulting from options to make future investments ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992).Growth opportunities are also represented by the relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in place, the higher the growth opportunities ([32] Gull and Kelley, 1999). [43] Caliper and Tremble (2001) suggest that, the conventional notion of investment opportunity set is of new capital expenditure made to introduce a new product or expand production of an existing product. This may include an option to make expenditure to reduce costs during a corporate restructuring. An investment opportunity has been measured in various ways by various writers. These include market to book value of equity ([21] Collins and Kithara, 1989; [20] Chung and Charoenwong, 1991), book to market value of assets ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992), and Tobin's q ([58] Skinner, 1993).Existing literature suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. [59] Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with high investment opportunity set are likely to pursue a low dividend payout policy, since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources ([29] Giverand Giver, 1993). [40] Jones (2001), extending and modifying the work of [29] Giver and Gaver (1993), found out that high growth firms were associated with significantly lower dividend yields. [32] Gul and Kealey (1999) also found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. [1] Abbott (2001) argues that firms that experienced an investment opportunity set expansion (decrease) generally reduced (increase) their dividend payout policy. Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus recording lower dividend payout ratios ([56] Rozeff, 1982; [44] Lloyd et al. , 1985; [22] Collins et al. , 1996; [4] Amidu and Abor, 2006). [55] Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001) also validated the fact that firms in high investment opportunity set group are "PE valued" whilst firms in low investment opportunity set are "dividend yield valued". This implies that for firms in low investment opportunity set, dividends are of greater relevance than earnings whilst the opposite is true for firms in high investment opportunity set. Using market-to-book ratio as proxy for investment opportunity set, [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), however, found a positive relationship between market-to-book value ratio and dividend payments, suggesting that firms with higher investment opportunities rather pay higher dividends.2.2 Corporate finance and dividend payoutThe financing choice of firms is perhaps the most researched area in finance in the past decades following the seminal article of [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) raising the issue of the relationship between a firms choice of finance and its value. Recently, there are still increasing research and new evidence being sought for the relevance or otherwise of the theory started by Modigliani and Miller. The theorem hinges on the principle of perfect capital markets. This asserts that firm value is completely independent of how its productive assets are financed. Subsequent researches have suggested a relationship between choice of financing and firm value even though some researchers corroborated the findings of Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory ([26] Fama, 1974; [54] Pruitt and Gitman, 1991). However, studiesby [5] Anderson (1983), [53] Peterson and Benesh (1983) have proved that in the "real world" market imperfections effectively prohibit the independence of firm's investment and financing decisions. This market imperfection is primarily coming from the fact that there are taxes, transaction cost, information asymmetry, and bankruptcy cost. This indicates a relationship between the choice of financing and firm value.Financial leverage is said to play an important role in reducing agency costs arising from shareholder-manager conflict and is believed to play a vital role of monitoring managers ([39] Jensen and Meckling, 1976; [37] Jensen, 1986; [60] Stulz, 1988). [28] Farinha (2003) contends that debt is likely to influence dividend decisions because of debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders. Also, firms with high financial leverage and implied financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate risk associated with the use of debt finance. [56] Rozeff (1982), [25] Easterbrook (1984) and [22] Collins et al. (1996) extending the agency theory observe that firms pay dividend and raise capital simultaneously. In the view of [25] Easterbrook (1984), increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be raised externally on a periodic basis. This view is also shared by [31] Green et al. (1993) who argue that dividend payout levels are not totally decided after a firm's financing has been made. [35] Higgins (1972) suggests that firms' dividend payout ratio could be negatively influenced by their need for finance. Thus, dividend decision is taken alongside financing decisions. [36] Higgins (1981) shows a direct link between growth and financing needs, in that rapidly growing firms have external financing need because working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003) support the fact that financial constraints can affect dividend decisions, therefore, firms with relatively less debt have greater financial slack and are more likely to pay and maintain their dividends.3. Data and econometric method3.1 Data and variable constructionThis study examines the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on the dividend payout policy of emerging market firms. Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for a large sample of publicly traded firms in 34 emerging market countries over the period 1990-2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This information is obtained through the Corporate Vulnerability Utility of the International Monetary Fund. The corporate vulnerability utility provides indicators for surveillance of the corporate sector and it relies on accounting data from Worldscope and market data mainly from Datastream.The dependent variable, dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividend to capital. Dividend is total cash dividend paid to equity and preferred shareholders. The independent variables include investment opportunity set and corporate finance. We also control for profitability, risk, market capitalization, and two other macroeconomic variables: inflation rate and log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the country's income level.In terms of the independent variables, Tobin's q is used as a proxy for investment opportunity set. Three measures of corporate finance are used. These are; financial leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), external finance (the ratio of external finance to total finance), and debt maturity (the ratio of short-term debt to total debt).In terms of the control variables, profitability is measured as return on assets. Profitability is considered as the primary indicator of the firm's capacity to declare and pay dividends. [11] Baker et al. (1985) find that a major determinant of dividend payment is the anticipated level of future earnings. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also report that current and past years' profits are important in influencing dividend payments. Others such as [38] Jensen et al. (1992), [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), and [4] Amidu and Abor (2006) find evidence of a positive association betweenprofitability and dividend payouts. [10] Baker (1989) finds that an important reason cited by firms for not paying dividends is "poor earnings". Similarly, [23] DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that a significant proportion of firms with losses over a five year period, tend to omit their dividends entirely. A positive relationship should exist between profitability and dividend payout.Risk is defined using the O-Score, which is a measure of probability of default. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find that risk is a major determinant of firms' dividend policy. Firms which have higher risk profiles are more likely to maintain lower dividend payout policy compared with those with lower risk profiles. Using ßvalue of a firm as a measure of its market risk, [56] Rozeff (1982), [44] Lloyd et al. (1985), and [22] Collins et al. (1996) found a significantly negative relationship between ßand dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher level of market risk will pursue lower dividend payout policy. [24] D'Souza (1999) also suggests that risk is significantly and negatively related with firms' dividend payout. We expect risk to be negatively related to dividend payout.We control for size of the market. This is defined as ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Size of the market is used as a proxy for capital market access. Firms with better access to the capital market should be able to pay higher dividends ([6] Aivazian and Booth, 2003). It is expected that a positive relationship will exist between market capitalization and dividend payout policy.We also control for two macroeconomic variables: inflation and GDP per capita. Inflation is the inflation rate. GDP per capita is log of GDP per capita and is included as a measure of the country's income level.3.2 Model specificationWe estimate the following panel data regression model: Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where subscript i and t represent the country and time, respectively. Y is a measure of dividend payout. Invt is a measure of investment opportunity set. Fin are measures of corporate finance variables including, financialleverage, external finance, and debt maturity. X are the control variables and include profitability, risk, stock market capitalization, inflation, and GDP per capita. μ is the error term. Using this model, it is possible to investigate the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.3.3 Estimation issuesThis study adopts a panel data method given that it allows for broader set of data points. Therefore, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. Also, panel data can control for individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross section estimations leads to biased results ([9] Baltagi, 2005). The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where α is a scalar, ßis KX 1 and X it is the it th observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the μit follow a one-way error component model: Equation 3 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where μi is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The term V it represents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual countries and time. It can be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. The choice of the model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, μi and V it are random with known disturbances. In the fixed effects model, the