外文翻译--是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值？
外文翻译--企业和国家层面的结构治理机制对企业股利政策、现金持有量和
原文：The Effects of Firm and Country-level Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy, Cash Holdings, and Firm Value: a Cross-country StudyIntroductionThis study examines the effects of firm- and country-level corporate governance mechanisms on dividends and cash holding policies and their joint impact on firm value using a sample of over 3,000 listed firms from 21 countries.Firms outside the US are often controlled by a large shareholder. For example, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) trace the ultimate owners of 2,980 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies and find more than two-thirds of them have controlling owners. Faccio and Lang (2002) carry out a similar task for over 5,000 firms from 13 Western European countries. They find that ownership concentrations among these Europeans firms are even higher than those of Asian firms. The primary agency problem for firms with high ownership concentration is the conflict between the controlling shareholders and those of minority shareholders. With de facto control, coupled with insufficient legal protection of investor rights in many countries, the controlling owners often engage in activities that increase private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. These agency conflicts are further exacerbated when the controlling owners have excess control rights1.This paper contributes to the literature on international corporate governance in four ways. First, it provides additional evidence on the linkage between excess control, dividend/cash holding policies, and firm value, respectively. It also directly test the valuation effects of dividend and cash holding policies. Second, this study extends the strand of literature on the importance of investor protection in corporate governance. The empirical analysis reveals that the country-level investor protection mitigates the1 Excess control rights are computed as the difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rightsheld by the largest owner. The common use of pyramidal structure, cross-shareholdings, dual class shares,and other control enhancing mechanisms result in the largest owners having control beyond their ownershipstake [see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)].entrenchment effect of excess control by forcing the insiders to disgorge cash. Furthermore, the valuation effects of dividend and cash holdings policies are also dependent on the legal environment a firm operates in. Third, it demonstrates that how the policy choices affect firm performance depends on firm and country-level governance mechanisms. Fourth, it explicitly considers the interdependence among policies and firm value by adopting a simultaneous equations approach. The results indicate that dividend payout, cash holdings, and firm values are interrelated.The remainder of the paper is organized as followings. In the next section, I present some theoretical and empirical results on the relations between dividend/cash holding policies and corporate governance mechanisms and discuss studies examining the effects of the corporate governance on firm value.The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm policies and performanceTwo effects of high ownership concentrationTwo effects are hypothesized to coexist in firms with high ownership concentration: (1) a positive incentive effect, i.e., the large shareholders have interests and power to engage in value maximization activities given their high ownership stake; (2) a negative entrenchment effect. As pointed out by Denis & McConnell (2002), “If large shareholders benefit only from proportionate cash dividends and appreciation in the market value of their shares there is no conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders.” However, private benefits of control do exist and are quite substantial in some cases. With de facto control, large shareholders might divert corporate resources to themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. More recent studies provide ample evidence supporting this entrenchment effect. This adverse effect is exacerbated when the largest owner’s control rights are further enhanced through the use of pyramidal structure, cross-shareholding, or super voting shares. Under these circumstances, the largest owners often have control rights in excess of their cash flow rights, which gives them strong incentives to expropriateminority shareholders.LLSV (1998, 2000) establish the importance of legal protection of investor rightsas a country-level corporate governance regime. They discover that there exists significant differences across countries in the degree of investor rights protection. Firms in countries with strong investor protection have low ownership concentration and better access to external financing than those in countries with poor investor protection. The primary agency conflict for firms with concentrated ownership structure is between the controlling owners and minority shareholders. The investors’ legal rights and enforcement of law mitigates this agency conflict. Therefore, any cross-country governance analysis must control for the country-level governance effect.Dividend policyEasterbrook (1984) proposes that dividend payments force firms to raise fund from capital markets which provide monitoring of managers. Therefore, the managerial agency problem can be mitigated through dividend policy. Jensen (1986) posits that managers may use lower dividends in order to retain resources which can be used for excessive salary, perquisite consumption, or investing in projects that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) present a different view on the use of dividends. Using a sample of over 5,000 firms with concentrated ownership structure, they document that dividend payment is positively (negatively) associated with the excess control held by the largest shareholder of firms that are tightly (loosely) affiliated with business groups. They contend that outsiders perceive firms that are tightly affiliated with business groups have high agency costs and therefore discount firm value ex ante. In fear of value discount, the controlling owners use dividends as a bonding device. However, outsiders seem to be less alert to the agency problems in firms loosely affiliated with groups. Therefore, the controlling owners are able to retain dividends. For a sample of over 4,000 firms from 33 countries, LLSV (2000) find that firms operating in countries with better shareholder protection pay higher dividends. Taken together, both firm and country-level corporate governance mechanisms are important determinants of dividend policy.Cash holdingsCash holdings are associated with both benefits and costs in the context of agency theory. The existing literature presents two major motives of holding cash (1) the transaction costs motive and (2) the precautionary motive. According to these two motives, firms should hold high cash balances if the costs of raising external funds or the costs of cash shortfalls are high. The pecking order theory presented in Myers and Majluf (1984) supports the view of holding cash for transactional and/or precautionary motives. Researchers find substantial evidence supporting these arguments. For example, using all firms on the COMPUSTAT over the period of 1952 through 1994, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find that smaller firms, firms with good investment opportunities, firms with more volatile cash flows hold more cash. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2003) test the effect of financial constraints on corporate cash holdings by contrasting the propensity of holding cash between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. They find that the sensitivity of changes in cash holdings to cash flows is positive only for financially constrained firms, consistent with the precautionary motive of hoarding cash in anticipation of future investment opportunities. An alternative view of corporate cash holding is presented in Opler et al. (1999) which contends that cash holdings is simply an outcome of financing and investment decisions. Firms generating large cash flows would pay off debt, make dividend payment, and have high cash balances. Firms with low cash flows draw down their cash balances and use high leverage.More recent studies on cash holdings focus their attentions on the costs of holding high levels of cash. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) explore the relation between cash holdings and shareholder rights for about 11,000 firms across 45countries. They find a negative relation between firm level cash holdings and the degree of legal protection of shareholders. In their cross-country study on the determinants of cash holdings, Lins and Kalcheva (2004) find that when the management is entrenched and the investors are not well-protected, cash holdings has an incremental negative effect on firm value. Taken together, these findings suggest that the costs of holding cash is particularly high when the firm- or country-level corporate governance mechanisms do not offer sufficient protection tominority shareholders.Empirical analysisCountry random effect models are used in all the regression analyses to control for overall country effects and to test the effect of country level investor protection on dividend payment, cash holdings and Tobin’s Q. The Hausman test results suggest that the random effects estimator do not differ systematically from those estimated using a fixed effect model. Therefore, the random effect model is more appropriate for my analysis. I control for the industry effects by including industry group dummies using the Campbell (1996) classification.Dividend policy and corporate governanceFirst, I examine the effect of firm level governance on dividend policy by regressing dividend payout ratio against the excess control while controlling for other firm- and country-specific factors that have been shown to be