读者反映理论
将读者反应论应用于英美文学教学的尝试

将读者反应论应用于英美文学教学的尝试摘要:读者反应理论是篇章语言学与文学批评理论紧密结合的典范。
该理论强调文学的本质是人际间的交流性,它重点研究读者在阅读过程中对作品意义建构的重要作用。
以此理论为依据,在高校英语专业英美文学教学中应倡导以学生为中心的教学模式,引导学生深入文本,深化学生对作品的理解,培养学生的文学鉴赏能力和跨文化交际能力,以达到优化课堂教学、提升教学效果的目的。
关键词:读者反应理论;英美文学教学;启示;应用语言学的产生和发展,总会伴随或引起新的文学理论和文学方法的产生。
20世纪以来,许多文学批评理论以文学文本为中心,与篇章语言学理论密切联系。
读者反应理论就是这种将篇章语言学与文学批评理论紧密结合在一起的一个典范。
在英美文学的教学中,学生是文学课程学习的主体,也是文学作品的读者。
因此,研究如何调动学生的积极性与主动性,使之在了解作品的基础上以自己的感受来充实作品的内涵,从而实现提高学生阅读和赏析的能力,培养学生人文素养的目标,是搞好英美文学教学的一个新的视角。
一、读者反应理论溯源读者反应理论是以读者接受的状况而非作品本身为研究对象的一系列现代文学批评理论的概称,它重点研究读者在阅读过程中对作品意义建构的重要作用[1]。
读者反应理论的源起可以追溯至20世纪30年代。
随着当代西方接受美学理论在学术界的广泛传播,人们越来越倾向于将文学研究的重点从作家的创作活动扩大到作者与读者之间的交流之中来。
波兰文艺理论家罗曼·英加登和美国女批评家路易丝·M·罗森布拉特是这一思潮的两个源头。
英加登首先提出了读者是文学与艺术作品的共同创造者的主张。
后来,罗森布拉特在她的《作为探索的文学》一书中又提出了文学沟通的概念,认为文学作品的意义是通过作者与读者之间的沟通来实现的,无人阅读的作品等于不存在。
到20世纪60年代,读者反应理论开始进入其理论与实践的全面发展阶段,出现了两位重要的代表人物——德国的汉斯·罗伯特·姚斯和沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔。
读者反应论reader

读者反应论reader's response/responses of receptors
奈达早期的重要论点之一,在其《翻译科学初探》(1964)中提出。
他说:译文“接受者和译文信息之间的关系应该与原文接受者和原文信息之间的关系基本上相同”。
“翻译的重点不应当是语言的表现形式,而应当是读者对译文的反应”。
奈达从社会语言学和语言交际功能的观点出发,认为翻译必须以接受者为服务中心,要根据不同接受者的要求而对译文作相应调整。
奈达既是翻译理论家,也是翻译《圣经》的专家。
他认为《圣经》传达上帝的旨意,其语言对古代读者和听众来说是浅显易懂的,今天没有任何理由为追求语言的精美而阻碍平民直接聆听上帝的教诲。
他强调指出,任何信息如果起不到交际即思想交流的作用,就会变得毫无价值。
“要判断某个译作是否译得正确,也必须以译文的服务对象为衡量标准。
”也就是说,要判断译文质量的优劣,必须看读者对译文的反应如何,同时必须把这种反应和原作读者对原作的反应加以比较,看两种反应是否基本一致。
奈达的读者反应论20世纪80年代初进入我国译界,是有争议的。
第四讲:读者理论:阐释学、接受美学、读者反应批评解析

1. 哲学背景: 1)胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl, 1859-1938)现象学
现象学哲学提出“回到事物本身”的口号。所谓“回到 事物本身”,并不是指回到我们经验中的客观事物本身, 相反,胡塞尔恰恰认为,经验事实是不可靠的。 回到事物自身,首先必须排除对客体的自然态度,将超 出我们直接经验的事物放进“括号”里,以便使外部世 界变成我们自身意识的内容,在纯意识中把握“纯粹现 象”,把握“意向性客体”。 而“意向性客体”是靠对于意识活动本身和对客体具体 经验事实中不变成分的双重“洞察”获得的。
五、接受美学与读者反应批评
尧斯与伊塞尔:联邦德国“康斯坦茨学派”接 受美学(“reception” theory)。 接受美学(Reception theory)20世纪60年 代在联邦德国展开对文学割裂社会历史的批评, 形成了这一理论。60年代的文学挑战了已有的 文学形式,提高了读者的介入力度。 尧斯:《文学史作为向文学的挑战》(1967) 伊塞尔:《文本的召唤结构》(1970)
故事的叙述由受述者决定: The function of the narratee: It is hard to find the narratee while reading, sometimes from minor characters, or from some unimportant “signals”. In this case, the telling of the story is somewhat decided by the narratee ( like A Thousand and One Night). 叙述活动本身生成读者:The narratives produce their own “readers”, “listeners”, who may or may not coincide with actual readers.
