德沃金的荒岛理论
解读德沃金《认真对待权利》之原则模式
解读德沃金《认真对待权利》之原则模式作者：陈丽萍来源：《法制与社会》2009年第14期摘要本文阅读了《认真对待权利》一书,分析了德沃金提出的法律原则模式。
并从法律实证主义的代表观点入手,分析了德沃金对哈特法律实证主义的批判,从而进一步展现德沃金的法律原则理论体系的内容。
关键词德沃金法律规则原则中图分类号:D09 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1009-0592(2009)05-362-02《认真对待权利》是美国当代著名法理学家罗纳德?德沃金在20世纪60～70年代写成的。
在这个阶段中,美国国内面临种族歧视问题、越南战争问题、善良违法问题等等。
围绕着什么是法律,法律的目的是什么,谁在什么情况下应该遵守法律,在没有成文法依据,也没有先例的情况下法官如何审判案件等理论和实践问题,德沃金提出了自己的观点,批判了美国法律传统中的实证主义和实用主义,提出了政府必须平等地尊重和关心个人权利,不得为了社会福利或者社会利益牺牲人权的观点。
二次大战后自然法复兴之际,哈特有力地为法律实证主义辩护,强调法律不必与道德相关联;法律是一组规则,其效力来自于人民的接受。
德沃金直接挑战法律实证主义领导者哈特,认为法律固然是一项强制力的运用,但不应该是官员们的裁量所创造的规则组成;也不应当仅由人们的接受作为其效力基础。
强制力的运用与否,应涉及道德问题,反映在法律原则之上。
本文主要探讨《认真对待权利》中法律原则模式。
一、对法律实证主义的批判首先,德沃金将法律实证主义学说的基本思想归纳为以下三个方面:第一、一个社会的法律就是由该社会直接或间接地、为了决定某些行为将受到公共权力的惩罚或强制的目的而使用的一套特殊规则。
第二、这套有效的法律规则不是面面俱到。
它必须由法官来行使自己的自由裁量权。
这就意味着,法官已经走出了法律之外,以某种其他标准引导他创设出一条新的法律规则,或者对一个旧的规则加以补充。
第三、讲某人有“法律义务”,就是说他应服从一个有效的法律规则,要求他从事或不从事一定行为。
浅析德沃金的“善良违法”
浅析德沃金的“善良违法”作者：张羽来源：《今日湖北·下旬刊》2014年第05期摘要一场越南战争，使得美国民怨沸腾，民众濒濒违反《征兵法》。
也正因为此，引发了人们对善良违法的思考。
何为“善良违法”的“善良”？关键就在于“法”本身的有效性是令人怀疑的。
只有在法律本身有效性是令人怀疑的前提下，才存在善良违法问题。
如果法律本身的有效性是令民众深信不疑的，则民众没有违法的权利。
关键词善良违法良法恶法一、由“征兵法”引发的思考1967年12月30日，因反对越南战争战征兵美国546人被捕。
1967年12月30日，越南战争的反战人士们这个月改变了战术。
他们企图在纽约城关闭一个武装部队征兵中心。
至少546人在两天的抗议活动中被逮捕。
这些被监护的人中有本杰明-斯托克，是著名的儿科专家兼作家，还有诗人阿伦-金斯伯格。
他们被警察包围得水泄不通。
斯托克请求警察给他放行以便叫他本人能够被抓起来。
其他的抗议不得如愿，便堵塞了该地区的交通。
这天，河内胡志明打电报美国的反战人士说：“我们定会胜利。
你们也一定会胜利。
”某种行为在道德上看是合理的，但在法律上，行为人出于道德信念而故意实施善良违法行为，则是要受到处罚的，甚至可能被认为是刑事犯罪。
之所以是善良违法，是因为“他们不认为——也不要求别人把自己看成——正在寻求任何根本分裂和宪政重构。
他们接受政府和政治社会的根本合法性，他们与其说要挑战不如说要履行其作为公民的义务。
”二、善良违法的理论及其内涵（一）德沃金眼中的善良违法德沃金是新自然法学的代表人物之一，其学派认为法律和道德之间存在一定的关系，主张“恶法非法”论。
其所谓善良违法指当民众认为某项法律法规的规定并不合理时，可以采取非暴力的、理性的方式拒绝遵守该条法律，但同时，因为是违法行为，拒绝者有义务且有勇气接受违法后的法律惩罚。
“善良违法”，其重在“善良”一词。
何为“善良违法”的“善良”？关键就在于“法”本身的有效性是令人怀疑的。
解读德沃金的法律思想
自然法视野中的“法律帝国”——解读德沃金的法律思想明辉*提要：罗纳德•德沃金在批判实证主义法学和功利主义法学的基础上，提出了自己的原则学说与权利理论，强调原则应当得到遵守并且公民应当得到政府的平等关怀与尊重；运用“内在观点”对法律进行“建构性解释”，进而得出“作为整体性的法律”概念。
关键词：权利内在观点建构性解释整体性法律法院是法律帝国的首都，法官是帝国的王侯，但却不是它的先知或预言家。
我们每个人都是道德共和国的平等公民，这是一种伟大的信仰，只有乐观主义者才可以将这一信仰付诸实践。
——罗纳德•德沃金罗纳德•德沃金（Ronald Dworkin，1931-），美国当代法学家，毕业于哈佛大学法学院。
现任英国牛津大学和美国纽约大学法理学教授，同时又是美国哈佛大学、普林斯顿大学、西北大学等聘请的法律教授或哲学教授。
他最著名的代表作是1977年出版的《认真看待权利》，之后又相继出版了《原则论》、《自由论》、《法律帝国》和《自由的法》等著作。
德沃金的“权利论”是在对美国当时最尖锐、最敏感的社会矛盾的研究分析的基础上逐步确立起来的。
20世纪60年代的美国社会处于激烈的矛盾冲突当中，美国国内的一系列反对种族歧视、反对越战的学生运动、女权运动、民权运动，强烈地冲击着美国社会。
与之相应，在思想领域中，占统治地位的自由主义思想受到了来自各方的攻击。
保守主义者将放任自流所导致的性解放、吸毒等灾难性后果归咎于自由主义；激进主义者则指责自由主义不重视财富分配和消灭贫困，造成经济上的不公正，进而导致社会中诸如种族歧视、无视弱势群体权利的不公正。
正是在长期被奉为权威的西方法律传统受到质疑与挑战的背景下，德沃金明确宣称，他要提出并为之辩护的仍然是一种自由主义的法律学说，即关于个人权利的传统法律思想。
一、对于实证主义法学和功利主义法学的批判在批判实证主义法学和功利主义法学，特别是哈特（H.L.A. Hart）的新分析法学的基础上，德沃金逐渐形成了其独具特色的法理学思想。
试用德沃金理论分析马尧海案
试用德沃金理论分析马尧海案作者：萨楚拉来源：《赤峰学院学报·哲学社会科学版》 2011年第6期萨楚拉（北京航空航天大学法学院，北京 100191）摘要：南京某大学副教授马尧海“换妻案”不失为司法实践中一大疑难案件。
案件的争议点在于是否应当将该案定罪为聚众淫乱罪。
聚众淫乱罪是由我国1979年刑法中流氓罪分解而来，其犯罪构成也一直为人所争论，但毫无疑问的是该罪对道德底线提出了挑战。
德沃金作为西方新自然法学派的代表人物之一，其提出的法律原则论以及法律整体性思想对我国当今司法实践也有一定借鉴意义。
本文首先从笔者的视角对该案的争议点加以简要评析，然后试从德沃金在《认真对待权利》一书中提到的思想理论对该案进行法理分析。
关键词：马尧海案；德沃金理论；新自然法学派中图分类号：D9 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1673-2596（2011）06-0041-03一、案情简介2010年3月5日，南京某大学副教授马尧海等22人，被以“聚众淫乱罪”提起公诉。
一审中马尧海等22人以聚众淫乱罪被追究其刑事责任。
法庭指出，由于马尧海对自己行为的社会危害性和违法性始终缺乏清醒的认识，从重处罚，获刑3年6个月有期徒刑。
其它人由于认罪态度较好，被判缓刑到3年6个月有期徒刑不等刑罚。
二、本案争议点之我见依据我国《刑事诉讼法》第一百四十一条规定：“人民检察院认为犯罪嫌疑人的犯罪事实已经查清，证据确实、充分，依法应当追究刑事责任的，应当作出起诉决定，按照审判管辖的规定，向人民法院提起公诉。
”但本案中马尧海“换妻”是否构成我国《刑法》中所规定的聚众淫乱罪成为一审中公诉方与被告争论的焦点。
我国《刑法》第三百零一条第一款规定：“聚众进行淫乱活动的，对首要分子或者多次参加的，处5年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
”本罪是由1979年刑法第一百六十条而来，1979年刑法规定的是流氓罪，本罪是对流氓罪的分解，但这并不代表该罪等同于流氓罪。
依据我国刑法学界占据主流地位的犯罪构成四要件说，笔者将结合《中华人民共和国刑法第四版释义》，从主体、客体、主观要件及客观要件四方面对马尧海“换妻”行为是否构成聚众淫乱罪进行简要分析。
德沃金的法律思想
德沃金自由的法律思想在人类文明进程的漫长岁月中，随着社会的分工，私有制的出现及阶级的产生把人类从原始平等状态推入了不平等的深渊。
但从那一刻开始，人类就从未放弃过对平等、自由之理想的追求。
古希腊先哲柏拉图、亚里斯多德，罗马时代的西塞罗，及至十七、十八世纪的洛克、斯宾诺莎、孟德斯鸠、卢梭、康德等启蒙思想家无不殚思极虑、孜孜不倦地探求人类社会理想的政治、法律秩序及实现人类平等与自由、公平与正义的有效手段。
而从西方法律思想史来观察，个人与社会、国家三者之关系的协调，个人权利与政治权力的冲突与整合、平等与自由两种价值理念的取舍与均衡一直是各时代的政治、法律思想家们所致力于解决的核心问题。
本世纪60年代至70年代初期，美国社会一直处于动荡不安的状态中。
这时，第二次世界大战后最严重的经济危机、50年代末60年代初不得人心的越战政策及由此产生的针对征兵法的反对怒潮、青年学生反战运动、基于种族隔离的法律而导致数起社会事件所激起的黑人及有色群体争取种族实质性平等的运动、妇女争取自由与独立的解放运动，以及遍及各著名大学的反对政府政策及传统观念的学生校园造反运动等等事件相继发生。
人们开始关注并致力于争取在以前似乎是不可想象的权力要求，如：隐私权、生育自由权、充分的表达自由权、劳工最低工资保障和休息权、性自由权等等。
这一切极大地冲击了美国社会的统治秩序。
与此同时，人们的思想空前混乱。
长期以来，人们共同信奉的自由主义理论突然间失去了魅力，同时受到中年和青年的谴责。
长期以来被奉为至上的法律制度陷入了“前所未遇的危机”之中。
延续了几个世纪之久的西方法律传统受到了根本地怀疑。
美国人开始重新审视并且怀疑长期存在的法律和政治实践。
在这段时间里，关于什么是法律，谁必须遵守法律，什么时候遵守法律的问题成为重大的政治争议问题。
而被称为“自由主义”的政治态度似乎失去了很大吸引力！自由主义这个概念的内涵异常广泛，它既指一种意识形态、一种生活方式又是一种治国之道。
德沃金的权利论法哲学
德沃金的权利论法哲学德沃金(Ronald M Dworkin)是当代美国法哲学家。
德沃金的权利论法哲学.是六十年代后期到七十年代初期,美国社会大动荡在法律领域的反映。
