企业高管薪酬外文翻译文献
企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬外文文献翻译
文献信息文献标题：Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China（企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬：来自中国的经验证据）文献作者及出处：Rauf A, Amin K, Saleem Z. Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China[J]. Global Social Sciences Review, 2019, 4(1): 61-76.字数统计：英文3857单词，21619字符；中文7067汉字外文文献Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China Abstract This analysis focus corporate social responsibility and executive compensation in China and also tests the relationship between state possession and executive compensation in presence of CSR. The estimated results confirm our hypotheses true in the selected sample of 2011 to 2014 of China. The firms with high CSR performances positively moderate the previously negative or no relationship between state-ownership and executive compensation. Application of 2SLS and GMM guaranteed the robustness of the results to potential endogeneities.Key Words: CSR Performance; Executive Compensation; State-Ownership; Agency Theory; ChinaIntroductionThe burgeoning implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the modern corporate world have stimulated the researchers to probe its nexus with different mechanism of corporate governance. CSR practices and performance in itsvarying forms, such as economic, philanthropic, ethical and legal (Hill et al., 2007) are not only influenced by board characteristics, ownership structure, and governance mechanisms but also affects these distinct features of corporations. This phenomenon, thorugh different theories i.e. agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Michelon et al., 2013; Wood, 1991), has been analyzed by various sholars (Shahab and Ye, 2018; Shahab et al., 2018a, 2018b; Yu et al., 2017; Akisikand Gal, 2017; Yu and Rowe, 2017) in both developed and developing countries. As the debate over CSR and executive compensation relationship in developing countries is not mature therefore the consenses over the consequences and determinants of CSR has not built yet.In developed markets the wide spread between the executives and employees' compensations stirred a wave of concerns on ethical and economic grounds. The literature from developed countries claims that CSR engagement is a key factor of CEO compensation (Callan and Thomas, 2011) and executives engaged in CSR activities for increased compensation and personal reputation (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006). Literature also found a reverse causal relationship among CSR practices, the compensation structure of CEO (Cai et al., 2011) and different characteristics of CEO’s demographics and CSR performance (Huang, 2013). It is evident that there exists substantial association amongst corporate governance mechanisms, CSR and executive compensation (Hong et al., 2016). These imperative aspects has not been analysed by the literature so far especially in case of country like china.Keeping in view the previous research gaps, in the present study we have attempted to bring forth exciting insights from the world’s fastest-growing economy (China). In China, the state-owned firms (SOEs) constitute around two third of the total firms (Li and Zhang, 2010 and Li et al., 2013) and various state organizations are working to convince all of the firms mainly state-owned to pursue CSR activities. In October 2006, the 6th Plenum of the 16th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee stated that “to build a harmonious society, China should increase the social responsibility of the citizens, business enterprises, and all kinds of otherorganizations." In September 2011, guidelines were issued by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which proposed that “sustainable development should be the core of CSR, and state-owned enterprises should be harmonious in development with society and the environment” (M arquis and Qian, 2014). Still, there is a wide gap in the CSR practices and disclosure mechanism of Chinese enterprises and that of those western enterprises.Accordingly, this study aims to present an integrative model to answer the unexplored questions from the CSR-executive compensation nexus and add to the literature in following ways. First, the impact of CSR performance, state-ownership and control variables (which include both governance and firms’ variables) on executive compensation of Chinese listed firms from the year 2011-2014 are analysed to strengthen the arguments of Khana and Palepu (1997) and Altman et al (2007) that the economic, financial and governance system between developed and developing countries vary to a great extent.Second, economy dominated by state ownership reacts to the involvement of CSR practices and activities has not been analysed yet. Literature propose that SOE has no or negative effect on executive compensation in developing economies (Firth et al., 2007; Conyon & He, 2011) they are interested in non-financial objectives (See, 2009). Therefore, drawing on agency theory this study investigate how CSR activities can modify the previously examined relationship between SOE and executive compensation. Our objective is to determine whether the firms who are actively engaged in CSR activities and have significant state ownership, present the similar negative/no effect on executive compensation. Alternatively, the presence of CSR activities in SOE firms changes that relationship into a positive one, thus acting as a beneficial tool for the nexus of state ownership and executive compensation. We analysed the moderating influence of CSR performance on the nexus of state-ownership and executive compensation. The use of CSR as an interaction term is non-existent in the literature relevant to the developing countries. Such moderation effect will help in understanding how firms with state ownership and distinct governance structure will determine the executive compensation in the presence ofCSR.Third, Mahoney and Thorne (2006) state that executive compensation has a significant impact on CSR. Therefore, we argue that there might be potential reverse causality between executive compensation and CSR performance (Cai et al., 2011) which can affect the reliability of our regression results. To tackle this issue, previous literature (Cai et al., 2011) has stressed the implementation of instrument variable technique to ascertain more robust results in the developed market. Thus, to deal with the above-suggested issue and contribute more effectively, 2SLS and GMM is used. By using agency theory, our findings will shed new insights to the existing literature and will have practical implications for the regulatory bodies, government, and firms.Literature Review and Hypotheses DevelopmentCSR Performance and Executive CompensationSome early researchers (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Friedman, 1962; Wright & Ferris, 1997) have employed agency theories in studies related to CSR and corporate strategies primarily related to corporate boards. Similarly, some studies (e.g. Bear et al., 2010; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Oh et al., 2011) have discussed the positive aspects of CSR concerning the monetary and non-monetary performance of the organizations. They argued that CSR initiatives are encouraged by firms with state ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign investors as such financiers are more eager to invest in responsible and environmental-friendly companies to shun the financial menaces. Contrarily, the other scholarships provide limited evidence on the association between CSR and executive return with a particular focus on developed economies and have ignored the developing economies, e.g. Flammer et al (2017) found that corporate social responsibility astringent is dominant in production-intensive businesses and has developed over time. Hubbard et al (2017) provided empirical insights into the literature by proposing that CSR practices and performances play a vital role in the nexus among CEO's career outcomes and firm's financial performance. They empirically found that greater investment in CSR in the past, result in better financial performance with a boost in CEO’s career (ultimately inmore compensation) and vice-versa. Cai et al (2011) argued that there is a shortcoming in employing an integrated theory. The proposed two hypotheses, i.e. overinvestment and conflict-resolution hypotheses. They found empirical support only for the conflict- resolution hypothesis in USA and argued that the lag of CSR negatively determine CEO compensation (both total and cash compensation).In the light of the literature review, we infer that previous studies have been focused on developed countries, and prevailing literature has not yet studied the relationship between CSR and executive compensation from a developing economy, i.e. in particular China. This study take huge data set of Chinese listed companies to fill the gap.From the above discussion one can extract the following specific hypotheses;Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between CSR performance and executive compensation in