财务风险重要性分析毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文

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财务风险外文翻译外文文献英文文献财务风险重要性分析

外文原文How Important is Financial Risk?作者：Sohnke M. Bartram, Gregory W. Brown, and Murat Atamer起止页码：1-7出版日期（期刊号）：September 2009,V ol. 2, No. 4(Serial No. 11)出版单位：Theory and Decision, DOI 10.1007/s11238-005-4590-0Abstract：This paper examines the determinants of equity price risk for a large sample of non-financial corporations in the United States from 1964 to 2008. We estimate both structural and reduced form models to examine the endogenous nature of corporate financial characteristics such as total debt, debt maturity, cash holdings, and dividend policy. We find that the observed levels of equity price risk are explained primarily by operating and asset characteristics such as firm age, size, asset tangibility, as well as operating cash flow levels and volatility. In contrast, implied measures of financial risk are generally low and more stable than debt-to-equity ratios. Our measures of financial risk have declined over the last 30 years even as measures of equity volatility (e.g. idiosyncratic risk) have tended to increase. Consequently, documented trends in equity price risk are more than fully accounted for by trends in the riskiness of firms’ assets. Taken together, the results suggest that the typical U.S. firm substantially reduces financial risk by carefully managing financial policies. As a result, residual financial risk now appears negligible relative to underlying economic risk for a typical non-financial firm.Keywords：Capital structure；financial risk；risk management；corporate finance 1IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage. There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed, evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e.g., through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations) and the so-called “shadow banking system” may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to thedistress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example, non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact, bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries (e.g., automotive manufacturing, newspapers, and real estate) that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis. This surprising fact begs the question, “How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?” At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.Recent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. (2001) that firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor (see Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003, among others). Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi (2003) showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g., Dichev, 1998, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).However, much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, this paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First, we seek to understand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations (i.e., economic or business risks) and risks associated with financing the firms operations (i.e., financial risks). Second, we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost (i.e., via homemade leverage) and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless, financial policies, such as adding debt to the capital structure, can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast, recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase valuewith financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However, this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage. Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States. Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk (volatility) relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thus, throughout the paper, we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility. For example, in a static setting, debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy is determined by owners (and managers), we are careful to examine the effects of firms’ asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically, we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and, as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company (i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm (i.e. factors determining financial risk). We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft (1996), or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage. An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors (e.g., dividends), as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns. Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’ operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm. For example, firm size and age provide measures of line of- business maturity; tangible assets (plant, property, and equipment) serve as a proxy for the ‘hardness’ of a firm’s assets; capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential. Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk, we examine total debt, debt maturity, dividend payouts, and holdings of cash andshort-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising: factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly, measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is about 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique). This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels. These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels, debt maturity, or cash holdings (see, for example, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). In addition, many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit, call provisions in debt contracts, or contingencies in supplier contracts), special purpose vehicles (SPVs), or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant, with predicted signs. In addition, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial. We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm. This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business, which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns. Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak. Consistent with the predictions of Pástor and Veronesi (2003), we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility. This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky. Among economic risk variables, the effects of firm size, profit volatility, and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies, our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk. Otherwise, financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy, it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part, determined by the economic risks firms take. However, some of the specific findings are unexpected. For example, in a simple model of capital structure, dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm (i.e., increase net debt). We find thatdividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations (e.g., a mature company with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time. Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk. This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last 30 years at the same time that measures of equity price risk (such as idiosyncratic risk) appear to have been increasing. In fact, measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near 1.0 (i.e., no leverage) by the end of our sample. There are several possible reasons for this. First, total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last 30 years, so our measure of implied leverage should also decline. Second, firms have significantly increased cash holdings, so measures of net debt (debt minus cash and short-term investments) have also declined. Third, the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky (especially technology-oriented) firms becoming publicly listed. These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure. Fourth, as mentioned above, firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities. To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades, firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results. First, we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification. We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S. non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions. Finally, we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.In short, our results suggest that, as a practical matter, residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S. firm. This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress islikely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies. For example, our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage (e.g., Dichev, 1998). Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities, since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce risk. Lastly, our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Before proceeding we address a potential comment about our analysis. Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter. This is not the proper interpretation. Instead, our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks. Of course, financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management. In contrast, our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks. In short, gross financial risk may be important, but firms can manage it. This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that are more difficult (or undesirable) to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.The paper is organized at follows. Motivation, related literature, and hypotheses are reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 describes the models we employ followed by a description of the data in Section 4. Empirical results for the Leland-Toft model are presented in Section 5. Section 6 considers estimates from the reduced form model, aggregate debt data for the no financial sector in the U.S., and an analysis of bankruptcy filings over the last 25 years. Section 6 concludes.2 Motivation, Related Literature, and HypothesesStudying firm risk and its determinants is important for all areas of finance. In the corporate finance literature, firm risk has direct implications for a variety of fundamental issues ranging from optimal capital structure to the agency costs of asset substitution. Likewise, the characteristics of firm risk are fundamental factors in all asset pricing models.The corporate finance literature often relies on market imperfections associated with financial risk. In the Modigliani Miller (1958) framework, financial risk (or more generally financial policy) is irrelevant because investors can replicate the financialdecisions of the firm by themselves. Consequently, well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between frictionless financial distress and economic bankruptcy. For example, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) carefully distinguish between costs of financial and economic distress by analyzing highly leveraged transactions, and find that financial distress costs are small for a subset of the firms that did not experience an “economic” shock. They conclude that financial distress costs should be small or insignificant for typical firms. Kaplan and Stein (1990) analyze highly levered transactions and find that equity beta increases are surprisingly modest after recapitalizations.The ongoing debate on financial policy, however, does not address the relevance of financial leverage as a driver of the overall riskiness of the firm. Our study joins the debate from this perspective. Correspondingly, decomposing firm risk into financial and economic risks is at the heart of our study.Research in corporate risk management examines the role of total financial risk explicitly by examining the motivations for firms to engage in hedging activities. In particular, theory suggests positive valuation effects of corporate hedging in the presence of capital market imperfections. These might include agency costs related to underinvestment or asset substitution (see Bessembinder, 1991, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein,1993), bankruptcy costs and taxes (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and managerial risk aversion (Stulz,1990). However, the corporate risk management literature does not generally address the systematic pricing of corporate risk which has been the primary focus of the asset pricing literature.Lintner (1965) and Sharpe (1964) define a partial equilibrium pricing of risk in a mean variance framework. In this structure, total risk is decomposed into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, and only systematic risk should be priced in a frictionless market. However, Campbelletal (2001) find that firm-specific risk has increased substantially over the last four decades and various studies have found that idiosyncratic risk is a priced factor (Goyal and Santa Clara,2003, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006, 2008, Spiegel and Wang, 2006). Research has determined various firm characteristics (i.e., industry growth rates, institutional ownership, average firm size, growth options, firm age, and profitability risk) are associated with firm-specific risk. Recent research has also examined the role of equity price risk in the context of expected financial distress costs (Campbell and Taksler, 2003, Vassalou and Xing, 2004, Almeida and Philippon, 2007, among others). Likewise, fundamental economicrisks have been shown to be to be related to equity risk factors (see, for example, Vassalou, 2003, and the citations therein). Choiand Richardson (2009) examine the volatility of the firm’s assets using issue-level data on debt and find that asset volatilities exhibit significant time-series variation and that financial leverage has a substantial effect on equity volatility.How Important is Financial Risk?财务风险的重要性作者：Sohnke M. Bartram, Gregory W. Brown, and Murat Atamer起始页码：1-7出版日期（期刊号）：September 2009,Vol. 2, No. 4(Serial No. 11)出版单位：Theory and Decision, DOI 10.1007/s11238-005-4590-0外文翻译译文：摘要：本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。