在当时的社会情况下,统治阶级需要新的理论来缓和各种被激化的矛盾,克服人们对西方社会政治和法律制度的信任危机。
德沃金的法哲学是这方面的一种尝试,他信奉自由主义,维护西方的“自由社会”,主张对资本主义的弊端进行改良。
其代表作有《认真地对待权利》(1977年初版)、《原则问题》(1985)和《法律帝国》(1986年)。
《认真地对待权利》一书由论文编辑而成,该书系统地阐述了权利论法哲学,被认为是哈特《法律的概念》发表以来法哲学领域最重要的着作,标志着一个新的法哲学时代的开始。
、一、权利论与平等权利论。
“权利论”是德沃金法哲学的核心。
德沃金在其代表作《认真地对待权利》一书的导言中指出,他要阐述的既是一种自由主义法律学说,即关于个人权利的传统思想,然而他所要批判的也是一种自由主义学说。
这种自由主义学说在西方法学领域长期流行并占统治地位。
它可分为两部分,一是法律实证主义学说,即关于法律实际上是什么的理论。
二是功利主义法学,即关于法律应该是什么以及法律机构应如何行为的理论。
以上两部分都源于英国边泌的哲学。
这两种学说在对待个人权利问题上不同于德沃金的理论。
实证主义法学认为,在任何立法形式之前不可能有法律权利存在。
根据德沃金的权利论,“当集体目标不足以成为否认个人希望做事情的理由时,或当集体目标也不足以成为支持对个人所加的损失或伤害的理由时,个人就有权利。
”德沃金所阐述的个人权利,不仅指法律上规定的权利,而且指道德上的权利。
在德沃金看来政治权利也包括道德权利。
在所有个人权利中,德沃金认为,公民享有得到政府平等关怀和尊重的权利最为重要。
他指出,政府必须以关怀和尊重的态度对待其所治理的人民,政府不仅要关怀和尊重人民,而且要平等地给予关怀和尊重。
这就是说,政府绝不能以某些公民值得倍加关怀而有资格获得更多的商品或机会,也绝不能因某些团体中某个公民的美好生活概念比其他人高贵或优越而限制他人的自由。
德沃金关于正义的自由理论： 个人权利和作为共同体意志的法律原则
Dworkin presented law as integrity as a synthesis of the best elements of conventionalism and pragmatism. Like pragmatism, law as integrity affirmed the responsibility of judges to revise the law in response to the evolving needs of their community. Unlike pragmatism, but in common with conventionalism, law as integrity also affirmed the reality of legal rights. In contrast to conventionalism, though, law as integrity did not identify the legal rights of a given community exclusively with the rights specified in the explicit content of the legal conventions created through the decisions of its authorized law-making institutions. For Dworkin, law as integrity also recognized that the legal rights of a community derived from the principles of political morality which constituted the presupposed justification for its conventional system of law.Law as integrity stood as an essentially non-conventionalist thesis about the grounds of law and legal rights. The theory assumed that the legal rules of a community were valid not only because of their consistency with prior institutional decisions, but also because of their coherent relationship with 'the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process' that offered 'the best constructive interpretation of [that] community's legal practice'.12Under law as integrity, Dworkin maintained, such principles were recognized to serve as a foundation for the legal rights and obligations enforced by the courts in hard cases. Accordingly, law as integrity did not restrict the moral and political justification for the limitations imposed upon the coercive force of law to the conventionalist requirement of predictability in procedural due process. Instead, law as integrity affirmed that, in a real community, these limitations were themselves underwritten by the more substantive principles of justice and fairness embodied throughout its political structure and legal doctrine. Dworkin went on to claim that law as integrity offered the most theoretical interpretation of the American legal system, as determined by the criteria of fit and justification. Only law as integrity, he argued, matched the established conventions of American legal practice, in addition to remaining faithful to the principles of justice and morality embedded in the American political tradition which were understood to confer legitimacy upon these conventions. Law as integrity also brought out the political dimension of law and adjudication, which conventionalism obscured, while avoiding the implication of pragmatism that the courts were licensed to decide issues of public policy in defiance of the constraints of judicial discipline. Moreover, law as integrity stood apart from conventionalism and pragmatism in being a constructive interpretation of legal practice which acknowledged that civil adjudication was governed by the procedures of constructive interpretation. In all these respects, Dworkin submitted, law as integrity ranked as the best theoretical account of the methods of judicial reasoning adopted by the American courts in the interpretation of statutory legislation and the Constitution.According to law as integrity, the courts were required to enforce statutory legislation by developing constructive interpretations of its meaning in specific legal disputes. In turn, this methodological requirement of integrity directed the courts to seek to articulate the underlying point or purpose which lent justification to the explicit provisions of particular statutes. Dworkin emphasized that the procedure of interpretation set out in the theory of law as integrity accorded with accepted canons