μi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with V it independent and identically distributed, i.e. νit∼iid (0,σν2 ). The explanatory variables X it are assumed independent of the V it for all i and t . We use the [62] Hausman (1978) specification test in choosing the appropriate model. We report the results of the Hausman specification test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.].4. Empirical results4.1 Descriptive statisticsTable I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The sample covers 34 emerging countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. It reports the mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in the study as well as the number of observations over the sample period. The mean value for the dependent variable (dividend payout) is 0.32, implying that across the sample countries the average dividend payout is 32 percent. There is, however, a variation in the dependent variable across the countries over the time period as shown by standard deviation of 0.49 with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 3.93, respectively.The mean investment opportunity set measured by the Tobin's q is 1.05 with a variation of 0.52. All the countries have positive investment opportunities with minimum and maximum values of 0.06 and 5.01, respectively. Financial leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio has a mean value of 1.17 and has a standard deviation of 127.58. External finance registers an average value of -0.01 over the period with a standard deviation of 5.27. Debt maturity has a mean figure of 0.58, indicating that short-term debt accounts for 58 percent of total debt. Profitability defined in terms of return on assets also registers an average value of 6.66 percent. The standard deviation is also shown as 5.37. Risk shows a mean value of -3.37. Stock market capitalization to GDP has a mean value of 49.74 percent. The minimum and maximum values for this variable are 0.00 and 528.49, respectively, with a variation of 66.52. The average inflation rate and GDP per capita are 2.61 and 8.04 percent, respectively (Figure 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).4.2 Correlation analysisWe test for possible degree of multi-collinearity among the regressors by including a correlation matrix of the variables in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. Dividend payout shows significantly positive correlations with debt maturity, profitability, and GDP per capita. Investment opportunity set exhibits significantly negative correlations with financial leverage, inflation, and GDP per capita, but shows significantly positive correlations with external finance, debt maturity, profitability,and market capitalization. There is a significant but negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability and a positive correlation between financial leverage and risk. External finance shows significant and positive correlations with profitability and inflation but a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Debt maturity is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP per capita. There are significant and negative correlations between profitability and risk, market capitalization, as well as GDP per capita. However, we found positive correlation between profitability and inflation. There are statistically and significant positive correlations between risk and market capitalization, and GDP per capita. Market capitalization is also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.4.3 Panel regression resultsBoth fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After which the [62] Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. We report the results of the Hausman test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. The test statistics are all significant at 1 percent, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects. The Hausman specification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients are not systematic.The results indicate a statistically significant but negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout ratio. It could be inferred that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to exhibit low dividend payout ratio. In other words, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to pursue a low dividend payout ratio since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources. Paying low dividends means that such firms could retain enough funds to finance their future growth and investments.[29] Gaver and Gaver (1993) note that firms with high growth potential or investment opportunity set are expected to pay low dividends, since investment and dividends are。

企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献

企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency. Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise. On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement. Similarly, a company's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower .Harris et al. Well, Eriotis etc. as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation. Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact on the real estate debt capital structure of listed companies.Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares. According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings moreFor financing first will consider retained earnings. Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow more debt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio. rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, to select 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth.Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estate companies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small). The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises. The actual controller of the listed companies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0.040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies. The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control benefits, do not want to dilute theircontrol over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses. In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2.3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations.Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors in various industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capital structure. The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory.At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostly used multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult toreflect. base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function,currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications. Therefore, in this paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structure factors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises.Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio. Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities. Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow). reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listed companies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce the proportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA. growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the mainindicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk. Therefore, listed companies should be radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that the total debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to moreserious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system.译文。

财务报表分析外文文献及翻译

Review of accounting studies,2003,16(8):531-560 Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage and How It Informs About Protability and Price-to-Book RatiosDoron Nissim, Stephen. PenmanAbstractThis paper presents a financial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage that arises in financing activities from leverage that arises in operations. The analysis yields two leveraging equations, one for borrowing to finance operations and one for borrowing in the course of operations. These leveraging equations describe how the two types of leverage affect book rates of return on equity. An empirical analysis shows that the financial statement analysis explains cross-sectional differences in current and future rates of return as well as price-to-book ratios, which are based on expected rates of return on equity. The paper therefore concludes that balance sheet line items for operating liabilities are priced differently than those dealing with financing liabilities. Accordingly, financial statement analysis that distinguis hes the two types of liabilities informs on future profitability and aids in the evaluation of appropriate price-to-book ratios.Keywords: financing leverage; operating liability leverage; rate of return on equity; price-to-book ratioLeverage is traditiona lly viewed as arising from financing activities: Firms borrow to raise cash for operations. This paper shows that, for the purposes of analyzing profitability and valuing firms, two types of leverage are relevant, one indeed arising from financing activities b ut another from operating activities. The paper supplies a financial statement analysis of the two types of leveragethat explains differences in shareholder profitability and price-to-book ratios.The standard measure of leverage is total liabilities to equity. However, while some liabilities—like bank loans and bonds issued—are due to financing, other liabilities—like trade payables, deferred revenues, and pension liabilities—result from transactions with suppliers, customers and employees in conducting operations. Financing liabilities are typically traded in well-functioning capital markets where issuers are price takers. In contrast, firms are able to add value in operations because operations involve trading in input and output markets that are less perfect than capital markets. So, with equity valuation in mind, there are a priori reasons for viewing operating liabilities differently from liabilities that arise in financing.Our research asks whether a dollar of operating liabilities on the balance sheet is priced differently from a dollar of financing liabilities. As operating and financing liabilities are components of the book value of equity, the question is equivalent to asking whether price-to-book ratios depend on the composition of book values. The price-to-book ratio is determined by the expected rate of return on the book value so, if components of book value command different price premiums, they must imply different expected rates of return on book value. Accordingly, the paper also investigates whether the two types of liabilities are associated with differences in future book rates of return.Standard financial statement analysis distinguishes shareholder profitability that arises from operations from that which arises from borrowing to finance opera tions. So, return on assets is distinguished from return on equity, with the difference attributed to leverage. However, in