财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译财务风险重要性分析译文：摘要：本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。

我们通过相关结构以及简化模型，研究诸如债务总额，债务期限，现金持有量，及股利政策等公司财务特征，我们发现，股票价格风险主要通过经营和资产特点，如企业年龄，规模，有形资产，经营性现金流及其波动的水平来体现。

与此相反，隐含的财务风险普遍偏低，且比产权比率稳定。

在过去30年，我们对财务风险采取的措施有所减少，反而对股票波动（如独特性风险）采取的措施逐渐增加。

因此，股票价格风险的记载趋势比公司的资产风险趋势更具代表性。

综合二者，结果表明，典型的美国公司谨慎管理的财政政策大大降低了财务风险。

因此，现在看来微不足道的剩余财务风险相对底层的非金融公司为一典型的经济风险。

关键词：资本结构；财务风险；风险管理；企业融资1 绪论2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

毫无疑问，向金融机构的巨额举债和内部融资均有风险。

事实上，有证据表明，全球主要银行精心策划的杠杆（如通过抵押贷款和担保债务）和所谓的“影子银行系统”可能是最近的经济和金融混乱的根本原因。

财务杠杆在非金融企业的作用不太明显。

迄今为止，尽管资本市场已困在危机中，美国非金融部门的问题相比金融业的困境来说显得微不足道。

例如，非金融企业破产机遇仅限于自20世纪30年代大萧条以来的最大经济衰退。

事实上，非金融公司申请破产的事件大都发生在美国各行业（如汽车制造业，报纸，房地产）所面临的基本经济压力即金融危机之前。

这令人惊讶的事实引出了一个问题“非金融公司的财务风险是如何重要？”。

这个问题的核心是关于公司的总风险以及公司风险组成部分的各决定因素的不确定性。

最近在资产定价和企业融资再度引发的两个学术研究中分析了股票价格风险利率。

一系列的资产定价文献探讨了关于卡贝尔等的发现。

（2001）在过去的40年，公司特定（特有）的风险有增加的趋势。

财务风险管理外文文献翻译原文+译文

财务风险管理外文文献翻译原文+译文财务风险管理外文文献翻译原文+译文【2016年8月】目录原文：Financial Risk ManagementAlthough financial risk has increased significantly in recent years, risk and risk management are not contemporary issues. The result of increasingly global markets is that risk may originate with events thousands of miles away that have nothing to do with the domestic market. Information is available instantaneously, which means that change, and subsequent market reactions, occur very quickly. The economic climate and markets can be affected very quickly by changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. Counterparties can rapidly become problematic. As a result, it is important to ensure financial risks are identified and managed appropriately. Preparation is a key component of risk management.What Is Risk?Risk provides the basis for opportunity. The terms risk and exposure have subtle differences in their meaning. Risk refers to the probability of loss, while exposure is the possibility of loss, although they are often used interchangeably. Risk arises as a result of exposure.Exposure to financial markets affects most organizations, either directly or indirectly. When an organization has financial market exposure, there is a possibility of loss but also an opportunity for gain or profit. Financial market exposure may provide strategic or competitive benefits.Risk is the likelihood of losses resulting from events such aschanges in market prices. Events with a low probability of occurring, but that may result in a high loss, are particularly troublesome because they are often not anticipated. Put another way, risk is the probable variability of returns.Since it is not always possible or desirable to eliminate risk, understanding it is an important step in determining how to manage it. Identifying exposures and risks forms the basis for an appropriate financial risk management strategy.How Does Financial Risk?Financial risk arises through countless transactions of a financial nature, including sales and purchases, investments and loans, and various other business activities. It can arise as a result of legal transactions, new projects, mergers and acquisitions, debt financing, the energy component of costs, or through the activities of management, stakeholders, competitors, foreign governments, or weather. When financial prices change dramatically, it can increase costs, reduce revenues, or otherwise adversely impact the profitability of an organization. Financial fluctuations may make it more difficult to plan and budget, price goods and services, and allocate capital.There are three main sources of financial risk:1. Financial risks arising from an organization’s exposure to changes in market prices, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices.2. Financial risks arising from the actions of, and transactions with, other organizations such as vendors, customers, and counterparties in derivatives transactions3. Financial risks resulting from internal actions or failures of the organization, particularly people, processes, and systems What Is Financial Risk Management?Financial risk management is a process to deal with the uncertainties resulting from financial markets. It involves assessing the financial risks facing an organization and developing management strategies consistent with internal priorities and policies. Addressing financial risks proactively may provide an organization with a competitive advantage. It also ensures that management, operational staff, stakeholders, and the board of directors are in agreement on key issues of risk.Managing financial risk necessitates making organizational decisions about risks that are acceptable versus those that are not. The passive strategy of taking no action is the acceptance of all risks by default.Organizations manage financial risk using a variety of strategies and