bargains
Bargain必备用语
Bargain 必备用语1 That’s unreasonable！（overpriced）I’d take it for $100。
这真是卖得太贵了！如果是100美元我就买.2 I like everything about it except the price。
这东西除了价钱之外我都喜欢.3 How about ＄100?100美元卖不卖?4 Is it possible to give me a discount？能给我打个折吗？5 If you reduce the price by 30% I think I will buy 2 of it.要是你给我打个7折，那我就买两件。
6 If I buy more than one, will you give me a discount？多买一点有折扣吗？7 No one can do business at such a unreasonably high prices， you have to cut them down by 10%I am afraid。
没有人会接受这么不合理这么高的价位，我恐怕你必须打9折。
8 I'd buy this if it were cheaper。
再便宜一点我就买9 Lower the price, and I’ll consider it.价钱低一点我才会考虑。
10 Can you give me a better price?能再便宜点吗?11I've seen this cheaper （in) other places。
我在别家有看过更便宜的12I heard other stores were having great mark—downs on this item.我听说别家的这个东西在大减价.13 May we suggest that you perhaps give some gifts on the price？这个价格你能不能给些小赠品?ScriptsDialogue1A: What do you think of this dress? Do you think it suits me？B: Sure. Why don’t you try it on? The fitting room is over there。
便宜的英文单词怎么写
便宜的英文单词怎么写便宜属于多音词，一共有两种读音(分别为pián·yi、biànyí)，常用于指不应得的利益或东西价钱低廉。
那么，你知道便宜的英文单词怎么写吗?便宜[biàn yí,pián yi]便宜的英文释义：inexpensive 英[ˌɪnɪkˈspensɪv] 美[ˌɪnɪkˈspɛnsɪv]convenience 英[kənˈvi:niəns] 美[kənˈvinjəns]cheapness 英['tʃi:pnəs] 美['tʃi:pnəs]come low便宜的英文例句：乘长途汽车唯一可取之处就是旅费便宜。
The cheapness of coach travel is its only recommendation.【谚】不要的东西，再便宜也贵。
Nothing is cheap if you don't want it.真骗人，饭食好像很便宜，可是吃菜还得另付钱呢。
It's a real sell: the food seems cheap but you pay extra for vegetables.这个虽然不便宜，但我觉得我们还是应该买。
It's not cheap but I think we should buy it none the less.【谚】便宜无好货。
The cheap buyer takes bad meat.她的那双鞋看上去很便宜。
Her shoes look cheap.这东西太便宜，好不了。
(便宜没好货。
)It is too cheap to be good.你的步枪上有条便宜的尼龙背带。
Your rifle comes with a cheap nylon sling.经济舱飞机票价格要便宜得多。
An economy class air ticket costs much less.She took advantage of him even after they were divorced 甚至在他们离婚后，她还在占他的便宜。
bargains
bargains标题：BargainsIntroduction:Bargains, the mere mention of the word invokes a sense of excitement and anticipation. Everyone loves a good bargain, whether it is finding discounted items, enjoying special promotions or discovering hidden gems. In this document, we will explore the allure of bargains and the various ways in which people can save money and make the most of their shopping experiences.1. Why do people love bargains?One of the primary reasons why people love bargains is the feeling of obtaining more value for their money. Finding an item on sale or getting a good deal on a product not only saves money but also gives a sense of satisfaction. This feeling of accomplishment often leads to a positive shopping experience, making bargains highly appealing.2. Finding Bargains:There are multiple ways to find bargains, and with the advent of technology, it has become easier than ever before. Onlineshopping platforms offer various features to help users find the best deals. Price comparison websites, coupon codes, and deal aggregation sites allow consumers to compare prices and track down the best offers. In addition, social media platforms and email newsletters have become popular channels for retailers to promote exclusive offers and discounts directly to customers.3. Seasonal Sales and Events:Throughout the year, there are numerous seasonal sales and events that shoppers eagerly anticipate. From Black Friday and Cyber Monday to end-of-season clearance sales, these events offer significant discounts and bargains. Retailers often plan and strategize for these events, enabling consumers to get their hands on highly sought-after items at discounted prices.4. Outlet Stores and Discount Retailers:Outlet stores and discount retailers have become popular destinations for bargain hunters. These establishments offer a wide range of products at lower prices compared to traditional retail stores. They often sell overstocked or slightly imperfect items, allowing shoppers to purchase branded products at reduced prices.5. Secondhand and Thrift Stores:Secondhand and thrift stores have gained popularity in recent years as sustainable and ethical alternatives to traditional shopping. These stores offer gently used or pre-loved items at significantly lower prices. Bargain hunters can find unique and one-of-a-kind items, ranging from clothing and home decor to electronics and furniture.6. Price Matching and Negotiation:Price matching is a strategy used by some retailers to attract shoppers by guaranteeing the lowest prices. If a customer finds a lower price for the same product at a competitor, the retailer will match that price, providing a bargain for the customer. Additionally, negotiation can be an effective way to secure