Chinese listed firms.State ownership, CSR performance, and Executive CompensationPrevious literature has discussed this relationship, e.g. Hong et al. (2016) concluded that the firms whose governance structure is more shareholder-friendly will be more inclined to compensate CEOs, subject to enhanced social performance outcomes of firms. They further claimed that executives’ motivation to enhance firm’s social performance increases with increase in incentives for CSR engagement or initiatives. It implies that corporate governance mechanism is a vital factor in determining the executive inducements for social activities and engagement in such social activities will not only increase the social performance but will also be favourable to shareholders. Faleye and Trahan (2011) claimed that corporate strategies which are labour and environmental-friendly, have been used by the managers and directors avoid the negative consequences of managerial extravagances at the board level. Callan and Thomas (2011) broadened this framework by investigating a multi-equation model of the executive compensation, CSR, and firm financial performance. They control for endogeneity and found a simultaneous relationship between financial and social performances. Their findings also showed CSR as an important determinant of the CEO reward. Kato and Long (2006) discussed that thepay to performance linkage is weaker for executives in firms. Firth et al. (2007) found that the corporate management mechanism have a substantial influence on CEO compensation and it is different in developed and developing countries which needs further exploration especially in developing countries. Welford (2007) claimed that good corporate governance leads to better CSR performance. He studied issues in corporate governance (specifically ownership and control) about CSR performance in Asia. He explained that the concentrated ownership by owners (which may be by shareholders or state) is the main reason for strong corporate governance in the Asian region as compared to the western region. Conyon and He (2012) found positive impact of both stock and accounting market performance on the CEO’s pay structure. They also revealed that board characteristics and ownership design also influence the equity benefits,such as equity ownership and equity grants enjoyed by CEO. Conyon and He (2011) studied corporate governance and executive compensation of Chinese firms, and consistent with agency theory. Comparing the executive pay of Chinese firms with U.S. firms, they found that the executive compensation (salaries and bonuses) in the U.S. is greater than Chinese firms.Nevertheless, most of the studies from China depict a negative or no affinity between state ownership and executive compensation as these executives are bureaucrats whose appointment is subject to a specific time span and fixed salaries. However, a strong evidence claim that the SOEs’ main interest is to pursue non-financial objectives which are stated in the contracts of CEOs (Bai & Xu, 2005) and such state-owned firms emphasize the executives to achieve those non-financial objectives keenly (See, 2009). Drawing on agency theory, we argue that the written description in executives’ contracts to pursue non- financial objectives can stimulate CEOs of such firms to engage in CSR practices and improve CSR performance to achieve not only those non-financial objectives of the firms but also to enhance their compensation.We propose our second hypothesis from the above argument and suggest that the better CSR performance engenders a moderating mechanism between the presence of state ownership in firms and executive compensation link where the previous negativeor no relationship between SOEs and executive compensation is changed due to the inclusion of CSR in the form of non-financial objectives. Our second hypothesis is as follow:Hypothesis 2: CSR performance moderates the association between state ownership and executive compensation in Chinese listed firms.MethodsDataIn China, the rating agencies started evaluating the CSR related performance-indicators of Chinese listed firms from 2010. Therefore, we employed an unbalanced panel data of 554 firms (i.e. 1946 firm years’ observations) listed on two stock exchanges in China, i.e. Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) from 2011 to 2014. Our initial sample includes all those firms who report CSR in the stated period. However, we used unbalanced panel due to missing observations in some particular years. China Stock Market and Accounting Research were consulted for data on executive compensation. We extract the data on CSR performance of firms from HEXUN, one of the Chinese professional financial service websites, specialized for high-end investors in China. This database evaluates all firms listed on SZSE and SSE and develops an index by ranking the CSR performance of the firms. STATA software interactive tools were used for analyzing this data, and we employed Winsorization technique to control the issues of outliers.Variables descriptionFollowing Conyon and He (2011), and Kato and Long (2006) we measured our dependent variable: executive compensation by the top three executives’ average pay which includes base salary, bonuses, and commissions in China. Like western enterprises, the data on segregated heads of CEO compensation is not available for Chinese listed firms. This variable is dealt in natural log.Corporate Social Responsibility performance: Corporate Social Responsibility performance is measured by index provided by HEXUN website (Li and Foo, 2015; Shahab et al., 2018a, 2018b). This database divides CSR into five different categories;(i) shareholder responsibility; (ii) employee responsibility; (iii) supplier; (iv) customer and consumer right responsibility; and (v) environmental responsibility and public responsibility. These five categories are further sub-divided into second (13) and third (37) class indicators. Although the typical distribution of CSR index is similar amongst the industries, each industry follows their distribution method for CSR index’s development by priority. The value of CSR index is between 1 and 100 where 1 indicates the low level of CSR and 100 means high CSR.State Ownership: Hardly a study can be found that considered the importance state- ownership variable affecting executive compensation via an interaction of these variables with CSR performance.Therefore in case of this study SOE is measured by dummy wher it is 1 for state-ownership and 0 otherwise.Control Variables: Board size (Cai et al,, 2011) taken in log, board independence (Conyon and He, 2011) measured in % age f outside directives on the board, CEO duality (Firth et al., 2007) is proxy by dummy, CEO age (He, 2008) is taken in years, firm size (Kang, 2013) is calculated by number of employees in a firm, Return on Assets (Cai et al., 2011) is the income before extraordinary items divided by total assets of the firm, firm age (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) is calculated as the year that has been elapsed since the foundation of the firm and dividend (Bhattacharyya et al., 2004) used as a dummy variable.Econometric ModelThe data period of our study ranges from 2011 to 2014. Since there are many observations per firm in our data, therefore, unobserved heterogeneity was an issue. We checked the problem of heteroskedasticity in our data by applying Wald test suggested by Baum (2001), and we obtained a significant probability results. The autocorrelation in data was tested by Wooldridge (2002) technique, and we also got significant value. Furthermore, we also checked the within and between variation in our data. The findings showed that on average the value of between variations was greater than within variation in our variables. Cameron and Trivedi (2010, pp-607) say that if between effect values are greater than within variation then Hausman test becomes inconclusive and fixed effect results are inconsistent. Therefore, to tacklethese problems, we used panel generalized least square (GLS). We employ the following econometric model in our analysis:Where "i" shows the firm and "t" represent the period, while, the rest of the variables are described in detail in variable section and appendix (A).ResultsDescriptive StatisticsTable 1 displayed the descriptive statistics where the average value of executive compensation is 798000 with a standard deviation of 805000. It represents quite a high mean value for the CEO compensation. 