薪酬管理外文文献翻译
什么使薪酬看起来合理？【外文翻译】
外文文献翻译译文一：外文原文原文：What Make a Salary Seem ReasonableHighhouse Scoot，Brooks-Laber Margaret EAlthough considerable research attention has been directed at understanding perceptions of salary fairness, very little attention has been given to how salary expectations are formed or how trivial elements of the job search context may influence these expectations.Twoexp eriments demonstrated how the simple manipulation of response options for a multiple-choice item may influence subsequent salary expectations and salary satisfaction. Results are discussed in light of Parducci's(1995) contextual theory.It has been repeatedly shown that the way in which a question is asked can influence perceptions of what is normal. For example, Harris found that people who were asked 'How short was the basketball player?' estimated lower heights than people who were asked 'How tall was the basketball player?' Similarly, Loftus found that people who were asked 'Do you get headaches frequently?' reported more headaches than people asked 'Do you get headaches occasionally?' More recently, Norbert Schwarz and his colleagues identified numerous examples of how the wording of survey items can strongly impact self reports. For example, Schwarz reported research showing that people claimed a higher life success when the numeric values of a life-success item ranged from -5 to + 5, than when they ranged from 0 to 10. He described another study showing that psychosomatic patients reported symptom frequencies of more than twice a month when the item's response scale ranged from 'twice a month or less' to 'several times per day', but did not do so when the scale ranged from 'never' to 'more than twice a month'. Schwarz suggested that respondents to surveys assumethat the values in the middle range of a scale reflect the 'typical' value in the 'real world', whereas the extremes of the scale correspond to the extremes of the distribution. More provocative is the finding that, in addition to affecting respondents' behavioural reports on surveys, these simple context effects may also affect subsequent judgments. For example, patients in Schwarz and Scheuring's study reported a higher health satisfaction when the response scale suggested that their symptom frequency was below average.Similar to the Schwarz and Scheuring study, our research examined the effects of response scales on subsequent judgments. However,the response-scale paradigm was used to examine broader theoretical issues regarding the impact of the job-seeking context on expectations about pay. Despite the importance of starting salary in the job choice process,very little research has focused on factors that has focused on incumbent satisfaction with organizational pay noted that the existing meagre research on job-seeker expectations for staring salary is more fragmented than programmatic.The authors suggested that researchers draw from the vast literature on decision-making to understand how individual and situational factors influence salary perceptions.Our failure to find effects consistent with adaptation-level theory for our sample of job seekers was consistent with Parducci, Calfee, Marshall, and Davidson's (1960) failure to support adaptation-level theory predictions in the lab. Parducci and his colleagues found that, holding all else constant, variation in the mean of a distribution of numbers had no effect on student perceptions of the typical number. Similary, Ordóñez et al. (2000), in a study of distributive fairness perceptions, found that MBAs presented with two reference salaries (i.e., salary of a peer paid higher and salary of a peer paid lower) did not average these reference points in the manner predicted by adaptation-level theory. Ordóñez and her colleagues recommended that future research examine what happens when people are presented with more than two reference salaries.Parducci's (1995) contextual theory generally proposes that attribute judgments reflect a compromise between a range principle and a frequency principle. Most relevant tothe present concern is the frequency principle, which is a tendency for people to assign the same number of contextual representations to equal segments of the scale of judgment. For example, if fewer than one half of salaries available in the immediate context (e.g., salaries in classified advertisements) are below a particular salary, that salary is perceived to be in the bottom half of the scale of judgment. As another simple example, consider a summer job seeker whose three friends have accepted jobs with hourly rates of $5, $10, and $11. An offer of $8.50 may be perceived to be near the bottom of salaries available in the market, because two of the three available strategies are above that offer, even though it is objectively above the midpoint of the salaries of his friends. A related phenomenon, called the alternative-outcomes effect (Windschitl & Wells, 1998), has been observed for people judging the likelihood of winning a raffle. In one study, participants were presented with two different raffles involving 10 tickets. In the first situation, they were told 'You hold 3 tickets and seven other people each hold 1.' In the second situation, they were told 'You hold 3 tickets and one other person holds 7.' People felt much more certain of winning in the situation where they held more tickets than any individual competitor (3-1-1-1-1-1-1-1) than when they held fewer tickets ( 3-7), despite the fact that the probability of winning either raffle is the same. In both this example and the previous hypothetical salary examples, people are influenced by the context in which information is presented, ignoring the absolute value of the current situation. Contextual theory posits that when events that elicit hedonic judgments are concentrated at the upper endpoints of their contexts, they elicit greater happiness, regardless of the absolute levels of the events. This means that an important factor influencing satisfaction with any particular outcome is the placement of that outcome relative to other possible outcomes, or the proportion of contextual representations below that outcome. Other researchers have also suggested that reference points are not combined into a single comparison point (Kahneman, 1992) and that satisfaction is determined instead by the relative frequencies of positive and negative events (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1990). When