a better deal, especially in markets where haggling is common practice.7. Loyalty Programs and Rewards:Loyalty programs and rewards have become a popular way for retailers to engage with customers and reward their loyalty. These programs often offer exclusive discounts, special promotions, and personalized offers. Accumulating points or earning cash-back rewards allows customers to save money while enjoying the benefits of being a loyal shopper.8. Tips for Successful Bargain Hunting:To maximize the chances of finding the best bargains, shoppers can follow a few simple tips. Patience is key - waiting for the right moment or season often leads to better deals. Being proactive and researching prices, reading product reviews, and comparing options are essential when looking for bargains. Additionally, setting a budget and sticking to it can prevent impulse purchases and ensure that shoppers get the most value for their money.Conclusion:Bargains are irresistible to many as they present an opportunity to save money and enjoy the thrill of finding excellent deals. Whether it is through online platforms, seasonal sales, outlet stores, secondhand outlets, or negotiation strategies, there are various avenues for bargain hunters to explore. By utilizing these techniques and keeping a few tips in mind, shoppers can unlock the full potential of their shopping experiences, making every purchase a rewarding and exciting venture.。
bargain英语作文资料
. What is the difference between the orthodox definition and the recent understanding of the term bargain?The difference is that the conventional understanding takes the word at its face value, i.e. buying something at a low and advantageous price while the recent definition points up businessmen's trick to fool silly and innocent people.How would a business market its new product? And when would it cut down the price?At the beginning, a company would market its new product at a price much higher than its real worth, taking advantage of the consumer's love for novelty. When the attraction of novelty is beginning to fade, the company would make some slight cuts in the price, turning it into a so-called bargain.. What makes a customer think that “a bargainmust not be missed”?This is typical of consumer psychology. Even though a very tiny cut, such as a penny, looks like an insult, consumers do not want to miss it. They tend to think that since they have to buy such things as washing powder, soap etc., they might as well buy them one penny cheaper. Furthermore, they tend to believe these little bargains would eventually add up to a big fortune as they can save a penny here ... and a pennythere.☐People who like to bargain are those who think that bargaining is the best way to save their money. That is, use less money to get the best of what they want.☐Some people enjoy bargaining because they can experience the achievement of saving money. They can use the money that would have been wasted to do other things. To buy products at the lowest price is their top priority5. What is the real danger of bargains?The real danger is when consumers, tempted by bargains, rush to buy things that are either unnecessary for them or hard to find room for.6. What common misconception do customers have when they blindly spend money on bargains?Some customers tend to think t hat they can make money on such bargains. Actually, however cheap the things you buy are, you always spend money rather than make money7. What point does the writer want to make with the example of a couple who buy sugar in bulk?The writer is trying to prove how silly it would be if people buy unnecessary things in bulk for the sake of a cheaper price.8. What does the last paragraph mean? How would you look at this issue?The last paragraph points out that to offer bargains is a harmful practice. The writer reiterates his argument that the blame should be put on both businessmen and consumers. For the businessmen, they make the poor poorer with the dirty commercial trick. For the consumers, they are either too naive or too greedy and fall for such a trick. And he humorously proposes in the end that our living standards would rise by 7.39% by prohibiting bargains.☐For Group:☐Most people see bargaining as a way of enjoying life; they can buy things at the lowest possible price.☐People who like to bargain are those who think that bargaining is the best way to save their money. That is, use less money to get the best of what they want.