读者反应理论

读者反应理论与《傲慢与偏见》中的反讽艺术--《考试周刊》2007年09期--------------------------------------------------------------------------------本文献来源中国知网反讽艺术的应用是构成奥斯丁小说艺术大厦的主要支撑点。
本文从读者反应理论的角度看奥斯丁在作品中如何运用言语反讽、戏剧反讽和情景反讽等反讽艺术与读者进行交流,如何对读者的内心思想施加影响,从而构建作品的完整意义。
【作者单位】:广东外语艺术职业学院外语系广东广州510507【关键词】:读者反应;言语反讽;戏剧反讽;情景反讽【分类号】:I561【DOI】:CNKI:ISSN:1673-8918.0.2007-09-020【正文快照】:简·奥斯丁是十八世纪末十九世纪初英国著名的的小说家,在英国文学史上起了重要的承上启下的作用。
其代表作《傲慢与偏见》更是被全世界的读者喜爱推崇,被毛姆列为“世界十大小说名著”之一。
一、读者反应理论在文学的批评史上,读者及其阅读活动一直是人们易于忽略的研究点。
然而,在二十世纪六十年代末期,西方批评界开始兴起一股国际性的批评思潮,逐渐对读者及其阅读活动产生极大的兴趣,并投注了相当大的研究热情。
文学作品的接受、反应、效果以及作品与读者之间的交流、沟通、互动成了此思潮所关注的重点。
整体而言,读者反应理论具有一些基…HideWikipedia is getting a new lookHelp us find bugs and complete user interface translationsNotice something different? We've made a few improvements to Wikipedia. Learn more. [Hide][Help us with translations!]DeconstructionFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, searchFor the approach to post-modern architecture, see Deconstructivism; for other uses, see Deconstruction (disambiguation).Deconstruction is an approach, introduced by French philosopher Jacques Derrida, which rigorously pursues the meaning of a text to the point of exposing the contradictions and internal oppositions upon which it is apparently founded and showing that those foundations are irreducibly complex, unstable or impossible. It is an approach that may be deployed in philosophy, literary analysis, or other fields.Deconstruction generally tries to demonstrate that any text is not a discrete whole but contains several irreconcilable and contradictory meanings; that any text therefore has more thanone interpretation; that the text itself links these interpretations inextricably; that the incompatibility of these interpretations is irreducible; and thus that an interpretative reading cannot go beyond a certain point. Derrida refers to this point as an aporia in the text, and terms deconstructive reading "aporetic." J. Hillis Miller has described deconstruction this way: ―Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the structure of a text, but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself. Its apparently-solid ground is no rock, but thin air."[1]Contents [hide]1 History1.1 Sources of deconstruction2 Theory2.1 Différance2.2 Of Grammatology2.3 Speech and Phenomena2.4 Writing and Difference2.5 Derrida's later work3 The difficulty of definition3.1 Secondary definitions3.2 Derrida's negative descriptions3.3 Not a method3.4 Not a critique3.5 Not an analysis3.6 Not poststructuralist4 Developments after Derrida4.1 The Yale School4.2 The Ethics of Deconstruction4.3 Derrida and the Political4.4 The Inoperative Community5 Criticism5.1 Michel Foucault5.2 John Searle5.3 Jürgen Habermas5.4 Criticisms in popular media6 References6.1 Bibliography6.2 Notes7 External links[edit] HistoryIn Of Grammatology (1967) Derrida introduces the term deconstruction to describe the manner that understanding language, as ―writing‖ (in general) renders infeasible a straightforward semantic theory. In first using the term deconstruction, he ―wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the Heideggerian word Destruktion or Abbau‖.[2] Martin Heidegger’s philosophydeveloped in relation to Edmund Husserl’s, and Derrida’s use of the term deconstruction is closely linked to his own (Derrida’s) appropriation of the latter’s understanding of the problems of structural description.[edit] Sources of deconstructionDeconstruction emerged from the influence upon Derrida of several thinkers, including:Edmund Husserl. The greatest focus of Derrida's early work was on Husserl, from his dissertation (eventually published as The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy), to his "Introduction" to Husserl's "Essay on the Origin of Geometry," to his first published paper, "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" (in Writing and Difference), and lastly to his important early work, Speech and Phenomena.Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's thought was a crucial influence on Derrida, and he conducted numerous readings of Heidegger, including the important early essay, "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time" (in Margins of Philosophy), to his study of Heidegger and Nazism entitled Of Spirit, to a series of papers entitled "Geschlecht."Sigmund Freud. Derrida has written extensively on Freud, beginning with the paper, "Freud and the Scene of Writing" (in Writing and Difference), and a long reading of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle in his book, The Post Card. Jacques Lacan has also been read by Derrida, although the two writers to some extent avoided commenting on each others' work.Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's singular philosophical approach was an important forerunner of deconstruction, and Derrida devoted attent ion to his texts in Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles and The Ear of the Other.André Leroi-Gourhan. Of Grammatology makes clear the importance of Leroi-Gourhan for the formulation of deconstruction and especially of the concept of différance, relating this to the history of the evolution of systems for coding difference, from DNA to electronic data storage.Ferdinand de Saussure. Derrida's deconstruction in Of Grammatology of Saussure's structural linguistics was critical to his formulation of deconstruction, and his insertion of linguistic concerns into the heart of philosophy.[edit] TheoryDerrida began speaking and writing publicly at a time when the French intellectual scene was experiencing an increasing rift between what could broadly be called "phenomenological" and "structural" approaches to understanding individual and collective life. For those with a more phenomenological bent the goal was to understand experience by comprehending and describing its genesis, the process of its emergence from an origin or event. For the structuralists, this problematic was a very misleading avenue of interrogation, and the "depth" and originality of experience could in fact only be an effect of structures which are not themselves experiential. It is in this context that in 1959 Derrida asks the question: Must not structure have a genesis, and must not the origin, the point of genesis, be already structured, in order to be the genesis of something?[3]In other words, every structural or "synchronic" phenomenon has a history, and the structure cannot be understood without understanding its genesis.[4] At the same time, in order that there be movement, or potential, the origin cannot be some pure unity or simplicity, but must already bearticulated—complex—such that from it a "diachronic" process can emerge. This originary complexity must not be understood as an original positing, but more like a default of origin, which Derrida refers to as iterability, inscription, or textuality.[5] It is this thought of originary complexity, rather than original purity, which destabilises the thought of both genesis and structure, that sets Derrida's work in motion, and from which derive all of its terms, including deconstruction.