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国际经济学 (19)
C H A P T E R 19Macroeconomic Policy and Coordination under FloatingExchange Rates浮动汇率下的宏观经济政策和协调A s the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates began to show signs of strain in the late 1960s, many economists recommended that countries allow currency values to be determined freely in the foreign exchange market. When the governments of the industrialized countries adopted floating exchange rates early in 1973, they viewed their step as a temporary emergency measure and were not consciously following the advice of the economists then advocating a permanent floating-rate system. So far, however, it has proved impossible to put the fixed-rate system back together again: The dollar exchange rates of the industrialized countries have continued to float since 1973.The advocates of floating saw ft as a way out of the conflicts between internal and external balance that often arose under the rigid Bretton Woods exchange rates. By the mid-1980s, however, economists and policymakers had become more skeptical about the benefits of an international monetary system based on floating rates. Some critics describe the post-1973 currency arrangements as an international monetary "nonsystem,"a freefor- all in which national macroeconomic policies are frequently at odds. Many observers now think that the current exchange rate system is badly in need of reform. Why has the performance of floating rates been so disappointing, and what direction should reform of the current system take? In this chapter our models of fixed and floating exchange rates are applied to examine the recent performance of floating rates and to compare the macroeconomic policy problems of different exchange rate regimes.Case for Floating Exchange RatesAs international currency crises of increasing scope and frequency erupted in the late 1960s, most economists began advocating greater flexibility of exchange rates. Many argued that a system of floating exchange rates (one in which central banks did not intervene in the foreign exchange market to fix rates) would not only automatically ensure exchange rate flexibility but would also produce several other benefits for the world economy. The case for floating exchange rates rested on three major claims:1. Monetary policy autonomy. If central banks were no longer obliged to intervene in currency markets to fix exchange rates, governments would be able to use monetary policy to reach internal and external balance. Furthermore, no country would be forced to import inflation (or deflation) from abroad.2. Symmetry. Under a system of floating rates the inherent asymmetries of Bretton Woods would disappear and the United States would no longer be able to set world monetary conditions all by itself. At the same time, the United States would have the same opportunity as other countries to influence its exchange rate against foreign currencies.3. Exchange rates as automatic stabilizers. Even in the absence of an active monetary policy, the swift adjustment of market-determined exchange rates would help countriesmaintain internal and external balance in the face of changes in aggregate demand. The long and agonizing periods of speculation preceding exchange rate realignments under the Bretton Woods rules would not occur under floating.Monetary Policy AutonomyUnder the Bretton Woods fixed-rate system, countries other than the United States had little scope to use monetary policy to attain internal and external balance. Monetary policy was weakened by the mechanism of offsetting capital flows (discussed in Chapter 17). A central bank purchase of domestic assets, for example, would put temporary downward pressure on the domestic interest rate and cause the domestic currency to weaken in the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate then had to be propped up through central bank sales of official foreign reserves. Pressure on the interest and exchange rates disappeared, however, only when official reserve losses had driven the domestic money supply back down to its original level. Thus, in the closing years of fixed exchange rates, central banks imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on international payments to keep control over their money supplies. These restrictions were only partially successful in strengthening monetary policy, and they had the damaging side effect of distorting international trade.Advocates of floating rates pointed out that removal of the obligation to peg currency values would restore monetary control to central banks. If, for example, the central bank faced unemployment and wished to expand its money supply in response, there would no longer be any legal barrier to the currency depreciation this would cause. As in the analysis of Chapter 16, the currency depreciation would reduce unemployment by lowering the relative price