管理权力与经理人激励薪酬.ManagerialPowerandExecutiveCompensation
管理者的激励与薪酬
管理者的激励与薪酬人类最大的悲剧并不是天然资源的巨大浪费，虽然这也是悲剧。
但最大的悲剧却是人力资源的浪费”（荷尔，美国）。
如何激励作为最宝贵的和最富有创新精神的企业经营管理者而不导致人力资源的浪费？显然，薪金和奖酬就是最好的方式之一。
经营者薪酬计划是对经营者的薪金、奖酬及其相关事宜做出的制度安排，是经营者激励机制在物质上的具体体现，包括薪酬构成、计量依据、支付标准、支付方式等基本内容。
一、经营管理者激励不兼容的矛盾及其根源现实中，我们经常发现，许多经营者把企业管理的比较完善，并且取得了可喜的业绩，但是其所得却与业绩不相称，严重地挫伤了经营者的积极性，或者迫使经营者通过不正当手段谋求自己的所得；另一类情况是：经营者业绩很糟，然而其报酬是固定的，丝毫不因业绩差而受损。
这个矛盾称为经营者激励不兼容。
这是由现代企业制度中所有权和经营权的分离从而产生了所有者和经营者的委托代理关系导致的组织成员间利益的冲突，所有者与经营者之间激励不兼容以及由此而导致的代理成本、道德风险、效率损失等，是委托代理制面临的一个核心问题。
分析证明，问题的根源并不在于委托代理制本身，是传统产权理论中经营者不具有剩余控制权与剩余索取权的缺陷以及对人的自利性本质的忽略，而委托代理制只是为这一矛盾爆发提供了条件。
二、经营者管理技能资本化在全球经济的日趋知识技术化的时代，有两种价值的创造要素——知识与管理已经或正在获得较之劳动和财务资本更重要的地位。
随着两权分离与股权结构的日趋分散，经营者或经营者团队已经在相当大的程度上拥有了企业决策管理的实际控制权。
在这种现实格局下，无论是企业的价值目标抑或股东的财务目标等的实现，越来越取决于经营者的素质与能力。
从这种意义上讲，经营者及其知识产权完全融入了企业价值及其增值的创造过程，成为与财务资本同等的、甚至更为重要的一种实质性的资本要素。
也可以说“现代企业是财务资本及其所有者与知识资本及其所有者之间的平等而复杂契约”。
领导与权力Leadership and Power【共享精品-ppt】
资料来源：修改自格里芬、摩海德著，组织行为学(第八版)， 中国市场出版社， ，第268页
领导与权力
马克斯•韦伯认为，权力(power)是“一个人或一些人在 某一社会活动中，甚至是在不顾其他参与这种行动的 人进行抵抗的情况下实现自己意志的可能性”。
斯蒂芬•罗宾斯指出，权力是“个体A对于个体B的行为 产生影响的能力”。
“权力”的特性：权力是一种力量，借助这种力量可 以或可能产生某种特定的预期局面和结果。
领导与权力
权力
权力是依赖性(dependency)的函数。B对A的依
赖性越强，则在他们的关系中A对B拥有的权力就
越大。依赖性取决于个人拥有他人需要的重要的、
不可替代的、稀缺的资源。例如，对英特尔(Intel)
这样的高新技术公司而言，工程师因为拥有对公司
例如，古希腊哲学家亚里斯多德认为：人从出 生之日起，就决定里他是“治人”还是“治于 人”。这种观点具有一定代表性。
特质理论(trait theory )
早期的心理学家在研究领导时从特质论入手，把研 究重点放在人格特质与能否成为领导的关系上。
传统的特质理论认为，领导者具有某些固有的与生 俱来的特质, 只有先天具备这些特质的人才可能成为领导 者。从20纪30年代开始，心理学家对领导特质理论进行 了大量研究，希望找到一些特质因素使领导者和非领导 者，以及成功的领导者和失败的领导者相区分。但这些 努力以失败告终。但研究表明有一些特质，如智慧、支 配性、自信、精力充沛、富有专业知识，是与成功的领 导者密切相关的。这说明具备某些特质确实能提高领导 者成功的可能性，但没有一种特质能保证领导者的成功。
个人权力(Personal power)---内在于个人、与组织职位无 关的权力，因此，也被称为非职位权力。个人权力并不像职位 权力那样可以短期获得，它需要在组织中经过较长一段时间的 培养才能获得。个人权力的执行，需要靠权力所有者的威望、 魅力、情感或是其价值观来影响他人。从这个意义来看，个人 权力来自于参照性权力和某些强制性权力、奖赏性权力。
管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵
管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵引言随着市场经济的发展，企业层面的治理问题备受关注。
在这个过程中，管理层权力和薪酬操纵问题逐渐凸显出来。
本文将探讨之间的关系，并分析其对企业治理和经济发展的影响。
一、管理层权力与私有收益1.管理层权力对企业治理的作用管理层作为企业中的核心管理团队，对公司的发展和运营起着至关重要的作用。
管理层的权力主要包括决策权、资源分配权和控制权等。
适度而有效的管理层权力可以促使企业高效运作，增强企业的竞争优势。
2.管理层的私有收益需求管理层作为公司高层人员，往往享有相对较高的工资和福利待遇，这是与其权力和责任相对应的。
然而，管理层往往还追求更高的私有收益，包括操纵薪酬制度以获取更多的报酬、非法经营和侵占公司利益等方式。
这种追求私有收益的行为会对企业治理产生负面影响。
二、薪酬操纵对企业治理的影响1.薪酬操纵导致治理机制失灵管理层通过操纵薪酬制度来获取私有收益，会导致企业治理机制失灵。
一方面，管理层以虚构的业绩和利润为基础进行薪酬分配，不仅违背了企业治理的原则，也不利于企业长期发展。
另一方面，薪酬操纵可能导致企业内部腐败和人员流失，使企业陷入困境。
2.薪酬操纵削弱激励机制企业的薪酬制度应该是以绩效为导向的，旨在激励和奖励员工的努力和创新。
然而，管理层通过操纵薪酬制度，将更多的资源和报酬倾向于自己，忽视了对员工的激励和奖励。
这将导致员工的积极性下降，影响企业的创新和竞争力。
三、对策与建议1.加强企业治理的监督和改革为了避免薪酬操纵问题的发生，企业需要加强对管理层的监督和约束。
通过建立有效的内部控制机制、加强公司治理、完善董事会的监督职能等方式来规范管理层的行为。
2.优化薪酬制度设计为了减少薪酬操纵的可能性，企业需要优化薪酬制度的设计。
应该建立起科学合理的绩效考核体系，让薪酬与员工的绩效紧密挂钩，从而激发员工的积极性和创造力。
3.加强教育培训与公开透明企业应该加强员工的职业道德教育和法律法规知识培训，提高员工的道德意识和法律意识。
企业中高层管理人员薪酬激励制度
企业中高层管理人员薪酬激励制度
高层管理人员在企业中扮演着决策者和领导者的角色，他们对于企业的发展和运营起着至关重要的作用。
为了激励高层管理人员发挥出他们的最佳水平，企业需要建立一个有效的薪酬激励制度。
以下是一些关于企业中高层管理人员薪酬激励制度的措施和原则。
其次，高层管理人员的薪酬应该与个人绩效相关。
这可以通过设立个人目标和绩效评估来实现。
每个高层管理人员应该与企业及其部门设立目标，并在一定时间后进行评估，根据实际绩效对其进行奖励或惩罚。
这将激励高层管理人员努力工作，并积极推动企业的发展。
同时，这也要求企业建立一个公正的绩效评估体系，确保评估结果的客观性和公正性。
此外，企业还可以设立特殊奖励制度以激励高层管理人员，在特定时间或项目中表现出色的人员。
例如，企业可以设立创新奖励制度，对那些提出并实施创新理念的高层管理人员给予额外的奖励。
这将鼓励高层管理人员积极创新，推动企业的创新和发展。
最后，企业在设计薪酬激励制度时需要考虑到合理性和可持续性。
薪酬水平应适当，既要能够激励高层管理人员发挥出最佳水平，又要符合企业的财务状况和利润水平。
此外，薪酬激励制度应该是可持续的，不仅要考虑当下的状况，还要考虑未来的发展和长远的利益。
综上所述，企业中高层管理人员薪酬激励制度是为了激励他们发挥最佳水平，并促进企业的发展和运营。
该制度应确保高层管理人员的薪酬与企业的业绩和个人绩效紧密相关，并考虑长期激励和特殊奖励的方案。
同时，还需要考虑合理性和可持续性的原则。
通过建立一个有效的薪酬激励制度，企业可以吸引和留住高层管理人员，推动企业的长期发展。
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译(可编辑)
