耶鲁大学开放课程金融市场课表
《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)课程目录及下载地址(不断更新中)
《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)简介★小羊羊村长★大学开发课程粉丝Q群：122798308课程类型：金融课程简介：金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。
它们为投资活动提供支持及风险管理。
如果我们想要预测金融机构动态及他们在这个信息时代中的发展态势，我们必须对其业务有所了解。
本课程将涉及的内容有：金融学理论、金融业的发展历程、金融机构（例如银行、保险公司、证券公司、期货公司及其他衍生市场）的优势与缺陷以及这些机构的未来发展前景。
课程结构：本课程每讲75分钟，一周两次，在2008年春季录制并收入耶鲁大学公开课程系列。
关于教授罗伯特希勒Robert J. Shiller是Yale大学Arthur M. Okun经济学讲座教授和Yale大学管理学院国际金融中心研究员. Shiller教授的研究领域包括行为金融学和房地产，并在“金融经济学杂志”,“美国经济评论”,“金融学杂志”,“华尔街杂志”和“金融时报”等著名刊物发表文章. 主要著作包括“市场波动”,“宏观市场”(凭借此书他获得了TIAA-CREF的保罗 A. 萨缪尔森奖),“非理性繁荣和金融新秩序：二十一世纪的风险”Robert J. Shiller is Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University and a Fellow at the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management. Specializing in behavioral finance and real estate, Professor Shiller has published in Journal of Financial Economics, American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times. His books include Market V olatility, Macro Markets (for which he won the TIAA-CREF's Paul A. Samuelson Award), Irrational Exuberance and The New Financial Order: Risk in the Twenty-First Century.目录:1.Finance and Insurance as Powerful Forces in Our Economy and Society金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用2. The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and the Hedging of Risks风险管理中的普遍原理:风险聚集和对冲3. Technology and Invention in Finance金融中的科技与发明4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model)投资组合多元化和辅助性的金融机构(资本资产定价模型)5. Insurance: The Archetypal Risk Management Institution保险:典型的风险管理制度6. Efficient Markets vs. Excess V olatility有效市场与过度波动之争7. Behavioral Finance: The Role of Psychology行为金融学:心理的作用8. Human Foibles, Fraud, Manipulation, and Regulation 人性弱点,欺诈,操纵与管制9. Guest Lecture by David Swensen大卫•斯文森的客座演讲10. Debt Markets: Term Structure债券市场:期限结构11. Stocks股票12. Real Estate Finance and Its Vulnerability to Crisis 房地产金融和其易受危机影响的脆弱性13. Banking: Successes and Failures银行业:成功和失败14. Guest Lecture by Andrew Redleaf安德鲁•雷德利夫的客座演讲15. Guest Lecture by Carl Icahn卡尔•伊坎的客座演讲16. The Evolution and Perfection of Monetary Policy货币政策的进化和完善17. Investment Banking and Secondary Markets投资银行和二级市场18. Professional Money Managers and Their Influence金融市场翻译团队介绍友情奉献世界顶级大学开放课程的博客/。
耶鲁金融市场第11课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记11耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第11课] 股票（时长1小时15分）（上课伊始，希勒先介绍了下次讲座嘉宾史蒂芬.施瓦茨曼的基本情况）史蒂芬.施瓦茨曼（Stephen Schwarzman）是耶鲁大学的毕业生，也是本世纪的伟大传奇之一。
史蒂芬于1985年白手起家，创建了最大的私募股权公司，后来公司上市，获得了巨大的市值，足以与纽约最大的历史悠久的诸多投资银行相比。
史蒂芬和彼得.彼得森（Peter Peterson）创建了这家公司。
所以，听他的讲座会是非常有趣的。
而且，你们会有机会向他提问，问问他所做的事情（笑）。
我在阅读材料上放了一篇《纽约客The New Yorker》上刚发表的文章，大概是几周前发表的，列入到教学大纲里了。
我觉得，在史蒂芬来之前，我应该把这篇文章撤下了（笑），我之所以要这样做（笑），是因为他对这篇文章可能不会喜欢。
这是一篇很尖刻的批评性文章。
史蒂芬必定是一位强硬的商人，才能达到他现在的位置。
《纽约客》的这篇文章谈到，史蒂芬在纽约有一套公寓，其价格创下新高（笑），还讲了诸如此类的一些事。
昨天我在伦敦，那里的人们也喜欢八卦这样的事情，豪华轿车司机送我去机场时，他指着车外的伦敦景点，他说，你认识那栋大楼吗？有一个阿拉伯酋长花了一亿英镑，买了那栋楼的顶层公寓，这个酋长还为自己订了一架空客，就是那种大型客机（空中巴士），作为私人飞机，还镀上金子（笑）。
你们有谁听过这个故事（笑）？是真的吗？那个司机就在昨天告诉我的，（笑）他说，他得花5亿英镑左右才能做到这样。
当然，这都是八卦闲话了，而实质是，这个人为世界做了什么贡献？所以，我在这里收集了一些慈善机构名录，史蒂芬.施瓦茨曼是这些机构的一位主要的慈善家。
史蒂芬在黑石集团（the Blackstone Group）下建立了“黑石基金会The Blackstone Foundation”，他也是许多慈善组织的主要资助者或合作人，例如弗里克藏馆（The Frick1Collection）、惠特尼博物馆（The Whtiney Museum）、凤凰楼戒毒所（Phoenix House）、红十字会（The Red Cross）、贫民区奖学金基金（The Inner City Scholarship Fund—ICSF）、纽约城市拓展基金（New York City Outward Bound）、（美国）亚洲协会（The Asia Society）。
耶鲁金融市场第15课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记15耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第15课] 卡尔·伊坎的客座演讲（时长42分钟）讲座开始之前，希勒教授先作介绍：我非常荣幸地介绍卡尔.伊坎（Carl Icahn）作为我们今天的演讲嘉宾，伊坎先生的职业生涯，确实与我们这门课程讨论过的一些题目相关。
有一个讨论过的题目是企业大众化（corporate democracy），曾提到过贝乐（Berle）和闵思（Means）写的一本书，书中说，股东过于分散，的确就不能控制这个公司，而董事会是自身存续下去的。
在卡尔.伊坎的职业生涯中，他是美国商业社会趋势的对立面。
卡尔.伊坎毕业于普林斯顿大学（Princeton University），1957年转读（纽约大学）医科预科班。
在1968年，卡尔.伊坎创立了伊坎公司（Icahn and Company），这家公司已经取得了许多大规模企业大股东的地位，这些大企业包括：雷诺兹-纳贝斯克公司（RJR Nabisco 一家烟草公司）、环球航空公司（TWA）、德士古公司（Texaco 著名的跨国石油公司之一）、菲利普石油公司（Philips Petroleum）、时代华纳公司（Time Warner）、摩托罗拉公司（Motorola）等等。
每当伊坎公司取得某个公司的一个位置，就会积极地投入到这个公司的管理，改变这家公司经营业务的方式，他们的努力获得了巨大的成就。
所以，卡尔，我非常高兴今天你能光临来讲座，（大屏幕出现卡尔.伊坎带着耳机的视频，他回答：很高兴见到你，鲍比）。
希勒对着伊坎的视频说：如果你可以给我们的学生讲一些提示，那就太好啦。
学生中的许多人正准备开始他们的职业生涯，你给讲讲，你是怎样开始做这些事的？讲讲你的人生观，并给予一些建议。
卡尔.伊坎（视频）：你们问到我的职业生涯，那要追溯到二十世纪六十年代，那时我去到华尔街，当时我想，我去过普林斯顿，那确实是一所好学校，我是从一所非常严格的高中去的，是第一个从我们高中学校去的普林斯顿大学，没有人相信我能做到，因为从来没有人考上过任何一所常春藤学校（Ivy League），常春藤学校也从来没有录取过我们高中学校的任何人，但不管怎么说，我被录取了。
耶鲁金融市场第8课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记8耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第8课] 人性弱点，欺诈，操纵与管制（时长1小时12分）希勒上来先预告下次课的内容。
下次课是请大卫.斯文森（David Swensen）给大家做个讲座。
大卫.斯文森负责耶鲁大学捐赠基金的投资。
希勒在教学大纲中列出一篇《纽约时报New York Times 》的文章，是大卫.斯文森的传记，同时也列出了大卫.斯文森近期的书籍。
希望大家能够从大卫.斯文森身上学到更多的东西。
大卫.斯文森不是耶鲁的本科毕业生（在开课那次介绍时有误），而是耶鲁的经济学博士。
他的本科毕业于威廉康辛大学（University of Wisconsin ），但是他在耶鲁的时间很长。
大卫.斯文森于1985年从华尔街来到耶鲁，当时耶鲁捐赠基金总值大约为10亿美元，在他的管理下，目前基金总计达225亿美元。
这正是说明了学生们生活的许多质量来源于此（笑）。
因为这意味着，每位学生能摊到二百万美元。
二百万美元的获利是多少呢？大约一年为十万美元。
这就是为什么耶鲁在资金支持方面比其他学校慷慨得多；也是为什么有美丽的校园；学校的许多设施都受益。
在去年，耶鲁通过投资组合获得了28%的收益，在全美高校捐赠基金收益中排名第一。
而且，在过去的十年，耶鲁的年均收益为17.8%，在高校中也是排名第一。
耶鲁打败了哈佛、打败了普林斯顿（笑）。
但是，实际上，普林斯顿基金的头是大卫.斯文森的门徒（笑），这些人一定会聚在一起交谈。
所有的主要大学，像哈佛也做得非常好，还有杜克（Duke）、麻省理工、阿默斯特（Amhersta）等等，似乎各大学管理投资都非常好，至少在最近几十年是这样。
对此，希勒有个理论，他认为，这一定是与某种因素有关，比如大学里的学术氛围。
这就是说，投资非常需要仔细地研究，而在大学里的学术传统有助于推进研究。
耶鲁公开课笔记五
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记5耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第5课] 保险:典型的风险管理制度（时长1小时15分）本课内容是保险（Insurance），这是另一种风险管理工具。
习惯上，保险与上节课讲的证券业相互独立，但在基本原理上完全相同。
先请大家回顾一下证券业多元化的情况，再引入到保险问题。
为此，先简要回顾上节课的内容。
（在上节课）讲了（投资组合的）核心理论框架，即均值-方差理论；由此引申到资本资产定价模型，而基本的是要求大家运用这些框架。
首先，必须形成估算值，即各项资产的预期收益率r、各项资产收益的标准差、各项资产收益之间的协方差；其次，将估算值代入上节课讲的公式中，得出投资组合的标准差、预期收益率。
通过以上过程，如果大家认可了这些分析，认可所有的假设，认可由此所得的估算值，就能很好地知道如何构建投资组合。
这些估算值可能与你的信念或你的直觉不一致。
上节课还提到，在股票市场的预期收益率与短期债券预期收益率之间，似乎存在着一个巨大的差异，即发现了股票溢价，在西格尔书中给出，股票溢价为每年4%。
