WTO案例9英文

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国际贸易英语Unit 9

国际贸易英语Unit 9

WPA General Additional Coverage
illustration for FPA
Perils of the sea
Total loss
G.A.
Particular average because of fortuitous accidents

Particular average suffered from natural calamity
two characteristics: 1)Loss directly suffered from the risks. 2)The cargo owner whose goods were damaged or lost should undertake the loss by himself
Relationship between G.A. and P.A.
Unit 9
International cargo transportation insurance
WHAT IS INSURANCE

Insurance is essentially a contract between two parties. The first party is the assured, insured or policyholder: who wishes to transfer a risk. The second party is the insurance company, insurer or underwriter: with the party agreeing to take on the risk of the assured in return for a premium.

世贸组织英文版ppt-WTO presentation讲课教案

世贸组织英文版ppt-WTO presentation讲课教案
• 2. Settle disputes and reduce trade tensions
• 3. Stimulate economic growth and employment
• 4. Cut the cost of doing business internationally
• 5. Encourage good governance • 6. Help countries develop • 7. Give the weak a stronger voice
世贸组织英文版pptwtopresentationestablishmentgatt1947generalagreementtradegatt关税与贸易总协定brettonwoodsinstitutions布雷顿森林体系theworldbankinternationalmonetaryfund
世贸组织英文版ppt-WTO presentation
GATT trade rounds
Ⅲ. Basic information about the WTO
• 1. It head-quartered in Genev (2013)
3. The logo of the WTO
• Designed by Singaporean Su Yeang Design company, announced in 1997
On November 15th , 1999, China and the US signed a bilateral agreement.
On may 19th , 2000, China and the EU signed the bilateral agreement.
On November 11th , 2001, China joined the WTO

外贸英语函电Unit Nine

外贸英语函电Unit Nine
PREV.
Unit 9 Packing & Shipment
One
订货公司向发货公司说明货物包装损坏问题,希望其下 次改善包装质量。 Dear Sirs:
On October 19, we received your consignment of 40 cardboard cartons of steel screws.
Unit 9 Packing & Shipment
6.Please put each vase in a foam plastic casing and then in a thicker paper box for our future orders, otherwise, we shall be compelled to give up this order. 请每花瓶套一只泡沫塑料套,并装在较厚的纸盒内,否则, 我们只能放弃这次订单。 7.We await your shipping advice. 我们等待你方装运通知。 8.We trust the above shipment will reach you in sound condition. 我方希望上述船货将完好地抵达你处。 9.According to the terms of Contract No.200910, shipment is to be effected by the 14th Feb.. 按200910号合同条款,货物应于2月14日前装运。
Unit 9 Packing & Shipment
4.The packing of Women’s Blouses is each in a polybag, 10 dozen to a carton lined with waterproof paper and bound with two iron straps outside. 女士衬衫的包装为每件套一塑料袋,10打装一纸箱。内衬防 潮纸,外打铁箍两道。 5.The quality of your Wine is fine, but its packing is rather poor. Bottles are subject to breakage and carboard boxes are very thin. 贵公司红酒质量很好,但包装较差,瓶子易碎,纸盒太薄。

