stigler the theory of economic regulation译文
微观经济学教学课件：Ch14-Regulation and Antitrust Law
Regulation and Antitrust Law
After studying this chapter you will be able to
Explain the economic theory of government and how government activity arises from market failure and redistribution Define regulation and antitrust law and distinguish between the social interest and capture theories of regulation Explain how regulation and deregulation affect prices, outputs, profits, and the distribution of the gains from trade Describe the antitrust laws and review three of today’s antitrust policy debates
The Economic Theory of Government
The economic theory of government explains the purpose of governments, the economic choices that governments make, and the consequences of those choices. into a river that kills the fish downstream imposes an external cost.
国富论 翻译
国富论翻译国富论（The Wealth of Nations）是亚当·斯密于1776年出版的一部经济学著作，被广泛视为现代经济学的奠基之作。
该书从经济学、社会学、政治学等多个角度分析了国家财富的来源、分配和增长的原因，探讨了贸易自由化、劳动分工、市场竞争等一系列经济理论与政策。
国富论的核心思想是自由市场经济体制的推崇。
斯密认为，经济活动应该按照自然法则而不是政府干预来运行，自由市场和竞争会促使经济的繁荣。
他主张贸易自由化和废除各种贸易壁垒，认为国家应该以不干预市场为原则，实行自由贸易，使商品和劳动可以自由流动，从而达到最优化的经济效益。
斯密提出了劳动分工的概念，认为劳动者通过专门化的工作分工可以提高生产效率。
他以针厂为例，说明了如何通过分工将原本需要多个工人完成的任务分解为多个简单的操作，使生产效率显著提高。
他认为劳动分工不仅适用于个人的生产活动，也适用于整个国家的经济活动。
国富论还探讨了价值理论和价格形成的问题。
斯密认为，商品的价值是由生产成本决定的，劳动是商品价值的衡量标准。
他提出了“价值势力”的概念，即市场上供求关系决定商品价格的力量。
他认为，市场竞争会自动调节供求关系，使商品价格处于适当的水平。
斯密还关注财富分配的问题。
他认为社会财富的增长应该使人民生活得到改善，提出了“普通劳动者的利益最大化”这一原则。
他主张劳动者应该有足够的收入来维持其基本生活需求，同时也赞成实行非歧视性的纳税政策，以促进社会的公平与正义。
总的来说，国富论是一部具有深远影响的经济学著作，提出了许多经济学的基本理论和原则。
它强调自由市场经济的重要性，认为市场的自由与竞争是促进经济发展和繁荣的关键。
国富论的理念和原则在现代经济学理论与实践中仍然具有重要的指导意义。
The Constitution of Economic Policy
经济政策的立宪性1986诺贝尔经济学学奖获奖文章作者：布坎南一．引言公共财政这门科学应当始终将政治条件清楚的记在脑子里。
它应当致力于解开进步和发展精神的秘密，而不是期望从基于过时的政治哲学的税收教条理论中获得指导。
（维克塞尔，第87页）。
无论在哪种场合中，如果我不承认克努特·维克塞尔这位伟大的瑞典人对我工作的影响（如果没有他，我可能不会站在这个舞台上），那将是我的失误。
我的许多贡献，尤其是关于政治经济和财政方面的，可能会被描述为对维克塞尔的理论的多次的重复强调、阐述和扩展，这篇演讲也不例外。
我的职业生涯中一个最令人激动人心的时刻就是在1984年我发现了克努特·维克塞尔藏在芝加哥老哈珀图书馆尘土飞扬的书堆中的论文《财政理论研究》。
而正是这个事件------一个学术新手被允许快速浏览一下过时的论文-----导演了我自己的通过偶然机会学习的活生生的例子。
维克塞尔的关于税收公平性的新的原则使我的自信心倍增。
维克塞尔，一个经济思想历史长河中的既定人物，挑战和我的正在发展的批判意识不谋而合的正统的公共财政理论。
从在芝加哥的那一刻起，我决心要让维克塞尔的贡献被更多人所熟知，并且我立即着手开始翻译工作，这花了一些时间，伊丽莎白亨德森也给了我相当大的帮助，最后才出版。
剥离其本质，维克塞尔的信息是明确的、基本的、和不言而喻的。
如果经济学家受雇于一个仁慈的暴君，那么他们应该停止那些说者无心、听者有意的政策建议，而应该着眼于结构内的政治决策。
有了维克塞尔的强力支持，我也敢于挑战仍旧处于主导地位的正统的公共财政和福利经济学。
在一篇早期的文章中，我呼吁也是经济学家的同事们在着手分析替代政策措施的效应之前先假设一种状态、政治的模型。
我敦促经济学家看看经济政体的“宪法”以检查规则和约束范围内的政治代理人的行为。
和维克塞尔一样，我的目的是最终的规范，而不是防腐科学。
我试图使经济意义在推动政策秘方之前脱离个人和政府之间的关系。
关于经济规律的重要论述 英语
关于经济规律的重要论述英语1. The law of supply and demand determines price levels in an economy.供求关系决定了经济中的价格水平。
2. Competition is a necessary and beneficial aspect of free markets.竞争是自由市场的必要且有益的方面。
3. The law of diminishing returns states that as more resources are allocated to a particular activity, the marginal output decreases.递减收益法则指出，当更多资源被分配给特定活动时，边际产出会减少。
