融资参考文献
《中小企业融资问题研究国内外文献综述》
中小企业融资问题研究国内外文献综述目录中小企业融资问题研究国内外文献综述 (1)（一）国外研究现状 (1)（二）国内研究现状 (2)参考文献 (4)融资是一个企业赖以生存与发展所必不可少的环节，但是目前中小企业正在面临融资成本过高、融资渠道较狭窄和融资风险较高等融资问题。
因此，无论是在学术界还是企业运营管理中都得到了普遍的关注。
通过在知网、百度学术、谷歌学术等学术网站进行检索发现，国内外学者针对中小企业融资问题的研究成果较为丰富。
（一）国外研究现状在最近几年的时间里，自从互联网金融被越来越多人所熟知，全球的很多专家学者都基于互联网金融，对中小企业的融资工作开展了更深一步的分析和研究。
Jiang Miao（2020）分析了互联网金融融资模式的典型模式——众筹模式，分别介绍了众筹模式的概念、融资流程以及存在的风险，在此基础上提出了中小企业如何运用众筹模式提高融资效率，以及在融资过程中加强风险控制。
Kaya Orçun和Masetti Oliver（2019）总结出在互联网金融的背景下，中小企业赖以生存的最关键因素之一是信用，研究表明，信誉差的中小企业比信誉好的企业更容易失去银行贷款。
Loha Hashimya（2021）认为互联网金融平台通过大数据等手段和发布借贷相关信息，可以降低资金双方融资成本和信息不对称程度，减少逆向选择的可能性，从而提高了融资效率。
Richard和Micheline（2019）以为小微企业融资难的主要起因在于信息不对称，因为小微企业的规模较小、体制不完善、缺乏信誉，将导致银行无法衡量小微企业的信贷风险，因此小微企业很难获取银行的贷款。
他们提出了财务抑制假说，认为这是产生民间金融出现的根本原因。
Okwiri（2019）提出在地区经济环境中，除了正规融资这种方式之外，民间融资的方式可以作为补充，只不过不同融资方式的监督手段需要有差异性。
他认为，非正规金融在正式金融无法运行的地区可以产生效果的主要原因就是“熟人借款”。
《中小企业融资问题研究国内外文献综述1800字》
中小企业融资问题研究国内外文献综述1国外研究现状在西方经济学的研究对象中，国外许多专家和学者针对企业融资的问题进行了大量的实证研究和理论分析。
中小企业的融资在国外研究者的研究中，被归类于中小企业选题中，针对中小企业的融资，不同的专家和学者，从不同视角提出了不同的论点：Meyers在分析中小企业的融资方式后，提出中小企业在融资过程中的信息不对称问题比较明显。
比如在创业早期阶段，中小企业中的很多企业并未获得外部审计的财务报告，企业盈利能力难以预测和估算。
因此，中小企业在融资时，为快速满足资金筹措需求，会优先选择内部融资渠道，如果选择外部融资渠道，就需要优先选择债务融资方式。
Storey在分析金融机构与中小民营企业的融资冲突时, 提出中小企业以银行等金融机构的贷款作为最大的债务性融资渠道。
但因为中小企业自身的资质和发展水平偏低，金融机构提供给中小企业的贷款融资支持力度偏低。
Hairs&Raviv认为企业融资结构是中小企业收入流分配和企业控制权分配的依据，其指出，中小企业之所以很难得到金融信贷支持，主要源于在信息不对称的信贷市场中，中小企业存在道德风险及逆向选择问题。
Félix Corredera-Catalán等表示中小企业在制度、管理等方面存在的问题导致其在成长的不同阶段面对的融资问题不同。
对于中小企业融资问题的梳理，可从融资和负债角度出发，而不仅限于融资方面。
Liang Kaier认为融资渠道受制、融资制度不完善、政府关注度不高等都是中小企业难的主要原因。
融资难已经威胁到中小企业的生存与发展。
Barthelmess Benedik等表示中小企业融资需要面对的问题并不仅仅是融资本身，还包含中小企业自身的生存与发展条件问题，融资只是为中小企业注资，保障资金链，但其最终要解决的是，依赖于什么获得市场竞争实力。
2国内研究现状国内在针对中小企业融资困境问题展开分析时，主要从现实角度分析中小企业融资难的原因。
融资的参考文献近三年
企业融资论文参考文献(一)[1] Justin G. Longenecker, Carlos W. Moore,J. William Petty;郭武文等译。
小企业管理：创业之门：an entrepreneurial emphasis[M] .北京：人民邮电出版社，2006.[2] 李丽霞，徐海俊，孟菲。
我国中小企业融资体系的研究[M] .北京：科学出版社，2005.[3] 陈红辉，赵正堂。
天使投资：我国的现状、问题与对策[J].市场周刊，2004(08)。
[4] 范秀峰，李建中。
资本结构与中小企业股权融资的实证分析[J].宁夏大学学报(人文社会科学版)，2005(3)：97-98.[5] 韩娜。
论日本中小企业的界定标准[J].前言，2010(08)。
[6] 林汉川 ,魏中奇。
台湾中小企业界定标准的演变分析与启示[J].福建论坛(经济社会版)2002(04)。
[7] 梁文潮。
中小企业永续经营之道--理论·准则·方法[M] .武汉：武汉大学出版社，2008.[8] 彭十一。
我国中小企业界定标准的历史回顾及评价[J].企业管理，2009(5)。
[9] 丁会凯，王红艳，陈伟达等。
我国中小企业的界定及其发展过程中的规模问题研究[J].现代管理科学，2005(10)。
[10] 计〖1978〗234 号公布，关于基本建设项目和大中型划分标准的规定[S].企业融资论文参考文献(二)1.《我国中小企业融资难之现状与对策分析》【作者】刘群. 【刊名】金融纵横 2005年05期2.《我国中小企业融资对策分析》【作者】国亮. 【刊名】杨凌职业技术学院学报 2005年01期3.《中小企业的融资问题及对策》【作者】洪慧. 【刊名】云南财贸学院学报(社会科学版) 2005年01期4.《浅析中小企业融资难》【作者】党宏明. 【刊名】西安金融 2005年07期5.《对中小企业融资难问题的成因及对策分析》【作者】姜征宇. 申希国. 【刊名】济南金融 2005年06期6.《当前我国中小企业融资制约因素及对策》【作者】王伯芳. 【刊名】企业技术开发 2005年07期7.《中小民营企业融资难的问题与对策》【作者】崔俊峰. 【刊名】中国金融家 2005年06期8.《中小企业融资问题初探》【作者】李靖. 刊名】决策探索 2005年06期9.《浅谈我国中小企业融资困难的主要原因及对策》【作者】廖丹. 【刊名】湖南经济管理干部学院学报 2005年03期10.《对中国中小企业融资体系构建的理性思考》【作者】陈璐. 【刊名】巢湖学院学报 2005年04期企业融资论文参考文献(三)[1] 包诺敏。
企业融资文献综述（5篇）
企业融资文献综述（5篇）第一篇：企业融资文献综述中小型高新技术企业融资分析文献综述摘要在市场竞争越来越激烈的全球一体化进程中，我国中小高新技术企业的生存与发展受到了严峻的挑战，融资难已成为制约我国中小高新技术企业发展的瓶颈。
实践证明，发展经济、增加就业和完善市场经济体制，必须大力发展中小企业。
中小企业是国民经济可持续发展的重要组成部分，也是高新技术产业化创新的重要力量。
融资困难一直是阻碍我国中小高新技术企业发展的突出问题之一。
应针对我国当前中小高新技术企业融资的环境特征，借鉴国外经验，尽快建立中小高新技术企业诚信系统，有效降低银行的信息成本，建立健全中小企业信用担保体系，加快风险投资业发展，为中小高新技术企业提供强大的资本支持等，以改善中小高新技术企业融资环境。
关键词：高新技术中小企业融资环境前言长期以来，我国在经济发展中只重视改善大型企业的生存环境，而对中小企业发展尤其是中小高新技术企业的融资问题没有引起足够的重视，造成了中小高新技术企业融资难的困境。
而这些企业的融资意识也非常薄弱。
政府对中小高新技术企业融资的政策扶持力度也不够。
西方国家政府扶持中小高新技术企业融资的政策措施有贴息贷款、政府优惠贷款、银行贷款信用担保等。
我国政府为了支持中小高新技术企业的发展，先后出台了一些支持高科技中小企业融资的政策，但力度相当有限。
一方面，针对中小高新技术企业的贴息贷款、优惠贷款有限，另一方面在中小高新技术企业信用担保体系建设方面也显得滞后。
而部分发达资本主义国家在对待这个问题上，已经积累了比较久的经验，有了一些较成熟的政策和措施，值得我们学习借鉴。
国外现状研究及借鉴周慧在《事业财会》发表《中小高新技术企业融资环境的国际比较》一文，（2004，2.），调查指出，为消除不利于中小企业发展的社会因素，确保中小企业的活力和竞争力，美国（1890）制定了《反托拉斯法》来避免垄断对中小企业的不利影响。
美国联邦政府设立了小企业管理局，授权其向中小企业提供贷款，对中小企业的经营管理进行指导，并为中小企业获得政府的订货合同提供帮助。
《上市公司发行可转债融资问题研究国内外文献综述4100字》
上市公司发行可转债融资问题研究国内外文献综述目录上市公司发行可转债融资问题研究国内外文献综述 (1)1公司优序融资理论和可转债融资的动因研究 (1)2可转债融资对公司经营绩效的影响研究 (3)3 可转债的定价和价值理论研究 (4)文献总结 (5)参考文献 (5)企业融资有关问题的研究一直是金融领域研究的重要课题。
从初入市场到作为一种创新融资方式而盛行，可转债正逐渐成为证券市场中企业再融资的主要手段之一。
国内外已有许多学者运用多种研究方法并从不同研究视角对公司发行可转债融资进行全面深入的研究和探索，并提出相应的理论假设。
1公司优序融资理论和可转债融资的动因研究上市公司的融资按资金来源进行划分，有内部融资与外部融资两种，内部融资是企业直接将往年经营产生的留存收益转化为投资，而外部融资的方式则十分多样，可通过借款、发行债券、发行股份的方式进行。
在西方金融研究领域中一直存在着对企业最优资本结构的争论，至今都尚未得出定论。
企业可以通过不同的融资方式对自身的资本结构作出调整，但企业是否能通过改变资本结构来达到降低资本成本、提高企业价值或股东价值的目的，一直以来都是争论与分歧的核心。
Ross（1977），Leland和Pyle（1977）认为企业可以通过许多方式改变资本结构，企业可以通过增加负债，即提高杠杆比率，或者增持自己公司的股份等行为，向外界传达其经营投资状况良好的信号，并且可以降低企业和投资者之间的信息不对称，从而更容易获得外部融资。
1983年，Myers 和Majluf结合了Ross，Leland和Pyle的研究成果，建立了一个信号传递模型。
该模型认为公司的管理者和主要股东比外界投资者更了解自身公司的价值和经营绩效，而管理者着眼于短期的市场绩效，追求更优的股价表现，企图将股东利益最大化。
通常来说，管理层通过增发或配股进行融资的前提，往往是公司股票价格超过了管理层预期。
因此如果这种融资信息被公开，市场会对其报以消极态度，导致公司股价的在短期内下跌。
上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献出处：Abor J; Bokpin A. Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policy. Studies in Economics and Finance. 2015; 27(3):180-194.Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policyAbor J; Bokpin AAbstractPurpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach - This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17-year period, 1990-2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation. Findings - A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well-developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy. Originality/value - The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.Keywords: International; Dividends; Corporate finance;1. IntroductionThe impact of investment and financing decisions on firm value has been the focus of extensive research since [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the "separation principle". The theory asserts that in a perfect capital market, the value of the firm is independent of the manner in which its productive assets are financed. In fact someauthors like [12] Barnes et al.