Entry Strategies

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英语作文-便利店零售行业进入门槛,是否与地域有关

英语作文-便利店零售行业进入门槛，是否与地域有关The convenience store retail industry is a dynamic sector influenced significantly by geographic factors. The entry barriers into this industry vary based on location, impacting operational challenges, market strategies, and profitability.Firstly, geographical location plays a pivotal role in determining the initial investment required to establish a convenience store. Urban areas typically demand higher startup costs due to expensive real estate prices and fierce competition from existing stores. In contrast, rural or suburban regions may offer lower initial investments but could face challenges in attracting sufficient customer traffic to sustain operations.Secondly, regulatory frameworks and licensing requirements differ across regions, further influencing entry barriers. Urban centers often have stringent zoning laws and permit regulations, necessitating thorough compliance checks before commencing operations. Conversely, rural areas might have more lenient regulatory environments but could lack the infrastructure and consumer density to support sustained profitability.Moreover, the demographic composition of a region profoundly impacts the product mix and marketing strategies of convenience stores. Urban populations, characterized by diverse consumer preferences and high foot traffic, encourage stores to stock a wide range of products catering to varied tastes and lifestyles. Conversely, rural areas with homogeneous demographics may benefit from a more focused product assortment tailored to local needs and preferences.Infrastructure development also plays a crucial role in the convenience store industry's entry barriers. Access to reliable transportation networks, including highways and public transit, enhances customer accessibility and operational efficiency. Urban areas typically boast superior infrastructure, facilitating frequent deliveries and ensuring consistent product availability compared to rural locales, which may face logistical challenges and higher transportation costs.Furthermore, competition within the convenience store sector varies significantly based on geographic location. Urban markets often feature a saturated competitive landscape with numerous established chains and independent stores vying for market share. In contrast, rural areas may offer opportunities for niche market positioning, catering to underserved communities or focusing on specialized product offerings not available through larger chains.Customer behavior and purchasing patterns also differ regionally, influencing operational strategies and revenue streams for convenience stores. Urban consumers tend to prioritize convenience, speed, and a wide product selection, driving demand for quick-service items and on-the-go meals. In contrast, rural customers often value affordability, personalized service, and community connections, influencing store layouts, promotional activities, and customer engagement strategies.In conclusion, while the convenience store retail industry presents opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures across various geographies, the entry barriers are significantly shaped by location-specific factors. From initial investment requirements and regulatory compliance to competitive dynamics and consumer behavior, geographic considerations profoundly influence operational strategies and profitability within this dynamic sector. Understanding and adapting to these regional nuances are essential for aspiring entrepreneurs aiming to navigate and thrive in the competitive landscape of convenience store retailing.。

英语调研工作计划范文

英语调研工作计划范文1. Executive SummaryThe purpose of this market research project plan is to outline the approach, methodology, and timeline for conducting a comprehensive market research study for XYZ Company. The goal of this project is to gather insights and data that will support strategic decision making, market entry, and product development. This research plan will guide the team in executing the project and ensure that the objectives are met in a timely and efficient manner.2. Project ObjectivesThe key objectives of this market research project are as follows:- To understand the market dynamics, trends, and drivers in the target industry.- To identify the key competitors, their market share, and their strengths and weaknesses.- To gather insights into customer preferences, needs, and purchase behaviors.- To assess the demand and growth potential for XYZ Company's products and services.- To identify potential barriers and challenges for market entry and expansion.- To provide actionable recommendations based on the findings.3. Project ScopeThe scope of this project includes the following:- Industry Analysis: Understanding the macroeconomic and microeconomic factors influencing the industry, including market size, growth rates, and regulatory environment.- Competitive Analysis: Identifying key competitors, their market positioning, product offerings, pricing strategies, and distribution channels.- Customer Analysis: Gathering insights into customer demographics, preferences, purchase behaviors, and brand perceptions.- Product Analysis: Assessing the demand for XYZ Company's products and services, as well as identifying potential opportunities for new product development.- Market Entry Strategy: Evaluating potential market entry strategies, including partnerships, acquisitions, and organic growth.4. MethodologyThe market research will be conducted using a combination of primary and secondary research methods. The primary research will involve conducting surveys, interviews, andfocus groups with industry experts, customers, and key stakeholders. The secondary research will involve gathering data from industry reports, academic journals, and online databases.5. Research PlanThe research plan will be executed in the following stages:- Preliminary Research: Conducting a review of existing literature, market reports, and industry publications to gather background information and insights.- Research Design: Developing the research instruments, including surveys, interview guides, and discussion topics for focus groups.- Data Collection: Conducting surveys, interviews, and focus groups with targeted respondents, including industry experts, customers, and stakeholders.- Data Analysis: Analyzing the data collected to identify trends, patterns, and insights.- Reporting: Compiling the findings into a comprehensive report that includes an executive summary, research methodology, findings, conclusions, and recommendations.6. Project TimelinesThe market research project will be conducted over a period of 12 weeks, with the following key milestones:- Week 1-2: Preliminary Research- Week 3-4: Research Design- Week 5-8: Data Collection- Week 9-10: Data Analysis- Week 11-12: Reporting7. BudgetThe budget for the market research project will be allocated to cover the costs of research tools, data collection, analysis, and reporting. The budget will also include expenses for travel, honorariums, and incentives for respondents. A detailed budget plan will be developed and approved by the project stakeholders before the start of the project.8. Risk ManagementThe project team will identify potential risks and challenges that may impact the successful execution of the research plan. Risk mitigation strategies will be developed to address these risks and ensure that the project is completed within the specified timeline and budget.9. Project TeamThe project team will consist of a project manager, research analysts, and support staff who will be responsible for executing the research plan and delivering the final report. The team will work closely with the project stakeholders to ensure that the project objectives are met and the findings are actionable.10. ConclusionThis market research project plan outlines the approach, methodology, and timeline for conducting a comprehensive market research study for XYZ Company. The project team will work diligently to gather insights and data that will support strategic decision making, market entry, and product development. The findings of the research will be used to inform the company's growth strategy and ensure its long-term success in the marketplace.。

英语六级仔细阅读练习附答案讲解

英语六级仔细阅读练习附答案讲解英语六级仔细阅读练习一56.B)。

定位由题干中的governments及seeking ways to reduce the health-care spending定位到*第一段第一句：Caught in a squeeze between the health needs of aging populations on onehand and the financial crisis on the other，governments everywhere are looking for ways to slowthe growth in health-care spending.详解推理判断题。

由定位句可知，各国政府一方面面临老龄化人群的健康需求，另一方面受到金融危机的影响，所以都在寻求减少医疗保健开支的途径，B)符合题意。

第一段第二句提到they are looking to thegenetic-drugs industry as a savior，但是普通药物只是各国政府减少开支的一个方法，并不是他们这么做的原因，故排除A);C)的说法在文中没有提及;本段最后一句提到That greed…costs taxpayers nearly C$1 billion a year.这里是说药店的贪心导致纳税人受损，并不是说保健花费的问题，故排除D)。

