产业组织理论中文参考文献

产业组织理论英文参考文献References for Industrial OrganizationNote:Tirole = J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.HIO = R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization, New Y ork: North Holland, 1989.Laffont & Tirole=J. -J. Laffont & J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.Armstrong et al. = M. Armstrong, S. Crown, and J. V ickers, Regulatory Reform--Economic Analysis and British Experience, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.I. The Theory of the FirmA. TheoryTirole, Introduction and The Theory of the Firm.Chandler, ''Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (Summer 1992), 79-100.R. Coase, ''The Nature of the Firm,'' reprinted in G. Stigler and K. Boulding, eds., Readings in Price Theory, Irwin, 1952, 33 l-351.S. Grossman and O. Hart, ''The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of V ertical and Lateral Integration," J ournal of Political Economy, 94 (August 1986), 691 -796.B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, ''The Theory of the Firm," in HIO.B. Klein, R. Crawford, and A. Alchian, ''V ertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and theCompetitive Contracting Process,'' Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (October l978),297-326.O. Williamson, The Economic institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, 1985, Chapters 3-6 (especially 1 and 3).B. Empirical Evidence on Asset SpecificityE. Anderson and D. Schmittlein, ''Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination,"Rand Journal of Economics, 15(Autumn 1984), 327-343.P. Joskow, ''V ertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric-Generating Plants," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, I (Spring1985), 33-80.P. Joskow, ''Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, 77 (March 1987), 168-l85.P. Joskow, ''Asset Specificity and the Structure of V ertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," Chapter 8 in O. Williamson and S. Winter, The Nature of the Firm: Origins,Evolution, and Development, Oxford 1993, 117-137.K. Monteverde and D. Teece, ''Supplier Switching Costs and V ertical Integration in the Automobile Industry,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (Spring 1982), 206-213.A. Shepard, "Contractual Form, Retail Pricing and Asset Characteristics in GasolineRetailing," Rand Journal of Economics, 24(Spring 1993), 58-77.II. Monopoly PricingA. Basic Monopoly Pricing and Durable GoodsTirole, Chapter 1 (including supplementary section).M. Pesendorfer, ``Retail Sales. A Study of Pricing Behavior in Supermarkets,'' mimeo.B. First and Third Degree Price DiscriminationTirole, Sections 3.0 - 3.2Katz, M., "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets," American Economic Review, 77, (March 1 987), pp. 154-67.Schmalensee, R., ''Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price-Discrimination,'' American Economic Review, 71 (March 1981), pp. 242-47.V arian, H., ''Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,'' American Economic Review, 75 (September 1985), pp. 870-5.Perry, Martin, ''Forward Integration by ALCOA: 1888-1930," Journal of Industrial Economics, 29 (l), September 1980, pp. 37-53.C. Second Degree Price DiscriminationTirole, Sections 3.3 - 3.5.Maskin, E. And J. Riley, "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics 15 (Summer 1984), pp. 171-96,Oi, W., ''A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey-Mouse Monopoly,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (February 197l), pp. 77-96.McAfee, P., J. McMillan, and M. Whinston, ''Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of V alues,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (May 1989), pp.37l-83.Blackstone, E., ''Restrictive Practices in the Marketing of Electrofax Copying Machines. The SCM Corporation Case,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 23 (March 1975), pp.189-202.Shepard, A., ''Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration,'' Journal of Political Economy,99 (February 1991), pp. 30-53.I. A yers, and P. Siegelman, "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,''American Economic Review, 85 (June 1995), 304-321.Borenstein, S. and N. Rose, "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry,"Journal of Political Economy, 102 (August 1994), 653-683.III. Estimating Demand (and Supply)1.Deaton and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior, Parts 1 and2.2.S. Anderson, A. De Palma and J. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of ProductDifferentiation, Chapters 2-5.3. D. Epple, "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and SupplyFunctions for Differentiated Products, Journal of Political Economy, 95 (February1987), 59-80.4.Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, ''Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,"Econometrica, V ol. 63, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 841-890.5. A. Petrin, "Quantifying the Benefits of New Products:The Case of the Minivan'',mimeo.6.Goldberg, P.K., ''Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in international Markets: TheCase of the U.S. Automobile Industry,'' Econometrica, V ol. 63, No. 4, July 1995, pp.891-952.7.S. Ellison, I. Cockburn, Z. Griliches and J. Hansman, "Characteristics of Demand forPharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins,'' Rand Journal ofEconomics, 28, Autumn 1997, 426-446.8.J. Hausman, "V aluation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition,'' inThe Economics of New Goods, T. Bresnahan and R. Gordon (eds.) and comment by T.Bresnahan.9.J. Hansman, "Reply to Prof. Bresnahan," mimeo.10.T. Bresnahan, "The Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios War: V aluing New Goods, IdentifyingMarket Power, and Economic Measurement," mimeo.IV. Introduction to Strategic Behavior and Static CompetitionA. Introduction to Strategic Behavior1. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization:An Introduction and Overview,'' in HIO.2.Tirole, pp. 205-208 and Chapter 11.B. Prices and OutputC. Shapiro, ''Theories of Oligopoly Behavior," in HIO.Tirole, Chapters 2.1 and 5.D. Kreps and J. Scheinkman, ''Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition YieldCournt Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 326-337.Klemperer, P., "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Spring 1987), pp. 138-50.Sutton, J., and A. Shaked, ''Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation,'' Review of Economic Studies, 49 (January 1982), pp. 3- 14.D. Stalil, "Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search,'' InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 14 (April 1996), 243-268.V. Dynamic CompetitionA. TheoryTirole, Chapter 6.Rotemberg, J. J. and G. Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms,'' American Economic Review, 76 (June 1986), 390-407.K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, "Collusion over the Business Cycle,'' Rand Journal of Economics, (Spring 1997), 82-106.Brock, W. and J. Scheinkman, "Price-Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints,'' Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 37 l-82.Green, E. and R. Porter, ''Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,'' Econometrica, 52 (January 1984), pp. 87-100.Maskin, E. and J. Tirole, "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, 56 (May 1988), pp.571 -99.Bernheim and M. Whinston, "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Spring 1990), l-26.Stigler, G.J., "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, 72 (February l964), pp.44-61.B. Empirical EvidenceR. Porter, ''A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880-l886," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 301-314.G. Ellison, ''Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee,'' Rand Journal ofEconomics, 25 (Spring 1994), 37-57.D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Narrative Evidence on the Dynamics of Collusion: The SugarInstitute Case, " mimeo.R. Grether and C. Plott, ''The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case,'' Economic inquiry, 22 (October l984),479-507.M. Levenstein, "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the PreWorld War I Bromine industry,'' The Journal of Industrial Economics, June 1997, 117-138.S. Borenstein and A. Shepard, ''Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,'' The Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1996, V ol. 27, No. 3, pp. 429-451.VI. Empirical Studies of Firm ConductA. Inter-Industry StudiesF. M. Scherer and D. Ross, I ndustrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chapter11.R. Schmalensee, ''Interindustry Studies of Structure and Performance,'' in HIO.Demsetz, H., "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy,'' Journal of Law and Economics, 16, (1973), l-10.I. Domowitz, R. Hubbard and B. Petersen, "Business Cycles and the Relationship BetweenConcentration and Price-Cost Margins," Rand Journal of Economics, 17(Spring 1986),1-17.R. Schmalensee, ''Do Markets Differ Much?" American Economic Review, 75 (June 1985), 341-351.M. Salinger, "The Concentration-Margin Relationship Reconsidered,'' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, 287-335.B. Theory of Conduct Parameters1.T. Bresnahan, "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified," Economics Letters, 10,1982, 87-92.2.L. Lau, "On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and OutputData,'' Economics Letters, 10, 1982, 93-99.3.J. Panzar and J. Rosse, "Testing for 'Monopoly' Equilibrium," Journal of IndustrialEconomics, 35 (June 1987), 443-456.4.K. Corts, "Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power,'' Journal ofEconometrics ???C. Industry-Specific S tudies of Firm Conduct1.T. Bresnahan, "Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power,'' in HIO.2.R. Coterill, "Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from V ermont,"Review of Economics and Statistics, 68 (August 1986), 379-386.3. A. Nevo, "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,'' mimeo.4.T. Bresnahan, "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The1955 Price War,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (June 1987), 457-482.5. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Testing Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the SugarIndustry, 1898-1914,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1 998), 355-377.6. C. Wolfram, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,'' mimeo.7.Baker, J. and T. Bresnahan, ''Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring MarketPower," Antitrust Law Journal, V ol.61, 1992,pp.3-16.VII. EntryA. Basic TheoryTirole, Sections 7.l-7.2Mankiw, N.G. and M.D. Whinston, "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Spring 1986), pp. 48-58.Anderson, S., A. de Palma, and Y. Nesterov, "Oligopolistic Competition and the Optimal Provision of Products," Econometrica, V ol. 63, No. 6, November 1995, pp.l281-1302.Sutton, J., Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, 1991, Chapters l-2.B. Jovanovic, ''Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, (May 1982),649-670.Banmol, W.K., J.C. Panzar, and R.D. Willig, ''On the Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets," in J.E. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson, eds., New Developments in the Analysisof Market Structure, MIT Press, 1986.B . Empirical Evidence1.T. Bresnahan and P. Reiss, ''Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,'' J ournal ofPolitical Economy, 99 (October 1991), 977- 009.ments on Bresnahan and Reiss, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: SpecialIssue on Microeconomics, 3 (1987), 872-882.3.T. Dunne, M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson, ''Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S.Manufacturing,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 19 (Winter 1988), 495-515.4.Berry, S. and J. Waldfogel, ''Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting,"June 1996.5.S. Berry, ''Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline industry, "Econometrica, 60(July 1992), 889-918.VIII. Strategic InvestmentA. General ConsiderationsTirole, pp. 207-8, Chapter 8.J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer, '`Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, 93 (June 1985), 488-511.D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean andHungry Look,'' American Economic Review, 74 (May 1 984), 36 1 -366.R. Gilbert, ''Mobility Barriers and the V alue of Incumbency," in HIO.B. Capacity, Product Differentiation, beaming Curves, ContractsA. Dixit, ''The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence,'' Economic Journal, 90 (March l980),95-106.R. Schmalensee, ''Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry,'' Journal of Political Economy,89 (December 1981), pp. 1228-38.J.R. Gelman and S.C. Salop, ''Judo Economics. Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 315-25.D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to DeterMobility,'' Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (December 1983), 227-250.R. Schmalensee, ''Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (Autumn 1978), pp. 305-27.K. Judd, ''Credible Spatial Preemption," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (Summer 1985), pp.153-66.D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Learning by Doing and Market Performance,'' Bell Journal ofEconomics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 522-30.P. Aghion and P. Bolton, "Entry Prevention Through Contracts with Customers,'' American Economic Review, 77, June 1987, pp. 388-401.T.E. Cooper, "Most-Favored Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 377-88.J. J. Laffont, P. Rey and J. Tirole, "Network Competition I: Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Spring 1 998), l -37.C. Empirical Evidence on Strategic InvestmentJ. Chevalier, "Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry,'' American Economic Review, June 1995.M. Lieberman, "Post Entry investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing Industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Winter 1987), 533-549.G. Hurdle, et al., "Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Airline Industry,''Journal of Industrial Economics, 38 (December 1989), 119-140.R. Smiley, "Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence,'' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6 (June 1988), 167- 180.IX. Information and Strategic BehaviorA. Limit Pricing1.Tirole, Sections 9.0 - 9.4.2.P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ''Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: AnEquilibrium Analysis,'' Econometrica, 50 (March 1982), 443-460.B. PredationTirole, Sections 9.5 - 9.7.P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ''Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (August 1982), pp. 288-312.G. Saloner, ''Predation, Merger, and Incomplete information," Rand Journal of Economics, 18(Summer 1987), pp. 165-186.D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''A'Signal-Jamming' Theory of Predation,'' Rand Journal ofEconomics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 366-76.P. Bolton and D. Scharfstein, ''A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting,'' American Economic Review, 80 (March 1 990), pp. 93- 106.Benoit, J.P., ''Financially Constrained