products. It is important to understand how these products and strategies work to reduce risk within the context of the organization’s risk tolerance and objectives.Strategies for risk management often involve derivatives. Derivatives are traded widely among financial institutions and on organized exchanges. The value of derivatives contracts, such as futures, forwards, options, and swaps, is derived from the price of the underlying asset. Derivatives trade on interest rates, exchange rates, commodities, equity and fixed income securities, credit, and even weather.The products and strategies used by market participants to manage financial risk are the same ones used by speculators to increase leverage and risk. Although it can be argued that widespread use of derivatives increases risk, the existence of derivatives enables those who wish to reduce risk to pass it along to those who seek risk and its associated opportunities.The ability to estimate the likelihood of a financial loss ishighly desirable. However, standard theories of probability often fail in the analysis of financial markets. Risks usually do not exist in isolation, and the interactions of several exposures may have to be considered in developing an understanding of how financial risk arises. Sometimes, these interactions are difficult to forecast, since they ultimately depend on human behavior.The process of financial risk management is an ongoing one. Strategies need to be implemented and refined as the market and requirements change. Refinements may reflect changing expectations about market rates, changes to the business environment, or changing international political conditions, for example. In general, the process can be summarized as follows:1、Identify and prioritize key financial risks.2、Determine an appropriate level of risk tolerance.3、Implement risk management strategy in accordance with policy.4、Measure, report, monitor, and refine as needed.DiversificationFor many years, the riskiness of an asset was assessed based only on the variability of its returns. In contrast, modern portfolio theory considers not only an asset’s riskines s, but also its contribution to the overall riskiness of the portfolio to which it is added. Organizations may have an opportunity to reduce risk as a result ofrisk diversification.In portfolio management terms, the addition of individual components to a portfolio provides opportunities for diversification, within limits. A diversified portfolio contains assets whose returns are dissimilar, in other words, weakly or negatively correlated with one another. It is useful to think of theexposures of an organization as a portfolio and consider the impact of changes or additions on the potential risk of the total.Diversification is an important tool in managing financial risks. Diversification among counterparties may reduce the risk that unexpected events adversely impact the organization through defaults. Diversification among investment assets reduces the magnitude of loss if one issuer fails. Diversification of customers, suppliers, and financing sources reduces the possibility that an organization will have its business adversely affected by changes outside management’s control. Although the risk of loss still exists, diversification may reduce the opportunity for large adverse outcomes.Risk Management ProcessThe process of financial risk management comprises strategies that enable an organization to manage the risks associated with financial markets. Risk management is a dynamic process that should evolve with an organization and its business. It involves and impacts many parts of an organization including treasury, sales, marketing, legal, tax, commodity, and corporate finance.The risk management process involves both internal and external analysis. The first part of the process involves identifying and prioritizing the financial risks facing an organization and understanding their relevance. It may be necessary to examine the organization and its products, management, customers, suppliers, competitors, pricing, industry trends, balance sheet structure, and position in the industry. It is also necessary to consider stakeholders and their objectives and tolerance for risk.Once a clear understanding of the risks emerges, appropriate strategies can be implemented in conjunction with riskmanagement policy. For example, it might be possible to change where and how business is done, thereby reducing the。

毕业设计论文外文文献翻译

毕业设计(论文）外文文献翻译院系：财务与会计学院年级专业：201＊级财务管理姓名:学号：132148*＊*附件: 财务风险管理【Abstract】Although financial risk has increased significantly in recent years risk and risk management are not contemporary issues。

The result of increasingly global markets is that risk may originate with events thousands of miles away that have nothing to do with the domestic market。

