盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译
盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译
摘要
从犯罪现场调查员的视角来看盈余管理的检测，启蒙了早期对盈余管理的研究和它的近亲：盈利质量。
Ball和Shivakumar的著作（2008在会计和经济学杂志上出版的《首次公开发行时的盈利质量》）和Teoh et al .的著作(1998在金融杂志53期上刊登的《盈利管理和首次公开发行后的市场表现》)被用来阐释将犯罪现场调查的七个部分应用于盈利管理的研究。
关键词:市场效率盈余管理盈利质量会计欺诈
1、引言
在诸多会计和金融的研究课题中,可能没有比盈余管理更具有刺激性的议题。
为什么?我认为这是因为这个主题明确涉及了潜在的不法行为、恶作剧、冲突、间谍活动以及一种神秘感。
正如Healy和Wahlen在1999年(Schipper在1989也下过类似的定义)定义道:“盈余管理的发生是在管理者针对财务报表和交易建立，运用判断力来改变财务报告之时。
盈余管理要么会在公司潜在的经营表现上误导一些利益相关者，要么影响合同结果，这取决于会计报告数字。
”简而言之，有人做伤害别人的事情。
审计人员、监管机构、投资者和研究者们试图找到这些违法者并解开这个谜团,而这个谜团可能会演变成涉及欺诈(或犯罪,在此使用解决犯罪谜团的隐喻)的事件。
如果我们将盈余管理看成是一个潜在的欺诈性(犯罪性)活动,那么我们可以在利用比解决神秘谋杀案的福尔摩斯,或犯罪现场调查(CSI)更现代的条件下，考虑对盈余管理的探查。
这样的调查涉及到以下七个要素：一场犯罪是否已经实施，嫌疑人的责任，使用的凶器,犯罪活动的受害者,犯罪的动机，开展行动的机会和替代性解释。
替代性解释是指除了欺诈或犯罪活动，整个事件的起因。
这个起因能够证实在目击证据的基础上得出欺诈或犯罪的结论将是错误的。
我在讨论破解盈余管理的谜团的各种要素时，所举的例子主要来自Ball和Shivakumar(2008)和Teoh et al.(1998)。
(这些要素显然是相互关联的,以下的讨论中也有一些不可避免的重复)。
盈余管理与盈利质量有很多共同之处。
我想大多数人都会同意，受到高度管理的收益盈利质量较低。
然而,缺少盈余管理并不足以保证高质量的收益(更普遍的说法是高质量的会计数字),因为其他因素也会影响收益的质量。
例如,会计师挑剔地遵循一套低的会计标准也会产生低质量的财务报告。
然而,如果我们把这些给定的其他因素看成常数,我们可以将盈余管理和盈利质量联系的更加紧密。
虽然存在收益质量的其他解释,但是在接下来的讨论中,我的观点与Ball和Shivakumar保持一致。
高质量的盈利是保守的，然而低质量
的盈利呈现出不断增加的盈余管理行为。
2、盈余管理产生了吗
犯罪现场调查员的一个关键任务是确定犯罪是否已经发生,或者是否是一些自然原因产生的结果。
死亡是因为杀人、自杀或意外事故吗？做出这样的决定往往很困难，在会计研究中也丝毫不会更简单。
正如Healy和Wahlen(1999,第370页)解释道：“尽管流行的观点认为盈余管理是存在的,研究人员却很难提供令人信服的文字资料。
这个问题产生的主要原因在于，为了确定收益是否已经受到了管理控制，研究人员首先要估计受到管理前的收益。
”换句话说,研究人员需要区分收益中受到自然原因影响的部分和受到盈余管理活动影响的部分。
在早先对盈利管理和收益质量的研究中，研究设计普遍被总结为三个类：（1）时间序列，(2)横断面研究，(3)越野。
促使时间序列的研究方法获得世人瞩目的是Teoh et al.(1998)，他将包含在招股说明书中的上市前财务报表作为与IPO当年数值比较的一个基准。
在众多研究中使用横断面方法的是Ball和Shivakumar(2005)，他们比较了英国的私营企业的财务报表和上市公司的财务报表。
越野的方法是横断面的方法的一个变体，这种方法探究了机构的国际性差异。
在所有的研究中,基准并不完美的，而且最终得出的有关盈利管理的衡量或盈利质量的结论十分杂乱，这种杂乱还很频繁(Dechow et al .,1995)。
值得称赞的是，Ball和Shivakumar(2008)找到一个样本，这个样本克服了Healy和Wahlen(1999)所述的事后检测的难度。
通过探查一个在英国进行首次公开发行的样本公司，可以发现任何盈余管理都可以被精确地检测到。
这是因为存在两套财务报表，第一套(我称之为“影子财务报表”)属于在英国公司注册处备案的有限责任公司，这些公司仍然属于私营企业。
第二套是在IPO招股说明书中的财务报表。
我们可以提出合理的假设，即影子财务报表相对于受到IPO诱导的，IPO招股说明书中的财务报表拥有更大的收益管理的自由。
因此,影子财务报表为没有受到管控的盈利提供了一个良好的基准。
同时，我们可以推断出在高精度的比较下，任何盈余管理活动可以利用两套财务报表之间的差异。
Healy和Wahlen专注于检测的技术难度，这仅仅是站在事后的角度讨论。
我认为考虑事前检测技术的难度也很重要。
从根本上说，希望那些管理收益不应该被很容易地探测到。
经理越是老练，他或她便更不太可能进行容易被检测到的盈利管理，甚至为了逃避检测，他们的隐藏计划会更复杂。
推论是，如果什么东西，比如盈余管理，看起来太明显了，那么很有可能不是。
在财务报告中，涉及到的人通常是有经验的、聪明的、受过良好教育的、接受过明确的专业行为准则或隐式的伦理准则的指导的。
我不认为他们可能从事浮夸的、头脑简单的盈余管理，如果他们这样做，我希望他们的盈余管理不至于因过于明显而被检测到。
然而事后检测的问题是解决了，Ball和Shivakumar的研究背景是发觉盈余管理的可能性几乎是零的情况。
期望投资者、他们的律师以及监管机构不去注意财务报告的主要差异是不合理的，同样不合理的是，如果企业管理者采用了可能被允许进行特别检测的盈利管理方法，却无法系统地预测随之而来的负面影响。
换句话说，如果为了获得好处而参与其中，盈余管理必须做到难以发现。
在此讨论的基础上,我认为Ball和Shivakumar没有发现任何明显的盈利管理行为完全不足为奇。
事实上,他们发现的唯一的显著差异在于财务报表中与无形资产有关的项目，这些数据表现记录在了IPO账户中。
很明显,这种记录很容易识别，被读者接受的可能性也很高。
当我声称，在英国的IPO中，肯定会实际发生盈余管理被检测到的事时，我也许夸大
了事实。
参照Ball和Shivakumar样本研究，这种说法应该被合理化。
这个研究只包括了那些IPO财务报表与在公司署有备案的公司财报具有可比性的企业。
换句话说,样本中只包含了那些可以在财务报表项目之间作出一个简单和直接的比较的公司。
这就剔除了所有会增加或减少数量细节，或改变各种物品分类的公司。
这样的公司占据了总量的绝大部分：在t—1,t—2、t—3三个年度中，越393家IPO公司中，这类公司的数量分别为140、198和245。
如果采用更加复杂的比较方法，这不是给管理被检测到的可能性更低的账户提供机会吗？也许为了伪装他们的盈利管理行为，他们故意使IPO财务报表相比于影子财务报表变得不具可比性，在我看来，那些没有可比财报的公司存在隐瞒盈余管理的可能性，也更值得检验。
通过解决事后发现这个问题，Ball和Shivakumar“扔婴儿连同洗澡水一起倒掉”。
出于同样的原因,我认为从英国IPO研究情况推断到其他情形是不合理的，比如Teoh et al.(1998)研究的美国的IPO销量。
由于没有可供比较的公开上市前的财务报表，在美国，盈余管理更难被发现。
3.谁应当对盈余管理负责
神秘的谋杀事件有时被称为一个“侦探小说”。
在这样的一个故事中，“是谁”的疑问无疑最重要。
然而，“是谁”在会计研究中是一个有待进一步研究的问题。
尽管犯罪现场调查员自然想试图找出罪魁祸首,学术研究却对最终确定是否一个特定的公司，更不用说任何个人，实施了盈余管理不太关心。
他们对寻找盈余管理的倾向更感兴趣。
当然，关注点的差异和研究人员获得的信息量较少以及需要通过增加样本大小来提高统计的说服力密切相关。
然而，即使需要大样本，仍然存在可以被检验的有趣的“是谁”问题。
例如,培训和资历对盈余管理倾向的影响是什么？如果拥有专业职称，管理者管理盈余的可能性是否会降低，甚至因此遵守职业道德准则？不同的会计制度需要管理者作出不同程度的判断是否会导致不同程度的盈余管理？管理者之间的经济和文化差异会起到一定的作用吗?
