企业合并分立案例的中国税务分析(英文)
企业合并与分立对税务筹划的影响
企业合并与分立对税务筹划的影响在企业经营过程中，合并和分立是常见的策略之一。
无论是合并两个或两个以上的企业，还是将一个企业分立为两个或两个以上的企业，都会对税务筹划产生一定的影响。
本文将探讨企业合并与分立对税务筹划的影响，并分析其可能的利与弊。
一、企业合并对税务筹划的影响1. 企业所得税在企业合并过程中，两个或多个企业合二为一，在税务筹划方面可能会面临一些问题。
首先，合并后的企业所得税的计算方法可能会发生变化。
其次，合并后的企业可能会享受到一些税务优惠政策，例如减税、免税等，从而对企业的税负产生影响。
在制定合并策略时，企业需要全面评估这些变化带来的影响，并进行相应的税务筹划。
2. 资产转让税在企业合并过程中，涉及到的资产转让可能会导致资产转让税的发生。
企业需要在合并前对资产进行评估，以确定可能产生的资产转让税，并进行相应的税务筹划。
此外，在国家相关政策的引导下，企业也可以通过优化资产转让方案来减少资产转让税的负担。
3. 增值税企业合并后，合并企业可能面临增值税的计税问题。
在合并过程中，企业需要对合并后的增值税计税基础进行评估，并采取相应的税务筹划措施，以减少合并企业的税负。
二、企业分立对税务筹划的影响1. 企业所得税与企业合并相反，企业分立可能会导致分立后的企业所得税发生变化。
分立后的企业需要独立计算所得税，并可能面临分立所得税的变化。
在进行企业分立时，企业需要充分考虑税务筹划的影响，以最大程度地减少税负。
2. 资产转让税企业分立涉及到资产的转让，因此可能产生资产转让税。
企业在进行分立前需要对资产进行评估，并采取相应的税务筹划措施，以减少资产转让税的负担。
3. 增值税在企业分立过程中，涉及到的增值税计税基础可能会发生变化。
企业需要对分立后的增值税的计税基础进行评估，并制定相应的税务筹划方案，以减少增值税的负担。
三、企业合并与分立的利与弊1. 利企业合并与分立可以通过重新规划企业的税务结构，实现税收的优化，减少税负。
企业分立的税务处理及案例分析
企业分立的税务处理及案例分析分立，是指一家企业将部分或全部资产分离转让给现存或新设的企业，被分立企业股东换取分立企业的股权或非股权支付，实现企业的依法分立.现对分立过程中可能涉及到哪些税收问题,应如何进行税务处理？笔者在此进行分析以飨读者。
（一)企业分立活动不征收营业税《中华人民共和国营业税暂行条例》及其实施细则：营业税的征收范围为在中华人民共和国境内有偿提供应税劳务、转让无形资产或者销售不动产的行为。
企业分立不属于该征税范围，其实质是被分立企业股东将该企业的资产、负债转移至另一家企业，有别于被分立企业将该公司资产(土地使用权、房屋建筑物)转让给另一家企业的应征营业税行为，因此，企业分立不应征收营业税。
《国家税务总局关于转让企业产权不征收营业税问题的批复》（国税函［2002]165号）规定：“根据《中华人民共和国营业税暂行条例》及其实施细则的规定，营业税的征收范围为有偿提供应税劳务、转让无形资产或者销售不动产的行为。
转让企业产权是整体转让企业资产、债权、债务及劳动力的行为，其转让价格不仅仅是由资产价值决定的，与企业销售不动产、转让无形资产的行为完全不同。
因此，转让企业产权的行为不属于营业税征收范围,不应征收营业税。
" （二）企业分立活动不征收增值税根据《中华人民共和国增值税暂行条例》及其实施细则的规定，增值税的征收范围为在中华人民共和国境内销售货物或者提供加工、修理修配劳务以及进口货物.企业分立不属于该征税范围,其实质是被分立企业股东将该企业的资产、负债转移至另一家企业，有别于被分立企业将该公司资产（存货、固定资产）转让给另一家企业的应征增值税行为，因此，企业分立不应征收增值税。
《国家税务总局关于纳税人资产重组有关增值税问题的公告》（国家税务总局公告2011年第13号)规定:“纳税人在资产重组过程中，通过合并、分立、出售、置换等方式，将全部或者部分实物资产以及与其相关联的债权、负债和劳动力一并转让给其他单位和个人，不属于增值税的征税范围，其中涉及的货物转让,不征收增值税。
企业合并的税务管理及案例分析
企业合并的税务管理及案例分析企业合并是指两个或多个独立的企业合并为一个企业的过程。
在经济全球化的今天，企业合并是常见的一种方式，可以实现合并方的产业结构优化、技术创新、降低生产成本和提高市场竞争力等多个目标。
在企业合并过程中，税务管理是一件非常重要的事情。
下面，我们将从税务管理的角度来探讨企业合并的问题。
一、企业合并前的税务规划企业合并前的税务规划是企业进行合并的前提。
企业应该通过调查与研究，了解合并前双方的税务情况，确定税负分摊方式，制定合并后的税务策略。
一般来说，企业合并的税务规划包括以下几个方面：1.确定税负分摊方式企业合并后，原有的税负需要作出合理的分摊。
企业可以选择直接分摊或者通过沟通和协商后，采取其他方式进行分摊。
2.合并前的资产评估合并前，企业需要进行资产评估以确定企业的净资产和每项资产的价值。
这是确定合并后企业的税务策略的基础。
3.确定税务规划企业应该根据实际情况制定完整的税务规划，并在税务专家指导下选择最优方案。
二、企业合并在税务管理中的应用1.税务处理企业合并后，企业应该在税务部门办理相关手续，如税务登记，税务转移等。
如果未处理好这些手续，将会影响合并后企业的正常运营。
2.减税政策对于因合并而产生的税收问题，企业可以根据国家有关税收政策进行申请减免处理。
例如，可以申请合并优惠，免征因合并所得税。
3.合理避税在企业合并过程中，如果合并方存在资产减值可能，可以通过充分利用税务政策，在税务处理中合理避税。
4.合并后的税务报告企业在合并后，必须按照规定时间向税务部门提供合并后企业的相关税务报告。
如果未及时做好税务报告，将会对企业产生不可估量的损失。
三、案例分析2015年，浙江东南制药股份有限公司与宁波德兴制药股份有限公司进行了合并。
在税务管理方面，浙江东南制药股份有限公司及时办理了税务转移等手续，并在税务部门申请了合并优惠，享受了税收减免政策，增加了企业的经济效益。
在另一个合并案例中，2012年，北京胜利精密铸造有限责任公司因未及时向税务部门进行税务转移申报等手续，导致被税务机关处罚。
企业分立合并中的纳税安排案例分析
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股权转让筹划方案
方案4，AB公司的股东同意以未分配利润全额及 法定公积金的75%进行增资扩股，然后再按每股 净资产的1.05倍转让85%的股份。
投资损益 4845万元（1500+4200）×85% 溢价所得 369.75万元（3000×85%×2.9×0.05）Leabharlann 合计 5214.75万元12
股权转让筹划方案
国税函[2004]390号《国家税务总局关于企 业股权转让有关所得税问题的补充通知》
一、企业在一般的股权（包括转让股票或 股份）买卖中，应按《国家税务总局关于 企业股权投资业务若干所得税问题的通知》 （国税发〔2000〕118号）有关规定执行。 股权转让人应分享的被投资方累计未分配 利润或累计盈余公积应确认为股权转让所 得，不得确认为股息性质的所得。
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企业分立合并中的纳税安排
3.商品房销售环节 （1）A公司应缴纳土地增值税： 扣除项目金额＝ （ 3000 －500） ＋2060×（1＋
20%）＝4872（万元）； 增值额＝5500－4872＝628（万元）； 增值率＝628÷4872×100%＝13%。 《中华人民共和国土地增值税暂行条例》规定，
10
股权转让筹划方案
▲AB公司是一有限责任公司，适用所得税率33%。 AB公司2005年期末财务状况如下：实收资本3000 万元，其中，A公司持股比例为85%， B公司持股 比例为15%; 盈余公积1500万元，未分配利润4200 万元，所有者权益合计8700万元。 AB公司2005年 末每股净资产为2.9元。
某公司分立与合并的税务筹划方案实例
某公司分立与合并的税务筹划方案实例上海XL有限公司(以下简称XL公司)要进行派生分立,分拆成为XL公司和B公司两家公司,各自经营A业务和B业务,业务分拆过程不影响正常生产经营,不增加税负。
同时,为减轻XL公司生产经营主体的负担,现将为生产服务的房产及土地拟通过一定方式转由青岛E投资管理有限公司(以下简称E投资公司)持有。
二、税收筹划方案(一)XL公司实施企业分立XL公司派生分立为XL公司、B公司和后勤服务(以下简称后勤公司)三家公司,企业所得税按照特殊性税务处理。
(二)E投资公司吸收合并后勤公司分立完成一年后,E投资公司吸收合并后勤公司,相应地,土地房产转到E投资公司,吸收合并环节按照企业所得税特殊性税务处理政策处理。
以分立完成后一年为节点，是为了在分立环节享受特殊性税务处理政策，需要分立完成后12个月内保持权益及经营的连续性，不影响分立环节特殊性税务处理。
三、分立具体筹划方案及税负分析XL公司派生分立为XL公司、B公司和后勤公司三家公司，分立环节不产生税负。
(一)分立方案开始分立基准日：暂定为10月31日。
资产、负债的划分依据是各项资产、负债的业务所属和对应职能。