☐Some people enjoy bargaining because they can experience the achievement of saving money. They can use the money that would have been wasted to do other things. To buy products at the lowest price is their top priority☐To people who like bargaining at every opportunity, “bargaining” is just like a game. They can’t help bargaining.Even in some places, “bargaining” becomes a custom. If you don’t bargain with thevendor, maybe others will take you to be a stranger!☐Some people like to bargain because they think that lowering the price will enable them to afford the product they are interested in. ☐Some people think bargaining is a challenge. They get interested in it. If they can bargain successfully, they develop the sense of achievement.☐Add more points here …..Against Group:☐Some people don’t want to become bargain hunters, because they think offering low prices may make sellers think their customers are poor or stingy. Besides, many people think it is shameful to bargain. (They are ashamed to bargain.) They think it is not necessary to argue over one or two yuan they think it’s not necessary.☐Some people never bargain when they buy things because they don’t want to make the vendor feel uncomfortable by offering cheap prices. Sometimes they don’t want to be assertive (强人所难) Some of them want to give the impression that they can afford anything.☐Some people refuse to bargain because they think they cannot afford it. So they simply give up. Some people even think that bargaining is shameful. It might appear that he or she is too poorto afford the asking price.☐Some people think bargaining is embarrassing because they want to show they are rich, and they can afford anything they want.☐Some think the vendors will get angry so they dare not to bargain. ☐Some people don’t like bargaining because they think they are likely to be cheated when the sellers give discount, maybe the quality is not good, maybe the price the seller offers now is as unreasonable as the original price, maybe they can buy it at a lower price than the seller offers, etc.Retell the story using the following clues.☐comparison between the orthodox definitionand a recent definition of the word bargain☐how a bargain is created by businessmen☐consumer psychology in shopping☐mistaken view on bargains☐making money on bargains☐absurdity of buying unnecessary things in bulk☐conclusion—bargain: harmful to our life,lowering our living standard。
小心的英文是什么
小心的英文是什么小心的英文表达方式太多了，我们来看看有几种表达方法吧。
下面是给大家整理的小心的英文是什么，供大家参阅!小心的英文是什么1.watch out2.look out3.be careful4.take care5.be cautiouswatch out的英语例句1. Watch out for bargains, but never buy dented cans.留意便宜货，但绝不要买表面凹陷的罐头。
2. You'll lose your girlish figure if you don't watch out.如果不多加注意，你就会失去女孩般的苗条身段。
3. He called out to them to watch out for the unexploded mine.他冲他们大喊，叫他们小心哑雷。
4. "Watch out!" he hollered.“小心!”他大叫道。
5. Watch out for sharp bends and adjust your speedaccordingly.当心急转弯并相应调整车速。
6. Watch out for cars when you cross the road.过马路时当心车辆.7. Watch out that you don't get them into trouble.当心,别让他们碰到麻烦.8. You'd better watch out, or you'll be getting done in.你还是当心点好, 不然你会上当受骗.9. The doctor told her to watch out for symptoms of measles.医生叫她注意麻疹出现的症状.10. Watch out for that man.要提防那个人.11. Watch out! There is a dog coming.小心! 狗来了.12. Watch out for those New York slickers!当心那些纽约滑头,以免上当.13. You have to watch out because there are land mines all over the place.你必须小心，这里到处是地雷。
bargain的过去式和用法例句
bargain的过去式和用法例句bargain做动词有交易;便宜货;契约等意思，那么你知道bargain 的过去式是什么吗?下面跟着一起来学习一下，欢迎大家学习!bargain的过去式和其他时态：过去式: bargained过去分词: bargained复数: bargains现在分词: bargainingbargain的用法：bargain的用法1：bargain的基本含义是买卖双方就交易条件(尤指价格)进行谈判、磋商,常译为“讨价还价”“讲价钱”“谈判(交易)条件”,也可指单方面“提出条件”。
可用作及物动词,也可用作不及物动词。
bargain的用法2：bargain作“讨价还价”解时用作不及物动词,表示“与(某人)讨价还价”时接with,表示“为(某物)讨价还价”时接for,表示“就(某事)讨价还价”时接about或over。
bargain的用法3：bargain还可作“要求得到”解,这时用作及物动词,常接that从句,且从句中的谓语动词多用虚拟语气。
bargain的过去式例句：1. He had not bargained on the mad jealousy which bothwomen developed.他没料到这两个女人会嫉妒得发狂。
2. The hard - won liberties should never be bargained away lightly.好容易才获得自由,绝不能轻易放弃.3. The old house in the city was bargained away by his father.城里的老房子被他爸爸廉价卖掉了.4. We found the journey more strenuous than we had bargained for.我们发现这次旅行比预料的要辛苦.5. The trade union bargained that its members should have another week's holiday.工会要求再给其会员一个星期的假.6. The traveler bargained his watch away for food.这个旅行者用他的手表来换取食物.7. We bargained a new wage increase.我们达成了增加工资的新协议.8. He bargained away his house to the debt.他贱卖房子去还债.9. The effects of this policy were more than the government had bargained for.这项政策带来的影响是政府始料未及的。
002_bargain(清华大学,王一江)