(1981) support their view. However, others have contrasted the findings of the earlier studies suggesting that investment, financing, and dividend policy are related ([30] Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; [46] McCabe, 1979;[5] Anderson, 1983). This is predicated on the assumption that Modigliani and Miller's ideal world does not exist. Financial markets are not perfect given taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and uncertain inflation in the market place. According to [13] Bier man and Hass (1983), management usually addresses the dividend target payout level in the context of forecasting the firm's sources and use of funds. Considering prospective investment opportunities and the internal cash generation potential of the firm, both capital structure and dividend policy are chosen to ensure that sufficient funds are available to undertake all desirable investments without using new equity ([14] Black, 1976). But what constitutes a "desirable" investment? If it is one that has an expected return greater than the cost of funds that finance it, and if the cost of retained earnings is different from the cost of new equity capital, then dividend policy, capital structure, and investment strategy are necessarily jointly determined ([15] Black and Schools, 1974).Dividend payout policy is an important corporate issue and may be closely related to, and interacts with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. A proper understanding of dividend policy is critical for many other areas such as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting ([2] Allen and Michael, 1995). Firms' dividend decisions could also be influenced by their profit level, risk, and size. Though dividend policy has been identified as a major corporate decision faced by management, it remains one of the puzzles in corporate finance ([52] Obi, 2001). There has been emerging consensus that there is no single explanation of dividends. [19] Brook et al.(1998) agree that, there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal.Attention of empirical research has been at ascertaining the relationship between investment opportunities, corporate financing and dividend payout ([54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991; [6] Aviation and Booth, 2003). However, these findings have failed toestablish any clear link concerning this issue. Most of these studies tend to focus on developed markets. Little is, however, known about how investment opportunities and corporate finance influence dividend payout policy of emerging markets. This present study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets tend to exhibit different dividend behavior from those of developed markets like the US. This may be a result of the differences in levels of efficiency and institutional arrangements between developed markets and emerging markets. It is, therefore, useful to improve our understanding of the issue from an emerging market perspective.The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout. The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it considers a large-scale dataset covering 34 emerging market countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on dividend policy. It also reviews the existing literature on the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study and also details the model specification used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 includes the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Overview of literatureSince the publication of the dividend irrelevance theory by [47] Miller and Modigliani (1961), a lot of studies have been conducted in the area of determinants of dividend payout the world over. The dividend irrelevance theory is possible in a perfect and efficient market where stockholders are perfectly rational and there are no taxes and transaction costs. The theory, however, pointed out the importance of investment as being the main issue. Miller and Modigliani framework has thus formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout policy in general. Their framework is rich enough to encompass both dividends and repurchase, as the only determinant of a firm's value is its investment policy ([3] Allen and Michael, 2002). It is arguably said a company's overriding goal is to maximize shareholder wealth ([18]Berkley and Myers, 1996; [16] Block and Hart, 2000), but to [16] Block and Hart (2000) this concept is not a simple task as management cannot directly influence the price of a share but can only act in a manner consistent with the desires of investors. In the view of [61] Woods and Randall (1989), shareholder wealth is generally accepted as the aggregate market value of the common shares, which in turn is assumed to be the present value of the cash flows which will accrue to shareholders, discounted at their required rate of return on equity. These cash flows include dividend and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation except for its high volatility. Firms must, therefore, make important decisions over and over again about how much cash the firm should give back to its shareholders and probably what form it should take.Black (1976) observed that the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together. This attests to the much controversy that surrounds dividend policy. The dividend puzzle revolves around figuring out why companies pay dividends and investors pay attention to dividend. To [18] Berkley and Myers (1996), dividend policy is seen as a trade-off between retaining earnings on one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on the other. The theoretical principles underlying the dividend policy of firms range from information asymmetries, tax-adjusted theory to behavioral factors. The information asymmetries encompass several aspects, including the agency cost, free cash flow hypothesis, and signaling models.Tax-adjusted models presume that investors require and secure higher expected returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The consequence of tax adjusted theory is the division of investors into dividend tax clientele and the clientele effect is responsible for the alterations in portfolio composition ([49] Modigliani, 1982). To [45] Marsalis and Truman (1988), investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm dividend policy. They conclude that as tax liability increases, the dividend payment decreases while earnings reinvestment increases and vice versa.Shareholders typically face the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in the face of separation of ownership and control. The problem of information asymmetry is evident in conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. It holds that insiders such as managers have more information about the firm's cash flow than the providers of the funds. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial control ([39] Jensen and Heckling, 1976) and also in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor managerial activities ([57] Heifer and Vishnu, 1986). [27] Fame and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems can be resolved by the payment of large dividend to shareholders.According to the free cash flow model, [37] Jensen (1986) explains that finance available after financing all positive net present value projects can result in conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Clearly, dividends and debt interest payment decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite consumption. Firms with higher levels of cash flow should have higher dividend payout and/or higher leverage.The signaling theory suggests that corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting quality message across has a lower cost than other alternatives ([48] Miller and Rock, 1985; [8] Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This was developed initially for the labor market but its usefulness has been felt in the financial markets. [7] Aero (1970) defines signaling effect as a unique and specific signaling equilibrium in which a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective employer. The signaling theory suggests that dividends are used to signal managements' private information regarding the future earnings of the firm. Investors often see announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecast of future earnings changes ([34] Healy and Pileup, 1988). Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity ([11] Baker et al., 1985; [54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991).2.1 Investment opportunities and dividend payoutThe investment opportunities available to the firm constitute an important component of market value. The investment opportunity set of a firm affects the way the firm is viewed by managers, owners, investors, and creditors ([43] Caliper and Tremble, 2001). The literature has given considerable attention in recent years to examining the association between investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices, including financing, dividend, and compensation policies ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992;[29] Giver and Giver, 1993; [41] Caliper and Tremble, 1999; [40] Jones and Sharma, 2001; [1] Abbott, 2001). According to [40] Jones (2001), investment opportunity set represents a firm's investment or growth options but to [51] Myers (1977) its value depends on the discretional expenditures of managers. [51] Myers (1977) further explains investment opportunity as a yet-to-be realized potentially profitable project that a firm can exploit for economic rents. Thus, this represents the component of the firm's value resulting from options to make future investments ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992).Growth opportunities are also represented by the relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in place, the higher the growth opportunities ([32] Gull and Kelley, 1999). [43] Caliper and Tremble (2001) suggest that, the conventional notion of investment opportunity set is of new capital expenditure made to introduce a new product or expand production of an existing product. This may include an option to make expenditure to reduce costs during a corporate restructuring. An investment opportunity has been measured in various ways by various writers. These include market to book value of equity ([21] Collins and Kithara, 1989; [20] Chung and Charoenwong, 1991), book to market value of assets ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992), and Tobin's q ([58] Skinner, 1993).Existing literature suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. [59] Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with high investment opportunity set are likely to pursue a low dividend payout policy, since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources ([29] Giverand Giver, 1993). [40] Jones (2001), extending and modifying the work of [29] Giver and Gaver (1993), found out that high growth firms were associated with significantly lower dividend yields. [32] Gul and Kealey (1999) also found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. [1] Abbott (2001) argues that firms that experienced an investment opportunity set expansion (decrease) generally reduced (increase) their dividend payout policy. Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus recording lower dividend payout ratios ([56] Rozeff, 1982; [44] Lloyd et al. , 1985; [22] Collins et al. , 1996; [4] Amidu and Abor, 2006). [55] Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001) also validated the fact that firms in high investment opportunity set group are "PE valued" whilst firms in low investment opportunity set are "dividend yield valued". This implies that for firms in low investment opportunity set, dividends are of greater relevance than earnings whilst the opposite is true for firms in high investment opportunity set. Using market-to-book ratio as proxy for investment opportunity set, [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), however, found a positive relationship between market-to-book value ratio and dividend payments, suggesting that firms with higher investment opportunities rather pay higher dividends.2.2 Corporate finance and dividend payoutThe financing choice of firms is perhaps the most researched area in finance in the past decades following the seminal article of [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) raising