会计师审计独立性中英文对照外文翻译文献
审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文
文献出处：C E Hogan. The Discussion of Audit Risk Control [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, 25(1): 219.原文The Discussion of Audit Risk ControlC E HoganAbstractFor any one market, seeking resources optimal configuration is its internal requirements, this requirement with complete information between market subjects, in reality, however, investors and by investors, creditors and debtors, regulators and inevitable existence of information asymmetry between the regulated, audit the generation of the industry is to eliminate the information asymmetry. Certified public accountants to verify statements of the financial information of foreign enterprises and other information, the truth of market main body with information as close as possible to complete information is the process of the audit. Since the audit conclusion is certified public accountants in sampling surveys on the basis of the subjective conclusion, usually can't be absolutely perfect information, the audit risk and the audit risk is the audit itself inherent cannot evade a question.Keywords: audit risk, audit risk management and risk control1 IntroductionAuditing profession development, has become an indispensable organic part of market economy, in the establishment and maintenance of the capital market development, holds an important place of audit, audit of the financial market is hard to imagine.In recent years, however, in view of the accounting firms and certified public accountants case erupted repeatedly, most lawsuits and high litigation of the damages to the whole industry development.2002 of the American journal of accounting statistics results show that the United States over the past 15 years for the auditor to accuse lawsuit, far more than the whole industry occurred in the 105 - year history of the total number of ['];European Ernst & young, KPMG, delete and PWC international accounting firms in 2007, a year only received compensation lawsuit, claim amountmore than $1 billion in six, demanded amount of between $350 million to $1 billion with 12.Strengthen research of audit risk and its management, therefore, not only relates to the interests of the subject of audit and reputation, and is related to the construction of the economic system, is not only beneficial to audit the construction industry, promote audit, benign and healthy development of the career but also to contain or block the audit risk caused a chain reaction, make the audit resources to have economic benefits and social benefits in the direction of the flow, promote the reasonable allocation of social resources and social stability.2 Literature reviewIn 1978, D.H. Roberts (D.H.R obverts) raises the ultimate audit risk model, its mathematical expression is: the ultimate risk inherent risk control risk x 2 analytical detection risk and (+ sampling risk not sampling risk).In 1981, the auditing standards board (AlCPA) standards of 39 announcement the audit sampling and brought forward a new model of audit risk, this theory is that the audit.Risks from the analysis of inherent risk, control risk and detection risk and testing of four risk in detail, including: inherent risk and control risk the risk of significant error in financial statements and analytical examination and detailed test risks said the risk of significant error in the financial statements are not found. In 1983, the auditing standards board (AICPA) is explained in the auditing standards no. 47 "audit risk and the importance of audit services" (sAS47 #) of the audit risk model and made the changes, the revised audit model: audit risk inherent risk 2 x check risk control. As a result of this model includes the main audit risk factors, and shows that the number of the relationship between each risk factor, convenient measurement, operability and applicability, and therefore most audit organization and the international accounting firms are using this model, the independent auditing standards are also using this model. In 2004, the international auditing standards are revised in SAS47 # auditing standards audit model on the basis of a new audit risk model is put forward, its abstract expression is: the risk of material misstatement risk in audit risk = x check, this model to control risk and inherent risk into comprehensiverisk, and said with the risk of material misstatement. The model that audit risk depends on the size of the material misstatement risk and check risk, certified public accountant shall risk assessment of the implementation process, evaluation of material misstatement risk, and further to design and implement audit according to the results of the assessment program, to control the inspection risk, to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level.And for some institutions and scholars，Audit risk theory put forward its own views is put forward in 1983: Audit risk inherent risk control risk x x = analytical detection risk and substantive test risk [6]; the auditing practices board (APC) in 1988, an audit risk model is put forward, namely: audit risk = inherent risk control risk x x x sampling risk. In 1997, Alvin. A. Arenas and James k. loss baker (Alvin a. Arenas and James k. Lob eke) published monograph in combination with the audit learn A "(Auditing - An integrated Approach) adopted the system foundation audit and the risk-based audit pattern, on the basis of the risk assessment of the audited units, comprehensive analysis and evaluation of various influence factors of the audited units of economic activity, and according to the quantitative risk level to determine the implementation of the audit scope, focus, and carries on the substantive examination.3 Audit risk management and control3.1 Audit project management and controlEntrusted by the audit stage, first of all should carefully choose the auditees. Industry, the development level of industry correlation and macro-economic conditions, the types of industry market information such as help auditors on the current operating situation of the customer to make a preliminary judgment, and thus to initial positioning its risk. Customer’s own information focus should examine its management level, management level and sustainable management ability and senior management personnel quality, and so on and so forth. Auditors take special attention in the understanding of the unusual move, especially in the audit of listed company, any signs of abnormal behavior will have its exposed, namely risk signal. Between the auditor and the client if there is a related party relationship will affect theindependence of the audit, therefore when determining accepting new clients to avoid this kind of relationship to weaken the independence of certified public accountants. In commissioned phase can be a new customer list to inform law firm of professional auditors.Implementation stage of the audit specific controlled by implementation and business substantive testing phase and implementation detailed analytical testing and balance testing phase two phases, this stage guided by the audit plan, audit risk control oriented, to obtain audit evidence as the basic goals, the establishment of the internal control system of the audited units first and abide by the conditions for conformance test, according to the test results revised audit plan; And then to substantive testing of accounting report project data, evaluation and appraisal according to the test result.Way to achieve the goal of certified public accountants audit is the implementation of audit procedures, and the result is to achieve the goal of the audit through the audit report to reflect. Audit report reflects the client's final request, also reflect the quality of audit work to accomplish the task, and is also the judgement of the audited matters and conclusion. Therefore audit report stage is to audit the project quality and degree of risk control, the last part of the project risk control.3.2 Audit industry risk management and controlA sound system of laws and regulations is the audit laws is the basic measures to guard against auditing risk. Audit theory system must have a tight inner logic, to become a mature discipline and guide audit practice. Revised auditing standards as the core of the audit standard system, pay attention to the improvement on the application of audit risk model, perfect the risk-oriented audit on the implementation of the specific procedures of specific methods, such as the evaluation of internal control system, the control test and confirm the audit sampling method, test phase use expectation level of audit risk, inherent risk, control risk and detection risk and legal responsibility audit litigation risk and evaluation method, etc., for the auditor in practice to establish a normative and principled technical guidance system, enables the auditor's practice to rules-based and laws.An institute of certified public accountants should give full play to the function of its industry association, to further promote the improvement of the industry standards, strengthen supervision, to establish credit rating, filing system, peer review and experience exchange. In addition, an institute of certified public accountants shall promote the legislation and building rules and regulations, work, and take some measures to protect the lawful rights and interests of a member of the association. To explore in practice, summarize the experience on the basis of the audit work must be formulated in compliance with standards and guidelines as soon as possible, the audit procedures, content, clerical, language use and so on shall be clearly stipulated; Strengthen the constraints supervision mechanism, establish and perfect the relevant regulations of the peer review and the system.3.3 Audit environment risk management and controlThe audit environment is constantly changing. Industrial society to information society and the transformation of the