商务英语案例(doc 19页)

商务英语-案例Facing Business Challenges at Gateway 2000From Farm Boy to BillionaireComputers. The odds are slim you will survive, much less thrive, in this industry. You have to guess what customers will want more than a year in advance, even though technology is changing at an incredibly fast pace. It's hardly a business for cowboys-unless you're Ted Waitt.Son of a fourth-generation cattle broker , Waitt (currently 34 and worth an estimated $1.7 billion) rides herd over Gateway 2000 . They tell stories about Waitt, and not just in Sioux City, South Dakota -Gateway's homeland. They talk about how he built a fortune by trusting his instincts and making gutsy calls that led the industry. How he borrowed $10,000 from his grandmother to start a mail-order computer business , and how he turned a two-man, farmhouse operation into a global giant-in only ten years. And they talk about the pony-tailed farm boy clad in deck shoes and a polo shirt who knew that someday he was going to run his own company.It all began while Waitt was working for a local computer store; he was amazed by how easy it was to sell computer equipment to acknowledgeable computer users over the phone. So in 1985 Waitt (the marketer ) teamed up with his buddy Mike Hammond (the technical whiz), and the two started a small mail-order computer business of their own. Waitt and Hammond worked long hours-from their upstairs office in Waitt's family farmhouse.Their big break came in 1987, when Texas Instruments (TI) decided to stop manufacturing its own computers and instead sell only industry-standard IBM-compatible personal computers (PCs). Of course, owners of TI computers could trade in their equipment for newer IBM-compatible computers, but first they would have to cough up $3,500. Waitt and Hammond knew they could provide the same computer equipment TI was offering-and at a much cheaper price ($1,955). They did this by finding the best deals on cutting-edge computer components, and assembling the components to build top quality custom PCs . Because all sales were made-to-order and transacted over the phone , Gateway could afford to give customers more computer for their money-a strategy from which the company has never veered .Within three short years, the company was shipping 225 PCs a day (each one in a black-and-white cow-spotted box), and sales reached $70 million. By 1993 sales topped $1.7 billion, and the company sold its stock to the investing public. In spite of Gateway's speedy trip to the top, the company was at a treacherous intersection . Gateway was run essentially by one guy-Ted Waitt-who relied on his instincts. And the company was getting too big to depend on only one man's judgment. In order to survive in this competitive industry, Gateway would have to find ways to expand its customer base and manage the company's growth.If you were Ted Waitt, what steps would you take to beef up business ? Would you compete on price, speed, quality, or innovation? Would you consider other sales approaches besides telephone selling?Meeting Business Challenges at Gateway 2000Relying on his instincts, Ted Waitt made a number of critical calls that put Gateway in the lead. Of course, Waitt was no longer a one-man show. Beginning in 1991, he brought in experienced executives (from top companies like Digital Equipment, Texas Instruments, and IBM) to help manage the company's growth. Together they brought Gateway to new heights while sticking with its efficient, bare-bones assembly operation-no showroom, little inventory, and no retail outlets. In fact, Gateway's simple direct-sales operation allows the company to compete on speed, quality, and price.Speed and quality in manufacturing give Gateway the biggest advantage. Not only can speed and quality win customers, but they win the right kind of customers-those who are willing to pay a bit more for computer equipment. Gateway moves like lightning: It gets new computers out the door in a hurry. They include all the latest technology-like top-quality color monitors, the latest operating system and software, and the most powerful computer chip.Of course, buying a computer over the telephone and not seeing the equipment until the truck delivers the cow-spotted boxes to your doorstep is not for everyone. Gateway attracts computer-savvy buyers who need a lot less hand-holding and are comfortable purchasing from a catalog or an advertisement. Here's how it works: The customer calls in and, over the phone (or Internet), designs a custom-configured computer system using cutting-edge technology. In about five days, the customsystem is built and shipped. Because there is no inventory to speak of (computers are made-to-order), as technology gets cheaper, Gateway can compete on price by changing prices daily and passing the savings on to customers.Relying on word of mouth and a strong advertising campaign (about $90 million a year), Gateway rode a wave of success fueled by computer buyers hunting for good