the standard analysis, operating liabilities are not distinguished from financing liabilities. Therefore, to develop the specification s for the empirical analysis, the paper presents a financial statement analysis that identifies the effects of operating and financing liabilities on rates of return on book value—andso on price-to-book ratios—with explicit leveraging equations that explain when leverage from each type of liability is favorable or unfavorable.The empirical results in the paper show that financial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage in operations from leverage in financing also distinguishes differences in contemporaneous and future profitability among firms. Leverage from operating liabilities typically levers profitability more than financing leverage and has a higher frequency of favorable effects.Accordingly, for a given total leverage from both sources, firms with hig her leverage from operations have higher price-to-book ratios, on average. Additionally, distinction between contractual and estimated operating liabilities explains further differences in firms’ profitability and their price-to-book ratios.Our results are of consequence to an analyst who wishes to forecast earnings and book rates of return to value firms. Those forecasts—and valuations derived from them—depend, we show, on the composition of liabilities. The financial statement analysis of the paper, supported by the empirical results, shows how to exploit information in the balance sheet for forecasting and valuation.The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the financial statements analysis that identifies the two types of leverage and lays out expres sions that tie leverage measures to profitability. Section 2 links leverage to equity value and price-to-book ratios. The empirical analysis is in Section 3, with conclusions summarized in Section 4.1. Financial Statement Analysis of LeverageThe following financial statement analysis separates the effects of financing liabilities and operating liabilities on the profitability of shareholders’ equity. The analysis yields explicit leveraging equations from which the specifications for the empirical analysis are developed.Shareholder profitability, return on common equity, is measured asReturn on common equity (ROCE) = comprehensive net income ÷common equity (1) Leverage affects both the numerator and denominator of this profitability measure. Appropriate financial statement analysis disentangles the effects of leverage. The analysis below, which elaborates on parts of Nissim and Penman (2001), begins by identifying components of the balance sheet and income statement that involve operating and financing activities. The profitability due to each activity is then calculated and two types of leverage are introduced to explain both operating and financing profitability and overall shareholder profitability.1.1 Distinguishing the Protability of Operations from the Protability of Financing ActivitiesWith a focus on common equity (so that preferred equity is viewed as a financial liability), the balance sheet equation can be restated as follows:Common equity =operating assets+financial assets-operating liabilities-Financial liabilities (2)The distinction here between operating assets (like trade receivables, inventory and property,plant and equipment) and financial assets (the deposits and marketable securities that absorb excess cash) is made in other contexts. However, on the liability side, financing liabilities are also distinguished here from operating liabilities. Rather than treating all liabilities as financing debt, only liabilities that raise cash for operations—like bank loans, short-term commercial paper and bonds—are classified as such. Other liabilities—such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, deferred revenue, restructuring liabilities and pension liabilities—arise from operations. The distinction is not as simple as current versus long-term liabilities; pension liabilities, for example, are usually long-term, and short-term borrowing is a current liability.Rearranging terms in equation (2),Common equity = (operating assets-operating liabilities)-(financial liabilities-financial assets)Or,Common equity = net operating assets-net financing debt (3) This equation regroups assets and liabilities into operating and financing activities. Net operating assets are operating assets less operating liabilities. So a firm might invest in inventories, but to the extent to which the suppliers of those inventories grant credit, the net investment in inventories is reduced. Firms pay wages, but to the extent to which the payment of wages is deferred in pension liabilities, the net investment required to run the business is reduced. Net financing debt is financing debt (including preferred stock) minusfinancial assets. So, a firm may issue bonds to raise cash for operations but may also buy bonds with excess cash from operations. Its net indebtedness is its net position in bonds. Indeed a firm may be a net creditor (with more financial assets than financial liabilities) rather than a net debtor.The income statement can be reformulated to distinguish income that comes from operating and financing activities:Comprehensive net income = operating income-net financing expense (4) Operating income is produced in operations and net financial expense is incurred in the financing of operations. Interest income on financial assets is netted against interest expense on financial liabilities (including preferred dividends) in net financial expense. If interest i ncome is greater than interest expense, financing activities produce net financial income rather than net financial expense. Both operating income and net financial expense (or income) are after tax.3Equations (3) and (4) produce clean measures of after-tax o perating profitability and the borrowing rate:Return on net operating assets (RNOA) = operating income ÷net operating assets (5) andNet borrowing rate (NBR) = net financing expense ÷net financing debt (6) RNOA recognizes that profitabilit y must be based on the net assets invested in operations. So firms can increase their operating profitability by convincing suppliers, in the course of business, to grant or extend credit terms; credit reduces the investment that shareholders would otherwise have to put in the business. Correspondingly, the net borrowing rate, by excluding non-interest bearing liabilities from the denominator, gives the appropriate borrowing rate for the financing activities.Note that RNOA differs from the more common return on assets (ROA), usually defined as income before after-tax interest expense to total assets. ROA does not distinguish operating and financing activities appropriately. Unlike ROA, RNOA excludes financial assets in the denominator and subtracts operating liabilities. Nissim and Penman (2001) report a median ROA for NYSE and AMEX firms from 1963–1999 of only 6.8%, but a median RNOA of 10.0%—much closer to what one would expect as a return to business operations.1.2 Financial Leverage and its Effect on Shareholder ProtabilityFrom expressions (3) through (6), it is straightforward to demonstrate that ROCE is a weighted average of RNOA and the net borrowing rate, with weights derived from equation (3): ROCE= [net operating assets ÷common equity× RNOA]-[net financ ing debt÷common equity ×net borrowing rate (7) Additional algebra leads to the following leveraging equation:ROCE = RNOA+[FLEV× ( RNOA-net borrowing rate )] (8) where FLEV, the measure of leverage from financing activities, isFinancing leverage (FLEV) =net financing debt ÷common equity (9) The FLEV measure excludes operating liabilities but includes (as a net against financing debt) financial assets. If financial assets are greater than financial liabilities, FLEV is negative. The leveraging equation (8) works for negative FLEV (in which case the net borrowing rate is the return on net financial assets).This analysis breaks shareholder profitability, ROCE, down into that which i s due to operations and that which is due to financing. Financial leverage levers the ROCE over RNOA, with the leverage effect determined by the amount of financial leverage (FLEV) and the spread between RNOA and the borrowing rate. The spread can be positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable). 1.3 Operating Liability Leverage and its Effect on Operating ProtabilityWhile financing debt levers ROCE, operating liabilities lever the profitability of operations, RNOA. RNOA is operating income relative to net operating assets, and net operating assets are operating assets minus operating liabilities. So, the more operating liabilities a firm has relative to operating assets, the higher its RNOA, assuming no effect on operating income in the numerator. The intensity of the use of operating liabilities in the investment base is operating liability leverage: Operating liability leverage (OLLEV) =operating liabilities ÷net operating assets (10) Using operating liabilities to lever the rate of return from operations may not come for free, however; there may be a numerator effect on operating income. Suppliers provide what nominally may be interest-free credit, but presumably charge for that credit with higher prices for the goods and services supplied. This is the reason why operating liabilities are inextricably a part of operationsrather than the financing of operations. The amount that suppliers actually charge for this credit is difficult to identify. But the market borrowing rate is observable. The amount that suppliers would implicitly charge in prices for the credit at this borrowing rate can be estimated as a benchmark: Market interest on operating liabilities= operating liabilities×market borrowing ratewhere the market borrowing rate, given that most credit is short term, can be approximated by the after-tax short-term borrowing rate. This implicit cost is benchmark, for it is the cost that makes suppliers indifferent in supplying cred suppliers are fully compensated if they charge implicit interest at the cost borrowing to supply the credit. Or, alternatively, the firm buying the goods o r services is indifferent between trade credit and financing purchases at the borrowin rate.To analyze the effect of operating liability leverage on operating profitability, w e d efine:Return on operating assets (ROOA) =(operating income+market interest on operating liabilities)÷operating assets(11)The numerator of ROOA adjusts operating income for the full implicit cost of trad credit. If suppliers fully charge the implicit cost of credit, ROOA is the return of operating assets that would be earned had the firm no operating liability leverage. suppliers do not fully charge for the credit, ROOA measures the return fro operations that includes the favorable implicit credit terms from suppliers.Similar to the leveraging equation (8) for ROCE, RNOA can be expressed as:RNOA = ROOA+[ OLLEV ×(ROOA-market borrowing rate )] (12) where the borrowing rate is the after-tax short-term interest rate.Given ROOA, the effect ofleverage