knowledge economy era, the progressive realization of economic globalization, the modern enterprise system gradually introduced, further improving the corporate governance structure, information technology is widely applied in the audit practice, etc. Play an important role in the audit environment, is the auditor's quality and skills, social expectations and requirements for the audit, the development of related disciplines and so on.For the improvement of the audit environment and reform, not the auditing profession or an institute of certified public accountants can be achieved, it needs the joint efforts of the whole society, such as the correct understanding of the auditing profession widespread public, to reduce the audit expectation gap; To improve the standardization of the capital market operations and the transparency of information disclosure; Perfect the construction of accounting legal system, etc.4 ConclusionsAudit is to monitor the development of social economy, the important aspect of optimizing the allocation of resources, the development of capital market prosperity and stability is particularly important. Audit risk management throughout all aspects of the audit activities, throughout the audit activities. Public accounting firms andcertified public accountants as the main body of the audit risk management, especially must pay attention to in the daily audit practice and strengthen the audit risk management, they need to improve its own, perfect the causes of audit risk, and thus achieve the control of the audit risk more effectively.译文对审计风险控制的探讨C E Hogan摘要对于任何一个市场而言,寻求资源的最优配置都是其内在要求,这要求市场主体之间具备完全信息,然而现实中,投资者与被投资者、债权人与债务人、监管者与被监管者之间必然存在信息的不对称,审计这一行业的产生就是为了消除这种信息的不对称。
内部审计中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Internal auditing's role in ERMAs organizations lay their enterprise risk groundwork, many auditors are taking on management's oversight responsibilities, new research finds.Internal audit departments have played a variety of roles in their organization's enterprise risk management (ERM) activities since The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Tread way Commission (COSO) released its Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework in September 2004. An IIA position paper issued in the wake of COSO ERM, "The Role of Internal Auditing in Enterprise-wide Risk Management," indicates the roles that the internal audit function should and should not play throughout the ERM process, ranging from full involvement to no involvement. According to the paper, internal auditors should have a core role in five ERM-related assurance activities: giving assurance on risk management processes, giving assurance that risks are evaluated correctly, evaluating risk managementprocesses, evaluating the reporting of key risks, and reviewing the management of key risks.A recent IIA Research Foundation study examined the extent to which internal audit functions adhere to the ERM roles recommended in the IIA paper. During October 2005, researchers disseminated an online survey to 7,200 IIA members through The Institute's Global Auditing Information Network. The survey generated 361 responses from a mix of large, mid-sized, and small organizations in a variety of industries, including businesses, government agencies, and not for profit organizations. Nearly 60 percent of respondents identified themselves as a chief audit executive or audit director, 23 percent were audit managers, and 7.8 percent were staff or senior auditors. Approximately 90 percent were from the United States and Canada.Respondents' organizations are at different stages of implementing ERM, as defined by COSO. More than 11 percent say their organization's ERM infrastructure is mature or relatively mature, and 37 percent have recently adopted or are in the process of implementing ERM. Among all organizations surveyed, the internal audit function is primarily responsible for ERM-related activities in 36 percent of respondents' organizations, while 27 percent say the primary responsibility belongs to a chief risk officer (CRO) who is not part of the audit function. Nearly one-third of respondents say another executive or function oversees ERM..The hours and dollars internal audit functions spend on ERM-related activities are minimal for many respondents. Nearly half say their audit department spent 10 percent or less of its hourly and financial budgets on ERM-related activities during fiscal year 2004. More than one-third of audit departments spent II percent to 50 percent of their time on ERM, and 28 percent spent n percent to 50 percent of their financial budgets, while less than 10 percent of departments Spent more than 50 percent of their time and money.The IIA position paper categorizes 18 ERM-related activities according to the appropriate level of responsibility for the internal audit function. Survey respondents reported their current and ideal level of responsibility for these activities: no responsibility, limited responsibility, moderate responsibility, substantialresponsibility, and total responsibility.CORE ACTIVITIESDifferences between respondents' current and ideal responsibilities are greatest for the five core ERM assurance activities identified In the IIA paper. Respondents Indicated that their current responsibility for each of the core ERM related activities is moderate, but they say they should have a substantial level of responsibility. These views agree with the IIA guidance. Additionally, roughly half of internal audit functions surveyed currently have substantial or full responsibility for at least one core activity, and more than two-thirds say they should have till or substantial responsibility for at least one core activity.Within the core category, the audit function's two highest levels of current responsibility involve reviewing management of key risks and evaluating the risk management process. Evaluating the risk management process and giving assurance on risk management processes are the highest-rated ideal responsibilities. Conversely, giving assurance that risks are evaluated correctly is the lowest-rated current and ideal responsibility.The following respondent comments offer some insight into why audit departments are not currently involved in core ERM-related activities at the level they deem appropriate;"We have just recently begun implementing ERM activities in our company. We do not yet have complete understanding of the process and buy-in from management.""The audit committee and management are not aware of what ERM is.""The internal audit function has just initiated an awareness campaign among the audit committee members."These comments suggest that educating management and the audit committee on ERM issues can be critical to ensuring that the audit function takes on an appropriate level of responsibility for ERM.LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIESThe IIA paper prescribes seven legitimate ERM-related activities for which internal committee audit functions may be responsible as long as safeguards are inplace: facilitating the identification and evaluation of risks, coaching management in responding to risks, coordinating ERM-related activities, consolidating the reporting on risks, maintaining and developing the ERM framework, championing establishment of ERM, and developing risk management strategy for board approval. These activities are described as "consulting" activities. Although respondents' current responsibility for each of these legitimate activities ranges from limited to moderate, they say their ideal level should be moderate, which is consistent with the guidance.Within the legitimate category, the highest level of current internal audit responsibility involves facilitating the identification and evaluation of risks —the top-rated ERM-related activity, including core activities. This activity is also the highest-rated ideal activity among legitimate activities, suggesting that auditors consider it a core responsibility. This finding is not surprising. because risk detection and evaluation are traditional considerations in developing annual audit plans. The lowest-rated current and ideal activity is developing a risk management strategy for board approval, which is an activity that might best be handled by management.The IIA guidance cautions that when internal auditors undertake these legitimate consulting activities, safeguards should be in place to ensure that they do not take on management responsibility for actually managing risks. One possible preventive measure would include documenting the auditors' ERM responsibilities in an audit committee-approved audit charter. Further, if auditors take on any ERM-related activities that fall within this consulting role, they should treat these engagements as consulting engagements and apply the relevant IIA standards to help ensure their independence and objectivity.INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIESAccording to the IIA position paper. It is inappropriate for internal auditors to be responsible for six ERM-related activities: setting the risk appetite, imposing risk management processes, providing management assurance on risks, making decisions on risk responses, implementing risk responses on management's behalf, and having accountability for risk management. Overall, audit functions in the survey have greater responsibility for these activities than the IIA paper recommends. However,auditors say they should have some limited responsibility for the inappropriate activities.Within the inappropriate category, internal auditors' highest level of current and ideal responsibility is providing management assurance on risks, while their lowest level of responsibility is for setting the risk appetite. Respondents' comments suggest that auditors currently have greater responsibilities in these areas because the audit function is playing a leading role during the early stages of ERM development.ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICSThe perceived current and ideal FRM roles for the internal audit function may vary across organizations, depending on the organization's industry, size, and audit department size, as well as the firm's need to comply with the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.INDUSTRY Respondents work in a variety of sectors, including financial services, manufacturing, transportation, communications, utilities, health care, retail and wholesale, government, and education. Researchers compared responses from the two largest industry groups: financial services and manufacturing. On average, financial service industry audit departments have greater current responsibility for core activities than those from manufacturing. With respect to inappropriate activities, manufacturing audit departments tend to say their ideal involvement should be higher than their current responsibility, while financial service industry audit departments rate their current and ideal responsibilities at the same level.ORGANIZATION SIZE Approximately half of respondents work in organizations that had 2004 revenues between US $500 million and US $5 billion. Nearly 25 percent of respondents work in organizations that had revenues under US $500 million in 2004, while a similar number of respondents work in organizations that had more than US $5 billion in revenue that year. Researchers compared responses from organizations with revenues of less than US $1 billion with organizations with revenues greater than US $1 billion. On average, auditors from both types of organizations have relatively equal levels of responsibility for current core activities. However, smaller organizations rated their ideal involvement for thesecore activities higher than large organizations. Smaller organizations have a slightly higher current level of responsibility for inappropriate activities than larger organizations and say their ideal involvement in these areas should be higher.AUDIT STAFF SIZE More than half of respondents work in audit departments with 10 or fewer auditors, slightly more than one-quarter work in departments with between 11 and 50 auditors, and approximately one-tenth of respondents work in departments with more than 50 auditors. Internal audit functions with more than 10 auditors currently have somewhat more responsibility for core activities than audit departments with 10 or fewer auditors. Both large and small audit functions have roughly equal levels of responsibility for all other ERM-related activities. However, unlike large audit organizations, respondents from small audit departments want to have more responsibility for activities in the inappropriate category.SARBANES-OXLEY Most respondents' organizations are required to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404. Researchers found few differences between those organizations and respondents from organizations that do not have to comply with the act. The primary difference related to core activities, where compliers report a higher level of current responsibility than non-compliers.Although the IIA guidance is equally applicable to all organizations, the research indicates that smaller internal audit departments and those from smaller organizations tend to take on ERM responsibilities that would be more appropriate for management. In these cases, internal auditing should work to develop an ERM implementation and maintenance plan that includes a stratcgy and timeline for migrating responsibilities for these activities to managementTHE AUDITOR'S ROLEAlthough the survey results suggest that the current levels of responsibility audit departments have may differ somewhat from that levels recommended by The IIA'S position paper, the respondents' comments offer some evidence that auditors understand the underlying concepts of the guidance:"There needs to be a shift in the 'doing' of the ERM to being an internal audit function that relies on and evaluates the ERM process. ERM should be in sync withthe audit universe and plan,""In the past i8 months, the corporation has appointed a CRO to provide oversight and guidance to evolving ERM processes. During this period, much of internal auditing's previous ERM roles have migrated to this officer." More importantly, respondents identified significant barriers in their organizations to following the guidance:"These ERM responsibilities and processes are not well defined in many organizations and should be more clearly articulated by senior management."'There is not enough emphasis from the top that risk management is important and must be done effectively. Management is still trying to hide things from internal auditing. It's not them against us, we're all in it together.""Most auditors and enterprise managers lack clarity on the distinction between responsibility for risk assurance implementation versus responsibility for risk assurance compliance and monitoring."These comments stress that a key element to establishing a successful ERM program is education on the importance of ERM and the appropriate roles management and internal auditing have in the process. Internal auditors can play a key role in providing this education. The audit department, management, hoard of directors, and audit committee need to be clear about which ERM related activities internal auditors should perform and which activities should always be performed by management. Relevant training should highlight that internal auditing could serve in a monitoring or consulting role throughout much of the ERM process, but the formal decision-making authority must reside with management if the audit department is to maintain its independence and objectivity.Auditors should take steps to ensure that the board and audit committee are aware of the COSO ERM framework and are actively engaged in overseeing the ERM process. Additionally, auditors should consider training senior management, the board, and others throughout their organization on COSO ERM and related guidance.Responses to the survey provide useful insights into additional steps that the internal audit profession should take. Auditors whose organizations are in the earlystages of adopting ERM or will be implementing ERM in the future have many opportunities to ensure that the process is effective and efficient. For example, audit departments that currendy perform ERM-related activities that should be management's responsibility can take proactive steps to open up the lines of communication between internal auditing and management, the board and audit committee, and external auditors about the risks of this situation. Such communication should encourage management to take on appropriate ERM responsibilities. One approach audit departments could take is to develop a business plan describing how management can assume responsibility for ERM related activities for which they should be accountable. However, internal auditors should recognize that completing this plan and convincing management to accept these ERM responsibilities might not occur quickly.With appropriate planning, communication, and education, internal auditors, management, the board, and external auditors should be ready to work together to achieve the many benefits of ERM. Ideally, this coordination will result in performing ERM-related activities at appropriate places within the organization, management accepting its responsibility for ERM, and that audit function playing a role that is consistent with appropriate professional guidance.译文：内部审计在企业风险管理中的作用新的研究发现：随着企业以组织风险为基础，许多审计人员对管理层采取职责监督措施。
审计报告中英文对照
审计报告中英文对照审计报告中英文对照irumstanes.二、注册会计师的责任Auditor’s Responsibilit 我们的责任是在实施审计工作的基础上对财务报表发表审计意见。
我们按照中国注册会计师审计准则的规定执行了审计工作。
中国注册会计师审计准则要求我们遵守职业道德规范，计划和实施审计工作以对财务报表是否不存在重大错报获取合理保证。
Our responsibilit is to express an opinion on these finanial statements based on our audit. We onduted our audit in aordane ith the Standards on Auditing for Certified Publi Aountants. Those standards require that e pl ith ethialrequirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurane hether the finanial statements are free from material misstatement 审计工作涉及实施审计程序，以获取有关财务报表金额和和披露的审计证据。
选择的审计程序取决于注册会计师的判断，包括对由于舞弊或错报导致的财务报表重大错报风险的评估。
在进行风险评估时，我们考虑与财务报表编制相关的内部控制，以设计恰当的审计程序，但目的并非对内部控制的有效性发表意见。
审计工作还包括评价管理层选用会计政策的恰当性和作出会计估计的合理性，以及评价财务报表的总体列报。
An audit involves performing proedures to obtain audit evidene about the amounts and dislosures in the finanial statements. Theproedures seleted depend on the auditor’s judgment, inluding the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the finanial statements, hether due to fraud or error. In making those ris assessments, the auditor onsiders internal ontrol relevant to the entit’s preparation and fai presentation of the finanial statements in order to design audit proedurestha ar ppropriate in the irumstanes, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effetiveness of the entit’s internal ontrol. An audit als inludes evaluatingthe appropriateness of aounting poliies use an he reasonableness of aounting estimates mad b management, as el as evaluating the overall presentation of the finanial statements. 我们相信，我们获取的审计证据是充分、适当的，为发表审计意见提供了基础。
现实审计师的独立性和客观性[文献翻译]
![现实审计师的独立性和客观性[文献翻译]](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/3503356b01f69e314332941a.png)