of domestic products and increasing world demand for them. Similarly, the central bank of an overheated economy could cool down activity by contracting the money supply without worrying that undesired reserve inflows would undermine its stabilization effort. Enhanced control over monetary policy would allow countries to dismantle their distorting barriers to international payments.Advocates of floating also argued that floating rates would allow each country to choose its own desired long-run inflation rate rather than passively importing the inflation rate established abroad. We saw in the last chapter that a country faced with a rise in the foreign price level will be thrown out of balance and ultimately will import the foreign inflation if it holds its exchange rate fixed: By the end of the 1960s many countries felt that they were importing inflation from the United States. By revaluing its currency—that is, by lowering the domestic currency price of foreign currency—a country can insulate itself completely from an inflationary increase in foreign prices, and so remain in internal and external balance. One of the most telling arguments in favor of floating rates was their ability, in theory, to bring about automatically exchange rate changes that insulate economies from ongoing foreign inflation.The mechanism behind this insulation is purchasing power parity (Chapter 15). Recall that when all changes in the world economy are monetary, PPP holds true in the long run: Exchange rates eventually move to offset exactly national differences in inflation. If U.S. monetary growth leads to a long-run doubling of the U.S. price level, while Germany's price level remains constant, PPP predicts that the long-run DM price of the dollar will be halved. This nominal exchange rate change leaves the real exchange rate between thedollar and DM unchanged and thus maintains Germany's internal and external balance. In other words, the long-run exchange rate change predicted by PPP is exactly the change that insulates Germany from U.S. inflation.A money-induced increase in U.S. prices also causes an immediate appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar when the exchange rate floats. In the short run, the size of this appreciation can differ from what PPP predicts, but the foreign exchange speculators who might have mounted an attack on fixed dollar exchange rates speed the adjustment of floating rates. Since they know foreign currencies will appreciate according to PPP in the long run, they act on their expectations and push exchange rates in the direction of their long-run levels.Countries operating under the Bretton Woods rules were forced to choose between matching U.S. inflation to hold their dollar exchange rates fixed or deliberately revaluing their currencies in proportion to the rise in U.S. prices. Under floating, however, the foreign exchange market automatically brings about the exchange rate changes that shield countries from U.S. inflation. Since this outcome does not require any government policy decisions, the revaluation crises that occurred under fixed exchange rates are avoided.1SymmetryThe second argument put forward by the advocates of floating was that abandonment of the Bretton Woods system would remove the asymmetries that caused so much international disagreement in the 1960s and early 1970s. There were two main asymmetries, both the result of the dollar's central role in the international monetary system. First, because central banks pegged their currencies to the dollar and accumulated dollars as international reserves, the U.S. Federal Reserve played the leading role in determining the world money supply and central banks abroad had little scope to determine their own domestic money supplies. Second, any foreign country could devalue its currency against the dollar in conditions of "fundamental disequilibrium," but the system's rules did not give the United States the option of devaluing against foreign currencies. Thus, when the dollar was at last devalued in December 1971, it was only after a long and economically disruptive period of multilateral negotiation.A system of floating exchange rates, its proponents argued, would do away with these asymmetries. Since countries would no longer peg dollar exchange rates or need to hold dollar reserves for this purpose, each would be in a position to guide monetary conditions at home. For the same reason, the United States would not face any special obstacle to altering its exchange rate through monetary or fiscal policies. All countries' exchange rates would be determined symmetrically by the foreign exchange market, not by government decisions.2Exchange Rates as Automatic Stabilizers1Countries can also avoid importing undesired deflation by floating, since the analysis above goes through, in reverse, for a fall in the foreign price level.2The symmetry argument is not an argument