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译（可编辑）高管薪酬和激励外文翻译外文题目 Executive Compensation AndIncentives 外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives,20062:p25-40 外文作者 Martin J. Conyon原文:Executive Compensation And IncentivesMartin J. ConyonExecutive compensation is a complex and controversial subject. For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers CEOs, questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests. Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders’ interests are widespread and considerable. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ‘skimmingview’ of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al. present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance. In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States. We do not claim to distinguishbetween the contracting and managerial power views of executive pay. Instead, we document the pattern of executive pay and incentives in the United States, investigating whether this pattern is consistent with economic theory.The Context: Who Sets Executive Pay Before examining the empirical evidence presented in this paper, it is important to consider the pay-setting process and who sets executive pay. The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model. The theory maintains that firms seek to design the most efficient compensation packages possible in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs, executives, and managers. In the agency model, shareholders set pay. In practice, however, the compensation committee of the board determines pay on behalf of shareholders. A principal shareholder designs a contract and makes an offer to an agent CEO/ manager. Executive compensation ameliorates a moral hazard problem i.e., manager opportunism arising from low firm ownership. By using stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts, shareholders motivate the CEO to imize firm value. In other words, shareholders try to design optimal compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests. This is the contract approach to executive pay. Following Core, Guay, and Larcker, an efficient or optimal contract is one “that imizes the net expectedeconomic value to shareholders after transaction costs such ascontracting costs and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that contracts minimize agency costs.”Several important ideas flow from this definition. First, the contract reduces manager opportunism and motivates CEO effort by providing incentives through risky compensation such as stock options. Second, the optimal contract does not imply a “perfect” contract, only that the firm designs the best contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the manager, given the contracting constraints it faces. Third, in this arrangement, the firm does not necessarily eliminate agency costs, but instead evaluates the marginal benefits of implementing the contract relative to the marginal costs of doing so. Improvements in regulation or corporate governance can possibly alter these costs and benefits, making different contracts desirable. Moreover, what is efficient at one point in time may not be at another. Improvements in board governance, for example by adding independent directors, may lead to different patterns of compensation, stock, and option contracts that are desirable for one firm but not another.An alternative theory is that CEOs set pay. This is the managerial power view, exemplified recently by Bebchuk and Fried. In this theory, the board and compensation committee cooperate with the CEO and agree on excessive