4. The law of comparative advantage suggests that countries should specialize in producing goods and services that they have a lower opportunity cost in producing.比较优势法则认为，国家应专注于生产其生产机会成本较低的商品和服务。
5. Inflation is caused by an increase in the money supply relative to the amount of goods and services available in an economy.通货膨胀是由货币供应相对于经济中可用的商品和服务量增加而引起的。
6. The law of diminishing marginal utility states that each additional unit of a good or service provides less satisfaction or utility to a consumer.边际效用递减法则指出，每增加一单位的商品或服务对消费者提供的满足感或效用减少。
公共管理学完整版英文翻译XN
Chapter 2课本第一章An Era of Change改变的年代、时代Introduction引言There has been a transformation（转化、变革）in the management of the public sectors of advanced countries.在发达国家的公共部门的管理已经有了一个变革。
This new paradigm poses（形成，造成）a direct challenge to several of what had previously been regarded as fundamental principles of traditional public administration.这个新的范例对几个原先被认为是传统公共行政的基础规则提出了直接挑战。
These seven seeming verities（真理）have been challenged.这几个真理被挑战。
Economic problems in the 1980s meant governments reassessed（重新评估）their bureaucracies and demanded changes. 1980s的经济问题意味着政府重新评估他们的官僚制并且需要改变。
All these points will be discussed at greater length（长度）later, but the main point is there has been total change in a profession that saw little change for around a hundred years.这些观点会在以后做更大范围的讨论，但是这里强调的主要是一点：一百年来很少发生变革的公共职业领域发生了全面变革。
A new paradigm一个新的范例There is some debate over whether or not public managemnet, particularly the new public management, is a new paradigm for public sector management.有个争论，关于公共管理尤其是新的公共管理是不是公共部门管理的一个新的范例。
诺斯著,刘瑞华译版：制度、制度变迁与经济绩效
制度、制度变迁与经济成就原著/道格拉斯•诺斯译者/刘瑞华导读刘瑞华（清华大学经济研究所副教授）一道格拉斯·诺斯（Douglass C. North，1920－）是当代经济史学界最受瞩目的大师之一。
这本《制度、制度变迁与经济成就》是他的近期著作。
为了理解诺斯的理论脉络，有必要介绍一些他早期著作的内容。
诺斯在学术上的贡献与1950 年以来西方学界兴起的「新经济史」或「计量史学」（cliometrics）密切相关。
第二次世界大战之后，从美国的经济史学界崛起的新一代学者特别强调结合经济学与历史，并且致力于应用经济分析与统计方法研究历史问题。
诺斯就属于第一代的新经济史学家，在1950 年就开始推动应用经济理论分析历史的工作。
在1961年，诺斯就出版了《美国的经济成长，1790-1860年》（The Economic Growth of the United States，1790-1860）一书，探讨美国在内战以前的快速经济成长。
该书可说是新经济史革命开始之后的第一本专书，也是有关美国经济史的一本经典之作。
诺斯在该书中清楚的利用《国富论》的论点和美国的历史资料，说明十九世纪前美国经济成长的动力是来自出口贸易、资本流入与区域扩张，由于这些动力引发了专业分工的利益与组织的创新，而提高社会所得。
此外，这些力量也导致教育与知识的投资，以及技术进步而产生长远的影响。
接着在1966年，诺斯又写了《美国过去的成长与福利：一部新经济史》（Growth and Welfare in the American Past：A New Economic History ）。
这本书中，他延续了前书的分析，进一步探讨美国经过快速成长的后果。
在他的分析之下，美国在十九世纪以后的土地政策、农民抗争和政府积极介入经济活动的发展，都有其历史背景。
诺斯也在这本书里开始提出对公共部门的政策和法规的历史分析。
在1960至1966年之间正是新经济史全面拓展的时候，诺斯担任了《经济史学刊》（Journal of Economic History）的主编之一。
经典经济学入门教材英文讲义1(Principles of Economic)
Utility Theory
• Utility is the degree of a preference an individual assigns to a state. If situa tion A is preferred to B, we say that A offers a higher utility than B.