against fixed-rate systems in general, but an argument against the specific type of fixed-exchange rate system that broke down in the early 1970s. As we saw in Chapter 17, a fixed-rate system based on a gold standard can be completely symmetric. The creation of an artificial reserve asset, the SDR, in the late 1960s was an attempt to attain the symmetry of a gold standard without the other drawbacks of that system.The third argument in favor of floating rates concerned their ability, theoretically, to promote swift and relatively painless adjustment to certain types of economic changes. One such change, previously discussed, is foreign inflation. Figure 19-1, which uses the DD-AA model presented in Chapter 16, examines another type of change by comparing the economy's response under a fixed and a floating exchange rate to a temporary fall in foreign demand for its exports.A fall in demand for the home country's exports reduces aggregate demand for every level of the exchange rate, E, and so shifts the DD schedule leftward from DD] to DD2. (Recall that the DD schedule shows exchange rate and output pairs for which aggregate demand equals aggregate output.) Figure 19-la shows how this shift affects the economy's equilibrium when the exchange rate floats. Because the demand shift is assumed to be temporary, it does not change the long-run expected exchange rate and so does not move the asset market equilibrium schedule A A1. (Recall that the/\/\ schedule shows exchange rate and output pairs at which the foreign exchange market and the domestic money market are in equilibrium.) The economy's short-run equilibrium is therefore at point 2; compared with the initial equilibrium at point 1, the currency depreciates (E rises) and output falls. Why does the exchange rate rise from El to E21 As demand and output fall, reducing the transactions demand for money, the home interest rate must also decline to keep the money market in equilibrium. This fall in the home interest rate causes the domestic currency to depreciate in the foreign exchange market, and the exchange rate therefore rises from El to E2.The effect of the same export demand disturbance under a fixed exchange rate is shown in Figure 19-1 b. Since the central bank must prevent the currency depreciation that occurs under a floating rate, it buys domestic money with foreign currency, an action that contracts the money supply and shifts AAl left to AA2. The new short-run equilibrium of the economy under a fixed exchange rate is at point 3, where output equals Y3. Figure 19-1 shows that output actually falls more under a fixed rate than under a floating rate, dropping all the way to K3 rather than Y2. In other words, the movement of the floating exchange rate stabilizes the economy by reducing the shock's effect on employment relative to its effect under a fixed rate. Currency depreciation in the floating rate case makes domestic goods and services cheaper when the demand for them falls, partially offsetting the initial reduction in demand. In addition to reducing the departure from internal balance caused by the fall in export demand, the depreciation reduces the current account deficit that occurs under fixed rates by making domestic products more competitive in international markets.We have considered the case of a transitory fall in export demand, but even stronger conclusions can be drawn when there is a permanent fall in export demand. In this case, the expected exchange rate Ee also rises and AA shifts upward as a result. A permanent shock causes a greater depreciation than a temporary one, and the movement of the exchange rate therefore cushions domestic output more when the shock is permanent. Under the Bretton Woods system, a fall in export demand such as the one shown in Figure 19-lb would, if permanent, have led to a situation of "fundamental disequilibrium" calling for a devaluation of the currency or a long period of domestic unemployment as export prices fell. Uncertainty about the government's intentions would have encouraged speculative capital outflows, further worsening the situation by depleting central bankreserves and contracting the domestic money supply at a time of unemployment. Advocates of floating rates pointed out that the foreign exchange market wouldautomatically bring about the required real currency depreciation through a movement in the nominal exchange rate. This exchange rate change would reduce or eliminate the need to push the price level down through unemployment, and because it would occurimmediately there would be no risk of speculative disruption, as there would be under a fixed rate.The Case Against Floating Exchange RatesThe experience with floating exchange rates between the world wars had left many doubts about how they would function in practice if the Bretton Woods rules were scrapped. Some economists were skeptical of the claims advanced by the