有些人们觉得难以置信，一项资产怎么能比另一项资产在一年多出4%呢？有些人会说，若果真如此，那我就只投资那一项资产了，我为何还要去做那些收益欠佳的事情呢？西格尔更进一步地说明，自从19世纪中期以来，没有哪一个30年的周期发生过股票收益低于债券的情况。
所以，股票确是如此。
如果任何一个人的投资周期为30年，那你会想，为什么要持有债券呢？由西格尔产生的数据似乎表明，股票市场（的收益）有如此难以置信之高，这就是股票溢价之谜。
“股票溢价之谜”是经济学家普雷斯科特（Prescott）和梅拉（Mehra）杜撰出来的术语，现在被普遍使用。
1这个术语只是表明，股票（收益）远超于其他各种投资（的收益）。
耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场11股票
下周五将由史蒂芬·施瓦茨曼代课，他答应要来，我时常担心这些人事务缠身，可能会因为某些突发的危机或别的事情，而改变自己的日程，我知道他一定会来，所以我希望你们周五也能来，老时间老地点，如果他来不了我会以电子邮件通知你们知道，史蒂芬·施瓦茨曼是耶鲁大学的毕业生，同时也是这个时代的一个传奇，他于1985年白手起家，创建了最大的私募股权公司，后来公司上市市值相当可观，足以和纽约历史最悠久的，投资银行相提并论,他和彼得·彼得森是创始人,所以能听听他的讲座是不错的,此外你们还能就他的职业生涯进行提问,在阅读材料上有篇最近《纽约客》上的文章,我想大概是几周前发表的,我将其列在大纲中,但在他来之前我得把这篇文章撤掉,我之所以想这么做,是因为他看到后可能会不高兴,这是篇很尖刻的批评性文章,足够强硬的人才能达到他的位置,《纽约客》那篇文章谈到他有一套公寓,位于纽约价格创了新高,还谈了其他类似的内容,我昨天在伦敦,发现人们也喜欢八卦这样的事情,司机正开着加长轿车送我去机场,他对着窗外指指点点,他说你认识那栋大楼吗,某位阿拉伯的酋长花了一亿英镑,买了那套公寓里的顶层套间,这个酋长还订了架空客,就是那种大型空客,作为私人飞机还镀上了金叶子,你们听过这个故事吗,有谁是真的吗,那个司机昨天是这么跟我说的,他说他得花五亿英镑,才能买到,这只是些闲话,而问题的实质是这个男人或女人为世界做了什么贡献,这里我列出了一些慈善机构,史蒂芬·施瓦茨曼是它们的主要投资者,他在黑石集团下建立了黑石基金会,他也是许多慈善组织的主要赞助者和合作人,如弗里克藏馆惠特尼博物馆,凤凰楼戒毒所红十字会,贫民区奖学金基金[ICSF],纽约市外展计划和美国亚洲协会,我认为这才是我们需要谈论的,而不是他的顶层套房有多大,我会尝试找些客观的资料,并发到网上,顺便说下,他和大卫·斯文森有些相似之处,首先他们都非常成功,他们都致力于另类投资,他们不固守成规,他们注重实证研究,总之我觉得他很有意思记得周五9点来,今天我想讲一些股票市场的内容,我想多讲些基础的内容,因为我认为基本概念很重要,我会重点谈论MM定理,但也不会过分深入,在复习阶段我可能会讲的更专业一些,我会以一种直观清楚的方式讲授,什么是股票,我认为股票这个概念,在历史上被反复提出过多次,"股份"是个基本词汇,假设你要和某人一起做一笔生意...,可以在任何一个时代...,例如古巴比伦或者其他时代...肯定发生过这种事,一群人想要做一笔生意,他们说我们把钱分了吧,这很清楚明白对吧,如果你们在一起工作就要分配收入,这就意味着我们要按份额分配,我不知道这能追溯到什么时候,但在古时候肯定有人说,好吧你比别人干得多,你对公司的贡献更大,我们会把收入的大头给你,这是很基础的概念早已屡见不鲜,而这就是股票市场的最初思想,只不过现在的规模更大,法律方面的约束也更严格,因此基本概念是,比如在生意中必须划分股份,而这一概念可以追溯到古罗马,我们假设公司是一个被人所有的人,比如奴隶他们隶属于奴隶主,在法律上 "法人"的意思并不如你所想,在法律上 "自然人"是指像你我这样的人,有血肉之躯的人被称作自然人,但"法人"这个词,更加广义也指代公司,"公司"这个词来自于拉丁文corpus,意思是身体所以法人是种化身,我们创造了一个实体就法律看来,就像一个独立的个体,它的所有权也许属于其他个体,但它有自己权利和义务,就像个自然人一样,在古罗马公司是publicani[拉丁文],publicani就像我们今天的公司一样,根据斯坦福大学乌尔丽克克·马尔门迪尔的研究,她认为在古罗马,证券交易就在街边或城市广场上促成她能告诉你在哪,如果你去罗马的话,可以去看看当时证券市场的遗迹,但直到现代证券市场才繁荣起来,最初的做法是一个法人实体即公司,发行股票然后发放或卖给人们,理念就是股票象征着贡献,你向某人发放股票,以肯定他对公司做出的贡献,当你建立一家公司时,人与公司之间,就会有千丝万缕的关系,其中一种是股东股东持有股票,股东有权分配利润,还有雇员雇员领取工资,这是完全不同的关系,他们之间的劳工合同规定了工资的多少,还有债务人等其他各种关系,最基础的关系就是股东与公司的关系,因为股东是公司的所有人,而如今这些关系得到了改进,公司有了许可证和规章制度,创建公司时你会起草一份协议,其中规定了公司的条款,就像公司的宪法一样,此外公司许可证的中所涉及的州法条文,也会对公司规章提出一些限制,还有些一般性条款,如一份股票代表一张选票,还比如年度会议,每年至少有一次股东会议,股东可以对相关议题进行投票,其中最重要的议题就是要选出董事会,州法规定,公司必须要有董事会,但还有一些规定,是你在制订公司制度时自由规定的,但你不能为所欲为,州法对董事会有一定要求,我会用最基础的词语来说明,常见的结构是一位股东一张选票,在年会上股东会聚集起来选出董事会来管理公司,董事会雇用首席执行官以及公司的其他高层,这些人就是董事会的雇员,之所以理论上说股东是掌控者,是因为他们选出董事会,董事会选出总裁这是个民主的过程,之后我还会继续谈谈这个问题,事情并不总是如你想得那般完美无缺,基本上有两种不同的公司,他们之间有着明显的差异,即盈利性公司和非盈利性组织,我所提及的一直是盈利性公司,也是最普遍的一类,非盈利组织也有董事会,但没有股东,许可证上也有根本性的区别,政府对其反应也有所不同,非盈利组织的建立是为了推行某种事业它不为任何人所有,你可以认为其股价为零,实际上你并不能确定它的股价多少,因为股数为零其市值也为零,所以每股价值就是,零除以零无法计算,耶鲁大学可以看作是个非盈利组织,它的股价无法定义,是零除以零,董事会管理它,但董事会不是由股东选出的,实际上在校友会活动中还是会投票的,但这不是个盈利性公司,我们来谈谈盈利性公司,理解这类公司的关键在于,要衡量一家公司股票的价值你必须清楚总共发行的股票数量,如果我有一千股该公司的股票,这意味着什么,这毫无意义,除非你知道总共发行的股票数量,如果你有十手股票但后来发现,总共发行的股票数量,就是一千股,你就可以说整个公司都是我的,公司是我的我有一千股,而公司总共也就发行了一千股,如果你有一千股,但是已发行的有一千万股呢,这意味着公司的一万分之一是属于你的,我算得对吗,这一点非常重要要牢记心中,人们通常不知道,他们所投资的公司到底发行了多少股票,这是因为他们非常信任分析员,分析员应该对这些东西了如指掌,当他们看到公司股价的时候,怎么知道买入的价格是合理的呢,他们必然会对公司的价值有一定衡量,用其除以股票数量,然后大致得出每股价值,这是十分必要的所有股票只有在和总体股本数量联系起来看时才有意义,公司有一种惯常做法叫做"股票分割",他们会将一张股票拆为两张,意味着如果你有一千股就会收到信件说,恭喜您您现在有两千股了,股票分割后也不要过分高兴,对每个股东都是如此,你现在有两千股,但是发行总股数也变成了两千万,所以比例并没有变,你可能会问他们为什么要这么做呢,其实只是为了维持一定的数量,实际上分割并没有很好的理由,不分割也无可厚非,它只是改变了量度的大小,一般来说在美国,分割旨在将每股价格,维持在20到40美元间,为什么这样做呢有一个很有趣的理论,也许是传统使然,也许是为了将价值维持在一个惯常的小区间内,他们不想让价格升得太高因为人们,小投资者无法承担过高价格,谁知道呢不同国家有着不同的理由,所以股票总数几乎是个,这种分割的趋势是文化使然,没有实际的意义,沃伦·巴菲特并没有对,他的伯克希尔哈撒韦做股票分割,但其他一些公司,谷歌也是不做分割的对吧,对吗还是不对,我不记得了但是他们还没做过,每股价格是多少你们知道吗,现在有些偏高,550美元一股的价格很高,因为大部分人会买...我们的习惯是,大部分人会一手一手的买股票,一手就是一百股,如果每股价格是550美元,那么一手就要花5万5千美元,我站着的时候就算不清乘法了,大部分公司会分割因为这样会关闭...,比如你想投资谷歌,但是你可以说,我想买十股或者五股,经纪人会照办,但是会索取更高的佣金,这就是这节课的内容,有一个词我把它写下来,金融学中非常重要的词叫"摊薄",如果公司通过股票分割来增加总股数,这不是摊薄因为没有发生实质性变化,当进行分割时每个人拥有的股数变了,但每个人持股的比率没变,只是做做样子罢了,摊薄是指公司非对称地改变股数,而不是一概而论,摊薄的典型例子是,董事会为公司雇用了一位首席执行官,他们想激励这位首席执行官,他们可以给他发工资或分给他股份,这是惯常的做法因为他们觉得这样,可以把首席执行官变为股东,像是另一形式的薪金,这种薪金可能有着不同的激励效果,所以给他一种组合激励工资加股份,如果他们仅仅给首席执行官股份,而不给你们增发股份的话,那么你们的股份会因总数增加而被摊薄,比例有所降低,如果一个公司售卖股份,发行新股...这随时都可以,开办一家新公司时你可能要...,当彼得·彼得森和史蒂芬·施瓦茨曼创立黑石集团的时候,他们每人拿到了500股,这是我编的,显然随着时间推移会有更多股东,人们为进入公司就可能去购买股票,如果公司通过公开销售股票来增发新股,这显然不是摊薄,当然这会降低你对公司的控股,但补偿是公司增大了股本,因为人们购买股份不会摊薄你的那份,你也可以说这是一种摊薄,但总体上你的投资价值并没有因此减少,它的产生基于诸多要素,摊薄特指的是股票数量受到影响不利于已持股的股东,还有一个常用词是"股票股利",首先我来讲下股利,股票市场...我想讲下股票股利,但最好还是先解释下什么是股利,在盈利性公司中,人们投资公司是为了获得收益,那么他们怎么获得收益呢,公司董事会会决定何时向股东支付股利,州法规定,股东利益均等,他们赚了些钱想取出来花了,每个股东都应得到同等的待遇,这就是发放股利,他们可以偶尔为之,也可以在任何时间发放,或者定期发放一般是一季一发,当我开公司时卡魏施有限公司,并没发放股利这是年轻公司的通常做法,我们几乎将所有股票都发给了员工,作为他们的薪酬,希望能这样激励他们让他们感到自己是公司的一份子但是我们从不发放股利,有一次我跟首席执行官谈起这事他说,也许我们应该至少付一次股利,员工们都快忘了他们有股份这事儿了,所以我们分了一次红,我不知道这引起了多大的兴奋,但这是分了两美元股利后,是不是每股价格就会下降两美元,在刚分红之后,股票股价会下跌,是吗,他问的是如果一个公司分了红,就会降低...你问的是,股价会不会下跌,会下跌,一点没错,如果这家公司有了开支,那公司的价值就会随支出配比的数量而下降,但是总股数没有改变,这就意味着每股价格会降低,降低值为总开支除以总股数,有一个专门的术语叫做"除息",以前可以查查...现在也能查到,有些还在纽约证交所的网页上,股票除息的那一天,股价前面会有个小小的"x"标记,为了避免人们大惊小怪,很多人每天都会查看自己所持股股价,有些人因此神经过敏,突然间股价降低了2美元,他们会说天啊怎么办啊,他们会给经纪人打电话询问是怎么回事,经纪人会解释说你没看见x标记吗,它刚刚除息不用大惊小怪,除息日不是股东收到股利的日子,虽然它叫做除息日,而是公司决定的一个是否有分红权的日期,在此之后买入的股东,就不能拿到分红了,这很重要公司就是这么做的,股价通常会在除息日下跌,你提出了一个很有趣的问题,投资者应该注意除息日吗,答案一般来说是不用如果你买了股票,是在除息之前买的,你的买入价高但能分到红,如果你第二天再买,买入价低但没有分红,除非这里涉及到税负可能会影响...,税款常常把问题变得复杂但不考虑税的话,什么时候买是没区别的,事实上有个规定,给证券商颁发牌照的FINRA[美国金融业监管局],规定从业人员说股利不能做卖点来推销,这里提到了一个不好的现象,某些证券商的无良手段,他们告诉买家迅速买入这支股票,因为它马上要除息了,今天就买再等的话就拿不到分红了,这是误导,什么时候买股票都没区别,所以作为券商不应以股利为卖点,但这不意味着股利不重要,说到底持股也是为了拿分红,回到这里人们习惯于通过挂号信取得股利支票,如果你有股票...,我们现在不通过挂号信了,因为人们都通过经纪人账户,在网站上购买股票,你过去习惯于通过挂号信取得支票,现在你登陆网站,就能看到股利自动分发到你的账户,公司支付了股利帐户中的金额就会增加,现在继续探讨股票股利的问题,有时公司会宣布他们不发放现金股利,取而代之的是股票股利,他们会说我们很高兴的宣布本次股利,今日将以新股的形式发放,价值为现存股本的5%,所以是5%的股利恭喜,这是件好事吗,你该做何反应呢,如果收到公司派发股票股利的通知,你们怎么想,你根本不应该感到高兴,因为这没有什么意义,如果他们只给你一人发放股票,这就是件好事,但股票股利的要义就在于,他们给每个股东相同的份额,所以每一百股都变成了一百零五股,这对我来说毫无意义,比例才是最根本的要素,我有的股数除以总发行股数,如果大家都上升了相同幅度,分子和分母同比例增大,则没有变化,你可能要问,那公司发放股票股利到底是为了什么呢,意义何在,就是为了愚弄股东吗,关于这一点人们有不同看法,其中一个答案就是的确他们想糊弄你,如果