37.11 is the average for CSR with 11.33 standard deviation. This suggest poor trend in CSR performance in comparison to the highest values of CSR performance in developed countries. The mean value of state ownership is 63 percent, confirming the claim of Li and Zhang (2010) by arguing that more than 60% firms in China are state-owned. Mean value of board size is almost near to 10 while board independence value shows that approximately 1/3 of the board associates in Chinese firms are independent. The values of CEO duality show that the culture of the dual role of the CEO is less evident in China, and mostly CEO and chairman of the board hold separate offices.Table 1. Descriptive StatisticsAuthor’s CalculationsTable 2 depicts the values for correlation and Variance Inflated Factors. CSR and rest of the other variables has substantial correlation with executive compensation. The values of VIF are well below the standard threshold of 10 in our study.Table 2. Correlation and VIFRegression ResultsIn the first model, we included our independent variable (CSR performance) to test the first hypothesis by checking its impact on executive compensation (See table 3). CSR performance is substantial and suggest that 1% change in CSR performance changes the executive compensation by 0.493%. It is a strong evidence in support of our first hypothesis. Our findings are in coherence with the previous literature (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Callan and Thomas, 2011; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006) which claimed that engagement in CSR practices and enhanced CSR performance increase executive compensation. In the second model, we incorporated all the other control variables including state ownership and examined the effect of CSR performance on executive compensation to test our first hypothesis in the presence of control variables. We found significant results for CSR performance here too (See Table 3).In the model 2 we found inverse relation between SOE and executive compensation (See Table 3). This negative relationship has been discussed in someprevious studies in Chinese context (Conyon & He, 2011). They argued that due to increased involvement of the state in firms, the executive compensation of CEOs is adversely affected and a negative relationship exists between SOE and executive compensation. Further, we followed Li and Zhang (2010) that more than 60% Chinese firms are state-owned, and this study found that CSR performance moderates the relationship between SOE and executive compensation. Therefore, we developed the interaction of state-owned firms and CSR in model 3 to check how the combination of these two (SOE×CSR) affects executive compensation. Model 3 depicts a positive and significant (at 1%) coefficient of 0.120 for our proposed interaction term, i.e. SOE×CSR. That shows that greater is the CSR performance more will be the association with executive compensation.Lastly, in model 2 and model 4 of table 3, we included the control variables and results support our hypothesis of their relation with executive compensation. The findings of the firm characteristics control variables (size, ROA, firm and dividend pay-out) also suggest that these variables increase executive compensation.Table 3. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Estimates for Effect of CSR Performance, CorporateGovernance on CEO CompensationEndogeneityThe overall results are quite meaningful. However, there might be inverse causation and omitted variable biasness in the model. To test this we employed 2SLS and GMM techniques to reduce and tackle the potential problem of endogeneity. Following Cai et al., (2011); Shahab et al., (2018a, 2018b) we used industry-median CSR as an instrumental variable (IV) for CSR performance. CSR performance is different from industry to industry, (McWilliam and Siegel, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Therefore, we estimated industry-median CSR as an IV. (See Table 4). The outcome of 2SLS and GMM two-step shows that industry median CSR is positively associated with CSR index at 1% level by controlling the effect of governance and firm-specific characteristics and at 10% level of significance on total executive compensation. The validity of our instrumental variable is tested through F-stat test suggested by (Staiger and Stock, 1997) and found that the value of the instrumental variable was greater than 10 (value less than 10 represent weak instrument) which is considered as a strong instrument.Table 4. Endogeneity Results for effect of CSR performance, Corporate Governance on CEOcompensationDiscussionThe purpose of this study is to test the relationship between CSR performance, state ownership and executive compensation in China. Although, sufficient amount of literature is available in developed economies by testing the relationship between CSR and executive compensation which is largely based on two opposing theories namely agency theory and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Li and Zhang (2010) argued that Chinese government own more than 60 percent of the firms. Firth et al. (2007) suggested that the structure of the executive compensation is quite different in China and CEO of Chinese state-owned firms are state bureaucrats who are hired for a specific time- period and are entitled to a fixed salary. Bai and Xu (2005) and See (2009) argue that SOEs in China are interested in achieving non-financial objectives and these objectives are mentioned in CEO contract. We explored and provided empirical evidence on this interesting research gap by analysing the moderating role of CSR performance on the inconclusive relationship between state ownership and executive compensation. We explored these two research questions by empirically testing our proposed hypotheses. The findings based on generalized least squares (GLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and GMM, all provide significant evidence for our claim by drawing on extensive data-set from Chinese firms. Both of our hypothesis were supported by data. Our findingscontribute to the existing literature by shedding new insights from the perspective of the interaction effect of CSR performance on the nexus between SOE and executive compensation.ConclusionThis study analyzed the impacts of CSR performance on compensation of CEOs by drawing on a longitudinal sample of Chinese listed firms. We develop an argument that CSR performance not only determines the executive compensations in Chinese firms but also influence the connection between state ownership and compensation structure. Chinese firms are characterized by the dominance of the state ownership over the decades due to the complex structure of controlled Chinese economy in comparison to the free economies of the western world. This study bridge the existing gap in research on the moderating role of CSR performance between the state ownership and executive compensation. Our findings are pertinent to both theory and practice. Given the motivation of increased incentives or compensation, executives will be inclined to put more efforts in activities related to CSR and social welfare. We shed new acumens to the literature by empirically proving that independent ownership of Chinese government has a negative or no effect on firm’s compensation structure, however, if CSR-performance is established as the missing link in the chain, the outcomes will be changed. In China, the role of the state is dominant in firms and CEOs are either part of the state councils or have political ties (Firth et al., 2007; You & Du, 2012). We claim that if the government puts more focus on CSR practices and directs the CEOs to enhance the CSR performance, the increased CSR level will lead to an increase in CEO compensation structure. This study has practical implications for the practitioners by proposing to introduce a CSR-performance related system, where the enhancement in financial benefits of CEOs is related with the CSR enactment of the firm.中文译文企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬：来自中国的经验证据摘要本文以中国企业社会责任和高管薪酬为研究对象，检验了企业社会责任存在下的国有制与高管薪酬之间的关系。
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on the corporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemeson corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results. Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study.I consider a three-date two-period model. At time t0, a firm is established and goes public. There are now two kinds of owners in the firm, namely, the controlling shareholder and the atomistic shareholders. The proceeds from initial public offering are invested in some risky assets which generate an intermediate earnings, I, at t,. At the beginning, the firm also decides its financial structure. A manager is also hired to operate the firm at this time. The manager is entitled to hold a fraction of the firm's common stocks and stock options, a (where 0<a<l), at the beginning of the first period. At time t,, the firm receives intermediate earnings, denoted by I, from the initial asset. At the same time, a new project investment is available to the firm. For simplicity, the model assumes that the firm needs all the intermediate earnings, I, to invest in the new project. If the project is accepted at t,, it produces a stochastic earnings Y in t2, such that Y={I+X, I-X}, with Prob[Y=I+X] = p and Prob[Y=I-X] = 1-p, respectively. The probability, p, is a uniform density function with an interval ranged from 0 to 1. Initially, the model also assumes that the net earnings, X, is less than initial investment, I. This assumption is reasonable since most of the investment can not earn a more than 100% rate of return. Later, this assumption is relaxed to investigate the effect of the extraordinarily