毕业论文外文翻译-优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值

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优化资本结构：债务与权益之间找到恰当的平衡[外文翻译]

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译Optimizing the capital structure: Finding the right balance betweendebt and equityJust over 50 years ago Miller and Modigliani (1958) showed that under a certain set of conditions—namely perfect capital markets with no taxes and agency conflicts—a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant to its valuation.Their results are controversial and have raised a large number of questions from academics and practitioners.This article summarizes the main issues underlying the choice by firms of an appropriate capital structure, taking into account their specific fundamentals as well as macroeconomic factors.It presents the benefits and costs of borrowing, describes how to assess these to arrive at the basic trade-off between debt and equity, and examines conditions under which debt becomes irrelevant.Types of FinancingThere are three financing methods that companies can use: debt, equity, and hybrid securities. This categorization is based on the main characteristics of the securities.Debt FinancingDebt financing ranges from simple bank debt to commercial paper and corporate bonds. It is a contractual arrangement between a company and an investor, whereby the company pays a predetermined claim (or interest) that is not a function of its operating performance, but which is treated in accounting standards as an expense for tax purposes and is therefore tax-deductible. The debt has a fixed life and has a priority claim on cash flows in both operating periods and bankruptcy. This is because interest is paid before the claims to equity holders, and, if the company defaults oninterest payments, it will be declared bankrupt, its assets will be sold, and the amount owed to debt holders will be paid before any payments are made to equity holders.Equity FinancingEquity financing includes owners’ equity, venture capital (equity capital provided to a private firm in exchange for a share ownership of the firm), common equity, and warrants (the right to buy a share of stock in a company at a fixed price during the life of the warrant). Unlike debt, it is permanent in the company, its claim is residual and does not create a tax advantage from its payments as dividends are paid after interest and tax, it does not have priority in bankruptcy, and it provides management control for the owner.Hybrid SecuritiesHybrid securities are securities that share some characteristics with both debt and equity and include, for example, convertible securities (defined as debt that can be converted into equity at a prespecified date and conversion rate), preferred stock, and option-linked bonds.The Irrelevance PropositionIn 1958 Modigliani and Miller demonstrated that, under a certain set of assumptions, the choice between any of these securities (referred to as capital structure or leverage) is not relevant to a company’s valuation.The assumptions include: no taxes, no costs of financial distress, perfect capital markets, no interest rate differentials, no agency costs (rationality), and no transaction costs. These assumptions are, in fact, the main drivers of capital structure and gave rise to the trade-off theory of leverage.The Trade-Off of DebtIn this so-called Miller–Modigliani framework, firms choose their optimal level of leverage by weighing the following benefits and costs of debt financing.Benefits of DebtThere are two main advantages of debt financing: taxation, and added discipline.Taxation: Since the interest on debt is paid before taxation, whereas dividends paid to equity holders are usually paid from profit after tax, the cost of debt issubstantially less than the cost of equity. This tax-deductibility of interest makes debt financing attractive. Suppose that the debt of a company is $100 million and the interest rate is 10%. Every year the company pays interest of $10 million. Suppose that the corporation tax rate is 30%. If the company does not pay tax, its interest will be $10 million and the cost of debt will be 10%. However, if the company is able to deduct the tax on this $10 million from its corporation tax payment, then the company saves $10 million × 30% = $3 million in tax payments per year, making the effective interest payment only $7 million. If the debt is permanent, every year the company will have a $3 million tax saving, referred to as a tax shield. We can compute the present value (PV) by discounting annual value by the cost of debt, as follows: PV of tax shield = kd × D × tckd = D × tcwhere kd is the cost of debt, D is the amount of debt, and the product of kd and D gives the amount of the interest charge. tc is the corporation tax rate. We simplify the ratio by kd to obtain the present value of the tax shield as the product of the amount of debt and the corporation tax rate. Thus, the value of a company that is financed with debt and equity (such a company is referred to “levered”) should be equal to its value if it is financed only with equity plus the present value of the tax shield. We can write this value as:Value of levered firm with debt D =Value of nonlevered firm + D × tcThese arguments suggest that the after-tax cost of debt can be computed as 10% × (1-30%) = 7%.Added discipline: In practice, the managers are not the owners of the company. This so-called separation of managers and stockholders raises the possibility that managers may prefer to maximize their own wealth rather that of the stockholders. This is referred to as the agency conflict. In general, debt may make managers more disciplined because debt requires a fixed payment of interest, and defaulting on such payments will lead a company to bankruptcy.Costs of DebtDebt has a number of disadvantages, including a higher probability of bankruptcy, an increase in the agency conflicts between managers and bondholders,loss of future financial flexibility, and the cost of information asymmetry.Expected bankruptcy cost. Given that debt holders can declare a company bankrupt if it defaults on its interest payment, companies that have a high level of debt are likely to have a high probability of facing such a default. This probability is also increased when a company is operating in a high business risk