B车间及所占地归属B公司，A车间及所占地和中间办公楼归属XL公司，食堂洗浴及以东房产归属后勤公司。
未弥补亏损：可按分立资产占全部资产的比例进行分配，由分立企业继续弥补。
该处是按资产比例分配，不是按净资产比例分配，因此分立前需要对资产负债进行重分类。
并且税务机关一般认可按照分立资产公允价值占全部资产公允价值的比例进行可弥补亏损的分配。
根据我们的了解，目前全国绝大部分税务机关只认可按照资产比例分配可弥补亏损，如果想把全部亏损留在存续公司弥补，还需要跟青岛市地方税务局沟通确认。
员工安置方案：原人员中属于青岛B业务的人员从XL公司解约、同B公司签订合同缴纳社保，应付职工薪酬中应由B公司承担的部分划归B公司。
根据分立的本质，后勤公司也应分配部分人员。
外文翻译--合并政策和税收竞争
原文：Merger Policy and Tax CompetitionIn many situations governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. We find that whether national or international mergers are more likely to be enacted in the presence of nationally optimal tax policies depends crucially on the ownership structure of firms. When all firms are owned domestically in the premerger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are more efficient in the national merger case and smaller synergy effects are needed for this type of merger to be proposed and cleared. These results are reversed when there is a high degree of foreign firm ownership prior to the merger.Mergers have played a prominent role over the past decade, and international merger activity has grown particularly fast. During the period 1981-1998 the annual number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has increased more than fivefold and the share of cross-border mergers has reached more than one quarter of the total by the end of this period. This increase in merger activity has led to situations where a national or an international merger have been in direct competition with each other. A recent example has been the bidding race for the leading Spanish electricity provider Endesa, where the German-based E.ON company initially competed with the Spanish-based rival Gas Natural. The Spanish authorities favored the national merger and formulated severe obstacles to an international take-over by E.ON, which was one of the reasons why E.ON eventually withdrew its bid.A different approach has been taken by the British government, which has fully liberalized its electricity market in the early 1990s. In this process, foreign electricity providers (among them E.ON ) took over a large part of the British electricity industry. The British government responded to high profits in this and other privatized industries by imposing a one-time, sector-specifi c ‘windfall pro fi t tax’ in 1997. Since then, a renewed imposition of this tax has been repeatedly discussed as a complement to the regulation of prices through the regulation authority Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets).The last example shows clearly that national governments dispose overadditional policy instruments in an industry where a merger or a foreign acquisition has taken place. Price regulation in privatized `network industries' is one important way to increase domestic consumer surplus at the expense of corporate profits, which often accrue, at least in part, to foreign shareholders. Sector-specific profit taxes have very similar effects, if their proceeds are redistributed to consumers in compensation for higher goods prices. On the other hand, there are also many industries where subsidies are granted in order to improve the competitiveness of domestic products in world markets. One set of examples are direct subsidies to specific sectors, such as mining, shipbuilding, steel production, or airplane construction. Moreover, several of these sectors and several others (e.g. air transportation) also receive indirect subsidies by paying reduced rates of excise taxes, in particular mineral oil or electricity taxes. To the extent that these `eco taxes' represent Pigouvian taxes that cause firms to internalize the true social cost of their products, such tax rebates also represent subsidies to the involved sectors and, importantly, to the electricity and energy sector itself. In all these cases, sector-specific tax or subsidy policies can be adjusted by national policymakers in response to a change in market structure