applied to starting salary expectations, these models seem to suggest that the frequency of salary options above and below a targetsalary, not the lower and upper bounds of the salary distribution, will influence starting salary expectations. The experiments were designed to examine this proposition within the context of a simple multiple-choice item on a career-expectations survey.Participants were business students (N= 204) enrolled at a medium-sized public university in the Midwestern United States. Participation occurred during class time in seven marketing classes, ranging in size from 21 to 37 students. The majority (i.e., 90%) of the students were juniors or seniors, and male (52%). The average participant was 21 years of age. A'career attitudes survey' was designed that contained seven typical items inquiring about students' plans after graduation, along with demographic questions. Items were in multiple-choice and open-ended formats, and addressed issues such as how many jobs the students planned to apply for, what methods they planned to use to find jobs, and the nature of their expected first job. Embedded within the survey was the starting salary item that was the focus of the endpoint-level and option-frequency manipulations. The item read 'What do you expect your starting salary to be?' Participants received one of four response scales differing on the two factors. Table 1 presents the response options by endpoints of the range (low= $15,000-50,000; high= $30,000-65,000) and frequency of multiple-choice options above a target salary(low frequency; high frequency). The overall range roughly corresponded with the range of annual starting salaries of recent graduates from the business school (i.e., $21,000-65,000). Note that the manipulation of range endpoints (see Fig. 1) is distinct from a manipulation of range width, which has appeared in earlier research by Rynes et al. (1983) and Highhouse et al. (1999). The width of the salary range (i.e., $35,000) remained constant across experimental conditions in our study. The option-frequency manipulation was designed using $40,000 as the target salary(low frequency = 1 response option above $40,000; high frequency = 4 response options above $40,000). The target salary is the midpoint of the entire salary range (i.e., half the distance between the lowest salary in the low endpoint level condition and the highest salary in the high endpoint level condition). Each participant received one endpoint level and one frequency condition in a2 x 2between-subjects factorial design.Although previous research has shown that the social environment can have an impact on perceptions of a fair staring salary, far fewer studies have investigated the impact of contextual features of the decision-marking environment that may influence salary expectations. The research that does exist has focused on the width of the range of salaries available in the market. Our research builds on this work by showing that factors other than range width may influence salary expectations. Drawing from Parducci's contextual theory. We expected that, holding salary range constant, the frequency of salary options above and below a target salary would influence salary expectations independent of the level of the endpoints of salaries in the market. Our first experiment, using the manipulated response-option paradigm, showed that the frequency of response options above a target salary in the response categories for an item on a typical career survey influenced later reports of expected staring salary for a group of business majors. Contrary to Helson's adaptation-level theory, the salary endpoint level had no effect on expectations for this group. Thus, consistent with Parducci's proposition, our findings showed that one must consider not only the level of the endpoints of salaries in the immediate context but also the perceived frequency of salaries. The second experiment showed that these effects can extend beyond salary expectations to influence satisfaction with job offers. The frequency of response options above the midpoint salary in a multiple-choice item had a main effect on salary satisfaction and job attractiveness for psychology students presented 20 min later with a hypothetical job advertisement.These research results suggest that salary expectations,at least for naive job seekers,can be influenced by simple features of the contextual environment. Unfortunately, longitudinal investigations are highly dynamic.Future research is needed that employs more moment-to-moment assessments(see Stone, Shiffman,& DeCries, 1999)of job seekers' salary expectations.We do suspect,however,that our results are not limited to the simple numerical anchors set up in our experiments.Considerable research has shown that simple numerical anchors can strongly influence judgments of experts as well as novices (e.g, Northcraft andNeale,1987).Similarly, studies using such varied experts as agricultural judges (Gaeth Shanteau,1984) ,parole offices (Carroll& Payne, 1976),and court judges (Ebbesen & Konecni,1975) have concluded that the experience of these judges does not make them less susceptible to simple context effects.Barber and Bretz(2000) noted that understanding how different contexts can evoke difference in how a given salary offer will be evaluated is important for organizations"as organizations cannot predict employee reactions to pay practices without knowledge of the standards against which those practices will be evaluated" We believe that,in addition to the importance of this knowledge for organizations,such knowledge is important for job seekers. Job seekers need to be aware that their salary expectations can be inadvertently affected by their exposure to salaries that may or may not be meaningful to their situation.People are constantly faced with skewed distributions of salaries because they tend to hear more about fellow job seekers who were paid high salaries than they are to hear about fellow job seekers who were paid the industry average. This creates a cognitive context in which offered salaries are likely to be perceived as being in the bottom half of the scale of judgement,even when they are objectively near the middle of the distributions of salaries. This could be positive if it leads employees to hold high expectations of pay,as these expectations may be associated with higher negotiated salaries.Generally,though,it is important for job seekers to realize when they are being affected by context.Job seekers need to be aware of the danger of marking inferences from small saiples,as small samples of salaries may not represent the salary distribution in the population of relevant jobs.Demonstrating context dependence may be as simple as showing people how a multiple-choice option on a typical survey can influence their standards for appropriate pay.Future research might consider whether such basic training techniques can inoculate job seekers against simple context effects.Source：Frequency Context Effects On Starting-Salary Expectations. Journal of Occupational & Organizational Psychology, V olume 67, 2003(1): P69二、翻译文章译文：什么使薪酬看起来合理？虽然很多研究工作应该注意理解对工资公平、怎样看管给出了期望的薪水如何形成或者是多么微不足道的要素影响上下文可以找工作的这些期望。