the issue of the relationship between a firms choice of finance and its value. Recently, there are still increasing research and new evidence being sought for the relevance or otherwise of the theory started by Modigliani and Miller. The theorem hinges on the principle of perfect capital markets. This asserts that firm value is completely independent of how its productive assets are financed. Subsequent researches have suggested a relationship between choice of financing and firm value even though some researchers corroborated the findings of Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory ([26] Fama, 1974; [54] Pruitt and Gitman, 1991). However, studiesby [5] Anderson (1983), [53] Peterson and Benesh (1983) have proved that in the "real world" market imperfections effectively prohibit the independence of firm's investment and financing decisions. This market imperfection is primarily coming from the fact that there are taxes, transaction cost, information asymmetry, and bankruptcy cost. This indicates a relationship between the choice of financing and firm value.Financial leverage is said to play an important role in reducing agency costs arising from shareholder-manager conflict and is believed to play a vital role of monitoring managers ([39] Jensen and Meckling, 1976; [37] Jensen, 1986; [60] Stulz, 1988). [28] Farinha (2003) contends that debt is likely to influence dividend decisions because of debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders. Also, firms with high financial leverage and implied financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate risk associated with the use of debt finance. [56] Rozeff (1982), [25] Easterbrook (1984) and [22] Collins et al. (1996) extending the agency theory observe that firms pay dividend and raise capital simultaneously. In the view of [25] Easterbrook (1984), increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be raised externally on a periodic basis. This view is also shared by [31] Green et al. (1993) who argue that dividend payout levels are not totally decided after a firm's financing has been made. [35] Higgins (1972) suggests that firms' dividend payout ratio could be negatively influenced by their need for finance. Thus, dividend decision is taken alongside financing decisions. [36] Higgins (1981) shows a direct link between growth and financing needs, in that rapidly growing firms have external financing need because working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003) support the fact that financial constraints can affect dividend decisions, therefore, firms with relatively less debt have greater financial slack and are more likely to pay and maintain their dividends.3. Data and econometric method3.1 Data and variable constructionThis study examines the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on the dividend payout policy of emerging market firms. Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for a large sample of publicly traded firms in 34 emerging market countries over the period 1990-2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This information is obtained through the Corporate Vulnerability Utility of the International Monetary Fund. The corporate vulnerability utility provides indicators for surveillance of the corporate sector and it relies on accounting data from Worldscope and market data mainly from Datastream.The dependent variable, dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividend to capital. Dividend is total cash dividend paid to equity and preferred shareholders. The independent variables include investment opportunity set and corporate finance. We also control for profitability, risk, market capitalization, and two other macroeconomic variables: inflation rate and log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the country's income level.In terms of the independent variables, Tobin's q is used as a proxy for investment opportunity set. Three measures of corporate finance are used. These are; financial leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), external finance (the ratio of external finance to total finance), and debt maturity (the ratio of short-term debt to total debt).In terms of the control variables, profitability is measured as return on assets. Profitability is considered as the primary indicator of the firm's capacity to declare and pay dividends. [11] Baker et al. (1985) find that a major determinant of dividend payment is the anticipated level of future earnings. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also report that current and past years' profits are important in influencing dividend payments. Others such as [38] Jensen et al. (1992), [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), and [4] Amidu and Abor (2006) find evidence of a positive association betweenprofitability and dividend payouts. [10] Baker (1989) finds that an important reason cited by firms for not paying dividends is "poor earnings". Similarly, [23] DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that a significant proportion of firms with losses over a five year period, tend to omit their dividends entirely. A positive relationship should exist between profitability and dividend payout.Risk is defined using the O-Score, which is a measure of probability of default. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find that risk is a major determinant of firms' dividend policy. Firms which have higher risk profiles are more likely to maintain lower dividend payout policy compared with those with lower risk profiles. Using ßvalue of a firm as a measure of its market risk, [56] Rozeff (1982), [44] Lloyd et al. (1985), and [22] Collins et al. (1996) found a significantly negative relationship between ßand dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher level of market risk will pursue lower dividend payout policy. [24] D'Souza (1999) also suggests that risk is significantly and negatively related with firms' dividend payout. We expect risk to be negatively related to dividend payout.We control for size of the market. This is defined as ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Size of the market is used as a proxy for capital market access. Firms with better access to the capital market should be able to pay higher dividends ([6] Aivazian and Booth, 2003). It is expected that a positive relationship will exist between market capitalization and dividend payout policy.We also control for two macroeconomic variables: inflation and GDP per capita. Inflation is the inflation rate. GDP per capita is log of GDP per capita and is included as a measure of the country's income level.3.2 Model specificationWe estimate the following panel data regression model: Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where subscript i and t represent the country and time, respectively. Y is a measure of dividend payout. Invt is a measure of investment opportunity set. Fin are measures of corporate finance variables including, financialleverage, external finance, and debt maturity. X are the control variables and include profitability, risk, stock market capitalization, inflation, and GDP per capita. μ is the error term. Using this model, it is possible to investigate the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.3.3 Estimation issuesThis study adopts a panel data method given that it allows for broader set of data points. Therefore, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. Also, panel data can control for individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross section estimations leads to biased results ([9] Baltagi, 2005). The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where α is a scalar, ßis KX 1 and X it is the it th observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the μit follow a one-way error component model: Equation 3 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where μi is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The term V it represents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual countries and time. It can be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. The choice of the model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, μi and V it are random with known disturbances. In the fixed effects model, the μi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with V it independent and identically distributed, i.e. νit∼iid (0,σν2 ). The explanatory variables X it are assumed independent of the V it for all i and t . We use the [62] Hausman (1978) specification test in choosing the appropriate model. We report the results of the Hausman specification test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.].4. Empirical results4.1 Descriptive statisticsTable I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The sample covers 34 emerging countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. It reports the mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in the study as well as the number of observations over the sample period. The mean value for the dependent variable (dividend payout) is 0.32, implying that across the sample countries the average dividend payout is 32 percent. There is, however, a variation in the dependent variable across the countries over the time period as shown by standard deviation of 0.49 with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 3.93, respectively.The mean investment opportunity set measured by the Tobin's q is 1.05 with a variation of 0.52. All the countries have positive investment opportunities with minimum and maximum values of 0.06 and 5.01, respectively. Financial leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio has a mean value of 1.17 and has a standard deviation of 127.58. External finance registers an average value of -0.01 over the period with a standard deviation of 5.27. Debt maturity has a mean figure of 0.58, indicating that short-term debt accounts for 58 percent of total debt. Profitability defined in terms of return on assets also registers an average value of 6.66 percent. The standard deviation is also shown as 5.37. Risk shows a mean value of -3.37. Stock market capitalization to GDP has a mean value of 49.74 percent. The minimum and maximum values for this variable are 0.00 and 528.49, respectively, with a variation of 66.52. The average inflation rate and GDP per capita are 2.61 and 8.04 percent, respectively (Figure 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).4.2 Correlation analysisWe test for possible degree of multi-collinearity among the regressors by including a correlation matrix of the variables in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. Dividend payout shows significantly positive correlations with debt maturity, profitability, and GDP per capita. Investment opportunity set exhibits significantly negative correlations with financial leverage, inflation, and GDP per capita, but shows significantly positive correlations with external finance, debt maturity, profitability,and market capitalization. There is a significant but negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability and a positive correlation between financial leverage and risk. External finance shows significant and positive correlations with profitability and inflation but a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Debt maturity is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP per capita. There are significant and negative correlations between profitability and risk, market capitalization, as well as GDP per capita. However, we found positive correlation between profitability and inflation. There are statistically and significant positive correlations between risk and market capitalization, and GDP per capita. Market capitalization is also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.4.3 Panel regression resultsBoth fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After which the [62] Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. We report the results of the Hausman test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. The test statistics are all significant at 1 percent, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects. The Hausman specification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients are not systematic.The results indicate a statistically significant but negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout ratio. It could be inferred that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to exhibit low dividend payout ratio. In other words, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to pursue a low dividend payout ratio since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources. Paying low dividends means that such firms could retain enough funds to finance their future growth and investments.