Monotonicity examples
• Suppose values of y and x must be pos itive. In all of the following, y is a monotonic transformation of x:
–y –y –y –y = = = = 2x x+4 x^2 ln(x)
Monotonicity
• g(x) is a monotonic transformation of f(x) if, for all x1 and x2, f(x1) <, =, > f(x2) if and only if g(x1) <, =, > g (x2)
• In other words, monotonic transformat ions are order preserving. • Utility functions are equivalent to m onotonic transformations of themselve s
Branches of Economics
• Microeconomics is the study of how ho useholds and firms make decisions and how they interact in specific markets .
内生增长理论
CH 14 内生增长理论一、内生经济增长的理论渊源（一）财富增长的原因：斯密定理The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.“劳动生产力上最大的增进，以及运用劳动时所表现出来的更大熟练、技巧和判断力，似乎都是分工的结果”“有了分工，同数劳动者就能完成比过去多得多的工作量，其原因有三：第一，劳动者的技巧因业专而日进；第二，由一种工作转到另一种工作，通常须损失不少时间，有了分工，就可以免除这种损失，减少了重复学习提高了整个社会的学习能力；第三，许多简化劳动和缩减劳动的机械的发明，使一个人能够做许多人的工作。
”他把分工看作社会进步的标志：“在一个政治修明的社会里，造成普及到最下层人民的那种普遍富裕情况的，是各行各业的产量由于分工而大增。
”分工何以产生？“引出上述许多利益的分工，原不是人类智慧的结果，尽管人类智慧预见到分工会产生普遍富裕并想利用它来实现普遍富裕。
它是不以这广大效用为目标的一种人类倾向所缓慢而逐渐造成的结果，这种倾向就是互通有无，物物交换，互相交易”（第二章）。
“请给我以我所要的东西吧，同时，你也可以获得你所要的东西。
”“人类几乎随时随地都需要同胞的协助，想要仅仅依赖他人的恩惠，那是一定不行的。
他如果能够刺激他们的利己心，使有利于他，并告诉他们，给他做事，是对他们自己有利的，他要达到目的就容易多了。
不论是谁，如果他要与旁人做买卖，他首先要这样提议。
请给我以我所要的东西吧，同时，你也可以得到你所要的东西，这句话是交易的通义。
quantity theory of money名词解释
quantity theory of money名词解释“货币实体理论”是一种认为货币具有实体价值的理论。
根据这一理论，实体货币具有在商品交换中产生价值的能力，而不需要强制接受。
该理论的主要理论家和支持者认为，基于这一理论，价值有两层次：实体价值（来自交换的平价交换和折价交换）和社会价值（来自社会的凭据和假定）。
货币实体理论的起源货币实体理论是在17世纪末出现的。
它源自英国经济学家莱纳斯康桑斯（Leonardus Canasus）所提出的“折价货币”概念。
此概念认为，货币可以在商品交换中产生价值，不需要强制接受。
然而，其他英国经济学家（如德梅尔马登）和政治家（如英国首相邓恩斯蒂芬森）反对此概念，认为货币只是一个社会约定，没有实质性价值。
货币实体理论发展货币实体理论是由英国经济学家莱纳斯康桑斯（Leonardus Canasus）提出的。
然而，他直到1790年才把它提出来，而马登和斯蒂芬森也驳斥了他的理论。
后来，在19世纪，货币实体理论得到了重新审视，归功于美国经济学家凯斯斯派塞（Keith Spizel）的实证研究，他发现实体货币具有在商品交换中产生价值的能力。
他的论文引发了美国评论家的热烈讨论，并开启了货币实体理论的新篇章。
从那以后，许多经济学家支持实体货币的理论，其中包括约翰古斯塔夫斯密（John G. Stigler）、德里克库克（DerekCooke）和左拉奥尔登（Zola Olden）。
实证证据实证证据表明，货币实体理论是正确的。
实证研究表明，拥有金银和其他实体货币的人士可以以更平等的情况下交换商品。
这也巩固了实体货币作为一种替代品的观点，从而改变了社会中强制接受的货币的价值。
另外，研究表明，社会中的货币价值也受实体货币的影响。
例如，在欧美市场，人们认为1磅银币的实体价值较高，从而使社会中被视为1磅银币的价值也变得较高。
结论总之，货币实体理论认为，货币具有实体价值，并且可以在商品交换中产生价值而无需强制接受。
GeorgeJ.Stigler,TheEconomicsofInformation
Economics of Business E1600Draft Class 12 notesGeorge J. Stigler, The Economics of InformationStigler’s seminal 1961 article was among the first to explore how buyers and sellers invest in and calibrate their search for one another. In particular, how they search for or provide information about the prices available in the marketplace. In effect, he brought information out of the slums of the economic city. See vivid illustration of economic city below. He was awarded the 1982 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in part for initiating the economics of information, the first step of which is this session’s article. Stigler began his acceptance lecture with this thought.In the work on the economics of information which I began 20 some yearsago, I started with an example: How does one find the seller ofautomobiles who is offering a given model at the lowest rice? Does it payto search more, the more frequently one purchases an automobile, anddoes it ever pay to search out a large number of potential sellers? Thestudy of the search for trading partners and prices and qualities has nowbeen deepened and widened by the work of scores of skilled economictheorists.1Information costs are significant factors in using the market and managing firms. RecallCoase’s mention of finding prices as one of the majortransactions costs of using the market and Alchian andDemsetz’ emphasis on metering costs. Simon sought waysto use efficiently the information available to the manager.Gibbons and others emphasized the consequences ofasymmetric information.The Nature of Search.Introductory economics texts portray competitive marketsbalancing supply and demand at a uniform market-clearing price but we all know that there is a distributionof prices out there. This distribution (dispersion as Stiglercalls it) is attributable to many factors including:1 George J. Stigler, “Nobel Lecture: Process and Progress of Economics,” Journal of Political Economy, August 1983, pp 529-545. The whole article is worth reading for perspective. A publicly available version is at /mb65/library/stigler-1983.pdf1.Seller heterogeneity, some may offer different levels of service