员工薪酬体系外文翻译文献
薪酬管理外文文献翻译1 薪酬管理的涵义与内容1.1薪酬管理的涵义企业的薪酬管理，就是企业管理者对本企业员工报酬的支付标准、发放水平、要素结构进行确定、分配和调整的过程。
传统薪酬管理仅具有物质报酬分配的性质，而对被管理者的行为特征考虑较少，其着眼点是物质报酬。
现代企业薪酬管理理念发生了完全不同的变化，薪酬管理的着眼点转移到了人。
企业经营首先要树立目标，企业目标的实现有赖于对员工的激励。
激励分为外部和内部两种。
按照传统的类别划分，工资、奖金、福利等物质报酬是外部激励要素；而岗位的多样化、从事挑战性的工作、取得成就、得到认可、承担责任、获取新技能和事业发展的机会等则是员工的内部激励要素。
现代薪酬管理将物质报酬的管理过程与员工激励过程紧密结合起来，成为一个有机的整体。
1.2薪酬管理的内容企业薪酬管理主要包括以下几个方面的内容:1、确定薪酬管理目标薪酬管理目标根据企业的人力资源战略确定，具体地讲包括以下二个方面:(1)建立稳定的员工队伍，吸引高素质的人才；(2)激发员工的工作热情，创造高绩效；(3)努力实现组织目标员工和个人发展目标的协调。
2、选择薪酬政策所谓企业薪酬政策，就是企业管理者对企业薪酬管理运行的目标、任务和手段和组合，是企业在员工薪酬土所采取的方针策略。
(1)企业薪酬成木投入政策。
比如，根据企业组织发展的需要，采取扩张劳动力成本或紧缩劳动力成本政策。
(2)根据企业的自身情况选择企业合理的工资制度。
例如，是采取稳定员T收入的政策，还是激励员工绩效的政策?前者多与等级和岗位工资制度相结合，后者与绩效工资制度相结合。
(3)确定企业的工资结构以及工资水平。
例如，是采取向高额1资倾斜的工资结构，还是采取均等化，或者向低额结构倾斜的工资政策?前者要加大高级员工比例，提高其薪酬水平；后者要缩减高薪人员比例，降低其员工薪酬水平。
因此薪酬政策是企业管理者审时度势的结果，决策正确，企业薪酬机制就会充分发挥作用，运行就会畅通、高效。
有关薪酬体系的两篇外文原文跟翻译
关于薪水谈判的研究性别是个体因素，其做为谈判倾向的起薪，到目前为止，已经获得极大的关注。
许多实验室研究已证实,女性与男性相比，可能对回报的期望值低（卡拉汉-利维及麦斯，1979年；梅杰与科纳雷，1984年），而实际上产生这样的期望低工资也很有可能为女性（梅杰,旺德斯利斯, &麦克法林，1984年）。
这些结果的研究人员推测：女性与男性比更少为起薪谈判。
性别差异在谈判的可能性最近已经审查的范围内模拟招聘过程（卡曼＆海特尔，1994年）。
男性更有可能报告说，他们将从事哪些研究人员称之为“积极的谈判策略”，获得他们所需的工资水平，如拒绝提供初始工资和使用的谈判战略得到一个可接受的工资。
女性，另一方面，更可能预期使用“的传统战略”，如强调了相关的教育，并强调其动机如何努力工作。
除了采用不同的战术，实验室研究还表明，与男性相比，妇女可能会收到不太有利的谈判结果（金＆辛森，1994年）。
如果女性谈判技巧比较缺乏，通过工资谈判训练来降低男女之间的差异是很可能的。
在抽样的收到以内容为导向的谈判培训的工商管理硕士毕业生（例如学习了各种战术，可以以合理的薪金要求被雇佣），男性通过谈判得到的结果明显比女性更好。
然而，当自我管理培训（涉及制定目标，确定障碍，并制定计划，克服已查明的障碍）在以内容为导向的培训中被介绍，性别差异的对薪酬谈判的影响达到最低（史蒂文斯，诺维茨基，＆吉斯特，1993年）。
自我管理培训，有效地提高了妇女自觉控制局势，从而增加通过谈判提高其工资的可能性。
然而，由于史蒂文斯等人（1993）研究利用一个模拟的谈判任务，在何种程度上会讨价还价的妇女在现实世界的薪金谈判，不能进行评估，并围绕问题的成功妇女的努力，提高初始工资提供仍然没有答案。
虽然这些问题已收到超过较少注意性别方面的工资谈判，一些研究探索的影响结构性因素对谈判的策略和成果的一个实验室内的范围内。
例如，一个与他人有密切关系的电视广告的价格谈判的研究。
薪酬管理外文翻译--薪酬管理与精神激励机制
中文5240字本科毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献译文及原文学院经济管理学院专业工商管理年级班别学号学生姓名指导教师年月日薪酬管理与精神激励机制摘要薪酬只是员工待遇的一部分，企业仅重视薪酬激励，非但不能收到预期效果，甚至陷入恶性循环中。
企业在完善薪酬管理过程中，应当重视精神激励的作用。
关键词：薪酬，待遇，精神激励，人力资源管理1薪酬管理的困难性与员工难以对薪酬满意的原因薪酬管理是人力资源管理学中理论与实践相差距离最大的部分。
学习薪酬管理方面的理论知识对人力资源经理的帮助几乎是微不足道的。
之所以如此，主要是因为薪酬管理有如下三个特性：1、敏感性薪酬管理是人力资源管理中最敏感的部分，因为它牵扯到公司每一位员工的切身利益。
特别是在人们的生存质量还不是很高的情况下，薪酬直接影响到他们的生活水平。
另外，薪酬是员工在公司工作能力和水平的直接体现，员工往往通过薪酬水平来衡量自己在公司中的地位。
所以薪酬问题对每一位员工都会很敏感。
2、特权性薪酬管理是员工参与最少的人力资源管理项目，它几乎是公司老板的一个特权。
老板，包括企业管理者认为员工参与薪酬管理会使公司管理增加矛盾，并影响投资者的利益。
所以，员工对公司薪酬管理的过程几乎一无所知。
3、特殊性由于敏感性和特权性，每个公司的薪酬管理会差别很大。
另外，由于薪酬管理本身就有很多不同的管理类型，如岗位工资型、技能工资型、资历工资型、绩效工资型等等，所以，不同公司之间的薪酬管理几乎没有参考性。
从理论上讲，只有当员工的真实付出与真实回报不成正比的时候，员工才会对他的薪酬不满。
但实际上，即使薪酬的发放有多么公正和合理，大多数的员工也会对自己的薪酬不满。
对薪酬的不满并非客观的不公和不合理所至，其原因就在于：（1）低于期望值当员工的薪酬低于他的期望值时，就会对薪酬不满。
而这个期望值只是员工个人的自我定位。
一般而言，员工往往过高估计自己在公司中的贡献和价值，自然就会有过高的期望值，自然就会有许多人对自己的薪酬不满。
毕业论文外文翻译-绩效薪酬
原文一：Pay for performanceNot everyone sees the trend toward paying for skills and/or competencies as a good thing:It would be easy to conclude from reports in the business press that merit pay is dead and organizations need to reconstitute pay plans to pay people in some new way. Suggestions include paying employees for the knowledge, shills, abilities and behaviors they bring to the workplace. Although interesting, this call for wholesale reform overlooks fundamental tenets of economic and behavioral theories.Pay for performance is the holy grail of modern compensation administration—widely sought but hard to actually achieve .Pay for performance is the flag, motherhood, and apple pie, but it is easier said than done. One primary problem is defining performance properly, so that the organization pays for results and not for effort. Once over that hurdle, there remains the large impediment of finding enough money to make the reward for top performance meaningful. Many different approaches are used—various variable pay schemes, annual awards in lieu of permanent increase in base pay, and the traditional merit pay salary increase.The concept of pay for performance has different meanings to different people. Many either fail to recognize the pay for performance fails when the different in reward between adequate performance and outstanding performance is inconsequential or cannot solve the problem of funding adequate differentiation while dealing with essential range maintenance costs.For example, Logue reported on the introduction of performance-based pay for unionized employees in a public university. The old system had four annual, essentially “automatic,”5percent steps from minimum to maximum. The new system added 10 percent to the top of the salary range. All employees would move through the regular range automatically, but growth within the top 10 percent was based only on performance. Since 20 percent of all salary increase funds were allocated to performance increases, top performers could receive additional amounts over andabove the automatic movement through the standard portion of the salary range.Such performance-based salary increases (PSIs) went to 12 percent of the represented employees, who receive PSIs ranging from 3.9 to 5.9 percent in the first fiscal year (2000 to 2001). PSIs ranged from 0.5 to 4 percent in fiscal year 2001 to 2002 due to the greater number of employees receiving increases. One wonders what happened the third year! In any event, achieving an extra 1 or 2 or 3 percent is unlikely to stimulate anyone to significantly higher levels or performance, particularly when they are guaranteed automatic annual increases.Others take steps to address the differentiation problem:Through the implementation of a new tool called the Monoline Merit Increase Matrix, one organization shows how it rewards employees based on performance and gets more mileage out of its merit increase budget…The Monoline Merit eliminates the use of comparisons for merit increase. It is designed to create a larger distinction in the merit percent