《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)课程目录及下载地址(不断更新中)
耶鲁金融市场第11课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记11耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第11课] 股票（时长1小时15分）（上课伊始，希勒先介绍了下次讲座嘉宾史蒂芬.施瓦茨曼的基本情况）史蒂芬.施瓦茨曼（Stephen Schwarzman）是耶鲁大学的毕业生，也是本世纪的伟大传奇之一。
史蒂芬于1985年白手起家，创建了最大的私募股权公司，后来公司上市，获得了巨大的市值，足以与纽约最大的历史悠久的诸多投资银行相比。
史蒂芬和彼得.彼得森（Peter Peterson）创建了这家公司。
所以，听他的讲座会是非常有趣的。
而且，你们会有机会向他提问，问问他所做的事情（笑）。
我在阅读材料上放了一篇《纽约客The New Yorker》上刚发表的文章，大概是几周前发表的，列入到教学大纲里了。
我觉得，在史蒂芬来之前，我应该把这篇文章撤下了（笑），我之所以要这样做（笑），是因为他对这篇文章可能不会喜欢。
这是一篇很尖刻的批评性文章。
史蒂芬必定是一位强硬的商人，才能达到他现在的位置。
《纽约客》的这篇文章谈到，史蒂芬在纽约有一套公寓，其价格创下新高（笑），还讲了诸如此类的一些事。
昨天我在伦敦，那里的人们也喜欢八卦这样的事情，豪华轿车司机送我去机场时，他指着车外的伦敦景点，他说，你认识那栋大楼吗？有一个阿拉伯酋长花了一亿英镑，买了那栋楼的顶层公寓，这个酋长还为自己订了一架空客，就是那种大型客机（空中巴士），作为私人飞机，还镀上金子（笑）。
你们有谁听过这个故事（笑）？是真的吗？那个司机就在昨天告诉我的，（笑）他说，他得花5亿英镑左右才能做到这样。
当然，这都是八卦闲话了，而实质是，这个人为世界做了什么贡献？所以，我在这里收集了一些慈善机构名录，史蒂芬.施瓦茨曼是这些机构的一位主要的慈善家。
史蒂芬在黑石集团（the Blackstone Group）下建立了“黑石基金会The Blackstone Foundation”，他也是许多慈善组织的主要资助者或合作人，例如弗里克藏馆（The Frick1Collection）、惠特尼博物馆（The Whtiney Museum）、凤凰楼戒毒所（Phoenix House）、红十字会（The Red Cross）、贫民区奖学金基金（The Inner City Scholarship Fund—ICSF）、纽约城市拓展基金（New York City Outward Bound）、（美国）亚洲协会（The Asia Society）。
The Teaching Company 美国最著名的大学教育课程制作公司之一
The Teaching Company 美国最著名的大学教育课程制作公司之一，专门聘请世界一流大学的顶尖级教授讲授大学程度的各种课程，并推出课程的磁带，录像带，CD，DVD和学习手册，因注重学术性，教育性和娱乐性，符合终身学习的时代观念，在业界享有盛誉。
由它推出的课程简称为TTC course。
这家教育公司应该是美国生产教育类产品的公司中最为厉害的一家了，从它所聘请到的授课教师背景就能看出这一点来，美国高校有50万教授，为它所挑中的人选有5000人，可谓百里挑一，可以说是美国高校中的精英力量，许多教授在各自校园中都获得过“教师奖”，这种头衔对于一个教授的授课能力来讲是很大的一种肯定。
主页的左侧全是关于所授课程的介绍，人文、艺术、宗教学科及社会科学的课程占了比较大的比例。
原帖作者：myoung麻省理工、台湾国立交通大学、斯坦福大学、TTC课程和耶鲁大学的优秀开放课程资源，以及一小部分中科院研究生课程VeryCd资源索引。
麻省理工 (MIT)麻省理工开放课程主页：/courses/一.理学院*生物学(Biology)1.MIT开放课程：生物学导论 MIT OpenCourse:7.012 Introduction to Biology课程链接：/topics/2829182/*化学(Chemistry)1.MIT开放课程：固态化学导论 MIT OpenCourse:Introduction to Solid State Chemistry课程链接：/topics/2828243/*物理学(Physics)1.麻省理工电磁学视频课程 MIT--Physics--Electricity andMagnetism--Video Lectures课程链接1：/topics/2807625/课程链接2：/topics/2807625/2.美国麻省理工之经典力学 classical mechanics课程链接：/topics/2745060/*脑与认知科学(Brain and Cognitive Sciences)1.MIT开放式课程:心理学导论2004秋季学期 MIT OpenCourseWare,9.00 Introduction to Psychology,Fall 2004课程链接：/topics/65161/二.工程学院*电机工程与计算机科学(Electrical Engineering and Computer Science)1. MIT计算机科学及编程导论 MIT Introduction to Computer Science and Programming课程链接：/topics/2830263/2.MIT算法导论 MIT Introduction to Algorithms课程链接1：/topics/2812654/课程链接2：/topics/87348/3.数字通信原理 Principles of Digital Communications-MIT课程链接：/topics/2829316/三：高中开放式课程1.哥德尔，埃舍尔，巴赫：一次心灵太空漫游 Godel, Escher, Bach: A Mental Space Odyssey课程链接：/topics/2834837/斯坦福大学 (Stanford)斯坦福开放课程主页：/see/courses.aspxStanford Engineering Everywhere：斯坦福大学的“Stanford Engineering Everywhere ”免费提供学校里最受欢迎的工科课程，给全世界的学生和教育工作者。
耶鲁大学开放性课程金融市场
金融市场：第一讲2008年1月14日罗伯特.希勒教授：这是经济学系课程编号为252的金融市场课程，我是鲍勃.希勒，首先，请允许我以介绍这门课的教学研究员。
我们现有5名教研人员，来自世界各地。
我将把他们的照片张贴在这里以便你们知道他们是谁。
教学研究员们非常国际化，这反应了我把这门课也教得国际化的意图，这是因为当今经济学是全世界的课题，而非美国独有，所以我们的教学目标涵盖了全世界（的金融状况）。
奥斯曼.阿里来自巴基斯坦的拉合尔，他毕业于拉合尔大学管理科学系，他现在是经济学博士研究生，在做股票分析推荐和股票市场回报关系的博士论文，他同时对行为金融学，即心理学在金融学中的应用很感兴趣。
第二位助教，我看见他在那边，（对助教说）如果可以请举下手，桑托什.阿纳戈尔(Santos h Anagol),美国的一名议员，同时，他跟印度有很好的联系。
事实上他已经在美国经济评论上发表了一篇关于加纳资本回报的论文。
他与当地经济部门主席，克里斯.尤迪(Chris Ud ry)。
他花了很多时间调查乡村经济。
你过去在分发母牛，对么？学生：不，我仍在做跟母牛有关的工作，但我并不负责分发母牛。
罗伯特.希勒教授：好吧，这是本门课程中最后一次你们听到关于母牛的话题。
这个想法是给村民分发母牛然后观察产出。
在某些贫困地区得到一头母牛生活将得到很大的改善。
克里斯坦.阿武库布杜（Christian AwukuBudu）来自加纳的阿卡拉(Accra),但他是在美国的莫尔豪斯学院上的大学，他也是耶鲁大学经济学的博士研究生，在做发展中国家金融市场的研究。
段雅心（Yaxin Duan）来自中国，她从南京大学获得硕士学位，错了？你来自南京，我的资料搞错了么？你从哪所学院毕业的？好吧，很抱歉我搞错了。
她也是耶鲁大学经济学博士研究生，在做期权价格行为学中被称为“期权微笑”的现象，正如她现在对我微笑一样。
她同时对行为金融学感兴趣，对我来说很很重要，因为这也是我的兴趣之一。
耶鲁大学开放课程
耶鲁大学开放课程1。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：聆听音乐》(Open Yale course：Listening to Music)[YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2832525/2。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：基础物理》(Open Yale course：Fundamentals ofPhysics)[YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2834907/3。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：生物医学工程探索》(Open Yale course：Frontiers of Biomedical Engineering) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2834278/4。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：1871年后的法国》(Open Yale course：France Since 1871) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2835256/5。
《耶鲁大学开放课程—哲学：死亡》(Open Yale course—Philosophy：Death) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2824902/6。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)[YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2830134/7。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：心理学导论》(Open Yale course：Introduction to Psychology) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2827597/8。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：博弈论》(Open Yale course：Game Theory)[YYeTs人人影视出品] [中英双语字幕]/topics/2832107/9。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：1648-1945年的欧洲文明》(Open Yale course：European Civiliza tion,1648-1945) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2832611/10。