Entry in a Game of Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp. 490-99.J. Oulover and G. Saloner, ''Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust," in HIO.C. Empirical Studies of Information Asymmetries and PredationD. Cooper, S. Garvin and J. Kagel, "Signaling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry LimitPricing Game,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 28 (Winter 1997), 662-683.D. Genesove, "Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market,'' Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 101 (August 1993), 644-665.M. Doyle and C. Snyder, "Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor V ehicle Industry," mimeo.T. Hubbard, "Consumer Beliefs and Buyer and Seller Behavior in the V ehicle Inspection Market,'' mimeo.J. McGee,'' Predatory Price Cutting The Standard Oil (NJ) Case,'' Journal of Law and Economics, l (October 1958), 137-169.D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar industry, l887-1914," NBER Working Paper 6032, 1997.D. Weiman and R. Levin, ''Preying for Monopoly: Southern Bell," Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 102 (February 1994), 103-26.Kadiyali, V., ''Entry, Its Deferrence, and its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S.Photographic Film Industry," The Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1 996, V ol. 27, X. AdvertisingTirole, Sections 2.2-2.4, 7.3M. Stegeman, ''Advertising in Competitive Markets,'' American Economic Review, 81 (March 1991), 210-223.F. M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chapter18.Kwoka, J. ''Advertising the Price and Quality of Optometric Services,'' American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1984, 211 -216.P. Ippolito and A. Mathios, ''Information, Advertising and Health: A Study of the Cereal Market,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Autumn 1 990), 459-480.D. Ackerberg, "Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experience Good Markets:An Empirical Examination,'' mimeo.XI. AuctionsP. McAfee and J. McMillan, ''Auctions and Bidding," JEL, June 1987, pp. 699-738.P. Milgrom, "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," JEP, Summer 1989, pp. 3-22.K. Hendricks and R. Porter, ''An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information,'' American Economic Review, December 1 988, pp. 865-83.R. Porter, ''The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions,"Econometrica, 63 (January 1995), pp. 1-27.R. Porter and D. Zona, "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," JPE, June 1993, pp. 5 18-38.P. Bajari, "Econometrics of the First Price Auction with Asymmetric Bidders," mimeo.J.-J. Laffont, H. Ossard, and Q. V uong, ''Econometrics of First Price Auctions,'' EM, July 1995, pp. 953-80.J. Kagel, R. Harstad and D. Levin, ''Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private V alues: A Laboratory Study, "Econometrica, 55 (1987), pp. 1275-1304.J. Kagel, ''Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research,'' in J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds., The Handbook of Experimental Economics.XII. Technological ChangeA. Research and DevelopmentTirole, Sections 10.l - 10.5, 8. l.3G. C. Loury, ''Market Structure and Innovation,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93 (1979),pp. 395-410.D. Fudenberg, R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz, and J. Tirole, "Preemption, Leapfrogging, andCompetition in Patent Races," European Economic Review, 22 (1983), pp. 3-31.D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of NewTechnology,'' Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 383-401.Symposium on Patent Policy, Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Spring 1990).B. Standardization1.J. Farrell and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation,'' RandJournal of Economics, 16 (1985), pp. 70-83.2.M. Katz and C. Shapiro, ''Technology Adoption in the Presence of NetworkExternalities," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), pp. 822-841.C. Diffusion of T echnologiesRogers and Shoemaker, The Diffusion of Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Approach, Free Press, 1971.G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 101 (1993), pp. 612-643.D. Empirical StudiesA. Pakes, "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the V alue of Holding European PatentStocks, Econometrica, 54 (July 1986), 755-784.M. Trajtenberg, "The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations with an Application to Computed Tomography Scanners," Journal of Political Economy, 97 (April 1989),444-479.G. Saloner and A. Shepard, "Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An EmpiricalExamination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines," Rand Journal ofEconomics, 13 (Autumn 1995), 479-501.T. Hubbard, "Why Are Process Monitoring Technologies V aluable? The Use of On-Board Information Technology in the Trucking Industry," mimeo.E. Mansfield, "How Rapidly Does New industrial Technology Leak Out?" Journal ofIndustrial Economics, 34 (December 1985), 217-223.N. L. Rose and P. L. Joskow, ''The