WTO 英文选读 Passage 4

WTO 英文选读 Passage 4

Passage 4MEMBERSHIP OF THE WTOAll members have joined the system as a result of negotiation and therefore membership means a balance of rights and obligations. They enjoy the privileges that other member-countries give to them and the security that the trading rules provide. In return, they had to make commitments to open their markets and to abide by the rules ——those commitments were the result of the membership(or “accession”)negotiations.For most WTO members, the negotiations took place under the old GA TT system. Most automatically became founder-members of the WTO when it was established on 1 January 1995 because they had signed the Uruguay Round agreement in Marrakesh in April 1994. Some joined GA TT after April 1994 but before the WTO was set up and they also joined the WTO automatically. Another small group had participated in the Uruguay Round but did not complete their membership negotiations until 1995, when they, too, joined. All of these countries are considered “original”WTO members.As new members join, new applicants approach the WTO. By the end of 2001, the WTO had 143 members with about 30 applicants negotiating membership(they are WTO “observers”).How to join the WTO:the accession processAny state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may join(“accede to”)the WTO, but WTO members must agree on the terms. Broadly speaking the application goes through four stages:First, “tell us about yourself”. The government applying for membership has to describe all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements. This is submitted to the WTO in a memorandum which is examined by the working party dealing with the country’s application. These working parties are open to all WTO members.Second, “work out with us individually what you have to offer”. When the working party has made sufficient progress on principles and policies, parallel bilateral talks begin between the prospective new member and individual countries. They are bilateral because different countries have different trading interests. These talks cover tariff rates and specific market access commitments, and other policies in goods and services. The new member’s commitments are to apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally. In other words, the talks determine the benefits(in the form of exportopportunities and guarantees)other WTO members can expect when the new member joins. (The talks can be highly complicated. It has been said that in some cases the negotiations are almost as large as an entire round of multilateral trade negotiations.)Third, “let’s draft membership terms”. Once the working party has completed its examination of the applicant’s trade regime, and the parallel bilateral market access negotiations are complete, the working party finalizes the terms of accession. These appear in a report, a draft membership treaty(“protocol of accession”)and lists(“schedules”)of the member-to-be’s commitments.Finally, “the decision”. The final package, consisting of the report, protocol and lists of commitments, is presented to the WTO General Council or the Ministerial Conference. If a two-thirds majority of WTO members vote in favour, the applicant is free to sign the protocol and to accede to the organization. In some cases, the country’s own parliament or legislature has to ratify the agreement before membership is complete.。

《国贸专业英语》第9章资料

《国贸专业英语》第9章资料

Unit 9Insurance for Goods in Transit货物运输保险Is marine insurance(海上保险)only provided for ocean transport? Read the following article and you will know more about insurance for goods in transit.海上保险是否仅仅为海洋运输提供服务?阅读下文,你将会对运输物资保险有更多的了解。

Key terms : marine insurance 海上保险insurance interest 可保利益total loss 全损general average 共同海损1.The insurance that covers losses of goods in transit is always called marine insurance(海上保险), even thoughocean transport may not be involved in the matter at all . 为货物在运输过程中所受损失提供保障的保险一般称为海上保险,甚至货物不在海上进行运输。

Marine insurance is a contract(合同)whereby(凭那个)an insurer(保险人)indemnifies(赔偿)the insured(被保险人) against losses incident(伴随而来的) to transportation.海上保险是一种合同,通过该合同,保险人对运输过程中的损失对被保险人进行赔偿。

2. Originally marine insurance was provided only for transport and consequently the name was adopted(采用). 起初,海上保险仅仅为海上运输所提供,后来这个名字沿用了下来。