耶鲁公开课笔记2
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记2耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第2课] 风险管理中的普遍原理：风险汇聚和对冲（时长1小时09分）本课主题是风险管理中的普遍原理----风险汇聚和对冲（Pooling and Hedging of Risk）。
希勒认为这是金融理论中最基本、最核心的概念。
本课先讲概率论(Probability Theory)，再讲通过风险汇聚来分摊风险的概念。
概率论是极具智慧的构想，诞生于历史上的特定时期，并令人意想不到地获得广泛应用，金融是其应用领域之一。
对部分学生来说，本课相对所讲的其他课会显出更多的技术性，并且遗憾的是又安排在学期初。
对于学过概率和统计的学生而言，就不是新知识了。
这是从数学角度的看法。
概率论是新知识，但不要太畏惧。
课前有个学生告诉希勒，他的数学有些生疏了，是否还能选这门课？希勒说，如果你能听懂这堂课，那就不会有问题。
什么是概率？通过举例说明。
比如，今年股票市场会走高的概率是多少？例如认为概率是0.45，是因为对股市悲观，预测股市会走高的可能性是45%，而股市会走平或走低的可能性是55%。
这就是概率。
听了这个例子，人们就会觉得这个概念是熟悉的，如果有人提到概率是0.55或0.45，也就知道他说的意思了。
话锋一转，希勒强调，概率并非总是以这种方式来表述的。
概率论成形于十七世纪，此前没有人提出过。
撰写概率论历史的作者伊恩.哈金（Ian Hacking），查遍世界所有关于概率论的文献，没有发现在十七世纪之前有概率论的文献，也就是说，在十七世纪产生了一次智慧的飞跃，当时用概率词汇来表述非常时髦，引用概率进行表述的方式很快传遍世界。
但是，有意思的是，如此简单的概念此前从未使用过。
下面希勒详细介绍哈金的成果。
哈金研究表明，概率词汇早已存在于英语中，莎士比亚就用过，但其所代表的意思是什么呢？哈金举了一个年轻小姐的例子，这位小姐描述她喜欢的男子，说道，“我太喜欢他了，我觉得他有很大‘可能’”(probable)。
econ-252-11_05耶鲁大学公开课金融市场
PRINTECON-252-11: FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011)Lecture 5 - Insurance, the Archetypal Risk Management Institution: Its Opportunities and Vulnerabilities [January 31, 2011]Chapter 1. Introduction [00:00:00]Professor Robert Shiller:OK, good morning. I've been running to get over here. I just got back from The World Economic Forum. We talked to a lot of the world's financial leaders. And I was thinking what I would tell you about it, but then I realized, it's all off the record, so I'm not supposed to say anything to you.I was going to talk instead today about insurance, which is one of the major risk management institutions that is not always considered part of finance, because people think of finance and insurance as separate.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller:We talked about basic principles of risk management in the preceding lecture. It's all the same for finance and insurance. And yet, we tend to consider them as separate businesses. That's partly, I think, an accident of history, and it's partly a product of regulation because of certain ideas--that we'll come to in a few minutes--that has kept the insurance industry separate from other financial industries. Last period, we talked about the mean-variance risk management problem, and about the Capital Asset Pricing Model. That's fundamental to insurance as well. The basic idea is pooling of risks and preventing people from being subjected to extreme risks through the concept of risk pooling.So, what I wanted to start today is talking about insurance, starting with the concept of insurance. And then, I wanted to reiterate a theme of this course, that financial institutions are inventions, they're structures that someone had to design and make work right. Sometimes they don't work right. Then, I wanted to move to a particular example of insurance, which was until recently the biggest insurance company in the world, called the American International Group, or AIG. And it's particularly important that we talk about this example, because on March 2 we have the former CEO of AIG, Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, coming to our class. So, I thought it's appropriate that we use AIG--well not only because it was the biggest insurance company in the world, but also because he's coming here.And then, I want to talk about regulation of insurance, that the insurance industry has always been subject to government regulation. I'll talk about types of insurance. Your chapter in Fabozzi et al. is mostly about types of insurance, so I think you can mostly get that from the textbook, but I wanted to say some things about it. And then, I was going to conclude with thoughts about insurance, and how important it is to our lives, and what progress it still has to make.Chapter 2. Concepts and Principles of Insurance [00:03:53]So, insurance, it doesn't sound like a very exciting topic, does it? I'm going to try to make it more exciting. I guess you think of the insurance salesman coming, knocking on your door. They don't do that so much anymore, they used to go around door-to-door. And that was a depressing moment, when the life insurance salesman came. And if you invited this person into your house, he would tell you about the probability of dying, how tough it will be on your family, that sort of thing. But, to me, I think insurance is an exciting issue, because it's about making our lives work. And it's really about preventing horrible catastrophes from--and it involves mathematical theory that underlies the concept. To me, it's exciting, but I don't know if I canconvey that.The fundamental concept, again, is risk pooling. The idea of insurance goes back to ancient Rome, but only in