57.D)。

定位由题干中的the report issued by the European Commission 定位到*第二段第一句：Then on November 28th the European Commission issued the preliminary results...详解事实细节题。

定位句提到，11月28日欧洲委员会发布的一个初步调查报告，下文开始对该报告进行描述，由第二段最后一句Neelie Kroes，the EUs competition commissioner，says she is ready totake legal action if the evidence allows.可推断如果证据充足，委员们会采取行动，D)符合题意。

Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry

Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?L U´IS M.B.C ABRALLeonard Stern School of BusinessNew York University44West4th StreetNew York,NY10012lcabral@T HOMAS W.R OSSSauder School of BusinessUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouver,BC,Canada V6T1Z2tom.ross@sauder.ubc.caThe received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry—if entry fails,then the entrant,unable to recover sunk costs,incurs greater losses.In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant,sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect:they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market.By providing the entrant with commitment power,sunk investments may soften the reactions of incumbents.The net effect may imply that entry is more proﬁtable when sunk costs are greater.1.IntroductionThe role of sunk costs in the persistence of competitive advantage has been an important question in modern strategy thinking.Research in the area has generally taken one of two approaches toward modeling the importance of sunk costs:the structural approach,which views sunkness as a factor which increases the height of entry barriers;and the behavioral approach,which emphasizes sunkness as a form of commitment.Considerﬁrst the structural approach.Borrowing from the in-dustrial organization literature and work in antitrust economics,sunk costs have been shown to create barriers to entry for newﬁrms into proﬁtable industries,thus protecting incumbents and their proﬁts.The The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with Jim Brander;theﬁnancial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the PhelpsCentre for the Study of Government and Business in the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia;the excellent research assistance provided by Jennifer Ng; and useful comments by the editor and two referees.C 2008,The Author(s)Journal Compilation C 2008Blackwell PublishingJournal of Economics&Management Strategy,Volume17,Number1,Spring2008,97–11298Journal of Economics&Management Strategy sunk investments that give rise to these barriers may be largely exoge-nous(for example,the need for purpose-built production facilities with little value in alternative uses);or endogenous(for example,expensive brand-building activities such as advertising).In either case,sunk costs will represent investments put at risk by an entrant uncertain of its ability to successfully establish itself in the market.The greater the sunk investment required for entry,the riskier entry becomes and the less likely it is that incumbents will be challenged.1In contrast to the structural approach,the behavioral approach derives from the strategy literature on commitment.As argued by,for example,Ghemawat(1991),commitment to the right strategies can inﬂuence the play of other actors in ways beneﬁcial to players able to commit.2Competitors can be persuaded to compete less aggressively or not at all,suppliers can be convinced to make important relationship-speciﬁc investments,and customers’loyalty can be cultivated—in other words,the ability to make the right kind of commitment can be the source of aﬁrm’s competitive advantage.3The challenge forﬁrms seeking competitive advantage through commitment lies inﬁnding ways to make those commitments—that is,to take important irreversible actions that change other players’best responses in the right way.As sunk costs represent,by deﬁnition,irreversible investments,they are a natural candidate for such strategic behavior.Past work on strategic approaches to sunk costs has studied the ability of incumbents to protect monopoly positions through sunk investment in large capacity production rge sunk capacity in these models(e.g.,Spence,1977;Dixit,1980)serves to commit the incumbent to higher output rates,and this lowers post-entry price and proﬁts for prospective entrants.4If it lowers proﬁts enough,there will1.See,for example,the contestability literature,which considers the proﬁtability of hit-and-run entry in which sunk costs play a central role,for example,Baumol et al.(1982). See also Ross(2004).Related treatments of sunk costs as a barrier to entry can be found in a variety of strategy and industrial organization texts(e.g.,Church and Ware,2000)and in merger enforcement guidelines of a number of antitrust agencies,for example,Canada (2004,paragraphs6.10–6.14),European Commission(2004,paragraphs69and73)and United States(1997,section3).2.Many strategy texts have now picked up on this theme.See,for example,Besanko et al.(2004,chapter7).3.The value of commitment goes beyond competition in the market,as those familiar with the famous examples of generals burning bridges and ships to commit their soldiers toﬁerce military engagements will recognize.These military examples are often repeated in strategy texts,for example,Dixit and Skeath(1999,p.309),Dixit and Nalebuff(1991, p.156)and Besanko et al.(2004,p.234).4.Spulber(1981)offers a more dynamic version of the Dixit model in which entry is sequential.He also considers both Cournot and Stackelberg play in any post-entry situation.Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?99 be no entry.5In this way,sunk costs are seen,as under the structural approach,as barriers to entry.6Our interest here is also in the strategic use of sunk costs as commitment devices.However,we believe the entry barrier view of sunk costs is incomplete in an important sense.Through its focus on sunk investments by incumbents,it misses the potential for entrants to use sunk investments to commit to entry and thereby inﬂuence the behavior of their incumbent rivals.7If an entrant,who would otherwise anticipate an aggressive response by the incumbent(in an effort to chase the entrant from the market),can commit itself irreversibly to that entry, it can defeat the purpose of the incumbent’s retaliation.In this view, high levels of sunk investment may actually facilitate entry if they serve to commit entrants to staying in the market and thereby induce the incumbent to adopt a more accommodating strategy.8When Archer Daniels Midland(ADM)decided to enter the ly-sine market in July1989,it invested heavily in the construction of the world’s largest manufacturing facility in Decatur,Illinois—a plant three times the size of the next largest facility in the world.ADM used the excess capacity(a largely irreversible investment)to inﬂuence its rivals, speciﬁcally persuading them to enter into a price-ﬁxing agreement(until caught and successfully prosecuted by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice).9Bagwell and Ramey(1996,p.662)cite other examples that support the notion that large investments by entrants may serve to discourage aggressive post-entry behavior by incumbents.By contrast,the airline industry,frequently presented as a paradigm of low sunk costs,is a frequent source of failed entry attempts, frequently due to,at least in part,the aggressive and possibly even predatory responses by incumbents.10In summary,anecdotal evidence5.See also,Porter(1980,p.100),Saloner et al.(2001,p.229),Tirole(1989,pp.314–323), Geroski et al.(2000,pp.26–27)and Church and Ware(2000,p.123).6.Not all who have written on the topic believe sunk cost to be an important barrier to entry in real markets.See,for example,Spulber(2003)at pages59–61.7.The idea that sunk costs can strengthen an entrant’s position is recognized in at least one strategy text,though we are unaware of any formal modeling on this point.See Saloner et al.(2001,p.229).8.Bagwell and Ramey(1996)adapt the Dixit model by allowing the incumbent to have avoidableﬁxed costs and show that if they are large enough the entrant may be able to persuade the incumbent to leave the market after entry.As in our present work,their focus in on strategies available to entrants to elicit accommodating responses from incumbents. The key in their model,however,lies in the split between sunk and avoidable costs of the incumbent,while here our focus is on the entrant’s cost structure.9.See Connor(2001,p.170).10.We do not mean to suggest that every failure of a small airline(and there were many)was due to predatory actions undertaken by incumbent carriers—it is well recognized that many were undercapitalized and strategically unprepared for the markets they were entering.As pointed out by a referee,many new airlines were also severely100Journal of Economics&Management Strategy shows that higher sunk costs do not necessarily mean more difﬁcult or less likely successful entry.In this paper,we consider a model of rational predation to see if the degree of sunkness of entry costs can alter the incumbent’s incentives to predate.We show there exists an equilibrium with rational entry, possible predation by the incumbent and exit by the entrant.We then consider equilibrium comparative statics and show there are cases when the entrant beneﬁts(in terms of ex ante expected payoff)from higher