WTO第9章补贴与反补贴

WTO第9章补贴与反补贴

1.3 《补贴与反补贴协议》对补贴的定义及其基 本特点
• 定义:由一成员方境内的政府或任何公共机构提供并 授予某种利益的财政资助(Financial Contribution)或 其他任何形式的收入或价格的支持措施 。 • 补贴的特点:
– 第一,补贴是一种政府行为;不仅指中央政府,而且包括各 级地方政府和国有公司等公共机构,也包括政府授权或干预 下的私人行为 。 – 第二,补贴是一种财政措施,或收入或价格支持措施。 – 第三,受补贴方可以从补贴行为中得到某种“利益”,即从 某项政府资助计划中得到某些它从市场上不能取得的价值。 – 第四,补贴的对象是国内生产者和销售者,即对产品提供方 的补贴。 – 第五,补贴的目的是增强国内企业生产的产品在国内和国际 市场上的竞争地位。
1.2 《补贴与反补贴协议》主要特点
• (1)不仅对补贴作出了明确的定义,而且引入了 “专向性补贴”的新概念; • (2)将补贴分为禁止性补贴、可申诉补贴和不可申 诉补贴三个基本类型,并分别予以规范; • (3)对于发展中成员方的特殊和差别待遇规定得比 以往更为具体和详细; • (4)引入了世界贸易组织的争端解决机制,加强了 反补贴争议解决程序的力度; • (5)由于乌拉圭回合的多边协定采取一揽子接受方 式,该协议具有更大的普遍适用性。
2.3 不可申诉补贴
• 定义:成员方政府为鼓励研究活动、发展落后地区经济、保护 环境而实施的补贴,及其他普遍实施的非专向性的补贴。 这类补贴被保留的原因是其对国际贸易造成不利影响的可能性极 小,且具有特殊意义而应受到鼓励,其他成员方不应采取反补 贴措施并不可诉诸争端解决。 • 下列补贴属于不可申诉补贴: – (1)非专向性补贴。 – (2 )对企业所进行的,或在与企业签订合同的基础上由高 等教育机构或研究机构进行研究活动的资助。 – (3 )按地区发展的一般规划对成员方领土内落后地区的非 专向性资助 – (4) 为促进现有设备适应法律或法规所规定的新的环境要 求,对企业造成更大困难和财务负担给予的资助

WTO商务谈判英语系列9页word文档

WTO商务谈判英语系列9页word文档

1、Thanks. By the way, do you have any plans for tonight? 谢谢。

顺便问一下,今晚有什么安排吗?2、None whatsoever. Im at your disposal.一点儿也没有呢。

我得听你安排。

3、Why dont we have dinner together to celebrate the success of our first deal. There is a very nice restaurant round the corner. 咱们一起吃晚饭,庆祝我们的首次交易成功,好不好?附近有一家饭店非常不错。

4、Id love to!太好了!5、Excuse me, are you Mr. Pierre from Paris?请问,哪一位是从巴黎来的皮埃尔先生?6、Please remember to use both English and Chinese versions and both versions should be equally valid.请记住用中英两种文字缮制合同,两种文本同样有效。

7、Naturally. Each of us keeps one original and two copies.那是当然。

我们每人保留一份正本和两份副本。

8、Then Ill come along two days later to put my signature on it. 那么两天后我再来签字。

9、Good.好的。

10、Well Mr.Chen, its been very pleasant talking with you.陈先生,跟您谈话真是非常愉快。

11、Your L/C must be opened at least one month before the time of shipment, otherwise we wouldnt be able to catch the ship.你方信用证必须在装货前一个月开出,否则我们将赶不上船。