compensation, settling on contracts that are not in shareholders’ interests. This exces s pay constitutes an economic rent,an amount greater than necessary to get the CEO to work in the firm. The constraints the CEOs face are reputation loss and embarrassment if caught extracting rents, what Bebchuk and Fried call “outrage costs.” Outrage matters because it can impose on CEOs both market penalties such as devaluation of a manager’s reputation and social costs?the social costs come on top of the standard market costs. They argue that market constraints and the social costs coming from excessively favorable pay arrangements are not sufficient in preventing considerable deviations from optimal contracting.Executive CompensationThere is substantial disclosure about U.S. executive compensation. The Securities and Exchange Commission SEC expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U.S. executives in 1992. As a result, the proxy statements of firms contain considerable detail on stock ownership,stock options, and all components of compensation for the top five corporate executives. There are four basic components to executive pay, each having been the subject of much research. First, executives receive a base salary, which is generally benchmarked against peer firms. Second, they enjoy an annual bonus plan, usually based on accounting performance measures. Third, executives receive stock options, which represent a right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares in the future at some pre-specified exercise price. Lastly, pay includes additional compensation such asrestricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and retirement plans.Executive IncentivesWe now turn to executive incentives and the link between pay andfirm performance. The evidence demonstrates that executive compensation and the fraction of pay accounted for by option grants increased during the 1990s. Principal-agent theory predicts that a firm designs contracts in order to yield optimal incentives, therefore motivating the CEO to imize shareholder value. In designing the contract, the firm recognizes the CEO is risk averse. Thus, imposing greater incentives requires more pay to compensate the agent for increased risk. In the previous section, the paper demonstrated that CEO pay has increased. Next, we examine what has happened to CEO incentives. The analysis shows that executives have considerable equity incentives that create a strong and increasing link between CEO wealth and firm performance. This finding seems at odds with the notion that executive pay and performance are decoupled. It is, however, consistent with other economic evidence, showing that the link between pay and performance has been increasing in the United States.Executives receive incentives from several sources. They receive financial incentives from salary and bonus, as well as new grants of options and restricted stock, which together measure flow compensation. They also receive incentives from changes in their aggregate holdings of stock and options in the firm, as described in detail below. Finally, theprobability of termination because of poor performance gives the CEO an incentive to pursue strategies that imize firm value. In this case,if terminated, an executive suffers reputation loss and human capital devaluation in the managerial labor market. However, this paper?consistent with other recent research in financialeconomics?focuses on compensation and equity incentives, leavingaside career concerns and the labor market for managerial