profitable investment on the results. For simplicity, It is also assumed that there is no time value for the money and no dividend will be paid before t2. If the project is rejected at t,, the intermediate earnings, I, will be kept in the firm and its value at t2 will be equal to I. Effects of Management Compensation Schemes on Corporate Investment Decision Overinvestment versus UnderinvestmentA risk neutral investor should invest in a new project if it generates a positiexpected payoff. If the payoff is normally or symmetrically distributed, tinvestor should invest whenever the probability of making a positive earninggreater than 0.5. The minimum level of probability for making an investment the neutral investor is known as the cut-off probability. The project will generzero expected payoff at a cut-off probability. If the investor invests only in tprojects with the cut-off probability greater than 0.5, then the investor tendsinvest in the less risky projects and this is known as the underinvestment. Ifinvestor invests the projects with a cut-off probability less than 0.5, then tinvestor tends to invest in more risky projects and this is known as thoverinvestment. In the paper, it is assumed that the atomistic shareholders risk neutral, the manager and controlling shareholder are risk averse.It has been argued that risk-reduction activities are considered as managerial perquisites in the context of the agency cost model. Managers tend to engage in these risk-reduction activities to decrease their largely undiversifiable "employment risk" (Amihud and Lev 1981). The finding in this paper is consistent with Amihud and Lev's empirical result. Managers tend to underinvest when they have higher shareholdings and larger profit sharing percentage. This result is independent of the level of debt financing. Although the paper can not predict the manager's action when he has a large profit sharing percentage and the profit cashflow has high variance (X > I), it shows that the manager with high shareholding will underinvest in the project. This is inconsistent with the best interests of the atomistic shareholders. However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage.The results and findings in this paper provides several testable hypotheses forfuture research. If the managers underinvest in the projects, the company willunderperform in long run. Thus the earnings can be used as a proxy forunderinvestment, and a negative relationship between earningsandmanagement shareholdings, stock options or profit sharing ratio is expected.As the underinvestment problem can be alleviated by increasing the financialleverage, a positive relationship between earnings and financial leverage isexpected.在一个公司由于所有权和控制权的分离的代理问题存在的文献中得到了广泛的研究。
上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究外文文献翻译
上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究外⽂⽂献翻译⽂献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原⽂The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and differentcontrol variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译⽂上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要⾼管薪酬问题的产⽣源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司⾼管之间存在着⽬标不⼀致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这⼀问题的严重性，⽽通过与⾼管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执⾏⼀份良好的薪酬⽅案可以有效地解决上述问题。
2948BXXX公司的薪酬管理 外文参考文献译文及原文doc
2948BXXX公司的薪酬管理外文参考文献译文及原文doc 本科毕业设计(论文)外文参考文献译文及原文学院经济管理学院专业工商管理年级班别学号学生姓名指导教师年月日目录1 薪酬管理的涵义与内容 (1)1.1 薪酬管理的涵义 (1)1.2 薪酬管理的内容..............................................................................1 2 薪酬管理的历史考察 (3)2.1 专制阶段 (3)2.2 “温情主义”阶段 (3)2.3 科学管理阶段 (3)2.4 现代管理阶段.................................................................................4 3 薪酬管理的发展趋势 (6)3.1 企业人力成本将逐步上升 (6)3.2 薪酬制度的依据将更多地反映市场而不是工作本身的价值 (6)3.3 薪酬福利设计更富弹性并走向多轨化 (6)3.4 薪酬分配形式由货币主导型向资本主导型过渡 (6)3.5 薪酬支付方式将呈现多样化...............................................................7 1 Management salaries of the meaning and content (8)1.1 Salary Management meaning (8)1.2 Content of salary management................................................................8 2 Salary management historical inspection............................................................... . (11)2.1 Despotic stage (11)2.2 "Paternalism" stage (11)2.3 Scientific management stage (12)2.4 Modern Management stage..................................................................12 3 Salary management development tendency.. (14)3.1 The enterprise manpower cost gradually will rise (14)3.2 The salary system basis more will reflect the market but will not be works itselfvalue………………………………………….………………………………….…. .143.3 A salary welfare design richer elasticity and moves towards the multi-axles (15)3.4 Salary assignment form by currency leadership to capital leadership transition (15)3.5 The salary payment way will present the diversification (15)1 薪酬管理的涵义与内容1.1薪酬管理的涵义企业的薪酬管理，就是企业管理者对本企业员工报酬的支付标准、发放水平、要素结构进行确定、分配和调整的过程。
工商管理专业企业薪酬管理中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业薪酬管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Enterprise Salary Reward Management Salary the overall function of function and the management of human resource that rewards is consistent also for is can attract and encourage the human resource needed by enterprise from labor economy angle speak salary reward have 3 great merits can: guarantee function, encourage function and regulation function. Referring to the angle of the management of human resource salary reward should embody and play mainly it's encourage function the salary with reasonable establishment reward management system is every problem that enterprise needs solve. In recent years, as enterprise manages , mechanism change and establish modern enterprise system step by step needs, the built-in wages degree of assignment system of enterprise the self who changes enterprise into gradually from government behavior. Therefore how to meet market needs establish with modern enterprise system appearance the supplemental salary, that suits enterprise self development reward management system and distribution scheme, high limit land development enterprise human resource Ian can, become every important program of current Chinese enterprise.Salary the substance that rewarded , it is that enterprise, for employee, is the contribution done by enterprise that function and purpose salary reward , include realization Jig effect , the corresponding repayment and that effort, time, knowledge, ability, experience and creation pay that paid out or thank. Essentially, it is a kind of fair distribution principle that exchanges or trades and has embodied socialist market economy. And according to contribution distribution for implicit the meaning of the exchange of equal value of intrinsic, have reflected the law of value of the market of labor force.Salary the overall function of function and the management of human resource that rewards is consistent, it is also to be able to attract and encourage the human resource needed by enterprise. Say from labor economy angle, salary reward have 3 great merits can ─ guarantee function, encourage function and regulation function. Referring to the angle of the management of human resource salary reward should embody and play mainly it's encourage function.The existent problem of the traditional wages degree of assignment system is internal to lack fair sense, the external income degree of assignment system that lacks the traditional state-owned enterprise of competition ability major special Zhen is implement planned instruction and policy regulation, wages management system from in the restriction that gets planned economy , employee Ian can reality play will not often arouse the notice of people, so, the distribution of wages is major to wait according to standing, educational background, title and administrative rank, and overlook as every employee does , work analysis, do not more consider the discrepancy of working post and the contribution of employee.For realizing enterprise goal fully. It is very fair that this kind of system look , but actually is for working value negate , is hard to embody trunk the good dry difference of bad, horizontal difference in degree, its result can only be the "everybody eating from the same pot" of equalitarianism. Therefore under market economic condition continue this kind of practice Hour fruit is enterprise recruit do not enter person also reserve do not live person, is internal to lack fair sense , is external to lack competition ability.Salary reward is the contribution that enterprise does for employee for enterprise, include realization Jig effect, the time, knowledge, ability, experience and creation and effort that paid out are corresponding as paying to repay or thank , are a kind of fair distribution principle that exchanges or trades and has embodied socialist market economy essentially, and according to contribution distribution for implicit the meaning of the exchange of equal value of intrinsic, have reflected the law of value of the market of labor force.On knowledge with the mistake district in operation pass , the function understanding that rewarded