of judicial reasoning. Crucially, the procedure provided that the courts should expound justifications for particular statutes which were consistent both with the literal meaning of these statutes and with other legislation in force. At the same time, law as integrity provided that the courts should ground the interpretation of statutory legislation upon genuine considerations of political morality. In consequence, thecourts were required to assess the implications for any given dispute of the general public policies articulated in statute law, and to determine the relationship between these policies and the background principles of political morality, like justice or procedural fairness, which limited the implementation of all policy within the community.Dworkin denied that these methodological requirements could be set aside by appeal to theories of judicial interpretation which identified the meaning of statutory legislation with the actual purposes or intentions of its authors. That is, he rejected the appropriateness to the analysis of adjudication of any version of the speaker's meaning theory of interpretation which presupposed that statute law was to be con strued as 'an act of communication… understood on the simple model of speaker and audience'.13 For Dworkin, the form of interpretation essential to law as integrity was purposive rather than conversational. This meant that the purpose or intention of a statute was always ascribed to it by the courts through procedures of constructive interpretation. Thus, so far from being obliged to attend to the original legislative history of statute law, the courts were at liberty to develop purposive interpretations of its meaning which took account of changing social and economic circumstances, and of significant shifts in public conceptions of political morality.The model of judicial interpretation which Dworkin derived from the theory of law as integrity had a quite particular application to the analysis of constitutional adjudication in America. Since the United States Constitution underwrote the most basic arrangements of political power in American society, he argued, the courts were subject to a special institutional obligation to address fundamental questions of political morality in its interpretation. It was for this reason that Dworkin rejected what he classed as historicist theories of constitutional adjudication. For Dworkin, theories of judicial historicism were distinguished both by their exclusion of controversial questions of political morality from constitutional adjudication, and by their demand that judges should ground their interpretations of the Constitution upon the principles rendered explicit in the declared intentions of its historical authors. However, Dworkin insisted that the ideal of political neutrality implied by jurists of original intention was unrealizable-not because of any compelling principle of political morality, but because of the purposive element of constructive interpretation which he regarded as running through all adjudication.In 'Constitutional Cases', Dworkin had called for the formulation of a constitutional jurisprudence which would overcome the opposition between the positivism of orthodox theories of judicial passivism and the instrumentalism that marked standard defences of judicial activism. In Law's Empire, he claimed that exponents of judicial passivism had adhered to a narrowly conventionalist theory of law and adjudication, which they generally supported with a majoritarian principle of political fairness in explaining the meaning of the constitutional separation of powers, whereas defenders of judicial activism had espoused a radical form of legal pragmatism.According to Dworkin, judicial passivists had identified the rights secured by the Constitution exclusively with those provided for in the literal terms of the constitutional text. In doing this, passivists had viewed the decision of controversial cases of constitutional law as a form of judicial legislation, which involved a process of unacknowledged amendment of the original Constitution. As a result,most theorists of judicial passivism had excluded any purely judicial determination of constitutional rights, by assuming that the courts remained bound by an absolute constitutional obligation to conform to the decisions of the elective institutions of government in all questions of political morality or public policy which were not covered by the literalprovisions of the Constitution. Judicial