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英语阅读-经济学人文章三篇

英语阅读-经济学人文章三篇

IF THE Federal Reserve eases monetary policy again at its meeting on September 13th, as I expect, it will be its most meticulously debated, planned and scrutinised move in recent memory. The case for action has been apparent at least since the spring when it became clear the economy would underperform the Fed's repeatedly lowered economic forecasts. Yet Ben Bernanke spent much of the press conference following the Fed's meeting in June, when it extended Operation Twist (the purchase of long-term bonds financed by selling short-term bonds) on the defensive over why the Fed hadn't done more. In August, it again chose not to pull the trigger. But it did release a statement that hinted the point was drawing near. The minutes to that meeting released three weeks later suggested it would take an immediate and powerful improvement in the economy to stay the Fed's hand.When Mr Bernanke made his annual appearance at the Kansas City Fed's economic symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, today, the world was wondering whether he would send a definitive sign that action was coming. He did not, merely repeating the key sentence from the August statement, that the Fed "will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery." This should not have been surprising; Fed chairmen don't like to front-run the Federal Open Market Committee.Mr Bernanke had a different goal than signaling to Wall Street. Pressure on the Fed has become intense in the last year, from hawks and conservatives (not necessarily, but increasingly, the same) who think the Fed has done all it can do and going further risks inflation, monetisation of the debt, and a loss of credibility for the central bank; and from doves and liberals who accuse Mr Bernanke of having shirked his responsibility and his own prior advice to the Bank of Japan by not more aggressively using the tools and alternative frameworks available to boost employment. That this debate has unfolded against the backdrop of a tight and divisive presidential election has only raised the stakes, because it meant no matter what the Fed does, one party will accuse it of having helped the other win.Since Mr Bernanke could not escape criticism regardless of what the Fed did, tactically he was best served by waiting until the case for action was unambiguous, unsurprising and, most important, well articulated. The data have made the case unambiguous: employment and growth are weak and inflation by the Fed's preferred measure has edged down. By September 13th, it will certainly be unsurprising. Mr Bernanke's task today was to articulate the case.Mr Bernanke has always said the test was whether the benefits of more "quantitative easing" (QE)—the purchase of assets by printing money—exceeded the costs. This is what he did today. On the benefits, he said studies that show the Fed's two previous rounds of QE (large scale asset purchases, or LSAPs in Fed jargon) plus Operation Twist had lowered Treasury yields by 80 to 120 basis points. They have also led to "significant declines in the yields on both corporate bonds...[and] substantial reductions in MBS yields and retail mortgage rates. LSAPs also appear to have boosted stock prices, presumably both by lowering discount rates and by improving the economic outlook." On the economic impact, he reported:“If we are willing to take as a working assumption that the effects of easier financial conditions on the economy are similar to those observed historically, then econometric models can be used to estimate the effects of LSAPs on the economy. Model simulations conducted at the Federal Reserve generally find that the securities purchase programs have provided significant help for the economy. For example, a study using the Board's FRB/US model of the economy found that, as of 2012, the first two rounds of LSAPs may have raised the level of output by almost 3 percent and increased private payroll employment by more than 2 million jobs, relative to what otherwise would have occurred. The Bank of England has used LSAPs in a manner similar to that of the Federal Reserve, so it is of interest that researchers have found the financial and macroeconomic effects of the British programs to be qualitatively similar to those in the United States.”Mr Bernanke also argued that the Fed's forward rate guidance, that is its commitment not to raise rates through the end of 2014, have had a powerful impact on expectations of Fed tightening. In conclusion, he said that "nontraditional policy tools have been and can continue to be effective in providing financial accommodation" (emphasis mine).He then catalogued the potential costs of further easing: impaired market functioning as the Fed's share of total bonds in circulation rose; the potential for asset bubbles if interest rates are kept low for a long time; the threat of inflation if the Fed has trouble exiting from its purchases; and potential losses if the bonds lose value when interest rates rise. Mr Bernanke said "the hurdle for using non-traditional policies should be higher than for traditional policies. At the same time, the costs of non-traditional policies, when considered carefully, appear manageable, implying that we should not rule out the further use of such policies if economic conditions warrant."Do conditions warrant? Yes. As Mr Bernanke put it, "the economic situation is obviously far from satisfactory."If Mr Bernanke has made it clear that the Fed plans to act on September 13th, he has not yet clarified how. The Fed could extend its low-rate guidance past 2014, but Mr Bernanke's speech seemed to assign such a move less efficacy than further bond purchases. If the Fed buys bonds, would it buy Treasurys or MBS or something else? By citing housing as first among the headwinds holding back the economy, and specifying the impact on mortgage rates of prior QE, he made a prima facie case for buying MBS and Treasurys. It is still not clear, though, whether the Fed would announce a fixed amount of purchases over a fixed term, or an open-ended programme (eg, $100 billion per month, keyed to economic conditions).What is fairly certain is that he will not be thanked when it happens. Conservatives will dial up their accusations of reckless Fed activism, and probably add toadying to Barack Obama to the rap sheet. Liberals will decry the Fed for not having gone further, or acted sooner. And in truth, no one can be sure that either is wrong. At today's Jackson Hole conference, there was an animated debate on this question. Adam Posen, whose last day on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee is today, decried the "defeatism about policy" which leads people to conclude that if monetary policy isn't working, it must simply be the structure of the economy. In fact the problem is more likely to be impairments to particular financial markets, which can be addressed with assetpurchases in that specific sector (eg, small-business loans). Central banks have shied away from such purchases because of "self-imposed taboos", Mr Posen fretted, such as fears that such purchases would misallocate credit or look like politicised fiscal policy. This, he said, "is a prehistoric way of thinking."Larry Lindsey, a former Fed governor and adviser to George Bush, shot back: "In a free society, individuals and institutions don’t do unusual things because if you do, and break custom and happen to be wrong, you’re betting the farm. It's normal, prudential sort of political behaviour. For our profession, after the last two decades, to realise modesty in what we express and can do, is probably becoming."Mr Bernanke can sympathise with both. When he first joined the Fed in 2002, he was, like most academics, something of a hedgehog, quite sure of the answers and impatient with the fools and cowards who refused to implement them. One of his first speeches as governor made the academic point that when short-term interest rates are at zero, the Fed still has plenty of ammo by printing money, what Milton Friedman euphemistically called dropping money from a helicopter. This was the origin of the epithet "Helicopter Ben". A year after that, he made the same case but with more nuance in Japan. In the intervening years, he has become, as most policymakers do, a fox: the real world contains political constraints and unintended consequences that must be factored in before the academically ideal remedy is applied.The fox in Mr Bernanke appears to have made peace with the hedgehog. His most important audience today was his own colleagues. He needs not just their votes but their full-throated verbal endorsement of the Fed's next move in their speeches they make afterwards. What most outsiders can't appreciate about the job of Fed chairman is that among his unwritten responsibilities is maintaining the integrity and credibility of his institution for his successors. There are two ways this can be lost: by doing too little in the face of