国际贸易经典案例九:HallmarkCards

国际贸易经典案例九:HallmarkCards

Facing Business Challenges at Hallmark Cards Sending the Right Message to Employees One of Hallmark's sympathy cards reads "Please remember that winter's darkness emerges into spring." Given the troubles at Hallmark Cards, it's just the kind of message that Human Resources vice president Ralph Christenson wants to send to employees. From the early- to mid-1990s the privately held greeting card firm saw its market share slip from well over 50 percent to about 45 percent, as new players in the market made cards that were more attractive and up to date. Even though Hallmark sales remained strong at about $4 billion annually, many profit measures slipped dramatically. It's hard to say just how bad things were because Hallmark profits are kept secret, even from the 20,000 employees who own part of the company. But it wasn't good news when-Hallmark's profit-sharing contributions slipped from 10 percent of salaries to about 5 percent. Newly arrived in the Human Relations department, Christenson needed to find ways of keeping company employees happy. After all, the company's core mission is to communicate affection, love, and friendship through the warm messages that employees dream up. Hallmark started out in 1910 as a family-run business, and the Hall family's leadership continues today. Based in Kansas City, Missouri, the company has always attracted talented and creative people through its friendly and family-oriented atmosphere. Because Hallmark products are based on enhancing relationships, it stands to reason that the company would focus on keeping employees happy. For example, back in the 1950s, the Hall family set up one of the first profit-sharing arrangements for employees. Today, employees own about one-third of the company. In addition, the tuition-reimbursement program pays 100 percent of education expenses for fulltime staff. Other initiatives focus on child care and alternative work arrangements such as work sharing and job sharing. And the company's policies are flexible to meet employees' special needs, such as allowing time off to care for aging parents. Overall, the company has always done such a good job helping its employees that Hallmark consistently ranks among the best companies to work for in the United States. But in the mid-1990s Hallmark faced declining market share and shrinking profit. Consultants suggested major cost-cutting efforts, including a merger of the administrative, marketing, and product-development functions for the various card brands. To save money, Hallmark threw out its old organization and the ways that employees had beep doing their jobs. With the new focus on finances, employees were concerned that their family-oriented benefits would disappear. Moreover, many employees feared that their jobs would be changed dramatically or eliminated altogether. The organization was in turmoil. Christenson had come to Hallmark because he believed the company cared deeply about its employees as people. Because of management's recent sharp focus on corporate profits, Christenson worried that Hallmark wouldn't be able to keep up its long tradition of caring for employees and their families. For the company to see its way through the current crisis, he had to inspire the employees who create and produce Hallmark products. Christenson needed new ways to strengthen the family-oriented programs and shore up morale. If you were Ralph Christenson, what motivational techniques would you employ to keep Hallmark operating at peak levels? During times of massive organizational change, what would you recommend to reassure employees and help them deal with stress? How could you improve the company's communication with employees. What steps would you recommend for maintaining Hallmark's traditional focus on employee needs? Meeting Business Challenges at Hallmark Cards As the new vice president of Human Relations, Ralph Christenson was facing restructuring and disruption at Hallmark. Rumors of layoffs or massive job change and loss of benefits echoed along the corridors of Hallmark's Kansas City headquarters. Employees worried that profit sharing might be cut and that other important benefits such as child-care help,tuition reimbursement, and work sharing would be lost. Always known for its family-oriented atmosphere, the company had consistently ranked among the best places to work in America. But now employees' faith in Hallmark wavered, and Christenson needed to reassure company employees that things would work out. Although Hallmark Cards was a healthy company, management knew the underlying cost structure was too high. Moreover, the time it took to deliver new products to market was as much as three years, far too long when customer tastes can change rapidly and the competition can react more quickly. So with the help of outside consultants, Hallmark's management developed several strategies to reduce costs and introduce products with greater speed. During this time of change, preserving employee jobs and improving morale were Christenson's primary concerns. So he developed a creative solution for containing costs by looking beyond what people were originally hired to do. To retain employees displaced by the merger of three divisions, Christenson developed a program for retraining factory workers tol1andle office jobs. Yet another group of factory employees helped paint an operating plant while receiving their standardwages. When factory work is slow, employees can even choose to volunteer for community work while drawing their usual paychecks. And no employee with more than two years with the company can be let go without a case review by company executives. So with Christenson's help, Hallmark was able to perpetuate its special caring for employees and its history of no layoffs. Then to speed up the time it takes to develop and introduce new card products, Christenson helped Hallmark create cross-functional teams. Before these changes, Hallmark artists, designers, printers, and financial staff were working as much as a city block apart even though some of them were working on the same card design. With the new team concept,these employees have been brought together into one room to create, develop, cost-justify, and produce new cards. This approach cut the overall time to market from three years to about one year and helped Hallmark compete more effectively in the rapidly changing greeting card business. Employees quickly adapted to the idea of working together in teams, and they embraced the opportunity to learn more about the company's overall operations. Next, Christenson addressed employee benefits. Although workers were generally happy with the existing benefits package, Christenson wanted to offer even more solutions to keep Hallmark employees satisfied. He needed to build a two-way communication channel that allowed him to hear employee concerns firsthand; he set up a series of feedback sessions in which employees could tell him what was on their mind. As a result, Christenson reorganized the human relations department to focus on a number of themes important to employees。