activists, by contrast, had emphatically denied that the courts were bound by any obligation of deference to the decisions of such elective institutions, or that the courts were required to restrict the range of authentic constitutional rights to those detailed in the literal terms of the original Constitution. On the contrary, theories of judicial activism implied that the courts were licensed to legislate new constitutional rights, whenever this promoted favoured social or economic objectives.Dworkin repudiated both passivism and activism as theories of constitutional practice and adjudication.The classic theories of judicial passivism, he argued, significantly misrepresented the practice of the courts, chiefly through their adoption of the conventionalist view that the decision of controversial cases of constitutional law should be governed by the literal terms of the Constitution. Moreover, by appealing to a majoritarian principle of fairness as a justification for the separation of powers, passivism obscured the crucial relationship between constitutional adjudication and principles of political morality, like procedural due process and justice, which were expressly enshrined in the Constitution as limifations on the will of the political majority. Judicial activism, on the other hand, proved fundamentally subversive of the standard methods of legal reasoning. By ascribing quasi-legislative powers to the courts, Dworkin insisted, judicial activists had created the false impression that the courts were relieved of any responsibility to ground the determination of constitutional rights upon a disciplined interpretation of 'the Constitution's text, the history of its enactment, prior decisions of the Supreme Court' and of all the 'long-standing traditions of …[American) political cultur}".14Dworkin concluded that the procedures of constitutional adjudication followed by the American courts were best examined in terms of the theory of law as integrity. Law as integrity required the courts to adjudicate hard cases in consitutional law on the assumption that the United States Constitution consisted in 'the best available interpretation of American constitutional text and practice as a whole’15 Accordingly, the theory directed the courts to determine the schedule of rights underwritten by the Constitution through a procedure of reasoning concerned, not only with the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process implicit in the original text of the Constitution, but also with the continuous reinterpretation of the meaning of these principles as conducted throughout the entire history of constitutional amendment and adjudication.In contrast to judicial historicism, then, law as integrity imposed no institutional obligation upon the courts either to attach a decisive importance to the intentions of the original framers of the Constitution - as declared at the historical moment of its promulgation – or to regard these intentions as determining the range of rights to be recognized in subsequent judicial interpretations of its meaning. Indeed, law as integrity came close to the spirit of judicial activism, in the sense that it permitted the courts to specify authentic constitutional rights which were not explicitly provided for in the literal text of the Constitution. However, I?workin emphasized that law as integrity diverged from judicial activism because it demanded that such rights should be established through disciplined procedures of adjudication, rather than by arbitrary legislative fiat. Above all, integrity demanded that judicial decisions in hard cases of constitutional law should be made consistent both with the literal provisions of the Constitution, and with the principles of political morality which represented their most coherent justification.Under law as integrity, then, the courts were indeed bound to recognize that theUnited States Constitution conferred certain legislative powers on the specifically elective institutions of the American system of government. Even so, the theory differed from orthodox formulations of judicial passivism in imposing no unconditional duty upon the courts to defer to the decisions of the democratically accountable institutions of government in the interpretation of the meaning of the entire constitutional scheme. Instead, law as integrity directed the courts to interpret the Constitution on the understanding that it enshrined principles of political morality which were intended to protect the