for salary on pass frequently in quite, notice salary only the function of health protection that rewards , and have overlooked salary reward encourage function. No matter going to work , do not perform duty from time to tome , have to enterprise to make contribution, " go to work to take money" have become perfectly justified; Bonus in considerable level on have lost the meaning of award, become regular additional wages. What enterprise employee accumulates for a long period is that inertia and safe sense make salary reward and have lost, should be some to encourage function. Though along with enterprise, being thorough as reforming , the manager of human resource also begins to explore new method on salary rewards system , but when designing distribution scheme often lack for modern salary reward the knowledge of theoretical and design method, make scheme deviate from the law of value of the market of labor force.Now, in the wages system of state-owned enterprise and the most of domestic joint stock companies, do not consider that outside and the internal balance of distribution are balanced. The management of human resource replace labor personnel management not the simpledisplacement of noun, it signifies that from thought and theory, the method of arriving is basic as utilizing to change. Thus each manager must meet the development of socioeconomic culture; system accepts new management thought, theory and method, sets up the brand-new management concept of human resource.Design salary scientifically to reward the distribution scheme Japanese economic friendship association of central section encourage condition for the first big small and medium sized business to third production department carry out investigation, show as a result: In initiating vigor factor wages the only row position of 8th, and in weakening vigor factor, wages row is in the first place. It is been wages high that this explains and can not initiate vigor, and wages low definite reduction, vigor, therefore the difference in degree of pay for promote employee enthusiasm aspect influence great. Now a lot of western companies in salary reward aspect the experience of having explored some successes , share for example profit , profit share , stock option, employee holds share plan ( EOSP ) , is balanced to tally to block , key Jig effect index and group team spirit, and when establishing salary to reward policy, have considered the relation of short period, mid-term and long-term pay fully , and design for special talent " special salary reward scheme ", purpose is to make salary reward distribution scheme with encourage machine made , arouse creativity and the working enthusiasm of employee group team fully.Reward salary to fit into market economic category manage will salary reward fit into market economic category manage , from the distribution mechanism, 3 distribution management big aspects and degree of assignment system, carry out bold innovation. The degree innovation of assignment system is basic, distribution machine made innovation is crucial, management innovation is basic.Establish in order to press Lao distribution is main part. According to the salary the distribution of factor of production reward distribution structure establishment press Lao distribution with press factor of production distribution combination get up salary reward the degree of assignment system, it is the inevitable requirement of the development of socialist market economy, therefore modern enterprise salary reward distribution structure should be with press Lao distribution is main part , press Lao distribution with press factor of production the basic general layout distribution. Part is the income degree of assignment system in the row in cost, part is in tax Hour the degree of essential factor of assignment system of row in profit, make salary reward the technical, knowledge capital profit of distribution scheme design and employee labor income and employee appearance suit.Lead into market distribution mechanism, make the market and price of labor force conform the market price of labor force is the market labor rate that forms through marketcompetition, is decided by the supply demand relations of labor force. Therefore when designing salary to reward distribution scheme, will consider the market price of labor force, establish the price system of labor force of different post, post and related enterprise, regard it as the basic salary of enterprise inside to reward San shine standard, with the fully embodiment value of labor force, guide the reasonably floating and optimization disposition of labor force.Consider both enterprise benefit, establish the high benefit capital of senior engineer, the distribution idea of low being it low wages press Lao distribution must be the benefit distribution that created according to labor, if a product that worker offers (service) the needs that can not satisfy society, that Me him can not get the labor pay that reflects with market price, therefore must consider both the economic benefits of enterprise.According to employee working ability and accomplishment, pull open distribution gap reasonably, hang pay and contribution ability finger working complete level, through the goal reached or the effect realized, the latent ability that reflects and has denotes knowledge with ability synthesize to gr asp level as well as experience accumulation level. Salary the role that rewards for is will encourage employee all abilities of having self play, but these abilities must be level and the knowledge of place post first needs. Work accomplishmentwork Jig the size of effect, from the difference in ability can difference. Therefore the pay that worker gets should not be also identical. It is for enterprise, what is beneficial to it really is that the actual labor accomplishment of worker, therefore contribute big have to serve move should get higher pay.Establishment the salary " found on people " reward the system Japanese Hamburg shop of McDonald’s can give employee family members every year always the bonus of a considerable number; When they pass birthday, can send person to send last fresh flower. American chain hospital company in salary reward payment in much a extra bonus ─ " have oxygen sport challenge plan ", employee must reach every month minimum standard as jog 30 miles, play wall ball for 15 hours above etc., can be just qualified bonus. Haier in salary reward the system design of payment aspect is difference " the horse in 1000 the competitive platform " it is not same to put up and have built " ", as ordinary employee carries out , " 3 works coexist , development conversion " ─ excellent worker, qualified worker and trial worker, enter factory worker all recently have certain probation period , expire acceptable turn for qualified worker, otherwise, excellent worker turns probably because of working fault, is qualified worker or trial worker. It is 4 level development checks that according to excellent middle-level administrator, what Haier carry out is taking regularly check result as basis, it is " give your a ship, advance or retreat to float Sheen lean self " to design for the base salary ofbrainpower, according to the commission of economic benefits that new product gets in the market, get salary to reward.It is identical that the effect of leading work depends on the campaign in subordinate mainly, but each subordinate does not let in the aspects such as ability and wishes. Therefore leader must so implement different leading way as subordinate is going to analyze and find out discrepancy carefully , then can get the leading effect of the best. It is also such toreward systematic design for salad rye, employee demand has discrepancy, different employee or same employee in not at the same time wait demand possible difference. Forlow wages crowd, the role of bonus is very important; For taking in higher crowd especially knowledge share is with management cadre , promote post , respect personality, appointment title and encouragement the freely degree etc. of innovation and work look more important; For being engage in , it is heavy, dangerous. The physical labor with bad environment staff, the possibilities such as labor protection, labor condition and post subsidy are effective. Therefore to make salary reward system to develop larger effect, first want the needs for employee have ample understanding. If leader wants to make encouraging level for subordinate reach the biggest demand that melts and must value them, knows the variation of demand and makes positive reaction, embody really found on people thought.企业薪酬管理薪酬管理的功能和人力资源管理的功能总体来说是一致的。
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX people。
XXX enterprise management。
as it has a XXX attract。
retain。
and motivate employees。
particularly key talent。
As such。
it has XXX。
retain。
objective。
XXX on the design of salary XXX.2 The Importance of Salary System DesignThe design of a salary system is XXX's success。
An effective salary system can help attract and retain employees。
XXX。
XXX them to perform at their best。
In contrast。
a poorly designed salary system can lead to employee n and XXX。