没钱付股利,那就发股票股利,此外人们可能要说这会起反作用,如果发股票股利只是为了愚弄我们的话,接下来会发生什么呢,当天的股价会下跌,当你发放股票股利时,就会意识到股票总数增加了,每个人的股数除以增加后的总股数,每人拥有的公司价值减少,发行股票股利无法达成目的,所以更有说服力的观点是公司发放股票股利的唯一原因是,他们有利好消息要公布了,一般来说他们会写封信说,恭喜有好消息了业绩有所突破,为表示庆祝我们将给每人增发5%的股票股利,他们希望股价不会下跌,因为他们是带着利好宣布的,换言之发行股票股利只是想引人注目,顺便提一下在一家盈利性公司中,我们需要这样理解,这是个在法律中明文昭示的概念,在一家盈利性公司中,公司的目的是为股东谋求利益,但在某些国家及法律体系中,法律对此的规定并不明确,他们会说还有其他的股东,但在最纯粹的体系中,即美国现行体系,公司是为股东而存在的,还有其他和公司签订了合同的人,像员工但员工不是股东,他们拿工资或其他东西,公司最重要的任务就是要实现承诺,它必须要兑现自己的承诺,公司就是为股东而服务的,这是资本主义的观点,可能听起来不太对劲,你可能问公司为何要为股东存在呢,因为这是一个良好的商业模式,人们需要钱于是通过投资赚钱,明确的说这就是公司的任务,它必须对每个人都不偏不倚,必须实现合同所述条款,但是公司一般不给慈善机构捐款,也不向政治团体投资,理想的情况就是不掺和这些事,它应该努力为股东挣钱,假设将来大家会进入董事会,有一点我希望大家记住,因为你们中很多人将会进入董事会,如果你签订协议进入董事会,你就承担起一份庄严的责任它就是平等对待所有股东努力为他们赚钱,所以你不能做任何不诚实或者不符合合同要求的事,你的服务人群只有一个就是股东,一旦你进入了董事会你就成为了受托人,你的存在就是为了维护股东的利益,就是这样,这是盈利性公司,这是种滋生于资本主义国家的理论,也是个很好的模式,还有非盈利组织但是我们...,但是经济目标的实现只能通过,盈利性公司完成,让我们解释清楚一些,董事会就是公司的管理层,他们可以将自己的私人财产捐献给慈善机构,但是他们本身的责任就是一心赚钱,这无可厚非,这是法律规定的概念,之所以在法律中有这样的规定,是因为这是繁荣的温床,才能生产出我们需要的东西,像衣服医疗服务家用等等,这也是人们这么做的原因,不用因为为股东谋求利益而感到羞耻,最终,股票投资是为了取得股利,这也是公司明确的目标,我可能遗漏了其他的方式,刚才所述有些狭义,传统上购买股票就是为了股利,我会谨慎地求证这一点,首先很多人不明确这一基本点,买股票就是为了股利,很多人想我要买股票,但为什么要买股票呢,购买股票是因为他们认为股价会上升,从而可以赚很多钱,他们可以在有利的时候卖出,这就是大多人的想法对吧,我买股票是为了股利吗,有些人甚至都不知道股利是什么,他们仅仅把股票想象为一种会升值的玩意,可如果升值是一种必然趋势,期待升值还有什么意义呢,如果投进去的钱根本拿不出来,人们为什么还要买股票呢,最终还是回到了股利,股利即便很多人忘记了它的存在,没有认识到它的重要性,但它们才是驱动力所在,来看看一个图表你们应该已经看过,如果你们看了我上传的电子表格,这是美国的股票市场,这是标准普尔综合指数,在1957年他们将其重建,并命名为标准普尔500指数,但这里用到的是1871年发布的理论,所以不能称之为500,我称之为综合指数,这是美国公司的股票投资组合的价格,有点像经过分割调整的股票平均价格,因为你不想当一股分割成两股,价格下跌一半这是没意义的,所以要修正分割,标准普尔对分割及股价进行了修正,不幸的是与1871年的那些公司同类的公司已经不存在了,这些公司几乎都不存在了,他们的工作是为一个投资组合定价,不停的用新股票进行替代,有一个指数委员会在新公司发展壮大的时候,一直持续替换新股,他们希望在美国用500指数来反映世界上大部分的公司,你可以看到这些价格带来了怎样的变化,这里还有"每股收益",,每股收益是什么,收益是会计们算出来的,从1871年来一直如此,他们值得尊敬,年收益指的是公司这一年赚到的钱,每股价格是指收入所有权的价格,如果我和其他股东一样买了一份股票,那么我就对收益有要求权,但收益是逐年计算的,它显示了公司某一年的业绩如何,你可以看到,股票市场波动性大于其收益,每股价格往往是每股收益的几倍之多,市盈率一般来说是为15,这意味着人们需要预先支付15年的收益,收益和股利是不同的,收益是公司在某年赚到的钱,他们怎么知道赚了多少呢,会计们会计算这个复杂的问题,他们还会发现公司收益很难定义,但是他们会想办法得出一个数字,公司管理层们可能会对会计结果表示惊讶,不管他们赚的是多是少,股利则更加具体,这是他们实际发放的,实际发放给股东的现金,收益则是一种由会计得出的理论概念,会因不同的调整而上下波动,他们决定说,有几笔投资赔了钱,我们得减掉这些,管理人员会说,今年我们没有赔钱是什么意思,会计明明显示赔了这就是收益,股利则更具体公司发多少是多少,这是美国股票市场的市盈率,从1881年至今,这份数据也在网站上的电子数据表上,你可以看出我提到的15这个数字,收益的15倍是最有代表性的,但我们现在正处于一个高市盈率的时期,根据收益前景或者其他因素,这个数字可能会上升或下降,红色的线是长期利率,这节课不会谈论,收益是对公司价值的衡量,一般是以15乘以收益的形式体现的,当市盈率上升,如1929年人们焦躁不安,他们想天啊市盈率变成35了,这是价格除十年的收益,不是一年的,我是这样做的,在二十年代市盈率高得离奇,表现了当时人们对股票市场的乐观,当其得到修正并突然下跌时,大萧条便开始了,2000年时我们的市盈率甚至更高,达到了46 后来经过修正降低了,这个价格反映出当你购买一份股票并永久持有时,你此后会一直收到从收益中分出来的股利,你可以把它给你的孩子,也许200年后会变得非常值钱,也可能不值钱但还是可能值钱的,也许50年后公司不再存在了但它可能会被别的公司收购股票就还有价值并仍可能升值,这就是市盈率,你们都知道收益是个理论概念,但股利是我们分发出去的钱,那么公司如何决定股利的多少呢,这也是由董事会决定的,他们可以建立一个委员会来负责此事,但最终发放股利是个重大的决定,一般说来新公司不发放股利,如果开办一家公司的话,短期内你不会想发放股利,因为你需要将收益用来投资,人们会理解这一点,他们也不想立即收回投资,当公司进入成熟期他们就会觉得到了发股利的时间了,标准普尔500指数包括500家大公司,这些一般都是成熟期的公司,他们一般都处于需要支付股利的阶段,接下来的问题是股利发放率,股利发放率等于股利除以收益,公式为div/e 这里有美国的股利发放率,这是1871的股利发放率,这里几处激增例如,这是哪年 1921 那年,1932或者1933 公司付出了,收益的160倍作为股利,你可能会问发生了什么,当时正处于大萧条时期,大萧条将这些公司逼上了绝路,他们赚不到钱,但是又不想降低股利因为他们担心,一旦降低股利人们就会不安,也许他们有所缩减只是额度很小,这意味着他们支出比收入还多,这就是激增背后的故事危机发生了,目前也有降低的趋势,过去他们将收益的80%作为股利,但现在正慢慢减少目前降到了40%,这与文化相关,现在公司试图积累资金,这跟当下人们不再那么,关注股利有关,这意味着公司可以更多地将收益再投资而不是支付股利,这是1871年的股利价格比,回溯19世纪,股利价格比一般为5%,当时更加明确,在一个投资性文化中,我们更偏向于行动派,人们为了得到分红而购买股票的意图愈加明显,那时的股票有些不同,更多是铁路或者钢铁公司,人们也只知其皮毛,如果某人向你推荐一支股票,你会问股利如何,如果他说是4% 你会觉得少,我想要更高的股利,现在人们对股利不是那么在意了,换句话说他们更放心,把钱交给董事们管,让他们来决定什么时候或发不发股利,另一件方面是除了股利,还有其他收回投资的方法,比如股票回购,还有股票清偿,我们来说说清偿或者公司的销售,我来讲讲这个,公司不愿意支付股利,他们吸进资金并不断积累,然后某人会买下整个公司,在终止日期前所有股东的股票都将被买下,但当公司的全部股份被买下时,他们。
econ-252-11_05耶鲁大学公开课金融市场
PRINTECON-252-11: FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011)Lecture 5 - Insurance, the Archetypal Risk Management Institution: Its Opportunities and Vulnerabilities [January 31, 2011]Chapter 1. Introduction [00:00:00]Professor Robert Shiller:OK, good morning. I've been running to get over here. I just got back from The World Economic Forum. We talked to a lot of the world's financial leaders. And I was thinking what I would tell you about it, but then I realized, it's all off the record, so I'm not supposed to say anything to you.I was going to talk instead today about insurance, which is one of the major risk management institutions that is not always considered part of finance, because people think of finance and insurance as separate.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller:We talked about basic principles of risk management in the preceding lecture. It's all the same for finance and insurance. And yet, we tend to consider them as separate businesses. That's partly, I think, an accident of history, and it's partly a product of regulation because of certain ideas--that we'll come to in a few minutes--that has kept the insurance industry separate from other financial industries. Last period, we talked about the mean-variance risk management problem, and about the Capital Asset Pricing Model. That's fundamental to insurance as well. The basic idea is pooling of risks and preventing people from being subjected to extreme risks through the concept of risk pooling.So, what I wanted to start today is talking about insurance, starting with the concept of insurance. And then, I wanted to reiterate a theme of this course, that financial institutions are inventions, they're structures that someone had to design and make work right. Sometimes they don't work right. Then, I wanted to move to a particular example of insurance, which was until recently the biggest insurance company in the world, called the American International Group, or AIG. And it's particularly important that we talk about this example, because on March 2 we have the former CEO of AIG, Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, coming to our class. So, I thought it's appropriate that we use AIG--well not only because it was the biggest insurance company in the world, but also because he's coming here.And then, I want to talk about regulation of insurance, that