caused by a merger.we argue that the possibility to levy industry-specific taxes or subsidies in a nationally optimal way has important repercussions on the position that national regulation authorities take vis-µa-vis a national or an international merger proposal. At the same time, merging firms will incorporate a possible change in policy when deciding about a merger in a particular country. To analyze this interaction between tax and merger policies we set up a model where both firms and merger regulation authorities anticipate that taxes will be optimally adjusted in the host country after a merger has taken place. More specifically, we investigate a setting of Cournot quantity competition between four producing firms where two firms are located in each of two symmetric countries. Importantly, these firms may have foreign shareholders, thus giving an incentive to each government to employ profit taxes that can be partly exported to foreigners.Starting from a market structure of double duopoly, our focus is on the comparison between a national merger in one of the countries and an international merger between a home and a foreign firm.Our analysis shows that the relative attractiveness of a national versus an international merger depends critically on the degree of foreign firm ownership. When all firms are nationally owned prior to the merger, then a national merger will lead to more efficient tax policies as compared to the international merger. In contrast, when the level of foreign firm ownership is high initially, then non-cooperative tax policies in the host countries will be more efficient under the international merger. Extending the model to allow for synergy effects of mergers, we show that these welfare properties translate into the national (international) merger being more likely to be proposed and adopted when the degree of foreign firm ownership is low (high). These results imply that a more geographically dispersed ownership structure of firms, in combination with non-cooperatively chosen national tax policies, may offer one explanation for the recent surge in cross-border merger activity.Our analysis relates to two strands in the literature. First, there is a growing recent literature on merger policies in open economies. This literature, however, typically regards merger control as an isolated policy problem for national or international regulators. The literature that analyses the interaction of merger control with other policy instruments is scarce, and it almost exclusively focuses on international trade policies as the additional policy variable (Richardson, 1999; Horn and Levinsohn, 2001; Huck and Konrad, 2004; Saggi and Yildiz, 2006). In contrast, the interaction between merger policy and national tax policies has not been addressed in this literature so far. A second literature strand on which our paper builds is the analysis of optimal commodity taxation in oligopolistic markets (Keen and Lahiri, 1998; Lockwood, 2001; Keen et al., 2002;Haufler et al.,2005;Hashimzade et al.,2005). This literature, however, has focused mainly on issues of commodity tax harmonization and the choice of commodity tax regime under an exogenously given market structure. It has not addressed the implications for tax policy that follow from changes in the underlying market conditions as a result of mergers.The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework for our analysis. Section 3 presents the benchmark case of double duopoly, where two firms are located in each country and all four firms compete in both markets. Section4 analyzes the changes in tax policies and welfare when a national merger occurs in one of the countries. Section5 carries out the same analysis for an international merger. Section6 introduces synergy effects associated with a national and an international merger and compares the conditions under which one or the other type of merger is proposed