rights of individuals and minorities against institutional decisions made on behalf of the democratic majority.In the latter respect, Dworlcin claimed that the procedures of constitutional adjudication defined by law as integrity were consistent with the primacy assigned to individual moral rights in American political culture. This claim was the basis for his conclusion that the theory of law as integrity accorded with the principles of political morality which represented the best justification of the whole legal system of the United States. In this way, law as integrity underscored the fundamental unity of the descriptive concerns of legal analysis and the normative concerns of moral and political philosophy. More specifically, law as integrity provided a jurisprudential foundation for the reconstruction of the liberal theory of justice - a theory which, for Dworkin, constituted the most philosophically compelling vindication of the primacy of individual rights as a normative principle of political morality.ii. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE IDEA OF LAW AS A COMMUNITY OF PRINCIPLEDworkin did not present law as integrity as merely a theory of law and adjudication. He also considered integrity to be a distinct political virtue of law and legal institutions, which supplemented the more traditional political values of fairness, justice arid procedural due process. In combination, these four virtues of legal order made up the theory of political morality defended in Law's Empire.According to this theory, the idea of fairness had application to the constitution of the standing political institutions of a given community, and suggested that political power should be distributed throughout these institutions so as to represent accurately the different interests of its members. The idea of justice concerned the substantive decisions of political institutions, whether or not these institutions were fairly constituted. Justice required that all such institutional decisions should both respect personal rights and liberties, and work to promote a morally principled distribution of social and economic resources among the individual members of the community. The idea of procedural due process concerned the conduct of the institutions of government which were responsible for determining whether particular citizens stood in breach of the legal rules of the community. Hence, the principles of procedural due process required that the courts and executive institutions of government should abide by the precepts of natural justice in the adjudication of disputes between the individual and the community and in the coercive enforcement of the law generally. Integrity, however, was a formal virtue of legislation and adjudication, and required that a legal system should be coherent in terms of internally self-consistent principles of political morality. Secifically, integrity required legislators to enact statutes, and judges to interpret legal rules and precedents, in accordance with the moral principles that informed the entire system of law for which they, as officials, were responsible. Hence, integrity demanded not only that like cases be treated alike under the existing legal conventions of a community - the standard principle of procedural justice - butalso that the state itself should act on a single, coherent set of principles of political morality, even when its subjects were divided about what these principles should be. Dworkin maintained that integrity conferred a special normative authority upon the hale of law, in the respect that its structural requirement of coherence worked to guarantee each individual citizen a right to full equality of treatment under the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process accepted within his community. It was because of this guarantee of equal treatment, Dworkin argued, that law as integrity provided a better justification than either conventionalism or pragmatism both for the monopoly on lawful coercive force claimed by the modern sovereign state, and for the legitimacy of the political obligation to comply with the law which the modern state imposed upon its subjects. In particular, the theory explained the conditions under which a state could actively promote the civic virtues of fraternity and community that Dworkin regarded as essential to the generation of any authentic principle of legal and political obligation.Dworkin denied that the obligation to comply with the law was to be