参考文献
[1]Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005(39):83-128.
[2]Ball, R., Shivakumar, L.,Earnings quality at initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, submitted for publication.
[3]Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G., Sweeney, A.P., Detecting earnings management.The Accounting Review,1995(70):193–225。
盈余质量分析的评价指标体系外文翻译
原文：Analysis of earnings quality evaluation index system Earnings quality is an important aspect of evaluating an entity's financial health, yet investors, creditors, and other financial statement users often overlook it. Earnings quality refers to the ability of reported earnings to reflect the company's true earnings, as well as the usefulness of reported earnings to predict future earnings. Earnings quality also refers to the stability, persistence, and lack of variability in reported earnings. The evaluation of earnings is often difficult, because companies highlight a variety of earnings figures: revenues, operating earnings, net income, and pro forma earnings. In addition, companies often calculate these figures differently. The income statement alone is not useful in predicting future earnings.The SEC and the investing public are demanding greater assurance about the quality of earnings. Analysts need a more suitable basis for earnings estimates. Credit rating agencies are under increased scrutiny of their ratings by the SEC. Such comfort level and information is not provided in the audit report or the financial statements. Only 27% of finance executives recently surveyed by CFO “feel 'very confident' about the quality and completeness of information available about public companies” [“It's Better (and Worse) Than You Think,” by D. Dupree May 3, 2004].There are a variety of definitions and models for assessing earnings quality. The authors have proposed a uniform, independent definition of quality of earnings that allows for the development of an Earnings Quality Assessment (EQA) model. The proposed EQA model evaluates the degree to which a company's income statement reports its true earnings and the extent to which it can predict and anticipate future earnings.Earnings Quality DefinedA variety of earnings-quality definitions exist. Teats [“Quality of Earnings: An Introduction to the Issues in Accounting Education,” Issues in Accounting Education, 17 (4), 2002] states that “some consider quality of earnings to encompass the underlying economic performance of a firm, as well as the accounting standards that report on that underlying phenomenon; others consider quality of earnings to refer only to how well accounting earnings convey information about the underlying phenomenon.” Pratt defines earnings quality as “the extent to which net income reported on the income statement differs from true earnings” [in F. Hodge, “Investors'Perceptions of Earnings Quality, Auditor Independence, and the Usefulness of Audited Financial Information,” Accounting Horizons 17 (Supplement), 2003]. Penman [“The Quality of Financial Statements: Perspectives from the Recent Stock Market Bubble,” Accounting Horizons 17 (Supplement), 2003] indicates that quality of earnings is based on the quality of forward earnings as well as current reported earnings. Shipper and Vincent [“Earnings Quality,” Accounting Horizons 17 (Supplement), 2003] define earnings quality as “the extent to which reported earnings faithfully represent Hicks Ian income,” which includes “the change in net economic assets other than from transactions with owners.”Using various definitions of earnings quality, researchers and analysts have developed several models. The Sidebar summarizes eight models for measuring earnings quality. The models are used for very narrow, specific purposes. While the criteria used in these definitions and models overlap, none provide a comprehensive view of earnings quality. For example, the primary purpose of the Center for Financial Research and Analysis (CRFA)'s model is to uncover methods of earnings manipulation. Of the eight models discussed, only the Lev-Thiagarajan and Empirical Research Partners models have been empirically tested for evidence of usefulness related to quality of earnings. Lev and Thiagarajan's findings confirm that their fundamental (earnings) quality score correlates to earnings persistence and growth, and that subsequent growth is higher in high quality–scoring groups. Empirical Research Partners' model is based in part on methodology developed and tested by Potosi, whose findings indicate a positive relationship between scores based on the model and future profitability.The following summarizes the criteria considered in each of the eight models for measuring earnings quality.Center for Financial Research and Analysis: Four criteria to uncover methods used to manipulate earnings. Report includes financial summary, accounting policy analysis, discussion of areas of concernEmpirical Research Partners: Three components: net working-capital growth rate, net concurrent assets, deferred taxes; incremental earnings and free cash flow production relative to each new dollar of revenue or book value; and nine financial indicators, put together for a single gauge of fundamentals. Items viewed favorably:positive return on assets and operating cash flow; increases in return on assets, current ratio, gross margin, asset turnover; operating cash flow that exceeds net income.Items viewed unfavorably: increases in long-term debt-to-assets; presence of equity offerings. Each indicator given a 1 if favorable, an O if not; scores aggregated on an O to 9 scales.Ford Equity Research: Earnings variability is minimum standard error of earnings for past eight years, fitted to an exponential curve. Growth persistence considers earnings growth consistency over 10 years; projected earnings growth rate is applied to normal earnings to derive long-term value. Operating earnings calculated by excluding unusual items, such as restructuring charges and asset write-downs; earnings trend analysis done on this adjusted figure. Repurchases of an entity's own shares are analyzed to determine if results are favorable.Lev-Thiagarajan: Each fundamental is assigned a value of 1 for positive signal, O for negative signal. Each of 12 factors is equally weighted to develop aggregate fundamental score. Negative signals include: decrease in gross margins disproportionate to sales; disproportionate (versus industry) decreases in capital expenditures and R&D; increases in S&A expenses disproportionate to sales; and unusual decreases in effective tax rate. Inventory and accounts receivable signals measure percent change in each (individually) minus percent change in sales; inventory increases exceeding cost of sales increases and disproportionate increases in receivables to sales are considered negative. Unusual changes in percent change of provision for doubtful receivables, relative to percent change in gross receivables, are also viewed negatively. Percent change in sales minus percent change in order backlog is considered an indication of future performance.Merrill Lynch (David Hawkins) (see earnings quality: the establishment of a real 360 View, 2002). Higher total capital ratio (pre-tax operating return on total capital) returns a higher quality of earnings equivalent. Liquidity ratio above 1.0 (net income figure how close it is to achieve positive cash) that the higher quality of earnings. Re-investment in productive assets ratio above 1.0 (committed to maintaining the fixed asset investment) that a higher quality of earnings. The ratio ofeffective tax rate for all companies meet or exceed the average level (dependence on low-tax report) that the higher quality of earnings. Model also believes that long-term credit rating and Standard & Poor's S & P earnings and dividend growth and stability of rank-based, over the past 10 years.Raymond James & Partners (Michael Krensavage) (also see the earnings quality monitoring, 2003.) 1 (worst) to 10 (best) rating as a benchmark of 10 exclusive distributions; weighted average rating in the combined to determine the earnings quality scores. Low earnings quality indicators: increase in receivables; earnings growth due to reduced tax rates, interest capitalization, high frequency / time scale of the project. In a recent major acquisition made during the punishment. Practice of conservative pension fund management and improve the R & D budget faster than revenue in return. Cash flow growth and the related net income and gross margin of profit a positive impact on quality improvement.Standard & Poor's core earnings (see also the technical core earnings Bulletin, October 2002). Attempts to give a more accurate performance of the existing business of the real. Core benefits include: Employee stock option expenses; restructuring charges from ongoing operations; offset the depreciation of business assets or deferred pension costs; purchased research and development costs; merger / acquisition costs; and unrealized gains and losses on hedging. Excluded items: Goodwill impairment charges, pension income; litigation or insurance settlements, from the sale of assets (loss) and the provisions of the previous year's expenses and the reversal.UBS (David Bianca) (also see S & P 500 accounting information quality control, 2003.) Comparison of GAAP operating income; the difference between the net one time standard. Employee stock option expenses charged to operating profit. Assuming the market value of return on pension assets to adjust interest rates or the discount rate times. Health care costs adjusted for inflation, if the report is 300 basis points more than the S & P 500 companies are expected weighted average. Joint Oil Data Initiative is AUTHOR_AFFILIATION Bell ovary, CPA, is a Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Don E. Incoming, CPA, graduate students, professors, and Donald E &Beverly Flynn is Chairman of the holder at Marquette University. Michael D • Akers, CPA, CMA, CFE, CIA, CBM, is a Professor and Head of the Department.Of the 51 criteria/measurements used in the eight models, only eight (acquisitions; cash flow from operations/net income; employee stock options; operating earnings; pension fund expenses; R&D spending; share buyback/issuance; and tax-rate percentage) are common to two models, and only two (gross margin and one-time items) overlap in three models.The first step, then, is to develop a standard definition of earnings quality. One of the objectives of Fast’s Conceptual Framework is to assist investors in making investment decisions, which includes predicting future earnings. The Conceptual Framework refers not only to the reliability (or truthfulness) of financial statements, but also to the relevance and predictive ability of information presented in financial statements. The authors' definition of quality of earnings draws from Pratt's and Penman's definitions. The authors define earnings quality as the ability of reported earnings to reflect the company's true earnings and to help predict future earnings. They consider earnings stability, persistence, and lack of variability to be key. As Beaver indicates: “current earnings are useful for predicting future earnings … [and] future earnings are an indicator of future dividend-paying ability” (in M. Bauman, “A Review