Information is available instantaneously which means that change and subsequent market reactions occur very quickly。

The economic climate and markets can be affected very quickly by changes in exchange rates interest rates and commodity prices。

Counterparties can rapidly become problematic。

As a result it is important to ensure financial risks are identified and managed appropriately. Preparation is a key component of risk management。

【Key Words】Financial risk，Risk management，YieldsI. Financial risks arising1.1What Is Risk1.1.1The concept of riskRisk provides the basis for opportunity. The terms risk and exposure have subtle differences in their meaning. Risk refers to the probability of loss while exposure is the possibility of loss although they are often used interchangeably。

公司财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译外文资料Financial ﬁrm bankruptcy and systemic riskIn Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIG’s credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIG’s assets, w ith no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before. Thus, the government’s effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that ﬁrms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. T he concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related ﬁrms. This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomicresearch that financialﬁrmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “...more severe ﬁnancial events are associated withmore severe recessions...” Likewise, Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so severe.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firm’s bankruptcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial ﬁrm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S. economy through counterparty risk channels. This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread financial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially severe recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession. Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whether any firm ﬁles for bankruptcy.Pervasive ﬁnancial fragility may occur because the failure of one ﬁrm leads to the failure of other ﬁrms which cascades through the system (e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999; Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms fail simultaneously, as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed (Benston, 1986). In the former case, the failure of one ﬁrm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through ﬁnancial contracts such as CDSs. In the latter case, the fact that so many ﬁnancial institutions have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the economy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak ﬁnancial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one ﬁrm was allowed to ﬁle bankruptcy. Further, should one or the other ﬁrmgo bankrupt, the nonﬁnancial ﬁrmwould have the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of ﬁnancial ﬁrm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators. Foremost amo ng these policies is “too big to fail” (TBTF), the logic of which is that the failure of a large ﬁnancial institution will have ramifications for other ﬁnancial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous. TBTF was behind the Fed’s decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stearns and J.P.Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loans owed by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG. TBTF may be justiﬁed if the outcome is preven tion of a major downswing in the economy. However, if the systemic risks in these episodes have been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then the cost to the efﬁciency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any po tential beneﬁts from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while watching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine empiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off. There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor ﬁnancial ﬁrm.Most recently,we can point to the bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only one obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk. Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely. Thuswewill never knowifthemarket downturn th at followed the Lehman bankruptcy reﬂected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems: (1) information contagion,where the information that one ﬁnancial ﬁrmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other ﬁnanc ial institutions largely because the ﬁrms share common risk factors; or (2) counterparty contagion,where one important ﬁnancial institution’s collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor ﬁrms whose troubles snowball and drive other ﬁrms into distress. The efﬁcacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators do not ste p in to bail out an individual ﬁrm, the alternative is to let it fail. In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the ﬁrmare very quickly repaid. In contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 ﬁling of a nonﬁnancial ﬁrm. However, if the nonbank ﬁnancial ﬁrm inquestion has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation (SIPC), the ﬁrmi s required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act (SIPA) to liquidate under Chapter 7 (Don and Wang, 1990). This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman ﬁled for bankruptcy in 2008 and its broker–dealer subsidiaries were n ot part of the Chapter 11 ﬁling.A major fear of a ﬁnancial ﬁrm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that ﬁre sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed ﬁnancial ﬁrm and that these ﬁre saleswill have ramiﬁcations for other ﬁrms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed ﬁrm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This fear was behind the Fed’s decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 – Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on ﬁnancial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid markets. Thismight have resulted in...[a] ﬁre sale scenario..., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse ﬁnancial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia) The fear of potential ﬁre sales is expressed in further detail in t he same speech as a reason for the merger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear...would be forced to ﬁle for bankruptcy...[which] wouldhave forced Bear’s secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained losses. If they responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured ﬁnancing to other ﬁrms, a much broader liquidity crisis wou ld have ensued.”The idea that creditors of a failed ﬁrm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic tenets of U.S. bankruptcy laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their control. If that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the ﬁrm. If the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in no way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly procedure. Bankruptcy actually reduces the likelihood of ﬁre sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy ﬁling occurs. Cash does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a judge.Without pressure to pay debts, the ﬁrm can remain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of action. Indeed, a major complaint about the U.S. code is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the process.If, however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest, then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick action. This occurred in the case of Lehman’s asset sale to Barclays,which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold quickly.金融公司破产及系统性的风险2008年秋，当美联邦储备委员会和财政部拒绝85亿美金巨资保险投入到美国国际集团时，这边借给美国国际集团的货款就直接落到了竞争对手手里，而投保人只得到极少的一部分资金。