understood in terms of the ideas of consent and voluntary promissory agreement favoured by the mainstream theorists of classical liberalism. Instead, he insisted that this obligation was, ideally, a fraternal obligation, which should be examined as part of a class of so-called associative or communal obligations. These obligations bound their subjects, not on account of their choice or agreement, but because of their mutual participation in social practices which satisfied certain formal conditions of reciprocity. For Dworkin, associative obligations imposed an authoritative duty of compliance only when the distinct rights and responsibilities constituting a social practice were distributed according to some consistent principle of reciprocity - that is, when these rights and responsibilities were acknowledged to have equal application to all the participants in the practice.The members of a social practice so constituted, Dworkin suggested, would characteristically tend to view their obligations as being both special to the practice, rather than as universally binding duties, and fully personal – as to each other member, not just to the group as a whole in some collective sense'.16 The members of such a practice would also tend to assume that their obligations flowed from a more general obligation falling upon each member to show concern for the well- being of the other members of the practice. In this way, the participants in a social practice would be encouraged to conceive their obligations as organizing an association, or community, which manifested equal concern for all its members throughout its entire system of explicitly rule-defined rights and duties. When these formal conditions of reciprocity were satisfied, Dworkin argued, a social practice would generate genuine fraternal obligations which bound its members irrespective of their actual choice or agreement.According to Dworkin, any legal system governed by the constraints of integrity would naturally come to constitute an authentic associative community, and, in doing so, would acquire the normative authority to enforce the general duty of compliance with law as a matter of fraternal obligation. Hence, law as integrity succeeded, as theories of legal conventionalism did not, in conferring a moral status upon the obligation to comply with law which sufficed to vindicate the legitimacy of the rule of law as a form of political regulation.Dworkin claimed that legal conventionalism represented an impoverished theory of political association, and that the deficiencies of the theory followed from the preference of conventionalist jurists for what he called a rulebook conception of community and legal order. Dworkin did not dispute that conventionalist jurists oftenrecognized that legal subjects were legitimately bound by a general obligation to comply with the rules of their community, whenever these rules fulfilled the community's accepted conditions of legal validity. Nevertheless, Dworlcin emphasized that conventionalists characteristically held that the limits of the obligation of compliance with law were described by the explicit content of such rules. In consequence, conventionalists did not view this general duty of compliance as a fraternal obligation. On the contrary, they regarded the rule of law as being essentially a compromise between antagonistic interests, rather than as the public embodiment of some common commitment to principles of justice and fairness which were independent sources of political obligation.In contrast to conventionalism, Dworkin argued, the theory of law as integrity did not assume that the general obligation of compliance with law in a given community was exhausted by the explicit content of its legal rules. Instead, law as integrity allowed for the derivation of authentic political rights and duties from the reciprocally binding principles of justice and fairness presupposed by the conventional legal rules of a community. Hence, the theory grounded the duty of compliance with the rule of law upon the entitlement of each legal subject to the equal concern of his community, as this concern was publicly defined by the principles of political morality underlying its formal legal arrangements. In doing so, law as integrity brought out the conditions under which a rule of law could come to be accepted by its subjects as organizing a genuine community of principle.Dworkin believed that the analysis of law as a community of principle undermined the distinction assumed