of Fundamental Analysis Research in Accounting,” Journal of Accounting Literature 15, 1996).Earnings Quality Assessment (EQA)The authors propose an Earnings Quality Assessment (EQA) that provides an independent measure of the quality of a company's reported earnings. The EQA consists of a model that uses 20 criteria that impact earnings quality (see Exhibit 2 ), applied as a “rolling evaluation” of all p eriods presented in the financial statements. The EQA is more comprehensive than the eight models presented, considering revenue and expense items, as well as one-time items, accounting changes, acquisitions, and discontinued operations. The model also assesses the stability, or lack thereof, of a company, which leads to a more complete understanding of its future earnings potential.The criteria were drawn from the eight models discussed, including the 10 criteria overlapping two or more models. The EQA evaluator assigns a point value ranging from 1 to 5 for each of the 20 criteria, with a possible total of 100 points. Ascore of 1 indicates a negative effect on earnings quality, and a score of 5 indicates a very positive effect on earnings quality. EQA scores, then, can range from 20 to 100. Similar to the grading methods for bond ratings, grades are assigned based on the following scale: 85–100 points = A, 69–84 points = AB, 53–68 points = B, 35–51 points = BC and 20–34 points = C. While the EQA evaluator needs to use professional judgment in assigning scores to each of the criteria, the guidelines in Exhibit 2 are recommended.The Application of EQATo illustrate the process of applying the EQA, the authors chose two large pharmaceutical companies, Merck and with. Each of the authors independently applied the EQA to Merck's and Width’s 2003 financial statements, and then met to discuss their results. Based upon each individual assessment and the subsequent discussion, they reached an agreed-upon score, presented in Exhibit 3 .This process is similar to what an engagement team would go through. Each member would complete the EQA independently, and then the group would meet as a whole to discuss the assessment and reach a conclusion. This process allows for varying levels of experience, and takes into account each team member's perspective based on exposure to various areas of the company. The audit team's discussion is also helpful when one member finds an item that another might not have, which may explain variances in the scores assigned by each individual.For the illustration, the EQA was based solely on data provided in the financial statements. The authors found a high level of agreement on the quality of earnings measures, and there was little variation in the scores for both companies. One would expect even less variation when a group more intimately exposed to an organization, such as the audit engagement team, completes the EQA. The consistency provided by use of the EQA model would enhance the comfort level of users of the financial statements and the EQA.Need for Further DevelopmentThere is significant need for the development of a uniform definition and a consistent model to measure earnings quality. This article provides such a definition, positing that the quality of earnings includes the ability of reported earnings to reflect the company's true earnings, as well as the usefulness of reported earnings to predict future earnings. The authors propose an Earnings Quality Assessment (EQA) model that is consistent with this definition. The EQA recognizes many of the fragilities ofGAAP, and takes into account factors that are expected to affect future earnings but that are not explicitly disclosed in the financial statements.The authors propose that auditors conduct the EQA and issue a public report. Auditors' EQA reports will provide higher-quality information to financial statement users and meet the SEC's demand for greater assurance about the reliability of earnings figures.Source: MichaelD.Akers, 2005. “Analysis of earnings quality evaluation index system” the CPA journal. November.pp.199.译文：盈余质量分析的评价指标体系盈余质量是债权人评价一个实体的财务状况的重要方面，但投资者和其他财务报表使用者往往忽略它。
企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Measuring the quality of earnings1. IntroductionGenerally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) offer some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and give the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alternatives. Earning management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the firm (Ortega and Grant, 2003).In other words, earnings management is manipulating the earning to achieve a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献predetermined target set by the management. It is a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain (Schipper, 1989).Levit (1998) defines earning management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company.The popular press lists several instances of companies engaging in earnings management. Sensormatic Electronics, which stamped shipping dates and times on sold merchandise, stopped its clocks on the last day of a quarter until customer shipments reached its sales goal. Certain business units of Cendant Corporation inflated revenues nearly $500 million just prior to a merger; subsequently, Cendant restated revenuesand agreed with the SEC to change revenue recognition practices. AOL restated earnings for $385 million in improperly deferred marketing expenses. In 1994, the Wall Street Journal detailed the many ways in which General Electric smoothed earnings, including the careful timing of capital gains and the use of restructuring charges and reserves, in response to the article, General Electric reportedly received calls from other corporations questioning why such common practices were“front-page〞 news.Earning management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Whalen, 1999).Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that abusive earnings management and fraudulent practices begins by engaging in earnings management schemes designed primarily to “smooth〞 earnings to meet internally or externally imposed earnings forecasts and analysts’ expectations. Even if earnings management does not explicitly violate accounting rules, it is an ethically questionable practice. An organization that manages its earnings sends a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献message to its employees that bending the truth is an acceptable practice. Executives who partake of this practice risk creating an ethical climate in which other questionable activities may occur. A manager who asks the sales staff to help sales one day forfeits the moral authority to criticize questionable sales tactics another day.Earnings management can also become a very slippery slope, which relatively minor accounting gimmicks becoming more and more aggressiveuntil they create material misstatements in the financial statements (Clikeman, 2003)The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three staff accounting bulletins (SAB) to provide guidance on some accounting issues in order to prevent the inappropriate earnings management activities by public companies: SAB No. 99 “Materiality〞, SAB No. 100 “Restructuring and Impairment Charges〞 and SAB No. 101 “Revenue Recognition〞.Earnings management behavior may affect the quality of accounting earnings, which is defined by Schipper and Vincent (2003) as the extent to which the reported earnings faithfully represent Hichsian economic income, which is the amount that can be consumed (i.e. paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period.Assessment of earning quality requires sometimes the separations of earnings into cash from operation and accruals, the more the earnings is closed to cash from operation, the higher earnings quality. As Penman (2001) states that the purpose of accounting quality analysis is to distinguish between the “hard〞 numbers resulting from cash flows and the “soft〞 numbers resulting from accrual accounting.The quality of earnings can be assessed by focusing on the earning persistence; high quality earnings are more persistent and useful in the process of decision making.Beneish and Vargus (2002) investigate whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality using earning persistence as a measure for the quality of earnings, they find that income-increasing accruals are significantly more persistent for firms with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms with abnormal insider selling, relative to firms which there is no abnormal insider trading.Balsam et al. (2003) uses the level of discretionary accruals as a direct measure企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献for earning quality. The discretionary accruals model is based on a regression relationship between the change in total accruals as dependent variable and change in sales and change in the level of property, plant and equipment, change in cash flow from operations and change in firm size (total assets) as independent variables. If the regression coefficients in this model are significant that means that there is earning management in that firm and the earnings quality is low.This research presents an empirical study on using three different approaches of measuring the quality of earnings on different industry. The notion is; if there is a complete consistency among the three measures, a general assessment for the quality of earnings (high or low) can be reached and, if not, the quality of earnings is questionable and needs different other approaches for measurement and more investigations and analysis.The rest of the paper is divided into following sections: Earnings management incentives, Earnings management techniques, Model development, Sample and statistical results, and Conclusion.2. Earnings management incentives 2.1 Meeting analysts’ expectations In general, analysts’ expectations and company predictions tend to address two high-profile components of financial performance: revenue and earnings from operations.The pressure to meet revenue expectations is particularly intense and may be the primary catalyst in leading managers to engage in earning management practices that result in questionable or fraudulent revenue recognition practices. Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that improperrevenue recognition practices were the cause of one-third of all voluntary or forced restatements of income filed with the SEC from 1977 to 2000. Ironically, it is often the companies themselves that create this pressure to meet the market’s earnings expectations. It is common practice for companies to provide earnings estimates to analysts and investors. Management is often faced with the task of ensuring their targeted estimates are met.企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献Several companies, including Coca-Cola Co., Intel Corp., and Gillette Co., have taken a contrary stance and no longer provide quarterly and annual earnings estimates to analysts. In doing so, these companies claim they have shifted their focus from meeting short-term earnings estimates to achieving their long-term strategies (Mckay and Brown, 2002).2.2 To avoid debt-covenant violations and minimize political costs Some firms have the incentive to avoid violating earnings-based debt covenants. If violated, the lender may be able to raise the interest rate on the debt or demand immediate repayment. Consequently, some firms may use earnings-management techniques to increase earnings to avoid such covenant violations. On the other hand, some other firms have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too profitable. For example, if gasoline prices have been increasing significantly and oil companies are achieving record profit level, then there may be incentive for the government to intervene and enact an excess-profit tax or attempt to introduce price controls.2.3 To smooth earnings toward a long-term sustainable trendFor many years it has been believed that a firm should attempt to reduce the volatility in its earnings stream in order to maximize share price. Because a highly violate earning pattern indicates risk, therefore thestock will lose value compared to others with more stable earnings patterns. Consequently, firms have incentives to manage earnings to help achieve a smooth and growing earnings stream (Ortega and Grant, 2003).2.4 Meeting the bonus plan requirementsHealy (1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction that is consistent with maximizing executives’ earnings-based bonus. When earnings will be below the minimum level required to earn a bonus, then earning are managed upward so that the minimum is achieved and a bonus is earned. Conversely, when earning will be above the maximum level at which no additional bonus is paid, then earnings are managed downward. The extra earnings that will not generate extra bonus this current period are saved to be used to earn a bonus in a future period.。