[6]Derrida's method consisted in demonstrating all the forms and varieties of this originary complexity, and their multiple consequences in many fields. His way of achieving this was by conducting thorough, careful, sensitive, and yet transformational readings of philosophical and literary texts, with an ear to what in those texts runs counter to their apparent systematicity (structural unity) or intended sense (authorial genesis). By demonstrating the aporias and ellipses of thought, Derrida hoped to show the infinitely subtle ways that this originary complexity, which by definition cannot ever be completely known, works its structuring and destructuring effects.[7]Derrida initially resisted granting to his approach the overarching name "deconstruction," on the grounds that it was a precise technical term that could not be used to characterise his work generally. Nevertheless, he eventually accepted that the term had come into common use to refer to his textual approach, and Derrida himself increasingly began to use the term in this more general way.[edit] DifféranceCrucial to Derrida's work is the concept of différance, a complex term which refers to the process of the production of difference and deferral. According to Derrida, all difference and all presence arise from the operation of différance. He states that:To "deconstruct" philosophy [...] would be to think – in the most faithful, interior way – the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time to determine – from a certain exterior [...] –what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid [...] By means of this simultaneously faithful and violent circulation between the inside and the outside of philosophy [...a] putting into question the meaning of Being as presence.[8]To deconstruct philosophy is therefore to think carefully within philosophy about philosophical concepts in terms of their structure and genesis. Deconstruction questions the appeal to presence by arguing that there is always an irreducible aspect of non-presence in operation. Derrida terms this aspect of non-presence différance. Différance is therefore the key theoretical basis of deconstruction. Deconstruction questions the basic operation of all philosophy through the appeal to presence and différance therefore pervades all philosophy. Derrida argues that différance pervades all philosophy because "What defers presence [...] is the very basis on which presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign, its trace".[9] Différance therefore pervades all philosophy because all philosophy is constructed as a system through language. Différance is essential to language because it produces "what metaphysics calls the sign (signified/signifier)".[10]In one sense, a sign must point to something beyond itself that is its meaning so the sign is never fully present in itself but a deferral to something else, to something different. In another sense the structural relationship between the signified and signifier, as two related but separate aspects of the sign, is produced through differentiation. Derrida states that différance "is the economical concept", meaning that it is the concept of all systems and structures, because "there is no economy without différance [...] the movement of différance, as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language [...] différance is also the production [...] of these differences."[9] Différance is therefore the condition of possibility for all complex systems and hence all philosophy.Operating through différance, deconstruction is the description of how non-presence problematises the operation of the appeal to presence within a particular philosophical system. Différance is an a-priori condition of possibility that is always already in effect but a deconstruction must be a careful description of how this différance is actually in effect in a given text. Deconstruction therefore describes problems in the text rather than creating them (which would be trivial). Derrida considers the illustration of aporia in this way to be productive because it shows the failure of earlier philosophical systems and the necessity of continuing to philosophise through them with deconstruction.[edit] Of GrammatologyDerrida first employs the term deconstruction in Of Grammatology in 1967 when discussing the implications of understanding language as writing rather than speech. Derrida states that:[w]riting thus enlarged and radicalized, no longer issues from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos.[11]In this quotation Derrida states that deconstruction is what happens to meaning when language is understood as writing. For Derrida, when language is understood as writing it is realised that meaning does not originate in the logos or thought of the language user. Instead individual language users are understood to be using an external system of signs, a system that exists separately to them because these signs are written down. The meaning of language does not originate in the thoughts of the individual language user because those thoughts are already taking place in a language that does not originate with them. Individual language users operate within a system of meaning that is given to them from outside. Meaning is therefore not fully under the control of the individual language user. The meaning of a text is not neatly determined by authorial intention and cannot be unproblematically recreated by a reader. Meaning necessarily involves some degree of interpretation, negotiation, or translation. This necessity for the active interpretation of meaning by readers when language is understood as writing is why deconstruction takes place.To understand this more fully, consider the difference for Derrida between understanding language as speech and as writing. Derrida argues that people have historically understood speech as the primary mode of language[12] and understood writing as an inferior derivative ofspeech.[13] Derrida argues that speech is historically equated with logos,[14] meaning thought, and associated with the presence of the speaker to the listener.[15] It is as if the speaker thinks out loud and the listener hears what the speaker is thinking and if there is any confusion then the speaker's presence allows them to qualify the meaning of a previous statement. Derrida argues that by understanding speech as thought language "effaces itself."[16] Language itself is forgotten. The signified meaning of speech is so immediately understood that it is easy to forget that there are linguistic signifiers involved - but these signifiers are the spoken sounds (phonemes) and written marks (graphemes) that actually comprise language. Derrida therefore associates speech with a very straightforward and unproblematic theory of meaning and with the forgetting of the signifier and hence language itself.Derrida contrasts the understanding of language as speech with an understanding of language as writing. Unlike a speaker a writer is usually absent (even dead) and the reader cannot rely on the writer to clarify any problems that there might be with the meaning of the text. The consideration of language as writing leads inescapably to the insight that language is a system of signs. As a system of signs the signifiers are present but the signification can only be inferred. There is effectively an act of translation involved in extracting a significaton from the signifiers of language. This act of translation is so habitual to language users that they must step back from their experience of using language in order to fully realise its operation. The significance of understanding language as writing rather than speech is that signifiers are present in language but significations are absent. To decide what words mean is therefore an act of interpretation. The insight that language is a system of signs, most obvious in the consideration of language as writing, leads Derrida to state that "everything [...] gathered under the name of language is beginning to let itself be transferred to [...] the name of writing."