on profitability is determined by the level of operating liability leverage and the spread between ROOA and the short-term after-tax interest rate. Like financing l everage, the effect can be favorable or unfavorable: Firms can reduce their operating profitability through operating liability leverage if their ROOA is less than the market borrowing rate. However, ROOA will also be affected if the implicit borrowing cost on operating liabilities is different from the market borrowing rate.1.4 Total Leverage and its Effect on Shareholder ProtabilityOperating liabilities and net financing debt combine into a total leverage measure:Total leverage (TLEV) = ( net financing debt+operating liabilities)÷common equityThe borrowing rate for total liabilities is:Total borrowing rate = (net financing expense+market interest on operating liabilities) ÷net financing debt+operating liabilitiesROCE equals the weighted average of ROOA and the total borrowing rate, where the weights are proportional to the amount of total operating assets and the sum of net financing debt and operating liabilities (with a negative sign), respectively. So, similar to the leveraging equations (8) and (12):ROCE = ROOA +[TLEV×(ROOA -total borrowing rate)](13)In summary, financial statement analysis of operating and financing activities yields three leveraging equations, (8), (12), and (13). These equations are based on fixed accounting re lations and are therefore deterministic: They must hold for a given firm at a given point in time. The only requirement in identifying the sources of profitability appropriately is a clean separation betweenoperating and financing components in the financial statements.2. Leverage, Equity Value and Price-to-Book RatiosThe leverage effects above are described as effects on shareholder profitability. Our interest is not only in the effects on shareholder profitability, ROCE, but also in the effects on shareholder value, which is tied to ROCE in a straightforward way by the residual income valuation model. As a restatement of the dividend discount model, the residual income model expresses the value of equity at date 0 (P0) as:B is the book value of common shar eholders’ equity, X is comprehensive income to common shareholders, and r is the required return for equity investment. The price premium over book value is determined by forecasting residual income, Xt –rBt-1. Residual income is determined in part by income relative to book value, that is, by the forecasted ROCE. Accordingly, leverage effects on forecasted ROCE (net of effects on the required equity return) affect equity value relative to book value: The price paid for the book value depends on the expect ed profitability of the book value, and leverage affects profitability.So our empirical analysis investigates the effect of leverage on both profitability and price-to-book ratios. Or, stated differently, financing and operating liabilities are distinguishable components of book value, so the question is whether the pricing of book values depends on the composition of book values. If this is the case, the different components of book value must imply different profitability. Indeed, the two analyses (of profitab ility and price-to-book ratios) are complementary.Financing liabilities are contractual obligations for repayment of funds loaned. Operatingliabilities include contractual obligations (such as accounts payable), but also include accrual liabilities (such as deferred revenues and accrued expenses). Accrual liabilities may be based on contractual terms, but typically involve estimates. We consider the real effects of contracting and the effects of accounting estimates in turn. Appendix A provides some examples of contractual and estimated liabilities and their effect on profitability and value.2.1 Effects of Contractual liabilitiesThe ex post effects of financing and operating liabilities on profitability are clear from leveraging equations (8), (12) and (13). These expressions always hold ex post, so there is no issue regarding ex post effects. But valuation concerns ex ante effects. The extensive research on the effects of financial leverage takes, as its point of departure, the Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958) financing irrelevance proposition: With perfect capital markets and no taxes or information asymmetry, debt financing has no effect on value. In terms of the residual income valuation model, an increase in financial leverage due to a substitution of debt for equity may increase expected ROCE according to expression (8), but that increase is offset in the valuation (14) by the reduction in the book value of equity that earns the excess profitability and the increase in the required equity return, leaving total value (i.e., the value of equity and debt) unaffected. The required equity return increases because of increased financing risk: Leverage may be expected to be favorable but, the higher the leverage, the greater the loss to shareholders should the leverage turn unfavorable ex post, with RNOA less than the borrowing rate.In the face of the M&M proposition, research on the value effects of financial leverage has proceeded to relax the conditions for the proposition to hold. Modigliani and Miller (1963) hyp othesized that the tax benefits of debt increase after-tax returns to equity and so increase equityvalue. Recent empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis (e.g., Kemsley and Nissim, 2002), although the issue remains controversial. In any case, since the implicit cost of operating liabilities, like interest on financing debt, is tax deductible, the composition of leverage should have no tax implications.Debt has been depicted in many studies as affecting value by reducing transaction and contracting costs. While debt increases expected bankruptcy costs and introduces agency costs between shareholders and debtholders, it reduces the costs that shareholders must bear in monitoring management, and may have lower issuing costs relative to equity. One might expect these considerations to apply to operating debt as well as financing debt, with the effects differing only by degree. Indeed papers have explained the use of trade debt rather than financing debt by transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), differentia l access of suppliers and buyers to financing (Schwartz,1974), and informational advantages and comparative costs of monitoring (Smith, 1987; Mian and Smith, 1992; Biais and Gollier, 1997). Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide some tests of these explanations.In addition to tax, transaction costs and agency costs explanations for leverage, research has also conjectured an informational role. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) characterized financing choice as a signal of profitability and value, and subseque nt papers (for example, Myers and Majluf, 1984) have carried the idea further. Other studies have ascribed an informational role also for operating liabilities. Biais and Gollier (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (1997), for example, see suppliers as having mo re information about firms than banks and the bond market, so more operating debt might indicate higher value. Alternatively, high trade payables might indicate difficulti es in paying suppliers and declining fortunes.Additional insights come from further relaxing the perfect frictionless capital markets assumptions underlying the original M&M financing irrelevance proposition. When it comes to operations, the product and input markets in which firms trade are typically less competitive than capital markets. In deed, firms are viewed as adding value primarily in operations rather than in financing activities because of less than purely competitive product and input markets. So, whereas it is difficult to ‘‘make money off the debtholders,’’ firms can be seen as ‘‘mak ing money off the trade creditors.’’ In operations, firms can exert monopsony power, extracting value from suppliers and employees. Suppliers may provide cheap implicit financing in exchange for information about products and markets in which the firm operates. They may also benefit from efficiencies in the firm’s supply and distribution chain, and may grant credit to capture future business.2.2 Effects of Accrual Accounting EstimatesAccrual liabilities may be based on contractual terms, but typically involve estimates. Pension liabilities, for example, are based on employment contracts but involve actuarial estimates. Deferred revenues may involve obligations to service customers, but also involve estimates that allocate revenues to periods. While contractual liabilities are typically carried on the balance sheet as an unbiased indication of the cash to be paid, accrual accounting estimates are not necessarily unbiased. Conservative accounting, for example, might overstate pension liabilities or defer more revenue than required by contracts with customers.Such biases presumably do not affect value, but they affect accounting rates of return and the pricing of the liabilities relative to their carrying value (the price-to-book ratio). The effect of accounting estimates on operating liability leverage is clear: Higher carrying values for operatingliabilities result in higher leverage for a given level of operating assets. But the effect on profitability is also clear from leveraging equation (12): While conservative accounting for operating assets increases the ROOA, as modeled in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Zhang (2000), higher book values of operating liabilities lever up RNOA over ROOA. Indeed, conservative accounting for operating liabilities amounts to leverage of book rates of return. By leveraging equation (13), that leverage effect flows through to shareholder profitability, ROCE.And higher anticipated ROCE implies a higher price-to-book ratio.The potential bias in estimated operating liabilities has opposite effects on current and future profitability. For example, if a firm books higher deferred revenues, accrued expenses or other operating liabilities, and so increases its operating liability leverage, it reduces its current profitability: Current revenues must be lower or expenses higher. And, if a firm reports lower operating assets (by a write down of receivables, inventories or other assets, for example), and so increases operating liability leverage, it also reduces current profitability: Current expense s must be higher. But this application of accrual accounting affects future operating income: All else constant, lower current income implies higher future income. Moreover, higher operating liabilities and lower operating assets amount to lower book value of equity. The lower book value is the base for the rate of return for the higher future income. So the analysis of operating liabilities potentially identifies part of the accrual reversal phenomenon documented by Sloan (1996) and interprets it as affecting leverage, forecasts of profitability, and price-to-book ratios.3. Empirical AnalysisThe analysis covers all