very limited forms. But the idea of risk pooling is kind of an obvious one. People form organizations partly to risk-pool. So, in ancient Rome, a common form of insurance was death insurance that would pay funeral bills. People in the ancient world believed that you had to get a proper burial, or your soul would wander forever. So, insurance salespeople associated with guilds or business organizations would sell funeral insurance. But they didn't have a very clear idea of the risk pooling concept. It must have underlain their thinking.But it wasn't until much later that people began to understand the concept. There were examples of insurance throughout ancient and medieval times, but they're very blurred and sparse. I remember reading an insurance, supposedly, an insurance contract written in Renaissance Italy, translated into English, but it was hardly recognizable to me as an insurance contract. They didn't have the concepts down. It seemed to have a lot of religious language in it, which normally we don't think of as something that's part of an insurance contract. But it seems like insurance came in in the 1600s, at the same time that certain concepts of mathematics began to be developed. Notably, the concept of probability became more widely known in the 1600s. According to one historian, the oldest known description of the insurance concept goes back to a Count Oldenburg. Actually, it's an anonymous letter to Count Oldenburg, written in 1609.And the letter says, why don't we start--I'm paraphrasing at the moment--why don't we start a fund, in which people pay 1% of the value of their home every year into the fund, and then we will use the fund to replace the house if there's a fire? And now, quoting this anonymous writer, this writer said he had "no doubt that it would be fully proved, if a calculation were made of the number of houses consumed by fire within a certain space in the course of 30 years, that the loss would not amount, by a good deal, to the sum that would be collected in that time." OK? It was just intuitive. He said, there can't be that many fires. And if we collect that amount of money every year, we can pay for all the houses that are burned down. So, he didn't express any mathematical law, but it's the concept of insurance. You don't find that before that, before 1609. So, I guess we don't have any clear statement of insurance before then.Actually, you can find an approximate statement of the law of large numbers--and I'm thinking of Aristotle, the philosopher. This is in ancient times, and I'm quoting from De Caelo, his book. Aristotle: "To succeed in many things or many times is difficult. For instance, to repeat the same throw 10,000 times with the dice would be impossible, whereas to make it once or twice is comparatively easy." He doesn't have the language of probability, but he knows you can't throw the dice 1,000 times and come up with the same number every time.Now, we have a probability theory about it. So, we know that if you have n events, each occurring with the probability of p, then the average proportion out of the n events that occur--I'm sorry, we have n trials, an event occurring with probability p--then the standard deviation of this proportion of events that occur isAnd that's a theorem from probability theory. The standard deviation of the proportion of trials for which the event occurred, assuming independence, is given by this. And so, you note that it goes down with n. As n increases, it goes down with--I should say, the √n. So, that means that if n gets very large, if you write a lot of policies, then the probability of deviating from the mean by more than one or two standard deviations becomes very small, which is what Aristotle said.But making insurance work as an institution, to actually protect people against risk, is rather difficult to achieve. And that's because things have to be done right. So, let me just remind you, what are the basic types of insurance? This is what Fabozzi talks about. There's life insurance that insures people against earlydeath. Of course, you still die. What it really insures, is your family against the loss of a bread winner, the father or the mother. So, life insurance is suitably given to families, especially with young children, to protect the children. It used to be very important when there was a lot more early deaths. Now, very few young people lose their parents. So, life insurance has receded in importance.Another example is health insurance. This is insurance, of course, that you get sick and you need medical care. Then, there's property and casualty insurance, insuring your house or your car. And then, there's other kinds of [what] you might call investment-oriented products, like annuities. This is a table in your textbook by Fabozzi, which lists these categories of insurance. But any of these insurance types are inventions, and I want to specify that. We have the idea that an insurance company could be set up that would, say, insure houses against fires. And we just heard it, intuitively, in this letter to Oldenburg long ago. But to make it work, and to make it work reliably, involves a lot of detail. You can think of the idea of making an airplane, but to make it really work, and to make it work safely, is another matter.So first of all, insurance needs a contract design that specifies risks, and excludes risks that are inappropriate. An issue that insurance companies reach is moral hazard.