[17] This means that there is no room for the naive theory of meaning and forgetting of the signifier that previously existed when language was understood as speech.Much later in his career Derrida retrospectively confirms the importance of this distinction between speech and writing in the development of deconstruction when he states that:[F]rom about 1963 to 1968, I tried to work out - in particular in the three works published in 1967 - what was in no way meant to be a system but rather a sort of strategic device, opening its own abyss, an unclosed, unenclosable, not wholly formalizable ensemble of rules for reading, interpretation and writing. This type of device may have enabled me to detect not only in the history of philosophy and in the related socio-historical totality, but also in what are alleged to be sciences and in so-called post-philosophical discourses that figure among the most modern (in linguistics, in anthropology, in psychoanalysis), to detect in these an evaluation of writing, or, to tell the truth, rather a devaluation of writing whose insistent, repetitive, even obscurely compulsive, character was the sign of a whole set of long-standing constraints. These constraints were practised at the price of contradictions, of denials, of dogmatic decrees"[18]Here Derrida states that deconstruction exposes historical constraints within the whole history of philosophy that have been practised at the price of contradictions, denials, and dogmatic decrees. The description of how contradictions, denials, and dogmatic decrees are at work in agiven text is closely associated with deconstruction. The careful illustration of how such problems are inescapable in a given text can lead someone to describe that text as deconstructed.[edit] Speech and PhenomenaDerrida's first book length deconstruction is his critical engagement with Husserl's phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena published in 1967. Derrida states that Speech and Phenomena is the "essay I value the most"[19] and it is therefore a very important example of deconstruction. Husserl's philosophy is grounded in conscious experience as the ultimate origin of validity for all philosophy and science. Derrida's deconstruction operates by illustrating how the originary status of consciousness is compromised by the operation of structures within conscious experience that prevent it from being "the original self-giving evidence, the present or presence of sense to a full and primordial intuition."[20] Derrida argues that Husserl's "phenomenology seems to us tormented, if not contested from within, by its own descriptions of the movement of temporalization and language."[21] Derrida argues that the involvement of language and temporalisation within the "living present"[21] of conscious experience means that instead of consciousness being the pure unitary origin of validity that Husserl wishes it be, it is compromised by the operation of différance in the structures of language and temporalisation. Derrida argues that language is a structured system of signs and that the meanings of individual signs are produced by the différance between that sign and other signs. This means that words are not self sufficiently meaningful but only meaningful as part of a larger structure that makes meaning possible. Derrida therefore argues that the meaning of language is dependent on the larger structures of language and cannot originate in the unity of conscious experience. Derrida therefore argues that linguistic meaning does not originate in the intentional meaning of the speaking subject. This conclusion is very important for deconstruction and explains the importance of Speech and Phenomena for Derrida. Informed by this conclusion the deconstruction of a text will typically demonstrate the inability of the author to achieve their stated intentions within a text by demonstrating how the meaning of the language they use is, at least partially, beyond the ability of their intentions to control. Similarly, Derrida argues that Husserl's description of temporal of consciousness - where he describes the retension of past conscious experience and protension of future conscious experience - introduces the structural différance of temporal deferral, temporal non-presence, into consciousness. This means that the past and future are not in the living present of conscious experience but they taint the presence of the living present with their conscious absence through retension and protension. Husserl's description of temporal consciousness therefore compromises the total self presence of conscious experience required by Husserl's philosophy once again.[edit] Writing and DifferenceWriting and Difference is a collection of essays published by Derrida in 1967. Each essay is a critical negotiation by Derrida of texts by philosophical or literary writers. These essays have come to be termed deconstructions even though some of them were written before Derrida's first use of the term in Of Grammatology. For example, the chapter "Cogito and the History of Madness," dating from 1963, has been referred to as a deconstruction of the work of Michel Foucault, yet the term "deconstruction" does not actually appear in the chapter.[edit] Derrida's later workWhile Derrida's deconstructions in the 1960s and 1970s were frequently concerned with the major philosophical systems, in his later work he is often concerned to demonstrate the aporias of specific terms and concepts, including forgiveness, hospitality, friendship, the gift, responsibility and cosmopolitanism.[edit] The difficulty of definitionWhen asked "What is deconstruction?" Derrida replied, "I have no simple and formalisable response to this question. All my essays are attempts to have it out with this formidable question" (Derrida, 1985, p. 4). Derrida believes that the term deconstruction is necessarily complicated and difficult to explain since it actively criticises the very language needed to explain it.