企业利润分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Profit PatternsThe most important objective of companies is to create, develop and maintain one or more competitive advantages in order to generate dividends for the shareholders. For a long time, it was simply a question of dominating the market, either by costs or by a policy of differentiation. As Michael Porter advised, it was essential to avoid being “stuck in the middle”. This way of thinking set up competitive rivalry in a closed world, and tended towards stability. This model is less and less relevant today forwhole sectors of the economy. We see a multitude of strategic movements which defy the logic of the old system. “Profit Patterns”lists numerous strategies which have joined the small number that we knew before. These patterns often combine to give rise to strategic models which are better adapted to the new and changing needs of the consumer.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predict Value migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major of managers have a talent for recognizing development market trends There are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context. This book proposes thirty strategic prediction models divided into seven families. Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in time! Managers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identifyopportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectives.For most of the 20th century, mastering strategic evolution models was not a determining factor, and formulas for success were fixed and relatively simple. In industry, the basic model stated that profit was a function of relative market share. T oday, this rule is confronted with more and more contradictions: among car manufacturers for example, where small companies like T oyota are more profitable than General Motors and Ford. The highest rises in value have become the exclusive right of the companies with the most efficient business designs. These upstart companies have placed themselves in the profit zone of their sectors thanks, in part, to their size, but also to their new way of doing business –exploiting new rules which are sources of value creation. Among the new rules which define a good strategic plan are:1. Strong orientation towards the customer2. Internal decisions which are coherent with the overall activity, concerning the products and services as well as the involvement in the different activities of the value chain3. An efficient mechanism for value–capture.4. A powerful source of differentiation and of strategic control, inspiring investor confidence in future cash-flow.5. An internal organization carefully designed to support and reinforce the company’s strategic plan.Why does value migrate? The explanation lies largely in the explosion of risk-capital activities in the USA. Since the 40’s, of the many companies that have been created, about a thousand have allowed talented employees, the “brains”, to work without the heavy structures of very big companies. The risk–capital factor is now entering a new phase in the USA, in that the recipes for innovation and value creation are spreading from just the risk-capital companies to all big companies. A growing number of the 500 richest companies have an internal structure for getting into the game of investing in companies with high levels of value-creation. Where does this leave Eur ope? According to recent research, innovation in strategic thinking is under way in Europe, albeit with a slight time-lag. Globalization is making the acceptation of these value-creation rules a condition of global competitively .There is a second phenomenon that has an even more radical influence on value-creation –polarization: The combination of a convincing and innovative strategic plan, strategic control and a dominant market share creates a terrificincrease in investor confidence. The investors believe that the company has established its position of strength not only for the current, but also for the next strategic cycle. The result is an exponential growth in value, and especially a spectacular out-distancing of the direct rivals. The polarization process typically has two stages. In phase 1, the competitors seem to be level. In fact, one of them has understood, has “got it”, before the others and is investing in a new strategic action plan to take into account the pattern which is starting to redefine the sector. Phase 2 begins when the conditions are right for the pattern to take over: at this moment, the competitor who “got it”, attracts the attention of customers, investors and potential recruits (the brains). The intense public attention snowballs, the market value explodes to leave the nearest competitor way behind. Examples are numerous in various sectors: Microsoft against Apple and Lotus, Coca-Cola against Pepsi, Nike against Reebok and so on. Polarization of value raises the stakes and adds a sense of urgency: The first company to anticipate market change and to take appropriate investment decisions can gain a considerable lead thanks to recognition by the market.In a growing number of sectors today, competition is concentrated on the race towards mindshare. The companywhich leads this race attracts customers who attract others in an upwards spiral. At the transition from phase 1 to phase 2, the managing team’s top priority is to win the mindshare battle. There are three stages in this strategy: mind sharing with customers gives an immediate competitive advantage in terms of sales; mind sharing with investors provides the resources to maintain this advantage, and mind sharing with potential recruits increases the chances of maintaining the lead in the short and the long term. This triple capture sets off a chain reaction releasing an enormous amount of economic energy. Markets today are characterized by a staggering degree of transparency. Successes and failures are instantaneously visible to the whole world. The extraordinary success of some investors encourages professional and amateurs to look for the next hen to lay a golden egg. This investment mentality has spread to the employment market, where compensations (such as stock-options) are increasingly linked to results. From these three components - customers, investors and new talent –is created the accelerating phenomenon, polarization: thousands of investors look towards the leader at the beginning of the race. The share value goes up at the same time as the rise in customer numbers and the public perception that the current leader willbe the winner. The rise in share-price gets more attention from the media, and so on. How to get the knowledge before the others, in order to launch the company into leadership? There are several attitudes, forms of behavior and knowledge that can be used: being paranoiac, thinking from day to day that the current market conditions are going to change; talking to people with different points of view; being in the field, looking for signs of change. And above all, building a research network to find the patterns of strategic change, not only in one’s particular sector, but in the whole economy, so as always to understand the patterns a bit better and a bit sooner than the competitors.Experienced managers can detect similarities between movements of value in different circumstances. 30 of these patterns can be divided into 7 categories.Some managers understand migrations of value before other managers, allowing them to continually improvise their business plan in order to find and exploit value. Experience is an obvious advantage: situations can repeat themselves or be similar to others, so that experienced managers recognize and assimilate them quickly. There about 30 patterns .which can be put into 7 groups according to their key factors. It is important to understand that the patterns have three general characteristics:multiplicity, variants and cycles. The principle of multiplicity indicates that while a sector or a company may be affected by just one simple strategic pattern, most situations are more complicated and involve several simultaneously evolving patterns. The variants to the known models are developed in different circumstances and according to the creativity of the users of the models. Studying the variants gives more finesse in model-analysis. Finally, each model depends on economic cycles which are more or less long. The time a pattern takes to develop depends on its nature and also on the nature of the customers and sector in question.1) The first family of strategic evolution patterns consists of the six “Mega patterns”: these models do not address any particular dimension of the activity (customer, channels of distribution and value chain), but have an overall and transversal influence. They owe their name “Mega”to their range and their impact (as much from the point of view of the different economic sectors as from the duration). The six Mega models are: No profit, Back to profit, Convergence, Collapse in the middle, De facto standard and T echnology shifts the board. •The No profit pattern is characterized by a zero or negative result over several years in a company or economic sector. The first factor which favors this pattern is the existence of a singlestrategic a plan in several competitors: they all apply differentiation by price to capture market-share. The second factor is the loss of the “crutch”of the sector, that is the end of a system of the help, such as artificially maintained interest levels, or state subsidies. Among the best examples of this in the USA are in agriculture and the railway industry in the 50’s and 60’s, and in the aeronautical industry in the 80’s and 90’s. •The Back to profit pattern is characterized by the emergence of innovative strategic plans or the projects which permit the return of profits. In the 80’s, the watch industry was stagnating in a no profits zone. The vision of Nicolas Hayek allowed Swatch and other brands to get back into a profit-making situation thanks to a products pyramid built around the new brand. The authors rightly attribute this phenomenon to investors’recognition of the superiority of these new business designs. However this interpretation merits refinement: the superiority resides less in the companies’current capacity to identify the first an indications of strategic discontinuity than in their future capacity to develop a portfolio of strategic options and to choose the right one at the right time. The value of a such companies as Amazon and AOL, which benefit from financial polarization, can only be explained in this way. To be competitive in the long-term,a company must not only excel in its “real”market, but also in its financial market. Competition in both is very fierce, and one can not neglect either of these fields of battle without suffering the consequences. This share-market will assume its own importance alongside the commercial market, and in the future, its successful exploitation will be a key to the strategic superiority of publicly-quoted companies.