firm-year observations on the combined COMPUSTAT (Industry and Research) files for any of the 39 years from 1963 to 2001 that satisfy the following requirements: (1)the company was listed on the NYSE or AMEX; (2) the company was not a financial institution (SIC codes 6000–6999), thereby omitting firms where most financial assets and liabilities are used in operations; (3) the book value of common equity is at least $10 million in 2001 dollars; and (4) the averages of the beginning and ending balance of operating assets, net operating assets and common equity are positive (as balance sheet variables are measured in the analysis using annual averages). T hese criteria resulted in a sample of 63,527 firm-year observations.Appendix B describes how variables used in the analysis are measured. One measurement issue that deserves discussion is the estimation of the borrowing cost for operating liabilities. As most operating liabilities are short term, we approximate the borrowing rate by the after-tax risk-free one-year interest rate. This measure may understate the borrowing cost if the risk associated with operating liabilities is not trivial. The effect of such measurement error is to induce a negative correlation between ROOA and OLLEV. As we show below, however, even with this potential negative bias we document a strong positive relation between OLLEV and ROOA.4. ConclusionTo finance operations, firms borrow in the financial markets, creating financing leverage. In running their operations, firms also borrow, but from customers, employees and suppliers, creating operating liability leverage. Because they involve trading in different types of markets, the two types of leverage may have different value implications. In particular, operating liabilities may reflect contractual terms that add value in different ways than financing liabilities, and so they may be priced differently. Operating liabilities also involve accrual accounting estimates that may further affect their pricing. This study has investigated the implications of the two types of leverage for profitability and equity value.。

外文文献企业盈利能力分析

文献出处:标题 : A ssessm ent of Financial R isk in Firm 's Profitability A naly sis作者 : S olomon, Daniela C ristina; M untean, M i rcea出版物名称 : Economy Transdisciplinarity C og nition卷 : 15期 : 2页 : 58 -67页数 : 10出版年份 : 2012A ssessm en t of F in a n c ia l R isk in F ir m ' s P r ofita b i l i t y A n a ly sisA bstract: In the contex t of g lobalization w e are w i tnessing an unprecedented diversification of risk situations and uncertainty in the business w orld, the w hole ex i stence of an org anization being related to risk . The notion of risk i s inextricably l inked to the return. R eturn includes ensuring remuneration of production factors and invested capital but a lso resources manag em ent in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. A full financial and econom ic diag nosis can not be done w i thout reg a rd to the return-risk ra tio.S tock profitability analy s i s should not be dissociated from risk analy s i s to w hich the com pany i s subdued. R isk analy sis i s useful in decision making concerning the use of economic-financial potential or investm ent decisions, in developing business plans, and a lso to inform partners about the enterprise's performa nce level.R i sk takes many form:, operational risk, financial risk and tota l risk , risk of bankruptcy ( other risk categ ories) each influencing the business activity on a g reater or lesser extent. Financial risk analy s i s, realized w i th the use of specific indicators such as: financial leverag e , financial breakeven and leverag e ra tio ( C LF) accompany ing call to debt, presents a major interest to optim ize the financial s tructure and viability of any com pany operating under a g enuine m arket econom y .Key w ords: risk analy sis fina ncial risk , financial leverag e , breakeven point.IntroductionR i sk and return a re tw o interdependent aspects in the activity of a com pany , so the question i s assuming a certain level of risk to achieve the profitability that it a l low s. R eturn can only be assessed but on the basis of supported risk . This risk a ffects econom ic asset returns first, and secondly of capital invested. Therefore it can be addressed both in terms of business, as the org anizer of the production process driven by intention to increase property ow ners and adequate remuneration of production factors and the position of outside financial investors, interested in carry ing the best investm ent, in financial market conditions w i th several areas of return and different risk levels.R isk assessm ent should consider manag ing chang e : people chang e , methods chang e , the risks chang e [ 1 , 36 ] .C onsequently , profitability i s subject to the g eneral condition of risk w here the org anization operates. R i sk takes m any forms, each a ffecting the ag ents' econom ic activity on a lesser or g reater ex tent. For econom ic and financial analy sis a t the micro level presents a particular interest those form s of risk that ca n be influenced, in the sense of reduction, throug h the actions and measures the economic ag ents can underg o.1.. Financial R i sk in Economic Theory and PracticeFinancial activity , in i ts m any seg m ents is influenced by unex pectedly restrictive e lem ents as evolution, often unexpected, not depending directly on economic ag ents. Impact of various factors ( m a rket, competition, tim e factor,inflation, ex chang e rates, interest, com missions, human factors and not least the company culture) often mak es financial decision become a decision under risk.Financial risk characterizes variability in net profit, under the company 's financial structure. There a re no financial templa te features, each business activity prints i ts ow n sig nificant varia tions from case to case. In the case of reta i l ers, "intang ible assets a re less important, but stocks a re significant, and the appeal to credit provider is frequently used, being very useful for treasury business" [ 2 , 40 ] .A n optim a l capital structure w i l l max imize enterprise value by balancing the deg ree of risk and ex pected return rate.M anag em ent of financial risk is an integ ra l part of planning and financial control, subm itted to strateg ic and tactical decisions for a continuous adaptation to inside and outside company conditions, constantly chang ing and it requires:-identification of a reas that are prone to risk;-l ikelihood estima tion of financial risk production;-determining the independence relations betw een financial risk and other significant risks ( operational risk , market risk - interest rate fluctuations);-delim i ta tion of risk and keeping i t under observation to stop or diminish ( minim ize) the effect;-identify causal factors for financial risk, in order to define potential adverse effects induced on the overall activity of the company ;-determining the risk as quantifiable s i ze, as w ell as the effects associated to risk occurrence;-determining the routes to follow and strateg ies to fit the company 's financial activity in an area of financial certainty .Financial risk i ssues can be found a t the heart of R om anian accountant's norma l izors. A ccording to the OM PF 3055 /2 009 , the B oard m ust prepare for each financial y ear a report, called a M anag ers ' report, w hich must include, besides an accurate presentation of development and performance of the entity 's activity and i ts financial position, a lso a description of main risks and uncertainties that i t fa ces.Thus, M anag ers report must provide information on: the objectives and policies of the entity concerning financial risk m anag ement, including i ts policy for risk covering for each major ty pe of forecasted transaction for w hich risk coverag e accounting i s used, and entity 's exposure to market risk, credit risk , l i quidity risk and cash flow .R equired disclosures provide information to help users of financial statem ents in evaluating the risk financial instrum ents, recog nized or not in balance sheet.The m a in categ ories of financial risks a ffecting the company 's performance a re [ 3 ] :1 . M arket risk that com prises three ty pes of risk :0 currency risk - the risk that the value of a financial instrument { Financial instrum ent i s defined according OM FP 3055 /2 009 , A rt. 126 , as: ''... any contract that s im ultaneously g enerates a financial active for an entity and a financial debt or equity instrument for another entity ") w i l l fluctuate because of chang es in currency exchang e rates; the low ering of ex chang e rate can lead to a loss of value of assets denominated in foreig n currency thus influencing business perform ance;0 fa i r value interest rate risk - the risk that the value of a financial instrument w i l l fluctuate due to chang es in market interest ra tes;0 price risk - the risk that the value of a financial instrum ent w i l l fluctuate as a result of chang ing market prices, eveni f these chang es are caused by factors specific to individual instruments or their i ssuer, or factors a ffecting a l l instrum ents traded in the ma rket. The term "market risk " incorporates not only the potential loss but as w e l l the g a in.2.. C redit risk - the risk that a party of financial instrument w i l l not to com ply w i th the undertaking , causing the other party a financial loss.3.. Liquidity risk - ( a lso called funding risk) is risk that an entity meets in difficulties in procuring the necessary funds to m eet com mitm ents related to financial instrum ents. L iquidity risk ma y result from the inability to quickly se l l a financial asset a t a value close to i ts fa i r va lue.4.. Interest ra te risk from cash flow - i s the risk that future cash flow s w i l l fluctuate because of chang es in ma rket interest rates. For ex am ple, i f a variable rate debt instruments, such fluctuations a re to chang e the effective interest rate financial instrument, w i thout a corresponding chang e in its fa i r va lue.Financial environment i s characterized by a hig h interest rate volatility , w hich translates in term s of risk and indiscriminate harm s the va lue and profitability of any enterprise [ 4 , 89 ] . Interest ra te risk on the balance sheet i s reflected by chang es in m arket value of an asset, as the present value of an asset i s determ ined by discounting cash flow s using interest rate or w eig hted averag e cost of capital [ 5 , 89 ] .2 . Financial R isk A ssessmentFinancial risk assessm ent is performed by using specific indicators such as: financial leverag e, financial breakeven and leverag e factor ( C L F) w hose values ex press fluctuations in net profit, under the company 's financial structure chang e .Financial leverag e effectFinancial ri sk or capital concerns the com pany 's financial structure and depends on the manner of funding the activity : i f it is w holly financed by equity , i t w i l l not involve financial risk . This risk appears only if loan financing sources involving charg e to pay interest and