advocates of floating and predicted instead that floating rates would have adverse consequences for the world economy. The case against floating rates rested on five main arguments:1. Discipline. Central banks freed from the obligation to fix their exchange rates might embark on inflationary policies. In other words, the "discipline" imposed on individual countries by a fixed rate would be lost.2. Destabilizing speculation and money market disturbances. Speculation on changes in exchange rates could lead to instability in foreign exchange markets, and this instability, in turn, might have negative effects on countries' internal and external balances. Further,disturbances to the home money market could be more disruptive under floating thanunder a fixed rate.3. Injury to international trade and investment. Floating rates would make relative international prices more unpredictable and thus injure international trade and investment.4. Uncoordinated economic policies. If the Bretton Woods rules on exchange rate adjustment were abandoned, the door would be opened to competitive currency practices harmful to the world economy. As happened during the interwar years, countries might adopt policies without considering their possible beggar-thy-neighbor aspects. All countries would suffer as a result.5. The illusion of greater autonomy. Floating exchange rates would not really give countries more policy autonomy. Changes in exchange rates would have such pervasive macroeconomic effects that central banks would feel compelled to intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets even without a formal commitment to peg. Thus, floating would increase the uncertainty in the economy without really giving macroeconomic policy greater freedom.DisciplineProponents of floating rates argue they give governments more freedom in the use of monetary policy. Some critics of floating rates believed that floating rates would lead to license rather than liberty: Freed of the need to worry about losses of foreign reserves, governments might embark on overexpansionary fiscal or monetary policies, falling into the inflation bias trap discussed in Chapter 16 (p. XXX). Factors ranging from political objectives (such as stimulating the economy in time to win an election) to simple incompetence might set off an inflationary spiral. In the minds of those who made the discipline argument, the German hyperinflation of the 1920s epitomized the kind of monetary instability that floating rates might allow.The pro-floaters' response to the discipline criticism was that a floating exchange rate would bottle up inflationary disturbances within the country whose government was misbehaving; it would then be up to its voters, if they wished, to elect a government with better policies. The Bretton Woods arrangements ended up imposing relatively little discipline on the United States, which certainly contributed to the acceleration of worldwide inflation in the late 1960s. Unless a sacrosanct link between currencies and a commodity such as gold were at the center of a system of fixed rates, the system would remain susceptible to human tampering. As discussed in Chapter 17, however, commodity-based monetary standards suffer from difficulties that make them undesirable in practice.Destabilizing Speculation and Money Market DisturbancesAn additional concern arising out of the experience of the interwar period was the possibility that speculation in currency markets might fuel wide gyrations in exchange rates. If foreign exchange traders saw that a currency was depreciating, it was argued, they might sell the currency in the expectation of future depreciation regardless of the currency's longer-term prospects; and as more traders jumped on the bandwagon by selling the currency the expectations of depreciation would be realized. Suchdestabilizing speculation would tend to accentuate the fluctuations around the exchange rate's long-run value that would occur normally as a result of unexpected economic disturbances. Aside from interfering with international trade, destabilizing sales of a weak currency might encourage expectations of future inflation and set off a domestic wage-price spiral that would encourage further depreciation. Countries could be caught in a "vicious circle" of depreciation and inflation that might be difficult to escape. Advocates of floating rates questioned whether destabilizing speculators could stay in business. Anyone who persisted in selling a currency after it had depreciated below its longrun value or in buying a currency after it had appreciated above its long-run value was bound to lose money over the long term. Destabilizing speculators would thus be driven from the market, the pro-floaters argued, and the field would be left to speculators who had avoided long-term losses by speeding the adjustment of exchange rates toward their longrun values.Proponents