provided between top performers and employees who meet expectations and are paid fairly for their work…Under the new methodology, managers must examine the possibility that employees who meet performance goals do not have to receive a merit increase if they are competitively paid.Pay for whose performance :Even if one can solve the differentiation problem, there still remains the problem of determining the locus of performance pay plans all devolve into two broad categories, depending on whether performance is measured at the group or at the individual level:Group plans can fail to specifically direct or reward individual employees behaviors. As a result, group plans have produced somewhat limited results with respect to improvements in employees performance or organizational profitability. Further, group plans do not different reward individual who perform well vs. those who do not. This may exact the perception of pay inequities among better performers.Performance pay plans based on individual performance are more effectives in improving individual employee performances vs. group plans. Typically, these plansprovide specific and objective goals for employees to work toward. However, rewarding individual performance may reduce cooperation among employees and focus employees on a restricted range of results.Designing an effective compensation programFirst, an effective compensation program should recognize that monetary rewards do change employee behavior despite what some academicians have claimed. The power of money is twofold. It not only is valued for itself, for what it can buy, but it can also serve as a powerful communication devise, as a score card if you will.Second, stick to the basics when designing a salary program. Pay people at a reasonable market level for base salary based on survey data (what is reasonable will depend on your ability to pay and the availability of the talent you need.) focus primarily on external pay market data, and maintain internal equity only within each separate pay market. That is, internal equity is important within information technology, engineering, accounting, etc., but is not important between these groups as they are in separate pay markets. One size never fits all!Third, use variable pay everywhere. For those positions that cannot be individually measured, use group measures (work group, location, division, and/or corporate measures, as appropriate). For those positions that can be individual measured, use a combination of individual and group measures (individual measures to motivate individual effort, group measures to encourage cooperative behavior).Fourth, keep the performance measures as simple as possible and limit their numbers, preferably to two or three, Remember, what you measure is what you get, so pick your measures carefully.Fifth, communicate, communicate, communicate. Communicate the details of the program. Communicate the rationale for the measures—that is, how they fit into the organization’s strategy. Commu nicate on an ongoing basis actual performance versus target performance.Source: Martin G.Wolf,2002 “linking performance scorecards to profit performance pay” ACA News,vol.41,no.4,april,pp.23-25.译文一：绩效薪酬并不是所有人都认为薪酬体系向技能或能力工资转变的趋势是一件好事：从各类经济刊物的报道中不难看出，绩效工资已经不起作用了，企业需要使用新方法重塑他们地薪酬计划。
外文翻译--薪酬管理新概念的理解框架
中文3600字原文：外文出处International Foundation News外文作者Frank L.GiancolaA Framework for Understanding New Concepts in CompensationmanagementOver the past 25 years, several major new concepts in compensation management have reflected overly ambitious goals . Experts have disagreed about their basic premises, and the business world has had trouble accepting them. Examining the history of three such concepts-skill-based pay, broadbanding and total rewards -is worthwhile , for it reveals the challenges they present and helps define a pattern for how professionals deal with these and other new ideas in the profession . Skill -Based PayThe skill -based approach for determining base pay is based on an employee’s skills, rather than his or her current job. Leading thinkers in compensation management have supported this approach since the 1980s. According to compensation experts Patricia Zingheim and Jay Schuster it is the “next great thing in pay and benefits”. In an interview Edward Lawler called it “the compensation system of the future.”This approach shifts the focal point from the job to the person, with the goals of providing employees with greater incentives to improve skills and competencies and giving management a more versatile workforce. Generally, employees are paid to acquire higher skills in their own field or lateral ones in related fields. From a systems standpoint, job descriptions, job evaluation plans and job-based salary surveys are replaced by skill profiles, skill evaluation plans and skill-based salary surveys.The disappearance of the traditional job provides the primary rationale for this change. Today，employees are said to have variable and unstable work assignments , with roles that cannot be assigned a valid pay rate in traditional job evaluation plans . Contentious TenetsThe main tenets of skill-based pay (SBP) conflict with mainstream business thinking. The first tenet is that pay should be based only on skills, taking the value of an employee’s work to an organization out of the pay equation. In effect, SBP advocates are asking compensation professionals to set the same pay rate for employees, based on their skills, even though they might have substantially different duties and responsibilities and make substantially different contributions to a firm’s success. The omission of something of fundamental value to the firm makes the concept a hard sell with managers and employees. In recent years, compensation experts have affirmed the value of work as an essential part of the pay equation.The second tenet is the notion that pay should be based on how many skills employees have or how many jobs they potentially can do , not on the job they currently hold . Here again, SBP advocates make what many firms consider an unreasonable request. They introduce a controversial pay for potential concept that directly contradicts the pay for performance concept compensation professionals have diligently strived to establish. In recent years, emphasis has been on what employees actually accomplish on the job, rather than on static concepts relating to who they are, such as their management potential or length