sunk costs.Our model builds on a simple Dixit-type framework in which an entrant and incumbent play a two stage game.In theﬁrst stage the entrant decides whether or not to enter,and if entry is the choice,makes the necessaryﬁxed cost investments,a fraction of which is sunk.In the second stage the players select output levels in the Stackelberg fashion with the incumbent movingﬁrst.The incumbent then must choose between a predation strategy that involves setting a large output in an effort to encourage the entrant to leave the market(reclaiming its nonsunkﬁxed costs),and a strategy of accommodation that concedes some market share to its new rival.11In this model,a higher proportion ofﬁxed costs that are sunk means that exit will be less proﬁtable for the entrant;this will make the predation strategy more costly for the incumbent.Our key result is that increasing the fraction ofﬁxed costs that are sunk makes the entrant locally worse off,almost everywhere.However, there will be a critical level of sunkness such that for higher levels the incumbent cannot induce exit and the entry will not be resisted.In this way,our model illustrates how sunk costs can,in some cases,deter entry, while in others facilitate it.2.A Quantity Setting ModelConsider an industry with two potentialﬁrms,1and2,which compete in the market for a homogeneous product with demand p=1−q1−q2, restricted in their access to key support facilities such as gate facilities and landing slots. This said,there is also considerable evidence that a number of new carriers were compelled to exit through the very aggressive(and possibly predatory)actions of incumbents.On the experience in many countries see Forsythe et al.(2005)and Bolton et al.(2000).The set of airlines accused of predatory reactions to entry includes American Airlines,Northwest Airlines,Lufthansa,and Air Canada.11.The predation strategy will not in general involve prices below cost(without a recoupment period after exit it cannot be proﬁtable for the incumbent to sell below cost) and so may not satisfy some cost-based deﬁnitions of predation.However,as a strategy that is only proﬁtable because it induces the exit of a rival,it will satisfy the well-known Ordover-Willig(1981)deﬁnition of predation.See also Cabral and Riordan(1994).Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?101 where p is price and q i isﬁrm i’s output level.Firm1is committed toremaining active.Firm2must initially decide whether to enter.Ifﬁrm2enters,it pays an entry cost K and Nature generates its marginal cost.Forsimplicity,we assume thatﬁrm2’s marginal cost can either be equal toc,with probabilityθ,or zero,with probability1−θ.12Firm1’s marginalcost,in turn,is equal to zero.13Upon observingﬁrm2’s entry decision and its cost,ﬁrm1choosesits output.Firm2must then decide whether to be active or to exit;ifactive,ﬁrm2must also choose its output level.Finally,ifﬁrm2decidesto exit,then it recoversφ≡(1−s)K from its initial investment,where sis the degree of entry cost sunkness.Having a particular example in mind may help in following themodel.Consider the case of airline competition.An entry cost willinclude,among other things,buying(or leasing)an aircraftﬂeet(cost K).Once the incumbent airline learns that a new airline plans to enter aparticular market,the incumbent decides how manyﬂights it wants toschedule in that market(output q1).The entrant then decides whether itwants to remain active and,if so,how manyﬂights it wants to schedulein the market(output q2).Finally,equilibrium fares,p1=p2=p,result from the total number of availableﬂights:p=1−q1−q2.14 The assumption that the incumbent chooses output before theentrant is important for our analysis.In the spirit of Lipman andWang(2000)and Caruana and Einav(2006),we propose the Stackelbergassumption as the reduced form of a repeated quantity setting gamewhere the incumbent has a greater switching cost than the entrant.Thisseems a reasonable assumption given that the incumbent has been inthe market for some time.Essentially what we need in our model is the feature that aftera newﬁrm enters,the incumbent has the opportunity to take someaggressive action,after which the entrant can choose to exit.We believeour model is reasonable and that it is about the simplest we couldconstruct that allows for this sequence of meaningful decisions.Ofcourse this could be also be accomplished with a model in whichﬁrmsmake simultaneous moves over a sequence of periods,but this wouldcomplicate the model by forcing us to analyze other decisions that arenot really relevant to the possibilities we wish to explore here.The timing of the game is described in Table I.We assume that boththe prior distribution ofﬁrm2’s marginal cost and its actual realization12.Similar qualitative results would be obtained ifﬁrm2’s cost were drawn from a continuous probability distribution on an interval.13.Frequently,entrants have lower marginal cost than incumbents.Our assumption that the incumbent has zero marginal cost is made for simplicity and does not change the qualitative nature of our results.14.See Kreps and Sheinkman(1983)for a justiﬁcation of this reduced-form approach.102Journal of Economics &Management StrategyTable I.Model Timing1.Firm 2decides whether to enter;if so,it pays entry cost K .2.Nature generates ﬁrm 2’s cost level (c with probability θ,zero with probability 1−θ).3.Firm 1,with zero marginal cost,chooses output level,q 1.4.Firm 2chooses output level q 2or exits.If it exits,it recovers (1−s )K .are common knowledge.So,while there is uncertainty in our model we do not assume any information asymmetry across ﬁrms.In order to focus on the relevant parameter range,we make the following assumptions regarding the values of K and c :Assumption 1:K <116.Assumption 1ensures that we are not in a situation of “natural monopoly,”in which ﬁrm 2decides never to enter.Assumption 2:K >32−√16.Assumption 2is a suf ﬁcient condition for there to be cases when the incumbent has an incentive to induce the entrant to exit.If the value of K is very small,then regardless of the degree of cost sunkness theincumbent prefers not to ﬁght entry.Notice that 3−√is less than 1,sothe lower bound on K implied by Assumption 2is lower than the upper bound implied by Assumption 1.Assumption 3:c <1.Assumption 3ensures that in the standard Stackelberg outcome with ﬁrm 1as the leader and 2as the follower ﬁrm 2chooses a strictly positive output rate.A higher value of c leads to a corner solution whereby ﬁrm 2is shut out of the market.Figure 1illustrates the set induced by Assumptions 1–3.The upper limits of the box marked in the (c,K )space are the values in Assumption 2and 3.The lower bound in Assumption 2is the vertical intercept of the curve closer to the c axis.We note that Assumption 2is a suf ﬁcient condition.A necessary and suf ﬁcient condition for the interior-solution results we present below is that the value of K lie outside of region A in Figure 1.1515.This corresponds to the condition (explained below)that K >K ,where K is implicitly given by:(c +2√K )(1−c −2√K )=18(1+c )2.Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?103FIGURE 1.RELEV ANT REGIONS OF P ARAMETER V ALUESThe rest of the analysis is organized as follows.First,in Section 3we look at the post-entry game.That is,we assume ﬁrm 2has entered and look at ﬁrm 1’s output decision and ﬁrm 2’s response (which is either an output level or the decision to exit).As we will see,the answer depends on the particular values of K,c and s .Next,in Section 4we consider the comparative statics with respect to s .This will lead to the main results in the paper,namely,the impact of s on ﬁrm 2’s entry and exit decisions,as well as its ex ante expected value.3.The Post-Entry SubgameSuppose that ﬁrm 2enters.First we note that,because a (partially)sunk entry decision has been made,ﬁrm 2’s effective opportunity cost of entry is now given by φ=(1−s )K .Because s is a scalar in the unit interval,φlives in the same space as K .However,while the upper bound of φis the same as K (that is,116,by Assumption 1),the lower bound is zero.In terms of Figure 1,while pairs (c,K )must be in regions B or P ,(by Assumptions 1–3),pairs (c,φ)may also occupy region A .In the analysis that follows,we will consider three possible cases,corresponding to regions B,P ,and A in Figure 1.We will ﬁrst consider the case when ﬁrm 2’s cost is given by the positive value c .The case when ﬁrm 2’s cost is zero can simply be solved for by substituting 0for c .Firm 1’s expected payoff is given by (1−q 1−q 2)q 1.Firm 2’s continuation payoff,in turn,is given by (1−q 1−q 2−c )q 2if it remains104Journal of Economics &Management Strategy active and φif it exits.16If ﬁrm 2is to remain active,then its optimal output level is q ∗2=12(1−q 1−c ).This gives ﬁrm 2an optimal response pro ﬁt ofπ∗2=14(1−q 1−c )2,(1)conditional on being active.If ﬁrm 2is to remain active,then we have the conventional Stackel-berg case.Output levels are given by q S 1=1(1+c )and q S 2=1(1−3c ),where the superscript S stands for Stackelberg.This leads to equilibrium continuation pro ﬁts of πS 1=1(1+c )2and πS 2=1(1−3c )2.When will ﬁrm 2choose to exit?First,we consider the case of blockaded entry,that is,the case when ﬁrm 2exits even if ﬁrm 1selects monopoly output.Straightforward computation shows that monopoly output is given by q M 1=12.Substituting into (1)and equating to the opportunity cost of entry we get φ=116(1−2c )2.