[edit] Secondary definitionsThe popularity of the term deconstruction combined with the technical difficulty of Derrida's primary material on deconstruction and his reluctance to elaborate his understanding of the term has meant that many secondary sources have attempted to give a more straightforward explanation than Derrida himself ever attempted. Secondary definitions are therefore an interpretation of deconstruction by the person offering them rather than a direct summary of Derrida's actual position.Paul de Man was a member of the Yale School and a prominent practitioner of deconstruction as he understood it. His definition of deconstruction is that,"It's possible, within text, to frame a question or undo assertions made in the text, by means of elements which are in the text, which frequently would be precisely structures that play off the rhetorical against grammatical elements." (de Man, in Moynihan 1986, at 156.)Richard Rorty was a prominent interpreter of Derrida's philosophy. His definition of deconstruction is that, "the term 'deconstruction' refers in the first instance to the way in which the 'accidental' features of a text can be seen as betraying, subverting, its purportedly 'essential' message" (Rorty 1995). (The word accidental is used here in the sense of incidental.) John D. Caputo attempts to explain deconstruction in a nutshell by stating that:"Whenever deconstruction finds a nutshell—a secure axiom or a pithy maxim—the very idea is to crack it open and disturb this tranquility. Indeed, that is a good rule of thumb in deconstruction. That is what deconstruction is all about, its very meaning and mission, if it has any. One might even say that cracking nutshells is what deconstruction is. In a nutshell. ...Have we not run up against a paradox and an aporia [something contradictory]...the paralysis and impossibility of an aporia is just what impels deconstruction, what rouses it out of bed in the morning..." (Caputo 1997, p.32)David B. Allison is an early translator of Derrida and states in the introduction to his translation of Speech and Phenomena that :[Deconstruction] signifies a project of critical thought whose task is to locate and 'take apart' those concepts which serve as the axioms or rules for a period of thought, those concepts which command the unfolding of an entire epoch of metaphysics. 'Deconstruction' is somewhat less negative than the Heideggerian or Nietzschean terms 'destruction' or 'reversal'; it suggests that certain foundational concepts of metaphysics will never be entirely eliminated...There is no simple'overcoming' of metaphysics or the language of metaphysics.[22]Paul Ricoeur was another prominent supporter and interpreter of Derrida's philosophy. He defines deconstruction as a way of uncovering the questions behind the answers of a text or tradition (Klein 1995).A survey of the secondary literature reveals a wide range of heterogeneous arguments. Particularly problematic are the attempts to give neat introductions to deconstruction by people trained in literary criticism who sometimes have little or no expertise in the relevant areas of philosophy that Derrida is working in relation to. These secondary works (e.g. Deconstruction for Beginners[23] and Deconstructions: A User's Guide[24]) have attempted to explain deconstruction while being academically criticized as too far removed from the original texts and Derrida's actual position.[citation needed] In an effort to clarify the rather muddled reception of the term deconstruction Derrida specifies what deconstruction is not through a number of negative definitions.[edit] Derrida's negative descriptionsDerrida has been more forthcoming with negative than positive descriptions of deconstruction. Derrida gives these negative descriptions of deconstruction in order to explain "what deconstruction is not, or rather ought not to be"[25] and therefore to prevent misunderstandings of the term. Derrida states that deconstruction is not an analysis, a critique, or a method[26] in the traditional sense that philosophy understands these terms. In these negative descriptions of deconstruction Derrida is seeking to "multiply the cautionary indicators and put aside all the traditional philosophical concepts."[26] This does not mean that deconstruction has absolutely nothing in common with an analysis, a critique, or a method because while Derrida distances deconstruction from these terms, he reaffirms "the necessity of returning to them, at least under erasure."[26] Derrida's necessity of returning to a term under erasure means that even though these terms are problematic we must use them until they can be effectively reformulated or replaced. Derrida's thought developed in relation to Husserl's and this return to something under erasure has a similarity to Husserl's phenomenological reduction or epoché. Derrida acknowledges that his preference for negative description ―has been called...a type of negative theology.‖[27] The relevance of the tradition of negative theology to Derrida's preference for negative descriptions of deconstruction is the notion that a positive description of deconstruction would over-determine the idea of deconstruction and that this would be a mistake because it would close off the openness that Derrida wishes to preserve for deconstruction. This means that if Derrida were to positively define deconstruction as, for example, a critique then this would put the concept of critique for ever outside the possibility of deconstruction. Some new philosophy beyond deconstruction would then be required in order to surpass the notion of critique. By refusing to define deconstruction positively Derrida preserves the infinite possibility of deconstruction, the possibility for the deconstruction of everything. [original research?][edit] Not a methodDerr ida states that ―Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one.‖[27] This is because deconstruction is not a mechanical operation. Derrida warns against considering。
接受理论和读者反应批评概要

文学文本 和 文学作品
文本是指作家创造的同读者发生关系之前的作品本身的自 在状态;作品是指与读者构成对象性关系的东西,它已经 突破了孤立的存在,融会了读者即审美主体的经验、情感 和艺术趣味的审美对象。 文本是以文字符号的形式储存着多种多样审美信息的硬载 体;作品则是在具有鉴赏力读者的阅读中,由作家和读者 共同创造的审美信息的软载体。 文本是一种永久性的存在,它独立于接受主体的感知之外, 其存在不依赖于接受主体的审美经验,其结构形态也不会 因事而发生变化;作品则依赖接受主体的积极介入,它只 存在于读者的审美观照和感受中,受接受主体的思想情感 和心理结构的左右支配,是一种相对的具体的存在。由文 本到作品的转变,是审美感知的结果。也就是说,作品是 被审美主体感知、规定和创造的文本。
沃尔夫冈· 伊瑟尔 (Wolfgang Iser)
德国美学家、文学批评家, 接受美学的创始人与主要 代表之一。康士坦茨大学 英文系教授。
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代 表 人 物
其主要文论著作有: 《文本的召唤结构》(1970) 《隐在的读者》(The Implied Reader, 1972) 《阅读行为》(The Act of Reading, 1976) 《阅r-response Theory and Criticism
Li Zhujun
Content
· 接受美学的兴起和发展
· 接受理论内容及其代表人物 · 读者反应批评及其代表人物
· 读者反应批评的意义和局限
接受美学
接受美学(Receptional Aesthetic)又称接受理论、 接受研究,接受方法,是西方文学研究中一 种新兴的方法论。因为它产生于联邦德国南 部康斯坦茨,又称康斯坦茨学派。
康斯坦茨学派: 1960年代, 5位德国学者聚集在德国南部新建的 康斯坦茨大学提出了接受美学。 代表人物: 汉斯·罗伯特·姚斯(Hans Robert Jauss)、 沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔(Wolfgang Iser)。
读者反应论

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Reader ’ response theory
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真正把读者反应原则纳入到翻译标准中的第一 人则是奈达。 他认为,翻译的服务对象是读者或言语接受者, 要评价译文质量如何优劣,必须看读者对译文 的反应如何,同时必须把这种反应和原文读者 对原文可能产生的反应进行比较,看两者反应 是否基本一致。他强调说:“不对信息接受者的 作用进行全面的研究,对文际的任何分析都是 不完整的 。“奈达的读者反应论”则努力迎合 读者的要求,适应读者的接受程度,它不指望 读者对原文的文化背景有深入了解,而倾向利 用读者文化知识来理解译文。
译文一: 所罗门说得好:“有着爱的以草作餐,比带着恨的豢养的肥 牛还要强。“现在我不愿拿革特谢那里的日常奢侈品来换罗活德和 它一切的窘乏了。 —李界野译 译文二:所罗门说得好“吃素菜.彼此相爱强如吃肥牛,彼此相 恨。”现在.我可不愿意拿劳活德和它的贫困去换盖兹海特府和它平 常的奢华了。 —祝庆英译
以上两种译文均为名家所译。不可否 认两者都是正确的译文。对于一般读 者从阅读欣赏的角度认为译文二为好。 而学习原语的学习者可能会认为译文 一好一些,因为它保持了原文的语言 形式和单个词义从中便于理解原文的 句法、词法和句义。
• 读者反应论认为,读者是一个不断变化着的接受群体,重 译可以满足不断变化的读者的需要、反映他们的期待视 野、缩短现时读者与已有译本的审美距离。读者反应的 变化往往会引起翻译理论和翻译技巧的变化。 • 读者反应论认为,译者可以合理选择读者(即目标读者) , 翻译理论和翻译实践应充分关注目标读者的期待视野、 审美偏爱和审美能力。否则,这一理论就会失去它的指 导价值,这样的实践最终也是失败的实践。 • 读者反应论并不排除直译。相反,只要目的语提供了可 能性,它提倡这种方法的合理应用,因为人类有着共同的 经验世界可能还有普遍的信息处理策略。翻开翻译的历 史,我们同样也发现直译对丰富译语语言、传播文化信 息起到了积极作用。直译和意译(异化和归化) 体现了对 读者反应的不同态度。从这个意义上说,正确把握读者 反应,并使之与翻译方法有机结合起来关系到翻译的得 失。.