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9.United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China美国对中国某些产品征收反补贴税Current statusReport(s) adopted, with recommendation to bring measure(s) into conformity on 16 January 2015Key factsShort title: US — Countervailing Measures(China)Complainant(原告):ChinaRespondent(被告): United StatesThird Parties: 第三方Australia; Brazil; Canada; European Union; India; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Norway; Russian Federation; Turkey; Viet Nam; Saudi Arabia, Kingdom ofAgreements cited: (as cited in request for consultations)Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Art. 1.1, 1.1(a)(1), 1.1(b), 2, 10, 11, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12.7,14(d), 30, 32.1GATT 1994: Art. VI, XXIIIProtocol of Accession: Art. 15Request forConsultationsreceived:25 May 2012Panel Reportcirculated(发行):14 July 2014Appellate BodyReport circulated(上诉主体的报告时间):18 December 2014 Summary of the dispute to dateThe summary below was up-to-date at 3 November 2015ConsultationsComplaint by China.On 25 May 2012, China requested consultations with the United States concerning the imposition(征收) of countervailing duty measures by the United States on certain products from China.China challenges various aspects of certain identified countervailing duty investigations, including their opening, conduct and the preliminary and final determinations that led to the imposition of countervailing duties. China also challenges the “rebuttable presumption”(可辨驳的假设) allegedly established and applied by the US Department of Commerce(美国商务部) that majority government ownership is sufficient to treat an enterprise as a “public body”.China claims that the challenge measures are inconsistent with: ∙Article VI of the GATT 1994;∙Articles 1.1, 2, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12.7 and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement; and∙Article 15 of the Protocol of Accession of China.中国入市协定On 20 August 2012, China requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 31 August 2012, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel.Article;1Articles1.1,2,11.1,11.2,11.3,12.7114 SCM协议(D); 和Article中国的入世议定书的15。