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller: Moral hazard is an expression that appeared in the 19th century to refer to the effects of insurance on people's behavior that are undesirable. So, the classic example is, you take out fire insurance on your house, and then you burn it down deliberately in order to collect on the house. Or another example is, you take out life insurance, and then you kill yourself to support your family. These are undesirable outcomes, and they could be fatal to the whole concept of insurance, because if you don't control moral hazard, obviously the whole thing is not going to work. So, what they do in an insurance contract is they exclude risks that are particularly vulnerable to moral hazard. And so, that means you would exclude certain causes of death that might look like suicide. You can do other things to control moral hazard than excluding certain causes.You can also make sure that you don't insure the house for more than it's worth. Right? If someone insures a house, and the insurance does not cover the full value of the house, then there's no incentive to burn it down. You might as well just sell the house, right? No point in burning it down if you'll still lose a little bit of money. So, that's one of the problems that insurance companies face. And part of the design of [the] insurance contract has to prevent moral hazard from becoming excessive.An analogous thing is selection bias. That occurs when--chalk keeps breaking--selection bias occurs when the people who sign up for your contract know that they are higher risk. For example, health. People who know they have a terminal disease and are about to die, they'll all come signing up for your life insurance contract. That will put immense costs on the insurance company, and if they don't control the selection bias, they will have to charge very high premiums. And that will force other people, who don't know they're going to die, out of buying insurance. And so, that's the fundamental problem. Again, something has to be done to define the policy. So, one thing you can do is, exclude, in life insurance, certain causes of death that are likely to be known. And you only put on causes of death that people wouldn't be able to predict about themselves.Another aspect of insurance is that you have to have very specific, precise definitions of the loss, and what constitutes proof of the insured loss. If you're not clear about that, there's going to be ambiguities later, which will involve legal wrangling and dissatisfaction. We'll see, in a minute, that these problems are not minor and they keep coming up. It's a constant challenge for the insurance industry. Third, we need a mathematical model of risk pooling. Well, I just wrote one down here, but it might be more complicated insome circumstances. This is assuming independence. If you don't assume independence, you can make more complicated models. Then, fourth, you need a collection of statistics on risks, and you need to evaluate the quality of those statistics. So for example, in the 1600s, people started collecting mortality tables for the first time. There was no data on ages at death. It began in the 1600s, because people were building an insurance industry and they needed to know those things.Then, you need a form for the company. What is the insurance company? Who owns it? It could be a corporate form. There are shareholders who are investing in the company. And they're taking the risk that some of our policy modeling, or handling of moral hazard, or selection bias wasn't right. Some insurance companies are mutual, rather than share. The insurance is run for the benefit of the policyholders, and they're like a nonprofit in the sense that the founders of the company pay themselves salaries, but the benefits go entirely to the policy holders.Then, you need a government design, so that the government verifies all of these things about the insurance company. The problem with insurance is that people will pay in for many, many years before they ever collect, right? Especially if you're buying life insurance, you hope never to collect. And so, you don't know whether it's going to work right. That's why you need government regulation, you need government insurance regulators. And that's part of the design of insurance. It doesn't work if you don't have the regulators, because you wouldn't trust the insurance company. So, these are problems that have inhibited making insurance work.Chapter 3. The Story behind AIG [00:19:14]I wanted to give you an example. I think it makes it more concrete if we start off with talking about a particular example. And I said I was going to talk about AIG, which is a very important example, not only because it was the biggest insurance company. It was also the biggest bailout in the entire financial crisis we've seen now. And it has an interesting story.