equipment at bargain prices. Gateway's success, however, did not come without its share of growing pains. Gateway's first portable laptop computer was a disaster. Failing to recognize that customers had to see and touch the product to appreciate its smaller size and capabilities, Gateway ran into a wall because the company's computers were not sold in retail stores where customers could experience the product's features. This lesson would not be forgotten. Other mishaps included sending out machines that did not work and busy phone lines that kept customers waiting-sometimes for hours. Fortunately, Waitt corrected these problems early on by instituting various quality-control measures to increase customer satisfaction. And his efforts paid off. By 1996 Gateway was shipping 5,000 to 6,000 computers daily and sales skyrocketed to roughly $5 billion.That same year Gateway launched a product that was way ahead of its time. Called Destination, it was a combo PC and 31-inch television set with a wireless keyboard, a mouse, and a home-theater sound system. Learning from past mistakes, Waitt knew he would have to get the product in front of consumers so that they could see its features. This time Gateway cut deals with retail stores. None had ever carried Gateway's stuff before.But Waitt's biggest challenge has been trying to crack the corporate market. Whereas Gateway sold most of its computers to individual users and small businesses, rival Dell set its sights on the lucrative Fortune 1000 corporate accounts and made some expensive investments-like $22 million in research and development (Gateway spent practically zip). Despite doubling its sales force, Gateway discovered that selling computers to corporate customers was not an easy task. First of all, competitors like IBM and Hewlett-Packard (HP) have large, well-trained sales and service staffs who have been doing business with big companies for years. Furthermore, IBM and HP products can be purchased at traditional retail stores.Still, relying on a cost-efficient, bare-bones, direct-sale operation is Gateway's stronghold in this cutthroat industry. The company has no plans to alter its fundamental selling strategy. "If you come see us in the next century, we'll be bigger, better, and smarter, but fundamentally we'll be the same," notes Waitt. That is, Gateway will stick to what it does best: churning out huge volumes of PCs that areequipped with the latest technology at affordable-but not rock bottom-prices and selling them to customers over the phone.Facing Business Challenges at Holiday Inn WorldwideSending Invitations Across the GlobeIn the 1960s a family vacation in the United States usually meant loading the kids into the station wagon and driving off down the highway toward a tourist destination. And when weary vacationers needed to rest for the night, they oft en looked for the familiar green signs with “Holiday Inn” written in script and a colorful star for emphasis. All across the United States, this sign welcomed travelers to Holliday Inn hotels with promises of quality, comfort, and value.By 1968 Holiday Inn was so well known in the United States that it began o pening franchises in Europe. In 1973 the company opened its first Asian hotel in Japan, and in 1984 it became the first U.S.-based hotel to open for busine ss in China. For 25 years Holiday Inn enjoyed great success in the European and Asian markets, opening 600 hotels and earning a reputation as upscale , p rofessional, and well run.However, in the 1980s Holiday Inn’s fortunes were beginning to fade in the U nited States. Many of the franchises were outdated and substandard . Family v acationers were being replaced by business travelers as the hotel industry’s bre ad and butter , and aggressive competitors with superior marketing strategies w ere targeting this growing segment . In addition, overbuilding had set off a wa ve of price discounting . As a result, both Holiday Inn’s share of the lodging market and its image took a nosedive .But in the 1990s this icon of the U.S. highway was brought back to life after being purchased by Bass PLC, a British conglomerate. Bass moved quickly to make Holiday Inn Worldwide the leading hotel chain, not just in the UnitedStates but around the globe. In the United States, Holiday Inn pursued a strate gy that segmented the market into different types of travelers and created a un ique type of lodging for each group. Under names like Holiday Inn Express, Holiday Inn Select, Sunspree Resorts, and Crowne Plaza, the company offered different accommodations and amenities at different prices to suit the diverse n eeds of business and leisure travelers. Combined with a campaign to bring all of the franchises back up to a high standard of quality, the strategy quickly be gan to pay off.Even so, the top brass at Holiday Inn Worldwide knows that the greatest grow th potential is not in the saturated U.S. market but in the evolving markets of Europe, Asia, and Latin