the insurance industry has always been subject to government regulation. I'll talk about types of insurance. Your chapter in Fabozzi et al. is mostly about types of insurance, so I think you can mostly get that from the textbook, but I wanted to say some things about it. And then, I was going to conclude with thoughts about insurance, and how important it is to our lives, and what progress it still has to make.Chapter 2. Concepts and Principles of Insurance [00:03:53]So, insurance, it doesn't sound like a very exciting topic, does it? I'm going to try to make it more exciting. I guess you think of the insurance salesman coming, knocking on your door. They don't do that so much anymore, they used to go around door-to-door. And that was a depressing moment, when the life insurance salesman came. And if you invited this person into your house, he would tell you about the probability of dying, how tough it will be on your family, that sort of thing. But, to me, I think insurance is an exciting issue, because it's about making our lives work. And it's really about preventing horrible catastrophes from--and it involves mathematical theory that underlies the concept. To me, it's exciting, but I don't know if I canconvey that.The fundamental concept, again, is risk pooling. The idea of insurance goes back to ancient Rome, but only in very limited forms. But the idea of risk pooling is kind of an obvious one. People form organizations partly to risk-pool. So, in ancient Rome, a common form of insurance was death insurance that would pay funeral bills. People in the ancient world believed that you had to get a proper burial, or your soul would wander forever. So, insurance salespeople associated with guilds or business organizations would sell funeral insurance. But they didn't have a very clear idea of the risk pooling concept. It must have underlain their thinking.But it wasn't until much later that people began to understand the concept. There were examples of insurance throughout ancient and medieval times, but they're very blurred and sparse. I remember reading an insurance, supposedly, an insurance contract written in Renaissance Italy, translated into English, but it was hardly recognizable to me as an insurance contract. They didn't have the concepts down. It seemed to have a lot of religious language in it, which normally we don't think of as something that's part of an insurance contract. But it seems like insurance came in in the 1600s, at the same time that certain concepts of mathematics began to be developed. Notably, the concept of probability became more widely known in the 1600s. According to one historian, the oldest known description of the insurance concept goes back to a Count Oldenburg. Actually, it's an anonymous letter to Count Oldenburg, written in 1609.And the letter says, why don't we start--I'm paraphrasing at the moment--why don't we start a fund, in which people pay 1% of the value of their home every year into the fund, and then we will use the fund to replace the house if there's a fire? And now, quoting this anonymous writer, this writer said he had "no doubt that it would be fully proved, if a calculation were made of the number of houses consumed by fire within a certain space in the course of 30 years, that the loss would not amount, by a good deal, to the sum that would be collected in that time." OK? It was just intuitive. He said, there can't be that many fires. And if we collect that amount of money every year, we can pay for all the houses that are burned down. So, he didn't express any mathematical law, but it's the concept of insurance. You don't find that before that, before 1609. So, I guess we don't have any clear statement of insurance before then.Actually, you can find an approximate statement of the law of large numbers--and I'm thinking of Aristotle, the philosopher. This is in ancient times, and I'm quoting from De Caelo, his book. Aristotle: "To succeed in many things or many times is difficult. For instance, to repeat the same throw 10,000 times with the dice would be impossible, whereas to make it once or twice is comparatively easy." He doesn't have the language of probability, but he knows you can't throw the dice 1,000 times and come up with the same number every time.Now, we have a probability theory about it. So, we know that if you have n events, each occurring with the probability of p, then the average proportion out of the n events that occur--I'm sorry, we have n trials, an event occurring with probability p--then the standard deviation of this proportion of events that occur isAnd that's a theorem from probability theory. The standard deviation of the proportion of trials for which the event occurred, assuming independence, is given by this. And so, you note that it goes down with n. As n increases, it goes down with--I should say, the √n. So, that means that if n gets very large, if you write a lot of policies, then the probability of deviating from the mean by more than one or two standard deviations becomes very small, which is what Aristotle said.But making insurance work as an institution, to actually protect people against risk, is rather difficult to achieve. And that's because things have to be done right. So, let me just remind you, what are the basic types of insurance? This is what Fabozzi talks about. There's life insurance that insures people against earlydeath. Of course, you still die. What it really insures, is your family against the loss of a bread winner, the father or the mother. So, life insurance is suitably given to families, especially with young children, to protect the children. It used to be very important when there was a lot more early deaths. Now, very few young people lose their parents. So, life insurance has receded in importance.Another