either too high unemployment or inflation; the other is by doing too much, with activism that prompts a backlash against the institution, constraining its ability to act again. If Mr Bernanke has calculated correctly, he has found a path between the two.Barren rocks, barren nationalismTHE wave of anti-Japanese protests that has erupted across China, after tit-for-tat landings by ultranationalists on uninhabited islands which the Japanese call the Senkakus and the Chinese the Diaoyus, is alarming. It is a reminder of how a barren group of disputed rocks could upend pain-staking progress in the difficult relations between Asia’s two biggest powers (see article). And the spat even raises the spectre of a conflict that could conceivably draw in America.History always weighs heavily in East Asia, so it is essential to understand the roots of the squabble. China has never formally controlled the Senkakus, and for most Japanese, blithely forgetful of their country’s rapacious, imperial past, possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yet the islands’history is ambiguous. The Senkakus first crept into the record lying in the Chinese realm, just beyond the Ryukyu kingdom, which in the 1870s was absorbed by Japan and renamed Okinawa. The Chinese emperor objected to Japanese attempts to incorporate the Senkakus into Okinawa, but in 1895 Japan did it unilaterally. After Japan’s defeat in 1945 the Americans took over Okinawa’s administration, along with the Senkakus. In the 1951 peace treaty between Japan and the United States, as well as in the agreement to return Okinawa in 1972, the Senkakus’sovereignty was left vague (Taiwan claims them too). The Americans say the dispute is for the parties to resolve amicably.Three decades ago that looked possible. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s modernisation, recognised the risks. When he signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan in 1978, the two countries agreed to kick the Senkakus into the long grass. “Our generation”, Deng said, “is not wise enough to find common language on this question. The next generation will be wiser.”His hopes have been dashed.Chinese maritime power is growing, in ways that not only challenge Japan’s control of the Senkakus (but also worry other countries that have maritime disputes with China). Maritime law has evolved with exclusive economic zones around territories (see article). So all the islets have become more valuable. The current squabble began when the right-wing governor of Tokyo declared that the metropolitan government would buy the Senkakus from their indebted private owner, the better to assert Japanese sovereignty. Not to be seen as weak, Yoshihiko Noda, the prime minister, retorted that the Japanese government would buy them instead.The natural solutionWhat can be done? Neither side wants to jeopardise good relations, let alone go to war, over the Senkakus. But the fact that there is a (remote) danger of conflict should prompt both governments to do two things. The long-term task is to defang the more poisonous nationalist serpents in both countries’politics. In Japan that means producing honest textbooks so that schoolchildren can discover what their predecessors did. In China (no promulgator of honest textbooks itself) the government must abandon its habit of using Japanophobia as an outlet for populist anger, when modern Japan has been such a force for peace and prosperity in Asia. But the priority now is to look for ways to minimise the chances of unwished-for conflict, especially in seas swarming withrival vessels.At a minimum that means not only having hotlines between the two governments, but also cast-iron commitments from the Chinese always to pick up the phone. A mechanism to deal with maritime issues between the two countries was set up last year, but crumbled when put to the test. Ideally, both sides should make it clear that military force is not an option. China should undertake not to send official vessels into Japanese waters, as it still occasionally does, and deal more forcefully with militaristic sabre-rattlers like the general who suggested using the Senkakus for bombing practice. Back in 2008 the two countries agreed on a framework for the joint development of disputed gasfields in the East China Sea, though China unpicked this good work when a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese coastguard vessel near the Senkakus in 2010.As for the Senkakus themselves, Mr Noda’s proposal to buy them would have value if accompanied by a commitment to leave them unvisited. And it would be easier to face down the nationalists if America acknowledged its own past role in sweeping competing claims over the Senkakus under the carpet. Our own suggestion is for governments to agree to turn the Senkakus and the seas round them—along with other rocks contested by Japan and South Korea—into pioneering marine protected areas. As well as preventing war between humans, it would help other species. Thanks to decades of overfishing, too few fish swim in those waters anyway.CHARLOTTE, N.C. — A day after fumbling a predictable and straightforward question posed by Mitt Romney last week — are Americans better off than they were four years ago — the Obama campaign provided a response on Monday that it said would be hammered home during the Democratic convention here this week: “Absolutely.”The focus on the campaign’s handling of the question, after halting and contradictory responses from Democrats on Sunday, complicated the White House’s effort to begin striking a set of themes the president intends to highlight here and carry through the general election.That effort starts with an argument that Mr. Romney, the Republican nominee, would raise taxes on the middle class while cutting them for the wealthy. It seeks to pitch forward to the next four years the case that Mr. Obama and his allies have made over the spring and summer — that Mr. Romney’s business career showed him intent on profit even at the expense of workers and that his wealth has given him tax advantages not enjoyed by regular people.“The problem is everybody’s already seen his economic playbook,” Mr. Obama said at a campaign stop in Ohio before a Labor Day audience largely consisting of United Auto Workers union members. “On first down he hikes taxes by nearly $2,000 on the average family with kids in order to pay for a massive tax cut for multimillionaires.”The Obama campaign began running a new commercial making the same point, and asserting, “The middle class is carrying a heavy load in America, but Romney doesn’t see it.”As delegates streamed in for the opening of the convention on Tuesday, Mr. Obama and his team were putting the finishing touches on a program that requires a different kind of political daring from the one they showed four years ago, when Mr. Obama gave his speech in a stadium on a stage compared by some to a Greek temple.This week Mr. Obama is planning to undertake a tricky two-step of convincing wavering supporters being aggressively courted by Mr. Romney that they made the right decision in choosing him four years ago and that he has the country on its way to a sustainable recovery even if they do not always feel it. He will make the argument in an outdoor stadium again, on Thursday night under the threat of rain, but aides say there will be no Greek columns.Obama campaign aides indicated they were moving into a new phase, applying their case that Mr. Romney has no history of looking out for the middle class to the question of what the next four years would look like under a Romney presidency.But Republicans showed that they were not going to give Mr. Obama a free ride this week, with Mr. Romney’s running mate, Representativ e Paul D. Ryan, coming to North Carolina to keep the focus on the last four years.“The president can say a lot of things, and he will, but he can’t tell you that you’re better off,” Mr. Ryan said on Monday at a rally in Greenville, N.C. “Simply put, the J immy Carter years look like the good old days compared to where we are right now.”Mr. Obama’s aides initially appeared to stumble when television interviewers asked them to respond to Mr. Romney’s charge in his nomination acceptance speech Thursday night that Americans were not better off under Mr. Obama.On Fox News Channel, Mr. Obama’s top strategist, David Axelrod, said, “We’re in a better position than we were four years ago in our economy.” But Gov. Martin O’Malley of Maryland, a Democrat, answered “no” on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” though he blamed Republicans. Other aides equivocated.Mr. O’Malley provided another answer on Monday on CNN: “We are clearly better off as a country because we’re creating jobs rather than losing them. We have not recovered all that we lost in the Bush recession. That’s why we need to continue to move forward.”In fact, on Monday the campaign settled on a definitive answer of, as the deputy campaign manager Stephanie Cutter put it, “Absolutely.”。