environment. Debt financing creates financial risk. Thus, companies that have high business risk should not increase their risk of default by taking on a high financial risk through their use of debt. Evidence indicates that much of the loss of value occurs not in the liquidation process but in the stage of financial distress, when the firm is struggling to pay its bills (including interest), even though it may not go on to be liquidated.Agency costs. These costs arise when a company borrows funds and the managers use the funds to finance alternative, usually more risky, activities than those specified in the borrowing contract to generate higher returns to stockholders. The greater the separation between managers and lenders, the higher the agency costs.Loss of future financing flexibility. When a firm increases its debt substantially, it faces difficulties raising additional debt. Companies that can forecast their future financing needs accurately can plan their financing better and may not raise additional funds randomly. In general, the greater the uncertainty about future financing needs, the higher the costs.Information asymmetry. When companies do not disclose information to the market, their information asymmetry will be high, resulting in a higher cost of debt financing.Redeployable assets of debt. Lenders require some sort of security when they fund a company. This security is referred to as collateral. Lenders accept assets that can be resold or redeployed into other activities, such as property (real estate), as collateral. In general, the lower the value of the redeployable assets of debt, the higher are the costs.Financing Choices and a Firm’s Life CycleAlthough companies may prefer to use internal financing to minimize the issuance (transaction) costs, the trend in financing depends critically on the firm’s lifecycle.Start-ups are small, privately owned companies. They are likely to be financed by owners’ funds and bank borrowings. Their funding needs are high, but their ability to raise external funding is limited because they do not have sufficient assets to offer as security to finance providers. They will try to seek private equity funding. Their long-term leverage is likely to be low as they are mainly financed with short-term debt.Expanding companies are those that have succeeded in attracting customers and establishing a presence in the market. They are likely to be financed by private equity and/or ventu re capital in addition to owners’ equity and bank debt. Their level of debt is low and they have more short-term than long-term debt in their capital structure.High-growth companies are likely to be publicly traded, with rapidly growing revenues. They will issue equity in the form of common stock, warrants, and other equity options, and probably convertible debt. They are likely to have a moderate leverage.Mature companies are likely to finance their activities by internal financing, debt, and equity. Their leverage is likely to be relatively high but will depend on the costs and benefits of debt and their fundamental factors, such as business risk and taxation.ConclusionThis article discussed the different financing methods companies can use and then argued that their choice depends on the costs and benefits of debt financing and the firm’s life cycle. For example, whereas startup companies are likely to be financed with private personal funds, making their leverage low, mature companies tend to have high leverage because they are able to mitigate the costs of debt and gain from the tax benefits. In addition to these factors, in practice firms may choose their financing mix by mimicking comparable firms, or they may adopt the average level of debt of all the companies in their industry. These methods are not highly recommendable as they may result in a suboptimal choice. In other cases they follow a financing hierarchy, where retained earnings are the preferred option, followed by external financing in the form of debt, and then equity. This preference is driven bythe transaction and monitoring costs.Making It HappenThe choice of financing is strategic and involves the following issues:• Both low- and high-debt financing are suboptimal. Companies should aim for the most advantageous level of debt financing, whereby the costs are minimized and the benefits are maximized.• The costs of debt include a greater probability of bankruptcy, an increase in the agency conflicts between managers and bondholders, a loss of future financial flexibility (including the availability of collateral assets), and information asymmetry costs.• The benefits relate mainly to tax shields and the added discipline to mitigate the agency conflicts between stockholders and managers.• This equilibrium applies primarily to mature companies. Start-ups and growth companies are likely to have lower leverage as their borrowing capacity is low. It also applies to companies that normally pay dividends and do not accumulate cash for reinvestment in order to avoid the need to raise external financing.• The recent financial crisis has highlighted another issue in debt financing, namely liquidity. Leverage concepts were developed mainly in times when debt financing was fully available. In the current credit crisis this is no longer the case. Companies therefore now have to pay an extra liquidity cost to raise additional capital. The question is whether this is a temporary situation or a permanent one, in which case debt will become more costly and leverage will be lower than in the past.• Another challenge of debt financing relates to the ethics of the use of excessive debt financing, particularly by financial institutions. Pettifor (2006) was able to foresee the current crisis, tracing debt financing back to early times and arguing that religions are against debt because it results in usury. She provides interesting arguments, challenging the whole structure of debt financing, payment of interest, and interest tax deductibility. Possibly a new structure of debt that is linked to the profitability of assets and incurs no interest will emerge from the current crisis.Source: Meziane Lasfer, 2009”Optimizing the Capital Structure: Finding the Right Balance between Debt and Equity”. http://www.qfin .优化资本结构：债务与权益之间找到恰当的平衡仅仅在50年前，米勒和莫迪利亚尼（1958）表明，在一组特定的条件下，即没有税收和代理冲突的完全资本市场，一个公司的资本结构与其估值无关。