talent. In other words, it restricts attention to financial incentives.The key to understanding financial incentives is recognizing thatthey arise from the entire portfolio of equity holdings and not simply from current pay. Equity incentives, then, are the incentives toincrease the stock price arising from the managers’ ownership of financial securities in the firm. For example, a CEO may receive 100,000 options this year, which might add to 400,000 options granted inprevious years, for a total of 500,000 options held. If the stock price decreases, then the value of the 100,000 options granted this year declines? but so does the value of the options accumulated from previous years. Since the CEO will care about the whole stock of 500,000 options, not simply this year’s 100,000, executive compensation received in any given year provides only a partial picture of CEO wealth and incentives. To understand CEO incentives fully, it is important to focus on the aggregate amount of shares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in the firm.The evidence shows that CEOs have plenty of financial incentives, arising primarily from CEO ownership of stock and options in their firms. Again, we would stress that such financial incentives are only onefactor motivating executives. Agents are as likely to be motivated by intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, tournaments, and the like. One problem with stock options and other forms ofincentive pay is not that they provide too few incentives, but that they may lead to unintended consequences. It is well known that incentivescan bring about behavior by the agent that was unanticipated by the principal. In a classic paper, Steven Kerr highlighted the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B. In short, he articulated the notion that one gets what one pays for. If one rewards activity A and not B, then people will exert effort on A, while de-emphasizing B. Kerr illustrates his point with an array of examples from politics, industry, and human resource management. In general, this is a problem of providing appropriate incentives to agents engaging in multiple tasks. More recently, Robert Gibbons has discussed the design of incentive programs recognizing such problems.Another problem with incentive compensation is that it may encourage opportunistic behavior by managers, manipulation of performance measures, or cheating. The powerful and often unanticipated effects of financial incentives on economic outcomes have been documented in diverse contexts such as classroom teaching, real estate markets,vehicle inspection markets, and the behavior of physicians. In the corporate context, David Yermack demonstrates that CEOsopportunistically time the award of option grants around earnings announcements in order to increase their compensation. Other studiesfind that private information is used by executives to engineer abnormally large option exercises and hence the payouts from those options. In addition, studies show that firms with more incentives are associated with greater earnings manipulation. Recent studies show that the likelihood of a firm being the target of fraud allegations is positively correlated with option incentives. In short, options and incentive pay may motivate managerial behavior that is not always anticipated or ideal. When designing compensation plans, boards must be aware of the unwanted as well as beneficial effects of incentives.ConclusionsExecutive compensation is a controversial and complex subject that continues to attract the