关于经济类英语文章阅读范文欣赏

关于经济类英语文章阅读范文欣赏

关于经济类英语文章阅读范文欣赏经济方面的问题一直都是为人们所重点关注的,作为写作话题也是很常见的。

今天店铺在这里为大家介绍关于经济类英语文章阅读,欢迎大家阅读!关于经济类英语文章篇1东南亚诸国无惧英国脱欧唯怕中国经济放缓or Southeast Asia, the slowdown of China's economy may have a bigger economic impactthan the British vote to leave the European Union.对东南亚地区来说,中国经济放缓对其经济的影响可能要比英国公投脱欧大得多。

China's government reported the country's economy expanded at 6.7 percent in the first threemonths of this year. That is high compared to many countries. However, it is the lowestincrease of its Gross Domestic Product, or GDP, since early 2009.根据政府报告显示,我国今年前三个月的经济增速为6.7%。

这个增速已经比很多国家要高了。

但是,这是自2009年年初以来国内生产总值(GDP)最低的一次增长。

Joseph Incalcaterra is an economist with the British bank HSBC. He has studied economicgrowth in Asia from 2000 to 2014. He says Chinese trade became more and more important inthe area during those years. Yet, he notes that China's slowing economy is, in his words, "weighing down exports in the rest of the region."尹正和是在英国汇丰银行工作的经济学家。

经济学人文章(四六级雅思精读素材)2020-08-27

经济学人文章(四六级雅思精读素材)2020-08-27

The Economist August 29th 2020 Business 55Depending on whom you ask, Califor-nia is a leader in clean energy or a cau-tionary tale. Power outages in August prompted stern critiques from Republi-cans. “In California”, D onald Trump tweeted, “D emocrats have intentionally implemented rolling blackouts—forcing Americans in the dark.” In addition to pro-voking outrage and derision, however, the episode is also likely to inspire investment.The Golden State has long been Ameri-ca’s main testing ground for green compa-nies. Californians buy half of all electric cars sold in America. Theirs is the country’s largest solar market. As California deals with heat waves, fires and a goal of carbon-free electricity by 2045, the need for a reli-able grid is becoming ever more obvious.For years firms competed to generate clean power in California. Now a growing num-ber are vying to store and manage it, too. August’s blackouts have many causes,including poor planning, an unexpected lack of capacity and sweltering heat in not just California but nearby states from which it sometimes imports power. Long before the outages, however, electricity op-erators were anxious about capacity. Cali-fornia’s solar panels become less useful in the evening, when demand peaks. In No-vember state regulators mandated that utilities procure an additional 3.3 gigawatts (gw ) of capacity, including giant batteries that charge when energy is abundant and can sell electricity back to the grid.Too few such projects have come online to cope with the surge in demand for air-conditioning in the scorching summer. But more are sprouting across the state. On Au-gust 19th ls Power, an electricity firm backed by private equity, unveiled a 250-megawatt (mw ) storage project in San Die-go, the largest of its kind in America. In July the county of Monterey said Vistra Energy,a Texan power company, could build as much as 1.2gw of storage.The rooftop solar industry stands to benefit from a new Californian mandate that requires new homes to install panels on their roofs from this year. Sunrun, the market leader, is increasingly pairing such residential installations with batteries. In July, for instance, the company said it had won contracts with energy suppliers in the Bay Area to install 13mw of residential solar and batteries. These could supply power to residents in a blackout or feed power into the grid to help meet peak demand. Sunrunis so confident in its future that it has bid $3.2bn for Vivint Solar,its main rival.Another way to stave offoutages is to curb demand.Enel,a European power company,has contracts with local utilities to work with large commercial and indus-trial clients.When demand rises,Enel pays customers to reduce energy consumption,easing demand on the grid.A company called OhmConnect offers something sim-ilar for homeowners.Even as such offerings scale up,the need for reliability means that fossil fuels will not disappear just yet.On September 1st California’s regulators will vote on whether to delay the retirement of four natural-gas plants in light of the outages.The state remains intent on decarbonising its power system over the next 25years.But progress may not move in a straight line.7NEW YO RKBusinesses compete to battle California’s blackoutsEnergy utilitiesLitMany big companies may be struggling with depressed sales, but these are busy times for bribery-busters. Mexico is abuzz over allegations by an ex-boss of Pe-mex, the state oil giant, that several senior politicians received bungs from compa-nies including Odebrecht, a Brazilian con-struction firm (see Americas section). The scandal is the latest in a string of graft cases to make headlines this year, starting with Airbus’s record $4bn settlement in January over accusations of corruption for making illegal payments in various countries.Corporate bribery is hardly new. In sur-veys, between a third and a half of compa-nies typically claim to have lost business to rivals who won contracts by paying kick-backs. But such perceptions-based re-search has obvious limitations. A new study takes a more rigorous approach, and draws some striking conclusions.Raghavendra Rau of Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge, Yan-Leung Cheung of the Education University of Hong Kong and Aris Stouraitis of Hong Kong Baptist University examined nearly 200 prominent bribery cases in 60 coun-tries between 1975 and 2015. For the firms doing the bribing, they found, the short-term gains were juicy: every dollar of bribe translated into a $6-9 increase in excess re-turns, relative to the overall stockmarket. That, however, does not take account of the chances of getting caught. These have risen as enforcement of America’s 43-year-old anti-bribery law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (fcpa ), has been stepped up and other countries have passed similar laws. The number of fcpa cases is up sharply since the financial crisis of 2007-09, according to Stanford Law School (see chart). It has dipped a bit under Presi-dent Donald Trump, who has criticised the fcpa for hobbling American firms over-seas, but remains well above historic lev-els. Total fines for fcpa violations were $14bn in 2016-19, 48 times as much as in the four years to 2007.The authors also tested 11hypotheses that emerged from past studies of bribery.They found support for some, for instance that firms pay larger bribes when they ex-pect to receive larger benefits, and that the net benefits of bribing are smaller in places with more public disclosure of politicians’sources of income.But they punctured other bits of re-ceived wisdom. Most striking, they found no link between democracy and graft. This challenges the “Tullock paradox”, which holds that firms can get away with smaller bribes in democracies because politicians and officials have less of a lock on the sys-tem than those in autocratic countries, and so cannot extract as much rent. Such find-ings will doubtless be of interest to corrup-tion investigators and unscrupulous exec-utives alike. 7Bribery pays—if you don’t get caughtBriberyA closer look at greasy palmsBrown envelopes, big chequesUnited States,Foreign Corrupt Practices ActSources:Stanford Law School;Sullivan &Cromwell*Investigations and enforcement actions †To August6543210605040302010020†10152000059095851977Enforcement actionsSanctions, $bnUtilitiesTransport Communications Basic materials Financial services Consumer goods Aerospace & defence TechnologyIndustrials Health care Oil &gas 100806040200Number of cases* by selected industry1977-2020†。