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predictValue migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major managers have a talent for recognizing development market trendsThere are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context.Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in timeManagers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectivesSource: David .J. Morrison, 2001. “Profit Patterns”. Times Business.pp.17-27.译文：利润模式一个公司价值的增长依赖于公司自身的能力的预期，价值的迁移也只是从一个经济部门转移到另外一个经济部门或者是一个公司到另外一个意想不到的公司。
盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]
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外文翻译Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish AbstractAn issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of these studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals.I trace the explosive growth in accrual-based management research to three likely causes. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if earnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actions intended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Consequently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypotheses that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are used to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Because extant models of expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in fact occur.Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I raise three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do researchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to raise external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along those lines, I have chosen to present the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increase and decrease earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increase or to decrease earnings, and in Section 6, I present conclusions and suggestions for future work.2. Earnings Management2.1 DefinitionsNotice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no consensus on what is earnings management. There have been at least three attempts at defining earnings management:(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).(2) Managing earnings is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).A lack of consensus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus useful to compare the above three definitions.All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within thecontext of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leases). However, the second definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the second definition arises if readers interpret any real decisions - including those implying that managers forego profitable opportunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.There are two perspectives on earnings management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, and the information perspective, first enunciated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), under which managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s future cash flows. Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information perspective.2.2 Incidence of earnings managementIf one believes former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), earnings management is widespread, at least among public companies, as they face pressure to meet analysts’ expectations. Earnings management is also widespread if one relies on analytical arguments. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that the existence of relative performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect competitor firms to manage earnings. Similar prisoner’s dilemma-like arguments for the existence of earnings management appear in Erickson and Wang (1999) in the context of mergers and Shivakumar (2000) in the context of seasoned equity offerings.At the other extreme, we can only be certain that earnings have indeed been managed, when the judicial system, in cases that are brought by the SEC or the Department of Justice, resolves that earnings management has occurred. While it is likely that earnings management occurs more frequently than is observed from judicial actions, it is not clear to me that earnings management is pervasive: it seems implausible that firms face the same motivations to manage earnings over time. Aslater discussed, much of the evidence of earnings management is dependent on firm performance, suggesting that earnings management is more likely to be present when a firm’s performance is either unusually good or unusually bad.3. Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings ManagementI discuss four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management:(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider trading. The first two sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory research and the last two sources are explicitly described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in the SEC’s accounting enforcement actions, and have been investigated in recent research.3.1 Debt CovenantsDebt contracts are an important theme in financial accounting research as lenders often use accounting numbers to regulate firms’ activities,e,g. by requiring that certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and financing activities.The linkage between accounting numbers and debt contracts has been used in studies investigation (i) why economic consequences are observed when firms comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash flow impact，(ii) the determinants of accounting choice and managers’ exercise of discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations.The results of economic consequences studies have generally been mixed and researchers recently turned to investigating accounting choice in firms that experience actual technical default (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994；and De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1994). The idea is to increase the power of the tests by focusing on a sample where the effect of violating debt covenants is likely to be more noticeable. While some of the evidence suggests that managers take income increasing actions delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), other evidence does not (Beneish and Press,1993; DeAngelo,DeAngelo and Skinner,1994). Further, it is not clear such actions actually are sufficient to delay default. Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large sample of private debt agreements, andmeasuring firms’ closeness to current ratio and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. They suggest that manag ers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant default.3.2 Compensation AgreementsStudies examining the bonus hypothesis (Healy, 1985；Gaveretal, 1995; and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan, 1995) provide evidence consistent with managers altering reported earnings to increase their compensation. Except for Healy (1985)，these studies provide evidence consistent with managers decreasing reported earnings to increase future compensation. In addition, Holthausen et al. (1995) finds little evidence that managers increase income and suggest that the income-increasing evidence in Healy (1985) is induced by his experimental design.3.3 Equity OfferingsA growing body of research examines managers’ incentives to increase reported income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between owners-managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public offerings, is recognized in prior research.Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. (1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to estimate managers’ exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security offerings.Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the puzzling behavior of post-issuance stock prices. Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) study earnings management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) do so in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of earnings management using Jones like models around the time of the security issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and returns performance. The results in these studies suggest that marketparticipants fail to understand the valuation implications of unexpected accruals. While the results are compelling, the conclusion that intentional earnings management at the time of security issuance successfully misleads investors is premature. Beneish (1998b, p.210) expresses reservations about generalizing such a conclusion as follows: “First, the conclusion implies that financial statement fraud is pervasive at the time of issuance. To explain; fraud is defined by the National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993, p.6) as one or more intentional acts designed to deceive other persons and cause them financial loss." If financial statement fraud at issuance is pervasive - e.g. managers are successful in misleading investors. I would expect that firms would fare poorly post-issuance in terms of litigation brought about by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), disgruntled investors, and the plaintiff’s bar. I would also expect managers to fare poorly post-issuance in terms of wealth and employment. I would find evidence of post-issue consequences on firms and managers informative about the existence of at-issue intentional earnings management to mislead investors and believe these issues are worthy of future research.译文盈余管理：一种普遍现象资料来源: 财务管理作者：Messod D. Beneish 摘要：会计研究的核心问题是在某种程度上管理者为了自己的利益而改变报表上的收入。
《IPO公司盈余管理探究国内外文献综述2400字》
IPO公司盈余管理研究国内外文献综述国外研究现状国外学者对盈余管理的研究相对较早，美国学者Schipper于1989年提出了“盈余管理”的概念，他认为企业管理当局会对公开披露的财务信息进行粉饰调节，以实现自身利益的最大化，不同于利润操纵，盈余管理是在不违反会计准则的前提下，对会计政策和会计估计进行主观选择Scott William R (1997)认为盈余管理就是企业管理层为了实现公司利益或者市场价值最大化的目的，而选择相应的会计政策的行为。