(2)Equation (2)de ﬁnes the lower boundary of region B in Figure 1.For values of φto the NE of this boundary,entry is blockaded,that is,ﬁrm 2exits even though ﬁrm 1sets the monopoly quantity.For points to the SW of the boundary de ﬁned by (2),ﬁrm 2exits only if ﬁrm 1sets a high enough output.To determine this output level,we equate the right-hand side of (1)to the opportunity cost of entry:φ=14(1−q 1−c )2,or simply q P 1=1−c −2 φ,where the superscript P stands for predation.At this output level,and considering ﬁrm 2exits the market,ﬁrm 1’s pro ﬁt is given by πP 1= 1−q P 1 q P 1=(c +2 φ)(1−c −2 φ).Firm 1has the option of setting the Stackelberg output and receiving a pro ﬁt of πS 1=18(1+c )2.The condition for predation to be an optimal strategy is thus given by(c +2 φ)(1−c −2 φ)≥18(1+c )2.(3)16.Throughout the paper,we refer to continuation pro ﬁt or continuation payoff as ﬁrm 2’s pro ﬁt excluding the entry cost.Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?105Computation establishes that 18(1+c )2=c (1−c )+18(1−3c )2.This implies that,if φ=0,then the left-hand side of (3)is strictly lower than the right-hand side of (3).Let φ be the value of φthat solves (3)as an equality.Because output is decreasing in φand ﬁrm 1’s pro ﬁt is decreasing in output,the left-hand side is increasing in φ.Because moreover the left-hand side is lower than the right-hand side for φ=0,it follows that φ is strictly positive (for all c in the [0,1)interval).The critical value φ ,which is a function of c ,de ﬁnes the upper bound of region A in Figure 1.Recall that the left-hand side of (3)is increasing in φ.It follows that ﬁrm 1is better off by predating for values of φabove the boundary (region P ),and better off accommodating entry for values of φlower than the boundary (region A ).We summarize the analysis of this section with the following resultProposition 1:Consider the subgame following entry by ﬁrm 2.r If (c,φ)∈B,then q 1=q M 1=1and ﬁrm 2exits (blockaded entry).r If (c,φ)∈P,then q 1=q P 1=1−c −2√φand ﬁrm 2exits (predation).r If (c,φ)∈A,then q 1=q S 1=12(1+c ),q 2=q S 2=14(1−3c )(accommo-dated entry).4.Sunk Costs,Entry,and ExitWe now explore the comparative statics with respect to s implied by the results in the previous section.First,we note that ﬁrm 1’s optimal strategy implies a discontinuity in ﬁrm 2’s subgame pro ﬁt with respect to the value of s .To see this,notice that,for a given K ,different values of s imply different values of φ,ranging from K to zero as s varies from 0to1.This is illustrated in Figure2.For given values of (c,K ),as s changes from 0to 1,the pair (c,φ)moves from x 0(outside of A )to x 1(inside of A ).Notice that,by Assumption 2,K >32−√216,which implies that point x 0must lie outside of region A .In fact,for s =0,φ=K .Depending on the particular values of (s,K ),x 0may lie in region P or in region B .Whichever,is the case,x 0lies in a region where the subgame calls for ﬁrm 2to exit.As to x 1,it always falls in region A .In fact,the upper boundary of region A is strictly above the horizontal axis for any value c ∈[0,1).If ﬁrm 2exits,then its continuation payoff is given by φ.If ﬁrm 2does not exit (region A ),then its continuation payoff is given by πS 2=1(1−3c )2.The condition φ=πS 2=1(1−3c )2,that is,the condition106Journal of Economics&Management StrategyFIGURE2.EFFECT OF V ARYING s FROM0TO1.FOR GIVEN V ALUES OF(c,K),AS s CHANGES FROM0TO1,THE P AIR(c,φ)MOVES FROM x0(OUTSIDE OF A)TO x1(INSIDE OF A)that a Stackelberg follower is indifferent with respect to exiting or not,is given by the dashed line in Figure2.If follows that,for points in region A,all of which are below the dashed line,ﬁrm2strictly prefers to be a Stackelberg follower than to exit.This implies that,as s shifts from0to1,(s,φ)eventually crosses the boundary from the P region to the A region,and at that pointﬁrm2’s payoff discontinuously increases.On the other hand,while we are in the P region,ﬁrm2’s payoff,which is given byφ=(1−s)K,is decreasing in s.We summarize our analysis in the following result: Proposition2:There exists an s∗(c,K)such that dπ2/ds<0for s<s∗(c)and lim s↑s∗(c)π2(s)<lim s↓s∗(c)π2(s).Figure3illustrates Proposition2.It depicts the value ofﬁrm2’s continuation proﬁt for particular values of K and c.Notice thatπ2is weakly decreasing almost everywhere(and strictly decreasing for all s<s∗).In other words,for almost every value of s(that is,except for a set of measure zero),a small increase in s implies(weakly)a decrease inπ2.This result corresponds to the“conventional wisdom”that entry cost sunkness creates a barrier to entry.A second important property of the equilibriumπ2map is that it discontinuously increases as s crosses the s∗(c)threshold.The reasonFIGURE3.FIRM2’s CONTINUATION PROFIT AS A FUNCTION OF ENTRY COST SUNKNESS(K=0.01,c=0.05)for this is that a higher value of s implies a shift from the predation regime to the no-predation regime.Past this threshold we remain in a “no predation and no exit”regime in which the degree of sunkness of theﬁxed costs is irrelevant.We thus conclude that increasing the degree of cost sunkness has two opposing effects.To summarize the analysis so far:given thatﬁrm2has entered,ﬁrm2may be better off or worse off with s=s2than with s=s1<s2. If s1and s2lead to points in the P region,thenﬁrm2is better off with the lower s value.If s1belongs to the P region and s2belongs to the A region,thenﬁrm2is better off with the higher value of s.Our next step in the analysis is to close the model by considering the entry decision as well.As explained in Section2,ﬁrm2is ex ante uncertain about its marginal costs,which is equal to c with probability θand0with probability1−θ.Pre-entry uncertainty about marginal costs is important for two reasons.First,it leads to a natural model where predation occurs not only in the equilibrium,as we have already established,but also along the equilibrium path.17Second,as a result of predation along the equilibrium path,the entry with uncertainty model highlights the two main effects of entry cost sunkness:the negative effect (in case of exit sunk costs are bad for the entrant)and the positive effect (sunk costs increase the entrant’s commitment to remain active,which softens the incumbent).The analysis underlying Figure3was conducted for a particular value of c.The same analysis applies for the case when c=0,with the17.We have established that,for some parameter values,predation takes place in the post-entry game.However,we have not established that entry takes place in equilibrium (for the relevant parameter values).So while predation occurs in a subgame,that subgame may not be visited in equilibrium.In other words,predation may simply be a threat,notan actual event.difference that points x0,x1lie on the vertical axis.This implies that,if c=0,then there exists a threshold value s1such that,as s crosses s1we move from the P region into the A region;and if c>0,then there exists a threshold value s2>s1with the same properties,that is,as s crosses s2 we move from the P region into the A region.Notice that s2>s1followsfrom the fact that the boundary separating regions P and A is decreasing in c.Consider nowﬁrm2’s prospects upon deciding whether to enter. If it does so and c equals zero,then it will remain active if and only if s>s1.If c is positive,however,it will remain active if and only if s>s2. So,if s<s1ﬁrm2will exit regardless of the value of marginal cost.If s>s2,thenﬁrm2will not exit,regardless of the value of marginal cost. Finally,for intermediate values of s,s1<s<s2,ﬁrm2exits if and only if its marginal cost is positive.When shouldﬁrm2enter?Clearly,if s<s1thenﬁrm2never enters, because it anticipates it will always exit.For higher values of s,the answer depends on the particular values of c and K.If(c,K)is below the dashed line in Figure2,then Stackelberg follower proﬁts are greater than K,and theﬁrm is better off by entering.Notice however that(0,K) falls below the dashed line.This means that a sufﬁcient condition for entry when s>s1is thatθbe close to zero.We thus have the following result characterizing the overall entry and exit equilibrium: Proposition3:Supposeθis close to zero.There exist values0<s1< s2<1such that(a)Entry takes place if and only if s>s1.(b)If s1<s<s2,thenﬁrm2’s ex ante expected payoff is strictly decreasingin s;if s<s1or s>s2,then ex ante expected payoff is independent of s. In other words,ifθis close to zero then the equilibrium hasﬁrm2 entering if and only if entry costs are sufﬁciently sunk;and,given that ﬁrm2enters,its expected payoff is decreasing in the degree of entry cost sunkness.Figure4illustrates Proposition3.On the vertical axis,we measure ﬁrm2’s ex ante expected proﬁt,V2.(Recall thatπ2,introduced earlier,de-notesﬁrm2’s continuation payoff.)For s<s1,ﬁrm2correctly anticipates that,no matter what its costs,ﬁrm1will prey it out of the market.It follows that the expected payoff from entry is−sK,the measure of entry sunk costs.Because expected payoff from entry is negative,ﬁrm2does not enter and V2=0.If s>s2,thenﬁrm2anticipates that,no matter what its costs,ﬁrm1will accommodate entry.Becauseθis close to zero and a zero cost Stackelberg follower’s proﬁts are greater than entry。

