科斯企业的性质1
科斯企业的性质1
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1.2 写作背景
科斯利用伦敦大学的卡塞尔旅行奖学金，开始去美国研究美国的工 业结构。通过大量的数据和实地情况，发现美国的市场经济中不仅 是市场机制在起到调节市场的作用，而且还有另一种力量在起作用。 他还得到一个重要的发现，就是非常重要的“交易费用”理论。我 们可以将其归纳为《企业的性质》的实践基础。 1935年，科斯回到伦敦经济学院并讲授公共事业经济学，开始对 英国公共事业进行历史研究，这期间他分析总结在美国对工业和企 业调查分析的基础上，于1937年发表了第一篇学术研究论文《企业 的性质》。
企业组织中雇主与雇员的法律关系是依靠契约固定下来的 契约中明确规定了雇主与雇员之间的权利和义务
解释企业规模扩大时，可以利用边际原理 企业家控制企业内部成本来维持效益和成本之间的静态平衡
3 论文的贡献
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交易费用理论 产权理论 法律经济学
4 国内相关研究
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盛洪和陈郁的《科斯的新制度经济理论》（1990），论述了科斯的《企 业的性质》一文中的理论对于新制度经济学的发展起到了重大推动作用。 以科斯为先驱的新制度经济学运动完成了一次经济学革命，从零交易费用 世界走向了正交易费用世界，使经济学获得了对现实经济问题新的解释力。 张乃根《科斯的法律—经济学理论剖析》（1992），论述《企业的性质》 是提出了交易成本理论，《社会成本问题》是发展了交易成本理论，最后 通过两个原理即经济制度的选择就是法律制度的选择、交易成本理论的实 质就是效益最大化来说明两篇论文之间有着紧密的联系。 石路明《交易费用初探》（1994），详细的描述了交易费用的提出、内 涵和影响因素。 张五常（1996），对科斯的理论进一步的阐释和发挥认为企业事实上是 用要素的契约代替了产品的契约，核心还是节约交易成本。 刘东《企业性质的完整解释—兼评交易费用论》（1998），指出交易费 用并不能对企业性质做出完整解释，它只不过是企业替代的经济性质》（2001），从单位化企业的概念和性质 入手 ，旨在理清“单位化企业”的概念并描述其主要经济特征。然后从企 业理论的角度，主要从三方面来分析单位化企业的性质。 谢德仁《企业的性质：要素使用权交易合约之履行过程》（2002），从企 业的性质进行分析，得出企业的性质是市场中由要素所有者签订的一组不完 备的要素使用权交易合约的履行过程。 王学林《企业性质及其形式演变》（2005），企业契约要素随着经济发展 和社会进步逐渐丰富，企业形式也随契约要素变化，并逐步向松散化发展。 刘长庚、高连水和罗志《论多维企业性质》（2006），考察了企业的多维 性质，在首肯企业生产性的同时整合进了交易性和契约性，得出企业联合产 权制度性质是企业性质的演进方向的结论。
科斯：《企业的性质》.pdf
科斯：《企业的性质》Ｒ.科斯过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。
在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。
然而，这种考察不仅对于防止因对有关理论赖以成立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济学在一系列不同假设的选择中作出正确的判断也是极为重要的。
例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。
1由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向钉2，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处枣假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。
罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”3尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。
下文将表明，一种不仅是现实的（即能与现实世界中的企业含义相吻合），而且是易于处理的（即能用马歇尔所发展起来的两种最强有力的经济分析工具来处理），企业的定义是可以获得的。
这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念4，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。
在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。
让我们来考察一下阿瑟•索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。
6“正常的经济体制自行运行。
它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。
就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。
”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。
7经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。
人们都在不同方案之间进行着预测和选择。
企业的性质
文献解读：企业的性质第一部分：背景介绍和流派渊源《企业的性质》是新制度经济学流派的创始人科斯1937年的经典文献。
新制度经济学20世纪60年代在美国兴起，但是最早作品发表在英国，出自年仅27岁的年轻英国人科斯之手。
1937年11月，在伦敦经济学院任教的科斯在本国的《经济学》发表了《企业的性质》一文。
一、关于科斯罗纳德·科斯,1910年12月29日生于英国。
主要经历：1932年获伦敦大学学士学位1932年-1934年任丹迪经济暨商业专校助理讲师1934年-1935年任利物浦大学助理讲师1935年-1938年任伦敦经济学院助理讲师1938年-1947年任伦敦经济学院讲师1947年-1951年任伦敦经济学院高等讲师1951年获伦敦大学博士学位1951年-1958年任布法罗大学经济学教授1958年-1964年任弗吉尼亚大学经济学教授1964年-1970年任芝加哥大学法学院经济学教授1964年-1981年任芝加哥大学法学院慕瑟经济学教授1991年任堪萨斯大学法律与经济学荣誉客座教授1982年任芝加哥大学法学院慕瑟经济学荣誉教授及法律与经济学资深研究员重要著作：《英国的广播：垄断的研究》、《厂商、市场与法律》、《经济学与经济学家论文集》阳光从未停止照耀——科斯1937年，27岁的科斯当时还默默无闻，他完成了一篇名为《企业的性质》的文章，在被好几家杂志拒绝以后，最后终于发表在伦敦经济学院《经济学家》杂志，起先并没有人注意到这篇文章，直到20多年后科斯的另一篇重要论文《社会成本问题》问世后，《企业的性质》才引起经济学界的高度评价，这篇被埋没20年的文章今天被看作是新制度经济学开始的标志。
由于他揭示并澄清了经济制度结构和函数中交易费用的重要性，1991年获得诺贝尔经济学奖。
这位老人已是年逾花甲，不过当他回忆起自己的往事，他在获奖时无比欣慰的说：“当年我只有21岁，阳光从未停止照耀。
”对于这位白发苍苍的这位老人来说，80岁时对他在20岁做的工作加以褒奖，实在是一种奇特的经历。
科斯：企业的性质
《企业的性质》（The Nature of the Firm）By R. H. Coase过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。
在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。
然而，这种考察不仅对于防止因对有关理论赖以成立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济学在一系列不同假设的选择中作出正确的判断也是极为重要的。
例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。
由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向性，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。
罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。
下文将表明，一种不仅是现实的（即能与现实世界中的企业含义相吻合），而且是易于处理的（即能用马歇尔所发展起来的两种最强有力的经济分析工具来处理），企业的定义是可以获得的。
这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。
1在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。
让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。
“正常的经济体制自行运行。
它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。
就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。
”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。
经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。
科斯企业的性质读后感
科斯企业的性质读后感《科斯企业的性质》是诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗纳德·科斯的代表作之一，该书深刻地阐述了企业内部组织的性质和企业如何在市场中运作的机制。
通过对企业内部的交易成本和市场交易成本的比较，科斯提出了著名的“科斯定理”，对经济学和管理学领域产生了深远的影响。
科斯指出，企业内部的组织形式是由于市场交易成本高于企业内部交易成本而存在的。
这一理论解释了为什么企业在市场中存在，并且为企业内部的组织形式提供了理论支持。