of floating also pointed out that capital flows could behave in a destabilizing manner under fixed rates. An unexpected central bank reserve loss might set up expectations of a devaluation and spark a reserve hemorrhage as speculators dumped domestic currency assets. Such capital flight might actually force an unnecessary devaluation if government measures to restore confidence proved insufficient.A more telling argument against floating rates is that they make the economy more vulnerable to shocks coming from the domestic money market. Figure 19-2 uses theDD-AA model to illustrate this point. The figure shows the effect on the economy of a rise in real domestic money demand (that is, a rise in the real balances people desire to hold at each level of the interest rate and income) under a floating exchange rate. Because a lower level of income is now needed (given E) for people to be content to hold the available real money supply, A A1 shifts leftward to AA2: Income falls from Y] to Y2 as thecurrency appreciates from E1 to E2. The rise in money demand works exactly like a fall in the money supply, and if it is permanent it will lead eventually to a fall in the home price level.Under a fixed exchange rate, however, the change in money demand does not affect the economy at all. To prevent the home currency from appreciating, the central bank buys foreign reserves with domestic money until the real money supply rises by an amount equal to the rise in real money demand. This intervention has the effect of keeping AA[ in its original position, preventing any change in output or the price level.A fixed exchange rate therefore automatically prevents instability in the domestic money market from affecting the economy. This is a powerful argument in favor of fixed rates if most of the shocks that buffet the economy come from the home money market (that is, if they result from shifts in AA). But as we saw in the previous section, fixing the exchange rate will worsen macroeconomic performance on average if output market shocks (that is, shocks involving shifts in DD) predominate.Injury to International Trade and InvestmentCritics of floating also charged that the inherent variability of floating exchange rates would injure international trade and investment. Fluctuating currencies make importers more uncertain about the prices they will have to pay for goods in the future and make exporters more uncertain about the prices they will receive. This uncertainty, it was claimed, would make it costlier to engage in international trade, and as a result trade volumes—and with them the gains countries realize through trade—would shrink. Similarly, greater uncertainty about the payoffs on investments might interfere with productive international capital flows.Supporters of floating countered that international traders could avoid exchange rate risk through transactions in the forward exchange market (see Chapter 13), which would grow in scope and efficiency in a floating-rate world. The skeptics replied that forward exchange markets would be expensive to use and that it was doubtful that forward transactions could be used to cover all exchange-rate risks.At a more general level, opponents of floating rates feared that the usefulness of each country's money as a guide to rational planning and calculation would be reduced. A currency becomes less useful as a unit of account if its purchasing power over imports becomes less predictable. Uncoordinated Economic PoliciesSome defenders of the Bretton Woods system thought that its rules had helped promote orderly international trade by outlawing the competitive currency depreciations that occurred during the Great Depression. With countries once again free to alter their exchange rates at will, they argued, history might repeat itself. Countries might again follow self-serving macroeconomic policies that hurt all countries and, in the end, helped none. In rebuttal, the pro-floaters replied that the Bretton Woods rules for exchange rate adjustment were cumbersome.In addition, the rules were inequitable because, in practice, it was deficit countries that came under pressure to adopt restrictive macroeconomic policies or devalue. Thefixed-rate system had "solved" the problem of international cooperation on monetary policy only by giving the United States a dominant position that it ultimately abused.The Illusion of Greater AutonomyA final line of criticism held that the policy autonomy promised by the advocates of floating rates was, in part, illusory. True, a floating rate could in theory shut out foreign inflation over the long haul and allow central banks to set their money supplies as they pleased. But, it was argued, the exchange rate is such an important macroeconomic variable that policymakers would find themselves unable to take domestic monetary policy measures without considering their effects on the exchange