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller: So AIG, it's an interesting story. It was founded in 1919 in Shanghai. And you wonder, why is it called American International Group if it's founded in Shanghai? It was founded in Shanghai, called American Asiatic Underwriters. And it was founded by Cornelius Vander Starr, who was an American who just decided to go to Asia and start an insurance business. Shanghai, in 1919, was a world city. It was not really under the Chinese government, it was something like Hong Kong. It had constituencies representing many different countries. And so, it was a very lively business center. It's kind of interesting that the biggest insurance company in the world emerged from Shanghai, and also one of the biggest banks in the world, HSBC. You know what HSBC means? They don't emphasize it anymore. It's Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation [correction: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation]. So, AIG was founded by Mr. Starr in 1919, and started doing an insurance business in China. And moved their headquarters to New York just before Chairman Mao took over at China. And then, it became kind of a Chinese investment company in the United States.Cornelius Vander Starr ran the company from 1919 until he died in 1968. So, he was CEO for 49 years, a half-century. And then, just before he died, he appointed Hank Greenberg, who will visit us, as the CEO in 1962. So, that was 49 years under Starr, and then Greenberg took on, and then ran the company until 2005. So, it was 37 years under Greenberg. So, two men ran the company for almost a century. Since 2005, Greenberg has been succeeded by three CEOs, the usual thing. The usual company turns over CEOs.There's another interesting story that we might ask about Hank Greenberg.He joined the U.S. Army and fought in World War II. And among his jobs, then, was to liberate Dachau, which was a concentration camp. This is not one of the extermination camps, it was a concentration camp for Jews and others under the Nazis. And people were starving and dying, it was awful. At a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, Greenberg met with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is the president of Iran. And Ahmadinejad said something about the Holocaust, doubting that it ever happened. Greenberg stood up indignantly and said, it happened. I saw it. I was there. It's kind of interesting to me to think about this.This is an aside, momentarily. The other person I've met who--do you know Geoffrey Hartman, who's a professor here at Yale in literature? He and his wife, both Jewish, were teenagers during World War II. And Hartman escaped by what they called Kindertransport. But his wife, Renee, was in another concentration camp. Not Dachau, it was in Bratislava. And she was starving to death. And it really happened, by the way. It's awful. And I asked her, why do you think they were starving you to death? And she said, we didn't know. We thought maybe they were keeping us as hostages, or something. So anyway, we could ask him about that.What did these people do? Both Starr and Greenberg created a wide variety of risk management products. It became the largest underwriter of commercial and industrial insurance in the world. It became a very large automobile insurer, and also a travel insurance company. But Greenberg was forced out of the company after 37 years, when Eliot Spitzer, who was the Attorney General for the state of New York, claimed that there were some irregularities. And Greenberg was forced to resign. It turns out, though, that nothing that Spitzer said has held up, so apparently Greenberg was innocent of any of the allegations. The real problem occurred with AIG after Greenberg left. So, Greenberg left in 2005, and then the company absolutely blew up, and it absolutely had to be bailed out.The reason they had to be bailed out was, it was almost entirely due to a failure of the independence assumption, I would say. That under their risk modeling, namely, the company became exposed to real estate risk. And the idea that their risk modelers had was that it doesn't matter that we