《经济学人》英语热点文章精选8篇(中英文对照

《经济学人》英语热点文章精选8篇(中英文对照

(考研英语阅读原文很多来自《经济学人》,希望大家好好看看)印度的救赎IN MAY America’s Federal Reserve hinted that it would soon start to reduce its vast purchases of Treasury bonds. As global investors adjusted to a world without ultra—cheap money, there has been a great sucking of funds from emerging markets。

Currencies and shares have tumbled, from Brazil to Indonesia, but one country has been particularly badly hit。

今年五月,美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)暗示,它将很快开始缩减大量购买国债的规模。

随着全球投资者开始调整策略,以适应没有超廉价资金的世界,大量资金开始逃离新兴市场.从巴西到印度尼西亚,货币及股票纷纷暴跌,但有一个国家受创尤其严重.Not so long ago India was celebrated as an economic miracle. In 2008 Manmohan Singh,the prime minister,said growth of 8—9% was India’s new cruising speed. He even predicted the end of the “chronic poverty,ignorance and disease, which has been the fate of millions of our countrymen for centuries”. Today he admits the outlook is difficult. The rupee has tumbled by 13% in three months。

6篇经济学人文章

6篇经济学人文章

1、The Americas Argentina's debt Let's not make a deal Argentina may spurn a chance to settle with its creditors 美洲阿根廷债务别签协议啦阿根廷或将还债机会弃如敝履WHEN Argentina defaulted on its debt for the second time in 13 years last July, the government blamed a pesky clause in its contracts with bondholders. 去年七月,阿根廷发生了十三年来的第二次债务违约,而政府却将这次违约归咎于与债权人签订的合同中的某项麻烦条款。

The so-called Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause was set to expire on December 31st,in theory opening the way to a settlement with bondholders who had refused Argentina's earlier offers of partial payment. 由于之前债权人拒绝阿根廷部分偿还,这项本应于12月31日到期的未来发行权利(RUFO)条款理论上可以解决与债权人之间的债务问题。

A deal would make it easier to borrow dollars, which the country badly needs to pay for imports. 这项协议可以为阿根廷借入美元提供更多便利,有了美元,阿根廷就可以解决进口商品所使用货币的燃眉之急。

But the president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, may spurn the opportunity. 不过,克里斯蒂娜?费尔南德斯?基什内尔总统却有可能将这一机会弃如敝履。

经济学人精品文章

经济学人精品文章

经济学人精品文章1.世界经济一路泥泞还是一路下滑?夏天已经走近了世界几大金融中心,可人们的心情却阳光不起来。

受各地经济悲观消息影响,股市已经连阴数周。

全球工厂生产放缓,消费者也愈发谨慎。

在美国,从房屋价格到就业增长的几乎每一项统计数据都显示疲软迹象。

虽然本周早些时候悲观气氛有所平缓,但也只是因为如美国零售业和中国工业生产等数据没有预想的那么糟糕而已。

全球范围内,经济增长正处于约两年前复苏开始以来的最低点。

那么现在的疲软只是复苏道路上的一滩泥泞,还是预示了全球经济恢复动力正在消退?大疲软从导致增长停滞的原因来看停顿应该只是暂时的。

首先,虽然这次的海啸重创日本GDP;打断供应链;尤其影响了4月全球工业产出量。

但经济统计数据显示暴跌的同时,一些更具前瞻性的迹象也表明将有一轮反弹。

比如美国汽车制造商的夏季生产计划表显示,那里的年GDP增长将至少提高一个百分点。

第二,是年初突然高企的油价导致了需求下降。

虽然更多的收入正从资金紧张的石油进口国流入坐享其成的产出国。

昂贵的燃油价格也打击了消费者信心,特别是在石油消费大国美国。

而且油价随阿拉伯世界动荡加剧而再度上扬的可能性也令人不安。

然而至少就目前来看,价格上涨的压力正在减弱。

美国的平均汽油价格虽然仍比年初高出21%,但已经开始回落。

这样应该可以促进消费者信心(并刺激消费)。

第三,许多新兴经济体推行货币紧缩政策是为了应对高通胀。

中国今年5月CPI攀升到了5.5%,印度商品批发价格增长也一举跃上9.1%。

以此为鉴,增速放缓在一定程度上倒是一个有利迹象,这恰恰说明这些国家的央行正采取行动,并开始取得成效。

即使是在对经济硬着陆风险忧心最重的中国,也没有迹象表明政府措施有矫枉过正之嫌。

其实更大的风险在于对世界经济疲软的担忧导致紧缩政策过早收兵。

在当前货币环境仍极其宽松的背景下,如果政府决心有所动摇将导致更高的通胀,最终使经济崩溃的风险大大增加。

也许大部分新兴市场正好需要一场减速来降温,但任何一个发达国家此刻却对此避之不及。

《经济学人·商论》精选文章

《经济学人·商论》精选文章

《经济学人·商论》精选文章BUSINESS leaders often have a poor opinion of politicians, preferring to find their heroes elsewhere—in other boardrooms or on the coaching field. But running a country is an even greater test of leadership and character than running a corporation. Those who have passed through the fire surely have something to teach modern-day managers.企业领导人通常对政客评价不高,更愿意在其他地方找寻自己的偶像,像是别家公司的董事会会议室,或训练场。

但和经营公司相比,治理国家是更严峻的考验,更能检验领导者的能力和品格。

那些历经火的试炼的人必定有可供现代管理者学习之处。

Take three of the most feted national leaders: Otto von Bismarck, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Many will object both to what they achieved and to the violence they used. But their successes and failures hold lessons for CEOs.以三位最受崇敬的国家领导人为例:奥托·冯·俾斯麦、富兰克林·罗斯福、温斯顿·丘吉尔。