Diffusion of New Technologies. Evidence from the Electric Utility industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Autumn 1990), 354-373. XIII. Managerial incentives and Firm BehaviorTirole, pages 34-55.B. Holmstrom, "Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective,'' in Essays inHonor of Lars Wahlbeck, 1982.S. Grossman and O. Hart, "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (Spring 1980), 42-64.A. Shleifer and R. V ishny, "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,'' Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 94 (June 1996), 461-488.O. Hart, "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 366-382.C. Fershtman and K. Judd, "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American EconomicReview, 77(December 1987), 927-940.R. Masson, "Executive Motivation, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance,"Journal of Political Economy, 79 (December 1971), 1278- 1292.P. Healy, "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions,'' Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (April 1985), 85-107.XIV. Antitrust: Overview1.Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 1992, "Executive Summary of the AntitrustLaws." Kaye, Scholer's Antitrust Deskbook, NY, pp. 319.2.Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 1992, "Introduction to EC Competition Law,''Kaye, Scholer's Antitrust Deskbook, NY, pp. 237-242.XV. Antitrust: Horizontal MergersA. Policy IssuesMaterials on Time-Warner/Turner Merger (mimeo). Available from Graphic Arts as Part A of the 14.272 Readings Packet.B. Theory and Evidence1.J. Farrell & C. Shapiro, "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," AmericanEconomic Review, 80 (March 1990), 107-126.2.Robert D. Willig, "Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and MergerGuidelines," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1991, pp.281-332.3. B.E. Eckbo, "Mergers and Market Concentration Doctrine Evidence from the CapitalMarket," Journal of Business, 58 (July 1985), 325-349.4.R. McAfee & M. Williams, "Can Event Studies Detect Anticompetitive Merger?"Economic Letters, (1988), 199-203.5.R.A. Prager, "The Effects of Horizontal Mergers on Competition: The Case of theNorthern Securities Company," Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (Spring 1992), 123-133.6.G.L. Mullin, J.C. Mullin, and W.P. Mullin, "The Competitive Effects of Mergers: StockMarket Evidence from the U.S. Steel Dissolution Suit," Rand Journal of Economics, 26(Summer 1995), 314-330.7.S. Bhagat, A. Shleifer, & R.W. Wishny, "Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return toCorporate Specialization," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics,1990. 1-84.8.M. Pesendorfer, "Horizontal Mergers in the Paper industry,'' NBER Working Paper 6751.October 1988C. Horizontal Merger PolicyUS Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (revised April 1992).J. Hausman and G. Leonard, "Economic Analysis of Differentiated Product Mergers Using Real World Data," mimeo, October 25, 1996.David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller, "Econometric Market Delineation,'' Managerial and Decision Economics, V ol. 17, 165-178 (1996)G.J. Werden and L.M. Froeb, "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries:Logit Demand and Merger Policy,'' Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,10(October 1994), 407-26.S.C. Salop, L.J. White, F. M. Fisher, & R. Schmalensee, "Symposium: Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (Fail 1987), 3-54.S. Dalkir & F.R. Warren-Boulton, "Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997),'' in J.E. Kwoka, Jr. and L.J. White, eds., The AntitrustRevolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy,3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress (1999), pp. 143-165.XVI. Antitrust: V ertical Relations & V ertical Restraints1.Tirole, Chapter 4 (including supplementary section).2.J.A. Ordover, G. Saloner, & S.C. Salop, "Equilibrium V ertical Foreclosure," AmericanEconomic Review, 80 (March 1990), 127-142.3.Benjamin Klein, "Market Power in Aftermarkets," Managerial and Decision Economics,V ol. 17, 143-164 (1996).4.Carl Shapiro, "Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak,'' AntitrustLaw Journal, V ol. 63 at 483 (1995).5.O. Hart and J. Tirole, "V ertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Paperson Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, 205-286.6.P. Rey and J. Stiglitz, " The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition,"Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Autumn 1995), 431-451.7.M. B. Lieberman, "Determinants of V ertical Integration: An Empirical Test," Journal ofIndustrial Economics, 39(September 1991), 451-466.8.S.J. Ornstein & D.M. Hanssens, "Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing orRestructuring? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States," Journal of IndustrialEconomics, 36 (September 1987), 1-18.9. F. Lafontaine, "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results,'' RandJournal of Economics, 23 (Summer 1992) 263-283.XVII. The Political Economy of Regulation。