take on risk that home prices might fall, because they can never fall everywhere. They can fall in one city, but it won't matter to us. That's just one city, and it all averages out. But what actually happened after Greenberg left was the company took huge exposures toward real estate risk and it fell everywhere. Home prices fell everywhere, just exactly what they thought couldn't happen.So, the company was writing credit default swaps--I told you about those before--they were taking the risk. They were insuring, basically, against defaults on companies whose credit depended on the real estate market. They were also investing directly in real estate security, in mortgage-backed securities that depended on the real estate market for their success. And when all this failed at once, the AIG was about to fail. That meant that the federal government decided, in 2008, to bail out AIG. And the total bailout bill, well, the total amount committed by the U.S. federal government was $182 billion. It didn't all actually get spent. It was $182 billion committed to bail out AIG. That's a lot of money, I think that's the biggest bailout anywhere, at any time.A lot of people are angry about this. Part of this bailout came from what we called TARP. This is the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which was created under the Bush administration. And it was a proposal of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. It was initially run by Paulson. But it was not just TARP. There was also loans from the Federal Reserve. It was a complicated string of things that were done to bail out AIG. So, why did they do that? Why did the government bail out this insurance company? The main reason why they did so was their concern about systemic risk. I'll come back to other kinds of bailouts of insurance companies.The problem was that AIG--if it went under, all kinds of things would go wrong. All kinds of things would go wrong. All these insurance policies that it wrote on people's casualties, their travel insurance, any of these policies, would all now be subject to failure. Because people who had these insurance would find that the company that they bought it through was disappearing. But it would go on even beyond that. Lots of other companies, investment companies, banks, would fail too, or may fail too, because they're involved in some kind of business dealings with AIG, which would now become part of the AIG bankruptcy. If AIG failed, anybody who had any business with AIG would be starting to wonder, what's this going to mean to me? AIG owes me money, what's going to happen? And so, there was a worry that it would destroy the whole financial system.This was big enough to cause everybody to pull back, and if everybody pulls back, then the business world stops. It would be like a stampede for the exits. Everyone hears, AIG goes under, and so many people do business with AIG, they decided it was intolerable. And so, the government came up with the money, massively and quickly. If you remember the story, Henry Paulson, who was Treasury Secretary, first went to Congress asking for a blank check. He didn't say to bail out AIG, but that's what he did. He got sort of a blank check from Congress, because Paulson told the story that if we don't do this, if we let the company--he didn't say AIG, he actually asked for the TARP money before the AIG bailout--but he said if we don't do something to prevent a collapse, we could have the Great Depression again.Nobody liked to hear that, but they believed him, and they didn't know what else to do. And so, they allowed the TARP money, and they allowed the Federal Reserve to bail out this company. Some people misunderstand what this in fact means, though, for the shareholders in AIG. The AIG shareholders lost almost everything, because the government arranged the bailout in such a way that AIG got practically wiped out. The government took preferred shares in the company at a very low price in exchange for helping the company survive. And that diluted down the other shareholders in the company into a very low status. The company lost over 90% of its shareholder value, despite this bailout.In July of 2009, AIG did a 1-to-20 split. Remember, I told you about splits before? That's a reverse split. Usually, the stock goes up in a company and the shares, which originally sold for $30 a share, are now selling for $100 a share. And they think, well that's too high a price per share, so let's do a three-for-one split, and let's make every share into three shares. That's the usual split story. This is going the other way massively. They made every 20 shares into one share. So, if you look at the price recently, it's been something like $30 to $40 dollars a share. That's what we do on the stock exchange, we always like to keep it, it's an American