2012年巴菲特致股东的信
巴菲特写给股东的信pdf

巴菲特写给股东的信pdf记得那是一个周末,阳光透过窗户洒在我那乱糟糟的小书房里。
我正百无聊赖地翻看着书架上的书,突然,一本封面有点破旧的册子映入了我的眼帘。
我拿下来一看,嘿哟,原来是一本收录了巴菲特写给股东的信的pdf打印版。
我当时就来了兴致,心想:“巴菲特那可是投资界的传奇人物啊,他写给股东的信里说不定藏着什么发家致富的秘籍呢!”于是,我一屁股坐在书桌前,准备好好研究研究。
这时候,我的好哥们儿小李正好来找我。
他一进门就看到我拿着这本册子,眼睛一下子亮了起来,凑过来问道:“你这看的啥呢?巴菲特的信?那可得好好看看,说不定咱们以后也能跟着巴菲特的思路赚大钱!”我笑着白了他一眼,说:“就你想得美!这信哪有那么容易看懂啊,里面都是些专业术语和对各种公司业务的分析。
”小李不服气地哼了一声,说:“怕啥!咱不懂就慢慢琢磨呗。
说不定能从里面挖出点宝贝来。
”说着,我俩就开始认真看了起来。
刚开始看的时候,我真是一头雾水,那些密密麻麻的文字和各种数据看得我眼睛都花了。
我忍不住嘟囔道:“这巴菲特写的都是啥啊?怎么跟天书似的。
”小李却看得津津有味,还时不时地给我解释几句:“你看这里,他说的这个公司的盈利模式,其实就是通过这种方式来降低成本,提高利润。
你再看这里,他对市场趋势的分析……”听着小李的讲解,我渐渐也有点明白了。
突然,我看到信里提到了巴菲特对某家公司投资决策的过程。
他详细地描述了自己是怎么研究这家公司的,考虑了哪些因素,又遇到了哪些困难。
我越看越入迷,仿佛能看到巴菲特坐在办公室里,皱着眉头,认真分析各种数据的样子。
我兴奋地对小李说:“哇塞,你看这里!巴菲特做决策也不是那么容易的啊,他得考虑好多好多因素呢。
”小李点点头,说:“是啊,这才是真正的投资大师啊!不像咱们,平时就想着一夜暴富,哪有这么容易的事儿。
”我们继续往下看,看到巴菲特在信里对股东们真诚的态度,他不仅仅是在汇报公司的业绩,更是在和股东们交流,分享自己的想法和经验。
2012年巴菲特致股东信中文版(完整)

2012年巴菲特致股东信全文致伯克希尔-哈萨维的股东:2011年我们的A股和B股每股账面价值增长了4.6%。
在过去47年,即现任管理层就职以来,账面价值从每股19美元增长到99860美元,年复合增长19.8%。
伯克希尔副董事长,我的合伙人查理-芒格对2011年公司取得的进展感到满意,以下是要点:董事会的主要工作是确保让合适的人选来运营我们的业务,确认下一代领导人并让他们做好准备明天就可以接管公司。
我在19个公司董事会任职,伯克希尔董事们在继承方案上投入的时间和努力是最多的。
更重要的是,他们的努力得到了回报。
2011年开始的时候,Todd Combs作为一名投资经理加入了我们,在年末结束不久,Ted Weschler也加入了我们。
他们两个人都拥有杰出的投资技能,以及对伯克希尔的承诺。
在2012年他们两人只掌管数十亿美元资金,但他们拥有的大脑、判断力和魅力,可以在我和查理不再运营伯克希尔时掌管整个投资组合。
你们的董事会对于谁会成为CEO的继任人也同样热情。
同样我们也有两个非常好的超级替补。
我们到时候可以做到无缝交接,而伯克希尔的前途将保持光明。
我的98%以上净财富都是伯克希尔股票,他们将进入各种慈善基金。
将如此多资金投入到一只股票中并不符合传统智慧。
但我对这一安排感到满意,我知道我们的业务质量好并且多元化,而管理他们的人又如此能干。
有了这些资产,我的继任者就有了良好的开端。
不要把这段话解读为我和查理会去哪里。
我们仍非常健康,并且喜欢我们做的事情。
在9月16日,我们收购了路博润,一家生产添加剂和其他特殊化学制品的全球性公司。
自James Hambrick在2004年成为CEO以来取得了杰出的成绩。
税前利润从1.47亿美元增长到10.85亿美元。
路博润在特殊化学领域将会有很多附加的收购机会。
其实,我们已经同意了三起收购,成本为4.93亿美元。
James是一个有原则的买家,一个超级的公司运营者。
查理和我都迫切希望扩张他的管理领域。
XXX巴菲特致股东的信

XXX巴菲特致股东的信致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东:2009年,公司净利润为218亿美元,每股账面价值增长了19.8%。
也确实是说,自从现任治理层接手公司之后,45年来,每股账面价值从19美元增长到84,487美元,年复合增长率为20.3%。
我们当前的股东人数大约为500,000名,而最近伯克希尔收购伯林顿北方公司的行为,至少又增加了65000名股东。
对我和我长期合作伙伴查理·芒格来说,更重要的是,我们的所有者认同伯克希尔的业务、目标、约束和文化。
因此,在每篇报告里,我们都重述了引导我们的经济原则。
我强烈建议专门是新股东,要认真阅读这些原则。
历年来伯克希尔一直恪守这些原则,而且今后我离开后也会连续遵守下去。
此外,在股东信中,我们将再次审查下差不多业务,期望能给伯林顿北方公司新来者提供新生定位培训,同时对伯克希尔老职员提供一次培训。