财务管理类本科毕业论文外文翻译(原文+译文)

财务管理类本科毕业论文外文翻译〔原文+译文〕财务管理类本科毕业论文外文翻译译文：[美]卡伦·A·霍契.《什么是财务风险管理？》.《财务风险管理要点》. 约翰.威立国际出版公司,2022:P1-22.财务风险管理尽管近年来金融风险大大增加，但风险和风险管理不是当代的主要问题。

全球市场越来越多的问题是，风险可能来自几千英里以外的与这些事件无关的国外市场。

意味着需要的信息可以在瞬间得到，而其后的市场反响，很快就发生了。

经济气候和市场可能会快速影响外汇汇率变化、利率及大宗商品价格，交易对手会迅速成为一个问题。

因此，重要的一点是要确保金融风险是可以被识别并且管理得当的。

准备是风险管理工作的一个关键组成局部。

什么是风险？风险给时机提供了根底。

风险和暴露的条款让它们在含义上有了细微的差异。

风险是指有损失的可能性，而暴露是可能的损失，尽管他们通常可以互换。

风险起因是由于暴露。

金融市场的暴露影响大多数机构，包括直接或间接的影响。

当一个组织的金融市场暴露，有损失的可能性，但也是一个获利或利润的时机。

金融市场的暴露可以提供战略性或竞争性的利益。

风险损失的可能性事件来自如市场价格的变化。

事件发生的可能性很小，但这可能导致损失率很高，特别麻烦，因为他们往往比预想的要严重得多。

换句话说，可能就是变异的风险回报。

由于它并不总是可能的，或者能满意地把风险消除，在决定如何管理它中了解它是很重要的一步。

识别暴露和风险形式的根底需要相应的财务风险管理策略。

财务风险是如何产生的呢？无数金融性质的交易包括销售和采购，投资和贷款，以及其他各种业务活动，产生了财务风险。

它可以出现在合法的交易中，新工程中，兼并和收购中，债务融资中，能源局部的本钱中，或通过管理的活动，利益相关者，竞争者，外国政府，或天气出现。

当金融的价格变化很大，它可以增加本钱，降低财政收入，或影响其他有不利影响的盈利能力的组织。

金融波动可能使人们难以规划和预算商品和效劳的价格，并分配资金。

财务风险外文文献

外文文献The Important Of Financial RiskSohnke M. Bartram Gregory W. Brown and Murat AtamerAbstract:This paper examines the determinants of equity price risk for a largesample of non-financial corporations in the United States from 1964 to 2008. Weestimate both structural and reduced form models to examine the endogenous natureof corporate financial characteristics such as total debt debt maturity cash holdingsand dividend policy. We find that the observed levels of equity price risk areexplained primarily by operating and asset characteristics such as firm age size assettangibility as well as operating cash flow levels and volatility. In contrast impliedmeasures of financial risk are generally low and more stable than debt-to-equity ratios.Our measures of financial risk have declined over the last 30 years even as measuresof equity volatility e.g. idiosyncratic risk have tended to increase. Consequentlydocumented trends in equity price risk are more than fully accounted for by trends inthe riskiness of firms’assets. Taken together the results suggest that the typical U.S.firm substantially reduces financial risk by carefully managing financial policies. As aresult residual financial risk now appears negligible relative to underlying economicrisk for a typical non-financial firm.Keywords：Capital structure；financial risk；risk management；corporate finance1 1.IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects offinancial leverage. There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financialinstitutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed evidenceindicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks e.g. through themortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations and the so-called “shadowbanking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financialdislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to thedistress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis.For example non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economicdecline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact bankruptcyfilings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries e.g.automotive manufacturing newspapers and real estate that faced fundamentaleconomic pressures prior to the financial crisis. This surprising fact begs the question“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms”At the heart of this issue isthe uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firmrisk.Recent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate financehasrekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the assetpricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. 2001 that firm-specificidiosyncratic risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggeststhat idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor see Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003among others. Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi 2003showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinantof idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equityvolatility in bond pricing e.g. Dichev 1998 Campbell Hilscher and Szilagyi2008.However much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the riskof assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast thispaper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering totalrisk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations i.e. economic or businessrisks and risks associated with financing the firms operations i.e. financial risks.Second we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risksand the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller 1958 suggests that financial policymay be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate manyfinancial decisions by the firm at a low cost i.e. via homemade leverage andwell-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial andeconomic distress. Nonetheless financial policies such as adding debt to the capitalstructure can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast recent research on corporate riskmanagement suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase valuewith financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However thisresearch is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financialdistress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage. Empiricalresearch provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for atypical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk byexamining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample ofnon-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most importantdeterminants of equity price risk volatility relies on viewing financial policy astransforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thusthroughout the paper we consider financial leverage as the wedge between assetvolatility and equity volatility. For example in a static setting debt provides financialleverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy isdetermined by owners and managers we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically we examine avariety of characteristics suggested by previous research and as clearly as possibledistinguish between those associated of the company(i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm(i.e. factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced formmodel of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implciations of some factors(e.g .dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volantility if common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daliy equity returns.Our proxies for econmic risk are designed to capture the essential charactersitics of the firm’s operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of –business maturity; tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the ‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure captial intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows.To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary resuit or our analysis is surpriing:factors determining economic risk for a typical company exlain the vast majority of the varation in equity volatility.Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policise to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings (see,for example , Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial dervatives,contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts ,or contingencies in supplier contracts ),spcial purpose vehicles (SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our ecnomic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statiscally significant, with predicted size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which shoule be reflected in the volatility. This suggests that companties with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky .Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size ,prfit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leveage increases total firm risk. Otherwise,fiancial risk factors are not reliably to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy , it is no surprise that financial variables are , at least in part , determined by the econmic risks frims take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected. For example , in a simple model of capital structure ,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt ).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not asmuch a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our result indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consisitently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadoa (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.。