读者反应理论

读者反应理论
读者反应理论(Reader-Response Theory),是二十世纪七十年代末起流行起来的一种书面文本解读理论,它强调个体读者读者在阅读过程中受自身背景,思想观念,文化心理等影响,对文本产生不同的思考、体验,从而对读者的阅读产生不同的反应。
读者反应理论的出现,有利于建立和认识读者,更加重视读者的地位和现实意义。
读者反应理论并不是单一的理论,它包括整体反应理论,结构反应理论,文化反应理论,文本反应理论等多种学理,给文本解读和文本翻译方面提出了很多更新的解决方法。
在高等教育行业,读者反应理论可以有效地推动教学质量的改善,解决各类课题,提升师生的思考能力、临场反应能力。
学校可以采取多种措施,针对一般课程的教学同时给学生提供多元化的学科学习方法,激发学生的思考热情,加强对不同思维方式的讨论,并根据学生的背景、思想观念等,设计出更加让学生产生共鸣的教学模式,从而让学生能够更加实用地理解教学内容,拓展个人的思维深度和思考宽度,进而使整个教育体系的素质得到提升。
总之,读者反应理论是一种时代性的理论,它对于文本释义和文本翻译方面产生了革命性影响,在高等教学行业也发挥了重要作用,推动着教育体系持续改善着不断发展。
第四讲读者理论阐释学接受美学读者反应批评ppt课件

1.接受美学:
1)伊塞尔(Wolfgang Iser,1926-2007)
伊塞尔(German literary scholar)认为,文学研 究应该充分重视文本与读者之间的关系,因为“文 本只提供程式化了的各方面,后者促使作品的审美 对象得以形成”。
“作品”产生于读者与文本的相遇和交流过程中, 是读者与作者共同创造的产物。
2)伽达默尔(Hans-Georg Gadamer,1900-2002
公认的海德格尔最出色的后继者。 《真理与方法》(1960) 他认为,对于所有历史流传物的阐释都是现在与过去的
“对话”。 两个“视界”:一个是阐释者自身的“成见”(海德格
尔的“先结构”)出发形成的对作品的预想和前判断, 也称“个人视界”;另一个则是作品本身置于其中的 “历史视界”,它是文本在和历史的“对话”中构成的 一种现存的连续性,包括不同时期人们对文本做出的一 系列阐释。
(批评不是去探究作者的意图,而是去感悟,去 意识作者的意识和作者的情感,使作品得到理解和 阐释。这种阐释带有批评者主观的意识。使批评者 的主观意识与作者的相互融合,进行沟通。)
伽达默尔认为,一个文本的意义永远是相对的, 它不可能为作者的意图所穷尽,而总是由阐释 者所处的历史环境乃至全部的历史所决定。
尧斯:《文学史作为向文学的挑战》(1967) 伊塞尔:《文本的召唤结构》(1970)
尧斯:从文学史的角度研究文本接受问题, 强调对文学文本理解的历史性。文本的读者 阅读经验中具体化的实现过程。
伊塞尔:从具体的阅读活动入手,强调文本 与读者在阅读中的相互作用和相互影响。
英美读者反应批评:斯坦利·费什
而“意向性客体”是靠对于意识活动本身和对客体具体 经验事实中不变成分的双重“洞察”获得的。
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Real Reader⏹The “real readers”, or members of a particular reading public, are historicallyreal people. To reconstruct these readers, one needs to know, among other things, the norms (both literary and social) of their time, their emotions and attitudes aroused by the work, and the critical judgments they passed on it.⏹Here Iser must have in mind the work of his colleague H.R. Jauss, whose“aesthetics of reception” deals chiefly with the “history of responses”. Hypothetical Reader⏹Unlike the real historical reader, the hypothetical reader owes its existence tothe critic when the latter creates it as the receiver of the potential effect of a particular work.⏹There are two types of the hypothetical reader (as shown in the diagram), butwhat concerns Iser more is the first type, the ideal reader, because the second type, the contemporary reader, though often casually mentioned by critics, is difficult to specify.⏹Unlike the real reader and the contemporary reader, the ideal reader is a“fictional being” tha t crops up now and then in discussions of contemporary theory, often with different references and implications. P.J. Rabinowitz, for instance, defines it as theoretical models (such as G. Prince‟s “narratee”, W.Gibson‟s “mock reader”, and even Iser‟s “implied reader”) that help to show the ideal operation or processing of the text.The Psychologically Describable Reader⏹The reader in this category refers to one “whose psychology has been openedup by the findings of psychoanalysis” (Iser, 1987, pp.27-28). The typical psychoanalytical reader is found in the work of N. Holland, who defines his psychoanalytical reading of texts as “transactive criticism”, and his reader as the “transactive reader”, namely, one who “works explicitly from his transaction of th e text”The Reader as Heuristic Models⏹This category is important for the present discussion because Iser‟s “impliedreader” is, to a great extent, one such model along with many others.⏹We will begin our discussion of Iser‟s reading theory by first reca lling some ofthe “limitations” of the concepts of the reader discussed just now, in order to see how Iser tries to avoid, or rather, to overcome them in his model of the reader.The problem with the “real reader”, as we have seen, is that the reconstruc tion of the horizon of expectations depends heavily on the availability of historical data. The “ideal reader”, on the other hand, is believed to presuppose the total consumption of the work and therefore demolishes the very basis of its potential effects on the reader. As for Holland and Fish who try to locate meaning in the reader‟s mind (the unconscious for Holland and the internalized competences for Fish), the link seems loose between the literary experience they are talking about and the process ofcommunication that takes place to shape this very experience.Against these “limitations” Iser‟s concept of the reader stands as a good contrast. He says:⏹If, then, we are to try and understand the effects caused and the responseselicited by literary works, we must allow for the reader‟s presence without in any way predetermining his character or his historical situation. We may call him, for want of a better term, the implied reader. He embodies all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to exercise its effect -- predispositions laid down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by the text itself. Consequently, the implied reader as a concept has his roots firmly planted in the structure of the text; he is a construct and is in no way to be identified with any real reader. (179)The passage quoted above is a concentrated expression of Iser‟s basic ideas concerning the construction of his model and his reactions to the other models. It shows⏹i) the implied reader, as a theoretical construct, could avoid the practicaldifficulties faced by the concept of the “real reader”,⏹ii) though it does not stand for any actual reader, the concept itself implies hispresence and his operation in the process of literary communication,⏹iii) the implied reader carries within itself the “predispositions” that ensure theliterary work both to produce the desired effects on the reader and to elicit relevant responses from him, and⏹iv) what constitutes a major difference between Iser and Holland or Fish isthat the predispositions necessary for the production of effects and responses are determined not by personal desires or competences, but by the very structure of the text itself.Iser‟s concept of the implied reader may be better apprehended through an examination of its structure. From the above brief account it is clear that this structure should be able to account for both the “predispositions” prestructured by the text and the actualizations performed by the reader. For the former, Iser proposes the