如何运算从一开始,查理和我就对评估我们完成了什么和未完成什么坚持理性和坚决的标准。
那防止我们抵挡不住诱惑。
选择标普500作为我们的标准是一个专门简单的选择,因为我们的股东几乎不用花任何成本就能够通过持有指数基金来获得相应的业绩。
他们什么缘故要给我们钱来仅仅复制那个结果呢?我们的一个更难的决定是如何运算伯克希尔相对标普的进展。
有的观点说用我们股价的变化。
事实上,在一个长期的时刻,这是最好的选择。
但每年股票价格是专门反复无常的。
即使包括10年数据的估值,也会因估值期早期或末期专门高或低的价格而变得不正常。
微软的Steve Ballmer,GE的Jeff Immelt能够告诉你那个问题,当他们接手治理时,他们股票在极端的价格交易使他们痛楚不堪。
运算我们每年增长的最佳标准是伯克希尔每股内在价值的变化。
但是,那个价值不能够通过任何接近精确地数据运算得出,因此,我们给他一个粗略的代替:每股账面价值。
另外,多数公司的账面价值比他的内在价值少。
伯克希尔无疑也是这种情形。
巴菲特致股东的信主要内容

巴菲特致股东的信主要内容你知道吗?最近我可是花了不少时间去琢磨巴菲特致股东的信,这里面啊,那真是藏着好多有意思的事儿呢。
就说去年吧,我和几个老友一起搞了个小小的投资俱乐部。
我们几个啊,平时没事就凑到一块儿,讨论讨论股票啥的,那场面,就跟一群“股市探险家”聚在一起似的,热闹得很。
有一天,我们正热火朝天地聊着,老李突然一拍大腿,说:“你们说巴菲特那致股东的信里,是不是有啥特别的门道啊?咱是不是也该好好研究研究。
”老张就接话了:“是啊是啊,人家巴菲特那可是投资界的大佬,跟着他学学,说不定咱这小投资也能有点大起色呢。
”于是乎,我们就决定把巴菲特致股东的信当成我们的“投资秘籍”来研究。
我负责把信打印出来,人手一份。
那信纸在我手里,感觉就跟捧着宝贝似的。
当我们开始认真看的时候,才发现这里面的内容真是太丰富啦。
就好比巴菲特在信里跟股东们唠家常一样,把公司的各种情况都一五一十地讲得明明白白。
比如说,他会详细地说公司这一年赚了多少,花了多少,就像一个细心的管家在跟家里人汇报收支情况似的。
我们几个一边看,一边还时不时地讨论几句。
小王就指着其中一段说:“你们看啊,巴菲特这里说的这个投资策略,不就是告诉我们要稳扎稳打嘛,不能光想着一夜暴富。
”小赵也跟着点头:“对对对,他说得可太对啦,咱以前啊,老是想着找那些能快速翻倍的股票,结果呢,往往是赔得一塌糊涂。
”看着大家你一言我一语地讨论着,我心里也觉得特别有意思。
巴菲特在信里还会提到公司面临的一些挑战和困难,就好像在跟股东们说:“咱们一起面对这些难题,别害怕,总会有办法解决的。
”这让我们也觉得,投资啊,其实就是一场有挑战的冒险,遇到困难的时候,得像巴菲特一样,保持冷静,想办法应对。
后来啊,我们根据巴菲特信里的一些思路,调整了我们的投资组合。
以前我们都是盲目跟风,听说哪个股票好就一股脑地往里投。
现在呢,我们会更谨慎地分析公司的基本面,看看它是不是真的有发展潜力。
过了一段时间,还真有效果。
巴菲特致合伙人致股东的信全集(最完整版)

巴菲特致合伙人致股东的信全集(最完整版)一:本书介绍为了把《巴菲特致合伙人+致股东的信》这套资料整理出来,我花了将近一年时间。
我相信我整理的这套资料应该是国内最完整最准确的版本。
为什么这么说呢?首先巴菲特写的信原版都是英文的,而且从1950年代一直写到了现在,时间跨度达60多年,国内的翻译版本很乱很杂,都是这个翻译一点,那个翻译一点,没有一个相关领域的权威人士从头译到尾。
而这些版本,大多都残缺不全,找一封完整的信出来都很难,更何况60多年,60多封信。
本人打印出来的完整版,800多页,分为上下两本。
我在很多年前就开始阅读这些资料,深深的被上面所说的问题所困扰,我非常希望能有一套完整而准确的资料来研读,然而无论是从线上还是线下各种渠道找到的资料都是残缺的,错乱的,不完整的。
于是我只能自己花时间来编辑,整理,并对照英文原版,把其中残缺的,被删的,及其大量的表格(几乎所有版本都删除或不翻译表格,而我认为没有表格数据就好像研究公司不看财务报表一样不知所云),备注,全都翻译并补充完整,纠正了里面大量的文字和数据错误,把所有的信都按书本规格做好排版。
在做这些工作的时候,我只有一个原则,就是还原巴菲特写的一字一句,我从不按自己的主观删掉一句话,也不敢增加一句话,力求做到原汁原味,因为对于这样伟大的作品,我认为我没有资格改动其中的一个字。
全书目录,整套书按照专业书籍规格排版,阅读起来非常方便。
这一切都是值得的,暂且把《巴菲特致合伙人+致股东的信》看成是一本书吧,虽然十几年来我几乎天天书不离身,但没有任何一本书对我人生的影响有这么大。
自打我走向社会以来,就把投资作为我事业的一个方向,但在前面5年,我看了无数投资方面的书,也研究过无数公司,却一直没看懂投资的游戏规则,我像个迷路的小孩一样不知道该走向何方,直到我看了这本书,我突然找到了人生的灯塔。
刚看完第一遍,我就知道我的投资之路应该怎么走了,也明白了我的人生该怎么走。
《巴菲特致股东的信》读后感

《巴菲特致股东的信》读后感《巴菲特致股东的信》读后感一《巴菲特致股东的信》是一本充满智慧的投资宝典,犹如一座灯塔,在投资的茫茫大海中为我指引方向,让我对价值投资有了更深刻、更清晰的理解。