最优资本结构对经济及其它价值的作用外文翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Optimal Capital StructureReflections on Economic and Other ValuesOver the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stake holders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control 1 and, related, the issue of corporate governance , receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather ,the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the ﬁrm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two bro adly deﬁned situations. The ﬁrst is the traditional case of the ﬁrm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the ﬁrm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating ﬁnance literature. An example of the latter is the cooperation, a legal entity which can be found, in among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why ﬁrms are facingmultiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 。

资本结构优化分析论文

资本结构优化分析论文资本结构由长期债务、短期债务和股权资本组成，影响企业的经营效益、市场竞争力和风险承受能力。

合理的资本结构可以最大化企业价值，降低资本成本和风险，提高企业的经营效益和市场竞争力。

资本结构的优化分析可以从多个角度进行研究，包括资本结构的理论基础、资本结构的影响因素以及资本结构的实践应用等方面。

首先，资本结构的理论基础是资本结构理论。

常见的资本结构理论包括杜邦分析、财务杠杆理论和保守财务理论等。

杜邦分析是通过资本结构的三个基本要素（收益率、资产周转率和资本结构比例）来评估企业绩效。

财务杠杆理论认为，适度的债务融资可以降低资本成本，提高股东回报率。

保守财务理论则指出，企业应通过内部融资来避免或降低债务融资带来的风险。

其次，资本结构的影响因素是决定企业资本结构的关键因素。

影响资本结构的因素包括税收政策、法律环境、行业特征、公司规模以及市场情况等。

税收政策的变化可以影响债务融资的成本，进而影响企业的资本结构选择。

法律环境的差异也会对资本结构的选择产生影响。

行业特征以及公司规模等因素也会对资本结构产生一定的影响。

最后，资本结构的实践应用是指在实际经营过程中，企业如何根据自身情况进行资本结构的调整。

企业可以通过融资结构的调整来降低融资成本、改善财务状况，提高经营效益。

资本结构的调整可以包括增加债务融资比例、减少股权融资比例，或者进行股权重组等。

基于资本结构优化分析的实践应用可以帮助企业提出合理的资本结构调整方案，提高企业的财务状况和经营效益。

综上所述，资本结构优化分析对于企业的发展具有重要意义。

企业应该根据自身情况和市场需求，通过深入研究和实践应用，找到最佳的资本结构组合，以提高企业的财务状况和市场竞争力。

资本结构优化分析论文的研究内容可以从资本结构的理论基础、影响因素和实践应用等方面展开，以帮助企业进行资本结构优化的决策。

中英文外文文献翻译资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

毕业论文(浅议如何优化企业资本结构问题)

目录摘要 (1)一、财务管理的最优目标——企业价值最大化 (1)二、以企业价值最大化作为财务管理目标更符合我国国情 (2)三、资本结构理论与企业价值最大化 (3)(一)MM理论的发展阶段 (3)3.1.1最初的MM理论 (3)3.1.2修正的MM理论 (3)3.1.3米勒模型理论 (3)3.1.4权衡模型理论 (3)(二)资本结构理论对我们的启示 (4)3.2.1负债筹资是成本最低的筹资方式 (4)3.2.2成本最低的筹资方式未必是最佳筹资方式 (4)3.2.3最优资本结构是一种客观存在 (4)四、衡量资本结构重要指标——财务杠杆利益 (4)(一)提高企业的盈利能力 (5)(二)降低企业负债利率 (5)4.2.1经济周期因素 (5)4.2.2市场竞争环境因素 (5)4.2.3行业因素 (6)4.2.4预计的投资效益情况 (6)参考文献 (6)- 1 -摘要本文通过研究财务管理目标与资本结构理论的关系,对如何优化企业资本结构问题进行了探讨。

指出财务管理目标应为企业价值最大化,财务杠杆利益是衡量企业资本结构的重要指标,并在分析影响企业资本结构有关因素的基础上,对如何优化企业资本结构的问题提出了个人建议。

随着我国经济体制改革的不断深化,对企业财务管理体制的完善和发展提出了新的要求。

如何科学地设置财务管理最优目标,对于研究财务管理理论,确定资本的最优结构,有效地指导财务管理实践具有一定的现实意义。

本文拟从确定财务管理的最优目标出发,分析财务管理最优目标(企业价值最大化)与资本结构的关系,并运用资本结构的计量指标 (财务杠杆利益),对我国企业的负债经营状况进行分析研究。

【关键词】财务管理企业价值资本结构财务杠杆一、财务管理的最优目标——企业价值最大化财务管理目标是在特定的理财环境中通过组织财务活动,处理财务关系所要达到的目的。

比较具有代表性的财务管理目标主要有以下几种观点:企业利润最大化、股东财富最大化、企业价值最大化、企业经济效益最大化。

资本结构优化论文(独家整理6篇)