example is health insurance. This is insurance, of course, that you get sick and you need medical care. Then, there's property and casualty insurance, insuring your house or your car. And then, there's other kinds of [what] you might call investment-oriented products, like annuities. This is a table in your textbook by Fabozzi, which lists these categories of insurance. But any of these insurance types are inventions, and I want to specify that. We have the idea that an insurance company could be set up that would, say, insure houses against fires. And we just heard it, intuitively, in this letter to Oldenburg long ago. But to make it work, and to make it work reliably, involves a lot of detail. You can think of the idea of making an airplane, but to make it really work, and to make it work safely, is another matter.So first of all, insurance needs a contract design that specifies risks, and excludes risks that are inappropriate. An issue that insurance companies reach is moral hazard.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller: Moral hazard is an expression that appeared in the 19th century to refer to the effects of insurance on people's behavior that are undesirable. So, the classic example is, you take out fire insurance on your house, and then you burn it down deliberately in order to collect on the house. Or another example is, you take out life insurance, and then you kill yourself to support your family. These are undesirable outcomes, and they could be fatal to the whole concept of insurance, because if you don't control moral hazard, obviously the whole thing is not going to work. So, what they do in an insurance contract is they exclude risks that are particularly vulnerable to moral hazard. And so, that means you would exclude certain causes of death that might look like suicide. You can do other things to control moral hazard than excluding certain causes.You can also make sure that you don't insure the house for more than it's worth. Right? If someone insures a house, and the insurance does not cover the full value of the house, then there's no incentive to burn it down. You might as well just sell the house, right? No point in burning it down if you'll still lose a little bit of money. So, that's one of the problems that insurance companies face. And part of the design of [the] insurance contract has to prevent moral hazard from becoming excessive.An analogous thing is selection bias. That occurs when--chalk keeps breaking--selection bias occurs when the people who sign up for your contract know that they are higher risk. For example, health. People who know they have a terminal disease and are about to die, they'll all come signing up for your life insurance contract. That will put immense costs on the insurance company, and if they don't control the selection bias, they will have to charge very high premiums. And that will force other people, who don't know they're going to die, out of buying insurance. And so, that's the fundamental problem. Again, something has to be done to define the policy. So, one thing you can do is, exclude, in life insurance, certain causes of death that are likely to be known. And you only put on causes of death that people wouldn't be able to predict about themselves.Another aspect of insurance is that you have to have very specific, precise definitions of the loss, and what constitutes proof of the insured loss. If you're not clear about that, there's going to be ambiguities later, which will involve legal wrangling and dissatisfaction. We'll see, in a minute, that these problems are not minor and they keep coming up. It's a constant challenge for the insurance industry. Third, we need a mathematical model of risk pooling. Well, I just wrote one down here, but it might be more complicated insome circumstances. This is assuming independence. If you don't assume independence, you can make more complicated models. Then, fourth, you need a collection of statistics on risks, and you need to evaluate the quality of those statistics. So for example, in the 1600s, people started collecting mortality tables for the first time. There was no data on ages at death. It began in the 1600s, because people were building an insurance industry and they needed to know those things.Then, you need a form for the company. What is the insurance company? Who owns it? It could be a corporate form. There are shareholders who are investing in the company. And they're taking the risk that some of our policy modeling, or handling of moral hazard, or selection bias wasn't right. Some insurance companies are mutual, rather than share. The insurance is run for the benefit of the policyholders, and they're like a nonprofit in the sense that the founders of the company pay themselves salaries, but the benefits go entirely to the policy holders.Then, you need a government design, so that the government verifies all of these things about the insurance company. The problem with insurance is that people will pay in for many, many years before they ever collect, right? Especially if you're buying life insurance, you hope never to collect. And so, you don't know whether it's going to work right. That's why you need government regulation, you need government insurance regulators. And that's part of the design of insurance. It doesn't work if you don't have the regulators, because you wouldn't trust the insurance company. So, these are problems that have inhibited making insurance work.Chapter 3. The Story behind AIG [00:19:14]I wanted to give you an example. I think it makes it more concrete if we start off with talking about a particular example. And I said I was going to talk about AIG, which is a very important example, not only because it was the biggest insurance company. It was also the biggest bailout in the entire financial crisis we've seen now. And it has an interesting story.