[29] Gaver and Gaver (1993) note that firms with high growth potential or investment opportunity set are expected to pay low dividends, since investment and dividends are。
中小企业融资问题英文参考文献(精选122个最新)
近年来，随着中小企业的飞速发展，中小企业融资问题，已经成为一些中小企业进一步发展所面临的“瓶颈”。
在我国经济体制转型和经济结构调整的特殊历史时期,中小企业融资问题不仅表现得较为突出,也更为复杂。
下面是搜索整理的中小企业融资问题英文参考文献，欢迎借鉴参考。
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中小企业融资毕业参考文献.doc
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Abstract: Folk financing has played what role in thedevelopment of China's private enterprises? When private enterprises in the face of "CreditDiscrimination", by what ways to obtain the required capital for development? What kind of relationship exists between folk financing and private corporate funding requirements? Folk financing has what kind of impact on private enterprises debt financing? What kind of relationship between folk financing and private enterprises bank loans? We use 2006-2011 years listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities of private enterprises as samples, use the development of the enterprises financing difficulty from the private channel to measure the folk financing. By examining the relationship between folk financing with private enterprises total liabilities and bank loans, trying to make up for these shortcomings. First: the difficulty of folk financing for private enterprises has an important impact on debt financing, the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises more easy to obtain funds from private, private enterprises debt more; Second: the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises debt financing are more, but the private enterprises’ bank loans decreased.Keywords: Private enterprises; Financing Constraints; Folk Financing; Bank LoansⅠ. IntroductionFolk financing, also known as private lending, People's Bank of China considering that folk financing are with respect to the financial transactions by state-approved financial institution. Refers to the monetary value as the underlying funds transfer and the principal and interest payments between naturalpersons, enterprises and other economic entities(except financial). Kropp et al.considered that the state or government usually establish the central bank to regulate economic, those market outside of the regulation were defined as non-formal finance. Isaksson et al.believed that informal financial sector is the financial activities of certain sectors of the economy arenot regulated and controlled by the State. Folk financing as an integral part of China's financial system has become a useful complement to the formal financial financing methods, occupies a huge share of our entire financial system, play an important role in promoting the rapid development of the national economy.According to CICC research report estimates, Chinese private lending balances in the middle of the 2011, grow 38% compared to the same period, reached 3.8 trillion yuan, accounting for the total size of the shadow banking China loans (CICC estimates) of about 33%, equivalent to 7% of the total bank loans.After nearly 30 years of development, the private economy has become an important force in our national economy forward, has become an important part of our economy, and made great contributions to the economic development of our country. But in our transition economy background, because the lack of institution, the legal system is notperfect, the financial service is backward, andlong-standing political and ideological "Discrimination" and other reasons, private enterprises and state-owned enterprises is very difficult to obtain the same in a fair market competition position. Currently in debt financing of private enterprises in China also have been discriminated against, China's current financial system is still dominated bythe big four state banks, although with the continuous reform of management system of banking industry, state-owned banks also began applying the principle of market economy principles to credit decisions, but the government as the ultimate controlling shareholders and ownership of state-owned banks, still dominates the bank credit resource allocation, leading to more bank credit resources allocation to the same ultimate controller and owner as government-ownedenterprises, private enterprises is difficult to obtain bank credit support..Although China's private enterprises suffered serious credit discrimination, but the rapid development of private enterprises is an indisputable fact, and the rapid development of China's private enterprises and private lending expanded rapidly during the period of staggering synchronization, whether this is just coincidence, or inevitable result? What kind of relationship exists between folk financing and private corporate funding requirements? Folk financing has what kind of impact on private enterprises debt financing? And by "Credit Discrimination" private enterprises bank loans, what is the relationship between? The existing literature is seldom reported in this area.We use 2006-2011 years listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities of private enterprises as samples, use the development of the enterprise financing difficulty from the private channel to measure the folk financing.By examining the relationship between folk financing with private enterprises total liabilities and bank loans, trying to make up for these shortcomings. The results showed that:First: the difficulty of folk financing for private enterprises have an important impact on debt financing, the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises more easy to obtain funds from private, private enterprises debt moreSecond: the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises debt financing are more, but the private enterprises bank loans decreased.