Review questions from the first week.1. What are the two fundamental questions in economic organizations, according to Ben-Ner, et al?2. What do different economic theories say about the importance of integrated ownership in firms? Be explicit about the most critical assumptions made in these theories?3. How might you use a theory to explain the emergence of the factory system from the putting-out system in the shoe-making industry?4.What kind of questions with regard to ownership in economic organizations are economic empiricists interested in and what are some of the findings in their studies?Sharing the pie: Reaching an Agreement through Bargaining under Symmetric Information1. Relevance and types of bargaining relationsi. A competitive market works when the number of thebuyers and the number of the suppliers involved are bothlarge. Impersonal price mechanisms work well in thiskind of market.ii.When there is only one seller and many buyers, auction isa common approach for the two sides to reach a deal.iii.When the number of the sellers and that of the buyers are both very small, e.g., when there is only one buyer andone seller, a deal is often reached through bargaining.iv.If a contract is enforceable, ex ante (before the event) bargaining is conducted. If a contract is not enforceable,ex ante bargaining agreement is not credible. The twoparties will have to reply upon ex post bargaining todetermine the payoffs of their interaction.v.Bargaining models can be divided into static and dynamic ones. They can also be divided into the ones withsymmetric and those with asymmetric information.2. Nash Bargainingi. Nash bargaining is by far the most important bargainingmodel.ii.Consider the problem of two parties, A and B (worker and employer) sharing a pie of $90.iii.The model has the following key elements.∙Budget line, i.e., the size of the pie.∙Reservation values and breakup points∙Agreement regime and its relation with Pareto improvement regime.∙Bargaining power.∙Bargaining result.W A = 20 + (0.5)(90 – 20 – 50) = $30W B = 50 + (0.5)(90 – 20 – 50) = $60iv. A graphical illustrationA$50 $90 Bv. Commentsa)Principle of Efficiency: Unless the total is bigger than thesum of the parts, there is nothing to bargain about. Thusin any bargaining problem, “working together” has to havesome extra benefit. More formally, the productionfunction has to have the property thatf(a + b) > f(a) + f(b),where a and b are, respectively, the contributions of thetwo parties A and Bb)Principle of equity in distribution: The pie must beshared in such a way that both parties are better off withthan without an agreement and cooperation.a+b = principle of Pareto Improvementc)An agreement is immediate and costless.d)The generality of Nash bargaining relations…2. Sequential, alternating offer bargaining. (See Gibbons, p.68.)i)Key elements in sequential bargaining∙Timing∙Strategy space, moves and payoffs.∙Backward induction.ii) The model.∙Consider a case where 2 people, A and B, bargaining over $100.∙At the beginning of the first period, A proposes to take a1, leaving b1 = 100 - a1 for B.∙ B can either accept the offer or reject it.∙If B rejects A’s offer, the game enters the 2nd period.Only $40 is left. B proposes a2 for A and b2 = 40 - a2for self.∙ A either accepts or rejects B’s offer.∙If A rejects it, the game enters the 3rd period, in which $0 is left.What is the equilibrium bargaining results in terms ofa t andb t?iii) The model can be summarized in a game tree(Draw it as an exercise.)iv) The bargaining result.The bargaining solution has a1 = $60, b1 = 100 - a1 = $40.v) Comments∙The agreement (60, 40) is immediate and costless.∙Sequential bargaining doesn’t change the efficiency principle of Nash bargaining.∙Hicks paradox of strike incident.3. An application –is strike replacement ban in the worker’s bestinterest? (Budd and Wang, 1999, Advances in Industrial andLabor Relations, vo. 9: 239 – 52; Budd and Wang, 2004, spring, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, pp.?.)The firm has a production function f(K,θL) where K denotes units of sunk capital, L denotes units of labor, and θindicates the relative productivity levels of labor under different labor policy regimes such that 0 ≤θ≤1. If there is normal production not interrupted by a strike or other collective action, θ = 1; otherwise θ < 1.A key feature of this model is the incorporation of θ which depends on the specific labor policies in effect in a jurisdiction. For example, if the use of both temporary and permanent strike replacements is prohibited, the firm has minimal options for trying to maintain production during a strike so during a strike, θ = 0. If strike replacements are allowed, during a strike 0 < θ < 1 and whether θ is closer to 0 or 1 depends on the extent to which the replacement workers are inexperienced and therefore not as productive as the regular