various determinants of dividend ratio. On the one hand, the controlling owners with excess control rights have strong incentives to retain dividends for perquisite consumption or to invest in projects that increase private benefits of control. However, Faccio and Lang (2001) find that excess control is positively related to dividend when the outside investors perceive firms with excess control to be vulnerable to expropriation problems. Whether excess control increases or decreases dividend payments becomes an empirical issue that will be addressed in my regression analysis. I later investigate the policy effects on firm value to directly test whether dividend payments could prevent value discount, a view presented but not tested in Faccio and Lang (2001).LLSV (2000a) document a positive relation between country-level shareholder protection and corporate dividend payment. To control for this effect, I adopt two legal protection measures commonly used in previous studies. The first legal protection measure is the legal origin dummy (Common law) set to 1 if a firm is operating in a country having a common law legal origin and zero otherwise [see LLSV (1998)]. LLSV (1998) find that common law countries generally offer better investor protection relative to civil law countries. An alternative measure is the Anti-director rights index taking on a value ranging from 0 to 5 [see LLSV (1998)].Another country level determinant of dividend payment is the reserve requirement which is the minimum percentage of total share capital that the host country’s corporate laws mandate for corporations to hold to prevent their dissolution. Under this restriction, corporations are required to retain a proportion of their annual earnings until the threshold is reached. This restriction prevents firms from distributing all its earnings as dividend. I expect a negative relation between reserve and dividend ratio.Firm value and corporate governanceTo assess the valuation impact of corporate governance regimes, I first explore the entrenchment effect of excess control.The coefficient on excess control is negative and significant at the 5% level, in line with the findings of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002). Leverage has a negative effect on firm value. High growth firms receive high valuations. Large firms have low values, possibly because these firms are mature in their industries and have fewer growth opportunities.Summary and conclusionsThis study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms at both firm and country level on dividend and cash holding policies as well as their interrelationships. The regression analyses show that excess control is negatively related to dividend payment and positively related to cash holdings, consistent with the notion that the entrenched shareholders have the propensity to retain cash for private benefits. I also test whether the country-level shareholder protection influences the behavior of controlling shareholders’ policy decisions by including interaction terms between excess control and Anti-director rights index and find that strong investor protection partially offset the negative effect of excess control on dividend payout.In the analysis of governance effects on firm value, my results support the findings of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) that excess control has a negative valuation effect as well as the results reported in LLSV (2002) that country level investor protection has a positive effect on firm value. I also find that both dividend payments and cash holdings are positively related to firm value. However,the valuation effects of these policies depend on the ownership structure. When the controlling owners have excess control, incremental dividend payment becomes a credible signal to outsiders that they will be less likely to be expropriated. In contrast, the incremental level of cash holdings has a negative effect on firm value when the controlling owners have excess control rights, indicating the possibility for misuse of free cash flow is high when the owners become entrenched.Given the potential endogeneity of these policy choices and firm performance, I employ a simultaneous equations model to account for their interdependence. The result indicate that cash holdings supports dividend payout. Both dividend payments and cash reserves have positive effects on firm value after controlling for potential endogeneity. Taken together, my findings indicate that firms with entrenched shareholders have high agency costs manifested as having low dividend payments and/or high cash holdings. These policy choices directly affect firm performance. The legal protection of shareholder rights plays an important role in deterring expropriation activities at the firm level. Firms that are prone to expropriation problems due to their ownership structure may use dividend and or cash holding policies as bonding devices to present value discount.Source: Zhang, Rongrong,2005.“The Effects of Firm and Country-level Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy, Cash Holdings, and Firm Value: A Cross-country Study”. Georgia Southern University.January.pp.1-8.译文：企业和国家层面的结构治理机制对企业股利政策、现金持有量和企业价值的影响：一个跨国企业研究简介本文通过研究来自21个国家超过3000家上市公司样本来探讨企业股息和现金持有政策及其对企业治理机制的影响。
外文翻译--对股东财富影响的股利政策
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth1. IntroductionIn an ever-increasing Indian economy, globalization, liberalization and privatization together with rapid strides made by information technology, have brought intense competition in every field of activity. So, Indian companies at present are dazed, confused, and apprehensive. To maintain the competitiveness of, and add value to the companies, today’s finance managers have to make critical business and financial decisions which will lead to long-run perspective with the objective of maximizing the shareholders’ wealth.Shareholders’ wealth is represented in the market price of the company’s common stock, which, in turn, is the function of the company’s investment, financing and dividend decision. Managements' primary goal is shareholders' wealth maximization, which translates into maximizing the value of the company as measured by the price of the company’s common stock. Shareholders like cash dividends, but they also like the growth in EPS that results from ploughing earning back into the business. The optimal dividend policy is the one that maximizes the company's stock price which leads to maximization of shareholders' wealth and thereby ensures more rapid economic growth. The present study is intended to study how far the dividend payout has impact on shareholders' wealth in general; and in particular to study the relationship between the shareholders' wealth and the dividend payout and to analyze whether the level of dividend payout affects the wealth of the shareholders.2. Statement of the ProblemsIn India few studies have analyzed the relationship between the shareholders'wealth and dividend payment. Net earnings are divided into two parts –retained earnings and dividends. The retained earnings of the business may be reinvested and treated as a source of long-term funds. The dividend should be distributed to the shareholders in order to maximize their wealth as they have invested their money in the expectation of being made better off financially. Therefore, the present study mainly analyses how far the level of dividend payout affects the shareholders' wealth, particularly in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.3. Objectives of the Study• To study the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders' wealth.• To analyze the impact of variation in dividend policy on shareholders' wealth of dividend paying and non-paying companies in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies India.• To analyze the impact of retained earnings and past performance in the presence of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.4. Hypotheses• H1: “There is no significant difference in average market valu e relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”• H2:“There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”5. Methodology5.1. Sources of DataThe study used only secondary data which are collected from CMIE (Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy) prowess package. Analytical method is used for interpreting the data. The data collected from this source have been compiled and used with due care as per the requirements of the study.5.2. Sampling DesignOriginally the sample for this study has been planned to choose from the list of companies listed in National Stock Exchange (NSE). Since the number of companieslisted in the NSE is lesser in number (21 companies in Organic and Inorganic Chemical Industry), the sample of 28 companies in Chemical Industry (Organic-19 and Inorganic-9) has been chosen from 114 listed companies in BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange) using Multi-Stage Random Sampling Technique. The sample units have been chosen for the study based on the availability of required financial data like share price, DPS etc.6. Tools used for Analysis of DataThe equations and variables used for the study are given below:The subscript ‘i’ denotes the ith company in a sample of ‘n’ companies selected from a particular industry, and all variables are measured in the ith time period. Market price per share is the closing prices for the year. To analyze the data, the statistical tools that have been used are Mean, Standard Deviation, multiple regression technique and stepwise regression method to ascertain best fitted model for predicting the dividend policy impact on shareholder’s wealth. The significance of various explanatory variables has been tested by computing t-values. To determine the proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable, the coefficient of determination (R2) has been worked out. The significance of R2 has also been tested with the help of F-Value.7. Period of the StudyThe data used for the analysis are relating to the selected (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies for the period of Ten years (1997-2006).8. Analysis and Results8.1. Comparison of Shareholders’ Value between Dividend Payers an dNon-Payers among Organic CompaniesBefore going through evaluating the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth of selected (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India, it has been tried to compare the average wealth of investors between dividend paying and non-paying Organic and Inorganic companies in India. The comparison of mean shareholders’ wealth of companies of all types pooled under dividend paying and non-paying companies are also carried out. The mean values between two groups arecompared with t-values. The results of the analysis are shown from tables 1 – 3.Table 1: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic Chemical Companies in IndiaYear Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.89 1.55 1.00 1.88 1.13 ns1998 1.87 1.54 0.98 1.86 1.14 ns1999 1.90 1.56 0.97 1.83 1.19 ns2000 1.90 1.58 0.97 1.84 1.18 ns2001 1.87 1.53 0.99 1.89 1.12 ns2002 1.83 1.49 0.97 1.82 1.13 ns2003 1.84 1.50 0.95 1.82 1.16 ns2004 1.87 1.52 0.98 1.86 1.15 ns2005 1.82 1.41 0.97 1.89 1.11 ns2006 1.83 1.43 0.97 1.85 1.14 nsAll Years 1.86 1.44 0.98 1.76 3.81 0.01An examination of the results of year-wise comparison of market value of equity to its book value between dividend payers and non-payers of chemical companies in India (vide table 3) shows that the mean market value of equity relative to book value is well above 1 for all the years under study as well as for pooled years. It has been ranging from minimum of 1.53 in 2005 to 1.60 in 2000 with overall mean of 1.56 for all the years. This shows that the market value is well above the book value for the chemical companies which pay dividend. But the scenario has been slightly different in the case of dividend non-paying chemical companies in India.Table 2: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.04 0.56 -0.70 1.70 2.39 0.051998 1.03 0.54 -0.68 1.62 2.47 0.041999 1.05 0.58 -0.71 1.68 2.43 0.052001 1.10 0.72 -0.76 1.75 2.36 0.052002 1.07 0.65 -0.77 1.85 2.29 ns2003 1.07 0.66 -0.74 1.75 2.35 0.052004 1.07 0.63 -0.69 1.68 2.38 0.052005 1.05 0.59 -0.87 1.98 2.32 0.052006 1.06 0.60 -0.93 2.07 2.31 0.05All Years 1.06 0.58 -0.75 1.48 8.36 0.00An average market value relative to book value is <1, revealing marginal increase in wealth of the investors of these companies. The mean values vary between 0.50 in 2006 to 0.57 in 1997 and 1998. The decline in mean value in 2006 has indicated the decline in wealth of the investors during the period. However, comparison of mean values between dividend payer and non-payer under chemical sector (Organic and Inorganic) revealed that the wealth creation in each year does not show any significant difference. However, in the long-run, the difference is highly significant at 1 per cent level.H1: “There is no significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”Table 3: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity Between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic and Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.57 1.32 0.57 1.92 1.63 ns1998 1.56 1.30 0.57 1.89 1.64 ns1999 1.58 1.33 0.55 1.88 1.70 ns2000 1.60 1.35 0.55 1.89 1.71 ns2001 1.58 1.31 0.55 1.94 1.68 ns2002 1.54 1.27 0.54 1.91 1.68 ns2004 1.57 1.30 0.56 1.90 1.67 ns2005 1.53 1.20 0.51 2.00 1.67 ns2006 1.54 1.22 0.50 2.00 1.71 nsAll Years 1.56 1.25 0.54 1.85 5.49 0.00The H1 is rejected. Therefore, it is found that in the long-rum, wealth of shareholders of dividend paying chemical companies has increased significantly when compared to that of the dividend non-paying counterparts, which further shows the impact of dividend policy on wealth creation. Hence H1 stands: “There is significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”8.2. Relationship between Dividend Policy and Shareholders’ WealthDividend Paying Organic Chemical CompaniesTable 4: Results of Regression showing the Impact of Dividend Policy on Market Value of Equity of ALL DIVIDEND PAYING ORGANIC CHEMICAL COMPANIES in India.The impa ct of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of organic and inorganic chemical companies with adoption of dividend policy has been elicited using multiple regression analysis. The Dividend per share (DPS) has been used as proxy for measuring the dividend policy of the companies and Market value (MV) of equity of the companies under study is considered as proxy for measuring the shareholders’ wealth and used as dependent variable. Apart from DPS, Retained earnings (RE), lagged Price-Earning Ratio (PEt-1) and lagged Market value of equity (MVt-1) are also used as explanatory variables in order to know whether dividend policy of Organic and Inorganic chemical companies are dominated by these factors in influencing the creation of shareholders’ wealth. Table 4 shows the regression results for all selected organic chemical companies in India with regard to impact of initiating dividend payout on shareholders’ wealth. Perusal of the results indicates that the fit of all four models is significant at 1 per cent level (F = 23.77, p < 0.01 formodel 1, F = 11.77, p < 0.01 for model 2, F = 7.44, p < 0.01 for model 3 and F = 123.15, p < 0.01 for model 4). Among the four models, F value for model 4 is very high. Further, the coefficients of DPS in all four models are highly significant at 1 per cent level and positive in sign (β = 92.68, t = 4.88, p < 0.01 in model 1; β = 92.81, t = 4.84, p < 0.01 in model 2; β = 94.57, t = 4.66, p < 0.01 in model 3; and β = 32.34, t = 3.08, p < 0.01 in model 4). Also, from the perusal of adjusted R2 values, it is clear that the explanatory variables in the model 4 could together explain 80.46 per cent of the variance in market value, whereas explanatory variables in model 1, 2 and 3 could, together, explain 18.70 per cent, 17.87 per cent and 17.83 per cent respectively of the variance in dependent variable Hence, model 4 is the appropriate one for the final interpretation. Interestingly, the coefficient of DPS in model 4, though statistically significant, has declined considerably in the presence of RE and lagged MV, even though the coefficients of those variables are insignificant. Also, the intercepts, which are insignificant in the first three models, become significant in model 4, indicating that there are some factors inherent in the market dominated over dividend policy when market has started considering RE and lagged MV of organic chemical companies under chemical sector.H2: “There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies in I ndia.”9. Summary and Concluding RemarksGenerally, higher dividend increases the market value of the share and vice versa. Shareholders preferred current dividend to future income so, dividend is considered as an important factor which determines the shar eholders’ wealth. This is normally true in case of salaried individuals, retired pensioners and others with limited incomes. Dividend has information content and the payment of dividend indicates that the company has a good earning capacity. The wealth of the shareholders is greatly influenced mainly by five variables viz., Growth in Sales, Improvement of Profit Margin, Capital Investment Decisions (both working capital and fixed capital), Capital Structure Decisions, Cost of Capital (Dividend on Equity, Interest on Debt) etc. As far as the dividend paying companies are concerned, there is a significantimpact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies. Whereas, as far as the Inorganic Chemical Companies are concerned, the share holders’ wealth is not influenced by the dividend payout.Source: R. Azhagaiah, Sabari Priya.N. The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,2008(20) :P181－187.译文：对股东财富影响的股利政策1．简介印度经济不断发展，在全球化、自由化和私有化，特别是信息技术取得了迅速进展的情形下，带来了在各个活动领域的激烈竞争。
外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策
外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策在当今复杂多变的经济环境中，上市公司财务舞弊问题日益严重，不仅损害了投资者的利益，破坏了市场的公平和透明，也给整个经济社会带来了负面影响。
本文旨在深入探讨外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策，以维护市场的健康稳定发展。
一、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）利益驱动利益是导致外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的首要原因。
公司管理层为了达到个人或团体的经济利益，如获取高额薪酬、奖金、股票期权等，可能会操纵财务数据。
此外，公司为了满足上市要求、获得融资、避免退市等，也会不惜通过舞弊手段来美化财务报表。
（二）公司治理结构不完善公司内部治理结构的缺陷为财务舞弊提供了机会。
如果董事会、监事会等监督机制失效，管理层权力过大且缺乏有效制衡，就容易出现财务舞弊行为。
同时，内部审计部门独立性不足，无法发挥有效的监督作用，也使得财务舞弊难以被及时发现和制止。
（三）外部监管不力证券监管部门的监管力度不足，法律法规不够健全，对财务舞弊行为的处罚力度不够严厉，使得上市公司违法成本较低。
此外，审计机构、评级机构等第三方中介机构未能尽职尽责，也在一定程度上纵容了财务舞弊行为的发生。
（四）压力与动机公司面临的业绩压力、市场竞争压力以及来自股东和投资者的期望压力，都可能促使管理层采取不正当手段来达到预期的财务目标。
例如，当公司业绩不佳时，为了稳定股价、避免投资者恐慌抛售，管理层可能会选择财务舞弊。
（五）财务人员职业道德缺失部分财务人员缺乏职业操守和道德底线，为了个人利益或者迫于上级压力，参与或协助财务舞弊。
他们可能故意篡改财务数据、编制虚假财务报告，严重违背了会计职业的诚信原则。
（六）信息不对称上市公司与投资者之间存在信息不对称，投资者难以获取公司真实、准确、完整的财务信息。
这种信息差距使得上市公司更容易进行财务舞弊，而投资者难以察觉和防范。
二、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的对策（一）完善公司治理结构建立健全的公司治理机制，优化董事会结构，增强董事会的独立性和专业性。