2021年6月大学英语六级仔细阅读练习题附答案及解析(3)

2021年6月大学英语六级仔细阅读练习题附答案及解析(3)Passage OneQuestions 56 to 60 are based on the following passage.Caught in a squeeze between the health needs of aging populations on one hand and the financial crisis on the other, governments everywhere are looking for ways to slow the growth in health-care spending. Increasingly, they are looking to the generic-drugs (普通药物) industry as a savior. In November Japan's finance ministry issued a report complaining that the country's use of generics was less than a third of that in America or Britain. In the same month Canada's competition watchdog criticized the country's pharmacies for failing to pass on the savings made possible by the use of generic drugs. That greed, it reckoned, costs taxpayers nearly C$1 billion a year.Then on November 28th the European Commission issued the preliminary results of its year-long probe into drug giants in the European Union. The report reached a damning~, though provisional, conclusion: the drugs firms use a variety of unfair strategies to protect their expensive drugs by delayingthe entry of cheaper generic opponents. Though this initial report does not carry the force of law (a final report is due early next year), it has caused much controversy. Neelie Kroes, the EU's competition commissioner, says she is ready to take legal action if the evidence allows.One strategy the investigators criticize is the use of the "patent duster( 专利群)". A firm keen to defend its drug due to go off-patent may file dozens or hundreds of new patents, often of dubious merit, to confuse and terrify potential copycats and maintain its monopoly. An unnamed drugs firm once took out 1,300 patents across the EU on a single drug. The report also suggests that out-of-court settlements between makers of patented drags and generics firms may be a strategy used by the former to delay market entry by the latter.According to EU officials, such misdeeds -have delayed the arrival of generic competition and the accompanying savings. On average, rite report estimates, generics arrived seven months after a patented drug lost its protection, though where the drug was a big seller the lag was four months. The report says taxpayers paid about q 3 billion more than they would have-had the generics gone on sale immediately.But hang on a minute, Though many of the charges of badbehavior leveled at the patented-drugs industry by EU investigators may well be true, the report seems to let the generics industry off the hook(钩子) too lightly. After all, if the drugs giants stand accused, in effect, of bribing opponents to delay the launch of cheap generics, shouldn't the companies that accepted those "bribes" also share the blame?56. Why are governments around the world seeking ways to reduce their health-care spending?A) They consider the generic-drugs industry as a savior.B) They are under the double pressure of aging group and financial crisis.C) Health-care spending has accounted too large proportion.D) Health-care spending has cost taxpayers too much income.57. What can we learn from the report issued by the European Commission?A) Drug firm will use just ways to protect their drags.B) Cheaper generic drugs are easy to enter market,C) The report has come to an ultimate conclusion.D) The final report may lead to commissioner's legal action.58. The investigators seriously condemned the drug firms for__________.A) they do not let their opponents to resort to the cometB) they use clusters of patents to protect their productsC) they bribe the cheaper generic opponentsD) trey do not pass on the savings made by use of generic drugs59. On average, the genetics will be delayed to enter the market by __________.A) seven monthsB) three monthsC) four monthsD) eleven months60. Which of the following accords with the author's view?A) Charges on patented-drug industry are anything but true.B) Generics industry is a sheer victim in the competition.C) Only drug giants are to blame.D) Exclusion of generics industry from taking responsibility is questionable.Passage TwoQuestions 61 to 65 are based on the following passage.Yet with economies in free fail, managers also need up-to-date information about what is happening to their businesses, so that they can change course rapidly if necessary. Cisco, an American network-equipment giant, hasinvested over many years in the technology needed to generate such data .Frank Caideroni, the firm's CFO, says that every day its senior executives can track exactly what orders are coming in from sales teams around the world, and identify emerging trends in each region and market segment. And at the end of each month, the firm can get reliable financial results within four hours of closing its books. Most firms have to wait days or even weeks for such certainty.Admittedly, Cisco's financial results have not made happy reading recently because, in common with many other large technology companies, it has seen demand for its products decline in the downturn. In early February it announced that its fiscal second-quarter revenues of $ 9.1 billion were 7.5% lower than the same period in 2021 and that its profit had fallen by 27%, to $1.5 billion.In response to hard times, Cisco plans to cut $1 billion of costs this year by, among other things, making use of its own video-conferencing and other communications technologies to reduce the amount its executives travel. It is also using these facilities to relay information from employees on the ground to its senior managers, and to get instructions from Cisco's leaders back out to its 67,000 staff. A rapid exchangeof information and instructions is especially valuable if the company wants to alter course in stormy times.If everybody in a company can rapidly grasp what they have to do and how it is changing, they are more likely to get the job done. But some firms are reluctant to share their goals with the wider world. Unilever, a big Anglo-Dutch consumer-goods group, has decided against issuing a 2021 financial forecast to investors, arguing that it is difficult to predict what is going to happen, given the dangerous state of the world economy. "We're not just going to provide numbers for the sake of it," explains James Allison, the company's head of investor relations. Other companies that have decided not to provide annual earnings estimates for 2021 include Costco, a big American retailer, and Union Pacific, an American railway company.Some firms, such as Intel, seem to have chosen to take things quarter by quarter. The giant chipmaker(芯片制造商) said in January that it would not issue an official forecast for the first quarter of 2021 after its fourth-quarter 2021 profit decreased by 90%. Several retail chains have also stopped providing monthly sales estimates because they cannot see what the future holds. Retailers, chipmakers and firms inmany other industries may have a long wait before the economic fog finally lifts.61. What can we learn about Cisco from the passage?A) It will keep a record of the orders from sales teams.B) It cuts $1 billion cost by solely relying on its own technologies.C) Unlike other technology companies, its financial reports are encouraging.D) Only employees can use the video-conferencing to pass information.62. According to the author, the staff can perform better by__________.A) getting instructions from their senior managersB) seizing what to do at hand and what to do nextC) having a financial forecast as a goalD) sharing their goals with others63. What is important in the unstable time ff a company wants to change strategies?A) To issue company's financial reports faster.B) To obtain the up-to-date information of company's business.C) To predict what is going to happen in the future.D) To wait until the economic fog finally lifts.64. The reason Unilever plans not to issue financial forecast in 2021 lies in__________.A) its reluctance to share its goal with othersB) its rapid grasp of changes in the marketsC) the unstable economic situationD) its reduction in the cost of prediction65. What can we know about the giant chipmaker, Intel in the passage?A) It did not issue first-quarter forecast for great decrease in January.B) Inters chain store used to report sales estimates by year.C) Only retailers and chipmakers are greatly influenced.D) Intel's profit was greatly decreased in 2021's last quarter.答案解析：56．B)。