很多人会不认可他们的成就以及他们使用暴力的做法,但CEO们可从这三人的成功与失败中汲取教训。

最新英语阅读-经济学人文章三篇

最新英语阅读-经济学人文章三篇

IF THE Federal Reserve eases monetary policy again at its meeting on 1September 13th, as I expect, it will be its most meticulously debated, 2planned and scrutinised move in recent memory. The case for action has 3been apparent at least since the spring when it became clear the economy 4would underperform the Fed's repeatedly lowered economic forecasts. Yet 5Ben Bernanke spent much of the press conference following the Fed's 6meeting in June, when it extended Operation Twist (the purchase of 7long-term bonds financed by selling short-term bonds) on the defensive 8over why the Fed hadn't done more. In August, it again chose not to pull 9the trigger. But it did release a statement that hinted the point was 10drawing near. The minutes to that meeting released three weeks later 11suggested it would take an immediate and powerful improvement in the 12economy to stay the Fed's hand.1314When Mr Bernanke made his annual appearance at the Kansas City Fed's 15economic symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, today, the world was 16wondering whether he would send a definitive sign that action was coming.17He did not, merely repeating the key sentence from the August statement, 18that the Fed "will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to 19promote a stronger economic recovery." This should not have been 20surprising; Fed chairmen don't like to front-run the Federal Open Market 21Committee.2223Mr Bernanke had a different goal than signaling to Wall Street. Pressure 24on the Fed has become intense in the last year, from hawks and 25conservatives (not necessarily, but increasingly, the same) who think the 26Fed has done all it can do and going further risks inflation, monetisation 27of the debt, and a loss of credibility for the central bank; and from doves 28and liberals who accuse Mr Bernanke of having shirked his responsibility 29and his own prior advice to the Bank of Japan by not more aggressively 30using the tools and alternative frameworks available to boost employment.31That this debate has unfolded against the backdrop of a tight and divisive 32presidential election has only raised the stakes, because it meant no 33matter what the Fed does, one party will accuse it of having helped the 34other win.3536Since Mr Bernanke could not escape criticism regardless of what the Fed 37did, tactically he was best served by waiting until the case for action 38was unambiguous, unsurprising and, most important, well articulated. The 39data have made the case unambiguous: employment and growth are weak and 40inflation by the Fed's preferred measure has edged down. By September 13th, 41it will certainly be unsurprising. Mr Bernanke's task today was to 42articulate the case.4344Mr Bernanke has always said the test was whether the benefits of more 45"quantitative easing" (QE)—the purchase of assets by printing money 46—exceeded the costs. This is what he did today. On the benefits, he said 47studies that show the Fed's two previous rounds of QE (large scale asset 48purchases, or LSAPs in Fed jargon) plus Operation Twist had lowered 49Treasury yields by 80 to 120 basis points. They have also led to 50"significant declines in the yields on both corporate bonds...[and] 51substantial reductions in MBS yields and retail mortgage rates. LSAPs also 52appear to have boosted stock prices, presumably both by lowering discount 53rates and by improving the economic outlook." On the economic impact, he 54reported:5556“57If we are willing to take as a working assumption that the effects of 58easier financial conditions on the economy are similar to those observed 59historically, then econometric models can be used to estimate the effects 60of LSAPs on the economy. Model simulations conducted at the Federal 61Reserve generally find that the securities purchase programs have 62provided significant help for the economy. For example, a study using the 63Board's FRB/US model of the economy found that, as of 2012, the first two 64rounds of LSAPs may have raised the level of output by almost 3 percent 65and increased private payroll employment by more than 2 million jobs, 66relative to what otherwise would have occurred. The Bank of England has 67used LSAPs in a manner similar to that of the Federal Reserve, so it is 68of interest that researchers have found the financial and macroeconomic 69effects of the British programs to be qualitatively similar to those in 70the United States.”7172Mr Bernanke also argued that the Fed's forward rate guidance, that is 73its commitment not to raise rates through the end of 2014, have had a 74powerful impact on expectations of Fed tightening. In conclusion, he said 75that "nontraditional policy tools have been and can continue to be 76effective in providing financial accommodation" (emphasis mine).7778He then catalogued the potential costs of further easing: impaired 79market functioning as the Fed's share of total bonds in circulation rose;80the potential for asset bubbles if interest rates are kept low for a long 81time; the threat of inflation if the Fed has trouble exiting from its 82purchases; and potential losses if the bonds lose value when interest 83rates rise. Mr Bernanke said "the hurdle for using non-traditional 84policies should be higher than for traditional policies. At the same time, 85the costs of non-traditional policies, when considered carefully, appear 86manageable, implying that we should not rule out the further use of such 87policies if economic conditions warrant."8889Do conditions warrant? Yes. As Mr Bernanke put it, "the economic 90situation is obviously far from satisfactory."9192If Mr Bernanke has made it clear that the Fed plans to act on September 9313th, he has not yet clarified how. The Fed could extend its low-rate 94guidance past 2014, but Mr Bernanke's speech seemed to assign such a move 95less efficacy than further bond purchases. If the Fed buys bonds, would 96it buy Treasurys or MBS or something else? By citing housing as first among 97the headwinds holding back the economy, and specifying the impact on 98mortgage rates of prior QE, he made a prima facie case for buying MBS and 99Treasurys. It is still not clear, though, whether the Fed would announce 100a fixed amount of purchases over a fixed term, or an open-ended programme 101(eg, $100 billion per month, keyed to economic conditions).102103What is fairly certain is that he will not be thanked when it happens. 104Conservatives will dial up their accusations of reckless Fed activism, 105and probably add toadying to Barack Obama to the rap sheet. Liberals will 106decry the Fed for not having gone further, or acted sooner. And in truth, 107no one can be sure that either is wrong. At today's Jackson Hole conference, 108there was an animated debate on this question. Adam Posen, whose last day 109on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee is today, decried the 110"defeatism about policy" which leads people to conclude that if monetary 111policy isn't working, it must simply be the structure of the economy. In 112fact the problem is more likely to be impairments to particular financial 113markets, which can be addressed with asset purchases in that specific 114sector (eg, small-business loans). Central banks have shied away from such 115purchases because of "self-imposed taboos", Mr Posen fretted, such as 116fears that such purchases would misallocate credit or look like 117politicised fiscal policy. This, he said, "is a prehistoric way of 118thinking."119120Larry Lindsey, a former Fed governor and adviser to George Bush, shot 121back: "In a free society, individuals and institutions don’t do unusual 122things because if you do, and break custom and happen to be wrong, you’123re betting the farm. It's normal, prudential sort of political behaviour. 124For our profession, after the last two decades, to realise modesty in what 125we express and can do, is probably becoming."126127Mr Bernanke can sympathise with both. When he first joined the Fed in 1282002, he was, like most academics, something of a hedgehog, quite sure 129of the answers and impatient with the fools and cowards who refused to 130implement them. One of his first speeches as governor made the academic 131point that when short-term interest rates are at zero, the Fed still has 132plenty of ammo by printing money, what Milton Friedman euphemistically 133called dropping money from a helicopter. This was the origin of the epithet 134"Helicopter Ben". A year after that, he made the same case but with more 135nuance in Japan. In the intervening years, he has become, as most 136policymakers do, a fox: the real world contains political constraints and 137unintended consequences that must be factored in before the academically 138ideal remedy is applied.139140The fox in Mr Bernanke appears to have made peace with the hedgehog. 