股利政策【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Material Source: Fortune; 11/24/2008 Author: Tully-Shawn Dividend policy, one of the three corporation financial decisions, has been concerned among theoreticians and practitioners. John Linter (1956) brought forward a model of dividend adjustment. According to the model, firm that is currently paying dividends at the rate of Depts., and that has a target payout ratio of POR, ill adjust (ADJ) its dividend rate, but less than fully, as its earnings per share (EPS) changes. Modigliani and Miller (1961) argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital, a perfect world, the dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders wealth. His proposition has laid a solid theoretical foundation for the dividend policy. After that, economists have offered explanations in different ways about dividend payment, such as effect of taxes, ividend signaling, agency costs issues and transaction costs. Over decades, conformists could not come to an agreement. Thus, Black, Fischer (1976) gave it a name “dividend puzzle”.In China, the dividend policy of listed companies has its unique characteristic in the strong emerging market economy if comparing the type of dividend payment in China with the type used in developed countries. In addition to cash dividend and stock dividend, several mixed types of dividend payment derive from cash dividend and stock dividend such as mix of bonus issues and dividend, mix of rights issues and dividend, According to China Secur ities Journal’s relative statistical data, there are more listed companies who adopted the pattern of stock dividend in 1993 which were 36%, and more listed companies adopted cash dividend policy during 1994 and 1995 which were 40% and 36% respectively. The companies that paid no dividends account for 35%, 54%, 59% and 62% respectively during the period of 1996 and 1999. The proportion of total listed companies that adopted cash dividend increased from 47% to 54% during 2000 and 2001.In this situation, in o rder to resolve the “dividend puzzle”, many Chinese scholars have done a number of empirical studies. Two main approaches were taken in these studies:First, using event study method to analyze the influence of different dividend the policy on share price and the value of a firm. Wei Chen at (1999) empirical analyzedthe dividend policy of Shanghai stock market by the method of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and studies the existence and character of the signaling effect of dividend policy in this market. This study showed that the degree of CAR was very different from different dividend policy. The CAR of right issue was higher than cash dividend but lower than bonus. Yu Qiao et al (2001) found that there was evidential positive statistical relationship between the dividends and mix dividend policies of firms on the stock market. But their study showed that the market was not sensitive with cash dividends. This phenomenon is opposition with the result being observed in developed countries’ mature markets. Gang Wei (2000) found that dividend policy often signal the information of long-term earnings about a firm for investors.Second, based on diversified dividend policy theories, analyzers analyzed dynamic reasons of dividend policy, and tried to find impact of dynamic factors and influencing extent on dividend policy of firms. Different point of view offered different significant conclusions. For example, cash dividend may be affected by currency balance and retained earnings, and has positive relationship with them (Yang, 2000); different size of firms choose different pattern of dividend: small firms tend to choose stock dividend, while large firms prefer cash dividend (Yan, 2001; Zhao, 2001). If the firms have lower proportion of holding state shares and corporative shares and the stronger self-growth and development of firms, the firms enjoy the higher stock dividend payment, and also the lower cash dividend payment (Lu, 1999).Domestic theoretic and empirical researches based mostly on profit flow (net income, EPS or retained earnings) investigated the dividend policy, and ignored the effect on cash flow. In fact, cash dividend distribution not only depends on profitability of firms, but also depends on free cash flow to firm. Compare profit flow with cash flow, the latter not only express the value which has been created by firm, but also express how many value that has been realized. From the point of view of cash flow to analyze it, it can patch the faults of profit flow (accounting policy choice, earning management), and declare real relationship between cash flow and the ability of cash payout.Recently, more and more investors prefer cash flow, because of the idea that “cash is king” which have become many managers’ conception. Therefore,this paper seeks to analyze the problem of cash dividend payment from the cash flow point of view, and three questions answered in this paper: (1) how much cash will be distributed to shareholders by paying a cash dividend after all expenses. What is theactual dividend? (2) Why is the cash dividend payment higher or lower than cash flow? What are the factors that affect cash dividend payment? (3) What are the features of cash dividend payment in different industries?Firstly, the payment of cash dividend is usually less than accounting profit in Chinese listed companies, but quite a number of listed companies which had more payment of cash dividend than free cash flow to equity, the gap between cash dividend and FCFE is right issue. By theory, the phenomenon of both cash dividend and right issue is contrary to basic regulation of corporate financial management. This phenomenon of self-contradiction may be related to the rule by China security commission in 2000, which the listed companies must have cash dividend payment last three years while they finance by adding shares or right issue. In contrast, cash dividend payment in some listed companies were less than free cash flow to equity, which is result in forming cash storage in these firms. In China, dividend payment of firm can be described as: the firms have very few cash dividend payment and more stock dividend payment, while some firms have not paid any dividend. This is maybe one of the evidences that Chinese stock market full of speculation and unfair financing from stock market.Secondly, payment of cash dividend in Chinese listed companies is relevantly positive for current return per share and total assets but negative for debt to asset ratio. For the index of cash flow, it is closely related to the payment of cash dividend and net operating cash flow; the index of free cash flow to equity is irrelevant. This is because listed companies understand the index of free cash flow to equity in significant limit, they seldom use free cash flow. Additionally, the payment of cash dividend is irrelevant to non-outstanding shares.Lastly, comparatively, the results indicate that firms with a higher ROE, ONCF and higher cash dividend payment belong to traditional industry; the firms with a higher ROE, lower ONCF and lower cash dividend payment belong to high-tech industry. We find there are quite many firms, which cannot make enough residual cash flow, but they still invest big projects. They return back cash dividend to shareholders by financing from stock market. Other firms with little investment opportunity have plenty of cash flow but no cash dividend payment, still finance too. These phenomena should be paid more attention to.译文股利政策资料来源：财富；11/24/2008作者：Tully-Shawn 股利政策，是理论家和实践家一直关注的公司的三个财务决策之一。
企业利润分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Profit PatternsThe most important objective of companies is to create, develop and maintain one or more competitive advantages in order to generate dividends for the shareholders. For a long time, it was simply a question of dominating the market, either by costs or by a policy of differentiation. As Michael Porter advised, it was essential to avoid being “stuck in the middle”. This way of thinking set up competitive rivalry in a closed world, and tended towards stability. This model is less and less relevant today for whole sectors of the economy. We see a multitude of strategic movements which defy the logic of the old system. “Profit Patterns” lists numerous strategies which have joined the small number that we knew before. These patterns often combine to give rise to strategic models which are better adapted to the new and changing needs of the consumer.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predict Valuemigration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major of managers have a talent for recognizing development market trends There are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context. This book proposes thirty strategic prediction models divided into seven families. Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in time! Managers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectives.For most of the 20th century, mastering strategic evolution models was not a determining factor, and formulas for success were fixed and relatively simple. In industry, the basic model stated that profit was a function of relative market share. Today, this rule is confronted with more and more contradictions: among car manufacturers for example, where small companies like Toyota are more profitable than General Motors and Ford. The highest rises in value have become the exclusive right of the companies with the most efficient business designs. These upstart companies have placed themselves in the profit zone of their sectors thanks, in part, to their size, but also to their new way of doing business – exploiting new rules which are sources of value creation. Among the new rules which define a good strategic plan are:1. Strong orientation towards the customer2. Internal decisions which are coherent with the overall activity, concerning the products and services as well as the involvement in the different activities of the value chain3. An efficient mechanism for value–capture.4. A powerful source of differentiation and of strategic control, inspiring investorconfidence in future cash-flow.5. An internal organization carefully designed to support and reinforce the company’s strategic plan.Why does value migrate? The explanation lies largely in the explosion of risk-capital activities in the USA. Since the 40’s, of the many companies that have been created, about a thousand have allowed talented employees, the “brains”, to work without the heavy structures of very big companies. The risk–capital factor is now entering a new phase in the USA, in that the recipes for innovation and value creation are spreading from just the risk-capital companies to all big companies. A growing number of the 500 richest companies have an internal structure for getting into the game of investing in companies with high levels of value-creation. Where does this leave Eur ope? According to recent research, innovation in strategic thinking is under way in Europe, albeit with a slight time-lag. Globalization is making the acceptation of these value-creation rules a condition