which can XXX.To design an effective salary system。
XXX factors。
including the industry。
the enterprise's size and stage of development。
and the specific needs and goals of the XXX。
XXX.3 XXXXXX。
XXX incentives can help align the XXX with those of the enterprise and its shareholders。
XXX to perform at their best.When designing equity incentives。
外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。
上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效外文文献翻译最新
文献出处：Mehran H. The study on the correlation of Senior Executive Compensation and corporate performance in listed companies [J]. Journal of financial economics, 2016, 2(3): 161-174.原文The study on the correlation of Senior Executive Compensation and corporateperformance in listed companiesMehran HAbstractDue to information asymmetry between owners and executives, led to the moral risk and adverse selection problems. How to make the executive is satisfying the interests of the white body at the same time maximize the enterprise value ultimately achieve a win-win situation, become a great concern of many scholars.This paper from two aspects of theory and the literature reviewed the executive compensation and corporate performance of the related content. Then the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance empirical research. This article mainly from two aspects to analyze the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, is a longitudinal descriptive statistical analysis, samples are divided into general descriptive statistical analysis and descriptive statistical analysis, the second is to collect data, respectively, the university and multivariate linear regression analysis, selection of the top three executive pay means the natural logarithm of executive compensation, return on equity and earnings per share measure of enterprise performance, and to join the company size, financial leverage, ownership concentration, executives shareholding, the proportion of state-owned shares, the proportion of independent directors, the chairman and general manager of situation eight control variables, the size of the board of supervisors.Keywords: the listed company, executive compensation and corporate performanceIntroductionModern enterprise mostly adopts share-holding system operation, the emergence of the joint-stock company, led to the separate ownership with the agency. Shareholders as the owner of the enterprise property eventually, but not to participate in enterprise management and decision-making, but the entrusted agent for the management and operation enterprises, formed "by a proxy" relationship. Agent instead of shareholders as the authorized agent of the enterprise, its status or senior management of the enterprise. Considering the agent's risk factor, such as level of morality, ability, together with information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, can produce the agency cost.Executives as the human capital of enterprise is the most important and scarce, because its mastery of the enterprise management decision-making, the height of the enterprise control rights virtually increased the likelihood they use right to violate the interests of the shareholders. In order to solve this contradiction, shareholders adopted both constraints and incentive mechanism to balance the principal-agent relationship, can excite the work enthusiasms of executives unceasingly, can maximum limit to maximize shareholder wealth. Whether to stand in the Angle of the shareholders or executives, the company's performance is the important measure of executive pay. So, study on executive compensation and corporate performance correlation for an enterprise to formulate salary incentive mechanism and solve the problem of agency costs, it is very necessary.Literature reviewThe correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance Murphy (1985) 1964-1981 using the company data, chose the 73 largest manufacturing enterprises of the data of 500 managers as the research sample, using empirical method to test the stock yield, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate earnings growth, the conclusion is: the elasticity value cash incentives for the value of the company is near to 0.11, measured with returns to shareholders of company performance pay was significantly positively related to relationship with the manager. The conclusion and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) of the two scholars research conclusion.Carpenter and Sanders (2002) through the study concluded that: the senior management team and for board members incentives related relationship, motivation of the senior management team can more effectively improve the business performance.Phillip and Cyril (2004) by using linear regression and curve correlation analysis method of combining the, general manager of relationship between pay and performance indicators for empirical research, the conclusion is: the general manager, general manager of wages, and payment of remuneration bonuses both are positively correlated with corporate performance.Kevin (2011) by 2006-2009, 280 companies listed on the nose study draws the following conclusions: executive compensation and corporate performance (measured by return on equity as index) was significantly positive correlation; Affect the executive compensation level of the most significant variable is the size of the company.The influential factors of executive payCores, j., Holthausen, R.W. and Larkers, D.F (2005) in corporate governance structure as the breakthrough point to study the relationship between general manager compensation and corporate performance, the results show that if the company governance structure is imperfect, the condition of the compensation is the general manager will appear on the high side; General manager compensation and negatively related stake, was positively correlated with the size of the board.Kin Wai Lee (2005), Pieter Duffhues etc. (2008) after analyzing the influence factors of the company's executive compensation get the following conclusion: the board of directors of the company locates the geographical position, industry, and the size is about pay will have an impact factor; Whether they are of good corporate governance structure will largely affect the corporate performance.Kim and Hwang (2009) argue that directors only without actual contact with the enterprise are in the true sense of independence. The two scholars to fortune 100 companies in 2005 data from 1996-2005 as a sample for empirical research, get the following conclusion: director independence negatively related with executive pay,with pay performance sensitivity and in accordance with the performance was a positive correlation decision term chance.Research hypothesisExecutive compensation and corporate performance"The ownership and operation separate" on the one hand, make the enterprise economic efficiency was improved, but on the other hand also brought "by a proxy" problem. The principal and agent are in the pursuit of self-interest maximization, but due to the differences between the interests of both the demand, but on the market and the existence of information asymmetry phenomenon, in this case, the agent can make the behavior of the damage the interests of the principal for your own benefit, "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" problem such as will as, thus appeared the agency cost. In order to balance the principal-agent relationship, in turn, reduce agency cost; the owner will need to sign a compensation contract and operators. Compensation contracts, executive compensation and corporate performance, executive compensation determined by business performance, to link executive compensation and corporate performance effectively. In this case, the executive in order to improve their own reward will try my best to company management and company performance can be improved.Hypothesis 1: executive compensation and corporate performance are related Executive pay and company sizeThe size of the company has a large influence on executive pay. Compared with the smaller companies, the company size, the greater the division of the thinner, the more people, the more the more complex organization structure, operation and management problems, which makes operators face a greater risk of management and pressure, the ability and quality of senior executives put forward higher requirements. In this case, in order to good operation and management company, senior executives must pay more time and energy, and few businesses to be able to do this kind of ability, therefore, senior executives for more pay and logical.Hypothesis 2: executive pay scale is related with the companyExecutive compensation and the asset-liability ratioCompensation incentive of listed company's purpose is to reduce agency costs, ownership and operation separate, and keep the reasonable capital structure can reduce agency costs, thereby increasing the interests of the shareholders.Jesen and Michael (1986) put forward the free cash flow, said he thought the enterprises need to pay interest and principal on debt financing, so that