America. With increasing tourism and business devel opment in these regions, the demand for comfortable, consistent, and affordable accommodations is booming . Holiday Inn needs a strategy for tapping this v ast potential. Would the strategies that fueled Holiday Inn’s turnaround in the United States bring similar results internationally? Large-scale construction of n ew hotels will play a major role, so what kinds of hotels should they be? Ho w can the company best meet the needs of a wide variety of international trav elers? Should Holiday Inn expand through franchises or by opening company-o wned hotels? Should the same type of promotion be used for the entire global market or should it be localized to each geographic area? These are questions that Raymond Lewis faces daily as vice president of marketing. If you were Lewis, how would you answer them?Meeting Business Challenges at Holiday Inn WorldwidePart of Raymond Lewis’s job is to monitor and predict changes in the ever-ev olving global market . Among the trends he has observed is the increasing sim ilarity between the needs and desires expressed by consumers and businesses ar ound the world in certain product categories such as lodging. On the other han d, Lewis knows that various countries and cultures approach purchases differently, and that people of various cultures respond differently to product promotion . His challenge, then, is to figure out how to satisfy both the similar and the diverse needs of each new market.Lewis also knows that all travelers, regardless of where they are from or wher e they are going, share many of the same desires, fears, and expectations whe n they are traveling. They may not speak the same language or live the same lives while at home, but when they’re on the road, all travelers are (1) away f rom home and out of their personal comfort zones, (2) in different and often unfamiliar surroundings, and (3) subject to the same hassles and hardships. The refore, Holiday Inn focuses on delivering a consistent product around the world. This way, whether the hotel is in South Korea, India, Buenos Aires , or Israe l, travelers know that they will always receive a comfortable room at a fair pr ice.In addition, the strategy of segmenting the market by types of travelers that pr oved so successful in the United States also works abroad, but in a different way. Segmentation in the hotel industry is a relatively new concept in Europe, and in Asia it is virtually nonexistent. This is largely because in many of the developing nations of Asia, travel has only recently become an option for the majority of people. As a result, not every type of Holiday Inn hotel will be successful in every country. The company must know each market very well b efore it decides which type of hotel to open. Does the area draw mainly touris ts or business travelers? How long do visitors usually stay? Do people from su rrounding areas travel often? What types of accommodations do competitors off er in the area? By knowing the answers to questions like these, Holiday Inn is able to decide which type of hotel will best serve the needs of travelers to t he area. For example, the company opened a SunSpree Resort in Arequipa, Pe ru, close to Machu Pichu, a popular international tourist destination. Holiday In n’s management team feels that Sunspree has a great chance for success in this location because the hotel caters to tourists.In the same way, Holiday Inn management expects a mix of business and leis ure travelers to visit Seoul, South Korea. Therefore, the new Holiday Inn Seou l appeals to a broad range of travelers by offering a business center, banquet f acilities , four restaurants, a fitness center , and a gift shop.Just as in its early days of expansion in the United States, Holiday Inn is acc omplishing its international expansion through a mix of wholly owned facilities and franchises, depending on the availability of resources and potential for pr ofit in each local market. Although franchising agreements place less risk on Holiday Inn Worldwide, they also require the company to give up more contro l than it would by opening wholly owned facilities. However, franchises must adhere to strict quality standards if they intend to operate under Holiday Inn’s famous name.Lewis and his team also recognize that even though travelers have similar exp ectations for the quality and value they get in a hotel, sometimes they like to stay in places that don’t feel like hotel chains. Therefore, the company has op ened hotels in Europe, Australia, and South Africa that have a style and chara cter unique to their locations. In this way, Holiday Inn is able to tailor its glo bal product to local markets.Nonetheless, Holiday Inn’s promotion strategy is decidedly global, regardless of which market s it enters. Lewis bases the strategy on two themes: “Welcome”and “Stay with somebody you know.” Although the ad copy is translated whe n necessary, even the visual format is