and accepted by merger authorities. Section7 concludes.In practice a core motivation for firms to undertake mergers, and an important reason for regulation authorities to permit them, is that mergers can create synergy effects. We analyze how large the cost savings must be for a national or an international merger in order to be in the interest of both the merging firms and the regulation authority of the host country. We deal again with different ownership structures of firms. Due to the complexity of the resulting expressions, we confine the discussion in the main text to the polar cases of full national ownership and complete international ownership diversificationWe should observe a positive and systematic relationship between the foreign ownership share and the share of cross-border mergers in a particular industry. There is indeed some first, suggestive evidence in favour of this proposition. In the OECD countries the share of cross-border mergers in the total number of M&A cases differs widely across different economic sectors and is highest in manufacturing. At the same time, manufacturing is also one of the most internationalized sectors with respect to foreign ownership, at least in European countries. Similarly, there are sectors with a low share of foreign firm ownership, such as construction, where the share of cross-border mergers in the total number of M&A cases is also low. A detailed empirical study would be needed to rigorously test whether this positive relationship between foreign ownership and the share of cross-border mergers holds more generally, and whether it can be linked to the interaction of nationally optimal tax policies and merger control.In many industries governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market outcome after a change in market structure has occurred. In this paper we have set up a simple model to analyze how nationally optimal tax rates will be adjusted in response to a national merger on the one hand andan international merger on the other. Extending the analysis to incorporate synergy effects of mergers, we have then studied how these changes in tax policy feed back on the incentives for firms to propose one or the other kind of merger, and for the merger regulation authorities to accept it.Our analysis shows that a national and an international merger lead to different incentives for national tax policy. On the one hand an international merger increases the 24 incentives for non-cooperative tax policy to tax foreign firm owners in excess of the efficient levels. On the other hand, an international merger leads to a larger share of consumption in each country being served by local producers and thus increases the incentive for each country to grant Pareto efficient subsidies. Which of these two effects dominates depends crucially on the share of foreign firm ownership in the pre-merger situation. If all firms are locally owned initially, then the national merger is the dominant alternative, in the sense that it requires fewer cost savings in order to be proposed by the merging firms and to be cleared by the regulation authority. In contrast, if the share of foreign firm ownership is large, then the international merger will be proposed and cleared for a wider range of cost savings.One implication of our model is that a rise in international portfolio diversification will favour cross-border mergers, other things being equal. When, as it is often argued, a rise in foreign asset holdings is one of the consequences of economic integration, then our analysis provides an explanation for the rising share of cross-border mergers. In principle our argument is complementary to other reasons for cross-border mergers found in the literature, in particular the argument that they allow firms to save aggregate transport costs. It is interesting to note, however, that this alternative argument cannot explain a rising share of cross-border