the company's free cash flow is reduced, executives waste of corporate resources and reduce the chance of a successful, at the same time, through the debt contract, creditors have the supervision of executive behavior motivation, this agency problem between executives and shareholders and ease. When the company debt levels continue to improve, the creditor supervision executive behavior motive is also a corresponding increase. On the margin, as creditors supervision of external supervision and internal salary incentive mechanism can be substituted, therefore, when the enterprise debt level enhances unceasingly, the external supervision be enhanced, so that you can properly reduce the level of salary incentive, thus make executive pay in a certain extent, be suppressed.Hypothesis 3: executive compensation is negatively related to the asset-liability ratioExecutive pay and ownership concentrationIn general, if the company's ownership concentration is high, the big shareholder control of the executive ability of the stronger the will, they will be susceptible to the stimulation of interests for executives to implement effective supervision, prevent using executive position to improve their pay too much to damage the interests of the shareholders. On the contrary, when the company's equity dispersion, due to the constraints of the supervisory cost and especially when the benefits of less supervision cost, small and medium-sized shareholders motivation will gradually disappear, the supervision of such executives will have larger power, thus they would use the position to raise their pay.Demsetz and Leh (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) through the study found that in the practical work, because shareholders to supervise the management of the cost is high, in fact only the big shareholders have the ability to effectively supervise. When the company the more dispersed ownership, especiallywhen the benefits of less supervision cost, small shareholder supervision and motivation will be weakens even disappears completely, it will make managers to easily get more power, so that they can in advantage position in negotiations with shareholders to pay for their higher pay.Hypothesis 4: executive compensation is negatively related to the ownership concentrationExecutive compensation and executive shareholding"The ownership and operation separate" bring the problem of "entrust - agent”. The principal and the agent is "rational economic man", they are all in the pursuit of self-interest maximization, but due to the differences between the interests of both the demand and the market exists the phenomenon of information asymmetry, agents may make the behavior of the damage the interests of the principal for your own benefit, thus formed the agency cost. One of the effective ways to solve the principal-agent problem is equity incentive to executives, let executives holding shares of the company. Executive stock holding company, the more the interests of executives and the company's interests more closely, so both have common interests, enterprise value maximization. Executives in order to realize their own interests will inevitably to do all the management of the company, improve the efficiency of the enterprise, so that executives can get higher pay.Hypothesis 5: executive compensation and executive shareholding is related Research prospectFirst, in terms of executive pay, in addition to consider the disclosure of financial report of listed companies of monetary income, can also consider the effect of non-monetary income and hidden income. Secondly, in terms of business performance, due to the stock market is not mature, share price volatility, stock prices it is difficult to accurately reflect the operating performance of enterprises, this article only selected the return on equity, earnings per share both accounting profit index to measure business performance. With the continuous development of the securities market and perfect, in a follow-up study can use market value indicators (such as Thbins. Q value, economic value added, etc.) To measure business performance. Finally, the influenceof the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance factors can also, from the perspective of the other external factors and internal factors on executive compensation and corporate performance relationship of further research.译文上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究Mehran H摘要由于所有者与公司高管之间存在信息不对称,导致了风险道德、逆向选择等问题。
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企业高管薪酬外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)翻译:管理者薪酬和企业债务期限结构摘要：高管薪酬通过组合敏感性股价变动与股票报酬波动影响管理风险偏好。
股票价格不支持管理风险，而股票报酬波动鼓励冒险。
理论表明，短期债务通过控制管理风险偏好减轻债务代理成本。
我们断定，找到首席执行官组合和短期到期债务之间关系的证据。
我们还发现，短期到期债务减轻对债券收益率激励机制的影响。
总的来说，我们的经验证据表明，短期债务减轻了从风险补偿所产生的债务代理成本。
使用股票及期权为基础做为高管薪酬的现象在过去的几十年里急剧增加。
首席执行官财富的暴露使股票价格在1980年到1994年间增加了两倍，然后1994年到2000年间又增加了一倍。
高管薪酬的这种变化对经理所承受的风险有直接的影响，从而改变双方的激励机制和行为。
卡彭特和兰伯特探讨了对管理者激励补偿两方面的影响。
一个影响是通过补偿股票价格的敏感性造成的。
第二个影响是通过补偿股票报酬波动的敏感性造成的。
对股票价格补偿方案的灵敏度越高，经理人的风险偏好就越弱。
相比之下，对股票收益波动率补偿方案的敏感性越高，经理人的风险偏好就越大。
通过改变管理风险偏好，基于股票的补偿也影响那些风险偏好的第三方看法。
本研究的主要目的是探讨短期债务在减少来自高管激励合同所产生的债务代理成本的作用。
具体来说，我们研究了这两种组合敏感度对公司债务期限结构的影响。
此外，我们分析债务到期对投资组合灵敏度和债券收益率之间的关系。
实证结果提供了一个一致的意见，短期债务减少了与薪酬激励相关的债务代理成本。
传统的代理理论提出了股东和债权人之间的利益冲突。
在他们的开创性研究中，法玛、米勒、詹森和麦克林认为，股东有动机减少债券持有人财富通过代入高风险的投资，这种现象通常被称为资产替代。
股权报酬对管理人员去资产替代提供一个潜在的强大动力。
债权人了解这些风险的激励机制和合理定价他们。
例如，信用评级机构的报告显示CEO 薪酬和管理风险偏好之间有显而易见的联系。
2007年的穆迪投资服务公司特别说明“高管薪酬纳入穆迪信用分析的发行人评估，因为补偿是管理行为的决定因素，间接影响信贷质量”。
这个报告后来解释说“分析薪酬的主要目的是深入了解关于激励的结构，规模和奖励重点”。
穆迪也公布其在2005年进行的一项内部研究报告，题为“CEO报酬与信用风险”。
这项研究的结论是“支付方案对股票价格和经营业绩是高度敏感的，可能会诱发管理者更大的冒险行为，或许与股东保持一致的目标，但不一定债券持有人的目标”。
我们发现在普尔对于CEO的激励和信用分析的报告中有类似的研究，报告认为，短期债务可以减少管理的激励机制，以增加风险。
此外，利兰和托夫特（1996）声称，短期债务可以减少甚至消除与资产置换有关的代理成本。
斯图尔兹（2000）的一个重要观点是，短期债务的债权人提供了“一个非常强大的工具来监控管理”。
同样，拉詹和通泰（1995）认为，短期债务的债权人用最小的努力提供了额外的灵活性以监测管理者.在本文中使用了两项措施来源于管理者的薪酬待遇，我们测试短期债务在减轻资产置换所产生的债务代理成本的作用。
具体来说，我们断定，短期债务增加CEO的薪酬风险。
经理人的风险偏好的措施之一是对标的股票价格的敏感度补偿方案。
债权人认识到，降低这种敏感性，更像是经理人决定风险增加的策略。
因此，我们预期，经理人对股票价格的敏感度越低，短期债务在公司资本结构中的比重就越大。
与此相反，经理人偏好增加股票报酬波动的敏感性风险。
因此，我们预期，管理者的股票报酬波动灵敏度越高，短期债务在公司的资本结构中的比重就越大。
此前的研究认为，找到一些证据表明，债务成本增加在于企业经营者风险报酬。
如果短期内到期，约束管理风险寻求，那么我们预计短期债务将减弱补偿风险对债务成本的影响。
我们以1992年至2005年14年间6825个公司为观测样本，研究CEO薪酬激励与公司债务期限之间的因果关系。
我们采用短期债务的替代定义，遵循科尔和格威（2002）的估算选择敏感度理论，应用多种实验方法并且选择新债发行的样品进行分析预测关系。
与假设相同，我们发现一个消极的显著关系在公司首席执行官股票价格和短期债务之间。
也与预期一致，我们发现公司首席CEO组合股票报酬波动和短期债务之间的积极的显著关系。
总之，这些研究结果表明，短期债务是用来减少企业经营者报酬风险代理成本。
我们的实证结果是全面的控制首席执行官股权，杠杆率，资产期限，成长机会，企业规模，期限结构，债券评级，以及发行人的其他特性。
接下来，我们使用268400个债券观察样本，其为114个不同的企业在1994年至2005年期间的观察，研究短期到期债务是否减轻了对债务成本管理激励机制的影响。
与过往的研究（例如，丹尼尔等（2004），肖尔（2007），和比利，莫尔，和张（2009）），我们发现，股票报酬波动率越高，引起的借贷成本就较低。
更重要的是，我们发现短期债务减弱债券收益率和股票价格之间的负（正）的关系。
股票管理和期权补偿在管理风险寻求行为中表现为两个相反的影响。
一个影响来自经理人的投资组合对股票价格的灵敏度，另外一个影响来自对股票报酬波动的灵敏度。
其他方面相同，较高灵敏度的股票价格以及经理人薪酬会降低冒险行为，而经理人的补偿方案，以较高灵敏度的股票收益波动率将鼓励冒险行为。
债权人了解这些激励措施和合理的价格补偿引起的风险。
此前的研究表明，短期债务可以降低与资产置换有关的代理成本，提高监管放贷机构的效率。
在本文中，我们分析出短期债务产生的债务代理成本的减轻得益于CEO组合的敏感性度作用。
我们的第一个假设是，短期债务对CEO的投资组合的股票收益波动率的敏感性是正相关的，和CEO的投资组合的股票价格（增量）的敏感度呈负相关。
我们的第二个假说是，利用短期债务减少股票和债务成本之间的正（负）关系。
为了测试第一个假设，我们组建了一个模型，从1992年到2005年14个年间6825个公司年度观测样本，用短期债务的替代定义，采用科尔和格威（2002）的理论建立评估的敏感性模型，并采用多种计量经济学方法来分析预测关系。
我们发现，在补偿方案的灵敏度和股价和短期债之一直是负相关统计学关系。
我们还发现，股票收益波动率和短期债务的补偿方案的灵敏度之间时刻保持正相关统计学显著关系。
实证研究结果已经证明我们在控制诸多影响债务到期因素是成功的。
为了进一步减轻内生性问题，我们采用新的债务问题的样本重新检验我们的主要假设。
我们的研究结果证实，当CEO的股票价格高时债权人多（少）可能借短期资金。
我们还检测管理激励、短期到期债务以及公司债券收益率之间的关系。
与过往文献中相比，我们发现，债券收益率正在增加股票价格和减少股票价格波动。
更重要的是，我们分析了债券收益率期限结构和管理激励机制之间的相互作用。
我们发现，短期到期债务减弱股票价格对债券收益率的影响，同时也加强了对股票报酬波动对债券收益率的影响。
这些结果表明，短期到期债务约束管理风险偏好并减轻资产替代成本的问题。
总体而言，本研究扩展了几个方面的深度，像行政赔偿，债务代理成本和债务期限的决定因素。
我们提供的新证据表明，企业经营者报酬这个组合的敏感性影响公司债务期限，而且他们用完全不同的方式。
我们的研究结果无论是在文献上、统计学上还是经济学上都表明，股票报酬波动和股票价格是影响债务期限的决定因素。
我们的研究还发现，一方面是债权人评估高管薪酬和风险寻求行为之间的因果关系，而另一方面，是寻求债务风险行为与代理成本之间的关系。
最重要的是，我们的实证结果强调短期债务减轻债务代理成本的作用。
原文:Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure ofCorporate DebtPAUL BROCKMAN, XIUMIN MARTIN, and EMRE UNLUTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2010(3):1123-1127Abstract: Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that short-maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-relate incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.The use of stock and option-based executive compensation has increased dramatically during the past few decades. The median exposure of CEO wealth to stock prices tripled between 1980 and 1994,and then doubled again between 1994 and 2000 .Such changes in executive compensation have a direct impact on the manager’s exposure to risk, thus altering bothincentives and behavior. Carpenter and Lambert discuss two effects of compensation on managerial incentives. One effect is caused by the sensitivity of compensation to stock prices. A second effect is caused by the sensitivity of compensation to stock return volatility . The higher the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock prices, the weaker will be the manager’s appetite for risk. In contrast,the higher the compensation package’s se nsitivity to stock return volatility,the stronger will be the manager’s appetite for risk.By altering managerial risk preferences,stock-based compensation also influences third-party perceptions of those risk