attention of the media, policymakers, and academics. Contract theory predicts that shareholders use pay to provide incentives for the CEO to focus on imizing long-term firm value. Since CEOs have relatively low ownership of firm shares, they might otherwise behave opportunistically. An alternative theoretical perspective, the managerial power view, is that CEOs control the pay-setting process and set their own pay. This theory predicts that compliant compensation committees and boards provide CEOs with excess pay or compensation “rents” and that contracts are suboptimal from the shareholders’ perspective. Distinguishing between these two theories is an important challenge for future research.This paper provides evidence on what has happened to CEO pay between 1993 and 2003. It shows that total compensation increased significantlyover this period. Grants of stock options to CEOs and executives are the main driver of CEO pay gains. The paper also documents that CEOs have important financial incentives. These arise from the portfolio of firm stock and options owned by the CEO. The important point is that, if the stock price declines significantly, the value of the CEOs’ assets falls. Analogously, if asset prices increase, so does CEO wealth. In consequence, the wealth of the CEO varies with the stock price performance of the firm. An important research challenge is to fully understand the potentially unintended consequences of providing greater incentives to agents.In practice, CEO compensation contracts are determined by compensation committees that may have conflicting incentives to align with the CEO leading to suboptimal contracts and excess pay or with shareholders leading to optimal contractsand appropriate pay. The analysis in this paper illustrates that U.S. boards and compensation committees are becoming more independent measured by fewer insider directors and a greater number of outside directors. The evidence showsthat the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation committee an instance where greater managerial power is expected doesnot lead to greater CEO pay or fewer CEO incentives.In summary, high pay itself is not evidence of inefficient contracts but may simply reflect the market for CEOs and the pay necessary to attract, retain, and motivate talented individuals. Boards of directorsneed to design compensation contracts to align the interests of owners with managers. One test of whether the corporate governance system is working appropriately, including executive compensation arrangements, is to evaluate economic performance. Holmstrom and Kaplan investigate the state of U.S. corporate governance in the wake of corporate scandals. They conclude that the U.S. economy has performed well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over about two decades. Importantly, the economy has been robust even after the scandals were revealed. This is not to deny that improvements in governance arrangements may be beneficial. Furnishing CEOs with appropriate compensation and incentives is desirable for a healthy economy. However, ensuring that the contracting process is not corrupted is an important goal for corporate governance extracts译文:高管薪酬和激励Martin J. Conyon高管薪酬是一种既复杂又有争议的话题。
管理层权力与薪酬激励研究综述
管理层权力与薪酬激励研究综述管理层权力与薪酬激励一直是企业治理中的重要问题，对于企业的战略规划、股东投资回报率和员工激励等方面都具有重要影响。
本文将就现有研究对于此方面的探讨进行总结，以期给予管理者和学术研究者有所帮助。
一、管理层权力管理层的权力是企业治理的关键问题，这一指标可以帮助识别企业管理者如何分配资源、如何实行企业战略以及管理者是否愿意考虑股东利益等方面。
过去的研究表明，管理层权力的大小与股东财富损失、股东投票权利、企业绩效、企业运营管理等因素密切相关。
股东财富损失如果管理层拥有过多的权力，那么当企业遇到财务危机时，管理者往往会寻求进行利益转移。