workers.Labor at this firm is represented by a union which maximizes a utility function U(w, L) where w is the wage. For simplicity, we can normalize the units of labor to one so that output y = f(K, θ) and U(w) = w. The first-bestsolution is joint profit and utility maximization Max π(K, θ, w) + U(w)where π(K, θ, w) is the profit functionπ(K, θ, w) = f(K, θ) - w - rK.The first-order conditions are standard and yield first-best capital and wage levels K*and w*. Note carefully that K*and w*are determined simultaneously in this first-best solution.Bargaining in our model is sequential: investors determine K (capital)at time 0and subsequently the firm and union bargain over w (wage) at time 1.Consider first the wage bargaining in time 1. For investors, K is sunk at time 1 so the firm’s threat point is the profit level π obtained during a strike hiring labor at the market wage w: π(K, θ, w) = f(K, θ) - w which depends on the state of labor policy θ.Labor’s threat point is the al ternative market wage w. In an efficient bargains framework, the parties maximize the economic rent while the wage divides the surplus between the two parties.If β denotes labor’s relative bargaining power (which is also partially a function of the state of labor policy), the Nash bargaining solution yieldsw w K K f w K w )1()],,()1,([),,(**βθπβθ-+-=(1)If the union is very strong and labor policy is favorable towards labor, β is close to 1 and the union captures nearly all thesurplus = f(K, 1) - π(K, θ, w) – w .If the union is weak and labor policy favors management, β is close to 0 and the union captures little of the surplus so the negotiated wage w ** is close to the market wage w. Inserting the negotiated wage w ** from equation (1) into the firm’s profit equation yields),,(])1,()[1(),,(w K w K f w K θπββθπ+--=(2)for any given K at time 1. Thus, at time 0, the investors’ maximization problem isrK w K w K f K -+--),,(])1,()[1(max }{θπββ (3)The solution to this maximization problem yields the optimal investment level K **. It can be shown that if f K θ > 0 (where subscripts denote derivatives), then K ** < K *.4. Why capital hires labor: A bargainingperspectivei) The issue: Samuelson (1957): itdoesn’t matter whether capital hireslabor or the reverse.ii) But how does one explain why, in aneconomy of free entry, capital-managed firms (KMF’s) are muchmore common than labor-managedfirms (LMF’s)?●Ward (1958), Domar (1996), andVanek, 1970: LMF maximizes netrevenue per worker – downwardsupply curve.●Furubotn (1976) Jensen andMechling (1979): suboptimalinvestment because of worker’sshort horizon. (This argument isnot valid if membership can be sold.)●Ben-Ner: Internal logic of LMFiii) More generally, why someorganizational forms survive inequilibrium and others don’t?●Transaction-cost economics(Williamson, 1985, and others):organizational forms that produce alarger total surplus are the ones tosurvive.●Gregory K. Dow (AER, vol. 83,issue 1 (March, 1993):118-134)offers a bargaining perspective. Itis similar to TC economics in thatthey are both about how to allocatethe quasi rent. It is different in thata) bargaining is for individual gain,rather than total surplus; and b)firm is a set of strategies (vs. firm isa set of contracts).iv)The bargaining theory: main ideas●An investor invests in a specializedasset K, to be used by workers. K issunk when the investor bargainswith the worker.●Assumptions:1.Integration is impossible (K can’tsupply labor and L doesn’t havemoney to invest in or buy theasset).2.Some operational variable, e.g.,output, working conditions,production technique to be used,etc., is not contractible. Paymentto hired input is determined bybargaining outcomes and isinvariant to output.3.Cost of production is born byfactor suppliers themselves, c K(q)and c L(q), with usual properties.4.Hired input s can’t promise toforgo bargaining in exchange forside payments, i.e., there isalways ex post bargaining.●With control, the worker willchoose q in a way ignoring c K(q) toappropriate the quasi rent. Seeingthis, K will not invest. If theinvestor has control, she will ignorec L(q) when choosing q. But she’dhave to satisfy worker’sparticipation constraint, which canbe defined as w - c K(q) > 0.●Conclusion: to have the investmentand production, K has to havecontrol of q.●Comment: It is the sunk nature ofK that requires K to have control so that it can hope to obtain the quasirent and recoup the cost of K. Inorganizations where workers needto sink substantial initial investment, LMF’s prevail.