141His most important audience today was his own colleagues. He needs not 142just their votes but their full-throated verbal endorsement of the Fed's 143next move in their speeches they make afterwards. What most outsiders 144can't appreciate about the job of Fed chairman is that among his unwritten 145responsibilities is maintaining the integrity and credibility of his 146institution for his successors. There are two ways this can be lost: by 147doing too little in the face of either too high unemployment or inflation; 148the other is by doing too much, with activism that prompts a backlash 149against the institution, constraining its ability to act again. If Mr 150Bernanke has calculated correctly, he has found a path between the two. 151152153154155156157158159Barren rocks, barren nationalism160THE wave of anti-Japanese protests that has erupted across China, after 161tit-for-tat landings by ultranationalists on uninhabited islands which 162the Japanese call the Senkakus and the Chinese the Diaoyus, is alarming. 163It is a reminder of how a barren group of disputed rocks could upend 164pain-staking progress in the difficult relations between Asia’s two 165biggest powers (see article). And the spat even raises the spectre of a 166conflict that could conceivably draw in America.167168History always weighs heavily in East Asia, so it is essential to 169understand the roots of the squabble. China has never formally controlled 170the Senkakus, and for most Japanese, blithely forgetful of their country’171s rapacious, imperial past, possession is nine-tenths of the law. Yet the 172islands’ history is ambiguous. The Senkakus first crept into the record 173lying in the Chinese realm, just beyond the Ryukyu kingdom, which in the 1741870s was absorbed by Japan and renamed Okinawa. The Chinese emperor 175objected to Japanese attempts to incorporate the Senkakus into Okinawa, 176but in 1895 Japan did it unilaterally. After Japan’s defeat in 1945 the 177Americans took over Okinawa’s administration, along with the Senkakus. 178In the 1951 peace treaty between Japan and the United States, as well as 179in the agreement to return Okinawa in 1972, the Senkakus’ sovereignty 180was left vague (Taiwan claims them too). The Americans say the dispute 181is for the parties to resolve amicably.182Three decades ago that looked possible. Deng Xiaoping, the architect 183of China’s modernisation, recognised the risks. When he signed a Treaty 184of Peace and Friendship with Japan in 1978, the two countries agreed to 185kick the Senkakus into the long grass. “Our generation”, Deng said, “is 186not wise enough to find common language on this question. The next 187generation will be wiser.” His hopes have been dashed.188189Chinese maritime power is growing, in ways that not only challenge 190Japan’s control of the Senkakus (but also worry other countries that have 191maritime disputes with China). Maritime law has evolved with exclusive 192economic zones around territories (see article). So all the islets have 193become more valuable. The current squabble began when the right-wing 194governor of Tokyo declared that the metropolitan government would buy the 195Senkakus from their indebted private owner, the better to assert Japanese 196sovereignty. Not to be seen as weak, Yoshihiko Noda, the prime minister, 197retorted that the Japanese government would buy them instead.198199The natural solution200201What can be done? Neither side wants to jeopardise good relations, let 202alone go to war, over the Senkakus. But the fact that there is a (remote) 203danger of conflict should prompt both governments to do two things. The 204long-term task is to defang the more poisonous nationalist serpents in 205both countries’ politics. In Japan that means producing honest textbooks 206so that schoolchildren can discover what their predecessors did. In China 207(no promulgator of honest textbooks itself) the government must abandon 208its habit of using Japanophobia as an outlet for populist anger, when 209modern Japan has been such a force for peace and prosperity in Asia. But 210the priority now is to look for ways to minimise the chances of 211unwished-for conflict, especially in seas swarming with rival vessels. 212213At a minimum that means not only having hotlines between the two 214governments, but also cast-iron commitments from the Chinese always to 215pick up the phone. A mechanism to deal with maritime issues between the 216two countries was set up last year, but crumbled when put to the test. 217Ideally, both sides should make it clear that military force is not an 218option. China should undertake not to send official vessels into Japanese 219waters, as it still occasionally does, and deal more forcefully with 220militaristic sabre-rattlers like the general who suggested using the 221Senkakus for bombing practice. Back in 2008 the two countries agreed on 222a framework for the joint development of disputed gasfields in the East 223China Sea, though China unpicked this good work when a Chinese trawler 224rammed a Japanese coastguard vessel near the Senkakus in 2010.225226As for the Senkakus themselves, Mr Noda’s proposal to buy them would 227have value if accompanied by a commitment to leave them unvisited. And 228it would be easier to face down the nationalists if America acknowledged 229its own past role in sweeping competing claims over the Senkakus under 230the carpet. Our own suggestion is for governments to agree to turn the 231Senkakus and the seas round them—along with other rocks contested by 232Japan and South Korea—into pioneering marine protected areas. As well 233as preventing war between humans, it would help other species. Thanks to 234decades of overfishing, too few fish swim in those waters anyway.235236237238CHARLOTTE, N.C. — A day after fumbling a predictable and 239straightforward question posed by Mitt Romney last week —are Americans 240better off than they were four years ago — the Obama campaign provided 241a response on Monday that it said would be hammered home during the 242Democratic convention here this week: “Absolutely.”243The focus on the campaign’s handling of the question, after halting 244and contradictory responses from Democrats on Sunday, complicated the 245White House’s effort to begin striking a set of themes the president 246intends to highlight here and carry through the general election.247That effort starts with an argument that Mr. Romney, the Republican 248nominee, would raise taxes on the middle class while cutting them for the 249wealthy. It seeks to pitch forward to the next four years the case that 250Mr. Obama and his allies have made over the spring and summer —that Mr. 251Romney’s business caree r showed him intent on profit even at the expense 252of workers and that his wealth has given him tax advantages not enjoyed 253by regular people.254“The problem is everybody’s already seen his economic playbook,” Mr. 255Obama said at a campaign stop in Ohio before a Labor Day audience largely 256consisting of United Auto Workers union members. “On first down he hikes 257taxes by nearly $2,000 on the average family with kids in order to pay 258for a massive tax cut for multimillionaires.”259The Obama campaign began running a new commercial making the same point, 260and asserting, “The middle class is carrying a heavy load in America, 261but Romney doesn’t see it.”262As delegates streamed in for the opening of the convention on Tuesday, 263Mr. Obama and his team were putting the finishing touches on a program 264that requires a different kind of political daring from the one they showed 265four years ago, when Mr. Obama gave his speech in a stadium on a stage 266compared by some to a Greek temple.267This week Mr. Obama is planning to undertake a tricky two-step of 268convincing wavering supporters being aggressively courted by Mr. Romney 269that they made the right decision in choosing him four years ago and that 270he has the country on its way to a sustainable recovery even if they do 271not always feel it. He will make the argument in an outdoor stadium again, 272on Thursday night under the threat of rain, but aides say there will be 273no Greek columns.274Obama campaign aides indicated they were moving into a new phase, 275applying their case that Mr. Romney has no history of looking out for the 276middle class to the question of what the next four years would look like 277under a Romney presidency.278But Republicans showed that they were not going to give Mr. Obama a free 279ride this week, with Mr. Romney’s running mate, Representati ve Paul D. 280Ryan, coming to North Carolina to keep the focus on the last four years. 281“The president can say a lot of things, and he will, but he can’t tell 282you that you’re better off,” Mr. Ryan said on Monday at a rally in 283Greenville, N.C. “Simply put, the Jimmy Carter years look like the good 284old days compared to where we are right now.”285Mr. Obama’s aides initially appeared to stumble when television 286interviewers asked them to respond to Mr. Romney’s charge in his 287nomination acceptance speech Thursday night that Americans were not 288better off under Mr. Obama.289On Fox News Channel, Mr. Obama’s top strategist, David Axelrod, said, 290“We’re in a better position than we were four years ago in our economy.” 291But Gov. Martin O’Malley of Maryland, a Democrat, answered “no” on 292CBS’s “Face the Nation,” though he blamed Republicans. Other aides 293equivocated.294Mr. O’Malley provided another answer on Monday on CNN: “We are clearly 295better off as a country because we’re creating jobs rather than losing 296them. We have not recovered all that we lost in the Bush recession. That’s 297why we need to continue to move forward.”298In fact, on Monday the campaign settled on a definitive answer of, as 299the deputy campaign manager Stephanie Cutter put it, “Absolutely.”300301302。