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目The Realities of Auditor’s Independence and Objectivity 外文出处Journal of Accounting–Business & Management原文：The Realities of Auditor’s Independence and Objectivity Ahson Umar (2004) states that auditing, like other professions, requires its members to make impartial and objective judgements. There are standards and rules governing the work of auditors that emphasize two fundamental issues: First, the need for auditors to avoid any additional economic ties with the client, and, second, the need to be absolutely objective in their approach to the audit and the client. However,there has been consistent criticism about the quality of audits, especially after the Saving and Loans Associations failure of the 1980s. Critics have documented numerous instances where auditors fell short of fulfilling their obligations to the society for example, auditors were criticised for not warning shareholders and potential investors about the going concern problems of companies that subsequently failed. The author displays two schools of thoughts in his article one of which is that in an actual audit situation, the auditor must maintain a close relationship with his/her client in order to understand the operations and obtain appropriate information essential to the formation of his/her opinion. On the other hand, it is psychologically impossible for auditors to be independent and objective because, even an auditor possessing a high level of integrity, cannot ignore pressure enforced by management owing to their power to hire and fire auditors at will. They not only have to rely on the management for evidence but also for future streams of revenues that can only be ensured if they continue to serve in their capacity as auditors. The author notes that, in situations when the management is truthful and honest, the relationship between the management and the auditor is of collaboration and the auditor can complete the assignment to his/her complete satisfaction. However, in some situations the relationship between the auditors and the management may be antagonistic and anecdotal evidence suggests that, in such situations, client pressure on auditors may constitute a threat to auditor independence and objectivity. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to assume that there is independence of judgement in the auditing profession. So, does that mean that all auditors are sly and conniving persons?David T. Otley (1996) states that studies carried out in auditing firms in the USA have identified specific types of auditor dysfunctional behaviour, and suggested that these behaviours are strongly linked to the control system in general and to audit time budgets in particular. Earlier findings from the USA suggest that auditor’s reactio ns to tight budgets may have important implications for audit quality. Independent audit exists because of the presence of information asymmetry between management and shareholders. Independent monitoring of the accuracy of financial information produced by management can help reduce the risk of shareholders suffering agency losses. However, the quality of the audit cannot be verified by the shareholders and other users of financial information, so any judgement regarding the value of the audit must therefore be based, at least partly, on the perceived reputation of the auditor.Targets which are quantified and specific are an important element in an effective management control system. Provided such targets are set at appropriate levels of difficulty, they facilitate the evaluation of performance and the planning of corrective action when necessary. There is also considerable evidence in the psychological literature that the use of precise and quantified targets can result in better performance than when no such targets are set. This, however, is contingent on the motivational capacity of the targets, which depends on the extent to which they are accepted and internalized by subordinates. Auditors are generally in no doubt that meeting time budgets is vital for a successful career. There is therefore strong evidence that meeting budgets in this setting is clearly associated with valuable rewards. The second factor which is relevant to the motivational impact of budget targets relates to the perceived attainability of those targets. Research evidence has shown that the use of specific,difficult targets can lead to higher performance levels than moderate or easy targets. For audit firms, there is a need to recognize that audit quality may be increasingly threatened by behaviours which are motivated by the performance evaluation system. The current economic and social environment in which auditors operate seems to present a set of conditions likely to aggravate this threat. The key importance of time budgets and the use made of budgetary information in the evaluation of performance warrant careful consideration. It issuggested that because auditing is a tedious and meticulous process, if it was completed precipitately, there are reasons for it to be inaccurate。
内部审计论文中文外文参考文献
会计学内部审计中英文资料外文翻译文献内部审计在沙特阿拉伯的发展：协会理论透视内部审计职能的价值1早先的研究已经运用各种各样的方法来制定适当的标准以评估内部审计职能的有效率。
比如说，视遵照标准的程度为影响内部审计表现的其中因素之一。
一份1988 年国际会计师协会英国协会的研究报告就致力与研究内部审计作用价值中高级管理层和外部审计员的认知力。
这项研究证明了衡量所提供服务的价值的艰难性就是做评估的主要障碍。
收益性，费用标准以及资源利用率都被确认为服务价值的衡量标准。
在这项研究里，它强调了确保内部审计工作应遵从 SPP IA 的必要性。
在美国，1988 的A lbrec hta 研究过内部审计的地位和作用，还为了能有效的评估内部审计的效率特别制定出一套框架。
他们发现有四个能让内部审计部门发展从而提高内部审计效率的要件：一个合适的企业环境，高级管理层的支持，具备高素质的内部审计人员以及高质量的内部审计工作。
在这项研究里学者们强调管理层和审计人员都应该承认内部审计职能对于企业来说是一种具有增值性的职能。
在英国，1997年，Ri dley和D’S ilva证明遵循专业标准的重要性是促进内部审计职能增值功能的最重要的因素。
遵循 SPPI A大量的研究都特别专注于内部审计部门对于 SPPI A 遵从性的研究。
1992 年，Powe ll et al 对11 个国家的国际会计师协会的成员进行了一项全球性的调查以证明是否有全球性的内部审计文化。
有他们发现对这11 个国家的国际会计师协会成员的调查中， 82的是遵循S PPIA的。
这个蛮高的百分比率促使学者们建议S PPIA提供内部审计这个职业全球化的证据。
审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文
审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文The n of Audit Risk ControlXXXIn any market。
the optimal n of resources is an internal XXX。
however。
n asymmetry exists een investors and creditors。
debtors and regulators。
and other regulated XXX verify the financial n of foreign enterprises and other n to ensure that the market's main body has as close to complete n as possible。
This process is known as the audit.XXX' subjective ns。
which are usually based on sampling surveys。
XXX。
audit risk is XXX.n:The auditing n has e an essential part of the market economy。
XXX the development of the capital market。
It holds a XXX the financial market。
However。
in recent years。
due to the repeatedn of cases XXX accountants。
the industry has XXX。
A 2002study published in the American Journal of Accounting Statistics revealed that the number of lawsuits against auditors in the United States over the past 15 years is far more than the total number of lawsuits in the industry's 105-year history。
审计师的独立性,行为和道德,外文文献
文献出处Falk H, Lynn B, Mestelman S, et al. Auditor independence, self-interested behavior and ethics: some experimental evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2000, 18(4): 395-428.Auditor independence, self-interested behavior and ethics: some experimental evidenceFalk H, Lynn B, Mestelman SAbstractOur paper presents the results obtained in a laboratory environment in which subjects revealed their beliefs about an uncertain state of the world and then participated in a simple task which required them to report on whether the report of a second party is consistent with the subjects’ beliefs. Because maintaining prior judgements (audit independence) which were in disagreement with the second party’s decision (a potential for a qualified audit opinion) were costly to the subject, a situation was created in which the subject might compromise her beliefs at a price. The results suggest that amoral, self-interested profit-maximizing behavior does not generally characterize the subjects in this experiment. Furthermore, subjects compromise their beliefs less often, i.e., breach independence, the higher their scores on a Defining Issues Test, but more often, the greater the cost of adhering to their beliefs.1. IntroductionThe requirement of auditor independence arises from the need to establish the independent auditor as an objective and trustworthy arbiter of the fair presentation of financial results.Indeed, Mautz and Sharaf (1961, pp. 204–231) and Berryman (1974, p. 1) posit that independence is the cornerstone of the audit profession and an essential ingredient of users’ confidence in financial statements. Since independent auditors occupy a position of trust between the management of the reporting entity and users of its financial statements, they must be perceived to be operating independently on the basis of sound auditing standards and strong ethical principles.Examinations of the independence issue over the last three decades, such as the United States Senate et al., 1976, United States Senate (Moss Committee), 1978 and The Commission on Auditors’Responsibilities (Cohen Commission), 1978, and Treadway (1987) Commissions and the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence (1994) have all emphasized the importance of independence as a critical factor of professional conduct. Moreover, the US Supreme Court, in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. et al. 1984 (1986, p. 818), has ruled that the independent auditor must “maintain total independence from the client at all tim es”.Codes of professional conduct, such as those of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario require that a member “in public pra ctice be independent in fact and in appearance…” (Pany and Whittington, 1994, p. 94).1 Whereas the literature is replete with studies that model auditors’ decisions of whether to preserve or compromise their independence under various circumstances Antle, 1984,DeAngelo, 1981, Goldman and Barlev, 1974, Kanodia and Mukherji, 1994, Magee and Tseng, 1990,Yoon, 1990, Penno and Watts, 1991 and Yost, 1995, studies that attempt to observe independence directly are quitesparse.2 Furthermore, research which tries to link audit independence and ethical propensity is rare Ponemon and Gabhart, 1990 and Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995. We report on actual observations, obtained via a controlled laboratory experiment concerning decisions to compromise or preserve independence in the case of client–auditor disagreements about a reporting decision. Outside this controlled environment these inconsistent decisions or breaches of independence are unobservable and, hence, theories about their occurrence are largely untestable using field data. Furthermore, we combine and extend