科斯的研究深刻地揭示了企业内部组织的性质，为人们理解企业内部运作机制提供了新的视角。
通过阅读《科斯企业的性质》，我深刻地认识到了企业内部组织的重要性。
科斯的理论不仅对经济学和管理学领域有着重要的启发意义，同时也对企业实践具有一定的指导意义。
在当今竞争激烈的市场环境中，企业内部组织的合理性和高效性对企业的发展至关重要。
科斯的研究为我们提供了一种新的思路和方法，帮助我们更好地理解和解决企业内部组织所面临的问题。
除此之外，科斯的研究也引发了我对企业内部组织形式的思考。
在现代企业管理中，企业内部组织形式的选择对企业的发展至关重要。
科斯的研究为我们提供了一种新的思路和方法，帮助我们更好地理解和解决企业内部组织所面临的问题。
通过对科斯的研究，我深刻地认识到了企业内部组织形式的重要性，也更加清晰地认识到了企业内部组织形式的选择对企业的发展具有重要的影响。
总的来说，科斯的研究为我们提供了一种新的思路和方法，帮助我们更好地理解和解决企业内部组织所面临的问题。
通过对科斯的研究，我深刻地认识到了企业内部组织形式的重要性，也更加清晰地认识到了企业内部组织形式的选择对企业的发展具有重要的影响。
科斯的研究为我们提供了一种新的思路和方法，帮助我们更好地理解和解决企业内部组织所面临的问题。
通过对科斯的研究，我深刻地认识到了企业内部组织形式的重要性，也更加清晰地认识到了企业内部组织形式的选择对企业的发展具有重要的影响。
The Nature of the Firm(科斯：企业的性质原文)
The Nature of the Firm (1937)R. H. COASEEconomic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumption. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent them is understanding and needles controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, itis suggested that the use of the word “firm” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the “plain man.”' Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is ail the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word "firm" should be given but that its difference from a firm in the "real world," if it aists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that "the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? And : Do they correspond with the real world?"3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, "More often one set will be manageable and the other realistic," yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.4 Our definition must, of course, "relate to formal relations which are capable of being conceived exactly."5IIt is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic system as it is normally treated by the economist. Let us consider the description of the economic system given by Sir Arthur Salter6. “The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, andproduction to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive.” An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an organism.7 The econ omic system “works itself. This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the systemBut this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.8 Sir Arthur Salter's description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a firm, the description does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except if 50 far as it compensates for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do 50. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the problem is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our economic system which is quite different from the individual planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning. The example given above is typical of a large sphere in our modem economic system. 0f course, this fact has not been ignored by economists. Marshall introduces organization as a fourth factor of production; J.B. Clark gives theco-ordinating function to the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces managers who co-ordinate. As D.H. Robertson points out, we find "islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”9 But in view of the fact that it is usua lly argued that co-ordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary? Why are there these "islands of conscious power"? Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these markets transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur co-ordinator, who directs production.10 It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that if production isregulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?0f course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly. In a department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in the building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of competitive price bidding for space. In the Lancashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent power and shop-room and can obtain looms and yarn on credit.11 This co-ordination of the various factors of production is, however, normally carried out without the interven tion of the price mechanism. As is evident, the amount of “vertical” integration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatly from industry to industry and from firm to firm. It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism. It is, of course, as Professor Robbins points out, “related to an outside network of relative prices and costs,” 12 but it is important to discover