(完整)Porter’s Generic Strategies 波特的一般竞争战略

Porter's Generic StrategiesIf the primary determinant of a firm’s profitability is the attractiveness of the industry in which it operates, an important secondary determinant is its position within that industry。

Even though an industry may have below-average profitability， a firmthat is optimally positioned can generate superior returns。

A firm positions itself by leveraging its strengths. Michael Porter has argued that a firm’s strengths ultimately fall into one of two headings: cost advantage and differentiation。

By applying these strengths in either a broad or narrow scope, three generic strategies result：cost leadership，differentiation, and focus. Thesestrategies are applied at the business unit level. They are called generic strategies because they are not firm or industry dependent. The following table illustratesPorter’s generic strategies：Porter’s Generic StrategiesCost Leadership StrategyThis generic strategy calls for being the low cost producer in an industry for a given level of quality。

论文外文翻译译文题目：新兴市场跨国公司的通用国际化战略以中国公司为例

1 Introductionforeign direct investment (FDI) outflows and the remarkable rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies. FDI outflows from emerging economies reached a record level of $553 billion in 2014, accounting for 39% of global FDI outflows compared with only 12% at the beginning of the 2000s . Emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs), as vehicles of FDI outflows from emerging economies, are expanding overseas at an increasingly large scale and at an ever-accelerating speed. In 2014 there were 123 MNEs from the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) on the Fortune Global 500 list, as compared with about 20 companies from these countries a decade ago.The evolution of EMNEs has gained attention of scholars in international business (IB) and strategic management, prompting them to rethink and develop models and theories relating to the internationalization of firms. Although there was some interest in emerging market multinationals since the early 1980s , attention to this topic became an import research in international business in the 2000s, because emerging-market firms are quickly catching up and internationalizing in recent years. Scholars are starting to take stock of what is actually known about EMNEs and what is speculation .Particularly, the rise of emerging economies such as China and India has generated a number of EMNEs, providing an opportunity for scholars to review the theories of MNEs’ internationalization in contemporary context. For example, Paul and Mas examined the common factors that had contributed to the emergence of Chinese and Indian multinationals in the global market including their focus on exports, manufacturing growth, science and technology, etc. One of the evolving research entails adopting both strategic view and international business studies, a pilot study of which derived from case studies of Indian companies proposes the generic strategies for EMNEs as they embark on an international expansion.In this research, the major question is raised as what are the generic strategies of the internationalization of Chinese firms? What are the strategic directions including the targeted countries, value chain movement, branding, and mode of entry that Chinese firms are executing in their overseas expansion? How do the choices and combination of strategic directions ultimately lead to the distinct path of Chinese internationalization? What are the firm-specific factors that have influence on the generic strategies of Chinese internationalization?We consider these questions through examination of the strategies of Chinese EMNEs as they propel increasing FDI outflows world widely. We argue that the models explaining the generic strategies of Indian multinationals can be extended and modified to the study of Chinese multinationals. We begin by selecting and describing cases of Chinese EMNEs in typical manufacturing industries. We then examine the strategic directions for each of these Chinese EMNEs in its internationalization, which include a multinational’s targeted countries, value chain activities in host country, choice of original equipment manufacturer (OEM) versus own branded manufacturer (OBM), and themode of entry. On the basis of this analysis, we identify and discuss the generic internationalization strategy that can be illustrated from Chinese EMNEs. Further discussions on several firm-specific factors e.g. the industry a multinational is concerned of, the experience of its overseas operations, R&D intensity as indicator of firm-specific advantage are used to develop practical and theoretical insights from the internationalization of Chinese EMNEs. We conclude the paper by offering a few directions for future studies of the internationalization strategies of emerging-market multinationals. We believe this study will be helpful for deepening our understanding of the internationalization of EMNEs by bringing the analysis of multinational’s generic strategy into the focus.2.Literature ReviewInternational business studies are emerged from investigations of developed economies in North America and Europe. Consequently, mainstream IB theories on internationalization have been developed based on studies of developed-country multinational enterprises (DMNEs). Such theories, for example, monopolistic advantage theory , product life cycle theory , the eclectic or ownership-internalization-location (OLI) paradigm, and the internationalization process model , have provided a strong foundation for explaining the presence of MNEs. Some scholars thus argue that the emergence of EMNCs can also be explained with these theories. For example, Dunning et al. relies on OLI framework to explain the existence of EMNEs, which have become multinationals despite their limited firm-specific advantages. Rugman argues that EMNEs do not have firm-specific advantages, and their internationalization depends on the country-specific advantages in low-cost labor, finance, economies of scale, and natural resources.On the other side, a widely accepted taxonomy of strategies such as multi-domestic, transnational, and global strategies of DMNEs exists , few schemes have described the strategies of EMNEs in building up their global presence . Researchers suggest that the multinationals fromemerging markets have pursued distinctive approaches to internationalization and they enjoy different specific advantages than multinationals from developed countries. At this point, the resource-based view of firms originated from strategic management has enriched IB studies in explaining the behavior of EMNEs , since the traditional strategic management approach has not yet yielded substantive knowledge within research on internationalization as a strategic process adopted by MNEs . Mathews introduces the linkage, leverage, learning (LLL) framework, which is consistent with the extended resource-based perspective, to provide the explanations of the rapid appearance of EMNCs. Luo and Tung describe that EMNEs use international expansion as a springboard to obtain new resources and capabilities via the alliances or acquisition of firms to upgrade capabilities at home and catch up to DMNCs.The rise of new multinationals from emerging markets provides researchers an opportunity with extension and modification of the models and theories of internationalization [34]. Buckley et al. [35] find strong support for the argument that aspects of the special theory e.g. the institutional factors influencing outward direct investment help to explain the behavior of Chinese MNEs, since Chinese internationalization has both a conventional and an idiosyncratic dimension. Yiu et al. studies the international venture of Chinese companies and highlights the importance of incorporating the institutional component of a multinational including networking with domestic institutions and entrepreneurial organizational transformation into existing theories of the MNEs. Goldstein argues that as emerging market multinationals are embedded in their political, social, and ethnic networks, their internationalization of business offers valuable lessons for practical and theoretical implications. Guillen and Garcia-Canal note the decline of American model of the MNEs and to what extent we need a new theory to explain the growth