rate.Particularly important to this view was the role of the exchange rate in the domestic inflation process. A currency depreciation that raised import prices might induce workers to demand higher wages to maintain their customary standard of living. Higher wage settlements would then feed into final goods prices, fueling price level inflation and further wage hikes. In addition, currency depreciation would immediately raise the prices of imported goods used in the production of domestic output. Therefore, floating rates could be expected to quicken the pace at which the price level responded to increases in the money supply. While floating rates implied greater central bank control over the nominal money supply, M s, they did not necessarily imply correspondingly greater control over the policy instrument that affects employment and other real economic variables, the real money supply, M S IP. The response of domestic prices to exchange rate changes would be particularly rapid in economies where imports make up a large share of the domestic consumption basket: In such countries, currency changes have significant effects on the purchasing power of workers' wages.The skeptics also maintained that the insulating properties of a floating rate are very limited. They conceded that the exchange rate would adjust eventually to offset foreign price inflation due to excessive monetary growth. In a world of sticky prices, however, countries are nonetheless buffeted by foreign monetary developments, which affect real interest rates and real exchange rates in the short run. Further, there is no reason, even in theory, why one country's fiscal policies cannot have repercussions abroad.Critics of floating thus argued that its potential benefits had been oversold relative toits costs. Macroeconomic policymakers would continue to labor under the constraint of avoiding excessive exchange rate fluctuations. But by abandoning fixed rates, they would have forgone the benefits for world trade and investment of predictable currency values. CASE STUDYExchange Rate Experience Between the Oil Shocks, 1973-1980 Which group was right, the advocates of floating rates or the critics? In this Case Study and the next we survey the experience with floating exchange rates since 1973 in an attempt to answer this question. To avoid future disappointment, however, it is best to state up front that, as is often the case in economics, the data do not lead to a clear verdict. Although a number of predictions made by the critics of floating were borne out by subsequent events, it is also unclear whether a regime of fixed exchange rates would have survived the series of economic storms that has shaken the world economy since 1973. The First Oil Shock and Its Effects, I973-I975As the industrialized countries' exchange rates were allowed to float in March 1973, an official group representing all IMF members was preparing plans to restore world monetary order. Formed in the fall of 1972, this group, called the Committee of Twenty, had been assigned the job of designing a new system of fixed exchange rates free of the asymmetries of Bretton Woods. By the time the committee issued its final "Outline of Reform" in July 1974, however, an upheaval in the world petroleum market had made an early return to fixed exchange rates unthinkable.Energy Prices and the 1974-1975 Recession.In October 1973 war broke out between Israel and the Arab countries. To protest support of Israel by the United States and the Netherlands, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an international cartel including most large oil producers, imposed an embargo on oil shipments to those two countries. Fearing more general disruptions in oil shipments, buyers bid up market oil prices as they tried to build precautionary inventories. Encouraged by these developments in the oil market, OPEC countries began raising the price they charged to their main customers, the large oil companies. By March 1974 the oil price had quadrupled from its prewar price of $3 per barrel to $ 12 per barrel.The massive increase in the price of oil raised the energy prices paid by consumers and the operating costs of energy-using firms and also fed into the prices of nonenergy petroleum products, such as plastics. To understand the impact of these price increases, think of them as a large tax on oil importers imposed by the oil producers of OPEC. The oil shock had the same macroeconomic effect as a simultaneous increase in consumer and business taxes: Consumption and investment slowed down everywhere, and the world economy was thrown into recession. The current account balances of oil-importing countries worsened.The Acceleration of Inflation. The model we developed in Chapters 13 through 17 predicts that inflation tends to rise in booms and fall in recessions. As the world went into deep recession in 1974, however, inflation accelerated