mergers over time, as it becomes less important when economic integration proceeds and transport costs accordingly fall.Our analysis could be extended in several directions. One possibility would be to indigenize the share of foreign firm ownership, and relate this share explicitly to the forces of economic integration. In such a setting international portfolio diversification would lead to gains in the form of higher returns or lower aggregate risk, but it wouldalso cause higher information or transaction costs. If economic integration reduces the latter, the link between globalization and the rise of cross-border mergers could be explicitly modeled. We do not expect, however, that our conclusions would be fun- dementally altered by this extension. Another model extension would be to consider consecutive mergers, or `merger waves'. In such a setting it would be possible to derive equilibrium market structures for any given set of exogenous model parameters (as in Horn and Parson, 2001). In principle this extension could be incorporated into our model, but the analysis must account for both the change in market structure and for the change in tax policies following each merger. We leave this task for future research.Source: Andreas Haufle, 2007.”Merger Policy and Tax Competition”, Munich Discussion Paper No.39 P25-35.译文：合并政策和税收竞争通常政府有特定部门的税收和管理政策来处理国内并购或者跨国并购中产生的市场问题。
企业重组改制税收案例分析及政策解读
企业重组改制税收案例分析及政策解读企业重组改制是指两个或多个企业为了通过合并、分立、收购等手段来共同利用资源、提高效益、实现可持续发展的行为。
重组改制对于企业来说是一种重要的战略选择，可以为企业带来更多的经济效益和市场竞争力。
税收是一项重要的成本，对企业的经营活动和盈利能力有着直接影响。
那么企业重组改制的税收影响和政策解读是怎样的呢？下面将通过案例分析进行详细探讨。
以A公司为例，A公司是一家传统制造业企业，面临着市场需求下滑、产能过剩等问题。
为了应对市场挑战和提高效率，A公司决定与B公司进行合并，并进行产能整合和转型升级。
首先，我们来分析重组改制中可能涉及的税收问题。
重组改制中的主要税收问题包括企业所得税、增值税、资产评估等方面。
对于企业所得税，企业重组改制可能会导致资产重估，从而触发企业所得税的应纳税额调整。
例如，在合并重组过程中，A公司的原有固定资产经过评估价值上升，即出现了无形资产的形成，这将可能导致企业所得税的应纳额增加。
此外，重组后形成的新企业可能会产生财务亏损，对于财务亏损的处理也会涉及企业所得税的问题。
对于增值税，重组改制中的资产转让和业务调整可能会涉及增值税的征收和抵扣。
例如，在合并过程中，A公司将其原有的产品线转让给B公司，此时可能需要对资产转让所得进行增值税的计税。
同时，重组后的企业可能会产生销售额减少或者亏损，这将对增值税的进项抵扣产生一定的影响。
对于资产评估，重组改制中的企业评估工作是重要环节。
资产评估涉及到对企业整体价值和资产价值的评估，评估结果将影响到重组后企业的税收纳税义务。
在资产评估过程中，往往需要与税务部门进行沟通并获得相关认可，以确保评估结果的合法性和准确性。
接下来，我们来解读相关政策。
在企业重组改制的税收优惠政策方面，我国税收法律法规对于企业重组改制提供了一定的支持和优惠。
例如，在企业合并、股权转让等情况下，可以享受企业所得税的优惠政策，如合并税前亏损的抵扣、资产重组不征收企业所得税等。
并购及案例的分析全英文版.docx
一、About M&AMerger: combination of two or more corporations. Acquisition: the act of contracting or assuming or acquiring possession of something.Merger refers to an enterprise to take various forms for receiving the property rights of other enterprises, so that the merged party lost the qualifications of a legal person or legal entity economic behavior change.Acquisition refers to an enterprise can through the purchase of shares of listed companies and the companies operating decisions change behaviorIn my opinion, merger is one commercial company could totally control the other company. acquisition is one commercial company own the other company.二、Case：TCL mergers Thomson Background information:1.TCL:TCL Group Co., Ltd. was founded in 1981, is one of theconsumer electronics business groups worldwide scale, forming a multi-media, telecommunications, home appliances,and parts of the four industry groups, as well as real estate and investment business, logistics and services business group .2. Thomson: Thomson is France's largest state-owned enterprises, is the world's fourth-largest consumer electronics maker, has four main business direction: content and networking, consumer products, components, patent licensing.About case: TCL mergers Thomsonprogress: July 29, 2004, TCL and France's Thomson jointly funded 470 million euros, of which one hundred million eurosTTETCL invested 3.149million euros hold 67% sharesThomson invested 155.1 million euros hold 33% sharesTCL3.149 investment accounted for 67% of shares, Thomson invested 155.1 million euros held by 33% of the shares, the establishment of TCL- Thomson Electronics Limited, referred TTE company.Result:By