two important streams in the audit literature: (1) Magee's and Tseng's (1990) and Antle's (1984) analytical modelling of audit independence and (2) Ponemon's and Gabhart's (1990) and Windsor's and Ashkanasy (1995) empirical tests of the relation between moral development and auditor independence.We assume the Magee and Tseng (1990, pp. 318–320) audit framework and devise an experimental audit task which focuses on a test of whether subjects exercise independent judgement based on their prior beliefs. Because our controlled laboratory environment includes explicit monetary incentives (economic motivation) both as positive payoffs and negative penalties, we feel that the method allows us to make a more direct evaluation of subjects’ behavior and its relation to their moral development than either Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) or Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995) were able to do using their hypothetical audit case experiments. While Ponemon (1993) did attempt to link an economic decision (a free rider/Prisoner’s Dilemma situation) with moral development and ethical education,3 his classroom setting did not have the formal controls available in the laboratory environment. Essentially, our study uses a proxy variable for moral development to control for the potentialimpact of moral choice on what is largely a test of economic rationality in an audit setting. Our results show that:1.As the probability of losing a client by disagreeing with the client’s decision increases, the frequency of independence violations increases. This result is independent of whether the independent auditors’ behavior is monitored.2.Monitoring and penalizing independent auditors’ behavior reduce the frequency of independence violations when the probability of losing a client is small, but the frequency of violations is not reduced when the probability of the loss of a client is high.3.On average, subjects with low moral development scores violate independence more frequently than those who have higher scores.These results suggest that while external review and potential penalties (litigation costs, loss of reputation, direct fines or licence suspension) may reduce violations of auditor independence somewhat, the positive reinforcement of the attribute may come from increasing independent auditors’ awareness of the ethical dimensions of their decisions. Using a different research method, our results also validate Ponemon and Gabhart's (1990, pp. 240–247) and Windsor’s and Ashkanasy’s (1995, pp. 715–717) findings on the significance of moral development to auditor independence.The next section provides a review of the research on ethics and auditing, including a discussion of the moral development literature from developmental psychology which is used in the present study. We then provide a general framework for our study, describe the research design and hypotheses, and discuss the results of the experiment. Finally, we draw conclusions from the results and identify opportunities for extending the research.2. Auditing and ethical backgroundPrior research on auditor independence has largely concentrated either on modelling the independent auditor’s judgement or on s ituations where auditors may breach their required independence. Studies such as Dopuch and King, 1991 and Schatzberg,1990 and Schatzberg and Sevcik (1994) have attempted to study the concept of independence in audit settings, but do not provide direct observations of subjects’ independence as does the present study.4 In the studies cited, audit independence (or lack thereof) is revealed by agreement or disagreement with management’s portrayal of a financial reporting dilemma of some description. While the studies use experimental techniques, none of them attempt to assess the independent auditor’s prior beliefs or expectations vis à vis the situation. Such an assessment is central to our present experimental treatment and forms the basis of determining whether a subject has behaved independently or has compromised prior beliefs.The suggestion that when external auditors exercise independent judgement about financial statements, they are engaging in what is tantamount to an ethical act, is not a novel idea. Codes of ethics such as those used by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants are normally designed to motivate members of professional organizations to operate in an ethical manner. Prior studies suggest, however, that the underlying psychology that governs professional behavior is more complicated t han simply hoping that professionals adhere to the organization’s code of conduct. For example, Lampe and Finn (1992, pp. 34–55) compared the auditors’ ethi cal decision process model they developed to an AICPA Code decision model and concluded (pp. 55–56) that the latter is insufficient to motivate accountants to pursue ethical behavior. Similarly, Ponemon (1988, 1990, 1992a, b, 1993, 1995), Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) and Ponemon and Glazer (1990)utilized theories of cognitive-developmental psychology (described below) to elucidate the ethical dimensions of accountants’ judgementprocedures and generally concluded that the ethical culture of the firm and domain-specific experience coupled with ethical reasoning are significantly related to accountants’ ethical behavior.More specifically, Ponemon and Gabhart (1990, pp. 240–247) and Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995, pp. 709–714) have established that the degree of moral development helps to explain external auditors’ independence behavior. Cushing (1990, p. 254) expressed concern about Ponemon’s and Gabhart’s(1990) chosen scenario (a management advisory task of whether the independent auditors should help to hire a financial officer for a firm for whom they provide audit service) because it did not imply explicit, measurable economic consequences. Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995, p. 702) tried to answer Cushing’s comments by constructing an auditing case involving a materiality dilemma about an error in an accounting balance to be reported on the financial statements. Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995, pp. 702–707) also enriched their analysis by incorporating the economic environs (the client’s financial health and probability of tendering) and the independent auditor’s beliefs (level of moral development and the concept of belief in justice) as variables which influence the auditor’s exercise of independence.Many of these studies of accounting and business ethical judgements (such as those by Ponemon cited above) are grounded in the theory of the developmental stages of moral reasoning begun by Piaget (1965) and formalized by Kohlberg, 1969 and Kohlberg, 1976. Kohlberg (1976, pp. 33–35) bases his stage theory of moral development on the concept of justice by which individuals make moral judgements, a concept which changes as individuals mature and proceed through their education. Kohlberg (1969, pp. 382–391)identifies three levels of moral development each of which represents two distinct stages of moral reasoning:•Level 1, the “preconventional” level where moral reasoning is guided either by fear of punishment(Stage 1) or by self-interest, i.e., satisfying one’s own needs (Stage 2).•Level 2, the “conventional” level where moral reasoning is guided either by the wish to please or help others (Stage 3) or by the desire to fulfil societal, legal or religious norms, i.e., ruled-based reasoning (Stage 4).•Level 3, the “postconventional” level, where moral reasoning derives from either general, individual rights and socially accepted standards, i.e., a social contract (Stage5) or from universal ethical principles as defined by the decision-maker’s conscience(Stage 6).Kohlberg’s(1969) stage theory of moral development suggests that moral reasoning grows from a simple obedience, fear-of-punishment orientation where justice is seen as external authority to an independent judgement based on universal ethical ideals, where justice is an internal construct. In Kohlberg (1969), the concept of justice thus shifts from something externally imposed to something internally defined and mediated by the individual conscience. Rest (1979) developed a Defining Issues Test (DIT) to assess subjects’ moral development. Elm and Weber (1994, pp. 351–354) compare the development stages described by Kohlberg (1969) and Rest (1979) and found them subtly different. The DIT hasbeen proven to be a reliable instrument in hundreds of studies (Rest et al., 1986, pp. 28–58) and is basically a recognition task that uses a series of dilemmas (three or six stories) presented as short moral scenarios.The DIT (Rest et al., 1986, pp. 185–200) requires participants to choose an action which they believe will resolve the dilemma and then to rank the reasons for their choice from the set of responses provided. The response set for each dilemma includes rationales based on the six stages of moral development and the test is scored by totalling the proportion of responses indicating each of the stages of reasoning. The most commonly used scores from the DIT are the p-score and the d-score. The p-score represents the proportion of stages five and six reasoning used to rationalize the dilemmas, and the d-score is a comprehensive overall score based on reasoning across all stages (Rest, 1990, pp. 4.2–4.3).Researchers have used the DIT results to study a number of aspects of moral development across age groups, educational levels, political persuasions and across cultures.5Blasi (1980, pp. 17–25) has summarized the results of using the DIT scores as a control variable in psychological experiments on cheating behavior. More recently, Trevino and Youngblood (1990), Elm and Nichols (1993), Ferrel and Skinner (1998), Laczhiak and Interredian (1987), and Singhapakdi and Vittel (1990) have used the DIT results as one of the explanatory variables for studies of managerial behavior in business settings, focusing mainly on the issues such as kickbacks, cheating on business expenses, and knowledge of faulty products. Ponemon (1990, 1992a, 1995) has undertaken several studies which analyze the association between moral development (via the DIT) and professional accountants’behavior. Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) and Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995) both use the DIT scores as the proxy for moral development in their studies of auditor independence.Church et al. (1994) used DIT scores in an experiment assessing the relative strength of altruism versus economic self interest. Our study goes beyond previous studies by using DIT scores as a control va riable to proxy moral development to determine whether subjects’ moral reasoning has a moderating effect on strict economic rationality. We consider the moral dimension in an audit experiment, testing, inter alia, whether higher moral development, i.e., a higher d-score, results in more independent audit choices. 6The model of auditor independence that forms the basis of our laboratory experiment thus provides a direct test of whether subjects’ behavior is driven solely by economic rationality or is moderated by their degree of moral development. Having reviewed the ethical and auditing background to our study we next look at the general framework we use and then describe the actual conduct of the experiment.3. General frameworkThe setting in our experiment captures an important aspect of the naturally occurring audit environment and follows the general pattern of prior analytical studies (e.g., Magee and Tseng, 1990) in which a client prepares financial statements and chooses reporting practices from available alternatives.7 In our experiment, an independent auditor is hired to perform the mandatory audit and to express an opinion whether the financial statements present fairly the client’s financial position. Audit c ontracts are not binding for more than one period, but it is expected that, in the absence of a client–auditor disagreement that the audit contract will berenewed periodically. In contrast to DeAngelo (1981) and consistent withElitzur and Falk (1996a) we assume that the entire expected engagement period is finite.8As in Penno and Watts (1991, p. 207) we define “an independent auditor as one whose preferences over financial reporting alternatives are unaffected by management’s preferences”. When the client’s reporting practice does not match the independent auditor’s preference, a client–auditor disagreement occurs, which may result in compromising independence if the auditors remove their objection to the client’s choice. If the conflict is not resolved the auditor will qualify the opinion on the client’s financial statements.If independent auditors are assumed to be rational profit maximizers, their decision to compromise independence depends on whether the expected cost of preserving independence outweighs the expected benefits from compromising it. In the absence of external intervention, such as lawsuits by a third party or disciplinary action by oversight bodies, if the independent auditors compromise their independence they are retained by the client for future audit engagements. Where the independent auditors face a probability of peer review that may reveal the breach, the decision to compromise independence may result in costly disciplinary sanctions, loss of reputation and market share. If external auditors preserve independence, and qualify their report, they face a threat of dismissal by their clients, which involves loss of future audit fees and a possible reputation effect arising from the loss of their clients. In a mandatory audit environment, however, a client’s threat of dismissal may be credible only if there is at least one competing independent auditor who does not object to this client’s reporting choice.While independent auditors are expected to behave as rational economic agents, it is possible that their decisions are also affected by their moral perspective. When moral behavior conflicts with economic rationality, independent auditors with higher moral reasoning are expected to exhibit more consistent, independent behavior than those with lower moral reasoning, even in the absence of monitoring and penalties. As Ponemon and Gabhart (1990, pp. 240–244) and Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995, pp. 711–712) have shown, moral development has some relation to independent audit judgement.Membership in a professional accounting organization, one of whose requirements is adherence to a code of professional ethics, adds an additional bonding element to the client–auditor relationship Watts and Zimermann, 1986 and Matthews, 1991. Indeed, intensified peer reviews Yoon, 1990 and Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, 1994 and stiff penalties for compromising independence provisions have been suggested as a means of enhancing auditor independence Goldman and Barlev, 1974,Ponemon and Gabhart, 1990, Shockley, 1982, Elitzur and Falk, 1996a and Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995. In this context we examine the independent auditor’s behavior in three client–auditor disagreement settings. A description of the auditing context of the settings follows.In each setting we assume a finite total engagement period. As in Magee and Tseng (1990, pp. 318–320)we distinguish between the cases where there are and where there are not replacement auditors available. In the baseline setting there is no replacement independent auditor available. In the two other settings we assume that there is at least one competing independent auditor who agrees with the client and who is as efficient as the incumbent auditor with respect to the client’s audit. Similar to Magee and Tseng (1990, p. 329) we assume thatthe price of the periodic audit by an incumbent auditor will be M t=ν + βt, where M t is the audit fee for period t, ν is the normal audit cost that is the same for all equally efficient auditors, and βt is the learning cost that a competing auditor must assume and incorporate in a bid for an audit in period t. Because the alignment between the client’s and incumbent independent auditor’s information systems increases over time ( Antle 1982, pp. 506–508; 1984, pp. 8–10), βt is increasing over time and M t is increasing over time. 9 We, therefore, structured the periodic expected income to the incumbent independent auditor accordingly. 10 However, under the realistic assumptions that the marginal learning cost to a competitor is less than the normal audit cost and that any penalty for compromising independence is not increasing over time, the total expected payoff to the incumbent independent auditor, from the remaining total audit engagement, is decreasing over time. To maintain consistency across settings, we used the same structure of periodic income from fees in all three settings. The three settings created in the laboratory are described below.•Setting 1: There are no penalties against preserving independence (no competing independent auditor who may side with the client is available). When the client cannot threaten contract termination, as is the case, for example, in France and Spain where the auditor must be retained by law for a minimum number of years there is no cost difference between a qualified and unqualified report regardless of what the client reports (Coopers & Lybrand, 1991, pp. I-32, S-56). 11 This holds for each period of the audit engagement.•Setting 2: There is a positive probability that the independent auditor will lose the client if the auditor chooses to qualify the report (there is one competing auditor who sides with the client). Regardless of what the client reports, the independent auditor’s expected profit is greater if an unqualified report is issued than if a qualified report is issued. This holds for each period of the audit engagement. However, given the discussion about the T period engagement, the differences between the expected profits associated with a qualified report and an unqualified report fall over time.•Setting 3: There is a positive probability that, in addition to the threat of termination which characterizes Setting 2, the independent auditor may be peer reviewed and will be penalized (a threat of external review) when found to have compromised independence. When the client’s report is inconsistent with the independent auditor’s belief, the relationship between the economic values of issuing a qualified report versus an unqualified report is not the same across the periods of the audit engagement. In the first period, for example, the cost of an unqualified report to the independent auditor will be the loss of the client plus a penalty if the independent auditor is peer-reviewed, while a qualified report will only result in losing the client because of the disagreement. The expected cost of issuing a qualified report will be greater than the cost of issuing an unqualified report. In the last period, however, there is no cost to issuing a qualified report, but there is still a cost associated with issuing an unqualified report because of the potential peer-review. Between the first and last period, the differences between the expected costs of issuing a qualified or unqualifiedreport will switch from positive to negative. Whether the economic value of an unqualified report is greater than, equal to or less than the economic value of a qualified report depends upon the probability of peer review, the penalty if the auditor is found compromising independence, the probability that the auditor will lose the client if a qualified report is filed, and the period during the audit engagement in which the report must be issued.In Setting 1 the independent auditor’s choice between filing a qualified or unqualified report when a client’s decision is inconsistent with the independent auditor’s belief cannot be determined on economic