of global competitively .There is a second phenomenon that has an even more radical influence on value-creation –polarization: The combination of a convincing and innovative strategic plan, strategic control and a dominant market share creates a terrific increase in investor confidence. The investors believe that the company has established its position of strength not only for the current, but also for the next strategic cycle. The result is an exponential growth in value, and especially a spectacular out-distancing of the direct rivals. The polarization process typically has two stages. In phase 1, the competitors seem to be level. In fact, one of them has unde rstood, has “got it”, before the others and is investing in a new strategic action plan to take into account the pattern which is starting to redefine the sector. Phase 2 begins when the conditions are right for the pattern to take over: at this moment, th e competitor who “got it”, attracts the attention of customers, investors and potential recruits (the brains). The intense public attention snowballs, the market value explodes to leave the nearest competitor way behind. Examples are numerous in various sectors: Microsoft against Apple and Lotus, Coca-Cola against Pepsi, Nike against Reebok and so on. Polarization of value raises the stakes and adds a sense of urgency: The first company to anticipate market changeand to take appropriate investment decisions can gain a considerable lead thanks to recognition by the market.In a growing number of sectors today, competition is concentrated on the race towards mindshare. The company which leads this race attracts customers who attract others in an upwards spiral. At the transition from phase 1 to phase 2, the managing team’s top priority is to win the mindshare battle. There are three stages in this strategy: mind sharing with customers gives an immediate competitive advantage in terms of sales; mind sharing with investors provides the resources to maintain this advantage, and mind sharing with potential recruits increases the chances of maintaining the lead in the short and the long term. This triple capture sets off a chain reaction releasing an enormous amount of economic energy. Markets today are characterized by a staggering degree of transparency. Successes and failures are instantaneously visible to the whole world. The extraordinary success of some investors encourages professional and amateurs to look for the next hen to lay a golden egg. This investment mentality has spread to the employment market, where compensations (such as stock-options) are increasingly linked to results. From these three components - customers, investors and new talent – is created the accelerating phenomenon, polarization: thousands of investors look towards the leader at the beginning of the race. The share value goes up at the same time as the rise in customer numbers and the public perception that the current leader will be the winner. The rise in share-price gets more attention from the media, and so on. How to get the knowledge before the others, in order to launch the company into leadership? There are several attitudes, forms of behavior and knowledge that can be used: being paranoiac, thinking from day to day that the current market conditions are going to change; talking to people with different points of view; being in the field, looking for signs of change. And above all, building a research network to find the patterns of strategic change, not only in one’s particular sector, but in the whole economy, so as always to understand the patterns a bit better and a bit sooner than the competitors.Experienced managers can detect similarities between movements of value in different circumstances. 30 of these patterns can be divided into 7 categories.Some managers understand migrations of value before other managers, allowing them to continually improvise their business plan in order to find and exploit value. Experience is an obvious advantage: situations can repeat themselves or be similar to others, so that experienced managers recognize and assimilate them quickly. There about 30 patterns .which can be put into 7 groups according to their key factors. It is important to understand that the patterns have three general characteristics: multiplicity,variants and cycles. The principle of multiplicity indicates that while a sector or a company may be affected by just one simple strategic pattern, most situations are more complicated and involve several simultaneously evolving patterns. The variants to the known models are developed in different circumstances and according to the creativity of the users of the models. Studying the variants gives more finesse in model-analysis. Finally, each model depends on economic cycles which are more or less long. The time a pattern takes to develop depends on its nature and also on the nature of the customers and sector in question.1) The first family of strategic evolution patterns consists of the six “Mega patterns”: these models do not address any particular dimension of the activity (customer, channels of distribution and value chain), but have an overall and transversal influence. They owe their name “Mega” to their range and their impact (as much from the point of view of the different economic sectors as from the duration). The six Mega models are: No profit, Back to profit, Convergence, Collapse in the middle, De facto standard and Technology shifts the board. • The No profit pattern is characterized by a zero or negative result over several years in a company or economic sector. The first factor which favors this pattern is the existence of a single strategic a plan in several competitors: they all apply differentiation by price to capture market-share. The second factor is the loss of the “crutch” of the sector, that is the end of a system of the help, such as artificially maintained interest levels, or state subsidies. Among the best examples of this in the USA are in agriculture and the railway industry in the 50’s and 60’s,and in the aeronautical industry in the 80’s and 90’s.• The Back to profit pattern is characterized by the emergence of innovative strategic plans or the projects which permit the return of profits. In the 80’s, the watch industry was stagnating in a noprofits zone. The vision of Nicolas Hayek allowed Swatch and other brands to get back into a profit-making situation thanks to a products pyramid built around the new brand.The authors rightly attribute this phenomenon to investors’ recognition of the superiority of these new business designs. However this interpretation merits refinement: the superiority resides less in the companies’ current capacity to identify the first an indications of strategic discontinuity than in their future capacity to develop a portfolio of strategic options and to choose the right one at the right time. The value of a such companies as Amazon and AOL, which benefit from financial polarization, can only be explained in this way. To be competitive in the long-term, a company must not only excel in its “real” market, but also in its financial market. Competition in both is very fierce, and one can not neglect either of these fields of battle without suffering the consequences. This share-market will assume its own importance alongside the commercial market, and in the future, its successful exploitation will be a key to the strategic superiority of publicly-quoted companies.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predictValue migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major managers have a talent for recognizing development market trendsThere are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context.Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in timeManagers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectivesSource: David .J. Morrison, 2001. “Profit Patterns”. Times Business.pp.17-27.译文：利润模式一个公司价值的增长依赖于公司自身的能力的预期，价值的迁移也只是从一个经济部门转移到另外一个经济部门或者是一个公司到另外一个意想不到的公司。
资本结构与企业绩效【外文翻译】
外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。
外文翻译---浅析企业负债经营的利与弊
外文翻译---浅析企业负债经营的利与弊nEnterprise liability n is a business model that has gained popularity in recent years。
It involves assigning responsibility for the ns of a company to the company itself。
rather than to individual employees or managers。
This approach can have both advantages and disadvantages。
which will be discussed in this article.Advantages of Enterprise Liability nOne of the main advantages of enterprise liability n is that it can help to ce the risk of lawsuits against individual employees or managers。
When a company is held liable for its ns。
it can be easier for employees to avoid personal liability。
This can be especially important in industries where the risk of lawsuits is high。
such as healthcare or finance.Another advantage of enterprise liability n is that it can helpto improve accountability within a company。
激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响外文文献翻译