Panel and Appellate Body proceedingsAt its meeting on 28 September 2012, the DSB established apanel. Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Viet Nam reserved their third party rights. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia reserved its third party rights.On 14 November 2012, China requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel. On 26 November 2012, the Director-General composed the panel. On 29 April 2013, the Chair of the panel informed the DSB that the timetable adopted by the panel after consultations with the parties envisaged that the final report would be issued to the parties by January 2014. On 18 November 2013, the Chair of the panel informed the DSB that due to the complexity of the issues raised by the parties in this dispute, the panel expected to conclude its work in May 2014.On 14 July 2014, the panel report was circulated to Members.Summary of key findingsThe dispute concerns several initiation decisions, as well as preliminary and final determinations in 17 countervailing duty investigations conducted by the United States' Department of Commerce (USDOC) from 2007 through 2012. The Chinese products concerned by these investigations consist of solar panels; wind towers; thermal paper; coated paper; tow behind lawn groomers; kitchen shelving; steel sinks; citric acid; magnesia carbon bricks; pressure pipe; line pipe; seamless pipe; steel cylinders; drill pipe; oil country tubular goods; wire strand; and aluminum extrusions.China requested the Panel to find that the United States' investigating authority, the USDOC, acted inconsistently with the following obligations set forth in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) when initiating countervailing duty investigations, and making preliminary and final determinations in these investigations:a.In connection with the alleged provision of input goods for lessthan adequate remuneration:i.That the USDOC's findings of financial contribution areinconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement,because the USDOC incorrectly determined, or did not have asufficient basis to determine, that certain State-ownedenterprises (SOEs) are “public bodies”within the meaningof that provision in certain investigations;ii.That the “rebuttable presumption” established and applied by the USDOC in respect of whether SOEs can be classified as“public bodies” is, as such, inconsistent with Article1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement;iii.That the USDOC's initiation of countervailing dutyinvestigations in respect of allegations that SOEs confercountervailable subsidies through their sales of inputs todownstream producers, in the absence of sufficient evidencein the petition to support an allegation that SOEs constitute“public bodies” within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) ofthe SCM Agreement, and in the absence of a sufficient reviewof the petition by the USDOC in respect of this allegation,is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCMAgreement in certain investigations;iv.That the USDOC's findings of benefit are inconsistent with Article 1.1(b) and Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement,because the USDOC improperly found that the alleged provisionof goods for less than adequate remuneration conferred abenefit upon the recipient, and improperly calculated theamount of any benefit allegedly conferred, including, interalia, its erroneous findings that prevailing marketconditions in China were “distorted” as the basis forrejecting actual transaction prices in China as benchmarksin certain investigations;v.That the USDOC's findings of specificity are inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, because theUSDOC failed to make a proper determination on the basis ofpositive evidence that the alleged provision of inputs forless than adequate remuneration was specific to an enterpriseor industry or group of enterprises or industries in certaininvestigations;vi.That the USDOC's initiation of countervailing duty investigations in respect of the alleged provision of inputsfor less than adequate remuneration, in the absence ofsufficient evidence in the petition to support an allegationthat any such subsidy would be specific under Article 2 ofthe SCM Agreement, and in the absence of a sufficient reviewof the petition by the USDOC in respect of this allegation,is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCMAgreement in certain investigations.b.In connection with all of the identified countervailing dutyinvestigations in which the USDOC has issued a preliminary or final countervailing duty determination:i.That the USDOC's use of so-called “adverse facts available”to support its findings of financial contribution,specificity, and benefit is inconsistent with Article 12.7of the SCM Agreement in certain instances because the USDOCdid not rely on facts available on the record.c.In connection with the alleged provision of land and land-use rightsfor less than adequate remuneration:i.That the USDOC's findings of specificity are inconsistentwith Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, because theUSDOC failed to make a proper determination on the basis ofpositive evidence that the alleged subsidy was specific toan enterprise or industry or to a group of enterprises orindustries in certain land specificity investigations.d.In connection with export restraints allegedly maintained by China:i.That the USDOC's initiation of countervailing dutyinvestigations in respect of these allegations isinconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreementin certain investigations;ii.That the USDOC's determination that export restraints provided a “financial contribution” is inconsistent withArticle 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement in certaininvestigations.The United States requested that the Panel reject China's claims in this dispute. It also requested that the Panel to disregard China's claims pertaining to the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks. According to the United States, as China did not request consultations on these determinations, such determinations should be outside the terms of reference of this panel proceeding.Regarding China's claims made on an “as applied” basis, the Panel upheld China's claims against the USDOC's findings (i) that certain Chinese State-owned enterprises were public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, capable of providing financial contributions; (ii) that alleged subsidies were regionally specific; and (iii) on the