show s a direct influence on financial profitability ( of equity ) [ 6 , 170 ] .Debt, the size and cost drives the variability of results and autom a tica l l y chang es the financial risk. The size of influence of financial structure on firm performance has produced financial leverag e effect, w hich can be defined as the m echanism throug h w hich debt a ffects return on equity , return on the ratio of benefits ( net income) and equity .B etw een economic profitability and financial return there i s a tig ht correlation. Financial return is rooted in economic returns. The difference betw een the tw o rates is g enerated by com pany policy options for funding . U sually , on equal economic rate return, financial profitability ra tes vary depending on finance source - from ow n equity or borrow ed capital.In econom ic theory the link betw een financial profitability ra te ( R f) and econom ic ra te of return ( R e) is hig hlig hted by the follow ing equation:...w here: d = averag e interest rate; D= total debts; C pr = ow n equity ;...If for calculation of return ra tes profit tax i s taken into account, the relationship becomes [ 6 , 170 ] :w here: i=the tax rate....W e can see the influence that financial structure, respective "all financial resources or capital composition that financial manag er use to increase the needed funding " [ 7 , 36 ] , has on the overall profitability of the company . B y reporting total debt ( D) to ow n equity ( C PR ) i s determined financial leverag e ( L F) ( or leverag e ratio) reflecting the proportion of g rants to loans and g rants to i ts ow n resources. The report should not ex ceed the value 2 , otherw i se the debt capacity of the enterprise i s considered saturated, and borrow ing above this l im i t lead to the risk of insolvency , both to the borrow er and the lender.The financial leverag e effect ( E L F) results from the difference betw een financial and economic return and "ex pressesthe impact of debt on the entity 's equity , the ratio betw een ex ternal and domestic financing ( dom estic resources) " [ 2 , 40 ] thus reflecting the influence offinancial structure on the perform ance of an entity :...Depending or not on the consideration of income tax , net or g ross ra tes of return can be measured, i.e . net or raw financial leverag e effect, as follow s:Debt i s favorable w hile the interest rate i s inferior to the ra te of economic profitability , w hich has a positive influence on financial ra te of the company .Financial leverag e i s even g reater as the difference betw een economic profitability and interest rate i s hig her, in this respect can be seen several cases presented in Table 1 .Leverag e effect a l low s evolution stimulation for financial profitability according to the chang e in funding policy of the enterprise being an im portant param eter for stra teg ic business decisions [ 8 , 164 -165 ] .B ased on the balance sheet and profit and loss account of tw o studied companies' rates of return and financial leverag e a re determ ined, as presented in table no. 2 .From the analy sis of the data presented in Table 2 w e may see the follow ing conclusions:1.. Economic and financial rates of return, in the case of S .C . A L FA S .A . follow s an upw a rd trend recently analy zed aspect reflecting the increased efficiency in the use of equity capital invested, w hile for S .C . B ETA S .A . evolution is a descendant one.2.. R eturn on equity ( equity efficiency ) w as hig her than the ra te of economic profitability ( econom ic efficiency of assets, invested capital respectively ) throug hout the period under review follow ing a positive financial leverag e ( EL F> 0 ) and hig her econom ic efficiency cost of borrow ing ( R e> d).3.. R educing financial leverag e for S .C . A L FA S .A . reduced the favorable effect of the debt presence on financial efficiency ra te , w hich w as due to low er w e ig ht ra tio of tota l debt and equity g row th.4.. Total debt increased during N-l and N y ears for S .C . B ETA S .A . resulted in increased financial leverag e that potentiates financial return ahead as the economic ra te of return.The evolution of the relationship betw een g ross economic return ( R ebr) and g ross financial profitability ( R fbr) for S .C . A L FA S .A . is g raphically presented in Fig ure 1 , and for S .C . B ETA S .A . in Fig ure 2 .A naly zing the evolution offinancial leverag e ( Fig ure 3 ) one can see that risk capital i s not placed a t a level too hig h, w hich m ig ht jeopardize the financial autonom y of enterprises.S ome financiers, as M odig l i ani and Fisher a rg ue that i t i s more advantag eous for the company to finance from loans than from equity [ 6 , 170 ] as the cost of borrow ed capital ( debt interest) i s a lw a y s deductible company 's tax , w hile the cost of equity ( preserved benefits and dividends) i s not tax deductible for the com pany . S hareholders tend to fa ll into debt to g et more tax sa ving , in this w a y , "indebted enterprise va lue appears to be hig her than the company that i s not under debt"[ 7 , 36 ] .Financial breakeven returnEstablishing the company 's position in relation to financial return breakeven for financial risk analy s i s i s determined taking into account fix ed costs and fix ed financial costs, meaning interest ex penses. In this s ituation turnover is calculated corresponding to a financial breakeven return or "financial standstill".B reakeven thus determ ined depends on four fundam ental variables [ 10 ] :-three parameters that influence the stability results of operations:*stability of turnover;*costs structure;*firm position in relation to i ts dead point;-financial ex penses level, respective the debt policy practiced by the company .B ased on these values safety indicators or position indicators are estimated, presented in Table 3 .w here: C A ^tic= financial breakeven;C f = fix ed ex penses;C hfin = financial ex pensesC V = variable ex penses; CA = turnover;R mcv = variable ex penses rate marg in.Financial risk deepens econom ic risk ( in addition to repa y ment of loans, interest costs need to be paid), and finally g enerates a pay ment default of the company that can lead to bankruptcy risk [ 11 , 36 ] .Financial leverag e ratio ( C L F)Financial risk assessment and evaluation can be m ade based on financial leverag e factor ( C L F). It ex presses the sensitivity of net income ( R net) to operating results variations ( R exp) and m easures the percentag e increase of net incom e in response to increase w i th one percentag e of results from operations. C a lculation relationship is as follow s:...respective: ...The C L F calculation takes into account only the current result and financial ex penses, only that correlate w i th the operation, w hich reduces net income relationship: R net = ( R ex p - C hfin) * ( ! - /)In these c ircum stances, financial leverag e coefficient g a ins ex pression: d c . \ /. .v i R exp...C L F= R qx PIt notes that the financial leverag e ratio i s directly proportional to financial ex penses w hich increase hig her the value of C L F and therefore increase in financial risk .Financial risk as measured by financial leverag e ra tio meets vary ing deg rees depending on know ing the coefficient values from zero to infinity [ 6 , 170 ] :B ased on profit and loss account of the tw o studied companies w e determine financial risk indicators presented in Table no. 4 .It can be noticed that, based on the data in Table 4 , the com panies have a com fortable s i tuation in term s of financial risk , because financial expenses have insig nificant values, and in N-2 y ear their absence a l low ed to obtain a financial leverag e ra tio equal to 1 , companies' ex posure to financial risk being m inor.A ctual turnover for the tw o com panies w ere above breakeven financial ( o ver critical turnover) in the analy zed period, aspect w hich a l low ed the recording of safety m arg ins, safety spaces and positive efficiency g a ins.Graphical representation of comparative evolution of financial leverag e ratio i s sug g estively show n in Fig ure no. 4 .In the case of S . C . A L FA S .A . the entire period financial risk is minor due to low level of financial costs, the company preferring to use only i ts ow n resources to finance the activity . Poor values of financial leverag e ra tio ( very c lose to 1 ) support the previous sta tements.Greatest financial risk to w hich S .C . B ETA S .A . i s ex posed to i s manifested in financial y ear N, w hen the value ofcoefficient C L F is max imum , respectively 1 ,11047 w hich show s increasing dependence of net result on the operating result, and consequently , increased financial risk due to the g ap betw een the index and results of operations index of financial ex penses ( l R ex p <Ichfin)- How ever, financial risk i s minor, the society proves superior financial perform ance as turnover i s w e l l above the critical turnover ( financial breakeven), rang e safety hovering w ell above the 20 % in the analy zed period.C onclusionsDebt had a positive effect on financial profitability m anifested as a "financial leverag e" ( positive leverag e effect). Ex tremely low level of debt and low er value of financial l iabilities inferior to ow n equity makes companies not ri sk y in term s of financial solvency . In this situation, for both com panies, i s m ore advantag eous to use the medium and long term loans to finance business, thus ensuring them an additional profit. U s ing debt should be made w i th caution in order not to l imit the financial independence of firm s and reduce additional debt opportunities in times of crisis.A naly sis of financial risk and leverag e effect that accom pany the call to debt, presents a major interest to optim ize the financial structure and viability of any com pany operating under a real market econom y .The use of loans can be risky for the entity and i ts shareholders, but this m ethod of financing becom es advantag eous for entity shareholders s imply because they are able to hold an asset more im porta nt than equity value, increasing their economic pow er. The financing of company ex pansion activity can be achieved by a s ig nificant increase in borrow ed capital provided economic returns exceed the averag e interest rate.C ompany 's risk assessment on the basis of leverag e coefficients i s required for the predicted behavior analy s i s for estimating future results, w hich must be taken into account in decision m aking process.R efer en ces[ 1 ] M orariu, A ., C recanä,C ., D., ( 2009 ) , ''Internal audit. S tra teg y in manag em ent advising ", Theoretical and A pplied Economics - supplem ent, B ucharest, p. 36 .[ 2 ] M orariu, A ., C recanä, C ., D., ( 2009 ) , ''The im pact of economic performance on financial position", Financial A udit, no. 5 , The C hamber of Financial A uditors from R omania Publish house ( C A FR ) , B ucharest, p. 40 .[ 3 ] OM FP, 3055 /2 009 , A rt. 306 , a l .( 3) .[ 4 ] J offre, P., S im on, Z., ( 2007 ) , Ency c lopédie de g estion, Economie Publish house, Paris, 1989 , quoted by J ianu, L , p. 89 .[ 5 ] J ianu, I., ( 2007 ) , Evaluation, presentation and analy sis of enterprise's performance - A n approach from International Financial R eporting S tandards, C EC C A R Publish house, B ucharest, p. 89 .[ 6 ] Petrescu, S ., ( 2010 ) , A naly sis and financial - accounting diag nostic -Theoreticapplicative g uide, 3 rd edition, revised and enlarg ed, C EC C A R Publish house, B ucharest, p. 170 .[ 7 ] M i roniuc, M ., ( 2007 ) , A ccounting and financial manag ement of the company . C oncepts. Policies. Practices, S edcom L ibris Publish house, Iaçi, p. 36 .[ 8 ] Zait, D., ( 2008 ) , Evaluation and manag em ent of direct investments, S edcom Libris Publish house, Ia §i, p. 164 -165 .[ 9 ] National B ank of R om ania, R eference Interest - history , available on[ 10 ] Quiry , P., Le Fur, Y ., Pierre V emim men ( 2008 ) , Finance d'entreprise 2009 , 7 th edition , Dalloz Publisher, Paris.[ 11 ] B erheci, M ., ( 2009 ) , "The risks in l i fe business and accounting outcom e variability " - Part II, A ccounting , auditing and business expertise, p. 36 .。