文献信息：文献标题：Impact of Aggressive Working Capital Management Policy on Firms’ Profitability（激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响）国外作者：Mian Sajid Nazir，Talat Afza文献出处：《The IUP Journal of Applied Finance》,2009,Vol.15,PP19-30 字数统计：英文2669单词，14456字符；中文4407汉字外文文献：Impact of Aggressive Working Capital Management Policyon Firms’ ProfitabilityIntroductionThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions, particularly investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation decisions. However, short-term assets and liabilities are important components of total assets and need to be carefully analyzed. Management of these short-term assets and liabilities warrants a careful investigation since the working capital m anagement plays an important role in a firm’s profitability and risk as well as its value (Smith, 1980). Efficient management of working capital is a fundamental part of the overall corporate strategy in creating the shareholders’ value. Firms try to keep an optimal level of working capital that maximizes their value (Deloof, 2003; Howorth and Westhead, 2003 and Afza and Nazir, 2007).In general, from the perspective of Chief Financial Officer (CFO), working capital management is a simple and straightforward concept of ensuring the ability of the organization to fund the difference between the short-term assets and short-term liabilities (Harris, 2005). However, a ‘Total’ approach is desired as it can cover all thecompany’s activities relating to vendor, cu stomer and product (Hall, 2002). In practice, working capital management has become one of the most important issues in the organizations where many financial executives are struggling to identify the basic working capital drivers and an appropriate level of working capital (Lamberson, 1995). Consequently, companies can minimize risk and improve the overall performance by understanding the role and drivers of working capital management.A firm may adopt an aggressive working capital management policy with a low level of current assets as a percentage of total assets, or it may also be used for the financing decisions of the firm in the form of high level of current liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities. Excessive levels of current assets may have a negative effect on the firm’s profitability, whereas a low level of current assets may lead to a lower level of liquidity and stockouts, resulting in difficulties in maintaining smooth operations (Van Horne and Wachowicz, 2004).The main objective of working capital management is to maintain an optimal balance between each of the working capital components. Business success heavily depends on the financial executives’ ability to effectively manage receivables, inventory, and payables (Filbeck and Krueger, 2005). Firms can reduce their financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion projects by minimizing the amount of investment tied up in current assets. Most of the financial managers’ time and efforts are allocated towards bringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back to optimal levels (Lamberson, 1995). An optimal level of working capital would be the one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency. It requires continuous monitoring to maintain proper level in various components of working capital, i.e., cash receivables, inventory and payables, etc.In general, current assets are considered as one of the important components of total assets of a firm. A firm may be able to reduce the investment in fixed assets by renting or leasing plant and machinery, whereas the same policy cannot be followed for the components of working capital. The high level of current assets may reduce the risk of liquidity associated with the opportunity cost of funds that may have been invested in long-term assets. Though the impact of working capital policies onprofitability is highly important, only a few empirical studies have been carried out to examine this relationship. This study investigates the potential relationship of aggressive/conservative policies with the accounting and market measures of profitability of Pakistani firms using a panel data set for the period 1998-2005. The present study is expected to contribute to better understand these policies and their impact on profitability, especially in emerging markets like Pakistan.Research MethodologyVariables Used in the StudyThis study uses aggressive investment policy as used by Weinraub and Visscher (1998), who analyzed working capital policies of 126 industrial firms in the US market. Aggressive Investment Policy (AIP) results in minimal level of investment in current assets versus fixed assets. In contrast, a conservative investment policy places a greater proportion of capital in liquid assets with the opportunity cost of less profitability. If the level of current assets increases in proportion to the total assets of the firm, the management is said to be more conservative in managing the current assets of the firm. In order to measure the degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment policy, the following ratio was used:where a lower ratio means a relatively aggressive policy.On the other hand, an Aggressive Financing Policy (AFP) utilizes higher levels of current liabilities and less long-term debt. In contrast, a conservative financing policy uses more long-term debt and capital and less current liabilities. The firms are more aggressive in terms of current liabilities management if they are concentrating on the use of more current liabilities which put their liquidity on risk. The degree of aggressiveness of a financing policy adopted by a firm is measured by working capital financing policy, and the following ratio is used:where a higher ratio means a relatively aggressive policy.The impact of working capital policies on the profitability has been analyzed through accounting measures of profitability as well as market measures of profitability, i.e., Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. These variables of return are calculated as:Tobin’s q compares the value of a company given by financial markets with the value of a company’s assets. A low q (between 0 and 1) means that the cost to replace a firm’s assets is greater than the value of its stock. This implies that the stock is undervalued. Conversely, a high q (greater than 1) implies that a firm’s stock is more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets, which implies that the stock is overvalued. It is calculated as:where Market Value of Firm (MVF) is the sum of book value of long plus short term and market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the current market price of the stock in a particular year.Control VariablesIn working capital literature, various studies have used the control variables along with the main variables of working capital in order to have an apposite analysis of working capital management on the profitability of firms (Lamberson, 1995; Smith and Begemann, 1997; Deelof, 2003; Eljelly, 2004; Teruel and Solano, 2005 and Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006). On the same lines, along with working capital variables, the present study has taken into consideration some control variables relating to firms such as the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its financial leverage. The size of the firm (SIZE) has been measured by the logarithm of its totalassets, as the original large value of total assets may disturb the analysis. The growth of firm (GROWTH) is measured by variation in its annual sales value with reference to previous year’s sales[(Sales t –Sales t –1)/Sales t –1]. Moreover, the financial leverage (LVRG) was taken as the debt to equity ratio of each firm for the whole sample period. Some studies, like Deloof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms, also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable; however, this variable cannot be included in the present study because of unavailability of data, as most of the firms do not disclose full information in their financial statements. Finally, since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’s profitability (Lamberson, 1995), this phenomenon has been controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the GDPGR variable, which measures the real annual GDP growth in Pakistan for each of the study year from 1998 to 2005.Statistical AnalysisThe impact of aggressive and conservative working capital policies on the profitability of the firms has been evaluated by applying the panel data regression analysis. The performance variables (ROA and Tobin’s q) as well as the TCA/TA and TCL/TA along with the control variables were regressed using the SPSS software. The following regression equations are run to estimate the impact of working capital policies on the profitability measures.where,TCA/TA=Total current assets to total assets ratioTCL/TA i=Total current liabilities to total assets ratioROA i=Return on assetsTobin’s q i=V alue of qSIZE i=Natural log of firm sizeGROWTH i=Growth of salesLVRG i=Financial leverage of firmsGDPGR i=Real Annual GDP growth rate of Pakistanα=Intercept; andε=Error term of the modelSample and DataThe sample of the study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). KSE has divided the non-financial firms into various industrial sectors based on their nature of business. In order to be included in the sample, a firm must be in business for the whole study period. Also, firms should neither have been delisted by the KSE nor merged with any other firm during the whole window period. New incumbents in the market during the study period have also not been included in the sample. Furthermore, firms must have complete data for the period 1998-2005. Firms with negative equity during the study period have also been excluded. Thus, the final sample consists of 204 non-financial firms from 17 various industrial sectors.This study used annual financial data of 204 non-financial firms for the period 1998-2005. The panel data set was developed for eight years and for the 204 sampled firms which produced 1,632 year-end observations. The required financial data for the purpose of the study was obtained from the respective companies’annual reports and publications of State Bank of Pakistan. The data regarding annual average market prices was collected from the daily quotations of KSE.AnalysisTable 1 presents the results of regression model in which the impact of working capital investment policy on the performance measurements has been examined. The F-values of regression models run are found statistically significant, whereas Durbin-Watson statistics of more than 1.8 indicate less correlation among the independent variables of the regressions models. The t-statistics of working capital investment policy is positive and statistically significant at 1% level for Return on Assets and Tobin’s q. The positive coefficient of TCA/TA indicates a negative relationship between the degree of aggressiveness of investment policy and return on assets. As the TCA/TA increases, the degree of aggressiveness decreases, and return on assets increases. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between the relative degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment policies of firms and both performance measures, i.e., ROA and Tobin’s q. This similarity in market and accounting returns confirms the notion that investors do not believe in the adoption of aggressive approach in the working capital management, hence, they do not give any additional weight to the firms on KSE.Table 2 reports regression results for working capital financing policy and the performance measures. The F-value of regression models and Durbin-Watson statistics indicate similar results as reported in Table 1. The negative value of coefficient for TCL/TA also points out the negative relationship between the aggressiveness of working capital financing policy and return on assets. The higher the TCL/TA ratio, the more aggressive the financing policy, that yields negative return on assets. However, surprisingly, the relationship between Tobin’s q and working capital financing policy has been established as positive and statistically significant. Investors were found giving more weight to the firms which are adopting an aggressive approach towards working capital financing policy and having higher levels of short-term and spontaneous financing on their balance sheets.The control variables used in the regression models are natural log of firm size, sales growth, real GDP growth and the average leverage. All the control variables have their impact on the performance of the firms. Firms’size causes the returns of the firms to be increased and it is found to be statistically significant. Moreover, GROWTH and LVRG are found to be significantly associated with the book-based returns on assets which confirm the notion that leverage and growth are strongly correlated with the book value-based performance measures (Deloof, 2003 and Eljelly,2004). Real GDP growth may not affect the returns based on book values; however, investors may react positively to a positive change in the level of economic activity which is in accordance with the findings of Lamberson (1995).The above results contradict the findings of Gardner et al. (1986), Deloof (2003), Eljelly (2004) and Teruel and Solano (2005); however, they are in accordance with Afza and Nazir (2007) and produced a negative relationship between the aggressiveness of working capital policies and accounting measures of profitability. Managers cannot create value if they adopt an aggressive approach towards working capital investment and working capital financing policy. However, if firms adopt aggressive approach in managing their short-term liabilities, investors give more value to those firms. The degree of aggressiveness of working capital policies adopted helps only in creating shareholders’wealth through increased market performance, whereas accounting performance cannot be increased by being aggressive in managing the working capital requirements. The results of this study are somewhat different from those conducted in the developed economies. Pakistan is one of the emerging economies and Pakistani markets are not fully transparent and efficient to fully absorb the impact of information. The study results confirm this state of Pakistani markets.ConclusionThe present study investigates the relationship between the aggressive/conservative working capital asset management and financing polices and its impact on profitability of 204 Pakistani firms divided into 16 industrial groups by KSE for the period 1998-2005. The impact of aggressive/conservative working capital investment and the financing policies has been examined using panel data regression models between working capital policies and profitability. The study finds a negative relationship between the profitability measures of firms and degree of aggressiveness of working capital investment and financing policies. The firms report negative returns if they follow an aggressive working capital policy. These results were furthervalidated by examining the impact of aggressive working capital policies on market measures of profitability, which was not tested before. The results of Tobin’s q were in line of the accounting measures of profitability and produced almost similar results for working capital investment policy. However, investors were found giving more value to those firms that are more aggressive in managing their current liabilities.The study used a new measure of profitability, i.e., Tobin’s q and panel data regression analysis, to investigate the relationship between working capital management and firm returns in Pakistan. The findings of the present study are expected to contribute significantly to finance literature. The results of the present study are in contradiction to those of some earlier studies on the issue. This phenomenon may be attributed to the inconsistent and volatile economic conditions of Pakistan. The reasons for this contradiction may further be explored in future researches.The study also suggests some policy implications for the managers and prospective investors in the emerging market of Pakistan. Firms with more aggressive policy towards working capital may not be able to generate more profit. So, as far as the book value performance is concerned, managers cannot generate more returns on assets by following aggressive approach towards short-term assets and liabilities. On the other hand, investors are found giving more value to the firms that adopt an aggressive approach towards working capital financing policies. The market value of firms using high level of current liabilities in their financing is more than the book value. The investors believe that firms with less equity and less long-term loans would be able to perform better than the others. However, there are various other factors like agency problem which may play a pivotal role in such cases, and so these factors may further be explored in future.中文译文：激进的营运资本管理政策对企业盈利能力的影响简介企业融资文章历来侧重于研究长期财务决策，特别是投资、资本结构、股利和公司估值决策。
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外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文：Do Leverage, Dividend Policy and Profitability influence the Future Value of Firm? Evidence from IndiaINTRODUCTIONWith the ushering of economic liberalization in 1992, Indian stock market has undergone several changes over the last decade. These include introduction of new exchanges, massive computerization and electronic limit order book integrating the stock exchanges across the nation, establishing of clearing corporation and subsequent introduction of new derivative products in the market. Perhaps the most important among these changes was the establishment of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992 as the market watchdog. SEBI, since it’s inception has strived in the direction of narrowing the information gap between Indian corporations and investors, enforce better corporate governance practices through guidelines, rules and regulations and through active market for corporate control that has marked a new era in the Indian financial arena. The investors reveled their confidence through their participation in the primary and secondary market. Large number of new companies came to the primary market over 1993-96 and the market capitalization of S&PCNX 500 has increased considerably over 1990s. India has emerged as an emerging economy with largest number of companies listed in its stock markets.Over the last decade corporate governance has received considerable importance in Indian financial market. With the initiation of market for corporate control and activities in the merger and acquisition market, CEOs have assigned tremendous importance for creating value for their firms. Accordingly companies from different sectors (and/or ownership groups) have adopted different strategies to signal their earning and growth potential over the years and thereby influence their stock prices.With this in the background this paper attempts to analyze the factors that influenced the future value of the companies listed in Indian stock markets and also how the effect of these factor changes over different categories of firms.Background LiteratureThe well-developed and vibrant literature in modern corporate finance has its root in the seminal paper by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958, 1963),(M-M henceforth). This branch of finance started with the assumption of perfect information and complete markets. It postulates that in a typical neoclassical market with perfect competition, absence of agency costs, transaction and banking costs, the average cost of raising fund for any firm is completely independent of its capital structure. With the same set of assumptions M-M (1963) argued that the value of the firm is unaffected by the dividend policy. However, over time many of these simplified assumptions were relaxed and subsequent research showed capital structure does matter and there could exist optimal dividend policy in the modified M-M framework.Academic literature over the last decade has documented the effect of different strategic factors influencing the firm values for the developed countries. Rappaport (1981, 1987) has used value creation literature for corporate mergers and acquisition and underlined the importance of growth rate, operating profit, income tax rate and fixed capital investment as the major factor influen cing the firms’ value. Recently some of the studies concentrated on emerging market to analyze the factors that influenced the firms’value in this market. Ben Naceur and Goaied (2002) investigated value creation process for Tunisian stock exchange using a random probit model with unbalanced panel data. It considered that the managers’ succeeded creating value to its share holders if the market value of the share exceeds the book value of the corporation and vice versa. The authors considered three main determinants of value creation: financial policy, profitability and dividend policy.In the modified M-M framework, literature has shown that firm’s performance depends on the capital structure (or