preferences. The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role of short-term debt in reducing agency costs of debt arising from executive incentive contracts. Specifically, we examine the effect of the two portfolio sensitivities on the maturity structure of corporate debt. In addition, we analyze the effect of debt maturity on the relation between portfolio sensitivities and bond yields. The empirical results provide a consistent picture that short-term debt reduces agency costs of debt associated with compensation incentives.Traditional agency theory posits a conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors. In their seminal studies, Fama and Miller and Jensen and Meckling show that shareholders have an incentive to expropriate bondholder wealth by substituting into riskier investments, a phenomenon commonly referred to as asset substitution. Equity-basedcompensation provides managers with a potentially stronger motive for asset substitution. Creditors understand these risk incentives and rationally price them. For example, credit rating agency reports show an awareness of the link between CEO compensation and managerial risk appetites. A 2007 Moody’s Investors Service Special Comment states that “Executive pay is incorporated into Moody’s credit analysis of rated issuers because compensation is a determinant of management behavior that affects indirectly credit quality” .The report later explains that the “primary interest in analyzing pay is to gain insight into the compensation committee’s intent regarding the structure, size and focus of incentives” Moody’s has also published the results of an internal study conducted in 2005 entitled “CEO Compensation and Credit Risk.” This study concludes that “pay packages that are highly sensitive to stock price and/or operating performance may induce greater risk taking by managers, perhaps consistent with stockholders’ objectives, but not necessarily bondholders’ objectives ” .We find similar statements regarding CEO incentives and credit analysis in Standard & Poor’s reports argue that short er-term debt can reduce managerial incentives to increase risk.Further, Leland and Toft (1996) claim that short-term debt can reduce or even eliminate agency costs associated with asset substitution.An important insight from Stulz (2000) is that short-term debt provides creditors with “an extremely powerful tool to monitor management.” Similarly, Rajanand Winton (1995) argue that short-term debt provides creditors with additional flexibility to monitor managers with minimum ing two measures of risk preference derived from managerial compensation packages in this paper, we test the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt arising from asset substitution. Specifically, we posit that the proportion of short-term debt increases in CEO compensation risk. One measure of the manager’s appetite for risk is the sensitivity of the compensation package to underlying stock prices. Creditors recognize that the lower this sensitivity, the more likely the manager is to engage in risk-increasing strategies. We therefore expect that the lower the manager’s sensitivity to stock prices, the larger the proportion of short-term debt in the firm’s capital structure. In contrast, the manager’s appetite for risk increases with the sensitivity of the compensation package to stock return volatility. We therefore expect that the higher the manager’s sensitivity to stock return volatility, the larger the proportion of short-term debt in the firm’s capital structure. Prior studies argue and find some evidence that the cost of debt increases in managerial compensation risk. If short maturities restrain managerial risk-seeking, then we expect that short-term debt will attenuate the effect of compensation risk on the cost of debt.We study the causal link between CEO incentive compensation and corporate debt maturity using a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations during the 14 year period from 1992 to 2005. We employ alternativedefinitions of short-term debt, follow Core and Guay’s (2002) method for estimating option sensitivities and apply several empirical methodologies and an alternative new debt issuance sample to analyze the predicted relations. As hypothesized, we find a negative and significant relation between CEO portfolio deltas and short-term debt. Also consistent with expectations, we find a positive and significant relation between CEO portfolio vegas and short-term debt. Taken together, these findings suggest that short-term debt is used to reduce agency costs associated with high managerial compensation risk. Our empirical results are robust to controlling for CEO stock ownership, leverage, asset maturity, growth opportunities, firm size, term structure,bond rating, and other issuer characteristics.Next, we use a sample of 268,400 bond-day observations for 114 unique firms during the 1994 to 2005 period to examine whether short-maturity debt mitigates the impact of managerial incentives on the cost of debt. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Daniel et al. (2004), Shaw (2007), and Billett, Mauer,and Zhang (2009)), we find that higher deltas (vegas) lead to lower (higher) borrowing costs. More importantly, we show that short-term debt attenuates the negative (positive) relation between bond yields and deltas (vegas).Managerial stock and option compensation exerts two opposing forces on managerial risk-seeking behavior. One effect arises from the sensitivityof the manager’s portfolio to stock prices (delta), and the other effect arises from the sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). All else equal, higher sensitivity of the manager’s compensation package to stock prices will discourage risk-taking behavior whereas higher sensitivity of the manager’s compensation package to stock return volatility will encourage risk-taking behavior.Creditors understand these incentives and rationally price the compensation-induced risks. Prior research suggests that short-term debt can reduce agency costs associated with asset substitution and improve the efficiency of monitoring by lenders. In this paper, we analyze the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt arising from CEO portfolio sensitivities. Our first hypothesis is that short-term debt is positively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to stock return volatility (vega), an d negatively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to stock prices (delta). Our second hypoth-esis is that the use of short-term debt reduces the positive (negative) relation between vega (delta) and the cost of debt.To test the first hypothesis, we construct a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations during the 14-year period from 1992 to 2005, use alternative definitions of short-term debt, implement Core and Guay’s (2002) method for estimating option sensitivities, and employ several econometric techniques to analyze the predicted relations. We find a consistently negativeand statistically significant relation between the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock prices and short-term debt. We also find a consistently positive and statistically significant relation between the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock return volatility and short-term debt. Our empirical findings are robust to controls for numerous factors that have been shown to affect debt maturity.To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we retest our main hypotheses using a sample of new debt issues. Our results confirm that creditors are more (less) likely to lend short-term funds when CEOs have high vega (high delta) incentive packages.We also examine the relation between managerial incentives, short-maturity debt, and corporate bond yields. Consistent with prior literature, we find that bond yields are increasing in vega and decreasing in delta. More importantly, we analyze the interaction between maturity structure and managerial incentives on bond yields. We show that short-maturity debt attenuates the impact of vega on bond yields while it reinforces the impact of delta on bond yields.These results suggest that short-maturity debt constrains managerial risk preferences and mitigates asset substitution problems.Overall, this study extends the literature in several areas, including executive compensation, agency costs of debt, and the determinants of debt maturity.We provide new evidence that the two portfolio sensitivities in managerial compensation affect corporate debt maturity, and that they do soin quite different ways. Our results add to the literature on the determinants of debt maturity by showing that executive portfolio deltas and vegas are significant determinants,both statistically and economically. Our study also sheds light on the creditor’s assessment of the causal connections between executive compensation and risk-seeking behavior on the one hand, and between risk-seeking behavior and agency costs of debt on the other hand. Perhaps most importantly, our empirical results highlight the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt.。