the end of 2004, the European business losses only a fewhundred million yuan; by the end of 2005, a loss of 550 million yuan in Europe; the first half of 2006, TCL European business losses rose to 700 million yuan; and 2006 end of 9, TCL in Europe investment accumulated losses reached 203 million euros (about 2.034 billion yuan). TTE Europe's "accumulated losses" has exceeded 3.345 billion yuan, TCL Multimedia in the European business restructuring and contraction of the overall cost more than expectedBy the end of 2004, Europe leads the global TV market, quickly turned to flat-panel TV from CRT TV. European integration has not been good company reacted too slowly, TCL is still a lot of factories around the CRT TV production. When the merger allows Thomson TCL promising more than 10,000 TV 3,4 patents, did not help that much, because they are basically traditional CRT TV. Until 2005, TCL flat-panel TVs began large-scale supply of the market, this time, competitorshavebegun to cut prices, TCL from product development, supply chain management to the entire system is not adapted to this change. Flat-panel TVs will come to kill so quickly, so TCL- Thomson pace the whole mess.Problem:1, M&A too hastily that the internationalization lack the necessary prudence.2. overestimate the economic benefits of the acquisition, ignoring market trends3. Too many brands, lack of competitive advantage. Undercapitalised cause operational difficulties4. Manage the drawbacks become cross-border M&A "fuse"Fail Reason:1.The integration of core technologies improper2.Overseas M&A trigger funding loophole3.Cultural differences in business managementSuggest：(一)、before M&A—Conduct a comprehensive assessment of precautions1、under the height of strategy to choose the object2、 analysis careful financial plan of the target enterprises and own company.3、Assessment of both culture and values4、Formulate and improve the integration plan(二)、after M&A—Conduct active integration1、Strategic Integration2、Financial Integration3、human resources Integration4、Cultural IntegrationConclusion:The average success rate of only 40% of mergers and acquisitions, the success rate of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, only 20% to 30%Mergers and acquisitions of profit opportunities：1、Economies of scale, become the market leader2、To achieve the optimal allocation of resources, resource sharing, combination3、Implement diversification and maintain core competitiveness。
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III. Other Consideration IV. Appendix
பைடு நூலகம்
2
I. Our Understanding
SC Group is mainly engaged in manufacturing business and has several PRC entities in China. Currently, the Management would like to restructure its holding structure within the Group. The current holding structure can be depicted as follows:
Seller
Applicable rates for Customs Duty and 17% for Import Value Added Tax
Seller
Stamp Duty (“SD”)
0.03% or 0.05%
The contract sum of signed contracts for transferring inventory and other assets (including intangible assets)
The PRC tax implications on transfers of relevant assets are summarized as below:
Taxes Tax Rate Applicable Scope/Description Taxpayer
17%
The transfer amount of inventory, while the VAT can be credited by the buyer (if bonded can be exempt from VAT under bonded transfer)
Seller (creditable against output VAT)
2%
Seller (non-creditable against output VAT)
17%
Business Tax (“BT”)
Sales of second-hand fixed assets (purchased after 1 Jan. 2009)
BS
SCHK
BS
SCHK
20%
80%
MK
MK A
Hold: -Land use right -Trademark -Club Membership
MK B
- Keep existing operating business activities
9
II. PRC Tax Implications - Option 1: Spin off (after the merger)
Appreciation amount on disposal of land use rights or property rights For disposal of the tax-exempted equipment under custom supervision, the dutiable price shall be calculated based on the residual period of custom supervision.