financial policy). Ross (1977) argued that more leverage would signal the investors about the improved firm prospect andinfluence the firm’s value in future. Increase in dividend payout increases the investors’ income at present and signal the expected future cash flow for the corporation. Profitability is undoubtedly one of the major factors determining the firm value. Ben Naceur and Goaied(2002) argued that while profitability and debt have positive effect on the probability of crating future value, the pay-out have reverse effect on the same.India has one of the most developed stock markets in the world with large number of domestic and international players investing in Indian stock market. With maximum number of companies listed in the Indian stock exchanges from different industries and different ownership groups (e.g. business affiliated firms, Indian standalone, foreign standalone) and with the emphasis on corporate governance practices, India has become an important and interesting destination for such studies. Among the available studies in this area, Sahu (2002) used a sample of companies listed in BSE to explain the abnormal stock returns by dividend stability and found no statically significant result. Another study by Tuli and Mittal (2001) used 101 Indian firms and found price earning ratio is significantly influenced by variability of market price and dividend pay out ratio.However, the authors did not find any significant effect of industry and ownership pattern on price to earning ratio.This papers aims at determining the factors influencing the probability of future firm value for Indian corporations after controlling for the industry and time specific effects. In particular this study attempts to answer the following questions:（1）How the probability of future value creation is affected by firm’s profitability, financing pattern and the dividend pay-out policy?（2）Whether the firms belonging to business groups have different effect on probability of value creation?DataThe primary source of the data for this paper is PROWESS database, compiled by Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). This dataset is similar to the COMPUSTAT database in USA. We have selected the firms that are presently included in S&PCNX 500 index. The accounting and stock price data for these companies are extracted for the year 1989-90 to 2001-02 from Prowess dataset forthis study.So far we have done the univariate and bivariate analysis in the previous section.To examine the factors effecting the future value creation of the firms listed in the Indian stock exchange we examine the effect of previous year’s leverage, dividend and profitability on the MBVR of the company in a multivariate framework.Variable DescriptionMarket to book value ratio (MBVR) is defined as the ratio of closing price of the equity to book value of equity at the end of the financial year. MBVR is the dependent variable for the OLS regression. For the logit model the dependent variable is a binary series, which takes the value 1 if price to book value ratio is greater than one (i.e., market perceived that future value of the firm is going to increase) and zero otherwise.The other variables of interest include those representing Leverage Policy,Dividend Policy and Profitabilit y that have key bearing on the firms’ future value creation. While the ratio of total amount of long-term debt to total amount of equity capital (LEVERAGE) is included to proxy the leverage policy of the corporation, the ratio of total dividend to total earning of the firm (PAY_OUT) i s included to capture the dividend policy of the same. The profitability of a company, on the other hand, is captured by the ratio of net profit to net worth of the firm, which is also known as return on equity (ROE).To control for the size of the firm we consider total assets (ASSET) of the firm as a proxy variable. To control for the differenced arising due to the firms belonging to different business groups this paper considers different dummy variables. If the firm is Among the large number of listed companies, those included in S&PCNX 500 are often considered for empirical studies for their liquid nature and representative characteristics.Private Indian standalone then the dummy, D_PVT_IND, take the value one and zero otherwise. If, on the other hand, a firm is private foreign standalone then the dummy, D_PVT_FOR, take the value one and otherwise zero. Indian companies differ considerably access the industries. So industry dummies were used to control for industry specific heterogeneity. Since 1990, Indian economy has undergoneseveral changes, which have their influence on the corporate valuation. So time dummies were also included to control for the time trend. All the nominal variables are deflated by GDP deflator and expressed at constant price of 1987-88.(Insert Table-1 here)Table 1: Descriptive statistics(MBVR) is ratio of closing price of the equity to book value of equity at the end of thefinancial year. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total amount of long-term debt to total amount ofequity capital.PAY_OUT is the ratio of total dividend to total earning of the firm. Returnon equity (ROE) is the ratio of net profit to net worth of the firm.ASSET total assets of thefirm.Variable All Firms Large Firms Small Firms Group FirmsIndianStandaloneFirmsForeign StandaloneFirmsMBVRLE VERAGE DIVIDEND P AY OFF3.137(5.993)1.726(4.140)0.023(0.029)2.133(3.537)3.057(7.151)0.025(0.028)3.349(6.372)1.441(3.063)0.023(0.029)2.833(5.659)1.973(4.470)0.024(0.030)2.850(5.119)1.247(3.094)0.024(0.026)5.776(8.255)0.319(0.484)0.020(0.023)PROFITABILITY (ROE) 0.138(0.367)0.095(0.449)0.148(0.346)0.133(0.372)0.168(0.283)0.148(0.Table 1 shows the mean values and the standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the variables under consideration under six different cases (namely, all firms, large firms, small firms, group-affiliated firms, Indian standalone firms and foreign standalone firms). The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 shows that the value of a firm, in terms of MBVR, is higher for the small firms and the foreign standalone firms. Large firms get more leverage than any other category of firms. Profitability of the firm, in terms of ROE, is higher for the Indian standalone companies. Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix between the variables of interest. It shows that MBVR has significant negative correlation with leverage and size of the firm and positive correlation with dividend policy and profitability of the firm. In the Appendix Figure 1 and 4 show that with the ushering of economic liberalization there is a sharp rise in MBVR and ROE in the year 1992, which have gradually decreased over the years. Figure 2 shows since post liberalization period, the leverage has shown an increasing trend. However, dividend payout policy does not depict any significant trend over this period.The coefficient of lagged value of leverage (-O.44) and its square term (0.007)imply that as the leverage of the firm increases, the probability of raise in future firm’s values declines at a decreasing rate. The negative influence of leverage on the probability of future value creation was observed across the ownership groups and size. The profitability of the firm (as apparent from the coefficient of ROE) increases the probability of increase in future value creation. Point to note is, this increase is higher for foreign standalone firms as compare to Indian standalone or group-affiliated firms.Unlike the OLS model, the dividend payout did not significantly explain the chance of future value creation. Neither in the pooled model nor in the size and ownership group specific regression the coefficient of payout was significantly different from zero at 10per cent level.ResultThis paper analyzed the accounting factor that influence the probability of increase in future m arket valuation of the firms’ listed in Indian stock exchange after controlling for the time and industry specific effects. The empirical results indicate that the increase in leverage has a negative impact on the chance of future value increase of the firm. It could be because more reliance on credit increases the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors, giving more control to the managers/promoter, which in turn have a negative influence on the future valuation. Alike Naceur and Goaied (2002), we found previous year’s profitability positive influences future firm’s value, a s increase in profitability might have signaled better quality of size. This finding could be because of the fact that the dividend payment the future per management. However, the pay-off did not significantly influence the probability of future MBVR increase in the pooled model as well as the models across ownership group an formance varied considerably across firms listed in Indian stock exchange.ConclusionThis paper investigates the value creation process of the firms listed in the Indian stock market and their dependence on the accounting variables. It used an unbalanced logit model and found that the increase in profitability has a positive influence on theprobability of creating future value and the relation is stronger for foreign standalone firms as compared to private Indian standalone or business group owned firms. Leverage, one the other hand, has negative impact on the chances of increase in future value of the corporation and this relation was uniform across size and ownership group. It could be because of the potential conflict of interest between the equity holders and the creditors that got reflected in the stock prices. The dividend pay-off policy of the firm, however, could not significantly influence the probability of future value creation of the firms listed in Indian stock market.Source:Saurabh Ghosh,2008“Do Leverage, Dividend Policy and Profitability Influence Future Value of Firm? Evidence from India”.Reserve Bank of India.July.pp.1-3.二、翻译文章译文：是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值？介绍随着1992年以来的经济自由化，印度股市在过去十年经历了很多变化。