existence of financial contributions in light of export restraints maintained by China. The Panel partially rejected China's claims against the USDOC's findings that alleged subsidies were specific to certain enterprises. The Panel rejected China's claims against the USDOC's findings (i) that there was “market distortion” justifying the use of an out-of-country benchmark in the benefit calculation; (ii) that there was sufficient evidence of financial contributions by public bodies and of specificity to justify the initiation of countervailing duty investigations; and (iii) on the use of “adverse facts available”.Regarding China's claims made on an “as such” basis, the Panel upheld China's claim challenging the USDOC's “rebuttable presumption” that majority State-owned enterprises are public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, and thus capable of conferring a financial contribution.As a consequence of the inconsistencies of the USDOC's actions with Articles 1, 2 and 11 of the SCM Agreement, the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.The Panel concluded that, to the extent that the measures at issue are inconsistent with certain provisions of the SCM Agreement, they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to China under that agreement. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommended that the United States bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the SCM Agreement.The Panel found the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks not to be within its terms of reference.On 22 August 2014, China filed an appeal covering most of the issues on which the Panel did not rule in its favour. On 27 August 2014, the United States filed a cross-appeal of the Panel's preliminary determination relating to the consistency of one section of China's panel request with Article 6.2 of the DSU. The United States did not appeal the Panel's finding that the USDOC's application of a “rebuttable presumption” to determine whether certain entities can be characterized as “public bodies”was inconsistent “as such” with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. Nor did the United States challenge on appeal the Panel's finding that the “public body” determinations made by the USDOC in 14 countervailing duty investigations were inconsistent with the same provision1 , or the Panel's findings regarding the USDOC's treatment of certain export restraints in two of the investigations at issue.On 18 December 2014, the Appellate Body report was circulated to Members.Summary of key findingsTerms of reference: In its other appeal, the United States claimed that the Panel erred in concluding that China's panel request, as it relates to China's facts available claims under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, was consistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU.The Appellate Body considered it to be clear from China's panelrequest that China was challenging all instances where the USDOC used “facts available” across the 22 measures at issue listed in China's panel request. The Appellate Body also disagreed with the United States that Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement contained multiple, distinct obligations. The Appellate Body thereforerejected the United States' appeal and upheld the Panel'sconclusion, finding that China's panel request, as it relates to China's facts available claims under Article 12.7, provided a“brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly”, as required under Article 6.2.Determination of benefit: With respect to the issues raised by China on appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findingupholding the USDOC's rejection of private prices as potential benchmarks in the investigations at issue on the grounds that such prices were distorted. The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel's finding that China failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Articles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement in respect of the benefit analysis in the OCTG, Solar Panels, Pressure Pipe, and Line Pipe investigations, and found, instead, that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations underArticles 14(d) and 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement by rejecting prices in China as benchmarks in its benefit analyses in these four countervailing duty investigations. While the Appellate Body agreed with China that there is a single definition of the term “government” for purposes of the SCM Agreement, it observed that it does not follow that, in determining the appropriate benefit benchmark under Article 14(d), investigating authorities are required to limit their analysis to an examination of the role played in the market by government-related entities that have been properly found to be government in the narrow sense or public bodies. However, because the issue of whether a price may be relied upon for benchmarking purposes under Article 14(d) is not a function of its source, but rather, whether it is a market-determined price reflective of prevailing market conditions in the country of provision, the Appellate Body stated that the selection of a benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d) cannot, at the outset, exclude consideration of in-country prices from any particular source, including government-related prices other than the financial contribution at issue. The Appellate Body explained that a finding of inconsistency with Article 14(d) depends on whether the investigating authority conducted the necessary market analysis in order to evaluate whether the proposed benchmark prices are market determined such that they can be used to assess whether the relevant goods have been provided for less than adequate remuneration.Sequence of the specificity analysis under the subparagraphs of Article 2.1: The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that China did not establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement by analysing specificity exclusively underArticle 2.1(c). Whereas the specificity analysis under each subparagraph of Article 2.1 should “ordinarily” proceed in a certain sequence, the Appellate Body did not exclude the possibility that, in certain circumstances, an investigating authority could properly conduct the specificity analysis withoutexamining the subparagraphs of Article 2.1 in a strict sequential order. The Appellate Body found that the application of theprinciples laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b) does notnecessarily