这种转移会导致企业中资源的不适当分配，进而加剧公司资源浪费与利润下降。
Bebchuk和Weisbach（2010）的研究表明，企业的董事会组成更容易反映出股东的利益，可以减轻管理层往往寻求损害股东利益的现象。
股东投票权利管理层拥有的权力一直是影响企业治理的关键问题之一。
由于管理层能够有效的影响企业的运营以及股东的投票权利，因此管理层权力的大小对于股东反对立场和企业绩效都具有较大影响。
Bebchuk等人(2009)发现，管理层过多权力会使得企业在确保股东正当权益方面较为困难，可能会导致企业在财务危机下的采取优先股利润的战略。
在股东投票权利方面，Dhaliwal等人的研究(2011)发现，投资者会对企业董事长权力大小和董事会独立性大小给予反馈。
企业绩效二、薪酬激励管理层薪酬激励制度是很多企业中非常普遍的一种激励方式。
管理层薪酬激励一直是热门的研究话题之一，其重要性不可忽视。
薪酬激励可以帮助调动管理层的积极性，促进企业的战略规划和绩效评估等方面。
现有研究表明，管理层薪酬激励与企业绩效、股东回报、股东投票等因素密切相关。
管理层薪酬激励与企业绩效密切相关。
Tsui(2012) 的研究表明，适当的薪酬激励可以有效地促进员工的工作动力，进而提高企业的绩效。
Colakoglu和Calantone(2007)的研究表明，薪酬激励制度对企业的技术创新有着显著正面的影响。
公司治理激励和薪酬制度
公司治理激励和薪酬制度英文回答：Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Compensation.Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. It includes the mechanisms by which the company's owners (shareholders) exercise their rights and responsibilities, and the ways in which the company's managers are held accountable for their actions.Incentives are rewards or punishments that are designed to motivate people to behave in a certain way. In the context of corporate governance, incentives can be used to encourage managers to act in the best interests of shareholders. For example, managers may be given bonuses or other forms of compensation if the company performs well.Compensation is the total amount of money and benefitsthat a company pays to its employees. It includes salary, bonuses, stock options, and other forms of pay. Compensation can be used to attract and retain talented employees, and to motivate them to perform well.The design of a company's corporate governance, incentive, and compensation systems can have a significant impact on the company's performance. A well-designed system will encourage managers to act in the best interests of shareholders, and will motivate employees to perform well.中文回答：公司治理、激励和薪酬制度。
管理层权力与薪酬激励研究综述
管理层权力与薪酬激励研究综述【摘要】本文通过综述研究了管理层权力与薪酬激励之间的关系。
首先分析了管理层权力对薪酬激励的影响，接着探讨了薪酬激励对管理层权力的影响，并详细解析了两者之间的相互关系。
在影响因素分析中，考虑了不同因素对管理层权力与薪酬激励的影响，并通过研究方法与数据分析进行了论证。
研究结论指出管理层权力与薪酬激励存在密切关系，具有重要的管理意义。
研究启示表明应该合理管理管理层权力和薪酬激励以提高企业绩效。
未来研究展望建议进一步深入研究管理层权力与薪酬激励的机理，为企业管理提供更有针对性的政策建议。
以上为本文的研究摘要。
【关键词】管理层权力、薪酬激励、关系、影响因素、研究方法、数据分析、结论、启示、未来研究、研究背景、研究目的、研究意义。
1. 引言1.1 研究背景随着全球经济的发展和竞争的加剧，管理层薪酬水平和权力分配已经成为学术界和实务界关注的焦点。
研究显示，管理层权力对薪酬激励有着显著影响，不同的权力结构会导致不同的薪酬政策和激励机制。
薪酬激励也会影响管理层权力的行使和发展，一定程度上决定了管理层的行为和绩效。
深入研究管理层权力与薪酬激励之间的关系对于提高管理层绩效、促进组织发展具有重要意义。
本文旨在对管理层权力与薪酬激励的关系进行综述，分析其影响因素并探讨相关研究方法。
通过研究，我们可以更好地理解管理层行为和组织绩效之间的关系，为实践提供理论指导和决策支持。
1.2 研究目的管理层权力与薪酬激励是组织管理领域一个备受关注的研究课题。
本文旨在通过综述已有的研究成果，深入探讨管理层权力与薪酬激励之间的关系，揭示其内在机制和影响因素。
具体而言，本研究的目的包括以下几个方面：通过分析管理层权力对薪酬激励的影响，探讨管理层权力如何影响组织中对高层管理人员的薪酬设置和激励机制。
这有助于理解管理层权力在薪酬决策中的作用机制，为提高组织薪酬管理效率提供理论依据。
本研究旨在全面审视管理层权力与薪酬激励之间的相互关系，探讨影响因素，从而为组织管理实践提供理论支持和政策建议。
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• 如果经理人能够完全为所有者利益行事，那么， 这种代理关系就不会产生额外的成本，自然也 不存在代理问题。
• 但是，经理人与所有者毕竟是两个不同的经济 人，他们的立场和地位不完全相同。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
• 由此，在企业组织里便产生了“逆向选择” （Adverse Selection）和“道德风险”（Moral Hazard）两个基本的代理问题。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 而内部人控制则是伴随企业的所有权与经营权 “两权分离”特征而产生的一种现象。
• Borokhovich et al.：CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments，The Journal of Finance，52（4），1997.
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
• 经理人影响甚至决定自己的激励薪酬是 近年来内部人控制领域研究的新进展。
• 这种现象一经披露，立即引起财务学界 和法学界的兴趣，成为近年来国际主流 的研究热点。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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• 有鉴于此，本专题讨论： • 现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本 身就是代理问题
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 相反，经理人在只有控制权或支配权而 没有所有权的情况下对企业资源进行配 置时，他们会优先考虑自己的利益。