grounds alone. The ext ent to which the independent auditor’s beliefs are relevant to the auditor’s decisions will be important. In Setting 2 the independent auditor’s decision could be made solely on economic grounds, however, the independent auditor’s beliefs could introduce an opposing influence to the economic incentives and lead to a different outcome than would amoral, self-interested, profit-maximizing decision-making. Finally, in Setting 3, predictions about the independent auditor’s behavior and the role of beliefs and economic gain cannot be made without more detailed information about the auditor’s environment. Changing settings permits tests of how subjects respond to changes in the probability of losing a client or in the probability of being caught. But without introducing the multi-period decision cycles it is not possible to create an environment in which the threat of losing a client is credible. In addition, this provides an opportunity to change the cost of maintaining independence without changing the underlying probability of losing a client.Section 4 introduces the research design and procedures we will follow to operationalize the more general framework which is comparable in nature to independent auditor’s decisions in a naturally occurring environment.4. Research design and procedures4.1. DesignWe designed a controlled laboratory experiment to test self-interested choice behavior in a quasi-auditing task. The design involved three discrete sessions with no overlap of subjects, allowing us to examine both within group and between group observations under the three settings: (1) no threat of client loss, (2) threat of client loss, and (3) threat of client loss with external intervention and penalties.Three sessions were conducted at the University of the Philippines in the summer of 1995 using subjects recruited from the undergraduate business program.12 Each session was identical in all respects except that under Settings 2 and 3, the probability of losing a client if the auditor disagreed with the client was manipulated at three levels (between groups condition). For session 1 the probability was 10%, for session 2, 25% and for session 3, 40%. We introduced the escalating probabilities of client loss between the sessions to increase the motivation for subjects to make inconsistent choices (compromise independence) since the potential for lost payoffs rose as the probabilities increased. As well, the variation of probabilities of client loss allowed us to test the effect of external intervention and penalties on the behavior of subjects (between groups) facing different potential client loss functions.4.2. ProceduresAt each of the three sessions conducted, the subjects were assigned seats as they arrived. Seats were organized in a classroom setting and were separated sufficiently to prevent face-to-face contact between subjects and to maintain privacy.Professor Shehata (one of the co-authors) explained the environment to the subjects and provided them with written instructions. Subjects were told that while their earnings in the game would be assigned in laboratory currency called francs, the francs that they earned would be converted into Philippine pesos at the end of the session. As part of the instructions, Professor Shehata also communicated the exchange rate to convert francs to pesos.13After explaining the compensation scheme to the subjects, Professor Shehata described the decisions the subjects were to make. Professor Shehata told subjects that they were to assume the role of a reviewer who has been hired by the owners of a firm to examine whether the firm’s manager’s production decisions have been appropriate, given the production environment. For each firm, one of two products (X or Y) can be produced depending on the production environment. If the production environment is good then producing product X would maximize the owner’s wealth. If the condition is bad, then product Y is the optimal production choice. The environment condition is expected to last for a complete business cycle of four periods. Owners are unable to predict ex ante which product should be produced to maximize their wealth. Managers might find it in their best interests to produce inappropriate products (from the owner’s perspective) or to c hange products from period to period within a cycle. 14 The subject reviewers, who knew the probability that a production condition was good, were told that their task was to monitor and validate the appropriateness of the managerial。
审计监督中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:The Legal Framework of Audit SupervisionChinese Legal System & Current Legal Reform. (Jan 1999).The legal system of audit supervision is an important part of Chinese economic law. The Auditing Law was promulgated on 31 August 1994 in order to improveState audit supervision, to maintain the financial and economic order of the State, to promote the building of a corruption-free government, and to safeguard the stable, healthy and continuous development of the national economy. The Auditing Law is composed of general principles, auditing of_ fices and auditors, duties of an auditing office, powers and functions of an auditing office, auditing procedure, legal liability and supplementary principles. This Law explicitly stipulates that the fiscal revenue and expenditure of various departments of the State Council, local people's governments at all levels and their business departments, the financial income and expenditure of State-owned finance organs, enterprises and institutional units, as wellas fiscal revenue and expenditure and financial income and expenditure which should be subject to auditing as stipulated by this Law, shall be subject to audit supervision in accordance with the provisions of this Law.Other than the national auditing system, there are also internal auditing system and social auditing system in China. The former internal auditing system was established by various departments of the State Council, local people's govermnents at all levels, state-owned financial institutions, enterprises and institutions; the latter is the auditing system by which the social independent auditing institutions carry out audit supervision.In order to ensure the authority and effectiveness of the auditing works, according to this Law, people's governments at all levels are required to submit annual audit work reports on budget implementation and other fiscal revenue and expenditure to the people's congress at their respective levels.1. Auditing offices and auditorsThe State Council and local people's governments above county level shall establish auditing administrations. The State Council shall establish an Auditing Administration, under the leadership of the Premier of the State Council, be in charge of all ofthe audit work throughout the country. The auditor-General shall be the administrative leader of the national auditing Administration. Auditing offices of the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government, munic ipalities divided into districts, autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, cities not divided into districts shall be in charge of the audit work within their respective administrative areas under the respective leadership of governors of provinces, chairmen of autonomous regions, prefecture heads, counties' head or district heads respectively, as well as under the leadershipof audit institutions at the next higher levels.The various levels of the local auditing offices shall be responsible to and report their work to the people's government at the same level and to the auditing office at the next higher level.Audit operations shall be undertaken primarily under the leadership of the auditing offices at the next higher level.An auditing office may, in line with work requirements, send its special auditors to places or departments within its jurisdiction. A special auditor shall, according to the authorisation of his/her auditing office, undertake auditing work in accordance with the law.An auditing office shall exercise independent audit supervision rights in accordance with the law and no other administrative organ, social group or individual shall be permitted to interfere. Auditors exercise their powers of office in accordance with the law and shall receive the protection of the law. In handling audit matters, auditing offices and auditors shall be objective and impersonal, practical and realistic, and honest when performing their official duties, and they shall maintain confidentiality.2. Duties of auditing office scope of auditingThe auditing offices at various levels shall conduct audit supervision over the following items:----The various departments at the equivalent level (including units directly under such departments) and lower level government authorities on financial budget implementation and final financial accounts, as well as the administration and use of non-budgetary funds;---- Assets, liabilities, losses and profits of State-owned financial institutions;----Financial income and expenditure of government institutions;---- Assets, liabilities, losses and profits of State-owned enterprises;---- State-owned enterprises which play an important role in the national economy and the people's livelihood, State-owned enterprises which receive excessive financial allowances or which incur a relatively large amount of losses, and State-owned enterprises designated by the State Council and the local people's government at the equivalent level;---- Enterprises in which State assets comprise a proprietary or prime position;---- Budget implementation and final accounts of State construction projects;---- Financial income and expenditure relating to social welfare funds and financial resources from public donations, as well as other relevant funds which are managed by government departments and the social organisations entrusted by government authorities;---- Other matters which