●Compare this with Grossman andHart (1986): The party whose inputis more important should haveownership.Sharing the pie: Reaching an Agreement through Bargaining under Asymmetric Information Read:John Kennan, 1986, in The Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. II, pp.1091-1137.Gibbons, 1992.1. The screening effect of a bargain offer: Alternating offersEarlier we looked at an alternating offer model with thefollowing specifications.∙ 2 people, A and B, bargain over $100.∙At the beginning of the first period, A proposes to take a1 of the money, leaving 100-a1 for B.∙ B can either accept the offer or reject it.∙If B rejects A’s offer, the game enters the second period.Only $40 is left. B proposes a2 for A and 40-a2 for self.∙ A either accepts or rejects B’s offer.∙If A rejects it, the game enters the 3rd period, in which $0 is left.We came to the conclusion that the bargaining leads to anagreement (60, 40).Now suppose that A (the union) doesn’t know the size of thepie, but only its distribution, S = $80 or $120 at 50:50probability. In the second period, only $30 (if it’s 80 tobegin with) or $50 (if its 120 to begin with) is left. After that, $0 is left.If S=80, and 30 is left in the 2nd period, the equilibrium is (50,30).If S=120, and 50 is left in the 2nd period, the equilibrium is (70, 50).If A offers B （1- a1）=$30 in the first period, B accepts the offer if S=$80. If B rejects it, in the second offer, B has to give $1 to A and has only $29 left. B rejects the offer ifS=$120 and wait until the 2nd period to offer $1 to A and retain $49.The key question for thinking about the equilibrium: Should A offer B $30 or $50 so that its own expected return v is maximized? (Note: B knows the value of S.)E(v|offer B $30) = (0.5)(80-30) + (0.5)(1) = 25.5E(v|offer B $50) = (0.5)(80-50) + (0.5)(120-50) = 50 ⇨1 should offer B $50.However, the result (ofequilibrium offer strategy) maybe different if the parametersare different. For example, ifp($80)=0.8, we haveE(v|offer B $30) = (0.8)(80-30) + (0.2)(1) = $40.2E(v|offer B $50) = (0.8)(80-50) + (0.2)(120-50) = $38 ⇨1 should offer B $30.⇨Sometimes B will reject the offer. In such a case, there isa delay in reaching an agreement. Bargaining is costly.Now suppose that S=$100, but A (the union) doesn’t knowthe cost of delay, i.e., in the 2nd period whether $30 or $50 isleft, only that they occur at probability 80:20. B (the firm)knows. The purpose of this exercise is to see what happens ifthe only informational asymmetry is about the cost of delay.E(v|A offers B $30) = (0.8)($70) + (0.2)($1) = $56.2E(v|A offers B $50) = $50.⇨The union’s equilibrium bargaining strategy is again to offer $30 in period 1.⇨The firm accepts the $30 offer if the cost of delay is high (if in the 2nd period only $30 is left). It rejects theoffer if the cost of delay is low. The latter happens at20% probability.⇨More profitable firms (with many orders to fill) have a higher cost of delay than other firms. They acceptunions wage offer more readily.2. The screening effect of a bargain offer: One party makesr epeated offerings. The other party can only say “yes” or “no”.(See Gibbons, 1992, pp.218-224. Simplified.)Now suppose that∙S=$120 or 100 in the 1st period, at probabilities p1:p2.∙S=$60 or 50 in the 2nd period, at the sameprobabilities.∙S=0 after the 2nd period.∙ A (the union) doesn’t know if the firm is “type 1” (high profit with $120, $60 combination) or “type 2” (low profitwith $100, $50 combination).∙ A makes an offer in each period.Analysis:If A asks for $118 in the first period, B will a ccept it if it’stype 1, and reject it if its type 2. (Why?)If the first offer is rejected, A knows that B is type 2, and will ask for $49 in the 2nd period.E(w|A asks for $118 in the 1st period)= E(w1) + E(w2)= 118p1 + 49p2.E(w|A asks for $98 in the 1st period) = $98Conclusions:∙ A will ask for $118, if the parameters are right.∙When A asks for $118, sometimes B rejects it. There isa delay in reaching an agreement.∙There is screening and learning after B’s “accept” or “reject” decision.∙w2 < w1. This is so for two reasons. First, there is less left. Second, “type 1” has been screened out. A knowsB is a “type 2” (with low profit).Asymmetric information is thefoundation of most modelsexplaining strike incidents.3. When the firm can choose the informational structure.i. The question. Wang (Economics Letters,1995, pp.73-76) noticed that inasymmetric information models, theinformational structure (asymmetricinformation) is assumed. In reality,firms can choose the informational structure – whether or not it shares information with the workers. (Examples.)Question: What is bargaining like if informational structure (information being symmetric or asymmetric) is endogenous?ii. The model.