in most countries. Table 19-1 shows how inflation in the seven largest industrial countries spurted upward in that year. In a number of these countries inflation rates came close to doubling even though unemployment was rising.What happened? An important contributing factor was the oil shock itself: By directly raising the prices of petroleum products and the costs of energy-using industries, the increase in the oil price caused price levels to jump upward. Further, the worldwide inflationary pressures that had built up since the end of the 1960s had become entrenched in the wage-setting process and were continuing to contribute to inflation in spite of the deteriorating employment picture. The same inflationary expectations that were driving new wage contracts were also putting additional upward pressure on commodity prices as speculators built up stocks of commodities whose prices they expected to rise.Finally, the oil crisis, as luck would have it, was not the only supply shock troubling the world economy at the time. From 1972 on, a coincidence of adverse supply disturbances pushed farm prices upward and thus contributed to the general inflation.。
《国际经济学》(全套课件218P)
1998年9月，美国突然要求所有来自中国的木 质包装和木质铺垫材料必须附有中国出入境检验检 疫机关出具的证书，证明木质包装经过热处理、熏 蒸处理或防腐处理，违规货物将整批禁止入境，这 使我国1／3以上的对美出口受到影响。
第二年，欧盟也仿效美国的做法，宣布对从中国 离境产品的木质包装采取紧急措施，实施新的检疫 标准，以防止带有天牛虫的木质包装箱进入欧洲。 据当时的估算，仅欧盟的这一决定就至少影响中国 70多亿美元的对欧出口贸易。
国际经济学
碳关税——美国为保护其国内企业针对发展中
国家采取的措施将会是又一个主要的趋势。
国际经济学
第六章 贸易保护政策：关税
关税是历史上最重要的一类贸易保护政策， 通过本章的学习，你可以了解：
关税的概念、种类和征收方式 小国关税效应、大国关税效应 最优关税率、有效保护率 关税的总体均衡分析
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生产者剩余
品和市场（保护关税）。
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（二） 关税的种类
1、依据征税商品的流向
进口关税：对进口商品课 征的关税；
出口关税：对出口商品课 征的关税；
过境关税：对途经本国关 境，运往他国的外国商品 课征的关税。
获得财政收入和保护国内生产；
有时出于干预市场的目的，会 选择一些关系到国民生活的敏 感商品征收关税。
获取良好的国际政治与经济环境
一国贸易政策的选择必须考虑到国际政治经济环境的影响。
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国际贸易政策的类型
自由贸易政策
自由贸易政策是指国家对贸易行为不加任何干预，使 商品自由进出口，在国际市场上自由竞争。
保护贸易政策
国际经济学第八章
一、关税同盟的静态效应
□ 贸易创造效应
■ 由于关税同盟内实行自由贸易后，产品从成本较高的国内生产转往成本 较低的成员国生产，从成员国的进口量增加，新的贸易得以“创造”
■ 第一由于成员国之间相互取消关税，成员国由原先生产并消费本国的高成本、
高价格产品，转向购买成员国的低价格产品，从而使消费者节省开支，增加福 利。
关税同盟的扩大出口效应：图形
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图118/—174/2关02税3 同盟的扩大出口效应
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三、关税同盟的动态效应
□市场扩大效应（或规模经济效应）
□关税同盟的建立促进了成员国企业之间的竞争
□ 关税同盟的建立有利于吸引外资
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贸易创造与贸易转移的综合分析
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图8—3 贸易创造与贸易转移的综合分析
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一定的商品进口量的增加，还会带来出口的增加，对于一个希望 参加关税同盟的国家（特别是小国）而言，它的加入往往并非看 准该关税同盟能给它带来多少进口的好处，更多的是看重其产品 的出口市场。
第一章国际经济学教案导论(可编辑修改word版)
一、国际经济学的含义第一章绪论第一节国际经济学的产生与发展研究开放条件下的生产、交换行为以及价格、货币和宏观政策。
由国际贸易经济学和国际货币经济学组成。
（研究世界范围内商品、服务和资本的生产、分配和消费活动的学科）二、国际经济学的产生1、家政学：家庭是经济行为的基本单位，追求在收入既定情况下的福利最大化。
家政学――家庭―――收入既定福利最大2、微观经济学：微观经济学以企业为经济活动中心，研究企业在资源既定的条件下获得最大的利润，消费者在收入既定的条件下获得最大的效用。
微观经济学着重探讨生产什么、为谁生产、如何生产。
3、宏观经济学：研究国民经济，对一个国家的经济总量（如经济增长、就业等）进行分析。
宏观经济的目标包括经济增长、充分就业、稳定物价和国际收支平衡。
4、国际经济学随着历史的发展，国家间的经济往来日益频繁，彼此经济关系日益紧密，国家于是成为国际经济往来和活动的主体，出现了各种国际经济往来的形式，国际经济因而产生。
为了探讨国际经济关系的内在联系，就有必要产生独立的经济学分支学科，即国际经济学。
国际经济学是西方经济学的一般理论在国际经济中的延伸和应用，是西方经济学的分支学科。
国际经济学的两大特征（1）国际交易不同于国内交易。
国际交易中普遍存在对贸易和要素流动的自然的和人为的阻碍。
如，劳动力和资本在国家间的流动性远远低于其在一国之内自由流动的程度；关税和非关税壁垒在一国之内一般是不存在的；各国使用不同的货币，使得国际交易远比国内交易复杂得多。
（2）国际经济关系发生在各个独立的经济实体之间。
各国政府制定政策考虑的往往是本国的福利和稳定，而非全世界的福利和稳定，因此往往导致在一国看来是最佳的选择，而在世界范围内看并非最佳；此外，经济间的连锁机制使得一国的经济政策，如财政政策和货币政策，不仅会影响着本国的资源配置，同时还会影响他国的资源配置。
三、国际经济学的发展1、国际贸易理论的发展（1）古典贸易理论：斯密的绝对优势理论、李嘉图的比较优势理论（2）新古典贸易理论：国际贸易理论的标准模型、H-O 模型（3）当代贸易理论：打破了已往的“规模收益不变和完全竞争”的基本假设，研究重点由国家间的差异转向市场结构和厂商行为方面，着重研究不完全竞争市场下国际贸易的新特点以及贸易政策。
国际经济学
国际经济学绪论国际经济学是建立在经济学基本理论基础上的经济学的分支科学。
它是研究经济资源或稀缺资源在世界范围内的最优分配，以及在此过程中发生的经济活动和经济关系的科学。
即国际经济学是以国际经济关系为其研究对象。
它的研究目的就是要解释各个国家或地区之间经济联系的内在机制。
国际经济学定义国际经济学研究现代国家和地区之间经济的相互依存与相互影响及其内在机制，分析一国与世界其他国家间商品、生产要素的流向和直接影响这个流向的国内外政策，以及这些政策对某个国家的福利所产生的影响。
国际经济学的内容国际经济学的微观部分和宏观部分被分别称之为国际贸易理论和国际金融理论。
国际贸易理论旨在说明贸易的起因与利益，以及贸易政策的影响及依据，它主要涉及的主要内容包括贸易纯理论、贸易政策以及贸易与经济增长之间关系等。
国际金融理论则主要说明国际经济活动（如商品、服务贸易和资本国际流动）在各国国民收入中的作用，以及各种国内经济活动对国际经济关系的影响。
即包括外汇理论与政策、国际收支调整理论与政策及国际货币制度等。
国际经济学的范围1、微观国际经济理论：古典国际经济理论、现代国际经济理论；2、宏观国际经济理论：国际贸易政策、国际收支调整理论、内外平衡政策3、生产要素的国际流动：国际间的资本流动（国际间接资本流动和国际直接资本流动）、国际间的劳动力流动；4、国际经济协调：国际间贸易关系协调、国际间金融关系协调、国际间税收关系协调、国际经济一体化；本次课程的内容组成国际贸易理论与政策国际金融理论与政策国际经济学与西方经济学的区别西方经济学研究的是资源的流动和管理机制；可以分为微观经济学和宏观经济学；国际经济学研究的是国际格局下的的资源配置问题。
它分为微观国际经济理论（国际贸易理论）：主要讨论世界范围内的资源配置问题。
宏观国际经济理论（国际金融理论）：主要讨论在国际格局下资源利用的决定因素及其国际传递机制。
第一篇国际贸易理论与政策国际贸易与微观经济学的区别国际贸易理论与微观经济学之间存在着内在联系。
(完整word版)国际经济学(第四版)
国际经济学名词：1、国际经济学：是经济的一般理论在国际经济范围中的延伸和应用,是以经济学的一般理论为基础来研究国际经济活动与国际经济关系的经济学分支学科，是整个经济学体系的有机组成部分.主要研究对象有国际贸易理论与政策、国际收支、外汇理论、生产要素的国际流动、跨国公司、经济发展、经济一体化、开放经济的宏观调节、经济全球化与国际经济秩序研究等.2、绝对利益：在某一种商品上，一个经济在劳动生产率上占有绝对优势,或其生产所耗费的劳动成本绝对低于另一经济，若各个经济都从事自己占有绝对优势商品的生产，继而进行交换，那么双方都可以通过交换得到绝对的利益，从而整个世界也可以获得分工的好处.3、比较利益：甲国在生产任何产品时成本均低于乙国，劳动生产率均高于乙国，处于绝对优势，两个国家间进行贸易的可能性依然存在,因为两国劳动生产率之间的差距,并不是在任何产品上都一样。