tradition. Not so much true in other countries, they have different traditions about what is the preferred price about a stock. So, AIG lost--the shareholders lost just about everything. So, the public anger about a bailout of AIG is really a little bit inappropriate, because they lost almost everything. They could've lost everything. This company did not fail, it was bailed out and it survived. But it lost almost everything. I think the real anger is not anger about the shareholders of AIG, who lost almost everything.The real anger is that the business partners of AIG didn't lose anything, notably Goldman Sachs, which was a major partner taking the other side of contracts with AIG. It didn't lose a penny, all right? But, of course, Goldman Sachs was not being bailed out. It was not in danger. The government didn't know what to do with AIG, because it felt that it was such a big company doing so many things that if we let them fail, who knows, Goldman Sachs might fail. The government didn't know, they didn't know whether Goldman Sachs might fail. Because it didn't have the information, because the regulators had not collected such information. So, they decided the only thing they could do responsibly was to keep AIG alive, somehow alive, as an insurance company. Maybe, they lose almost all of their value to the shareholders, but they keep going. So, that's what happened. And AIG continues to this day. It survived after the bailout.Chapter 4. Regulation of the Insurance Industry [00:35:51]Now, I wanted to talk about something else that many of you may not know about insurance companies. Mainly, that we do have something like deposit insurance for insurance companies. You know, when you go into a bank, there will be a little sign saying FDIC Insured? Do you notice that when you go into a bank? They're required to post that. Bank accounts are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation up to a limit, $250,000 now. It's only for relatively small savers, because $250,000 is not big time, a lot of money. We don't want innocent people who walk into a bank and put their money there to lose their money. So, you wonder about insurance. Do we have something like that for insurance? Yes we do.We have state insurance guarantee funds that protect insurance companies. They're not as old, though. The oldest insurance guarantee fund is 1941, and that's in New York. And this fund was the first, but now virtually every state in the United States has these funds. Connecticut got its first insurance guarantee fund in 1972. So, these are supposed to protect you, as an individual, if you take out an insurance policy, and then your insurance company, like AIG, blows up. So, then you wonder, well, why didn't the insurance guarantee fund handle AIG? Any idea where the answer is? Why did we need the special bailout? Well, maybe the answer is obvious. The insurance guarantee fund, like the FDIC, is to protect the little guy, right? AIG was way too big for these state insurance funds. There's a limit to how much you can collect from a state insurance fund if your insurance company goes under, and in New York it's $500,000, and in Connecticut it's the same. These are two of the most generous states. Typically, in a state in the United States, you only collect $300,000 maximum.That may sound like a lot of money to you, but think of it this way: Suppose you bought a life insurance policy for your family. What would you typically buy? Ever thought about it? Well, you have two children. You're thinking of sending them both to Yale, or some place like that. It's going to cost you like $500,000 right there, just sending them to college. So, if that's all you get in your insurance, it's not enough, not big. So, these are small, they don't guarantee you enough. There's another thing about, at least I know about the Connecticut insurance guarantee fund, and that is that you can't play the trick that you do with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank accounts for 250,000, all right? But all you do is, you put your money over many different banks. So, if you've got $2.5 million, you put it in 10 different banks. The FDIC will insure every one of those, so you can insure $2.5 million. But the Connecticut insurance guarantee fund won't do that, they'll limit you to $500,000, no matter how many different policies you got.There's another important difference between deposit insurance and banks and state insurance guarantee funds, at least in Connecticut. I know Connecticut does not allow an insurance company to advertise that they're insured. It's quite the opposite with deposit insurance, where the FDIC requires that they post that they're insured. So that's why you don't hear about this. But there's a fundamental lesson that I'm trying to get to with all of this, and that is that you have to look at the insurance company that you buy insurance from. It's still a wild world out there in the sense that if you buy insurance from an insurance company that goes under, well, you're protected up to $500,000, but beyond that, not. And you're supposed to watch out. Now, we also have state insurance regulators who are supposed to watch out that insurance companies are good, but they won't make good on you. So, we have a Connecticut Insurance Department, for example, which regulates insurance companies.Now, another interesting thing about insurance that separates it from finance is that insurance is done by the state government. It's regulated and the guarantee funds are state. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a federal--it's a national insurance program. But insurance is done entirely by the states.。
耶鲁金融市场第14课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记14耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第14课] 安德鲁·雷德利夫的客座演讲（时长1小时15分）（关于安德鲁·雷德利夫，在上节课开头已有过介绍，所以，在这个讲座，安德鲁·雷德利夫上来就开讲了）我要说的第一件事，是我认为，当你们在考虑金融市场时，大多数人所想的第一件事或第一个问题是，那些市场是否有效？是否包含了所有已知的信息？如果能够做到这些，那在一定程度上，金融市场显然就比整个市场还好（笑）。
我不确定，曾经是绝对吸纳了经济学智慧的金融市场，就是有效了？我认为，到现在，这种观点还是主流的学术观点。
但是，对此存在着激烈的争论，双方都有代言人。
对我来说，实际上，这是一个非常简单的问题。
关于市场有效的概念，源于一个先验的理论，该理论是关于所有市场的，认为有很多动机，激励人们按照自己的兴趣采取行动，也只能这样去做。
这是一种非常吸引人的先验理论，但是，作为理论，是用来进行预测的。
如果预测的一些事情并没有成为事实，那么这个理论就被摒弃，这样的理论有很多很多。
有很多与金融市场有效性相反的例子。
在某种程度上，有这样的事情，有些公司拥有两种不同类别的股票，而在经济意义上相同。
比如，皇家壳牌公司（Royal Shell）就曾经拥有过在荷兰交易的荷兰股份，以及在英国交易的英国股份，两者在经济意义上相同，但价格会有波动且非常剧烈。
在1998年时期，有一只这种类型的股票，比起另一只股票要打折20%，并持续了好几年。
因此，你拥有经济意义上相同的东西，会以不同的价格进行交易。
例如，你持有封闭式基金（closed end funds），这是一种拥有一组其他证券的金融工具，封闭式基金是作为一种债券在证券交易所进行挂牌交易，而这种基金所做的事，就是持有其他的证券。
耶鲁金融市场第7课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记7耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第7课] 行为金融学：心理的作用（时长1小时5分）本课主题是行为金融学（Behavioral Finance）。
这一术语大约在20世纪90年代中期才出现在公众视野，此前并不为人所知。
而“有效市场”这一术语就老得多了，前面介绍过是在19世纪提出的。
行为金融学这一术语是20世纪60年代提出的。
行为金融学是金融领域一场新兴的革命，希勒教授在这方面参与颇多，他从1991年开始，与芝加哥大学的查德.塞勒（Richard Thaler）教授一起，组织关于行为金融学的研讨会，已经坚持举办了18年，时间挺长的了（笑）。
刚开始时，完全不为人们所重视，他们想过，没人欣赏我们，而希勒是终身教授，所以就能一直研究。
但是，问题在于，谁都不愿意去研究过于冷门的领域，幸运的是，我们具有允许这样做的体系，这是令人欣喜之处。
行为金融学是人们对于在有效市场理论中、或在数理金融学中极端情况的反应。
希勒认为数理金融学是一门精美结构的学科，他很钦佩这方面学者的成就，他也曾参与过。
但是，数理金融学具有其局限性，人们都知道一种范式发展的途径，当发展到一定阶段，都会出现这种情况。
在20世纪60年代，数理金融学是门新学科，充满着令人振奋的事情，没有人再想研究其他的情况，人们都要去做令人振奋的事。
当到了70年代和80年代，在这方面有点过了头，人们跑得太远了，他们以为这就是人类所要的一切，不需要再考虑其他事情了。
随后便时常显得有点疯狂。
然而，我们必须反思，其实一切不尽完美（笑），世界并不完美（笑），世上存在着真实的人。
所以，就引申出行为金融学。
行为金融学指的是什么呢？它不同于行为心理学，也不是意味着将行为心理学应用于金融学，其实际含义要广泛得多。
行为金融学意味着是将所有的其他社会科学应用于金融学。
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《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)
简介
★小羊羊村长★大学开发课程粉丝Q群：122798308
课程类型：金融
课程简介：
金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。
它们为投资活动提供支持及风险管理。
如果我们想要预测金融机构动态及他们在这个信息时代中的发展态势，我们必须对其业务有所了解。
本课程将涉及的内容有：金融学理论、金融业的发展历程、金融机构（例如银行、保险公司、证券公
司、期货公司及其他衍生市场）的优势与缺陷以及这些机构的未来发展前景。
课程结构：
本课程每讲75分钟，一周两次，在2008年春季录制并收入耶鲁大学公开课程系列。
关于教授罗伯特希勒
Robert J. Shiller是Yale大学Arthur M. Okun经济学讲座教授和Yale大学管理学院国际金融中心研究员. Shiller教授的研究领域包括行为金融学和房地产，并在“金融经济学杂志”,“美国经济评论”,“金融学杂志”,“华尔街杂志”和“金融时报”等著名刊物发表文章. 主要著作包括“市场波动”,“宏观市场”(凭借此书他获得了TIAA-CREF的保罗 A. 萨缪尔森奖),“非理性繁荣和金融新秩序：二十一世纪的风险”
Robert J. Shiller is Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University and a Fellow at the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management. Specializing in behavioral finance and real estate, Professor Shiller has published in Journal of Financial Economics, American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times. His books include Market V olatility, Macro Markets (for which he won the TIAA-CREF's Paul A. Samuelson Award), Irrational Exuberance and The New Financial Order: Risk in the Twenty-First Century.
目录:
1.Finance and Insurance as Powerful Forces in Our Economy and Society
金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用
2. The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and the Hedging of Risks
风险管理中的普遍原理:风险聚集和对冲
3. Technology and Invention in Finance
金融中的科技与发明
4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model)
投资组合多元化和辅助性的金融机构(资本资产定价模型)
5. Insurance: The Archetypal Risk Management Institution
保险:典型的风险管理制度
6. Efficient Markets vs. Excess V olatility
有效市场与过度波动之争
7. Behavioral Finance: The Role of Psychology
行为金融学:心理的作用
8. Human Foibles, Fraud, Manipulation, and Regulation 人性弱点,欺诈,操纵与管制
9. Guest Lecture by David Swensen
大卫•斯文森的客座演讲
10. Debt Markets: Term Structure
债券市场:期限结构
11. Stocks
股票
12. Real Estate Finance and Its Vulnerability to Crisis 房地产金融和其易受危机影响的脆弱性
13. Banking: Successes and Failures
银行业:成功和失败
14. Guest Lecture by Andrew Redleaf
安德鲁•雷德利夫的客座演讲
15. Guest Lecture by Carl Icahn
卡尔•伊坎的客座演讲
16. The Evolution and Perfection of Monetary Policy
货币政策的进化和完善
17. Investment Banking and Secondary Markets
投资银行和二级市场
18. Professional Money Managers and Their Influence
金融市场翻译团队介绍
友情奉献
世界顶级大学开放课程的博客/。