of service. Also, by asking firms to pay employees for a job that they might perform in the future, SBP is a practice few firms could afford. With these core beliefs, SBP has experienced an uphill battle for acceptance as the primary means to determine base pay.Questionable AssumptionThe SBP concept rests on a questionable assumption -that a job does not reflect the skills of the person required to do it. That makes job evaluation plans an inappropriate method for evaluating skills and setting pay rates. According to SBP advocates, skills must be valued by using market-based skill surveys. They overlook the fact that most point-factor job evaluation plans award the bulk of their points for the possession and application of knowledge, skills and abilities. On this point, Lawler has stated ,“In many cases , this ( skill-based pay ) will not produce dramatically different pay rates than are produced by paying for the nature of the job . After all, the skills that people have usually match reasonably well the jobs that they are doing.”Also overlooked is the fact that many occupations (e.g., accountant, electrician and actuary) do reflect the skills required to perform them; when salary surveys are conducted and employees are paid based on occupation titles and job summaries , skill requirements are being valued .Ambiguous DefinitionFew “new” ideas in compensation management represent a complete break from the prior ideas. Although SBP was billed as a new idea in compensation when introduced, it included old compensation practices, such as career ladders and generalist classifications.The result is that today，when companies are surveyed to see if they use SBP practices , those that use old SBP practices are counted among the firms that have signed on to the concept . This gives a false picture about the adoption of this “new”, way of paying employees and contr ibutes to varying descriptions of the concept’s level of acceptance.Competency-Based PayIn the 1990s, competency-based pay was introduced as a type of SBP plan for professional and managerial employees. It calls for base pay to be determined based on competencies instead of duties and responsibilities. Shortly after the concept was introduced, controversy arose as to what constitutes a legitimate competency. Today, there are many alternatives to choose from—core, organizational, behavioral and technical competencies. One compensation expert has asked for a governing body, similar to those in the accounting profession, to help sort out what the termcompetency actually means in the world of employee compensation.Changes in the economy and the nature of work—such as the rise of the contingent workforce and the disappearance of traditional jobs, which were predicted to result in a need for SBP—have not materialized. That and the lack of administrative support systems probably have contributed to the concept’s slow growth. Today, SBP is associated with blue-collar workers in manufacturing industries, which are in decline in the United States, while competency-based pay has had a greater impact on performance management than on base pay.Despite these issues and setbacks, prominent compensation experts continue to support the concept.BroadbandingOne of the most visible concepts in compensation management in the 1990s was broadbanding, which collapses many salary grades and ranges into fewer bands with broader salary spans. Its popularity was attributed in part to the 1990s trend to downsize organizations by reducing the number of hierarchical levels.When broadbanding was introduced, some thought leaders saw it as a new pay program for managing salaries and supporting organizational initiatives, such as eliminating bureaucracy and reducing costs.Others saw it as a “higher order of change” and a new way of managing human resources that would be a catalyst for organizational change and represent much more than a new way to reduce bureaucracy and costs.The concept was loosely defined, and companies were said to have welcomed the opportunity to adapt it to their unique needs. And some were given credit for adopting it, even though one cited plan had 13 bands, with multiple salary ranges within them, making it resemble a traditional salary administration plan.FlexibilityOne constant in the dialogue on broadbanding is that it provides the flexibility to accommodate change and to define job responsibilities more broadly. Proponents have dismissed traditional salary administration systems as being too structured, with too many rules.Execution IssuesEarly experience with broadbanding was not completely positive. Although these systems were supposed to reduce costs, managers had too much discretion to increase salaries within the bands. After several years, salaries had progressed to levels that could not be justified.“Second generation” banded systems gave less freedom for managers to determine salaries. These systems include more bands and specifically define salary ranges within the bands,making them resemble the traditional systems they were supposed to replace.Two compensation textbooks have reserved final judgment on the value of broadbanding. One sees it as a potential reprise of the type of salary administration “flexibility” that gave rise to the traditional plans. These plans were developed to reduce favoritism and inconsistencies that resulted from a lack of structure and controls that exist in broadbanding.Total RewardsIn the past decade, professional associations, major human resource consulting firms and compensation experts have advocated the total rewards approach to the development of a firm’s rewards strategy. Some billed it as more than a passing phase and possibly the greatest breakthrough in compensation since health care plans were combined with pay packages.The approach calls for HR professionals to consider all aspects of the work experience of value to people when developing a strategy to attract, retain and motivate employees .It extends the prior concept of total compensation, which encompassed only pay and benefit programs, and gives form to an idea described in a compensation textbook widely used in the 1970s.Thus, the idea is more novel than radical.In the early 2000s, after the intense competition for talent and the economy of the 1990s had cooled, employers sought ways to reduce costs and needed a strategy that places more emphasis on low-cost rewards and less on costly pay and benefit programs, such