constitute a condition that must be met in order to consider the factors listed under subparagraph (c). Recalling that “there may be instances in which the evidence underconsideration unequivocally indicates specificity ornon-specificity by reason of law, or by reason of fact, under one of the subparagraphs, and that in such circumstancesfurtherconsideration under the other subparagraphs of Article 2.1 may be unnecessary”, the Appellate Body disagreed with China that the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) conditions the assessment of de facto specificity on the basis of the factors listed under that subparagraph upon an application of the principles set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b). The Appellate Body further noted that China had not pointed to any evidence that was before the USDOC of the kind that would ordinarily be examined in determining de jure specificity under subparagraphs (a) and (b).Existence of an unwritten subsidy programme: The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that China had not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of theUnited States under Article 2.1 by failing to identify a“subsidy programme”. The Appellate Body noted that the reference to “use of a subsidy programme” in Article 2.1 suggests that it is relevant to consider whether subsidies have been provided to recipients pursuant to a plan or scheme. The Appellate Body also found that the existence of an unwritten subsidy scheme or plan may be evidenced by, inter alia, a systematic series of actions pursuant to which financial contributions have been provided to certain enterprises. The Appellate Body found, however, that the Panel did not apply Article 2.1(c), as properly interpreted, because it failed to provide any case-specific discussion or references to the particular USDOC determinations of specificity challenged by China on an “as applied” basis. As a consequence, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding and was unable to complete theanalysis.Identification of the jurisdiction of the granting authority: The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel's finding that China had not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 2.1 by failing to identify a “granting authority” in each of the specificity determinations at issue. The Appellate Body considered that the identification of the “jurisdiction of the granting authority”involves a holistic analysis and does not focus on the identity of the “granting authority” independently from its “jurisdiction”. The Appellate Body therefore disagreed with China that identification of the jurisdiction must necessarily be preceded by identification of the granting authority. Noting that the notion of jurisdiction is linked to, and does not exist in isolation from, the granting authority, the Appellate Body observed that a proper identification of “the jurisdiction of the granting authority”will require an analysis of both the “granting authority” and its “jurisdiction” in a conjunctive manner. However, the Appellate Body found that the Panel had conducted an extremely cursory analysis in rejecting China's claims on the basis that it appeared “that the relevant jurisdiction was at the very least implicitly understood to be China in the challenged investigations”. Consequently, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding and was unable to complete the analysis.Use of facts available: The Appellate Body found that the Panel acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU in assessing China's claims under Article 12.7 of theSCM Agreement. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that China had not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement by not relying on facts on the record in 42 “adverse”facts available determinations across the 13 investigations challenged by China. The Appellate Body recalled that Article 12.7 requires that an investigating authority must use those facts available that reasonably replace the missing “necessary”information that an interested party failed to provide. The Appellate Body also reiterated that ascertaining reasonable replacements for the missing information involves a process of reasoning and evaluation on the part of the investigating authority, although the evaluation that is required, and the form it may take, depend on the particular circumstances of a given case, including the nature, quality and amount of the evidence on the record and the particular determinations to be made. With respect to China's claim of error under Article 11 of the DSU, the Appellate Body found that the Panel failed to address each of the 42 instances of the USDOC's use of “adverse” facts available challenged by China. Moreover, the Appellate Body found that, in respect of the instances of the use of “adverse” facts available by the USDOC that the Panel did discuss in its Report, the Panel focused on the language and formulations used by the USDOC in its determinations, without undertaking a critical and in-depth examination of the USDOC's statements to assess whether the USDOC complied with Article 12.7of the SCM Agreement. For these reasons, the Appellate Bodyreversed the Panel's finding that China failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 12.7. Having reversed the Panel's conclusion, the Appellate Body did not complete the legal analysis, noting that completion in the present case would be of limited value inresolving the dispute and would also raise due process concerns.At its meeting on 16 January 2015, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report.Reasonable period of timeOn 13 February 2015, the United States informed the DSB that it intended to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in a manner that respects its WTO obligations, and that it would need a reasonable period of time to do so. On 26 June 2015, China requested that the reasonable period of time be determined through binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. On 9 July 2015, China requested the Director-General to appoint the arbitrator. On 17 July 2015, the Director-General appointed Mr Georges M. Abi-Saab to act as arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. On 22 July 2015, Mr Abi-Saab accepted this appointment.On 9 October 2015, the Award of the Arbitrator was circulated to Members. The Arbitrator determined the reasonable period of time as 14 months, 16 days. The reasonable period of time will thus expire on 1 April 2016.。

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