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中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firmsAbstractExtant empirical evidence indicates that the proportion of firms going public prior to achieving profitability has been increasing over time. This phenomenon is largely driven by an increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. Since there is considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of these firms at the time of going public, identifying factors that influence their ability to attain key post-IPO milestones such as achieving profitability represents an important area of research. We employ a theoretical framework built around agency and signaling considerations to identify factors that influence the probability and timing of post-IPO profitability of Internet IPO firms. We estimate Cox Proportional Hazards models to test whether factors identified by our theoretical framework significantly impact the probability of post-IPO profitability as a function of time. We find that the probability of post- IPO profitability increases with pre-IPO investor demand and change in ownership at the IPO of the top officers and directors. On the other hand, the probability ofpost-IPO profitability decreases with the venture capital participation, proportion of outsiders on the board, and pre-market valuation uncertainty.Keywords: Initial public offerings, Internet firms, Path-to-profitability, Hazard models, Survival1. Executive summaryThere has been an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability. Further, this phenomenon is largely driven by the increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. The risk of post-IPO failure is particularly high for unprofitable firms as shifts in investor sentiment leading to negative market perceptions regarding their prospects or unfavorable financing environments could lead to a shutdown of external financing sources thereby imperiling firm survival. Therefore, the actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the company's evolution since it signals the long-term economic viability of the firm. While the extant research in entrepreneurship has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to attain important milestones prior to or at the time of going public, relatively little is known regarding the timing or ability of firms to achieve critical post-IPO milestones. In this study, we construct a theoretical framework anchored on agency and signaling theories to understand the impact of pre-IPO factors such as governance and ownership structure, management quality, institutional investor demand, and third party certification on firms' post-IPO path-to-profitability. We attempt to validate the testable implications arising from our theoretical framework using the Internet industry as our setting. Achieving post-issue profitability in a timely manner is of particular interest for Internet IPO firms since they are predominantly unprofitable at the time of going public and are typically characterized by high cash burn rates thereby raising questions regarding their long-term economic viability. Since there is a repeated tendency for high technology firms in various emerging sectors of the economy to go public in waves amid investor optimism followed by disappointing performance, insights gained from a study of factors that influence the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms will help increase our understanding of the development path and long-term economic viability of entrepreneurial firms in emerging, high technology industries.2. IntroductionThe past few decades have witnessed the formation and development of several vitallyimportant technologically oriented emerging industries such as disk drive, biotechnology, and most recently the Internet industry. Entrepreneurial firms in such knowledge intensive industries are increasingly going public earlier in their life cycle while there is still a great deal of uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects (Janey and Folta, 2006). A natural consequence of the rapid transition from founding stage firms to public corporations is an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability.3 Although sustained profitability is no longer a requirement for firms in order to go public, actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the firm's evolution since it reduces uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of the firm. In this paper, we focus on identifying observable factors at the time of going public that have the ability to influence the likelihood and timing of attaining post-IPO profitability by Internet firms. We restrict our study to the Internet industry since it represents a natural setting to study the long-term economic viability of an emerging industry where firms tend to go public when they are predominantly unprofitable and where there is considerably uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects.4The attainment of post-IPO profitability assumes significance since the IPO event does not provide the same level of legitimizing differentiation that it did in the past as sustained profitability is no longer a prerequisite to go public particularly in periods where the market is favorably inclined towards investments rather than demonstration of profitability (Stuartet al., 1999; Janey and Folta, 2006). During the Internet boom, investors readily accepted the mantra of “growth at all costs” and enthusiastically bid up the post-IPO offering prices to irrational levels (Lange et al., 2001). In fact, investor focus on the promise of growth rather than profitability resulted in Internet start-ups being viewed differently from typical new ventures in that they were able to marshal substantial resources virtually independent of performance benchmarks (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005).Since the Internet bubble burst in April 2000, venture capital funds dried up and many firms that had successful IPOs went bankrupt or faced severe liquidity problems (Chang, 2004). Consequently, investors' attention shifted from their previously singular focus on growth prospects to the question of profitability with their new mantrabeing “path-to- profitability.” As such, market participants focused on not just whe ther the IPO firm wouldbe able to achieve profitability but also “when” or “how soon.” IPO firms unable to credibly demonstrate a clear path-to-profitability were swiftly punished with steeply lower valuations and consequently faced significantly higher financing constraints. Since cash flow negative firms are not yet self sufficient and, therefore, dependent on external financing to continue to operate, the inability to raise additional capital results in a vicious cycle of events that can quickly lead to delisting and even bankruptcy.5 Therefore, the actual attainment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the evolution of an IPO firm providing it with legitimacy and signaling its ability to remain economically viable through the ups and downs associated with changing capital market conditions. The theoretical framework supporting our analysis draws from signaling and agency theories as they relate to IPO firms. In our study, signaling theory provides the theoretical basis to evaluate the signaling impact of factors such as management quality, third party certification, institutional investor demand, and pre-IPO valuation uncertainty on the path-to-profitability. Similarly, agency theory provides the theoretical foundations to allow us to examine the impact of governance structure and change in top management ownership at the time of going public on the probability of achieving the post-IPO profitability milestone. Our empirical analysis is based on the hazard analysis methodology to identify the determinants of the probability of becoming profitable as a function of time for a sample of 160 Internet IPOs issued during the period 1996–2000.Our study makes several contributions. First, we construct a theoretical framework based on agency and signaling theories to identify factors that may influence the path-to- profitability of IPO firms. Second, we provide empirical evidence on the economic viability of newly public firms (path-to-profitability and firm survival) in the Internet industry. Third, we add to the theoretical and empirical entrepreneurship literature that has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to achieve critical milestones during the transition from private to public ownership. While previous studies have focused on milestones during the private phase of firm development such as receipt of VC funding and successful completion of a public offering (Chang, 2004; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Beckman et al., 2007), our study extends this literature by focusing on post-IPOmilestones. Finally, extant empirical evidence indicates that the phenomenon of young, early stage firms belonging to relatively new industries being taken public amid a wave of investor optimism fueled by the promise of growth rather than profitability tends to repeat itself over time.6 However, profitability tends to remain elusive and takes much longer than anticipated which results in investor disillusionment and consequently high failure rate among firms in such sectors. 