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller: So AIG, it's an interesting story. It was founded in 1919 in Shanghai. And you wonder, why is it called American International Group if it's founded in Shanghai? It was founded in Shanghai, called American Asiatic Underwriters. And it was founded by Cornelius Vander Starr, who was an American who just decided to go to Asia and start an insurance business. Shanghai, in 1919, was a world city. It was not really under the Chinese government, it was something like Hong Kong. It had constituencies representing many different countries. And so, it was a very lively business center. It's kind of interesting that the biggest insurance company in the world emerged from Shanghai, and also one of the biggest banks in the world, HSBC. You know what HSBC means? They don't emphasize it anymore. It's Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation [correction: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation]. So, AIG was founded by Mr. Starr in 1919, and started doing an insurance business in China. And moved their headquarters to New York just before Chairman Mao took over at China. And then, it became kind of a Chinese investment company in the United States.Cornelius Vander Starr ran the company from 1919 until he died in 1968. So, he was CEO for 49 years, a half-century. And then, just before he died, he appointed Hank Greenberg, who will visit us, as the CEO in 1962. So, that was 49 years under Starr, and then Greenberg took on, and then ran the company until 2005. So, it was 37 years under Greenberg. So, two men ran the company for almost a century. Since 2005, Greenberg has been succeeded by three CEOs, the usual thing. The usual company turns over CEOs.There's another interesting story that we might ask about Hank Greenberg.He joined the U.S. Army and fought in World War II. And among his jobs, then, was to liberate Dachau, which was a concentration camp. This is not one of the extermination camps, it was a concentration camp for Jews and others under the Nazis. And people were starving and dying, it was awful. At a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, Greenberg met with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is the president of Iran. And Ahmadinejad said something about the Holocaust, doubting that it ever happened. Greenberg stood up indignantly and said, it happened. I saw it. I was there. It's kind of interesting to me to think about this.This is an aside, momentarily. The other person I've met who--do you know Geoffrey Hartman, who's a professor here at Yale in literature? He and his wife, both Jewish, were teenagers during World War II. And Hartman escaped by what they called Kindertransport. But his wife, Renee, was in another concentration camp. Not Dachau, it was in Bratislava. And she was starving to death. And it really happened, by the way. It's awful. And I asked her, why do you think they were starving you to death? And she said, we didn't know. We thought maybe they were keeping us as hostages, or something. So anyway, we could ask him about that.What did these people do? Both Starr and Greenberg created a wide variety of risk management products. It became the largest underwriter of commercial and industrial insurance in the world. It became a very large automobile insurer, and also a travel insurance company. But Greenberg was forced out of the company after 37 years, when Eliot Spitzer, who was the Attorney General for the state of New York, claimed that there were some irregularities. And Greenberg was forced to resign. It turns out, though, that nothing that Spitzer said has held up, so apparently Greenberg was innocent of any of the allegations. The real problem occurred with AIG after Greenberg left. So, Greenberg left in 2005, and then the company absolutely blew up, and it absolutely had to be bailed out.The reason they had to be bailed out was, it was almost entirely due to a failure of the independence assumption, I would say. That under their risk modeling, namely, the company became exposed to real estate risk. And the idea that their risk modelers had was that it doesn't matter that we take on risk that home prices might fall, because they can never fall everywhere. They can fall in one city, but it won't matter to us. That's just one city, and it all averages out. But what actually happened after Greenberg left was the company took huge exposures toward real estate risk and it fell everywhere. Home prices fell everywhere, just exactly what they thought couldn't happen.So, the company was writing credit default swaps--I told you about those before--they were taking the risk. They were insuring, basically, against defaults on companies whose credit depended on the real estate market. They were also investing directly in real estate security, in mortgage-backed securities that depended on the real estate market for their success. And when all this failed at once, the AIG was about to fail. That meant that the federal government decided, in 2008, to bail out AIG. And the total bailout bill, well, the total amount committed by the U.S. federal government was $182 billion. It didn't all actually get spent. It was $182 billion committed to bail out AIG. That's a lot of money, I think that's the biggest bailout anywhere, at any time.A lot of people are angry about this. Part of this bailout came from what we called TARP. This is the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which was created under the Bush administration. And it was a proposal of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. It was initially run by Paulson. But it was not just TARP. There was also loans from the Federal Reserve. It was a complicated string