of EMNEs, with analysis of the distinctive internationalization of EMNEs with regard to the competitive advantages, political capabilities, expansion paths, preference of entry mode, and organizational adaptability. The study of EMNEs can thus bring context more explicitly and comprehensively into theory and deepen our understanding of how firms internationalize.Ramamurti indicates that multinationals from emerging markets follow particular paths of international expansion, which modifies some of the predictions of existing theories of MNEs. EMNEs internationalize differently since the global environment facilitates speed-up internationalization, the industry characteristics lead to different patterns, the companies exploit differences rather than similarities in foreign expansion, and they have ownership advantages that are different from DMNEs. Consequen tly, he suggests the generic strategies for EMNEs’internationalization, each of these generic strategies, for example the vertical integrator, local optimizer, low-cost partner, global consolidator, and global first-mover have resulted in distinct internationalization paths of EMNEs . Each generic strategy leverages different country-specific advantages and firm-specific advantages and results in distinct internationalization path of emerging market multinationals. Ramamurti proposes a framework of generic internationalization strategy as a common platform for the analysis of EMNEs’ internationalization and explains how the research of EMNCs can help better understand the MNEs’ internationalization process, the contextual factors, and firm-specific and location-specific ownership advantages.However, the framework is developed from the case study of Indian multinationals, which requires more rigorous empirical studies aimed at gathering and analyzing large sample data at the firm level . Generic strategies are notunique to the internationalization of Indian EMNEs, they are also relevant to other EMNEs, with distinct aspects of each emerging economy resulting in some generic strategies being more viable than others . Williamson and Zeng , who analyzed four of the biggest Chinese multinationals, namely Hisense, Wanxiang, CIMC, and Huawei, and argued that several strategies of Indian multinationals could also be observed from the internationalization of Chinese firms. Further research on a number of Chinese firms is needed for developing alternative configurations of generic strategies that contribute more explanatory power regarding the internationalization of EMNEs.The core of the analysis of generic strategies of EMNEs’ internationalization is a company’s str ategic direction in its international expansion. In the incremental internationalization model, Johanson and Vahlne explain the selection among countries and regions in which to enter, which is also analyzed in Ramamurti’s framework of EMNEs. The incremen tal internationalization model also explains a firm’s selection of its operation in the host country e.g. production base, sales subsidiaries, procurement center, which in the generic strategy is described as the movement and relocation of value chain activities. Besides, in the linkage-leverage-learning model, Bonaglia et al. discuss the implications for OEM firms originated from emerging countries that aim to upgrade to OBM status to compete on the basis of global brand rather than just on their manufacturing capabilities. The choice of OEM versus OBM direction is probably one of the most challenges for Chinese companies while they are seeking foreign markets for international growth. Finally, the rapid expansion of Chinese companies in the 2000s through merges and acquisitions of brands and production operationsother than greenfield investment has been widely discussed in several research. All of these directions e.g. targeted country, value chain movement, OEM or OBM products, and the mode of entry are analyzed in this research in consideration about the generic internationalization strategies of Chinese EMNEs.3.Research MethodologyIn this research, we analyze the strategies of Chinese EMNEs’ internationalization through multiple case study method. Firstly, we defined the multinational enterprises (MNEs) operationally and screened out a number of multinational enterprises from typical Chinese manufacturing industries. We subsequently examine the strategic directions toward internationalization for each of these cases to find any results and make further discussions about the strategies of Chinese internationalization. Since the scope of this study is focused on the more surprising and interesting Chinese manufacturing firms, companies in service and resource sector are excluded. A number of typical Chinese manufacturers are included as telecommunication equipment manufacturers, computers and peripherals manufacturers, semiconductor manufacturers, home appliances manufacturers, consumer electronics manufacturers, automobiles and motorcycles manufacturers, and auto parts manufacturers. The Global Industry Classification Standard and Hang Seng Industry Classification System are followed here. The above industries can be categorized into high-tech industries, medium-tech industries, and medium-low-tech industries according to the OECD classification .4.Insights from Case Study: Strategic DirectionsTable 1 illustrates each of the strategic directions of Chinese EMNEs’ internationalization. The target countries are the locations of FDI activities conducted by an EMNE, which is classified into south–south or south–north paradigm in this study. South–south FDIs originate in emerging economies and flow into other emerging economies. By contrast, the destinations of south–north FDIs are developed countries. “North” is broadly defined as developed countries, including North America, Europe (excluding Eastern Europe), Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. “South” comprises emerging economies in South America, Eastern Eur ope, and Asia, and includes developing and transition economies, as defined by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNTCAD). At the firm level, south–south FDI occurs when an EMNE establishes its overseas subsidiaries in emerging economies, while south–north FDI occurs when an EMNE’s overseas subsidiaries are located in developed countries. Our analysis of each of the 50 Chinese manufacturing EMNEs showed that 5 firms are only engaged in south–south FDI, 25firms in south–north FDI, and 20 firms in both south–south and south–north FDI. There were more overseas subsidiaries of Chinese EMNEs located in developed countries than in emerging economies, which reflected that south-north FDI is the major path of Chinese internationalization. Among the developed countries, the United States and Western European countries such as Germany, France, and Netherlands were the primary FDI destinations of Chinese manufacturing EMNEs.5.Insights from Case Study: Generic Internationalization StrategiesBas ed on the above analysis of Chinese multinational’s strategic directions toward internationalization, we examined and identified the generic strategy for each of the companies (as summarized in Table 1). As in the following section, each of the generic strategy illustrated from Chinese cases targets south-south or south-north expansion, moves up or down the value chain activities, provide OEM or OBM products in international markets, enter foreign countries through greenfield investment or M&A. A multinatio nal’s preference in combination with these strategic directions thus results in distinct strategies for Chinese EMNEs including local optimizer, low-cost supplier, advanced-market seeker, and global consolidator. To be noted in the case study, few firms may pursue one strategy in pure form or do so to the exclusion of other strategies, however it is conceptually useful to specify each of the strategies and its properties. We illustrate each generic strategy with cases that have come closest to pursuing that strategy. Particularly, the identification of which generic strategy a firm had pursued was based on the analysis of its major business segment. In case of Chinese automobile and motorcycle manufacturers, it was found that a firm pursued an internationalization strategy in its small business segment is different from the strategy while internationalizing its major business.1介绍新兴经济体的外国直接投资(FDI)外流和跨国企业(MNEs)的显著增长。