the same from country to country. Of c ourse, cultural differences must be accommodated from time to time. For exam ple, travelers in Britain preferred an ad that focused on a friendly doorman, w hereas U.S. and German travelers preferred a more sentimental ad showing a b usinesswoman receiving a fax of a drawing from her child.The inspiration for this global strategy came to Lewis, not surprisingly, while he was traveling. When boarding a plane at Dulles Airport outside of Washington, D.C., he passed a group of Russian teenagers gathered around a guitar pla yer singing “Puff the Magic Dragon,” a folk song that was popular in the Uni ted States a few decades ago. This connection between cultures helped convinc e Lewis that the world’s people were alike in many ways, particularly in the f ield of pleasure and business travel.It remains to be se en how successful Holiday Inn’s global strategy will be in t he long run . The company is off to a flying start. However, competitors such as Marriott and Choice Hotels are moving quickly to make sure Holiday Inn doesn’t outpace them in the hot new global m arkets. But one thing is sure, Le wis and the rest of the management team are not content with Holiday Inn bei ng a leading hotel chain in the United States. They want Holiday Inn to be th e leader around the world.Facing Business Challenges at Levi Strauss Can a company be socially respon sible and successful? Levi Strauss & Company chairman and chief executive of ficer Bob Hass had some problems on his hands. After taking over leadership of the world-famous blue-jeans maker in 1984, Haas had worked hard to revita lize the company’s long-standing commitment to ethical and socially responsibl e behavior. However, changes in consumer tastes and stiff competition from riv al clothing manufacturers were hitting the company hard on all sides. In order to remain competitive, Hass would have to make some tough decisions that c ould threaten the company’s principles. The original Mr. Levi Strauss had a si mple business mission—make and sell quality work pants for San Francisco’s gold-rush miners. However, Strauss also demonstrated a strong social conscienc e and commitment to employees early on. During the Great Depression , work ers were paid to lay a new floor in the factory until business picked up. By t he 1960s, the company had become a vocal advocate for racial integration and a leader in corporate diversity programs. However, by the time Bob Haas (gr eat-great-grand-nephew of Levi Strauss) took over in 1984, the company seeme d to have lost its social conscience. Levi’s had expanded aggressively into product lines that were ultimately unprofitable. The company was bloated , profits were falling, and management was more concerned with numbers than with v alues. Haas believed that public shareholders and stock analysts had blurred the company’s vision by demanding short-term profit gains over long-term goals. So with the help of friends and family, Haas bought up the remaining public stock and set out to turn the company around. Haas began to streamline the c ompany, which meant taking the painful step of cutting the work force by a t hird. To reward and motivate those who remained, he developed an aspirations statement with companywide goals based on ethics, diversity, environmental st ewardship , teamwork, trust, and openness. He backed up his statement by trai ning employees in leadership, diversity, and ethical decision making and also b y linking employee compensation to performance in these areas. “A company’s values —what it stands for, what its people believe in—are crucial to its com petitive success,” Haas exhorted . “Indeed, values drive the business.” Levi’s al so spent large sums to reduce the impact of its operations on the environment. At the same time, the company shed unprofitable clothing styles and refocuse d on traditional jeans and the new casual “Dockers” products. Wi th revitalized company values, soaring staff morale, and revamped product lines, Levi Strau ss enjoyed double-digit gains in sales revenues and profits. However, the 1990s brought new crises. First, reports of widespread human rights abuses in some Asian countries led the company to question the ethics of its operations there. Second, Levi’s discovered that some of its suppliers in Asia were making Lev i’s products with child labor. And third, Levi’s own failure to spot new clothi ng trends, modernize its production facilities, and keep retailers happy resulted in declining jeans sales. The situation worsened as new competitors undercut L evi’s pricing by manufacturing the majority of their products overseas. (Levi’s still made half of its products in the United States). With demand shrinking, L evi’s again found it had too many plants and employees in the United States. But large-scale layoffs could undermine the social values that had once again become synonymous with the Levi’s name. Haas had to find a way to e nsurethe company’s