by positivist jurists between legal norms and the norms of social morality. However, this communitarian theory of political association involved no adherence on Dworkin's part to the ethical and metaphysical viewpoints integral to the classical and medieval traditions in natural law philosophy. He did not seek to defend the theory by specifying any morally determinate conception of the common goods and values implied in the idea of a political community. Still less did he argue that the theory involved a teleological justification of the moral authority exerted by a community through its legal and constitutional arrangements. In fact, Dworkin envisaged no incompatibility between the political communitarianism expounded in Law`s Empire and his endorsement deontologically grounded schedule of individual rights Rawls took to embody the moral foundation of the liberal of justice.In 'Liberalism',17 a key essay first published in 1978, Dworkin reconstructed what he called the constitutive political morality of liberalism in terms of an essentially Kantian principle of equality. This principle required government to remain 'neutral on…the question of the good life', and to ensure that its public decisions regarding social and economic policy be kept fully 'independent of any particular conception of the good life，or of what gives value to life'.18For Dworkin, the requirement of 'official neutrality towards rival conceptions of the good neither presupposed a substantive theory of human nature, nor entailed an atomistic or individualistic analysis of political society. On the contrary, official neutrality on the part of the governmental authority towards different forms of moral commitment was 'a principle of political org anization… required by justice'."19In general, Dworkin insisted that a system of law which nurtured the virtues of fraternity and community offered the most appropriate political context for the public exercise of the individual rights underwritten by the liberal theory of justice. To this extent, the ideal of law as a community of principle defended in Law's Empire vindicated the legal and political arrangements of modern liberal society which Dworkin endorsed throughout his work.However, the communitarian conception of political association carried with it a justification for the legitimacy of modern liberal society which diverged markedly from the voluntarist analysis of legal obligation developed by political philosophers standing in the tradition of the social contract. Under his conception of political community, Dworkin understood the state to be a distinct collective entity, which stood as an autonomous source of moral and legal obligation. Accordingly, he emphatically denied that a political community was an instrumental association which merely provided institutional facilities for the satisfaction or reconciliation of the private interests of its individual members. Instead, he affirmed that the legal and institutional structure of an integrated political community enshrined certain publicly defined values, like fraternity, which were neither the product of, nor reducible to, the contractual choices and agreements of its subjects.In these respects, Dworkin's defence of law as a community of principle aligned him with the tradition in political philosophy of Aristotle, Rousseau, Burke and Hegel, rather than with the work of Hobbes, Locke and the other theorists who laid the philosophical foundations of modern liberalism. In one sense, the idea of law as a community of principle was a testament to the continuing relevance for modern society of the Aristotelian conception of the state – or polis - as an arena of virtue, in which the citizen actively fulfilled his political nature under a reciprocally enforceable system of rights and duties that bound both ruler and subject by reason of shared and publicly defined principles of justice. Likewise, the contrast德沃金指出了法律是作为因袭主义和实用主义最佳元素结合的完整性综合体。
法学家应当如何思维？——罗纳德·德沃金《原则问题》
法学家应当如何思维？——罗纳德·德沃金《原则问题》法学家应当如何思维？理想的法律人共同体应当如何建构？这是困扰着中国法学界的重要问题。
虽然人们可以从各个途径接触到一些具体的重要法学家和法理学家，但是从理论上讲，这两个问题仍有作深入探讨的必要。
罗纳德·德沃金（Ronald Dworkin， 1931—）以毕生学术活动建构了一个完美的法律人形象，即：“认真对待权利，严肃原则问题；出入法律帝国，逍遥人生疆界；心系自由律令，胸怀至上美德。
”[2]诚然，作为实际的法理学家，德沃金的法律思维方法并非完美无缺，但是德沃金建构的理想法学家对我们建构理想的法律人共同体提供了重要启示。
有鉴于此，借《原则问题》出版之际，我把德沃金作为一个优秀法学家的范例来展开上述话题的探讨。
一、法学家要有鲜明的法律立场和道德立场首先，德沃金是一位认真、细心、谨慎而自信的法理学家，一位在常规学术领域不断创造新意的既充满诗意又令人敬佩的学院教授。
在当代美国法学家中，德沃金之所以显得如此与众不同，不仅与他讨论话题的严肃性直接相关，而且与他面对的众多论敌的强大性直接相关。
德沃金是一个不苟言笑的缺少幽默感的人。