∙Two players: the firm as a profit maximizer and the union (workers) as a wage maximizer.∙Two possible states of profit determined by nature: the high-profit state π = πh at probability α∈(0,1) and the low-profit state π=πl at probability 1-α. The value of α is common knowledge to both the firm and the workers.∙The firm moves first to decide, before it learns the true state of profit, about its book-opening policy: at what probability to open the books to the workers in a particular state of profit once the state is learned. The policy is announced to the workers.∙ Nature moves next to reveal the true state of profit to the firm. ∙ After that the firm moves again to carry out its policy. At this time, the firm also offers the workers a wage increase w h > 0 or w l = 0. ∙ Finally, the workers move to decide whether to strike or not. If π = πh , a strike leads to w h . If π = πl , a strike leads to w l . A strike also inflicts costs c w and c f to the workers and the firm, respectively, with c i > 0, i=w, f.Comments:∙ Since w h is never offered when π = πl , we can treat w h as equivalent to opening the books to acknowledge the highprofit state by the firm.∙Assume w - c w > 0. The possibility of a strike exists only when the firm does not open the books and its wage offer isw l. The moves and payoffs are summarized in Figure 1.1Let q i, i=h,l, be the probability (firm's policy) of not opening the books in state i. Let r be the probability that the workers will strike. The firm's problem is toMaximize E[π(q h,q l)] = α[(1-q h)(πh-w h)+q h r(πh-w h-c f)+q h(1-r)πh]q h,q l+(1-α)[(1-q l)πl+q l r(πl-c f)+q l(1-r)πl] (1)subject to: r = r(q h, q l).Proposition 1:1. If αw h-c w < 0, (q h,q l) = (1,1) maximizes E[π(.,.)] andleads to r = 0.2. If αw h-c w > 0, E[π(1,1)] < E[π(0,0)] < E[π(q*h,1)], whereq*h = (1-α)c w/α(w h-c w). (q*h,1) maximizes E[π(.,.)].Both (0,0) and (q*h,1) lead to r=0.Proof: Knowing that the firm's policy is (q h,q l) and observingthat the books are not opened, the worker will use the Bayesrule to update the pro bability that π = πh.Pr(π=πh|books are not opened) = αq h/[αq h+(1-α)q l] = β(q h,q l).The workers' strike decision is based on the value of βw h-c w.⎧ 0, if βw h - c w < 0; andr = ⎨(2)⎩ 1, if βw h - c w > 0.1In the game tree we do not explicitly specify the firm's wage offer. From the above discussion one can easily infer that w h is offered when π=πh and the books are opened, otherwise w l is offered.Notice that under the policy (1,1), β = α. Hence we know that when αw h - c w < 0 the firm will adopt (1,1). It never incurs the cost of c f. Any positive probability of opening the books only leads to a possible loss of w h to the workers, which leads to a lower E[π(.,.)].If αw h - c w > 0, the workers will always strike (r=1) if thefirm's policy is (1,1). The firm always ends up with paying the workers w h when π = πh and w l when π = πl. It also always suffer a loss of c f. The firm is better off by adopting the policy (0,0), i.e., always open the books. This explains the first inequality in the second statement of the proposition. Under the policy (0,0), the firm does not incur c f, but always offer w h when π=πh. The firm can increase E[π(.,.)] by choosing values of q h and q l at which it does not incur the cost of strike c f and does not always pay w h when π=πh. This is achieved by choosing q h, q l > 0 such thatβ(q h,q l)w h - c w= αq h w h/[αq h + (1- α)q l] - c w < 0. (3) An inspection of (3) reveals that at any given value of q l>0, a sufficiently small q h can satisfy this condition. Given q l, the set of q h at which (3) is satisfied is given by [0,q*h], withβ(q*h,q l) - c w = 0. Since q*h'(q l) > 0, the firm is least likely to share the benefit of πh with the workers when it sets q l = 1 and q h = q*h as defined in the proposition. Since at (q*h,1) (3) is satisfied, the firm does not incur c f. Q.E.D. Comments:When book-opening is allowed, under no circumstances strikes can occur as an equilibrium outcome, even whenthere is asymmetric information regarding the true stateof the firm’s profit.The pure strategy of always opening the books is adopted only because the firm fails to credibly commit to a mixed strategy. So long as the workers believe(q*h,1) is the firm's strategy, the firm has the incentive to deviate from the strategy by always offering w l(deviating from q*h to q h=1). Knowing this, the workers cannot believe (q*h, 1) and will always strike when the books are not opened and w l is offered. In contrast, (q h, q l) as pure strategies are credible. This is obvious when αw h - c w <0, r = 0, and (q h,q l) = (1,1). When αw h - c w > 0 and (0,0) is adopted, the firm has no incentives todeviate to not opening the books when π = πl. Deviating to not opening the books when π = πh reveals to theworkers the true state of profit. The threat of a strike, which is credible because w h - c w > 0, provides theincentive for the firm not to deviate.。