long-term profitability while standing by Levi’s principles. If yo u were Bob Haas, how would you balance your company’s economic needs wi th its goals for ethics and social responsibility? How would you deal with sup pliers who don’t adhere to your company’s values? Would you take a stand ag ainst human rights abuses? How would you handle the problem of excess capa city and employees? Meeting Business Challenges at Levi Strauss Bob Haas kn ew that Levi Strauss & Company faced an uphill battle . The company had u ncovered violations of its ethical standards among its Asian suppliers. Meanwhi le, consumer tastes had shifted while Levi’s looked the other way , and compe titors were beating Levi’s on price and service. But Haas determined to tackle these problems by refocusing on the original company strengths: strong comm ercial instincts and a commitment to social values and to the work force. In th e early 1990s, Haas developed global guidelines addressing specific workplace issues, such as length of work periods, fair wages, respect for the environment, and prohibitions against child labor. To add muscle to these guidelines, the c ompany began sending inspectors around the world on surprise visits to look f or violations. It was during one of these global audits that Haas discovered so me manufacturing contractors in Asia employed underage workers, a clear viola tion of the guidelines. However, most of the children were significant contribut ors to family incomes, and losing their jobs would force them into more inhu mane ways of earning money. Wanting to retain Levi Strauss as their customer, the factory owners asked Levi’s management what to do. Some companies wi th strong values confronting this issue might simply instruct contractors to disc harge underage workers. But Levi Strauss devised a unique solution with positi ve benefits for everyone. The contractors agreed to suspend underage workers but still pay their salaries and benefits. For its part, Levi Strauss paid for scho ol tuition and other education-related expenses with no obligations. When the c hildren reached working age, they were all offered full-time jobs in the manuf acturing plants. Everyone gained. The children were able to continue their educ ation and their family income contributions, the contractors kept their good customers, and Levi Strauss retained its quality contractors while protecting compa ny values. Levi’s faced more ethical problems in China, where widespread abu ses of human rights clashed directly with the company’s ethical principl es. So Haas decided to phase out most of Levi’s operations in that country over a pe riod of several years. Although some critics argued that the move was just a p ublic relations stunt, and that losing its $50 million annual business in China was small compared to the favorable publicity the company would receive, Lev i’s maintained that its only objective was to uphold its own ethical standards. “Our hope is that conditions will change and improve so that we can revisit o ur decision at some time in the futur e,” stated one Levi’s executive. The comp any could turn to its established ethical guidelines to handle the challenges it f aced in Asia, but the another challenge would be harder to deal with. Demand for Levi’s products was sagging, so the company had far more manufacturing capacity than it needed. The problem had several causes: (1) The company ha d failed to notice certain fashion trends that competitors recognized early (such as teenagers’ preferences for extra-baggy jeans), (2) the company had no cons istent marketing message (which resulted in its blue jeans being perceived as “preppy” or for older generations), (3) the company’s slow product-delivery an d restrictive pricing policies angered many retailers and prompted some to carr y more competing brands, and (4) many competitors produced the majority of their products overseas using more advanced production technology and thus re quiring fewer employees, which enabled them to undercut Levi’s prices. To ov ercome these threats, Haas began a new campaign to listen to the needs of co nsumers, cut production costs, improve relations with retailers, and refocus its marketing message. Unfortunately, the situation required Hass once again to fac e the difficult task of laying off large numbers of workers. In early 1997 the company laid off 1,000 management and clerical employees to save $80 millio n in costs. Nine months later the announcement was made that Levi’s would c lose 11 U.S. plants and lay off nearly 6,400 production workers, a full one-thi rd of its U.S. work force. The decision was not an easy one, but Haas and the rest of Levi’s senior managers saw it as necessary in order to keep the com pany profitable in the years ahead. Nevertheless, Haas was not about to let em ployees just walk out into an uncertain futur e. Some had been with Levi’s for many years. So true to the company’s high standards for social responsibility, Levi’s