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What went wrongIN RECENT months many economists and policymakers, including such unlikely bedfellows as Paul Krugman, an economist and New York Times columnist, and Hank Paulson, a former American treasury secretary, have put “global imbalances”—the huge current-account surpluses run by countries like China, alongside America’s huge deficit—at the root of the financial crisis. But the IMF disagrees. It argues, in new papers released on Friday March 6th, that the “main culprit” was deficient regulation of t he financial system, together with a failure of market discipline. Olivier Blanchard, the IMF's chief economist, said this week that global imbalances contributed only “indirectly” to the crisis. This may sound like buck-passing by the world’s main interna tional macroeconomic organisation. But the distinction has important consequences for whether macroeconomic policy or more regulation of financial markets will provide the solutions to the mess.In broad strokes, the global imbalances view of the crisis argues that a glut of money from countries with high savings rates, such as China and the oil-producing states, came flooding into America. This kept interest rates low and fuelled the credit boom and the related boom in the prices of assets, such as houses and equity, whose collapse precipitated the financial crisis. A workable long-term fix for the problems of the world economy would, therefore, involve figuring out what to do about these imbalances.But the IMF argues that imbalances could not have caused the crisis without the creative ability of financial institutions to develop new structures and instruments to cater to investors’ demand for higher yields. These instruments turned out to be more risky than they appeared. Investors, overly optimistic about continued rises in asset prices, did not look closely into the nature of the assets that they bought, preferring to rely on the analysis of credit-rating agencies which were, in some cases, also selling advice on how to game the ratings system. This “failure of market discipline”, the fund argues, played a big role in the crisis.As big a problem, according to the IMF, was that financial regulation was flawed, ineffective and too limited in scope. What it calls the “shadow banking system”—the loosely regulated but highly interconnected network of investment banks, hedge funds, mortgage originators, and the like—was not subject to the sorts of prudential regulation (capital-adequacy norms, for example) that applied to banks.In part, the fund argues, this was because they were not thought to be systemically important, in the sense that banks were understood to be. But their being unregulated made it more attractive for banks (whose affiliates the non-banks often were) to evade capital requirements by pushing risk into these entities. In time, this network of institutions grew so large that they were indeed systemically important: in the now-familiar phrase, they were “too big” or “too interconnected” to fail. By late 2007, some estimates of the assets of the bank-like institutions in America outside the scope of existing prudential regulation, was around $10 trillion, as large as the assets of the regulated American banking system itself.Given this interpretation, it is not surprising that the IMF has thrown its weight strongly behind an enormous increase in the scale and scope of financial regulation in a series of papers leading up to the G20 meetings. Among many other proposals, it wants the shadow banking system to be subjected to the same sorts of prudential requirements that banks must follow. Sensibly, it is calling for regulation to concentrate on what an institution does, not what it is called (that is, the basis of regulation should be activities, not entities). It also wants regulators to focus more broadly onthings that contribute to systemic risk (leverage, funding and interconnectedness), the significance of which was probably under-appreciated until the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent chaos. And there is much more to be done, it suggests, involving cross-border banking, disclosure requirements, indices of systemic risk and international co-operation.Yet there is an underlying inconsistency here. The IMF’s version of “how it all happened” is a classic example of institutions gaming the regulatory system. It is impossible to anticipate all the possible ways in which regulations can be evaded. And while the wisdom of hindsight may make it appear blindingly obvious that non-bank financial institutions could become large enough to pose a risk to the entire system, clearly this was not apparent to policymakers at the time. Increasing the scope of regulation may well prevent the precise problems that led to this crisis from recurring in the same way, but nothing stops financiers from finding ways to evade the plethora of regulations that the fund is proposing. It is hard to shoot a moving target.And what about those pesky imbalances? The IMF’s view, broadly speaking, is that without excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, which was aided by the absence of regulation, imbalances would not by themselves have caused the meltdown. But equally, without the flood of money seeking returns, the risky financial instruments that the IMF is blaming for increasing systemic risk may not hav e grown and posed the risk that they did. Some blame the IMF’s policies during the Asian crisis for spurring countries in the region to build up enormous reserves. That may offer part of the explanation for why the Fund has come down so strongly on one side of the debate. Household choresTHERE are two radically different tales doing the rounds about HSBC, Europe’s biggest lender by market value. The first says that HSBC, deep down, is still an emerging-markets operation run by rugged types who disdain the sorcery of modern finance. Under the temporary grip of an evil spell in 2003 they bought Household, an American consumer-credit firm that then haemorrhaged losses. On March 2nd they snapped out of it. HSBC’s chairman acknowledged that it was “an acquisitio n we wish we had not undertaken”, wrote off its cost and promised to run down its book of dodgy loans. Having opened its heart, HSBC felt able to lower its dividend and raise its core tier-one capital ratio to 8.5%, above those of JPMorgan Chase (6.4%) and Santander (7.2%), two more of the Western world’s biggest banks also vying for the title of the safest one.Against this there is a horror story. It says that HSBC’s definition of capital excludes mark-to-market losses on asset-backed securities (ABS). Furthermore, particularly demanding critics say that it also excludes mark-to-market losses on its loan book. Like almost all banks, HSBC carries these at book value and impairs as customers default. However, include