PaulM Healy和James M Wahlen (1999)指出盈余管理具体表现在企业管理当局通过调整具体的交易活动，影响公司会计报告信息，以此实现误导利益相关方决策的目的。
企业管理层会出于种种目的操纵盈余信息，Watts和Zimmerman(1990)认为管理层会出于报酬契约、债务契约和政治方面的考虑，会采取一定的手段影响企业对外披露的财务信息。
Healy (1999)发现，一些上市公司管理者会为了获得奖金报酬，对公司业绩进行调整，扮靓财务数据。
Jones (1991)研究发现，一些企业会为了申请政府税收减免而递延当年收益。
外部的监管与监督是影响企业IPO盈余管理的重要外部因素，严格的外部监管会在一定程度上约束IPO公司的盈余管理活动。
Cohen (2000)研究发现在萨班斯法案颁布后，由于管理单位加大对于上市公司盈余管理的监管和处罚，上市公司更倾向于采用真实活动的盈余管理。
Rowchoydhury C 2006研究发现，成熟的机构投资者会识别影响公司长远利益的盈余管理活动，并采取相应的遏制措施。
国内研究现状顾明润和田存志(2012)认为由于我国一级资本市场证券定价市场功能相对较弱，许多IPO公司会为了提高股票的发行价格而对公司财务报告进行粉饰。
同时，由于我国资本市场IPO制度仍处于核准制向注册制过渡的阶段，对公司IPO 资格仍有较高的要求，张征和崔毅(2014)认为IPO公司会出于满足发行条件和获得更多的发行收入的目的，在会计准则允许的范围内对盈余进行调整。
利润质量外文参考文献
利润质量外文参考文献以下是关于利润质量的外文参考文献，中文翻译已标注在括号里：1. Dechow, P. M., & Dichev, I. D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors. Accounting review, 77(s-1), 35-59. （Dechow和Dichev，2002年，论文名称：应计调整和净收益的质量：应计调整估计误差的作用。
）2. Kasznik R. (1999). On the association betweenvoluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of accounting research, 37(1), 57-81. （Kasznik，1999年，论文名称：自愿披露和盈余管理之间的关联。
）3. Piotroski, J. D., & Wong, T. J. (2005). The evolution of profitability and earnings in recent decades. Journal of accounting research, 43(3), 335-377. （Piotroski和Wong，2005年，论文名称：近几十年来盈利能力和净收益的演变。
）4. Sloan, R. G. (1996). Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?. The accounting review, 71(3), 289-315. （Sloan，1996年，论文名称：股价是否充分反映应计应收和现金流量有关未来收益的信息？）5. Xie, H., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of corporate finance,9(3), 295-316. （Xie、Davidson和DaDalt，2003年，论文名称：盈余管理和企业治理：董事会和审计委员会的作用。
现行企业会计准则下盈余管理分析研究外文翻译
中文2300字外文翻译之一A Review of the Earnings Management Literature andIts Implications for Standard SettingAuthor：Paul M. Healy and James M. WahlenNationality：AmericaDerivation: Accounting Horizons 365-383INTRODUCTIONIn this paper we review the academic evidence on earnings management. The primary purpose of this review is to summarize the implications of scholarly evidence on earnings management to help accounting standard setters and regulators assess the pervasiveness of earnings management and the overall integrity of financial reporting. This review is also aimed at identifying fruitful areas for future academic research on earnings management.Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate with t he firm’s external By creating a framework that independent auditors and the SEC can enforce, accounting standards can provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for corporate managers to report information on theirfirms’performance to external capital providers and other Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best-performing firms in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor performers and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders.If financial reports are to convey managers’ information on their firms’performance, standards must permit managers to exercise judgment in financial reporting. Managers can then use their knowledge about the business and its opportunities to select reportin g methods, estimates, and disclosures that match the firms’ business economics, potentially increasing the value of accounting as a form of communication. However, because auditing is imperfect, management’s use of judgment also creates opportunities for “earnings management,” in which managers choose reporting methods andestimates that do not accurately reflect their firms’ underlying economics.The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, recently expressed concerns over earnings management and its effect on resource allocation. He noted that management abuses of “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, “cookie jar”reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D are threatening the credibility of financial reporting. To address these concerns, the SEC is examining new disclosure requirements and has formed an earnings management task force to crack down on firms that manage earnings. The SEC also expects to require more firms to restate Reported earnings and will step up enforcement of disclosure requirements.A number of recent studies, however, sharpen the focus of their tests to examine earnings management using specific accruals, such as bank loan loss provisions, claim loss reserves for property-casualty insurers, and deferred tax valuation allowances.There is evidence that banks use loan loss provisions and insurers use claim loss reserves to manage earnings, particularly to meet regulatory requirements. There is little evidence that firms manage earnings using deferred tax valuation allowances.Much of the evidence on the capital market consequences of earnings management shows that investors are not “fooled” by earnings management and that financial statements provide useful information to investors. Current earnings, which reflect management reporting judgment, have been widely found to be value-relevant and are typically better predictors of future cash flow performance than are current cash flows.Answers to the above questions are difficult to infer from current studies for a number of reasons. First, most academic studies attempt to document earnings management, but do not provide evidence on its extent and scope. Consequently, existing evidence does not help standard setters to assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating communication with investors, or whether they encourage widespread earnings management. Second, most studies have examined unexpected accruals for evidence of earnings management. While this research provides a useful summary index of earnings management, it does not show which standards are effective infacilitating communication between managers and investors and which are ineffective.The studies that examine the effects of earnings management on the capital markets leave a number of unanswered questions for future research. First, as noted above, how pervasive is earnings management for capital market reasons, both amongthe firms sampled and for the population of firms? Second, what is the magnitude of any earnings management? Third, what specific accruals do firms (other than banks and insurers) use to manage earnings? Fourth, why do some firms appear to manage earnings whereas others with similar incentives do not? Finally, under what conditions do market participants detect and, therefore, react to earnings management, and under what conditions do they fail to detect earnings management? For example, do required disclosures that make the use of accounting judgment more transparent help to mitigate the impact of earnings management on resource allocation?In summary, the earnings management studies strongly suggest that regulatory considerations induce firms to manage earnings. There is limited evidence on whether this behavior is widespread or rare, however, and very little evidence on the effect on regulators or investors.盈余管理文献回顾及其对标准设置的启迪作者：Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen国籍：美国选自：会计天涯365-383介绍:本文咱们回顾一些关于盈余管理的相关学术的研究，本文回顾的主要目的是为了总括学者们和会计标准的设定者和管理者评估盈余管理的普遍性和对于财务报表的完整性，本文献同时志于对盈余管理的未来学术研究提供有效的鉴戒。
外文翻译--德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS 外文出处 European Accounting Review外文作者 Tendeloo, B.V., and Vanstraelen, A原文：Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS AbstractThis paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management.1. IntroductionThe International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards to be adopted inthe world’s major capital markets.Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. This paper contributes to this debate by examining whether the adoption of high quality standards like IFRS is associated with high financial reporting quality. In particular, we question whether IFRS are sufficient to override managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management and affect the quality of reported earnings.Previous research provides evidence that the magnitude of earnings management is on average higher in code-law countries with low investor protection rights, compared to common-law countries with high investor protection rights (Leuz et al., 2003). Hence, to assess whether firms that report under IFRS can be associated with higher earnings quality we focus on Germany, which is a code-law country with relatively low investor protection rights (La Portal et al.,2000). Moreover, a relatively large number of German companies have already voluntarily chosen to adopt IFRS prior to 2005. This allows a comparison between companies that have adopted IFRS versus companies that report under domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).The results of our research show that IFRS do not impose a significant constraint on earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. On the contrary, adopting IFRS seems to increase the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Our results further suggest that companies that have adopted IFRS engage more in earnings smoothing, although this effect is significantly reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor. However, hidden reserves, which are allowed under German GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely picked up by the traditional accruals measures. When hidden reserves are taken into consideration, our results show that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. Hence, our results indicate that adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management. This finding suggests that the adoption of high quality standards is not a sufficient condition for providing high quality information in code-law countries with low investor protection rights.