spent $200 million on severance pay and additional benefits. Under the generous plan, each laid-off worker received 8 months’ paid notice before the job cuts took effect; up to 3 weeks of additional pay for every year of servic e with the company; a $500 bonus upon finding a new job; paid health benefi ts for 18 months; and a $6,000 allowance for relocating, retraining, or starting a new busi ness. In addition, Levi’s provided career counseling to employees f or up to 6 months, and the Levi Strauss Foundation gave $8 million in grants to assist communities affected by the plant closings. Conventional wisdom hol ds that the costs of these progressive solutions placed Levi Strauss at a compe titive disadvantage. But Bob Haas believes that decisions emphasizing costs alo ne do not serve a company’s best interests. And Haas has taken action on this belief time and again.FACING BUSINESS CHALLENGES AT AJ WRAPSWrapping Up a Business - To GoAlice Thomson and Judith Nantook are identical twin sisters whose passion for food led them into a gutsy decision: opening a chain of fast-food restaurants¾starting with one, of course.AJ Wraps “probably began when we were teenagers working in fast-food restaurants,” says Alice. “Then our parents gave us a trip to Paris as a graduation present,” adds her twin Judith. “We fell in love with gourmet French cuisine.” They had wanted to stay and study with the masters of French cooking, but it just wasn’t feasible. So they went home to Illinois to finish college (Alice majored in psychology, Judith in premed zoology). Then Judith met and married Jeff Nantook, following him to San Francisco where he worked as a CPA and tax adviser.Before long, Judith was begging Alice to move to San Francisco and attend the California Culinary Academy with her. During the week they were learning about sauces and soufflés , and on weekends they were tasting and sampling the city'sgourmet offerings while endlessly discussing the restaurant they planned to open after graduation. They were fascinated by the local trend toward multiethnic combinations--and by a "new" eating invention called the wrap. Some say it evolved from a Mexican burrito filled with unexpected ingredients. Others say the idea of a meal wrapped in an easy bundle shows up in every culture sooner or later.Whatever its origin, the twins saw gold. They started planning a fast-food restaurant that would sell multiethnic, gourm et “wraps” containing exotic , fresh “fusion” (hot and cold) cuisine. They imagined a flavored red tortilla filled with Thai chicken, jasmine-lime rice, and fresh snap peas¾or a green one filled with blackened red snapper, Spanish rice, Napa cabbage, and lime-horseradish sour cream. They even started making samples in Judith's home kitchen, much to Jeff’s delight.The twins knew wraps appealed to anyone with a hectic lifestyle¾and who doesn't fall into that category at least occasionally? Commuters want to eat behind the wheel, parents want to pick up dinner on the way home, and single people are looking for fresh, healthy, inexpensive meals. Wraps could satisfy all these needs, the twins believed. A National Restaurant Association survey on ethnic cuisine showed that consumers were eager to try more ethnic foods; moreover, a look at the Internet Food Channel’s “Ultra Trend Tracker” showed them that the wrap was leading the sandwich category, where focaccia was fading. From coast to coast, newspaper reviews were hailing wraps as the best new fast-food discovery.Now Judith and Alice face some hard business decisions. Jeff has agreed to share his expertise as financial adviser, but who will manage the food and who will handle the books? How will they share ownership, pay taxes, and compensate themselves? What will they offer financial backers? How will the business grow? Alice and Judith have absolute confidence in their teamwork and their culinary expertise. But they also know that if they don't set the business on the right structural foundation, it could fail overnight¾as a lot of well-meaning friends keep pointing out.Meeting Business Challenges at AJ WrapsFor a time, Alice Thomson and Judith Nantook thought their plans to open AJ Wraps were falling through . Judith's husband Jeff was offered a partnership in a large accounting firm¾the catch was, he'd have to move to Los Angeles. However, with a little more research, the twins' enthusiasm was restored. They read about a company partly owned by actor Woody Harrelson: Yoganics, an organic food-delivery service, was apparently reaping tax benefits from a location in South-Central Los Angeles. A 1992 racial uprising left a scarred community that needed to rebuild itself, and the area was designated a “revitalization zone.” State officials were offering tax incentives to spur businesses into the area. It was working beautifully, creating new jobs and a positive, thriving atmosphere.Alice and Judith loved this idea. As financial adviser, Jeff thought the tax savings。