require auditing by auditing offices in accordance with the provisions of other laws and statutory regulations.In addition, the Auditing Administration shall conduct audit supervision of the financial income and expenditure of the Central Bank.3. Specific audit investigationAn auditing office shall have the right to conduct a special audit investigation of relevant local government authorities, departments or units on specific matters relating to State fiscal revenues and expenditures, anaudit investigation result shall be reported to the people's government at the equivalent level and to the superior level auditing office.4. Scope of audit jurisdictionThe scope of audit jurisdiction shall be determined by auditing offices at the various levels in accordance with the jurisdictional framework of the financial affairs or the state asset supervision and management of the unit to be audited.5. Powers of auditing officeAn auditing office shall,----Have the power to compel a unit being audited to submit its fiscal budget or financial income and expenditure plans, budget implementation details, final accounts, final reports, audit report prepared by a public auditing body and other materials relating to fiscal revenue and expenditure or financial income and expenditure, and that Unit shall not be permitted to refuse, delay or make false submission;----Inspect the accounting vouchers, account books, accounting statements and other materials and assets relating to fiscal revenue and expenditure or financial income and expenditure, of the unit being audited, and that unit shall not be permitted to refuse to provide such access;----Investigate the relevant unit or individual involved with respect to matters relating to the audit and shall obtain related testimonial materials. The unit and/or individual involved with matters relating to an audit shall support and assist the auditing office in its work and shall report the situation accurately and provide the auditing office with all relevant testimonial materials;----Make a stay ruling in a case where an act by a unit being audited which is in violation of regulations of the State on fiscal revenue and expenditure or financial income and expenditure and if the stay proves ineffectual, subject to approval by the person in charge of the auditing office at county level or above, the auditing office shall have the power to notify the relevant financial department or competent department to temporarily suspend access to relevant funds directly relating to the act which is in violation of those regulations of the State. In the event of the aforesaid fund already having been allocated, that fund shall be temporarily suspended from use;----If it is deemed by an auditing office that the rules of the superior level competent department concerning fiscal revenue and expenditure or financial income and expenditure implemented by the unit being audited are in conflict with the provisions of laws and statutory regulations, the auditing office shall request the competent department to make correction; if such correction is not made by the competent department, the auditing office shall request the authority with power to handle the matter in accordance with the law;----Circulate a notice of an audit result to the relevant government departments or may make a public announcement of an audit result.6. Audit procedureAn auditing office shall form an auditing group on the basis of the matter for audit, clarified according to theaudit project plan, and shall send an audit notice to the unit to be audited three days prior to the commencement of the audit.A unit being audited shall co-operate with the work of the auditing office and shall provide necessary convenience to facilitate the work of the auditing office.An auditor shall conduct an audit Based on means such as inspection of accounting vouchers, account books and accounting statements, consultation of documents and information relating to the matter for audit, examination of cash, goods and marketable securities, and investigation of related units and individuals and the acquisition of testimonial material.When investigating related units and individuals, an auditor shall produce employment credentials and a copy of the audit notice.After an auditing group has concluded an audit, an audit report shall be presented to the auditing office. The opinion of the unit being audited shall be sought regarding the audit report before submission of the auditreport to the auditing office. The unitbeing audited shall submit a written response to the auditing group or to the auditing office within ten days of receiving the audit report.After an auditing office has examined and approved an audit report and made conclusions concerning theaudit, an audit opinion shall be provided; in a case where an act in violation of State regulations concerning fiscal revenue and expenditure or financial income and expenditure which needs to be handled or penalised in accordance with the law, the audit decision shall be made within the scope of statutory powers, or the handling and penalty decision shall be provided by the relevant competent authority. Within thirty days of receiving an audit report,an audit office shall deliver an audit opinion and audit decision to the unit which has been audited and relevant units. An audit decision shall take effect from the date on which it is delivered.译文:审计监督的法律框架审计监督的法律体系是中国经济法的重要组成部分。
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会计师审计独立性中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)变化中的会计师审计独立性——与当前环境与时俱进2005年8月——具《注册会计师专刊》的主编罗伯特科尔森在他2004年3月的专栏里的研究表明，“会计师审计的独立性”的概念，在过去的150多年中，是不断变化的。
从一般意义上说，会计师审计的独立性与当前的商业环境是存在着密切的关联的。
但是，不同的“会计师审计的独立性”的概念之间，并没有明显的过渡。
通常情况下，许多审计的独立性的不同概念的提出，都是围绕着专业的会计师、审计师、监管机构和一般公众之间的独立性，所展开讨论的。
会计师审计的独立性的最初概念，出现在19世纪。
它的出现，是基于这样一个前提的，即主要是英国本土的专业会计师和审计师，对整个大英帝国以前的和现有的殖民资本承担监督的责任。
在此期间，数量上相对来说较少的会计师事务所，却要对相对来说大数量的群体执行审计的任务。
这些专业的会计师和审计师就有可能同时对不同的实体出具财务报告、为不同的投资群体工作。
在这个时代，会计师审计独立性的概念，并没有把审计设想为一个独立存在的审计实体;英国投资者明确禁止审计者在其审计的企业工作或参与投资。
与此同时，只要会计师保持对主要投资者的审计服务，他们的专业会计服务的范围，是可以合理地扩大的。
例如，审计师被允许可以帮他们所审计的企业编制财务报表。
会计师审计的独立性这一初步的概念在19世纪末到20世纪初发生了改变。
在这段时期，经济上有了一个大的变化，那就是资本的主要来源由国内市场转向到外国资本市场。
这一变化的出现是与美国的大型工业公司，如采矿，铁路，能源，电力和电信，的出现相关联的。
伴随着这些美国大公司的出现的，也包括着对公司商业性的理解的改变。
在上世纪30年代，经济学家阿道夫贝尔和伽尔迪纳指出，推进对这一变化的理解的，是大型企业所有权的分离，以及会计和审计对于公司的财产权益的重要性。
在这一新思路下，审计的主要职责，就是为集体的所有权益的需要而服务，而不是某个具体的无所有权的利益。
这种集体的所有权益，基本上是由国内的股东组成，通常往往是大银行或非常富有的投资者。
联邦证券法在新政时代的通过，以及美国证券交易委员会的成立，使会计师审计的独立性的概念，有了再一次的转变。
美国证券交易委员会的成立，对建立出具财务报告和审计法规的标准，有着最重要的影响。
通过这种努力，公共的会计师和审计师不再认为他们的主要职责，是为那些特定的物主，或某些集体的所有权益；而是按照一套既定的专业标准，来编制财务报表，和进行财务决算的审计工作。
会计师审计的独立性的概念，转向为在财务状况和经营业绩的报告中保持客观性和中立性，而不是忠于某一政党。
这一观点，由西澳佩顿教授，在理论上和书面上被阐述出来，他着重强调了公司财务报表的重要性。
会计师审计独立性的客观和中立的概念，一直趋于上风，成为主流。
直到20世纪70年代，当财务会计准则委员会成立，成为独立的、权威的会计标准制定者。
大约从那个时候开始，公共的会计公司开始改变其客观和中立的原则，并开始对他们的审计客户宣传和提供关于会计和审计的事项。
同时，在全球范围内，企业的快速增长，为公共的会计师事务所提供了大量的机会去获得收入，而这些收入，远远超过了传统的审计服务所能取得的收入。
虽然，美国注册会计师协会的审计准则委员会（ASB），发布的审计标准，一直继续强调着与客户保持独立性，但是日益激烈的审计服务市场的竞争，以及错综复杂的国际商业惯例，导致一些审计者不得不违反会计准则的客观性和中立性的，因为这更有利于赢得客户的信赖。
继2000年初的会计和审计丑闻之后，以及2002年沙宾法案的通过，审计者被认为是值得信赖的顾问的这种想法，似乎已经越来越难以让人信服。
一个潜在的会计师审计的独立性的新概念，仍然未能演变出来，但上市公司会计监督委员会（ PCAOB ）对这种独立性的概念上，似乎更强调要在更大程度上区分注册审计师和客户管理的独立性。
会计师审计独立性的早期争议在20世纪的下半叶，学术界和出现了关于会计师审计独立性的各种争论和专业文献。
有一些关于会计师审计独立性的观点，是从包括英国和美国两者的会计职业相关的历史性观点中理想化、发展和演变出来的。
例如，托马斯李，在《公司审计》第3版（范诺斯得莱因霍尔德，1986年，页89）中提到的：一个诚实的审计者应该是完全独立的，用独立的意志和态度思考，绝不允许的其观点和结论，受到利益冲突所带来的压力所影响或对其有所依赖。
不幸的是，虽然这种对于会计师审计独立性的表达，是令人钦佩和向往的，但是这种对于会计师审计独立性的表达，在一定程度上，是有不确定性的，因此，判断一个会计师的审计是否是独立的，根据托马斯李的定义要得出结论，是不可能的。
皮莫扎尔，在“独立性”（在《当前审计的问题》，由木雪纳尔和斯特利编辑，保罗查普曼公司出版，1991年）中，主张会计师审计独立的经济逻辑的辩论，是这样归纳的：人们期望会计师进行了审计后，可以把不能诉讼成功的概率和审计风险降低到一个可以接受的水平。
用经济学的语言来说，审计员执行审计工作的费用，应该是和工作量平等的，换句话说，是会计师执行审计任务时所产生的费用，和其所能减少的风险，是成正比的。
然而，所有的审计者都是单独的个体，他们都对风险和回报，持有着各自不同的态度，因此会计师审计工作的最低标准并不一定必须是相同的。
用这种经济上的理论来解释会计师审计的独立性，似乎是合乎逻辑的。
但是，如果某些审计者采纳了关于会计师审计的独立性的一般概念，是为了可以获得好处，从中谋利，以便获得更多的市场占有率和市场份额，那么这种观点就不能成立了。
换言之，虽然这种立足于经济上论证是有效的，但是会计师审计的独立性，还是需要一个可以去完全遵守的原则。
正与此相反，相对于这种经过专业的和经济论证的会计师审计独立性的概念，巴特利特在“审计独立性的挑战”（会计地平线，第二卷，第五刊，第一期，1991年）中所提出的则大相径庭。
巴特利特认为，关于会计师审计的独立性，有四种不同的比喻。
1、“冒烟的枪口”，这个论点是说只有少数几个事例表明会计师审计的独立性被认为是和审计失败有所牵连的。
大多数诉讼和被起诉的审计者，都是基于对其不称职或不尽职调查的说法上的，而不是缺乏独立性。
然而，因为无法获得有关的审计失败的详细的记录和其他的诉讼证据，使这种观点很难被证明。
2、“我们这样做很好。
”这一论点中，根据民意调查，公众会计界普遍已经得到了高度的关注。
民意调查结果显示，民众所关心的，往往是会计师对于职业本身的尊重、对问题的客观性的处理、可靠性和诚实，而不是独立性本身。
虽然，客观性、可靠性和诚实，在一定程度上可能和独立性有所重叠，什么是所谓的“独立性”，实际上一般公众并没有一个清楚的概念。
通常情况下，并没有人告诉公众，会计师的审计到底是在做些什么。
3、“公共利益。
”这个是要表明，如果在公共会计的专业服务的范围内有了太多的限制，会计师事务所将无法正确的为客户提供服务，而白白的耗费了大数额的费用。
一些公共的会计公司认为，提供审计以外的服务，让他们能更好地履行审计义务，因为它们可以更好地去了解他们的客户。
4、“信任我们。
”独立性往往是说一个专业的会计师所拥有的精神状态，因此这是不能被实证、以实验来观察，或被量化的。
这种说法是基于审计者自身的经济利益出发的，即审计者被假定为可以、会保持他的独立性和客观性，以便不损害其自身的长期的经济利益。
虽然这种假设可能是备受争议的，因为这样做是为了产生最大的、长期的经济利益。
某个会计师在执行审计时可能会因为个人的经济利益而去权衡，从而保留某一个重要客户，而不是去保持客观性和独立性，这实际上也破坏了“信任我们”的这一论调。
市场变化对会计师审计独立性的影响乔纳森•威尔，在“企业不为人知的欺骗：如何变更审计工作”（华尔街日报，2004年3月25日）指出，在20世纪的70年代和80年代的审计服务市场，会计师进行审计的方式是有所改变的，在一定程度上对于会计师审计的独立性是有所减弱的。
这种变化的开始的第一个组成部分，是价格竞争。
在20世纪70年代以前，美国注册会计师协会的行为守则中是禁止会计师、审计者公开的为他们的审计服务做广告的，或者为了赢得公司的客户而相互竞争的，甚至是去参加为审计举行的竞争性的投标、竞标。
在受到联邦政府的反垄断诉讼的威胁下，美国注册会计师协会不得不被迫取消了这些对反竞争的做法的禁令。
其结果是，审计的竞争性招标变得司空见惯。
审计变成了商品。
审计实施上的第二个转变，是越来越强调“审计基础风险”。
审计的基础风险的增大与审计任务的数量的增大成正比，这是合理的，这种假设是合乎逻辑的。
但是，审计专家是可以确定一家公司的经营业务中，最危险的那个部分的。
不幸的是，安然公司和其他企业的倒闭，已经表明，一些审计者没有办法充分的确定，公司业务的经营运作中，哪个部分会遭受着最大的风险。
此外，审计者采用基本风险的方法，有可能无法发现欺诈活动。
虽然这一会计师审计独立性的新概念，对于某种环境下的某个审计者，可能是适合的，但往往审计者会努力去用欺骗性的会计数字，帮助隐瞒经营状况，从而隐瞒真实的经济业绩。
在20世纪90年代，似乎有些审计者会忽视他们的最直接的责任，而按照第三方投资者的利益去行动。
加强会计师审计的独立性法律上禁止担任审计工作的会计师与委托人在财务上有经济利益关系，是美国从20世纪30年代直至20世纪90年代期间，会计师审计独立性原则存在的基础。
但这并不代表这在英国或其他一些国家也是同样正确，即使禁止金融利益上的连带关系，通常是实际中按照最基本的会计制度中留心观察，就可以得出的结论性做法。
实际上，目前，禁止担任审计工作的会计师拥有客户的财务利益几乎是一个普遍性的原则。
美国证券交易委员会和公共会计行业都不约而同的把的他们大部分的注意力，重点地放在，会计师审计的独立性概念的界定，和对财政利益的禁令的执行上。
详细的规则和报告结构已制定的出来了，目的是为了要揭露，任何一个会计师事务所的职业雇员，所可能拥有的经济利益，也包括这些职业雇员的配偶，父母，或他们的孩子。
上市公司会计监管委员会采用了这些规则中的一大部分，这在一定程度上缓和了那些制度上有不合理地方的地区的问题。
除此之外，还有轮换任用的审计方法。
在某些国家，如意大利，审计者可以对委托人执行某一个特定年限的审计工作。
这种类型的管理方法，在美国和英国，从来没有被认真的考虑过。
虽然法案要求，个别审计者要定期地轮换委托人客户。
而在法国，会计师审计的轮换概念是颠倒的：即审计者的任期为一段固定的时间，在这段时间里，他们不能被取代。
这种规则的制定，目的是增加会计师审计的独立性，因为由此审计者对于被客户解雇的担忧就减少了。