as stock options. Total rewards meets that need with its message that learning and development, recognition and other soft-dollar programs are as important as pay and benefits in satisfying employees. In addition, it provides a flexible and broad array of rewards that responds well to globalization, mergers and acquisitions, and other forces that increase workforce diversity.Execution IssuesThe launch of total rewards confirmed the axiom that new compensation programs typically are simple in concept, but complex in execution. When HR practitioners put the concept into practice, they encountered many stumbling blocks. That led two consultants to describe human resource professionals in late 2004 as “feeling confused or sensing chaos regarding total rewards.” A primary cause of the confusion was experts who used different names, definitions and models to describe it. Corrective actions were taken to address these issues, courses were developed on total rewards management and the basic concept was simplified.Still, compensation professionals are likely to use other terms to refer to it, with the labels for outdated reward strategies—compensation and benefits package and total compensation—being used about as frequently as the new term.ConclusionsIn sum, new concepts in compensation management have the following general profile:•Are novel, but not radically new•Are simple in concept, but complex in execution•Do not always have expert agreement on main tenets•Overlap with prior concepts, creating a misleading impression about their adoption•Result in major execution issues, largely because of conceptual confusion •Do not reach expected adoption figures•Have a place in the field, but not a dominant role.Given this pattern, compensation professionals are advised to examine newconcepts closely to see if the ideas are too broadly defined, reflect expert agreement,represent significant change and provide guidance on execution and best applications. In addition, practitioners should closely review usage surveys of new concepts to determine if a concept’s broad definition and historical roots have caused related prior practices to be counted as evidence of the new one’s acceptance. They also should seek information as to why organizations have turned down or stopped using a new concept. And, at the risk of appearing behind the times, they would bewell-advised to wait until the knowledge base on the concept has been fully developed before adopting it.Source: International Foundation News, 2009(5):p12-15.译文：薪酬管理新概念的理解框架法兰克·詹科拉在过去的25年里，几个主要的薪酬管理的新理念过于反映其雄心勃勃的目标。
企业薪酬体系设计外文文献翻译中文字数3000多字
文献信息：Prasetya A.Enterprises salary system design and performance evaluation [J] Economic crisis, health systems and health in Europe，2015,5（2）：103-112.原文Enterprises salary system design and performance evaluationPrasetya AAbstractAny effective way of management must rely on a basis: people, all the staff of enterprises. Compensation system as an important aspect of enterprise management system, for an enterprise to attract, retain and motivate employees have a significant impact, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of the enterprise recognized goal. The compensation system design is not only an effective way to realize the core objective, is also an important content of modern enterprise development.Keywords: salary system and equity incentive, senior executives, design1 IntroductionHuman capital to the enterprise wealth maximization, the greatest degree of retaining key talent, attract potential talent, the basic principals and successful is perfect competitive compensation system. With the concept of human capital is more and more people Heart, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of enterprise determine target, compensation system for enterprises An important aspect of the system, to attract talents play an important role. Compensation system design is an effective way to reality is the core objective, but also an important content of the development of the enterprise to modernization, so the height weight by enterprises Depending on the.2 Literature reviewEarly in the traditional compensation phase, the employers always minimize workers to cut costs as much as possible, and through this method make the Labor of workers have to work harder in order to get paid enough to make a living. William. First, Quesnay’s minimum wage theory is that wages and other commodities, there is a natural value, namely maintain staff minimum standard of living life informationvalue, the minimum wage for workers does not depend on the enterprise or the employer's subjective desire, but the result of the competition in the market. The classical economists Muller believed that certain conditions, the total capital in the enterprise salary depends on the labor force and for the purchase of labor relationship between capital and other capital; For the payment of capital wage fund is difficult to change in the short term. Wages fund quantity depends on two factors: one is a worker, directly or indirectly, in the production of products and services production efficiency; the other one is in the process of production of these goods directly or indirectly employ labor quantity. With the development of era, the simple forms of employment have already can't satisfy the demand of the workers, so some interests to share views was put forward to motivate workers.On this basis, the Gantt invented the "complete tasks rewarded" system to perfect the incentive measures. Represented by American economist Becker’s theory of human capital school of thought argues that human capital is determined by the human capital investment, is present in the human body to the content of knowledge, skills, etc. Martin Weizmann share of economic theory that wages should be linked to corporate profits. Increase in profits, employee wages fund, increased profits, and employee wages fund. Between enterprises and employees is the key of the labor contract is not in a fixed wage of how many, but in the division of labor both sides share proportion. In modern compensation phase, the contents of the compensation has been changed, increased a lot of different compensation models, and more and more pay attention to employee's personal feelings and development, employees can even according to individual condition choose different salary portfolio model. Employees can be paid off on surface of the material and spiritual.3 Pay