[3]但是他很坦诚，因此，在《原则的问题》中，经常出现诸如“尽是胡闹”（all nonsense）[4]、“极其拙劣”（very bad）[5]、“多么虚弱无力”（how feeble）[6]、“荒诞”（bizarre）、“荒唐”（preposterous）、“行不通”（implausible）、“极其片面”（radically incomplete）、“十足假冒”（wholly spurious）、“完全失败”（wholly fail）[7]、“真正糟糕”（just bad）[8]、“极其愚蠢”（crazy）[9]、“像……一样地愚蠢”（as silly as）[10]、“无用”（useless）[11]、“失败”（fail）[12]、“荒谬”（fallacious）[13]之类用来批评或回击对手的直白粗话。
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1 德沃金的荒岛理论 在自由主义几百年的发展历史中，直到1971年罗尔斯的《正义论》问世前，平等问题一直被悬置着。换言之，在罗尔斯作出开创性的研究前，人们只能等待。
自由主义政治哲学出现这种情况，原因之一是始终认为平等与自由是两个相互竞争的政治价值，就像德沃金所评析的：如果不调和自由与平等之间的关系，那么不言而喻，对任何平等的强调都是一场自由必败的斗争。要调合这两者，就必须斩断经济学的冷冰冰的逻辑和超越功利主义的分析框架。这一点直到罗尔斯将伦理学介入政治哲学，才破除了它们势不两立的神话。罗尔斯之后，无论是反对罗尔斯的诺齐克，还是与罗尔斯有更多相同语言的德沃金，大体上都没有抛弃罗尔斯的这个分析框架。这个道理相当明显：政治不能缺少德性之维，特别是现代民主政治。
如果说罗尔斯的《正义论》是对传统的自由主义政治哲学框架的一个突破，那么德沃金的《至上的美德――平等的理论与实践》则试图将平等问题推进一步，并力图以可能的方式付诸政治实践。从某种意义上讲，这两本当代自由主义关于平等问题的最重要的理论著作完全可以相提并论，虽然差不多在罗尔斯发表《正义论》十年后，德沃金才开始他的思考。无论是罗尔斯还是德沃金的分析，采用的都是传统的社会契约论的框架，而从政治制度的建构上讲，美国的民主政治倒也恰恰深植于传统契约论的土壤中。而构成罗尔斯正义论基点的“原初状态”的理论虚构与构成德沃金的资源平等理论基点的“荒岛”理论，更有异曲同工之妙，虽然在某些方面，这两个理论构想是根本不同的。
正如罗尔斯认为正义是社会制度的首要价值一样，德沃金在一开篇也开宗明义：“平等是政治社会至上的美德——没有这种美德的政府，只能是专制的政府”。不过需要指出，这种“平等的关切”不是指福利平等，而是资源平等。换言之，在分配的平等中，没有伤害到公平的自由始终是一个高于平等的价值，而且它需要考虑到与公平有关的人的贡献和创造。而福利平等因至少更多地要考虑人的主观感受，从而在真正需要与虚假需要之间无法划出一条明确的界限。而且它有可能在面临实际的困难时滑入结果平等，这就不仅侵犯了自由，而且伤害了公平：“用勤快人的成果去奖励那些能够工作却选择了游手好闲的人”，这样的世界是相当荒唐的。资源平等可以克服这一状况。资源平等主义者“相信平等关切所要 2
求的政策目标是，要使经济结构分配给每个公民的资源尽可能是平等的份额，其衡量标准是每个人所拥有的资源的价值确定为此人拥有它们给别人造成的成本。”这就是德沃金津津乐道的“机会成本”，也就是说，如果每个人所拥有的资源份额给他人造成的机会成本，以及他人所拥有的资源份额所给自己造成的机会成本相等，那么，我们的确可以说，在此时候，即使人们拥有的资源各各不同，但分别与人的兴趣、特长等等对应，如果能够不让一个人嫉妒别人拥有的一份，人们就应该被认为获得了平等的关切。然后人们可以在此基础上追求自己的“成功”，虽然在结果出现伤害到了公平的不平等后，仍然要继续进行资源平等的分配。
“荒岛”理论恰恰是为了证明他的资源平等理论。如果说罗尔斯证明了在“原初状态”下人们会选择他的正义原则，那么，德沃金也认为：在“荒岛”上，选择资源平等分配是最为可取的。这样的一个“荒岛”德沃金“杜撰”如下：假设一条遇难的船只中的幸存者被海水冲到了一个荒岛上。岛上资源丰富，没有人烟，任何救援只能发生在多年之后。这些移民接受了一条原则：对于这里的任何资源，谁都不拥有优先权（其实我也可以补充：独占和多占权），而是只能在他们中间进行平等的分配。他们也接受（至少暂时如此）对资源平等分配的检验标准，即“嫉妒检验”（envy test）：一旦分配完成，如果有任何居民宁愿选择别人分得的那份资源而不要自己那份，则资源分配就是不平等的。
那么，岛上的“丰富资源”如何平等地分配？这些资源可能有奶牛、耕地、鸡蛋、森林、葡萄酒，等等。每一份资源本身都有好有坏，有优有劣，更重要的是它们既无法量化，更无法根据人头数平等地分成n等份。在这个时候，分配是不可能让人们满意的，即总是由于缺少平等分配的可操作的手段而导致分配的不平等。很显然，这种状态有点像原始状态，没有一个媒介――比如钱――来衡量各种资源的价值，最终通过这个媒介，使分配趋于平等。由此，德沃金引入了经济市场这个分析手段，或者说，“荒岛”理论就建立在契约论和经济市场的基础上，它们共同作为荒岛理论的背景支持它的论证。现在，“为了解决这个问题，分配者需要某种形式的拍卖或其他市场程序„„假设岛上有无数贝壳，谁也不认为它们有价值，分配者把它们平分给每个移民，用来充当接下来就会出现的市场中的钱币。”这些可以衡量物品的价值而本身却没有价值的“钱币”有了，显然，所有的资源就可以按钱币来衡量，一个可以拍卖的市场程序也就可以启动了。德沃金假定：岛上每一件单独的物品，都被列出要出售的一份，除非有人通知拍卖者（此时分配者变为拍卖者了）他打算买一件物品的一部分（而在此时这一部分同样变 3
成了单独的一份）。接下来拍卖者为每份物品定价，看这种价格能否清场，也就是说，在那个价位上是否只有一人购买，而且每一份都能卖出去，不然拍卖者就调整价格直到清场。最后，嫉妒检验得以通过，人人都表示自己满意，物品各得其主。
现在，我们可以认为，通过经济市场中的每个人一开始便拥有相同钱币在市场里购买不同的资源的拍卖程序，每个人所拥有的资源所给他人造成的机会成本，与他人所拥有的资源所给自己造成的机会成本，都是相同的。因此，这种分配便是资源平等的分配。分配似乎已经结束了，每个人都可以利用他所掌握的资源，自由地去追求他的“成功”了。而且，许多看起来好像与福利平等关系密切的因素，比如运气问题，如果他的嗜好相当古怪，而在拍卖的物品中又没有他想要的东西呢？再比如许多人都有同一嗜好，而这些物品却不够呢？等等，都被排除了。
但是，这种平等的起点是相当短暂的。每个人拥有不同的资源（虽然是通过了嫉妒检验的平等的资源分配），这些资源可以创造出不同的价值，那么，每个人所给别人造成的机会成本，就不一样了。而且每个人都不是一个模子里造出来的，他们有不同的爱好，不同的技能，这些因素都有可能让他们从同一起点出发，最终通往不同的道路。一句话，拍卖完成后人们就受到了各种偶然或必然的因素的支配，如果他们卷入生产和交易，那么，嫉妒检验可以预想只要差距一拉开就会失效，其结果就会出现可以让资源平等分配毁于一旦的社会不平等。而在此基础上再次进行的不是人为而是自动由市场调节的资源再分配，只能更加加重不平等。在这个时候，还存在一个“残疾人”和“运气”的问题：选择了某一种资源或生活，就意味着要承担一定的风险，而个人的先天“残疾”就限制了他的资源的意义，那么，如何使倒霉者和“残疾人”不受这种后天和先天的“运气”的影响呢？德沃金想到了“保险”，即，将“无情的运气”与“选择的运气”结合起来，从而使选择本身变成了一场赌博，如果处境不妙，那么保险就会给予补偿，从而，一个人的处境，仍然没有脱离资源平等的路径。这样，即使出现一些不平等，在德沃金看来，也没有理由反对：每一个人都必须为他的生活选择承担成本，一个不“赌博”的人，也是对任何获益机会的放弃，这种放弃导致的少得是没有理由要别人用“赌博”的风险所获进行补偿的。
但是，出现普遍的社会不平等，显然首先就意味着各种社会制度和社会安排没能建立起一个公平的秩序，因为一个人所拥有的资源，必然要影响到这些社会制度和社会安排，从而使它们对自己有利。其次，按德沃金的说法，这个时候政府没 4
有能做到对其统治下的公民平等地关切，而一个这样的政府只能是专制的政府。没有德性的政府和专制的政府都没有其赖以存在的合理性的支持依据。因此，面对普遍的社会不平等，必然要重新进行分配，而且这种分配在德沃金看来，目标仍然是资源平等。这个时候，“荒岛”理论已经可以从虚构的抽象中，走到具体的理论论述中来了。上面讲过，一个选择了某种冒险而没有所获的生活的人，是没有理由要求一个承担了冒险的风险，却有收获的人进行补偿的。也就是说，在重新进行的社会分配中，每一个人所给他人造成的机会成本不再能够像虚构的“荒岛”理论中那样单一，它必须被分解为两部分：自己所付出的成本和所给他人造成的机会成本。那么，人们显然就没有理由认为，某个人通过自己付出的成本所获得的收益，也应该拿来重新进行分配。但除此之外，一个人所创造的价值，却不仅仅是由“他”创造的，排除他占用的从理论上讲应该是公共的资源不谈，他的“成功”虽然荣誉属于他本人，但许多成本却是由社会支付的。用罗尔斯的话来说，是“社会合作”的结果：他的所得不仅包括了自己的劳动，更包括了他人的贡献。
作个假设：有一个人做生意狂赚了一百万；而有一个人穷困潦倒。那么，无论是罗尔斯的差别原则，还是德沃金的资源平等，都要求这个赚了一百万的主吐出一部分分给这个穷人，否则，这个社会制度便是不义的，而不能给予百万富翁与潦倒之人以平等关切的政府，也是一个专制的政府。这个时候，诺齐克可能会站起来表示反对，他肯定会争辩，政府这么做侵犯到了这个百万富翁的自由。罗尔斯也会针锋相对：这个富翁创造的一百万，并不仅仅是他依靠自己挣来的，他还依靠了社会合作。人是社会性动物，必须依赖于群体而生存。因此组成了社会。而在组成这个社会时，每一个人都是有份的，他参加了社会的创造。而每个人在组成社会时对他们所创造的这个共同的“价值资源”所作出的贡献，便是“基本贡献”。这个基本贡献是相等的，因为每个人是作为一个人而不是作为一个具有其他身份和属性的人在参加社会的创造，比如婴儿一出生就参加了社会的创造。离开了由每个人所组成的社会，这个百万富翁不要说什么能利用大家创造的“社会”这个“价值资源”狂赚一百万，连生存都不可能。因此，罗尔斯的驳斥，应该说是相当有力的。
但诺齐克的反驳也够让人受的。他会问：狂赚了一百万的主当然是利用了与这个穷困潦倒的人的社会合作，但后者难道不也与前者进行了社会合作？那么，有什么理由要求前者补偿后者，而后者就不对前者进行补偿呢？在这里，我们完全可以这样为罗尔斯辩护：每一个人当然都依赖于与他人的社会合作，不过，谁更多