the exact nature of this relationship. This distinction between the allocation of resources in a firm and the allocation in the economic system has been very vividly described by Mr. Maurice Dobb when discussing Adam Smith's conception of the capitalist: “It began to be seen that there was something more important than the relations inside each factory or unit captained by an undertaker; there were the relations of the undertaker with the rest of the economic world outside his immediate sphere... the undertaker busies himself with the division of labour inside each firm and he plans and organises consciously,” but “he is related to the much larger economic specialisation, of which he himself is merely one specialised unit. Here, he plays his part as a single ceIl in a larger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider rôle he fills.”13In view of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a coordinating instrument, the? also admit the co-ordinating function of the “entrepreneur,” it is surely important to enquire whyco-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in another. The purpose of this paper is to bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the assumption (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to explain the basis on which, in practice, this choice between alternatives is effected.14IIOur task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at ah in a specialized exchange economy. The price mechanism (considered purely from the side of the direction of resources) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred to work under the direction of some other person. Such individuals would accept less in order to work under someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it would appear that this cannot be a very important reason, for it would rather seem that the opposite tendency is operating if one judges from the stress normally laid on the advantage of “being one's own master;”15 0f course, if the desire was not to be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others, then people might be willing to give Up something in order to direct others; that is, they would be willing to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order to be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be able to do this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority of cases.16 Firms might also exist if purchasers preferred commodities which are produced by firms to those not 50 produced; but even in spheres where one would expect such preferences (if they exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be found in the real world.17 Thereforethere must be other elements involved.The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organizing” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.18 This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.19 Again, in certain markets, e.g., produce ex-changes, a technique is devised for minimizing these contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage, it is important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.20 The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur; Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.There are, however, other disadvantages - or costs - of using the price mechanism. It may be desired tomake a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service. This may be due to the fact that if one contract is made for a longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain costs of making each contract will be avoided. Or, owing to the risk attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather than a short-term contract. Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to take. Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details being left until a later date. All that is stated in the contract is the limits to what the persons supplying the commodity or service is expected to do. The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is decided later by the purchaser. When the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be obtained.21 A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short-term contract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more importance in the case of services -labor-than it is in the case of the buying of commodities. In the case of commodities, the main items can be stated in advance and the details which will be decided later will be of minor significance.We may sum Up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking into account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market transactions which he supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails to do this. The question of uncertainty is one which is often considered to be very relevant to the study of the equilibrium of the firm. It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty. But those, for instance, Professor Knight, who make the mode of payment the distinguishing mark of the firm - fixed incomes being guaranteed to some of those engaged in production by a person who takes the residual, and fluctuating, income-would appear to be introducing a point which is irrelevant to the problem we are considering. One entrepreneur may sell his services to another for a certain sum of money, while the payment to his employees may be mainly or wholly a share in profits.22 Thesignificant question would appear to be why the allocation of resources is not done directly by the price mechanism.Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and the same transactions organized within a firm are often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with regulatory powers. If we consider the operation of a sales tax, it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not on the same transactions organized within the firm. Now since these are alternative methods of organization"-by the price mechanism or by the entrepreneur-such a regulation would bring into existence firms which otherwise would have no raison d'être. It would furnish a reason for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy. 0f course, to the extent that firms already exist, such a measure as a sales tax would merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be. Similarly, quota schemes, and methods of price control which imply that there is rationing, and which do not apply to firms producing such products for themselves, by allowing advantages to those who organize within the firm and flot through the market, necessarily encourage the growth of firms. But it is difficult to believe that it is measures such as have been mentioned in this paragraph which have brought firms into existence. Such measures would, however, tend to have this result if they did not exist for other reasons.These, then, are the reasons why organizations such as firms exist in a specialized exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is "organized" by the price mechanism.A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur; The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in that it is possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger or smaller A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of such transactions. The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the forces which determine the size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more? It is interesting to note that Professor Knight considers that:the relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of theory, being, in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality and historical accident rather than of intelligible general principles.But the question is peculiarly vital because the possibility of monopoly gain offers a powerful incentive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force must be offset by some decreased efficiency (in the production of money income) with growth in size, if even boundary competition is toexist.23equally powerful one making forProfessor Knight would appear to consider that it is impossible to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the firm. On the basis of the concept of the firm developed above, this task will now be attempted.It was suggested that the introduction of the firm was due primarily to the existence of marketing costs. A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all?24 Why is not ah production carried on by one big firm? There would appear to be certain possible explanations.First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise.25 Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market, or; to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur. Secondly, it may be that as the transactions which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of production. Again, a point must be reached where the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market or to the loss if the transaction was organized by another entrepreneur. Finally, the supply price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the "other advantages" of