of things that were done to bail out AIG. So, why did they do that? Why did the government bail out this insurance company? The main reason why they did so was their concern about systemic risk. I'll come back to other kinds of bailouts of insurance companies.The problem was that AIG--if it went under, all kinds of things would go wrong. All kinds of things would go wrong. All these insurance policies that it wrote on people's casualties, their travel insurance, any of these policies, would all now be subject to failure. Because people who had these insurance would find that the company that they bought it through was disappearing. But it would go on even beyond that. Lots of other companies, investment companies, banks, would fail too, or may fail too, because they're involved in some kind of business dealings with AIG, which would now become part of the AIG bankruptcy. If AIG failed, anybody who had any business with AIG would be starting to wonder, what's this going to mean to me? AIG owes me money, what's going to happen? And so, there was a worry that it would destroy the whole financial system.This was big enough to cause everybody to pull back, and if everybody pulls back, then the business world stops. It would be like a stampede for the exits. Everyone hears, AIG goes under, and so many people do business with AIG, they decided it was intolerable. And so, the government came up with the money, massively and quickly. If you remember the story, Henry Paulson, who was Treasury Secretary, first went to Congress asking for a blank check. He didn't say to bail out AIG, but that's what he did. He got sort of a blank check from Congress, because Paulson told the story that if we don't do this, if we let the company--he didn't say AIG, he actually asked for the TARP money before the AIG bailout--but he said if we don't do something to prevent a collapse, we could have the Great Depression again.Nobody liked to hear that, but they believed him, and they didn't know what else to do. And so, they allowed the TARP money, and they allowed the Federal Reserve to bail out this company. Some people misunderstand what this in fact means, though, for the shareholders in AIG. The AIG shareholders lost almost everything, because the government arranged the bailout in such a way that AIG got practically wiped out. The government took preferred shares in the company at a very low price in exchange for helping the company survive. And that diluted down the other shareholders in the company into a very low status. The company lost over 90% of its shareholder value, despite this bailout.In July of 2009, AIG did a 1-to-20 split. Remember, I told you about splits before? That's a reverse split. Usually, the stock goes up in a company and the shares, which originally sold for $30 a share, are now selling for $100 a share. And they think, well that's too high a price per share, so let's do a three-for-one split, and let's make every share into three shares. That's the usual split story. This is going the other way massively. They made every 20 shares into one share. So, if you look at the price recently, it's been something like $30 to $40 dollars a share. That's what we do on the stock exchange, we always like to keep it, it's an American tradition. Not so much true in other countries, they have different traditions about what is the preferred price about a stock. So, AIG lost--the shareholders lost just about everything. So, the public anger about a bailout of AIG is really a little bit inappropriate, because they lost almost everything. They could've lost everything. This company did not fail, it was bailed out and it survived. But it lost almost everything. I think the real anger is not anger about the shareholders of AIG, who lost almost everything.The real anger is that the business partners of AIG didn't lose anything, notably Goldman Sachs, which was a major partner taking the other side of contracts with AIG. It didn't lose a penny, all right? But, of course, Goldman Sachs was not being bailed out. It was not in danger. The government didn't know what to do with AIG, because it felt that it was such a big company doing so many things that if we let them fail, who knows, Goldman Sachs might fail. The government didn't know, they didn't know whether Goldman Sachs might fail. Because it didn't have the information, because the regulators had not collected such information. So, they decided the only thing they could do responsibly was to keep AIG alive, somehow alive, as an insurance company. Maybe, they lose almost all of their value to the shareholders, but they keep going. So, that's what happened. And AIG continues to this day. It survived after the bailout.Chapter 4. Regulation of the Insurance Industry [00:35:51]Now, I wanted to talk about something else that many of you may not know about insurance companies. Mainly, that we do have something like deposit insurance for insurance companies. You know, when you go into a bank, there will be a little sign saying FDIC Insured? Do you notice that when you go into a bank? They're required to post that. Bank accounts are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation up to a limit, $250,000 now. It's only for relatively small savers, because $250,000 is not big time, a lot of money. We don't want innocent people who walk into a bank and put their money there to lose their money. So, you wonder about insurance. Do we have something like that for insurance? Yes we do.We have state insurance guarantee funds that protect insurance companies. They're not as old, though. The oldest insurance guarantee fund is 1941, and that's in New York. And this fund was the first, but now virtually every state in the United States has these funds. Connecticut got its first insurance guarantee fund in 