or have differentreputations for quality.22.Transactions costs. It may be impractical for retailers to constantly update theprices of thousands of goods or it may be too costly to investigate the pricesoffered by all rivals.If there is a distribution of asking prices it may pay the buyer to expend some effort (cost) to identify favorable prices. Clearly, in many markets it is not practical or cost-efficient to poll all sellers so buyers must have some understanding or expectations of the costs and expected rewards of search. Stigler introduced this notion with a “primitive” example of two equally sized groups of sellers, one group offering the good at $2.00, the other at $3.00. The question is – what is the expected minimum price observation for a given number of searches (canvasses)? For those of you whose statistics and probability is a bit rusty, lets start with a simple example that may be familiar.Stigler’s hypothesized marketplace is very similar to the case where a jar has equal numbers of black ($3) and white ($2) marbles. You reach into the jar and pull out one ball and ask what is the chance it is black, white? It is easy to see that the probability of drawing a white or a black ball is .5. The expected value is therefore: E(P) = .5($3) +.5($2) which of course equals $2.50.In this first draw the result is analogous to both the expected minimum and maximum price. But, if we continue the experiment, our expected minimum price observation converges on the real minimum of $2.00. For example, our chances of drawing a $3 or a $2 ball on the second try is still .5 but, the chances of drawing the same value ball as the first draw is only .5 * .5 or .252 Note though that this factor might be absent or greatly reduced as an explanation of price dispersion if a Lancasterian view of multi-attribute goods is employed.But if the chances of drawing the same color ball on the second draw declines to .25, then the chance of drawing at least one of each type of ball increases rapidly and is already .75 (1-.75). With each additional draw the chances of not drawing at least one of each color (or value) decline so the chances of getting at least one of each increase. The chance of getting at least one of each is simply the complement of the chances of getting all of the same observations or balls.Stigler extended this simple 50/50 model to trace out the expected values of a case where half of the stores ask for $2 and the other half $3The table above simply reflects the expected results of getting more information. With the high and equal probabilities of this example, the value of continued search diminishes pretty rapidly.Trials orPricesCanvassed$2.00$3.00Expected Minimum Price 10.50.5$2.5020.750.25$2.2530.8750.125$2.1340.93750.0625$2.0650.968750.03125$2.0360.9843750.015625$2.0270.99218750.0078125$2.01Probability of MinimumIf we were buying only one unit, the incremental value column in the table and the lower line in the graph could help us determine how much search to undertake. Assume for a moment that your search costs are .10 for each additional price you canvass – how many would you expect to check?The expected value of an additional search is the quantity the buyer is seeking to purchase times the expected reduction in price from the search and any additional savings attributable to the lower discovered price.Expected savings=E(Sn )=qδPminδn+average savings from increased purchases due to lower priceStigler ignores the second term which he suggests should be minor.A hypothetical demand curve for an individual customer based on Stigler’s expected price data and distribution and a demand curve q = 30 – 2 p is illustrated below (ignore the reversal of traditional independent-dependent variable axis convention).At an expected unit price of $3 the consumer buys 24 units, at $2.50 she buys 25 units and so on until at an expected price of $2 she will buy 26 units..Uniform distribution of pricesThe uniform distribution (sometimes called a rectangular distribution) is one in which the frequency or probability of every value is the same. Flipping a coin results in a uniform distribution of heads or tails, tossing a single unbiased die results in 6 equally probable outcomes.A uniform or rectangular distribution can be normalized by dividing all of its values by the maximum value. This results