英语考试中最常用的60个固定搭配
英语要学好，掌握单词和必要的搭配非常重要，只有牢记英语的固定结构，才能更好地进行句子表达和英语作文。
今天和大家分享英语考试中最常用的60个固定搭配，每天利用碎片时间背一点点，英语想不拿高分都难。
01agree with①同意；赞同：I quite agree with him on the sports. 我非常同意他在运动方面的观点。
②与…相符；与…一致：His words do not agree with his actions. 他言行不一致。
③[常用于否定句] (食物等) 适合：Too much meat doesn’t agreewith her. 她不宜吃太多肉。
02hold on①抓着…不放；坚持：She held on to me tightly. 她紧紧地抓住我。
I will hold on to my dream and never give it up.我要坚持自己的梦想，永不放弃。
②[电话用语] 别挂断；等一下：Can you hold on? I’ll see if the manager’s in the office. 先别挂电话行吗？我去看看经理在不在办公室。
03make up①[不用于进行时] 组成；构成：In some languages, 100 words make up half of all words used in daily conversations. 在一些语言中，100个词就构成了一半的日常会话用语。
②编写；编造：At your first meeting you should make up a rule book. 在第一次会议上，你要编写出一个规章手册。
③为…化妆：They made him up as an old man for the last act of the play. 在演这出戏的最后一幕时，他们把他打扮成一个老头。
伯恩巴克作品
威廉·伯恩巴克一、威廉·伯恩巴克* 1、生平介绍* 1911年出生于纽约一个服装设计师的家庭；* 1933年获得纽约大学文学学士学位；* 从收发室到营销与广告部；* “纽约1939—1940世界博览会”宣传部；* 老威廉·温特劳布广告公司* 1945年到葛瑞广告公司；* 1949年与道尔、戴恩创办DDB广告公司；* 1982年因病去世。
主张：在人们还不信任你的时候，你的货再真也没有用。
如果人们不明白你在说什么，也就无从信任你。
他们不听你在说什么，也就不明白你说的是什么。
你的话无趣，他们也不听。
如果你说的话没有给他们留下想象的空间，没有创新思想，也没有新鲜感，你的话就不可能有趣。
* ROI理论：* 好的广告应具备三个基本特质：关联性（Relevance）、原创性（Originality）、震撼性（Impact）。
* 广告与商品没有关联性，就失去了意义；广告本身没有原创性，就欠缺吸引力和生命力；广告没有震撼性，就不会给消费者留下深刻印象。
* 同时实现“关联”、“创新”和“震撼”是个高要求。
针对消费者需要的“关联”并不难，有关联但点子新奇也容易办到。
真正难的是，既要“关联”，又要“创新”和“震撼”。
代表作品：案例20---想想小的好处••产品：德国大众（Volkswagen）金龟车•标题：想想小的好处（Think Small）•正文：•我们的小轿车并没有多少新奇之处。
•一、二十个学生恐怕挤不下。
•加油站的那伙计也不想搭理它。
•对于它的外形，从来没有人拿正眼瞧它一下。
•事实上，连驾驶我们这种廉价小轿车的人们也没有仔细想过：•一加仑汽油可行驶27英里。
•五品脱的汽油顶得上五夸脱。
（注：1品脱＝1/2夸脱，这里意指耗油量仅为其他汽车的一半，难怪加油站的那伙计也不想搭理它。
）•从来不需要防冻剂。
•一副轮胎可以行驶40,000英里。
•我们为你精打细算，你也觉得习以为常，这便是你根本没去想它的原因。
bargain英语对话新概念1
八、Avoiding Rip-offs 避免被宰文档标题：Bargain英语对话新概念1一、Bargain Basics 讨价还价基础A: This price is too high. Can you lower it?B: I'm sorry, but we can't negotiate on this. The price is fixed.A: But I think it's worth less. Can you make a discount?B: We offer a 10% discount for bulk purchases. Would you like to consider that?二、Recognizing a Bargain 识别便宜货A: Look at this watch! It's really cheap.B: Cheap usually means low quality. We should be careful not to buy things that look too good to be true.A: But what if the watch is a bargain? Shouldn't we take advantage of it?B: Yes, but we should still be cautious. Let's inspect the watch closely before making a decision.三、Bargaining in Stores 店内讨价还价A: This dress costs too much. Do you think we can negotiate the price?B: We usually don't negotiate on our prices, but you can ask for a discount if you buy multiple items.A: But I really want this dress. Can't you give me a better deal?B: I'm sorry, but our prices are fixed. Maybe you can find something similar at a lower price elsewhere.四、Bargaining Etiquette 讨价还价礼仪A: Excuse me, but I think this price is too high. Do you mind if I negotiate?B: Not at all, you're welcome to negotiate. However, please be polite and respectful when doing so.A: Of course, I understand. Thank you for your time.B: You're welcome, good luck with your negotiation.五、Negotiating a Better Deal 争取更优惠的交易A: The price you're offering is too high. Can you give me a better deal?B: We can offer you a discount if you place a larger order. Otherwise, there's nothing more we can do.A: But I only need this one item. Can't you make an exception?B: We usually don't negotiate on individual items. However, if you're a regular customer, we can offer you a discount in the future.六、Bargain Hunting 寻找便宜货A: Do you know where we can find good bargains?B: Yes, there are many places to find bargains. You can try thrift stores, yard sales or online auctions.A: What about discount stores or outlets? Are they good places to shop?B: Yes, those are also great places to find bargains. You just need to be careful about the quality of the products.七、Bargain Tips 讨价还价技巧A: What are some tips for successful bargaining?B: First, do your research and know the market price of the item you want to buy. Then, be prepared to walk away if the seller won't negotiate. Finally, be patient and don't rush into a deal.A: Thank you for your advice. I'll keep these tips in mind when bargaining.八、Avoiding Rip-offs 避免被宰A: I think I was ripped off when I bought this item. The price was way too high!B: Yes, it sounds like you were overcharged. Next time, make sure to compare prices and check the item's value before making a purchase.。