a small firm are greater than those of a large firm.26 0f course, the actual point where the expansion of the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the economists' phrase of "diminishing returns to management."27The point has been made in the previous paragraph that a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm. But if the firm stops its expansion at a point below the costs of marketing in the open market and at a point equal to the costs of organizing in another firm, in most cases (excluding the case of "combination"28), this will imply that there is a market transaction between these two procedures, each of whom could organize it at less than the actual marketing costs. How is the paradox to be resolved? If we consider an example the reason for this will become clear. Suppose A is buying a product from B and that both A and B could organize this marketing transaction at less than its present cost. B, we can assume, is not organizing one process or stage of production, but several. If A therefore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will have to take over all the processes of production controlled by B. Unless A takes over ail the processes of production, a market transaction will still remain, although it is a different product that is bought. But we have previously assumed that as each producer expands he becomes less efficient; the additional costs of organizing extra transactions increase. It is probable that A's cost of organizing the transactions previously organized by B will be greater than B's costs of doing the same thing. A therefore will take over the whole of B's organization only if his cost of organizing B's work is not greater than B's cost by an amount equal to the costs of carrying out an exchange transaction on the open market. But once it becomes economical to have a market transaction, it also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost of organizing an extra transaction in each firm is the same.Up to now it has been assumed that the exchange transactions which take place through the price mechanism are homogeneous. In fact, nothing could be more diverse than the actual transactions which take place in our modem world. This would seem to imply that the costs of carrying out exchange transactions through the price mechanism will vary considerably as will also the costs of organizing these transactions within the firm. It seems therefore possible that quite apart from the question of diminishing returns the costs of organizing certain transactions within the firm may be greater than the costs of carrying out the exchange transactions in the open market. This would necessarily imply that there were exchange transactions carried out through the price mechanism, but would it mean that there would have to be more than one firm? Clearly not, for all those areas in the economicsystem where the direction of resources was not dependent directly on the price mechanism could be organized within one firm. The factors which were discussed earlier would seem to be the important ones, though it is difficult to say whether "diminishing returns to management" or the rising supply price of factors is likely to be the more important.Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:a. the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the transactions organized.b. the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized.c. the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size.Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different sizes, it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices.29 As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appçar that the transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places. This furnishes an additional reason why efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm gets larger. Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening spatial distribution,tend to increase the size of the firm.30 Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.31/32 It should be noted that the definition of a firm which was given above can be used to give more precise meanings to the terms "combination" and "integration."33 There is a combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or more entrepreneurs become organized by one. This becomes integration when it involves the organization of transactions which were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on a market. A firm can expand in either or both of these two ways. The whole of the "structure of competitive industry" becomes tractable by the ordinary technique ofeconomic analysis.IIIThe problem which has been investigated in the previous section has not been entirely neglected by economists and it is now necessary to consider why the reasons given above for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy are to be preferred to the other explanations which have been offered. It is sometimes said that the reason for the existence of a firm is to be found in the division of labor This is the view of Professor Usher, a view which has been adopted and expanded by Mr. Maurice Dobb. The firm becomes "the result of an increasing complexity of the division of lab our… The growth of this economic differentiation creates the need for some integrating force without which differentiation would collapse into chaos; and it is as the integrating force in a differentiated economy that industrial forms are chiefly significant."34 The answer to this argument is an obvious one. The "integrating force in a differentiated economy" already exists in the form of the price mechanism. It is perhaps the main achievement of economic science that it has shown that there is no reason to suppose that specialization must lead to chaos.35 The reason given by Mr. Maurice Dobb is therefore inadmissible. What has to be explained is why one integrating force (the entrepreneur) should be substituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism). The most interesting reasons (and probably the most widely accepted) which have beengiven to explain this fact are those to be found in Professor Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. His views will be examined in some detail.Professor Knight starts with a system in which there is no uncertainty:acting as individuals under absolute freedom but without collusion men are supposed to have organised economic life with the primary and secondary division of labour, the use of capital, etc., developed to the point familiar in present-day America. The principal fact which calls for the exercise of the imagination is the internal organization of the productive groups or establishments. With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation,there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of productive activity. Even marketing transactions in any realistic sense would not be found. The flow of raw materials and productive services to the consumer would be entirely automatic.36Professor Knight says that we can imagine this adjustment as being "the result of a long process of experimentation worked out by trial-and-error methods alone," while it is not necessary "to imagine every worker doing exactly the right thing at the right time in a sort of 'pre-established harmony' with the work of others. There might be managers, superintendents, etc., for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of individuals," though these managers would be performing a purely routine function, "without responsibility of any sort."37Professor Knight then continues:With the introduction of uncertainty-the fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting upon opinion rather than knowledge-into this Eden-like situation, its character is entirely changed. . . .。
企业的性质科斯(中文版) - 公司的本质科斯(中文版)
企业的性质科斯(中文版) - 公司的本质科斯(中文版)本文将讨论诺贝尔经济学奖得主Ronald Coase所提出的企业的本质理论。
科斯的企业本质理论科斯在其著作“企业、市场和法律”中提出，企业存在的原因在于市场机制和合同机制的不完美性。
市场机制需要通过价格来协调资源配置，但是却存在协调失败的情况，而合同机制需要依赖协商和执行，但是有时候成本过高而不现实。
因此，企业作为另一种资源配置方式出现。
科斯将企业定义为一种以厂商（或企业）的名义进行的社会组织形式，厂商通过协调和整合各种资源来达成目标。
而这种组织形式的选择是一种成本和效益的权衡过程。
科斯的企业本质理论涉及到的关键问题是企业与市场的区别以及企业内部协调的机制。
企业与市场的区别在于企业内部采用权威关系而非价格机制来协调资源配置。
而企业内部协调的机制则是通过权威关系、规则制度和契约来实现的。
企业内部权威关系所具有的特点是权力的归中和指挥的纵深。
这种权力的归中能够保证企业内部的一致性和整体效率，而指挥的纵深能够保证信息和命令的传递效率。
规则制度在企业内部协调中的作用是在某种程度上取代市场机制，从而实现更好的资源配置。
规则制度的核心是一系列标准化的规章制度和程序。
规则制度的实施要求企业内部各个部门或员工对企业整体目标和规则制度能够进行自觉遵守。
契约在企业内部的协作中同样具有重要作用。
契约可以明确各自的权利和义务，规定合作方式和目标，减少互动成本和风险，提高合作的效率和质量。
但是，契约本身也有其成本，如签订、执行、监督等环节。
小结科斯的企业本质理论反映了企业内部组织和协作的基本特点。
企业作为一种资源配置方式，在协调和整合各种资源的同时，也面临诸多的成本和效益权衡。
同时，企业内部协调也需要靠权威关系、规则制度和契约等手段来实现。
最后，我们需要明确的是，企业内部的效率和一致性并不是无限提高的，而需要针对实际问题进行制度设计和改进。
企业的性质The Nature of the Firm
科斯：企业的性质原著：科斯——陈郁过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。
在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。
然而，这种考察不仅对于防止因对有关理论赖以成立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济学在一系列不同假设的选择中作出正确的判断也是极为重要的。
例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。
1由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向钉2，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处棗假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。
罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”3尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。
下文将表明，一种不仅是现实的（即能与现实世界中的企业含义相吻合），而且是易于处理的（即能用马歇尔所发展起来的两种最强有力的经济分析工具来处理），企业的定义是可以获得的。
这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念4，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。
51在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。
让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。
6“正常的经济体制自行运行。
它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。
就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。
”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。
7经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。
人们都在不同方案之间进行着预测和选择。
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汇报人： 小组成员：
目录
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1、作者简介以及写作背景 2、论文的主要内容 3、论文的贡献 4、国内外相关研究
1.1 作者简介
1910年12月29日出生于英国伦敦郊区的威尔斯敦 1929年进入伦敦经济学院学习商业，1931年获得商学士 学位 1931-1932年，依靠卡塞尔旅行奖学金在美国研究美国 工业结构 1934-1935年，在利物浦大学任教 1935-1940年，在伦敦经济学院教书 二战期间，在政府做统计工作，先后在森林委员会、中 央统计局和战时内阁办公室任职 1946年，回到伦敦经济学院教授经济学课程 科斯 （1910-）
2.3 交易成本理论
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企业产生的原因 交易成本理论 相对价格理论 • 市场信息提供者的出现，减少价格机制的成本 • 市场上设计出了降低交易费用的技术，可以利用一个契约代替多个契约 契约的特性和性质 • 特性：报酬、权利和义务 • 性质：明确权利范围 企业边界理论 企业边界的概念 • 企业将扩张直到企业内部组织一笔额外交易的成本等于通过市场上完成 同一笔交易的成本或者在另一个企业中组织同样交易的成本为止 企业规模扩张的条件 • 内部组织生产的成本小于在市场交易的成本——扩张 企业规模扩张的形式 • 联合 • 一体化
2.5 交易成本与市场交易成本的差异
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企业交易成本小于市场交易成本，增加产品的数量和品种 企业交易成本大于市场交易成本，减少产品的数量和品种 企业交易成本等于市场交易成本，保持原有的数量和品 种
2.6 企业性质理论的现实解释力
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企业组织中雇主与雇员之间的法律关系是企业性质在现实生活中的具体体现
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1.1 作者简介
1951年，获得伦敦大学理学博士学位，并移居美国 1951-1958年，任布法罗大学教授 1959年，在行为科学高等中心工作 1958-1964年，任弗吉尼亚大学经济学教授 1964-1979年，任芝加哥大学教授 1964-1982性质》（1937）、《社会成本问题》 （1960）等，其中列举出的这两篇经典性著作具有划时 代的意义。1991年，科斯“因为发现和澄清了交易费用 和产权对经济制度结构和运行的意义”而被授予诺贝尔 经济学奖。
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1.2 写作背景
科斯利用伦敦大学的卡塞尔旅行奖学金，开始去美国研究美国的工 业结构。通过大量的数据和实地情况，发现美国的市场经济中不仅 是市场机制在起到调节市场的作用，而且还有另一种力量在起作用。 他还得到一个重要的发现，就是非常重要的“交易费用”理论。我 们可以将其归纳为《企业的性质》的实践基础。 1935年，科斯回到伦敦经济学院并讲授公共事业经济学，开始对 英国公共事业进行历史研究，这期间他分析总结在美国对工业和企 业调查分析的基础上，于1937年发表了第一篇学术研究论文《企业 的性质》。
2.2 企业的性质
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通过举反例来论证“经济理论中生产要素在各种不同的用途之间的配置是 由价格机制决定的”片面性，从而得出价格机制不是普遍适用 提出价格机制被替代的学说 生产要素配置过程不完全依靠价格机制调节 生产要素配置在企业中依靠企业家来完成 价格机制的调节作用在企业内部被企业家所替代 论证价格机制被替代的差异性 “企业的性质”学说：“企业的性质就是价格机制的替代物”
2.4 企业的基本特征
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劳动分工（厄舍教授的观点）不是企业的特征 “不确定性”也不能用来说明企业的特征 “企业对消费者需求的预测”和“决策和控制功能的集中化”也不能代表 企业的特征 “只有契约以及在契约中明确个人的权利和报酬”同样不是企业的特征 企业的特征就是“价格机制被企业取代”
科斯 （1910-）
1.2 写作背景
1929年10月，在伦敦经济学院，英国法与经济学学派的主要代表 人物阿诺德普兰特(Arnold plant)对科斯的思想和观念影响极深。 改变其对经济运转的见解，并给他灌输了亚当斯密的思想和观念， 使他了解一个竞争如何可以被定价系统协调。让他认识到资本主义 制度下经济规律的核心内容，对价格机制在资本主义经济社会所发 挥的作用有了清醒的认识，为以后专门研究资本主义经济体制和资 本主义企业奠定思想基础。 1931年，科斯大学毕业 ，听从了普兰特教授的职业选择和专业研 究方向建议，放弃了从事律师行业的打算，依然选择了新的研究方向。 为科斯发表《企业的性质》奠定了专业基础。
4 国内相关研究
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李新春《单位化企业的经济性质》（2001），从单位化企业的概念和性质 入手 ，旨在理清“单位化企业”的概念并描述其主要经济特征。然后从企 业理论的角度，主要从三方面来分析单位化企业的性质。 谢德仁《企业的性质：要素使用权交易合约之履行过程》（2002），从企 业的性质进行分析，得出企业的性质是市场中由要素所有者签订的一组不完 备的要素使用权交易合约的履行过程。 王学林《企业性质及其形式演变》（2005），企业契约要素随着经济发展 和社会进步逐渐丰富，企业形式也随契约要素变化，并逐步向松散化发展。 刘长庚、高连水和罗志《论多维企业性质》（2006），考察了企业的多维 性质，在首肯企业生产性的同时整合进了交易性和契约性，得出企业联合产 权制度性质是企业性质的演进方向的结论。
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2.1 序言
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明确了所要研究的方向和命题——企业的性质 申明过去的经济理论和经济学家没有很好的说明理论的假设，导致这种 假设出现误解和不必要的争论 明确研究方法： 让“企业的性质”这种假设能够容易处理。（技术性） 让“企业的性质”这种假设复合现实世界。（真实性） 让“企业的性质”这种假设能够正规叙述和表达准确。（逻辑性）
企业组织中雇主与雇员的法律关系是依靠契约固定下来的 契约中明确规定了雇主与雇员之间的权利和义务
解释企业规模扩大时，可以利用边际原理 企业家控制企业内部成本来维持效益和成本之间的静态平衡
3 论文的贡献
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交易费用理论 产权理论 法律经济学
4 国内相关研究
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盛洪和陈郁的《科斯的新制度经济理论》（1990），论述了科斯的《企 业的性质》一文中的理论对于新制度经济学的发展起到了重大推动作用。 以科斯为先驱的新制度经济学运动完成了一次经济学革命，从零交易费用 世界走向了正交易费用世界，使经济学获得了对现实经济问题新的解释力。 张乃根《科斯的法律—经济学理论剖析》（1992），论述《企业的性质》 是提出了交易成本理论，《社会成本问题》是发展了交易成本理论，最后 通过两个原理即经济制度的选择就是法律制度的选择、交易成本理论的实 质就是效益最大化来说明两篇论文之间有着紧密的联系。 石路明《交易费用初探》（1994），详细的描述了交易费用的提出、内 涵和影响因素。 张五常（1996），对科斯的理论进一步的阐释和发挥认为企业事实上是 用要素的契约代替了产品的契约，核心还是节约交易成本。 刘东《企业性质的完整解释—兼评交易费用论》（1998），指出交易费 用并不能对企业性质做出完整解释，它只不过是企业替代市场的部分原因。
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2.0 主要内容
基于对这篇论文的阅读和参考网络和图书馆书籍，我们认为这篇 著名的论文，主要论述两个问题： 1、企业产生的原因 2、企业的边界问题 我们认为这篇论文可以分为六个部分来理解： 第一部分，序言； 第二部分，论证企业的性质； 第三部分，交易成本理论； 第四部分，阐明企业的基本特征； 第五部分，交易成本与市场交易成本的差异； 第六部分，企业性质理论对现实的解释力。