Ⅱ. Innstitutional Background and HypothesesA.Private Enterprises Financing ConstraintsCompared with the State-owned enterprises,China's private enterprises have been limited in many ways, such as financing, market access and so on. Brandt and Lipointed out that in China's institutional environment, private owners and their companies have been unfairly treated in external financing, at a disadvantage position. Fan et al.also pointed out that therelevant Chinese laws and regulations is unjust to treat private enterprises, including external financing conditions more demanding, and China's financial sector also reluctant to provide loans to private enterprises. In general, the private corporate debt financing difficulties due to the following aspects: (1)Private enterprises owned tangible and intangible assets (particularly goodwill) less limited ability to obtain mortgages and credit loans from banks, and financial institutions in fact also exist for different ownership enterprises credit policy differences; (2)The credit guarantee system has not yet formed, guarantee agencies less, varieties of a single, system is not perfect, it is difficult to meet the needs of the development of private enterprises; (3)Some private enterprises lack of honesty,and enterprise credit information collection and evaluation system deficiencies, causing financial institutions to private enterprises“Credit Crunch” and social capital for private enterprises, “Reluctant to Invest”phenomenon.B. Folk Financing DevelopmentAt present the reason for the development of folk financing mainly has two viewpoints.One view thinks that the cause of folk financing in China is generated by the“Financial Repression” policy, the formal financial sector “Credit Rationing” behavior, so that the private enterprises cannot get enough financial resources within the system.Second point considered formal finance and folk financing coexist was produced by the information asymmetry of market segmentation. In addition, due to some historical reasons, the financial system of China's private enterprises transparency is low,companies often do not use formal accounting system or to keep several sets of financial books. What is more, some small andmedium private enterprises for the purpose of tax evasion to conceal its true financial information, but also exacerbated the problem of information asymmetry faced by bank credit.The development and growth of private enterprises in need of funds to support, lack of access to economic resources such as bank loans within the system (market-oriented approaches), the private enterprises began to consider non-market-based measures (such as folk financing) to obtain the necessary economic resources for development. Based on the above analysis, this paper verified hypothesis on the following.H1: Folk financing and private enterprises debt financing is positively related-- the higher the level of development in the areas of folk financing, the more debt financing of private enterprises; H2: Folk financing and private enterprises to obtain bank loans is negative correlation--the higher the level of development of folkfinancing, the more debt financing of private enterprises, but the bank loans has decreased.Ⅲ.Data and Research MethodsA. Sample Selection and Data SourcesThis paper takes 2006-2011 years listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, private enterprises as the research sample.According to the following principles toeliminate some samples:(1)Excluding financial sector sample,because the liabilities of financial industry company is different from that of non-financial industry company;(2)Removing during 2006-2011, either by ST, PT treated company;(3)Excluding the lack of data and sample data extremely unusual; Finally, our sample consisted of 245 firms in 2006-2011, a total of 1345 observations.B. Model Set and Variable DefinitionIn order to test hypothesis 1, 2, we will be tested regression equation is set to:Debt=α+β1Mjrz+β2X+β3Industry+β4Year+εIn the equation, Debt is debt financingvariables, which means that the debt financingof enterprises, based on previous literature, the ariables involved in this article include:private enterprises debt financing and bank loan mount variables.[10]The specific measurement ethods are as follows:The total debt financing variablesFUZHIHJ) = the natural logarithm of total orporate debt financing;Bank loan amount variables (STRUCTURE)= Total loans / Total assetsMjrz indicates the degree of difficulty of rivate enterprises to obtain funds from the rea. Related indicators we use Wang Xiaolu's usiness Environment Index for China’s rovinces 2011Report.olk financing is aken from one of "Private Financing"Index, according to Wang Xiaolu definition,the greater the index, which means that ompanies are more likely to raise funds from he local private channels.X is a vector formed by a plurality of ontrol variables, we controlled for a number f factors that affect enterprise debt financing:Enterprise Scale(Size), Profitability(ROE),Growth(Growth), Mortgage Assets (Assetstruc),the Proportion of the First Shareholder (Shrcrl),Non-Debt Tax Shield (Ndts), Free Cash Flow(Fcf), Tobin's Q (TQ). We also consider the ndustry attributes (Industry) and annual (year)may affect the financing of corporate debt.