在阅读这本书之前,我对投资的认知较为模糊,常常被市场的短期波动所左右,追逐热点却往往迷失其中。
然而,巴菲特通过这些信件,向我们展现了一种截然不同的投资理念和方法。
巴菲特强调价值投资的核心在于寻找具有长期竞争优势的企业。
他用生动的案例告诉我们,真正伟大的公司是那些能够在长时间内保持其经济护城河的企业。
这些企业拥有独特的商业模式、强大的品牌、高进入壁垒或者成本优势等。
比如可口可乐,其品牌在全球范围内深入人心,消费者对它的忠诚度极高,无论在哪个国家或地区,可口可乐都能占据一定的市场份额。
这种长期竞争优势使得公司能够持续盈利,并在经济周期的波动中保持稳定。
这让我明白,在投资时不能仅仅关注短期的利润报表,更要深入分析企业是否具备可持续发展的能力。
在评估企业价值方面,巴菲特的方法给我很大启发。
他并不依赖复杂的数学模型或者短期的市场预测,而是基于对企业基本面的深入理解。
通过分析企业的自由现金流、净资产收益率等关键指标,来估算企业的内在价值。
例如,对于一家制造业企业,如果它能够持续产生大量的自由现金流,并且将这些现金流合理地用于再投资或者回报股东,同时保持较高的净资产收益率,那么这家企业就具有较高的价值。
这种基于企业本质的价值评估方法,使我认识到投资决策不能被市场情绪和短期价格波动所干扰,要坚守对企业价值的判断。
巴菲特对市场波动的态度更是值得我们学习。
他把市场看作是一个“躁狂抑郁的家伙”,时而过度乐观,时而过度悲观。
在市场狂热时,他不会跟风买入高估的股票;在市场恐慌时,他也不会盲目抛售优质的资产。
他认为投资者应该利用市场的非理性,而不是被其左右。
这就像在2008年金融危机时,市场一片混乱,许多股票价格暴跌,但巴菲特却能冷静地寻找那些被错杀的优质企业进行投资。
巴菲特发表2012年致伯克希尔哈撒韦股东公开信

巴菲特发表2012年致伯克希尔哈撒韦股东公开信2012年02月26日09:33 来源:和讯网北京时间2月25日晚间,伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司在公司网站发表了2012年致股东的公开信,总结了公司2011年度的业绩表现和功过得失。
摘要部分翻译如下。
致伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东:2011年我们的A类股和B类股每股账面价值增长4.6%。
过去47年中,即目前管理层掌管公司以来,账面价值从每股19美元增至99860美元,年复合增长率为19.8%。
我和伯克希尔的副董事长、我的合伙人查理-芒格(Charlie Munger)都对2011年公司取得的进步感到满意,以下是2011年业绩亮点:董事会的首要工作是确保让合适人选来经营我们的公司,确定好下一代领导人并让他们做好随时就可以接管公司的准备。
目前我在19个公司董事会任职,在继承方案上投入时间和精力最多的是伯克希尔的董事们。
不仅如此,他们的努力得到了回报。
2011年初,库姆斯(Todd Combs)作为投资经理加入了我们,在2011年结束后不久,韦施勒(Ted Weschler)也加盟本公司。
他们都拥有卓越的投资技能,以及对伯克希尔的责任感。
2012年他们都只掌管数十亿美元资金,但他们的智慧、判断力和魅力,足以使他们在我和查理不再经营伯克希尔后能掌管我们的全部资产组合。
董事会对于谁会成为我的继任者,出任公司CEO抱有同样的热情,他必须是一个董事们充分了解,管理技能和个人品质得到董事尊重的人。
我们还有两个出色的超级替补。
一旦责任交接的时刻来临,我们可做到无缝传承,而伯克希尔的前景将依然光明。
我个人财富净值的98%以上都是伯克希尔的股票,这些财富将转入各种慈善事业。
将如此多财富集中在一只股票上不符合传统的投资智慧,但我依然对这样的安排感到满意,因为我知道我们的业务既质量好又多元化,管理企业的人也有良好素质。
坐拥这些资产,我的继任者就有了一个良好的开始。
但是,不要就此讨论我和查理会去哪里。
巴菲特写给股东的信

巴菲特写给股东的信
亲爱的股东。
您好!非常感谢您购买我们公司的股票,并为我们的发展做出了重要
贡献。
我们非常重视您对我们发展所做出的努力,并将继续尽我们最大努
力实现更高的股息回报,以及更好的服务体验。
同时,我们还将继续持续投入,以确保我们的业务稳步增长和实现更
大的价值。
我们将努力实现业绩持续性增长,并实现更高的股息回报给股东。
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2012年巴菲特致股东的信(重点节选)投资往往为被描述为这样一个过程,现在投入一些钱,希望未来能收回更多的钱。
在伯克希尔哈撒韦,我们采用更高的标准,将投资定义为“现在将购买力让渡给他人,合理期待未来支付名义收益税率后,仍能获得更高的购买力”。
简言之,投资就是放弃现在的消费,以便将来有能力消费更多。
从我们的定义可以得出一个重要结论:衡量投资风险高低的指标不应是贝塔值一个基于波动率的华尔街术语,常用于衡量风险,而是持有期满后投资人出现购买力损失的合理概率。