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and provide the theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 provides an overview of the German accounting system. In Section 4, we formulate the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research design. The results of thestudy are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize our results, discuss the implications and limitations of our analysis and give suggestions for further research.2. Previous Literature2.1. Adoption of International Accounting StandardsThe International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was established in 1973 and now renamed as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), aims to achieve uniformity in the accounting standards used by businesses and other organizations for financial reporting around the world (IASB website). The benefits of the adoption of international accounting standards are considered to be the following. First, it should improve the ability of investors to make informed financial decisions and eliminate confusion arising from different measures of financial position and performance across countries, thereby leading to a reduced risk for investors and a lower cost of capital for companies. Second, it should lower costs arising from multiple reporting. Third, it should encourage international investment. Finally, it should lead to amore efficient allocation of savings worldwide (Street et al., 1999).The original International Accounting Standards were mostly descriptive in nature and contained many alternative treatments. Because of this flexibility and a continuing lack of comparability across countries, the standards came under heavy criticism in the late 1980s. In response to this criticism, the IASC started the Comparability Project in 1987. The revised standards, which became effective in 1995, substantially reduced the alternative treatments and increased the disclosure requirements (Nobes, 2002). In July 1995, the IASC and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) agreed to a list of accounting issues that needed to be addressed for obtaining IOSCO’s endorsement of the standards. The subsequent Core Standards Project led again to substantial revisions of IAS. In May 2000, the IASC received IOSCO’s endorsement subject to ‘reconciliation where necessary to address subs tantive outstanding issues at a national or regional level’ (IOSCO Press Release, 17 May 2000). The Core Standards Project has brought a wider recognition to IAS around the world. For example, the European Parliament has issued a regulation (1606/2002/EC) requiring all EU listed companies to prepare consolidated financial statements based on InternationalAccounting Standards by 2005. In a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italyand Switzerland, companies were already permitted to prepare consolidated financial statements under IFRS (or US GAAP) prior to 2005.Since German accounting standards and disclosure practices have been criticized in the investor community (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), a relatively large number of German firms have adopted international accounting standards such as IFRS or US GAAP. This switch is thought to represent a substantial commitment to transparent financial reporting for the following two reasons. First, IFRS adoption itself might effectively enhance financial reporting quality. Second, firms which adopt IFRS or US GAAP might do so because they have higher incentives to report transparently, such as high financing needs. In this case, IFRS serves as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. A study conducted by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) with Swiss data reveals that early adopters of IFRS ‘are larger, more internationally diversified, less capital intensive and have a more diffuse ownership’. They argue that the decision to apply IFRS is primarily influenced by political costs and pressures from outside markets. Murphy (1999) also used Swiss data to study the determinants of the adoption of IFRS. She found that companies that adopt IFRS have a higher percentage of foreign sales and a higher number of foreign exchange listings. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) found the same relationships using data from various countries. In addition, they concluded that being domiciled in an EU country and having a lower debt to equity ratio is positively associated with the adoption of IFRS. Other determinants of the adoption of international standards mentioned in the literature include a high profitability, the issuance of equity during the year of adoption, domestic GAAP differing significantly from IFRS or US GAAP and, related to the latter, being domiciled in a country with a bank-oriented financial system (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).Not all companies that seek the international investment status that comes with the adoption of IFRS are, however, willing to fulfill all of the requirements and obligations involved. According to a study by Street and Gray (2002) there is a significant non-compliance with IFRS in 1998 company reports, especially in the case of IFRS disclosure requirements. With the revision of IAS 1, effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, financial statements are prohibited from noting compliance with International Accounting Standards ‘unless they comply with all the requirements of each applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing Interpretations Committee’.All companies included in our IFRS sample mention IFRS compliance in their financial statements after the revised IAS 1 became effective. Nevertheless, adopters of IFRS that appear to be fully compliant might as well be falsely signaling to be of high quality. Ball et al. (2000) argue that firms’ incentives to comply with accounting standards depend on the penalties assessed for non-compliance.When costs of complying to IFRS are viewed to exceed the costs of noncompliance, substantial non-compliance will continue to be a problem. While the main objective of adopting IFRS is considered to be enhancing the quality of the information provided in the financial statements, Ball et al. (2003) further suggest that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information but not a sufficient condition. If the adoption of IFRS cannot be associated with significantly higher financial reporting quality, IFRS adoption cannot serve as a signaling instrument for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. This study addresses this issue empirically.2.2. Earnings Management: Incentives and ConstraintsOne way of assessing the quality of reported earnings is examining to what extent earnings are managed, with the intention to ‘either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for earnings management, either through accounting decisions or structuring transactions, are ample. Managers may be inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of explicit and impli cit contracts, the firm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the political and regulatory environment or several other specific circumstances (Vander Bauwhede, 2001).A number of studies suggest that the quality of reported financial statement information is in large part determined by the underlying economic and institutional factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives. According to Ball et al. (2000) the demand for accounting income differs systematically between common-law and code-law countries. In common-law countries, which are characterized by arm’s length debt and equity markets, a diverse base of investors, high risk of litigation and strong investor protection, accounting information is designed to meet the needs of investors. In code-law countries, capital markets are less active. Investor protection is weak, litigation rates are lower and companies are more financed by banks, other financial institutions and the government, which results in less need for publicdisclosure. Accounting information is therefore designed more to meet other demands, including reduction in political costs and determination of income tax and dividend payments (Ball et al., 2000; La Portaet al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more prevalent in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. The benefits (e.g.enhanced liquidity) of engaging in earnings management appear to outweigh the costs (e.g. litigation) more in countries with weak investor protection rights. Firms which adopt IFRS, however, can be expected to have incentives to report investor-oriented information and thus engage significantly less in earnings management than non-adopters. On the other hand, low enforcement and low litigation risk might encourage low quality firms to falsely signal to be of high quality by adopting IFRS. This study addresses the question whether adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management in Germany, which La Porta et al. (2000) classify as a country with low investor protection rights.Accounting rules can limit a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings. But the extent to which accounting rules influence reported earnings and curb earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz et al., 2003). Apart from clear accounting standards, strong investor and creditor protection requires a statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective sanctions.A number of studies have shown that Big 4 auditors constitute a constraint on earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, the results of Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002) and Francis and Wang (2003) document that the constraint constituted by a Big 4 auditor on earnings management is not uniform across countries. Street and Gray (2002) find support for the fact that being audited by a large audit firm is also positively associated with IFRS compliance, both in the case of disclosure requirements as in the case of measurement and presentation requirements. In this respect, we question whether adoption of IFRS by a company has a stronger effect on the quality of earnings of that company when audited by a Big 4 audit firm.Source: Tendeloo, B.V. and Vanstraelen, A. Earnings management under German GAAP versus IFRS [J]. European Accounting Review, 2005, 14(1): 155-180.译文：德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理摘要：这篇论文阐述的问题是盈余管理的降低是否与国际财务报告准则（IFRS）的自愿采用有关。
股权激励与盈余管理外文文献翻译2014年译文4500字
股权激励与盈余管理外文文献翻译2014年译文4500字文献出处：Scott Duellman. Equity Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Account. Public Policy ,2014(32):495–517.原文Equity Incentives and Earnings ManagementScott DuellmanaAbstractPrior studies suggest that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. Using three distinct proxies for earnings management we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases). Furthermore, using the accrual-based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecast models we find that the opportunistic financial reporting effect of equity incentives dominates the incentive alignments effect for firms with low monitoring intensity. Using proxies for real earnings management, we find that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. However, for low monitoring intensity firms the opportunistic reporting effect mitigates, but does not completely offset, the benefits of the incentive alignment effect. Overall, these findings are consistent with the level of monitoring affecting the relation between equity incentives and earnings management.1. IntroductionClassical agency theory suggests that equity incentives align managers’interests with shareholders’in terests (see forexample, Mirlees, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Holmstrom, 1979). However, recent theoretical papers suggest that equity incentives may also motivate managers to boost short term stock prices by manipulating accounting numbers (see for example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003 and Goldman and Slezak, 2006). Empirical studies examining the effect of equity incentives on earnings management, a proxy for opportunistic reporting, yield mixed results. For example, Gao and Shrieves, 2002,Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Weber, 2006, and Cornett et al. (2008) document a positive relation between equity incentives and accrual-based earnings management; while Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that after controlling for cash flow volatility the relation between equity incentives and earnings management becomes insignificant.1 Furthermore, Cohen et al. (2008) find a negative relation between equity incentives and real earnings management. Thus, whether equity incentives are associated with opportunistic financial