8
II. PRC Tax Implications - Option 1: Spin off (after the merger)
After the merger, the new MK will be split into two companies with each company separately owned by different shareholders.
Transfer of intangible assets & Sales of properties
Seller (creditable against output VAT)
5% Gain from transfer of the assets, if any. If transferred at net book value, there would be no gain, but it will be subject to tax bureau's assessment on the arm's length basis for related party transactions.
Seller and Buyer
* All related party transactions should be conducted on an arm's length basis. Otherwise, the tax bureau is authorized to make adjustment.
3% (Applicable DT rate for Shenzhen) 30%-60%
The amount of transfer of land use rights or property rights
Buyer
Land Appreciation Tax (“LAT”) Re-evaluation of Customs Duty (“CD”) and Import Value Added Tax
Seller
Enterprise Income Tax (“EIT”)
25%
Seller
7
II. PRC Tax Implications on the Merger Under Asset Transfers
Taxes Tax Rates Applicable Scope Taxpayer
Deed Tax (“DT”)
5
II. PRC Tax Implications – Merger
Fact: SCSZ merged into MK PRC Tax Implications: 1. SCSZ is required to pay back the exempted/reduced EIT for previous tax holidays as its operating period is less than 10 years The net operating loss (“NOL”) of SCSZ can be utilised by MK according to Caishui [2009] No.59. The estimated NOL to be utilized = Net fair asset value of SCSZ x Longest-term government bond yield rate of the current year end
MK A (creditable against output VAT)
2% VAT
Sales of second-hand fixed assets (purchased prior to 1 Jan. 2009)
MK A (non-creditable against output VAT)
2.
6
II. PRC Tax Implications on the Merger Under Asset Transfers
Taxes Tax Rate Applicable Scope Taxpayer
17%
Value Added Tax (“VAT”)
The transfer amount of inventory, while the VAT can be credited by the buyer (if bonded can be exempt from VAT under bonded transfer ) Sales of second-hand fixed assets (purchased prior to 1 Jan. 2009)
The Group
SC Asia Limited (“SC Asia”)
100%
BS International Industrial Limited (“BS”)
100%
SC (South China) Limited (“SCHK”)
100%
MK Industrial (Shenzhen) Limited (“MK”)
SC Group PRC Tax Analysis on the Proposed M&A Project 23 November, 2010
Content
I.
II.
Our Understanding
PRC Tax Implications 1) Merger 2) After the merger
4
II. PRC Tax Implications – Merger
The proposed restructuring plan can be depicted as follows:
SC Asia
SC Asia
SCHK
BS BS SCSZ 20% Merger New MK
SCHK 80%
MK
SC (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd (“SCSZ”)
3
I. Our Understanding
Based on the Management’s decision, SCSZ will be merged with MK in Shenzhen. Under the proposed merger, SCSZ will be merged into MK by way of absorption and MK will be the surviving entity. After completion of the merger, the Management will consider the following options: Option I: The surviving MK will be divided into two separate entities, namely MK A and MK B shortly after the merger. MK A will hold the land use right and buildings located in Shenzhen, relevant trademark and a Mission Hill Country Club Membership, while MK B will continue to conduct its intended business as before the spin-off. In this connection, the shareholder of MK B shall be changed from BS to another group related company, SCHK, and BS shall remain as the sole shareholder of MK A. Once the change of shareholding is completed, MK A will be sold to a third party through BS subsequently. Option II: The surviving MK will sell its trademark and a Mission Hill Country Club membership, and the land use right and building located at Shenzhen to a PRC subsidiary of CM separately without dividing into two separate entities after the completion of the merger.