资产价格可能大幅波动,但只要有理由肯定投资期满后它们带来的购买力能得到提升,这项投资就没有风险。
稍后我们还会看到,价格没有波动的资产也可能充满风险。
投资选择林林总总,但大体可分为三类,理解每一类的特点很重要。
下面,我们将展开详细的分析。
市场上以特定货币结算的投资包括货币市场基金、债券、按揭、银行存款和其他工具。
大多数此类投资都被视为“安全”,但事实上却是可能属于最危险的资产。
它们的贝塔值可能是零,但风险巨大。
上个世纪,这类投资工具摧毁了很多国家投资者的购买力,尽管投资者一直能够按时收到支付的本息。
而且,这样的糟糕结果将来还会不断重现。
政府决定货币的最终价值,而系统性力量有时会推动它们制定导致通胀的政策。
这些政策一不留神就会失控。
即使是在美国,政府强烈希望维持本币稳定,但是,我1965年接管伯克希尔哈撒韦以来,美元也已贬值高达86%。
当年花1美元能买到的东西,今天至少要花7美元。
因此,这些年来,一个免税机构须取得4.3%的债券投资年收益,才能保持购买力不变。
假如管理层还将一切利息收入视为“收益”,他们一定是在开玩笑。
对于像你我这样的应税投资者,情况就更糟了。
过去的47年里,美国国债不断地滚动,年回报率5.7%。
听起来好像还不错。
但对于个人所得税率平均为25%的的个人投资者而言,这5.7%的回报率所能带来的实际收益是零。
投资者缴纳的、可见的所得税将拿走上述回报率中的1.4个百分点,通胀因素这个隐形的“税种”将吞噬其余4.3个百分点。
值得指出的是,尽管投资者可能认为显性的所得税是主要的负担,但其实,隐形的通胀“税”是所得税的3倍还多。
没错,每张美元上都印着“我们信仰上帝”这句话,但启动美国政府印钞机的是凡夫俗子的手。
当然,高利率能弥补依托于货币的投资工具所带来的通胀风险。
而且,20世纪80年代初时的利率确实很好地做到了这一点。
不过,要抵消消费者购买力面临的风险,当前的利率水平还差得远。
因此,眼下应谨慎投资债券。
By Warren BuffettInvesting is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power -- after taxes have been paid on nominal gains -- in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability -- the reasoned probability -- of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a nonfluctuating asset can be laden with risk.Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it's important to understand the characteristics of each. So let's survey the field.Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds,bonds,mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as "safe." In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as these holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal.This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as "income."For taxpaying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation "tax" was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. "In GodWe Trust" may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government'sprinting press has been all too human.High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments -- and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume.Right now bonds should come with a warning label.Warren Buffett: Your pick for Businessperson of the YearUnder today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchasecurrency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain -- either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past -- and may do so again -- we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: "Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk."The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else -- who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive -- will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce -- it will remain lifeless forever -- but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited andincapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth -- for a while.Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the "proof " delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers -- for a time -- expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: "What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end."Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce -- gold's price as I write this -- its value would be about $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers -- whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators -- must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops -- and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil (XOM) will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold.I'm confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard "cash is king" in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard "cash is trash" in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.My own preference -- and you knew this was coming -- is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola (KO), IBM (IBM), and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies -- think of our regulated utilities, for example -- fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods,consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial "cows" will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of "milk" to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well).Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety -- but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.。