in a distribution from 0 to 1. This form of the uniform distribution has some handy mathematical properties:1.The distribution of minimum prices with n searches is:n(1−p)n−12.The average minimum price is:1n+13.Finally, the variance of the average minimum price is:n(n+1)2(n+2)Stigler’s illustration of the progressive shapes of the distribution of the expected observations of minimum prices as a function of searches is reproduced below. It indicates that the first search can result in any value but has an expected value equal to the mean of the distribution. As you increase the number of searches your chances of finding a representative from the lower end of the distribution increase.A similar phenomenon occurs if prices are normally distributed but we will skip the derivation and suggest interested students pursue it on their own. The basic notion is that if looking for a price lower than some target level find the probability of a search resulting in a price higher than that level, then repeat and multiply.Having set out the fundamental dynamics of search, Stigler summarizes the basic relationships. Ceteris paribus: expected net savings of an incremental search will be:1.Greater the higher the expenditure on the commodity. You will searchlonger and harder for a car than for a popsicle.2.The larger the fraction of the buyer’s expenditures represented by thecommodity, the greater the potential savings and hence the greater theamount of search.3.Greater the dispersion of the prices. If prices are all over the place, youwill sense that looking further may well pay off.4.The greater the extent of the geographical size of the market, the larger thecost of search and therefore less will be undertaken.5.Smaller the higher the cost per search. If sellers are widely separated or itis difficult to compare quality or other factors, you will settle sooner.Conversely, if search is facilitated by the Internet, Consumer Reports, orother agents, you can search more extensively.6.The higher the positive correlation of prices among buyers over time, theless investment in search in subsequent periods. Once a buyer determinesthat repeated searches reveal the same results, he is likely to reduce oreliminate searches for that product with perhaps only an occasional check.a.This gives rise to reputational advantages, or brand equity, Stiglereven suggests that goodwill can be defined as the propensity topurchase without significant researchingb.People’s tendency to “lock-in” perceptions formed by multiplesearches explains in part why companies like Wal-Mart seek to beidentified as the low cost supplier and maintain an everyday lowprice policy (“sales” are a form of search-provoking tactic). It alsoexplains why bad reputations are so hard to shed – people have togo back to searching and must have a strong incentive to do so.Hyundai, for example, had to introduce exceptional warranties tooffset the bad taste left by their earlier low quality.7.The need for search never goes completely away. There will always besome price dispersion, simply because information becomes obsolete in adynamic economy with shifting supply and demand patterns. Retailerschange strategies, some are slower to re-price than others, and localconditions may diverge from regional or national norms.AdvertisingStigler, like Lancaster, takes a kinder view of advertising than did many economists, arguing that it provided buyers information and that in its absence (especially price advertising), buyers would have to pay more to find the best price and therefore would succeed less often with the result that less would be purchased.Advertising is less effective when there are relatively few buyers as a percentage of the medium’s circulation or viewership. Specialized dealers arise in this situation. For example, my friend Larry Rayman, president of GTI Power, specializes in quickly finding and delivering aircraft components which he can do by knowing a vast multitude of operators and suppliers. He is essentially an information appliance.Consider advertising a way to inform N customers where c=g(a) is the proportion reached, a, is the volume of advertising. Advertizing is a sort of asset, the number of informed customers increases with the intensity and duration of advertising but declines with time due to death or other forms of attrition.We