资本结构优化论文（独家整理6篇）标题1：资本结构对企业价值的影响资本结构是企业融资成本和财务风险的核心问题，企业通过调整资本结构来降低融资成本和财务风险，从而提高企业价值。

本文从企业财务风险和融资成本两个方面入手，对资本结构和企业价值之间的关系进行细致的阐述和分析。

首先，本文从理论上解释了资本结构对企业财务风险的影响，说明了资本结构越保守，企业的财务风险越小，但融资成本也越高。

反之，资本结构越倾向于股权融资，企业的财务风险越大，但融资成本也越低。

其次，本文结合实证研究，以市值为评估企业价值的标准，对我国上市公司的资本结构和企业价值之间的关系进行了实证检验。

实证结果表明，资本结构处于中等偏股权偏债务融资的上市公司，价值最高，而偏向股权融资或债务融资的公司价值较低。

综上所述，本文的研究结果可以为企业在资本结构决策上提供一定的参考。

企业可以根据自身经营状况、市场环境、融资需求等因素，选择最优的资本结构，以提高企业价值。

总结：资本结构对企业的影响是一个综合、长期的问题，企业应理性选择最优的资本结构，以获得经济效益的最大化。

标题2：股权融资与债务融资的利弊分析股权融资和债务融资是企业融资的两种常见方式。

股权融资是指企业向股东发行股票来筹集资金；债务融资是指企业通过向债权人发行债券或从银行获得贷款等方式来获得资金。

本文将从融资成本、财务风险、股东管理权等多个方面，对股权融资和债务融资的利弊进行深入分析。

首先，本文从融资成本出发，指出股权融资具有较高的融资成本，而债务融资具有相对较低的融资成本。

其次，本文从财务风险角度，说明股权融资具有较低的财务风险，而债务融资则存在着较高的财务风险。

再次，本文指出股权融资能够满足股东管理权的需求，而债务融资则不能。

最后，本文就股权融资和债务融资的利弊做了总结。

总体而言，股权融资和债务融资均有其利弊，企业应该根据自身情况和融资需求，权衡利弊，选择适合自身的融资方式。

总结：在实践中，股权融资和债务融资是企业融资的两种重要方式。

财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译

财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译核准通过，归档资料。

未经允许，请勿外传～LNTU Acc公司治理与高管薪酬:一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。

高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。

我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。

我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。

在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。

因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。

正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。

”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。

根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。

这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。

公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。

因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。

大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。

正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。

股东的目标是使财富最大化;因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。

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Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other valuesBy Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11. IntroductionDespite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’point of view.Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 (see Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 (see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal' for the value maximizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available.2. Maximizing shareholder valueAccording to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have one objective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the firm is maximization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value 4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision 5. Two theories about the capital structure of the firm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view. The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio 6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm (G u ) and an identical levered firm (G l) is the present value of tax shields (PVTS). Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm 7. The higher leverage, the lower G l , the higher G u - G l(=PVTS). In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields 8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)10, the asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976), the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' and the 'cash in and run' game (Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006). These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of debtis the reduction of agency costs between managers and external equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989). Jensen en Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders (only) which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.In Myers' (1984) and Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order model12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing13, firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity.A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. (See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.)The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman (2002)15 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financial stakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p. 598). These considerations by non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned) since thesestakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.17Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers (1999), testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim (2002) estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales (1995)19 explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Barclay & Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach.3. Other objectives and considerationsA lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys (see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise. The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financialdistress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as (an indirect) indication of concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument'.The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for financial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Furthermore, managers are reluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25.The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are (justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goals that is maximized by managers –which may not be excluded –and if the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage (and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any) to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999).Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, and policyrecommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’(Ibid., p. 1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response (see Jensen, 2001), 'the organizational theory' (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001) and the stakeholder equity model (see Soppe, 2006).We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.Pre-tax value is the maximum value of the firm including the maximum value of the present value of all stakeholders' surplus. The present value of the stakeholders' surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs (including above market wages), above market services provided to customers and the community etc.28 Depending on the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributed among the different stakeholders following certain 'rules'. Note that what we call 'surplus' in this framework is still based on the 'property rights' principle of the firm. Second, only distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are not29.Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call these criteria 'quasi non-economic criteria'. Non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other reasons than financial wealth.The broadest decision framework we propose in this paper is the one that includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far from complete.flexibility could be relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if it influences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see Section 2 and 4.The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the duration of a 'profitable' relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In Section 2and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other 'valued' variables of stakeholders other than equity (and debt) holders. We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4.In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effecting the financing decision. Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not30, the effect of the financing decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance. If a reduction in the earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent such a reduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons we treat EPS as a quasi non-economic variable.The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect.优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11。