concept of “the reader‟s role as textual structure”, and for the latter, “the reader‟s role as structured acts”.Each author, in his composition of a fictional work, selects useful materials to create a world of his own inventions, which in on e way or another represents the author‟s view of the real world. But few authors would present their views too explicitly or directly if they want their works to achieve any effect on the reader. Generally, the author‟s view is expressed through the variou s perspectives in the text, which perform two functions, namely, to “outline the author‟s view and also provide access to what the reader is meant to visualize” (180)Thus the textual structure of the implied reader, as we have seen, is composed of or prestructured by three basic components: the textual perspectives, their convergentplace, and the vantage point of the reader. The last two components, i.e., the convergent place of the textual perspectives and the vantage point of the reader, however, only remain potential in the textual structure and have to be actualized by the reader. This actualization is made possible by the other component of the implied reader, i.e., the structured acts.We may take A Dream of Red Mansions for an illustration of the concept of the implied reader. At the beginning of Chapter One, the viewpoints from the narrator‟s perspective tell that the whole story is but the dreams and illusions of the author, therefore the reader‟s vantage point decides that the story is purely f ictional.But this is immediately followed by the statement (another textual viewpoint) that the story is a record of the girls the author has known well, and that the dreams and illusions actually represent the real intention of the novel. So the reader changes his vantage point and believes that the story is real.Then the origin of the story (another textual viewpoint) from the perspective of the Reverend V oid once again puts the reader in an uncertain position as to the credulity of the story, but th is uncertainty is soon cleared up, this time from the stone‟s perspective, when the reader is told that the story is based on true facts without any modification.But this is not all, the reader‟s vantage point may undergo another shift to the contrary when he comes to the Illusory Land of Great V oid (太虚幻境) revealed through the perspective of the plot, especially when he reads the couplet “假作真时真亦假;无为有处有还无” “When false is taken for true, true becomes false; If non-being turns into being, being becomes non-being. ”The perspectives and viewpoints prescribed by the text provide instructions for the reader to build up mental images. The continuous replacement of these images results in shifts of the reader‟s vantage point, reflecting his changing attitudes in the process of reading. Finally, the textual viewpoints and the reader‟s vantage point meet at the convergent place, where the meaning potential of the work is actualized by the reader‟s structured acts.After these shifts of vantage point, most readers would finally agree, as indicated by the author‟s viewpoints, that the pages of the novel are not full of fantastic talks (“满纸荒唐言”), nor would they call the author mad (“都云作者痴”), but that they should read the story carefully and try to understand the au thor‟s message (“解其中味”)This is what we might call the final convergent place of the textual viewpoints and the reader‟s vantage points, or the meaning reached by the reader about the credulity of the story, after his interaction with the text under the guidance of the textual perspectives.From the above description of the implied reader, we may make several general observations about the concept:⏹1) Iser‟s theoretical construct of the implied reader is not an actual reader, noris it an abstraction of it. For any concept of the reader which centers chiefly on the reader to the neglect of other elements in the process of reading is unlikely to give an account of literary communication.⏹2) The implied reader is thus best understood as a phenomenological constructof the actual reader with two roles both as textual structure and as structured acts. These two roles are interrelated and interdependent in that the textual structure provides framework of perspectives for the structured acts to work within, while the latter implements the former to determine a vantage point and to arrive at the convergent place.Y et, the two roles are also in a sense separate, because only a separation allows of the possibility of a relationship between them and makes possible their mutual interaction and final combination in the concept of the implied reader. Just as the idea of the literary work is the result of the interaction between the text and the reader, the two are “separate” though by no means “autonomous” objects.T. Eagleton, believes that “Iser is aware of the social dimension of reading, but chooses to concentrate largely on its …aesthetic‟ aspects”, therefore his reader does not have a foothold in history (Eagleton, 1985, p.83).S.R. Suleiman has made a similar observation when she says that Iser‟s reader “is not a specific, historically situated individual but a transhistorical mind whose activities are ... everywhere the same”. She gives credit to Iser‟s effort at introducing a historical dimension to the description of the reading process by the use of the repertoire, but complains that his readers are still “implied”, not actual (Suleiman in Suleiman & Crosman, 1980, pp.25-26).Iser tries to keep in his phenomenological reader both its virtual presence in terms of “textual repertoire” or “structured acts” and brackets its historical presence. This treatment of the historicity of the reader in a way resembles the textualization of history and the idea of “praxis” (i.e., theoretical but not social practice) fa vored by the post-structuralists (cf. Zhu Gang. 2001, pp.173-175).Other Heuristic Models of the Reader: H.R. Jauss: The Historical ReaderJauss has devised a particular reader, labeled by Jauss himself as “the historical reader”:⏹The role of this historical reader should presuppose that one is experienced inone‟s associations with lyrics, but that