小学英语阅读教育研究专项课题中期报告

小学英语阅读教育研究专项课题中期报告The Mid-term Report of the Special Research Project on Primary School English Reading nProject Name: Special Research Project on Primary School English Reading nKeywords: English Reading。

Cognitive Development。

XXXAbstract:The Mid-term Report of the Special Research Project on Primary School English Reading XXX thinking。

proposes the practical approaches of 1+X problem string design and mind map design。

and obtains the XXX development。

The report also plans the research n for the next stage.Project n Time: XXX 2019Project Leader:Project XXX:I。

Problem Statement1.Research BackgroundSubject knowledge is the material that promotes students' thinking development。

English reading learning。

as an XXX abilities。

should play a role in XXX。

XXX' subjectivity。

XXX。

and shift students' focus from "learning answers" to "asking ns"。

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I I I
Degree of control desired Flexibility Logic of transaction cost reduction (TCA)
degree of control that is desirable

resource commitment a trade-off desirable governance structure transactions specific assets
Derive regression weights - objective weights Rate Asian countries
Xiec Sec
WiXiec
Independent variable
Success Score Dependent Var
Regression coefficient
Sec = a + W1X1ec + W2X2ec +…..
the “make or buy decision”

Entry Options
I
Indirect export
intermediary located in domestic market firms with little experience with export exporter deals with export agents
Environment
Economic
Marketing Research
Controllable
Segmentation and positioning Competitive Analysis Market Entry Strategy
We are here!
Planning
Organising/ Restructuring
Predict performance
Objective score from regression
Opportunity Matrix
Source: Source: Schutte (1995 (1995), in K&H,p.286
Entry Modes and Market Development
Licensee
(O/S Manufacturer) Manufacture & sell Ericsson uses CDMA technology in handphones
Franchising
Franchisor
(Country A) Owns IP Royalties & fees Master Franchisor Local entrepreneurs
Source: Reprinted by permission of the publisher from “Market Similarity and Market Selection: Implications for International Market Strategy,” by William H. Davidson, Journal of Business Research,vol. 11, no. 4., p. 445. Copyright 1983 by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc.
Foreign production
I
Licensing
no physical asset exposure

though IP risk remains
License
Licensor
(domestic manufacturer) Owns IP Qualcomm Royalties & fees 1 to 15%

building trust - save future costs where change is needed
e.g., Freeman Co., sued to break agreement with Japanese companies
high transaction costs

Entry Options
Formal Market Screening
Indicator Variables
•Per capita purchasing power •Psychic distance •Other key characteristic (e.g.,women in workforce)
Weighting of importance indicators Rate country based on each indicator
I
Determined by:
market potential firm’s capabilities and experience managerial commitment to export, market and risk tolerance
Entry Options - Overview
Market Entry Sequence:
based on psychic distance
Psychic distance
• A barrier if cultural knowledge within firm is low • Greater experience in international business - ability to enter more psychic distant markets • High correlation between market entry sequence and psychic “closeness” *
Main idea here: to use European experience information to evaluate Asian market entry Use historical data to extract independent variables for regression equation Evaluate post entry performance on each european market
Promotions
Logistics and Distribution
Products & Services
Pricing
Selecting Market Entry
I
Overview
Must decide what country to enter Must allocate the right resources Decide what to sell Decide where to sell Select the criteria for decision making Seek an acceptable equity share Acquire the right fit Design an exit strategy
Determinants of Entry Strategy
I
Degree of contact with foreign market desired
no contact - export intermediary some contact - foreign import intermediary high contact - subsidiary, FDI, etc.
Part 15: Entry Strategies
Liaoning University Dr Yuanyuan Xing International Business
Where are we in the strategy?
Uncontrollable
Political & Legal Culture
Exporter
I
Foreign sales subsidiary
by-pass intermediary functions like intermediary manufacturer has control capital investment for inventory
Intermed
Limited time Limited territory
Foreign production
I I
Local manufacture Decision driven by comparative advantage
Franchisee
(Country B) Trade name Trade mark Business Models (marketing plan) Operating manuals Standards Training Quality monitoring
Examples •Subway •World Gym Fitness •Mailboxes etc.
Income per capita wt = 1-100 1Population wt = 0-100 0Country A 50 25 ….. Country B 20 50 …..
Compute overall score (Multiply scores)
ห้องสมุดไป่ตู้
C ountry A B C
Pcap Inc

few intermediaries
Exporter
Home country
Agent
Intermediary
Host Country
Entry Options
I
Direct export
intermediary in o/s market agents and distributors - driven by profit margin