reporting is an open empirical question that warrants further study.We view equity incentives as one element of the firm’s governancestructure and argue that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. We investigate how the relation between equity incentives and earnings management changes with respect to the intensity of firms’monitoring systems. More specifically, we expect that when monitoring intensity is relatively high, equity incentives will have more of an incentive alignment effect leading to lower earnings management in comparison with low monitoring intensity firms. Conversely, when monitoring intensity is relatively low, equity incentives will have more of anopportunistic financial reporting effect leading to higher earnings management in comparison to high monitoring intensity firms. Thus, we predict that the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increases as monitoring intensity increases (decreases).Using a sample over the time period 2001–2007, we proxy for earnings management using three different measures common in the literature: (i) absolute abnormal accruals, (ii) real earnings management measures, and (iii) the likelihood of meeting/beating an analyst forecast. We measure equity incentives, in a manner consistent with prior studies such as Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) as the percentage of total CEO compensation for the year that would come from a 1% increase in the company’s stock as of the end of the previous fiscal year.To measure the intensity of monitoring mechanisms, we focus on threemechanisms that are most directly involved in monitoring managers’financial reporting decisions (board of directo rs, external auditors, and institutional investors). We identify six board characteristics, one auditor characteristic, and two institutional investor characteristics that could potentially affect monitoring effectiveness. Using principal component analysis we collapse these nine characteristics into two monitoring intensity measures (principal components) which capture 51.1% of the variance in these characteristics.2 We classify firms as high (low) monitoring intensity firms if both monitoring intensity measures are above (below) median values while firms with only one monitoring factor above the median are classified as moderate monitoring intensity firms. We use this approach as different monitoring attributes may be substitutes or complements to oneanother and principal component analysis effectively reduces the redundancy in these variables.We regress our measures of earnings management on lagged equity incentives, monitoring intensity classifications (moderate and low), the interaction between them, and a set of control variables. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases) across all three earnings management measures. Second, in tests using accrual based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecasts, we find that forlow monitoring intensity firms, the opportunistic reporting effect dominates the incentive alignment effect of equity incentives; and equity incentives and earnings management are unrelated when monitoring intensity is moderate or high.Third, with respect to real earnings management, we find a negative relation between equity incentives and real earnings management for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. Furthermore, for low intensity monitoring firms the negative relation is mitigated, but not completely offset, by the incentive alignment effect. In contrast with our abnormal accrual results, these findings suggest that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect with respect to real earnings management. A potential explanation for these findings is that both monitors and managers are aware of the higher potential long-term costs of real earnings management and thus tend to avoid cuts to discretionary expenses (research and development) or increase production.Our primary contribution to the literature on the relationbetween equity incentives and earnings management is that we provide evidence on how this relation varies with the level of oversight by monitoring mechanisms. This is in contrast with most prior studies in this area that either overlook the effects of monitoring (or governance) mechanisms or simply use one or more governance characteristics as control variables (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Cornett et al., 2008).3 However, a prior study by Weber (2006) also investigates the effects of governance on the relation between CEO wealth sensitivity and earnings management using a random sample of 410 S&P 1500 firms. Weber (2006) finds that CEO wealth sensitivity is positively related to abnormal accruals and that governance does not significantly affect this relation. Weber (2006) defines monitoring intensity by only using the factor that explains the most variance from the principle component analysis. However, this methodology could misclassify firms because monitoring has multiple dimensions and using only one factor ignores the presence of substitutive monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, in contrast to Weber (2006), using two monitoring intensity factors, we find that monitoring intensity has a significant effect on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Additionally, our study uses a broader sample of firms, a longer sample period, and multiple proxies for earnings management.In addition to our primary contribution, we add to the literature in two ways. First, while prior studies on equity incentives and accrual-based earnings management document that the results are dependent on controlling for operating cash flow volatility, we show that for firms with low monitoring, equity incentives are positively related to accrual-based earningsmanagement even after controlling for operating cash flow volatility. Second, we add to the literature by providing evidence on theeffects of monitoring intensity on the relation between equity incentives and real earnings management. To our knowledge, the only other study that investigates the relation between equity incentives and real earnings management is Cohen et al. (2008).4However, Cohen et al. (2008) do not consider the mitigating effects of monitoring intensity on this relation.An important limitation of our study (and other work in this area more generally) is that equity incentives and other governance mechanisms are likely to be chosen endogenously with the firm’s other corporate policies, structures, and features. Thus, while we attempt to mitigate the effects of endogeneity, we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that our results could be affected by endogeneity bias.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of prior research and our hypothesis development. Section 3 presents our research design choices and their rationale. The evidence is presented in Section 4 and the conclusion in Section 5.2. Prior research and hypothesis development2.1. Prior researchEquity incentives are an important part of firms’governa nce structures that are used to align managers’ interests with shareholder interests (Mirlees, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Holmstrom, 1979). However, recent studies suggest that they also motivate managers tofocus on boosting stock price in the short term (see for example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003 and Goldman and Slezak,2006).Prior studies document mixed evidence on the effect of equity incentives on earnings management. On the one hand, Gao and Shrieves, 2002, Cheng and Warfield, 2005, Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Weber, 2006, and Cornett et al. (2008) find that equity incentives are positively related to the absolute value of abnormal accruals. On the other hand, Hribar and Nichols (2007) demonstrate that findings of earnings management in studies that are based on absolute abnormal accruals no longer hold once controls for cash flow volatility are added. Furthermore, in contrast with studies documenting opportunistic effects of equity incentives, Cohen et al. (2008) find a negative relation between real earnings management methods and stock ownership, CEO bonuses, and unexercisable options consistent with incentive alignment effects dominating opportunistic effects. Armstrong et al. (2010a, 226) summarize the findings on the relation between equity incentives and accounting irregularities of all types (including accrual based earnings management) by stating that “no conclusive results have emerged from the literature.”Thus, whether equity incentives result in earnings management remains an open question.2.2. Equity incentives and other governance mechanismsWe view equity incentives as one element of a firm’s overall governancestructure. Furthermore, we note that equity incentives have both an incentive alignment effect as well as an opportunistic financial reporting effect. The incentive alignment effect follows from agency theory which suggests that managerial stock ownership align their interests with shareholders (Jensen andMeckling, 1976). The opportunistic financial reporting effect arises because managers with high equity incentives are motivated to overstate accounting performance and boost stock prices in the short-run. For example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) show that when managers can sell shares in the short-run, they will be motivated to misreport performance and misreporting will be an increasing function of the fraction of management-owned shares that could be sold (also see Goldman and Slezak, 2006 and Ronen et al., 2006).If firms choose their governance structures to maximize value, and optimally use equity incentives in conjunction with other governance mechanisms, there will be either a negative relation or no relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Intuitively, any opportunistic effects of equity incentives would be exactly offset by other governance or monitoring mechanisms. However, adjusting governance structures is costly so it is unclear whether most firms end up with optimal equity incentives and monitoring mechanisms in a dynamic environment. Deviations from optimal monitoring raises the possibility that under some conditions the opportunistic effects of equity incentives may dominate or mitigate the。
内部治理结构与盈余管理外文文献及翻译
内部治理结构与盈余管理本文探讨了公司的内部治理结构对盈余管理的约束作用。
这是假设盈余管理系统地涉及到公司内部治理机制的各个方面的前提下进行的研究，研究包括董事会的力量，审计委员会，内部审计职能的变化与外部审计师的选择四个方面。
基于横截面模型以2000年末在澳大利亚上市的434家公司为样本，将可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理的水平，发现董事会及审计委员会的非执行董事的人数越多盈余管理的可能性越低。
内部审计职能和审计机构的选择与盈余管理没有显著的相关性。
我们进一步分析还发现，利用收入的增加作为盈余管理的替代变量时，盈余管理和审计委员会的存在具有负相关关系。
关键词：审计委员会；公司治理；盈余管理；内部审计职能1 前言最近在澳大利亚及海外的操纵会计行为的案件表明公司治理机制的重要性，强有力的公司治理涉及到与公司绩效水平监测的一个适当的平衡(Cadbury,1997)。
在本论文中，我们以澳大利亚的公司治理为例探索治理机制与盈余之间的关系，因此，我们的重点是治理的监督作用。
我们研究的是独立的董事局（ShleiferandVishny，1997），独立委员会主席，一个有效的审计委员会（MenonandWilliams，1994年），内部审计（Clikeman，2003年）和外部审计师的选择使用（贝克尔埃塔尔，1998；弗朗西斯埃塔尔，1999）对盈余管理产生的影响。
在此之前的研究已经调查了治理机制可以减少欺诈性财务报告的产生（比斯利，1996; Dechowetal，1996年）。
这些研究认为有效的治理机制和真实的财务报告与违反一般公认会计原则（GAAP）呈负相关关系。
不过，相对较新的研究领域是公司治理与盈余管理。
Peasnell等（2000）研究表明盈余管理与董事会的独立性是负相关的，而另一些研究发现审计委员会与盈余管理之间存在显着的关系（Chtourouetal.2001; Xieetal，2001）。
澳大利亚公司内部治理结构和盈利管理实践检验是具有前提条件的，而Peasnell使用的数据主要是研究美国的。