generally assume diminishing returns at some point. Shown as the concave function below.1.Let N be total of potential customers2.Let b equal the number of new customers who are born or die each period. Then thepath of informed customers will becN in the first periodIn the second period cN(1-b) customers will still be informed and cbN newpotential customers will be reached while c[(1-b)N – cN(1-b)] of the old potential customers not reached the first time will now be informed.Total is now: cN[1+ (1-b)(1-c)3.You can generalize this sequence into an infinite series over k periods and then findthe limit as k gets large as:cN/1-(1-c)(1-b) =λNThe proportion of buyers informed, λ, thus depends on c and b. As c and/or b are large relative to 1 (as proportions both must be less than or equal to 1) then λ will become largerIf there are r sellers advertising, then λ is the probability of any one of them reaching any particular customer and the number of sellers therefore known to an average buyer is between 0 and r with a mean of λr and variance rλ(1-λ).The more advertising and by more sellers, the larger the number of sellers known to each buyer and the lower the variance in knowledge among buyers.Sellers will invest in marketing so long as the incremental revenue from morecontacts, which requires an estimate of propensity to buy for each new contact, is greater than or equal to the cost of reaching an incremental prospect.4.Advertising is less effective when there are relatively few buyers as a percentage ofthe medium’s circulation or viewership. Specialized dealers (brokers) arise in this situation.For example, my friend Larry Rayman, president of GTI Power, is a specialist inquickly finding and delivering aircraft components to small airlines and operators. He can do this (gain an asymmetric information advantage) by knowing a very largenumber of operators and suppliers. Many parts for older aircraft are very idiosyncratic and may no longer be produced. Operators, distributors, and manufacturers contact him about needs and availability of parts. The network effects work to Larry’sadvantage; each new customer is potentially valuable to all of the other customers (parts swaps or borrowing out of inventory) and to the suppliers.Larry is essentially an information appliance. Efforts to computerize the markethaven’t worked so far. Why do you think Larry has not been digitally displaced?5.Advertising mediums have to attract potential buyers in order to offer value to sellers.The creation of a newspaper or television program can be viewed as a device toassemble potential buyers for the advertisers. Hence the concern about ratings and demographics. Movies sell product placements while the theaters that show themovies run explicit advertisements for products and upcoming movies.In conclusion, Stigler notes that ignorance islike sub-zero weather (recall that he taught atthe University of Chicago): we can spend toreduce its effects and even achieve a degree ofcomfort but it is uneconomic to eliminate allof its effects. So too we can neither eliminatenor ignore the cold winds of ignorance.Thoughts for discussion:Stigler, like Simon, does not assume hyper-rationality (e.g. omniscience on market prices) on the parts of buyers and sellers. Is his model of search a form of bounded rationality?Stigler describes search costs and investment in them as part of the product transaction. Does this anticipate Williamson’s notion of transactions costs as an element to be considered in choosing among governance or contracting relationships?Does Stigler’s treatment of search costs comport with Coase’s notion of costs to use the market?How does the Internet affect the costs and benefits of information search and advertising? Does Big Data alter the economics of information?***************。
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stigler the theory of economic regulation译文
斯蒂格勒的经济管制理论
斯蒂格勒的经济管制理论是一种解释政府对经济活动进行管制的理论。
斯蒂格勒认为，政府对经济进行管制的主要原因是为了维护特定利益集团的利益，而不是出于公共利益的考虑。
斯蒂格勒提出了两个关键概念来解释经济管制的动因。
第一个概念是“规制产业”的概念，即一些特定的行业或企业因为其市场地位的垄断或寡头垄断而受到政府的监管。
斯蒂格勒认为，在这些行业中，利益集团会通过游说政府来维护自身的垄断地位，政府则会通过管制来支持这些利益集团。
第二个概念是“规制行政”，即政府为了维护自身的权力和资源而对经济进行管制。
根据斯蒂格勒的理论，政府通过规制行政来获得更多的资源和权力，从而增加其在经济中的影响力和控制力。
斯蒂格勒的经济管制理论对经济学家和政策制定者有着重要的启示。
他的理论强调了政府管制的目的和动因，并提出了一种经济学解释来分析和评估不同管制政策的影响。
这些理论在经济领域的政策制定中具有一定的指导意义，并对政府对经济的干预提供了一种新的视角。