• 第二，信息不对称
• “契约的实质就是信息”。经理人拥有 信息优势。
• 在企业组织的代理关系中，所有者所掌 握的有关经理人的信息很有限，而经理 人则占据着信息优势。
• 现代企业制度的所有权与经营权的“两权分离” 特征，使得所有者（委托人）将其资产交给职 业经理人（代理人）去经营。
• 从理论上说，经理人受托经营企业的资产，理 应为所有者服务。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
8
现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 但是，在“两权分离”的企业组织里，经理人 掌握着企业相当大的控制权。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
• Yermack（1997）研究发现CEO总是在公 司好消息公布之前获得股票期权，并得 出经理人能够影响自身激励薪酬合约的 结论。
• Yermack：Good Timing：CEO Stock
• 股权高度分散的社会公众公司，其内部人控制 问题更为严重。社会公众公司股权高度分散， 单独的所有者谁也控制不了经理人，也不愿意 花力气去监督经理人，大家都以为别人会去监 督，自己可以坐享其成，从而造成对经理人控 制的弱化。这就是所谓的“搭便车”（Freeride）问题。
• 这既是“强管理者，弱所有者”的财务基础， 也是经理人管理权力的形成基础。
• 正是由于现代企业制度的“两权分离”， 导致现代企业制度的组织缺陷——代理 问题（Agency Problem）以及由此而产生 的内部人控制（Insider’s Control）现象。
2020/9/19
Prof. Hu，Jinan University
7
现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 现代企业组织内部实际上就是一种代理关系 （Agency Relationship）。
管理权力与经理人激励薪酬
Managerial Power and Executive Compensation
暨南大学会计学系 胡玉明
thuHu，Jinan University
1
• 基于现代企业制度的经营权与所有权的分离， 经理人与所有者利益不对称，由此产生了代理 问题和内部人控制问题。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
11
现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 因此，经理人为了自己的利益，会想方设法在 达成协议之前利用信息优势诱致所有者签订有 利于自己的协议，或在达成协议之后利用信息 优势不履行协议或“出工不出力”即人们常说 的“磨洋工”，从而损害所有者的利益。
• 显然，经理人激励薪酬的初衷是为了解决现代 企业制度“所有权与经营权”相分离而导致的 代理问题。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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• 二、经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members：An Empirical Analysis，The Journal of Finance，54（5），1999.
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
• （一）概述
• 对这个问题的研究，较早的文献可以追 溯到Crystal（1991）。该文献认为经理 人在与股东谈判过程中掌握着大部分
“讨价还价”的能力，因而，激励薪酬 很高。
• Crytal：In Search of Excess：The OverCompensation of American Executives， New York：Norton，1991.
Prof. Hu，Jinan University
2
• 根据上述模式，董事会完全可以控制和决定经 理人的激励薪酬合约，由此可能制定出符合股 东利益最大化的激励薪酬合约（Jensen and Meckling，1976；Holmstrom，1979）。
• Jensen and Meckling：Theory of the Firm： Managerial Behavior，Agency Costs and Ownership Structure，Journal of Financial Economics，（3）1976.
• 过去，人们一向认为经理人（一般泛指企业的 高层管理人员，即高管Executive）的激励薪酬 （Incentive Compensation）是解决代理问题的 一种重要的公司治理机制。
• 股东大会选举出董事会，董事会在选聘经理人 并确定其激励薪酬。这是现代企业经理人激励 机制运行的基本模式。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 鉴于现代企业制度“两权分离”的组织缺陷， 如果想让企业的经理人为实现所有者利益最大 化目标而努力工作，就必须建立有效的激励机 制，在经理人薪酬合约“嵌入”激励因素，赋 经理人薪酬予激励功效，使经理人从单纯的 “支薪阶层”逐步转向“分享阶层”。
• Hallock（1997）进一步发现一些公司通过与其 他公司互派董事结成关系网，导致经理人激励 薪酬的确定过程有失独立和公正。
• Hallock：Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation，Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis，32（3）， 1997.
Option Awards and Company News Announcements，Journal of Finance，52 （2），1997.
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
• 由此，学者们开始关注管理权力对经理人利益 的影响。
• 近年来，管理权力对激励薪酬合约的具体影响 的研究文献主要围绕管理层利益壕沟 （Managerial Entrenchment）这个主题展开。
• 管理层利益壕沟的基本含义是指企业经理人能 够通过其权力影响董事会或薪酬委员会，获取 有力的激励薪酬合约条款，即便是企业绩效连 年下滑甚至亏损依然能够继续维持其职位或者 建立起一旦被迫取消职位将取得巨额利益补偿 的合约条款。
• 可能研究空间
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
5
• 一、现代企业制度的组织缺陷
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
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现代企业制度的组织缺陷
• 现代企业制度具有所有权与经营权相分 离（Ownership and control are separated） 即“两权分离”的特征。
• Holmstrom：Moral Hazard and Observability， Bell Journal of Economics，（10）1979.
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
3
• 然而，近年来许多文献发现，企业经理 人在相当大程度上，影响甚至决定自己 的激励薪酬。
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Prof. Hu，Jinan University
20
经理人激励薪酬：解决代理问题还是本身就是代理问题
• Shivadasani and Yermack（1999）研究发 现了CEO参与董事会新成员的选举可以 减少自身所受监管压力的证据。