system overviewIn the past the traditional pay system, usually are business owners value orientation as the guide to carry on the design. With the continuous development of the overall market environment, in the modern enterprise management concept has also changed. They are aware of the established compensation system should adapt to the employee benefit as a starting point, the self-interest pursuit and employeedemand together, to establish a set of enterprises and employees to maximize the interests of the two-way, so as to achieve win-win situation. Since the 90 s, the western developed economies in the enterprise owners and managers try to change the traditional form of compensation, relocation compensation system, the importance of also constantly try to innovate salary system of design and diversification.Performance pay system is established in accordance with the enterprise organization structure based on the results of the individual or team performance appraisal for salary distribution system. Total compensation is generally associated with individual or team performance. Now the enterprise model is used to combine individual performance and team performance. At the same time will be long term incentive and short-term incentive flexible model. In this kind of pay structure, contains a variety of forms of performance pay.Skill-based pay system on the basis of employees' skill determine employee wages level, and to the improvement of skills as their employees progress criteria. The compensation model can encourage employees to continuously learn new knowledge, to keep up with The Times, is the industry leader, when technology and equipment upgrades to the fastest response time to complete the change, and is helpful to form the learning corporate culture. If for flat organization structure, management jobs and opportunities for advancement are less, the compensation system can be very skillful professionals to make up for in terms of compensation. But with technical compensation system with the problem is that the enterprise needs to pay for a large number of staff training, and if the participants of the training is not all to use knowledge in actual production, enterprises will not be able to obtain benefits, resulting in wasted costs.Total compensation is the unity of the material reward and spiritual reward. Among them, external compensation including all in monetary form of economic compensation, internal compensation includes not to substantial form of economic compensation, more focused on the return of spirit. John’s Lipoma at the end of last century proposed the compensation design, customization and diversity is more representative of the overall package. He should show that the basic wage, additionalsalary, salary welfare, work supplies allowance, bonus, promotion and development opportunities, psychological income, life quality, and individual factors that ten compensation factors into consideration, the formation of compensation system, the design method is different from the past traditional salary structure, is the biggest different compensation system design approach from the owner as the center to the worker as the center, employees can choose a suitable for their own pay combination, is no longer a passive receiver. In this compensation mode, economic compensation and the economical compensation together, paying equal attention to material and spiritual.4 The implementation of the compensation system designSalary survey is the key in the compensation system design. It is not only the necessary to understand the enterprise existing compensation system, is also the basis of compensation system design again. Salary survey should be real in-depth internal employee survey, as far as possible let employees at all levels give true feelings, make compensation system designers understand the staff for the specific demands of overall compensation. In had certain understanding of the current salary system and problems, will determine the compensation system on that basis to the general principles of design. Compensation system and the determination of design general principle also should according to the specific conditions of different enterprise itself to specific design. At the same time, according to the general principle to determine the scope of the staff at the level of compensation.Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within the sort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference. Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within the sort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference.Enterprise operators and management personnel representing the highest quality, at the same time they also foreign representative enterprise image, and holds the enterprise the way forward. They tend to have certain matter accumulation, more the pursuit of spiritual satisfaction and the realization of self-worth. For management personnel shall be designed to be scientific and reasonable compensation system, comprehensive consideration, not only give reasonable compensation in terms of material, at the same time to consider their spiritual pursuit.General manager's daily work mainly are transactional, administrative work, but is not directly concerned with the production related, so during the design compensation system will post wage and performance wage together, thus the personal salary combined with enterprise business objectives. To general managers to take a wider range of incentives, such as the annual performance review top employees equity incentives, encourage managers over fulfilled the goal, and form a competitive atmosphere of the company culture, drive the enterprise vitality. Increase the general manager’s shareholding proportion.For the use of EV A on the sales staff, can draw lessons from Tula bank ever take method, the sales staff to set up a commission system based on EV A. Each sales staff receives a salary, in addition to qualification to get bonuses, the bonus amount depends on the "added value" has created. So that the program works: the company will be the added value of products are listed out, after distribution after the full cost of the product. The finance department monthly compiled a list of each product and added value of the net sales report. Each sales staff receives a copy of the report, as well as the use of the added value of the net total details of its own performance in the same format of monthly report. Further to deduct from the added value of net pay, perks and other fees and should share part of the management fee. After adjusting for these report line represents the added value.5 ConclusionIn the modern enterprises increasingly competitive today, talents become the key factor of enterprise long-term development more and more Business owners. And how to retain existing talent, and recruit more people of insight to join together createenterprise Interest, become the compulsory subject of enterprise owners and management, and improve the compensation system is retaining talents and attracting talents essential link.译文企业薪酬体系设计与绩效评估Prasetya A摘要任何一种行之有效的管理方式的运用都必须依赖于一个基础：人，企业的所有员工。