one can initially suspend one‟s literary historical or linguistic competence, and put in its place the capacity occasionally to wonder during the course of the reading, and to express this wonder in the form of questions. (Jauss, 1989, p.144)⏹First, this historical reader is one who deals with the effect of a literary workand the reader‟s response to it, and helps to reveal the nature of literary reading as an eventful and process-like experience in more or less the same way as Iser‟s implied reader shows. But the historical reader only wonders during the course of reading. Though this is a clear indication of the reader playing a role and responding to the effects of the text, it does not, in fact, say much about the intricate relationship between the reader and the text.Secondly, contrary to the ideal reader who is free to use his perfect historical knowledge and literary competence, the historical reader suspends both of these in order to have “the capacity occasionally to wonder”. This is understandable, for a reader with perfect knowledge and competence would only provide answers, rather than pose questions to bring about an aesthetic experience.Stanley Fish is perhaps the best known and most polemic American reader-response critic of all . Many of his early ideas (the dramatic nature of reading, the temporal unfolding of meaning, the active role played by the reader in the reading process, etc.) come closest to those of Iser‟s, yet one great difference between them, among others, is reflected in the concept of the role of the reader in their respective heuristic models.For Fish, this reader is someone who projects, expects and corrects his responses all the way as he moves from one word to the next in his linear processing of a text. In formulating his theory of reading, Fish draws on the theory of Chomskian transformational-generative grammar.Fish builds up his model of the reader, which he calls the “informed reader”, characterized by three notable competences: i) competence in the language of the text; ii) semantic competence; and iii) literary competence. The combination of these three competences, as Fish assures us, would unfailingly make any actual reader an “informed” one, and enable him to realize the potential and probable responses a text might elicit. The “informed reader”, therefore, is an abstraction of the idealized actual reader.Iser has observed in his critique of Fish‟s theory t hat the informed reader must “observe his own reactions during the process of actualization, in order to control them” (Iser, 1987, p.32). What Iser is saying here is that Fish‟s reader himself functions as a controlling element in the reading process, as the responses are regulated and organized by the three competences internalized in the informed reader and thus preexist the actual processing of the text.This difference about the controlling element in reading is ultimately again an epistemological question. Here it is enough to point out that such a difference already anticipates the Iser-Fish debate that took place a few years later, and that with the controlling power invested entirely in the reader, the Iserian process of dyadic二元的interaction between the reader and the text necessarily becomes non-existent. Holland maintains that a person reveals his unique personality in the various things hedoes and the various ideas he expresses. Behind these “behavioral transformations”, however, lies an “invariant”, the “unchanging core of personality”, which he calls the “primary identity”, or “identity theme”, a term he borrowed from the modern psychologist Heinz Lichtenstein, and upon which he builds his theory of transactive criticism.For Holland, literary interpretation is inseparable from the question of identity. It is in fact a function of identity, for differences in interpretation can be accounted for in terms of the differences in personality, both being “variations upon an identity theme” (Holland in Tompkins, 1984, p.123). But what is more important is Holland‟s discovery that the “overarching principle” of the function of identity is that “identity re-creates itself.”That is to say, the reader, while reading, makes use of the text to replicate his own characteristic patterns of desires, anxieties, expectations, etc.. This, as Holland seems to argue, is the purpose of reading a literary work, and it is also what his “transactive reader” actually does in the act of reading.In the reading process in which identity recreation is carried out, what the transactive reader does is to find in the text the match for his expectations (e.g., similar wishes and fears), and then to respond by defending against them with his characteristic strategies, either to gratify the wishes, or to defeat the fears.Once the deep wishes and fears are defensively adapted, the reader will be able to derive from the text “fantasies of the particular kind that yield him pleasure” and, therefore, begin to enjoy the text by transforming the guilt and anxiety aroused by the fantasies into “a total experience of aesthetic, moral, intellectual or social coherence and significance.”The brief description given above concerning the recreation of identity through what Holland calls the DEFT (defence-expectation-fantasy-transformation) mechanism serves to show that the “transactive reader” is neither the real reader nor the ideal reader, but an abstraction of any actual reader who reads psychoanalytically, or rather, who is read psychoanalytically by the text he is reading.The concept of the transactive reader has undoubtedly extended our investigation of the reader into the deeper realms of his unconscious, but as a key element in a theory of reading, it is inadequate for a satisfactory explanation of the complex process of literary reading. To use Culler‟s words, Holland “fails to study reading as a process with its own operations and goals” (Culler in Suleiman & Crosman, 1980, p.55).J. Culler: The Ideal ReaderM. Riffaterre: The SuperreaderG. Prince: The Zero-Degree Narratee, and C. Brooke-Rose: The Encoded Reader W. Gibson: The Mock ReaderW.C. Booth: The Reader Created by the Author, or the Implied Reader。