both these items and the core tier-one ratio would drop to just 2%. Treating loan books on the same basis, JPMorgan would be at 5% and many other banks would be insolvent.This would suggest that HSBC is in fact poorly capitalised, and needs to raise even more equity. The alternative, advocated by, among others, Knight Vinke, an activist investor, would be to cut loose Household, which HSBC does not legally guarantee and which accounts for just over half of the additional mark-to-market losses. Household’s credit spreads are much higher than HSBC’s, suggesting that investors think this is possible, despite HSBC’s verb al assurances to the contrary. Which story is right? Given the risk of litigation, the reputational hit and the fact that HSBC has itself loaned Household some $13.5 billion, its mark-to-market loss would have to get a lot worse before HSBC was prepared to let it default. And like many banks, HSBC argues that there is at least some chance mark-to-market losses overstate the ultimate impairments it will face. The ABS losshas been very volatile, doubling in six months and stands at ten times HSBC’s “stress test” estimate of the probable hit. The mark-to-market loss on Household’s loan book is double what optimistic analysts think the likely ultimate impairment will be.Pleading that fair-value accounting is cruel is hardly unique, but what makes HSBC’s position more credible than most is that it has the capacity to wait and see. Its funding position is excellent with deposits exceeding loans, reducing its dependence on wholesale markets. And the core business continues to generate lots of pre-provision earnings. If spread out over several years, the bank could absorb the hit from Household implied by the mark to-market valuation without damaging its capital.Indeed the real moral of the tale is different. Compared with other banks HSBC is protected by its big deposit base and its profitability. It looks therefore as if investors will back the rights issue. Others do not have even that comfort.Slash and burnIT FELT like death by a thousand cuts. Already this month has seen plenty to rattle stockmarkets, from dreadful economic news to the continuing bloodshed at American International Group, an insurer. Commodity firms were given a reprieve on March 4th by hopes of a big stimulus package in China—though all they got was reaffirmation of the country’s 8% growth target. Meanwhile, a new fear haunts the markets: the mounting number of firms slashing their dividends.That banks and insurance companies will chop their payments is now understood, but the pain has spread. General Electric (GE) has cut its dividend for the first time in 71 years, Dow Chemical for the first time since 1912. In Europe previously reliable payers like Telecom Italia and Anglo-American, a mining firm, have reduced their payouts, and even BP has said it cannot increase its dividend at today’s oil prices. Income investors were left to ponder Eurotunnel, the operator of the rail link between France and Britain, which will pay the first dividend since its creation in 1986. Its $9m may buy a few tissues for those mourning the loss of $9 billion of annual payouts from GE alone.Based on experience since the second world war, investors had cause to be more optimistic. Although stock prices and earnings move up and down violently, dividends have been more reliable, typically falling from the peak of a cycle to its trough by only one-tenth in real terms. Furthermore, the share of American earnings paid out as dividends has declined from a post-war peak of almost two-thirds to about one-third in 2007, with many firms preferring stock buybacks (which have now ground to a halt). That should have given companies a bigger buffer.Unfortunately other structural trends worked against income-lovers. Firms’ debt levels rose, increasing the volatility of earnings. And the quality of the profits fell. Financial companies contributed about one-third of the $736 billion of dividends paid globally by quoted firms in 2007. Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, reckons that dividends in America could fa ll by about a quarter this year—the steepest drop since 1938. Even this may understate the decline. Financial firms’ payouts will collapse—even relatively well capitalised banks like JPMorgan Chase have reduced their dividends. And more of the industrial firms that make up the other two-thirds of total dividends will cut too. Pessimists point to 1931-35, when dividends per share in America fell by 45% from peak to trough.For many firms dividend cuts are an unpleasant task that should not be shirked. There is no point in starving a business and endangering a firm’s balance-sheet in order to meet macho dividend commitments. The counter-argument, that cuts remove an important discipline on managers, hardlyholds true today, when all firms are counting the pennies. That being so, when firms announced cuts why did their share prices slump? The reason has a lot to do with signalling.A share’s value must be the present value of all future dividends—otherwise stockmarkets would be a giant Ponzi scheme. But in theory shareholders should not care whether dividends are paid out today or later. Just as taking money out of a cash machine does not make you richer, nor does extracting cash from a firm you own. Investors who need income to meet pension payments, for example, can raise it just as well by selling a small part of their holdings instead of receiving dividends. It is true that dividends, rather than capital appreciation, have provided a big chunk of long-term equity returns. But this partly reflects the choice of firms to pay out a big chunk of their earnings. Had they paid out less, capital appreciation would, in theory, have been commensurately higher.The main reason why investors are worried is that dividends are a guide to managers’ views of when earnings might reach their trough: they do not want to pay the dividend out of borrowing, or worse, cut it again. Occasionally this floor is breached—in 1933 American earnings per share dropped below dividends. Today, GE has cut its quarterly dividend from 31 cents per share to ten cents. That is partly to reduce gearing, but also suggests managers’ low confidence in analysts’ forecasts for earnings of about 30 cents. Likewise if American dividends fall by a third from their recent peak, then—assuming they set a floor for profits—earnings would bottom out at about two-thirds below the level of 2007. That would be a drop on a par with the 1930s and far below most forecasts. An overblown scenario perhaps, but the scare over dividends suggests that many investors are still too optimistic.What went wrong最近几个月,许多经济学家和决策者们,包括一些意见不太可能的一致的家伙:例如纽约时报专栏作者,经济学家保罗•克鲁格曼和美国前财长汉克•保尔森,都一致认为“全球失衡”——像中国一样的一些国家拥有巨大的经常账户盈余,而美国却有着巨额的赤字——是这次金融危机的根源所在。

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