薪酬激励相关外文文献
24 Personnel Rห้องสมุดไป่ตู้view Vol 4 Number 4 Autumn 1975
by the organization. Managers who conceive of their companies in this fashion see the need for balancing the 'system' of needs. Employees (and especially other, junior managers) are perceived as people whose actions should influence the entire organization not just their own department or subsystem of, for example, production control or purchasing or marketing, etc. The view held here is that it is no good to have nine tenths of the company's needs being met and the other tenth ignored. It is a 'systems' approach and is a model which is apparent in the management philosophy of our larger and more progressive industrial companies. Between these two polar models of organization there is obviously scope for many other concepts. A pluralistic model, for example would allow for different constituent parts of the organization to have their own separate goals. The models that managers hold of men as distinct from the goals of the company are described in a massive literature of organizational psychology. It is possible in this area also to establish extreme, polar concepts. One extreme would be the assumption that man is a 'rational-economic' animal. Because of this a manager holding such a view might use McGregor's well-known Theory X approach to his subordinate. McGregor1 points out that 'rational-economic' man assumptions imply that man is lazy by nature and is motivated primarily by financial incentives. The employee is seen to need direction and control so that he will work towards the organization's goals. He is seen to be unambitious and reluctant to take responsibility. The assumptions associated with Theory X are, of course, built into the foundations of the Classical organization theories. The employee, in short, is seen to react to his environment. The model of man seen to be at the opposite from the reactive, Theory X man is McGregor's Theory Y approach. Assumptions on which Theory Y are based include the fact that most men do not dislike work, they seek a challenge from the work environment and in fact welcome the opportunity to achieve a 'moral' involvement with the organization. Under appropriate conditions the employee, says Theory Y, will seek out responsibility and is capable of imagination, ingenuity and creativity. There have been several attempts to classify the various models of man and organization, a notable example being the typology developed by Etzioni2. For the purpose of this present discussion, however, the simple model constructed by Limerick3 to show the type of management style implied by management's assumptions about men and organization seems appropriate. The model takes the form of the matrix shown in Figure 1 below:
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The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).
The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on the corporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results. Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study. I consider a three-date two-period model. At time t0, a firm is established and goes public. There are now two kinds of owners in the firm, namely, the controlling shareholder and the atomistic shareholders. The proceeds from initial public offering are invested in some risky assets which generate an intermediate earnings, I, at t,. At the beginning, the firm also decides its financial structure. A manager is also hired to operate the firm at this time. The manager is entitled to hold a fraction of the firm's common stocks and stock options, a (where 0first period. At time t,, the firm receives intermediate earnings, denoted by I, from the initial asset. At the same time, a new project investment is available to the firm. For simplicity, the model assumes that the firm needs all the intermediate earnings, I, to invest in the new project. If the project is accepted at t,, it produces a stochastic earnings Y in t2, such that Y={I+X, I-X}, with Prob[Y=I+X] = p and Prob[Y=I-X] = 1-p, respectively. The probability, p, is a uniform density function with an interval ranged from 0 to 1. Initially, the model also assumes that the net earnings, X, is less than initial investment, I. This assumption is reasonable since most of the investment can not earn a more than 100% rate of return. Later, this assumption is relaxed to investigate the effect of the extraordinarily profitable investment on the results. For simplicity, It is also assumed that there is no time value for the money and no dividend will be paid before t2. If the project is rejected at t,, the intermediate earnings, I, will be kept in the firm and its value at t2 will be equal to I. Effects of Management Compensation Schemes on Corporate Investment Decision Overinvestment versus Underinvestment A risk neutral investor should invest in a new project if it generates a positiexpected payoff. If the payoff is normally or symmetrically distributed, tinvestor should invest whenever the probability of making a positive earninggreater than 0.5. The minimum level of probability for making an investment the neutral investor is known as the cut-off probability. The project will generzero expected payoff at a cut-off probability. If the investor invests only in tprojects with the cut-off probability greater than 0.5, then the investor tendsinvest in the less risky projects and this is known as the underinvestment. Ifinvestor invests the projects with a cut-off probability less than 0.5, then tinvestor tends to invest in more risky projects and this is known as thoverinvestment. In the paper, it is assumed that the atomistic shareholders risk neutral, the manager and controlling shareholder are risk averse.