这样，处于绝对优势的国家集中生产本国国内具有最大优势的产品,处于绝对劣势的国家停止生产在本国国内处于最大劣势的产品，通过自由交换，双方都可节约社会劳动，增加产品的消费。
世界也因而增加产量，提高劳动生产率。
4、国际分工：即各国之间的劳动分工,生产的国际专业化.它是国际贸易的基础,是社会分工从国内向国外延伸的结果。
各国对于分工方式的选择以及分工的变化，反映了彼此之间经济发展水平的差异及各国经济联系的程度。
主要有产业间、产业内、垂直、水平以及不同要素密集度之间的分工等类型.5、贸易乘数:在开放的条件下，对外贸易的增长可以使国民经济成倍增加，对外贸易乘数研究一国对外贸易与国民收入、就业之间的互相影响，描述了在开放经济体系内部出口促进经济增长的动态过程。
公式为：dY＝［l/（dM/dY)] dX。
（2003)6、一价定律：在完全竞争的市场上，相同的交易产品或金融资产经过汇率调整后，在世界范围内其交易成本一定是相等的。
这个定律在经济中是通过诸如购买力平价、利息平价、远期汇率等经济关系表现出来的.7、贸易创造与贸易转移:关税同盟成员国产品从生产成本较高的国内生产转向成本较低的关税同盟中贸易对象国生产，本国从贸易对象国进口的一种过程和现象。
《国际经济学》复习资料全
一、客观部分：（单项选择、多项选择、不定项选择、判断）（一）、选择部分1、甲国生产一单位酒需40个劳动力，生产一单位布需30个劳动力，乙国生产一单位酒需20个劳动力，生产一单位布需10个劳动力，则根据比较优势理论（ A ）A.甲国专业生产酒，乙国专业生产布B.甲国专业生产酒和布C.甲国专业生产布，乙国专业生产酒D.乙国专业生产酒和布★考核知识点:相对技术差异论附1.1.1（考核知识点解释）：即使一国处于绝对技术优势地位，另一国处于绝对技术劣势地位，只要存在价格差或机会成本的差别，就存在国际分工和贸易的基础和动力。
“两利相权取其重，两弊相权取其轻”。
2、假设一国的边际储蓄倾向为0.2，边际进口倾向为0.1，且最初该国的国际收支处于平衡状态，该国出口增加100万美元将使国际收支出现（ C ）万美元的顺差。
A.100B.33.3C.66.7D.50★考核知识点:国际收支调整的乘数论附1.1.2（考核知识点解释）：若出口增加ΔＸ，会引起贸易差额扩大。
但由于出口增加在乘数作用下会引起收入提高，进而使得进口增加，所以出口扩大引起的贸易差额的扩大被收入增加所引起的进口增加部分地抵消，导致贸易差额的扩大小于出口的增加，但是出口增加确实由于乘数作用导致了国民收入的增加和贸易顺差的扩大，其影响程度则取决于乘数中s与m的大小。
ΔＸ－m/(s+m)* ΔＸ＝66.73、如果一国进口竞争部门和出口部门各有一种特定要素，而劳动力是共同要素，则进口关税一定会（ A ）A.提高进口竞争部门特定要素所有者的实际收入B.提高出口部门特定要素所有者的实际收入C.降低两部门共同要素劳动力的实际收入D.同时提高进口竞争部门和出口部门特定要素所有者的实际收入★考核知识点:特定要素模型附1.1.3（考核知识点解释）：国际贸易会导致出口部门特定要素的实际收入上升，进口部门特定要素的实际收入下降，可自由流动的共同要素实际收入变动不确定，取决于其消费结构。
国际经济学第2章(Helen)
David Ricardo,1772-1823
13
(一）概述
涵义：两国都能生产同样两种产品的条件下，其中一国在 两种产品生产上的劳动生产率均高于另一国，该国可以专 门生产优势较大的产品，处于劣势地位的另一国可以专门 生产劣势较小的产品；通过国际分工与贸易，双方仍可从 国际贸易中获利。 两利相权取其重，两弊相权取其轻。 由David Ricardo（1772-1823）提出。英国工业革命深入 发展时期的经济学家，1817年出版了主要著作《政治经济 学和赋税原理》，提出了比较成本理论。
25
（2）赫克歇尔——俄林定理（Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem）
在各国生产要素存量一定的情况下，一国将生产和出口密集使用 其丰裕要素的产品，进口密集使用其稀缺要素的产品。 推理过程：
国际贸易 商品的价格差
生产产品的成本差别
生产要素的价格不同
假定中国和美国生产同种产品 的技术相同，生产布需要2单 位资本和5单位劳动。中国每 单位资本和劳动的价格分别为 6美元和1美元，而美国则分别 为3美元和4美元，结果中国每 单位布的成本为2x6＋5x1＝17 美元，而美国为2x3＋5x4＝26 美元。
毛呢产量 2.7单位
所需劳动 190人/年
4
交换后： (假定英国以1单位毛呢交换葡萄牙1单位葡萄酒) 酒消费量 毛呢消费量 英 1单位 1.7单位 葡 1.375单位 1单位 而分工前：
英 葡
酒消费量 1单位 1单位
毛呢消费量 1单位 1单位
5
（二）具体内容 1、理论分析的假定条件
（1）生产过程中只投入一种生产要素——劳动力； （2）世界上只有两个国家——中国和美国； （3）这两个国家都能生产两种产品——小麦和布； （4）劳动力在一国范围内各部门间自由流动； （5）劳动力在部门间转移时机会成本不变； （6）生产要素在两国之间不能流动； （7）两国经济资源都充分利用； （8）贸易平衡；
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对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院
研究生课程班期末考试试卷
《国际经济学》
课程班代码：授课教师：董虹
学号：姓名：成绩：
一、名词解释（每题5分，共35分）
1.里昂惕夫之谜
里昂惕夫运用投入产出分析法，对1947年美国出口行业和进口竞争行业的资本存量和工人数值进行了比较，却得出了相反的结论：美国出口的是劳动密集型产品，进口的是资本密集型产品。
2.贫困化增长
当一国由于某种原因（一般总是单一要素供给的极大增长）使传统出口商品的出口规模极大增长，其结果是不仅导致该国贸易条件的严重恶化，该国国民福利水平绝对下降。
贫困化增长发生的前提有三：一是该国的商品出口在世界市场上占有较大份额；二是该国生产能力的增长主要集中在出口部门；三是国际市场对这种商品的需求弹性较低。
显然，对于一个发展中大国的开放经济来说，这三个条件是基本符合的，因而更加需要警惕出现经济的贫困化增长。
之所以发生贫困化增长，其原因在于技术进步或要素积累增加所导致的实际产出的增加有可能使价格贸易条件不利于正在增长的国家。
而且价格贸易条件恶化所造成的损失会超过产出增加所带来的收益，最终使该国的境况不如从前。
3.倾销
倾销，是指一国（地区）的生产商或出口商以低于其国内市场价格或低于成本价格将其商品抛售到另一国（地区）市场的行为。
对倾销的调查和确定，由对外贸易经济合作部负责。
是与政府对出口的建立制度相联系的。
倾销被视为一种不正当的竞争手段，为WTO所禁止，因此反倾销也成为各国保护本国市场，扶持本国企业强有力的借口和理由。
4.贸易创造效应
所谓贸易创造，是指由于国际经济一体化组织成员国之间相互取消了关税和与关税具有同等效力的其他措施，造成了他们相互之间贸易规模的扩大和福利水平的提高。
贸易创造效应是指，由于关税同盟取消关税，成员国由原来自己生产并消费的高成本、高价格产品，转向购买成员国低成本、低价格的产品，从而使消费者节省开支，提高福利；
提高生产效率，降低生产成本。
5.国际收支平衡表
国际收支平衡表是反映一定时期一国同外国的全部经济往来的收支流量表。
国际收支平衡表是对一个国家与其他国家进行经济技术交流过程中所发生的贸易、非贸易、资本往来以及储备资产的实际动态所作的系统记录，是国际收支核算的重要工具。
通过国际收支平衡表，可综合反映一国的国际收支平衡状况、收支结构及储备资产的增减变动情况，为制定对外经济政策，分析影响国际收支平衡的基本经济因素，采取相应的调控措施提供依据，并为其他核算表中有关国外部分提供基础性资料。
6.J曲线
一国货币贬值或升值时，该国贸易收支及经常帐户收支状况一般并不能立即改善或恶化，往往要经过一段时间。
由于这种经常帐户收支变动的轨迹成英文字母J的形状，所以被称为J曲线。
本国货币贬值后，最初发生的情况往往正好相反，经常项目收支状况反而会比原先恶化，进口增加而出口减少。
这一变化被称为“J曲线效应”。
7.斯旺图
斯旺图是由澳大利亚经济学家特雷弗·斯旺首先引入到国际经济分析中。
运用斯旺图可以考察内外平衡的政策调节，在经济处于内外失衡时，采取转换支出政策和改变支出政策能实现内外平衡。
二、问答题（共25分）
1.试画图分析资本国际流动的经济效应。
（10分）
下图说明了国际资本流动的经济效应：
横轴代表全世界的资本量，从左自右是本国资本量，从右自左是外国资本量，左边的纵轴表示本国资本的边际收益MPP1，右边纵轴表示外国资本的边际收益MPP2。
起初本国的资本稀缺，因此资本的边际收益—利率I1较高，外国的资本丰富，则利率I2较低，因此外国的资本由于高利率的驱动流向本国，由此外国的资本得到了高利益，本国的资本稀缺也得到了缓解，直到在A点达到平衡。
经济效应：
（1）导致实际利率的趋同。
本国实际利率下降，外国实际利率上升。
（2）增加世界总收益，福利水平提高。
资本的国际流动导致世界福利上升，如图阴影部分的面积ABC。
2.试利用IS-LM-BP模型分析资本有限流动（即资本较小弹性自由流动）情况下，财政政
策和货币政策在固定汇率制和浮动汇率制情况下的影响的差异。
（15分）
固定汇率制下：
浮动汇率制下：
三、计算分析题（共40分）
1.在简单国民收入模型中，国家的自发性消费为100，边际消费倾向为0.8，，自发性投资
为50，自发性出口为100，自发性进口为50，边际进口倾向为0.2。
不考虑政府。
（1）国民收入为多少？
（2）投资变动引起的对外贸易乘数为多少？
（3）贸易收支为多少？若实现国际收支平衡需要如何进行调节（10分）
答：（1）联立方程得，y=c+i+x=100+0.8y+50+100-50-0.2y，
解方程得国民收入y等于500
（2）对外贸易乘数=1/(1-0.8+0.2)=2.5
（3）进口m=50+0.2*500=150 出口为100，贸易收支为-50，即赤字。
为了实现国际收支平衡，可以通过减少支出，促进出口等措施，具体如下：
支出下降政策，包括紧缩性财政政策、紧缩性货币政策；
支出转移政策(包括贬值政策)；
直接管制政策(包括关税、限额、多重汇率、补贴等措施)。
2.某小国的某产品的需求曲线和供给曲线分别为：Qd=50-5P，Qs=-10+5P。
（1）国内封闭经济中的市场价格为多少？（5分）
（2）如果世界市场价格为2，进口为多少？（5分）
（3）如果征收100%的进口关税，进口为多少？导致的福利损失为多少？（8分）
（4）如果政府实施进口配额限制，规定每年只能进口20单位的产品，该国的无谓损失是多少？此政策与（3）中的进口关税政策有何区别？（12分）
答：（1）令Qd=Qs，解得P=6
（2）如果世界价格P等于2，则该国供给QS=0，需求QD=40，需进口40单位产品（3）征收关税为2*100%=2，进口价格变为4，则进口为零，损失福利20X(4-2)X0.5=20 （4）实施进口配额为20单位，该国进口20单位产品，剩下的20单位缺口需要提高国
内价格来促进国内生产弥补。
即QD-QS=20,将式子带进去求得国内价格为4.
生产者所得=10，消费者剩余=-70
关税收入为进口量乘以关税即20*2=40，抵消了部分损失，最终该国损失等于20.
关税和进口配额都提高了价格，限制了贸易，并引起无谓损失，唯一差别是关税至少能给政府带来收入，而进口配额为那些得到进口许可的人创造了剩余。