1972. So, these are supposed to protect you, as an individual, if you take out an insurance policy, and then your insurance company, like AIG, blows up. So, then you wonder, well, why didn't the insurance guarantee fund handle AIG? Any idea where the answer is? Why did we need the special bailout? Well, maybe the answer is obvious. The insurance guarantee fund, like the FDIC, is to protect the little guy, right? AIG was way too big for these state insurance funds. There's a limit to how much you can collect from a state insurance fund if your insurance company goes under, and in New York it's $500,000, and in Connecticut it's the same. These are two of the most generous states. Typically, in a state in the United States, you only collect $300,000 maximum.That may sound like a lot of money to you, but think of it this way: Suppose you bought a life insurance policy for your family. What would you typically buy? Ever thought about it? Well, you have two children. You're thinking of sending them both to Yale, or some place like that. It's going to cost you like $500,000 right there, just sending them to college. So, if that's all you get in your insurance, it's not enough, not big. So, these are small, they don't guarantee you enough. There's another thing about, at least I know about the Connecticut insurance guarantee fund, and that is that you can't play the trick that you do with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank accounts for 250,000, all right? But all you do is, you put your money over many different banks. So, if you've got $2.5 million, you put it in 10 different banks. The FDIC will insure every one of those, so you can insure $2.5 million. But the Connecticut insurance guarantee fund won't do that, they'll limit you to $500,000, no matter how many different policies you got.There's another important difference between deposit insurance and banks and state insurance guarantee funds, at least in Connecticut. I know Connecticut does not allow an insurance company to advertise that they're insured. It's quite the opposite with deposit insurance, where the FDIC requires that they post that they're insured. So that's why you don't hear about this. But there's a fundamental lesson that I'm trying to get to with all of this, and that is that you have to look at the insurance company that you buy insurance from. It's still a wild world out there in the sense that if you buy insurance from an insurance company that goes under, well, you're protected up to $500,000, but beyond that, not. And you're supposed to watch out. Now, we also have state insurance regulators who are supposed to watch out that insurance companies are good, but they won't make good on you. So, we have a Connecticut Insurance Department, for example, which regulates insurance companies.Now, another interesting thing about insurance that separates it from finance is that insurance is done by the state government. It's regulated and the guarantee funds are state. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a federal--it's a national insurance program. But insurance is done entirely by the states.。
耶鲁大学：金融市场__课程文字内容
关于这门课程金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。
它们为投资活动提供支持及风险管理。
如果我们想要预测金融机构动态，及他们在这个信息时代中的发展态势，我们必须对其业务有所了解。
本课程将涉及的内容有：金融学理论、金融业的发展历程、金融机构（例如银行、保险公司、证券公司、期货公司及其他衍生市场）的优势与缺陷，以及这些机构的未来发展前景。
检视课程表>>课程结构：本课程每讲75分钟，一周两次，在2008年春季录制并收入耶鲁大学开放式课程系列。
关于Robert Shiller 教授Robert J. Shiller是Yale大学Arthur M. Okun经济学讲座教授和Yale大学管理学院国际金融中心研究员。
Shiller教授的研究领域包括行为金融学和房地产，并在《金融经济学杂志》、《美国经济评论》、《金融学杂志》、《华尔街杂志》和《金融时报》等著名刊物发表文章。
主要著作包括《市场波动》、《宏观市场》(凭借此书他获得了TIAA-CREF的保罗A. 萨缪尔森奖),《非理性繁荣和金融新秩序：二十一世纪的风险》。
影片请按此下载阅读中文字幕纯文字版本讲座1–金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用第一讲概述：Shiller教授概述了金融市场这门课的内容，包括行政细节，及每堂课所讨论的主题。
他简要地论述了学习金融学和每个关键主题的重要性。
讲座主题包括：行为金融学、金融技术、金融工具、商业银行、投资银行、金融市场和金融机构、房地产、金融监管、货币政策及金融民主化。
阅读作业：弗兰克·法博齐等人着，《金融市场与机构通论》，第一章（1-11页）和第二章罗伯特·希勒着，《非理性繁荣》，前言和第一章资源：PowerPoint 幻灯片－第一讲[PDF]讲座1–金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用2008年1月14日Robert Shiller教授：这是经济类252号课程，金融市场。
我是罗伯特•希勒。
课程伊始，先介绍下课程助教，我把他们的简历展示在这里。
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耶鲁大学开放课程金融市场课表
1.Finance and Insurance as Powerful Forces in Our Economy and Society 金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用
2. The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and the Hedging of Risks
风险管理中的普遍原理:风险聚集和对冲
3. Technology and Invention in Finance
金融中的科技与发明
4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model)
投资组合多元化和辅助性的金融机构(资本资产定价模型)
5. Insurance: The Archetypal Risk Management Institution
保险:典型的风险管理制度
6. Efficient Markets vs. Excess Volatility
有效市场与过度波动之争
7. Behavioral Finance: The Role of Psychology
行为金融学:心理的作用
8. Human Foibles, Fraud, Manipulation, and Regulation
人性弱点,欺诈,操纵与管制
9. Guest Lecture by David Swensen
大卫•斯文森的客座演讲
10. Debt Markets: Term Structure
债券市场:期限结构
11. Stocks
股票
12. Real Estate Finance and Its Vulnerability to Crisis
房地产金融和其易受危机影响的脆弱性
13. Banking: Successes and Failures
银行业:成功和失败
14. Guest Lecture by Andrew Redleaf
安德鲁•雷德利夫的客座演讲
15. Guest Lecture by Carl Icahn
卡尔•伊坎的客座演讲
16. The Evolution and Perfection of Monetary Policy
货币政策的进化和完善
17. Investment Banking and Secondary Markets
投资银行和二级市场
18. Professional Money Managers and Their Influence
职业财富管理者和他们的影响
19. Brokerage, ECNs, etc.
经纪业务,电子交易系统,等等
20. Guest Lecture by Stephen Schwarzman
斯蒂芬•施瓦茨曼的客座演讲
21. Forwards and Futures
远期合约和期货
22. Stock Index, Oil and Other Futures Markets
股指,石油和其他期货市场
23. Options Markets
期权市场
24. Making It Work for Real People: The Democratization of Finance 让金融为大众所用:金融民主化
25. Learning from and Responding to Financial Crisis, Part I (Guest Lecture by Lawrence Summers)
劳伦斯•萨默斯应对金融危机并从中学习第一部分
26. Learning from and Responding to Financial Crisis, Part II (Guest Lecture by Lawrence Summers)
劳伦斯•萨默斯应对金融危机并从中学习第二部分
Final Exam 期末考试。