Ⅳ.Empirical Results and nalysisThe empirical analysis of the order, first be rouped by key variables descriptive statistics,ndcompare the mean of each variable whether there are differences with the"Independent Sample t Test" between the twogroups; then by multivariate regression analysis to test folk financing for private corporate debt financing and bank loans have what kind of impact; finally grouping regression according to folk financing level whether the effect of folk financing for the private enterprises debt and bank loans differ in the level of group.A.Descriptive Statistics of VariablesWe put the sample in accordance with the development of high and low levels of folk financing into two groups (greater than the median of a group, less than or equal to the median of another group), and with the"Independent Sample t Test ", comparing the mean value of each variable in the two groups.The results are shown in Table 1, the results show that, the higher level of the folk financing development group total liabilities at the level of 5%,significantly higher than the low group;while total bank loans of a high level group at the 10% level, significantly lower. This suggests that higher levels of folk financing in the development of the region, the higher the total liabilities of private enterprises, but instead fewer total bank loans. The higher level group in Enterprise Scale (Size), Non-Debt Tax Shield(Ndts), Folk Finance Development Level (Mjrz)were significantly higher than the low level of development group; but the Company Growth(Growth), Mortgage Assets (Assetstruc), Free Cash Flow (Fcf) were significantly less than the low level group; the Profitability (Roe), TobinQ (TQ) and the Proportion of the First Shareholder (Shrcrl) there are no significant difference between the two groups. Descriptive results intuitively show the differences in each variable mean on the folk financing development level group of private enterprises,initially supported the hypothesis 1 and 2; To obtain reliable results, also need further multivariate regression analysis.B. Multiple Regression ResultsTable 2 by single variable analysis preliminary support hypothesis 1, 2, here we add control variables, further through regression analysis to test the influence of folk financing on private enterprises total liabilities and bank loans. Therefore, here we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) test, in order toavoid possible heteroscedasticity regression analysis in this paper, we using the White (1980)of the heteroskedasticity correction technique.The results shown in Table 2.Model (1), (2), (3)in table2 display folk financing and private enterprises total liabilities test results: In the model (1), we will put the whole folk financing in model, test results show that the folk inancing and total liabilities in a significant positive correlation at 1% level; In the model(2), we expressed a high level of development a group of folk financing into the model, the result is that the a higher level of development of folk financing to total liabilities under the 1% level was significant positive correlation;Similarly, we develop the folk financing group into a lower model (3), the result is a low level of development of folk financing is a positive correlation between total liabilities, but it does not have statistically significant. This shows the difficulty of folk financing of private enterprises have a significant impact on debt financing, the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises is more easy to obtain funds from private, private enterprises debt more.Model (4), (5), (6), said the test results of folk financing and bank loans to private enterprises. In the model (4), we will put the whole folk financing in model, test results show that the folk financing with bank loans at the 5% level was significantly negatively correlated; In the model (5), we expressed a high level of development of a group of folk financing into the model, the result is a higher level of development of folk financing with the bank loans under the 5% level significantnegative correlation; Similarly, we develop the folk financing group into a lower model (6), the result is a low level of development of folk financing with bank loans is negative correlation but not significant. This means that,the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises are more easily to receive money from the folk, thereby reducing the demand for bank loans.Model (1) to (6) confirms the alternative relationship between the folk financing and bank loans. Also shows that folk financing for the development of private enterprises has an important supporting role, high level of development of the folk area, private enterprises debt more, but the bank loan is less,which means, the private enterprises in the face of all kinds of "Discrimination" and “nstitutional Constraints”, private enterprises actively to use the folk financing to obtain economic resources.The above results show that, the folk financing by providing financing to the private enterprises, more funding to meet the needs of private enterprises, thus reducing the need for bank loans. It also confirms, the folk financing as a kind of social credit form, replacement effect of competing with the formal financial.Ⅴ.ConclusionsIn recent years, on the one hand, China's private enterprises, though it suffered a severe credit discrimination has been rapid development. On the other hand is the rapid growth of folk financing of our country, then folk financing and development of private enterprises has what kind of relationship?Using private enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen two city 2006-2011 years as samples, the empirical study found that: the folk financing difficulty has an important impact on the debt financing of private enterprises, In the higher level of development of folk financing, private enterprises is more easy to obtain funds from private, private enterprises debt financing is more; while the higher the level of development of folk financing, private enterprises debt more, but the bank loans decreased. This shows, folk financing by providing financing to the private enterprises, more to meet the financing needs of private enterprises, thus reducing the demand for bank loans.。