7 Therefore, our study is likely to provide useful lessons to investors when applying valuations to IPO firms when this phenomenon starts to repeat itself.This articles proceeds as follows. First, using agency and signaling theories, we develop our hypotheses. Second, we describe our sample selection procedures and present descriptive statistics. Third, we describe our research methods and present our results. Finally, we discuss our results and end the article with our concluding remarks.3. Theory and hypothesesSignaling models and agency theory have been extensively applied in the financial economics, management, and strategy literatures to analyze a wide range of economic phenomena that revolve around problems associated with information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Signaling theory in particular has been widely applied in the IPO market as a framework to analyze mechanisms that are potentially effective in resolving the adverse selection problem that arises as a result of information asymmetry between various market participants (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986; Welch, 1989). In this study, signaling theory provides the framework to evaluate the impact of pre-IPO factors such as management quality, third party certification, and institutional investor demand on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.The IPO market provides a particularly fertile setting to explore the consequences of separation of ownership and control and potential remedies for the resulting agency problems since the interests of pre-IPO and post-IPO shareholders can diverge. In the context of the IPO market, agency and signaling effects are also related to the extent that insider actions such as increasing the percentage of the firm sold at the IPO, percentage of management stock holdings liquidated at the IPO, or percentage of VC holdings liquidated at the IPO can accentuate agency problems with outside investors and, as a consequence, signal poorperformance (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005). We, therefore, apply agency theory to evaluate the impact of board structure and the change in pre-to-post IPO ownership of top management on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.3.1. Governance structureIn the context of IPO firms, there are at least two different agency problems (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005). The first problem arises as a result of opportunistic behavior of agents to increase their share of the wealth at the expense of principals. The introduction of effective monitoring and control systems can help mitigate or eliminate this type of behavior and its negative impact on post-issue performance. The extant corporate governance literature has argued that the effectiveness of monitoring and control functions depends to a large extent on the composition of the board of directors. We, therefore, examine the relationship between board composition and the likelihood and timing of post-IPO profitability.The second type of agency problem that arises in the IPO market is due to uncertainty regarding whether insiders seek to use the IPO as an exit mechanism to cash out or whether they use the IPO to raise capital to invest in positive NPV projects. The extent of insider selling their shares at the time of the IPO can provide an effective signal regarding which of the above two motivations is the likely reason for the IPO. We, therefore, examine the impact of the change in ownership of officers and directors around the IPO on the likelihood and timing of attaining post-issue profitability.3.2. Management qualityAn extensive body of research has examined the impact of to management team (TMT) characteristics on firm outcomes for established firms as well as for new ventures by drawing from human capital and demography theories. For instance, researchers drawing from human capital theories study the impact of characteristics such as type and amount of experience of TMTs on performance (Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Burton et al., 2002; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Additionally, Beckman et al. (2007) argue that demographic arguments are distinct from human capital arguments in that they examine team composition and diversity in addition to experience. The authors consequently examine the impact of characteristics such as background affiliation, composition, and turnover of TMT members on thelikelihood of firms completing an IPO. Overall, researchers have generally found evidence to support arguments that human capital and demographic characteristics of TMT members influence firm outcomes.Drawing from signaling theory, we argue that the quality of the TMT of IPO firms can serve as a signal of the ability of a firm to attain post-IPO profitability. Since management quality is costly to acquire, signaling theory implies that by hiring higher quality management, high value firms can signal their superior prospects and separate themselves from low value firms with less capable managers. The beneficial impact of management quality in the IPO market includes the ability to attract more prestigious investment bankers, generate stronger institutional investor demand, raise capital more effectively, lower underwriting expenses, attract stronger analyst following, make better investment and financing decisions, and consequently influence the short and long-run post-IPO operating and stock performance(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). Thus, agency theory, in turn, would argue that higher quality management is more likely to earn their marginal productivity of labor and thus have a lower incentive to shirk, thereby also leading to more favorable post-IPO outcomes.8We focus our analyses on the signaling impact of CEO and CFO quality on post-IPO performance. We focus on these two members of the TMT of IPO firms since they are particularly influential in establishing beneficial networks, providing legitimacy to the organization, and are instrumental in designing, communicating, and implementing the various strategic choices and standard operating procedures that are likely to influence post- IPO performance.3.3. Third party certificationThe extant literature has widely recognized the potential for third party certification as a solution to the information asymmetry problem in the IPO market (Beatty, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995, 1999b; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). The theoretical basis for third party certification is drawn from the signaling models which argue that intermediaries such as investment bankers, venture capitalists, and auditors have the ability to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry by virtue of their reputation capital (Booth and Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini,1995, Carter et al., 1998). In addition to certification at the IPO, intermediaries, through their continued involvement,monitoring, and advising role have the ability to enhance performance after the IPO. In the discussion below, we focus on the signaling impact of venture capitalists involvement and investment bank prestige on post-IPO outcomes3.4. Institutional investor demandPrior to marketing the issue to investors, the issuing firm and their investment bankers are required to file an estimated price range in the registration statement. The final pricing of the IPO firm is typically done on the day before the IPO based upon the perceived demand from potential investors. Further, the final offer price is determined after investment bankers ave conducted road shows and obtained indications of interest from institutional investors. Therefore, the initial price range relative to the final IPO offer price is a measure of institutional investor uncertainty regarding the value of the firm. Since institutional investors typically conduct sophisticated valuation analyses prior to providing their indications of demand, divergence of opinion on valuation amongst them is a reflection of the risk and uncertainty associated with the prospects of the IPO firm during the post-IPO phase. Consistent with this view, Houge et al. (2001) find empirical evidence to indicate that greater divergence of opinion and investor uncertainty about an IPO can generate short- run overvaluation and long-run underperformance. Therefore, higher divergence of opinion among institutional investors is likely to be negatively related to the probability of post-IPO profitability and positively related to time-to-profitability.A related issue is the extent of pre-market demand by institutional investors for allocation of shares in the IPO firm. Higher pre-issue demand represents a favorable consensus of sophisticated institutional investors regarding the prospects of the issuing firm. Institutional investor consensus as well as their higher holdings in the post-IPO firm is likely to be an informative signal regarding the post-IPO prospects of the firm.4. Sample description and variable measurementOur initial sample of 325 Internet IPOs over the period January 1996 to February 2000 was obtained from the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Internet Research Report dated February 17,2000. The unavailability of IPO offering prospectuses and exclusion of foreign firms reduces the sample size to 205 firms. Further, to be included in our sample, we require that financial and accountinginformation for sample firms is available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat files and IPO offering related information is accessible from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global New Issues database. As a result of these additional data requirements, our final sample consists of 160 Internet IPO firms. Information on corporate governance variables (ownership, board composition, past experience of the CEO and CFO), and number of risk factors is collected from the offering prospectuses.Our final sample of Internet IPO firms has the following attributes. The mean offer price for our sample of IPO firms is $16.12. The average firm in our sample raised $99.48 million. The gross underwriting fee spread is around seven percent. About 79% of the firms in our sample had venture capital backing. Both the mean and median returns on assets for firms in our sample at the time of going public are significantly negative. For example, the average operating return on assets for our sample of firms is − 56.3%. The average number of employees for the firms in our sample is 287. The average board size is 6.57 for our sample. In about 7.5% of our sample, the CEO and CFO came from the same firm. In addition, we find that 59 firms representing 37% of the sample attained profitability during the post-IPO period with the median time-to-profitability being three quarters from the IPO date.5. Discussion of results and concluding remarksThe development path of various emerging industries tend to be similar in that they are characterized by high firm founding rates, rapid growth rates, substantial investments in R&D and capital expenditures, potential for product/process breakthroughs, investor exuberance, huge demand for capital, large number of firms going public while relatively young, and a struggle for survival during the post-IPO phase as profitability and growth targets remain elusive and shifts in investor sentiment substantially raise financing constraints. Recently, the Internet has rapidly emerged as a vitally important industry that has fundamentally impacted the global economy with start-up firms in the industry attracting $108 billion of investment capital during the period 1995–2000。

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