财务风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料翻译Financial Risk ManagementAlthough financial risk has increased significantly in recent years, risk and risk management are not contemporary issues. The result of increasingly global markets is that risk may originate with events thousands of miles away that have nothing to do with the domestic market. Information is available instantaneously, which means that change, and subsequent market reactions, occur very quickly. The economic climate and markets can be affected very quickly by changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. Counterparties can rapidly become problematic. As a result, it is important to ensure financial risks are identified and managed appropriately. Preparation is a key component of risk management.What Is Risk?Risk provides the basis for opportunity. The terms risk and exposure have subtle differences in their meaning. Risk refers to the probability of loss, while exposure is the possibility of loss, although they are often used interchangeably. Risk arises as a result of exposure.Exposure to financial markets affects most organizations, either directly or indirectly. When an organization has financial market exposure, there is a possibility of loss but also an opportunity for gain or profit. Financial market exposure may provide strategic or competitive benefits.Risk is the likelihood of losses resulting from events such as changes in market prices. Events with a low probability of occurring, but that may result in a high loss, are particularly troublesome because they are often not anticipated. Put another way, risk is the probable variability of returns.Since it is not always possible or desirable to eliminate risk, understanding it is an important step in determining how to manage it. Identifying exposures and risks forms the basis for an appropriate financial risk management strategy.How Does Financial Risk?Financial risk arises through countless transactions of a financial nature, including sales and purchases, investments and loans, and various other business activities. It can arise as a result of legal transactions, new projects, mergers and acquisitions, debt financing, the energy component of costs, or through the activities of management, stakeholders, competitors, foreign governments, or weather. When financial prices change dramatically, it can increase costs, reduce revenues, or otherwise adversely impact the profitability of an organization. Financial fluctuations may make it more difficult to plan and budget, price goods and services, and allocate capital.There are three main sources of financial risk:1. Financial risks arising from an organization’s exposure to changes in market prices, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices.2. Financial risks arising from the actions of, and transactions with, other organizations such as vendors, customers, and counterparties in derivatives transactions3. Financial risks resulting from internal actions or failures of the organization, particularly people, processes, and systemsWhat Is Financial Risk Management?Financial risk management is a process to deal with the uncertainties resulting from financial markets. It involves assessing the financial risks facing an organization and developing management strategies consistent with internal priorities and policies. Addressing financial risks proactively may provide an organization with a competitive advantage. It also ensures that management, operational staff, stakeholders, and the board of directors are in agreement on key issues of risk.Managing financial risk necessitates making organizational decisions about risks that are acceptable versus those that are not. The passive strategy of taking no action is the acceptance of all risks by default.Organizations manage financial risk using a variety of strategies and products. It is important to understand how these products and strategies work to reduce riskwithin the context of the organization’s risk tolerance and objectives.Strategies for risk management often involve derivatives. Derivatives are traded widely among financial institutions and on organized exchanges. The value of derivatives contracts, such as futures, forwards, options, and swaps, is derived from the price of the underlying asset. Derivatives trade on interest rates, exchange rates, commodities, equity and fixed income securities, credit, and even weather.The products and strategies used by market participants to manage financial risk are the same ones used by speculators to increase leverage and risk. Although it can be argued that widespread use of derivatives increases risk, the existence of derivatives enables those who wish to reduce risk to pass it along to those who seek risk and its associated opportunities.The ability to estimate the likelihood of a financial loss is highly desirable. However, standard theories of probability often fail in the analysis of financial markets. Risks usually do not exist in isolation, and the interactions of several exposures may have to be considered in developing an understanding of how financial risk arises. Sometimes, these interactions are difficult to forecast, since they ultimately depend on human behavior.The process of financial risk management is an ongoing one. Strategies need to be implemented and refined as the market and requirements change. Refinements may reflect changing expectations about market rates, changes to the business environment, or changing international political conditions, for example. In general, the process can be summarized as follows:1、Identify and prioritize key financial risks.2、Determine an appropriate level of risk tolerance.3、Implement risk management strategy in accordance with policy.4、Measure, report, monitor, and refine as needed.DiversificationFor many years, the riskiness of an asset was assessed based only on the variability of its returns. In contrast, modern portfolio theory considers not only an asset’s riskiness, but also its contribution to the overall riskiness of the portfolio towhich it is added. Organizations may have an opportunity to reduce risk as a result of risk diversification.In portfolio management terms, the addition of individual components to a portfolio provides opportunities for diversification, within limits. A diversified portfolio contains assets whose returns are dissimilar, in other words, weakly or negatively correlated with one another. It is useful to think of the exposures of an organization as a portfolio and consider the impact of changes or additions on the potential risk of the total.Diversification is an important tool in managing financial risks. Diversification among counterparties may reduce the risk that unexpected events adversely impact the organization through defaults. Diversification among investment assets reduces the magnitude of loss if one issuer fails. Diversification of customers, suppliers, and financing sources reduces the possibility that an organization will have its business adversely affected by changes outside management’s control. Although the risk of loss still exists, diversification may reduce the opportunity for large adverse outcomes.Risk Management ProcessThe process of financial risk management comprises strategies that enable an organization to manage the risks associated with financial markets. Risk management is a dynamic process that should evolve with an organization and its business. It involves and impacts many parts of an organization including treasury, sales, marketing, legal, tax, commodity, and corporate finance.The risk management process involves both internal and external analysis. The first part of the process involves identifying and prioritizing the financial risks facing an organization and understanding their relevance. It may be necessary to examine the organization and its products, management, customers, suppliers, competitors, pricing, industry trends, balance sheet structure, and position in the industry. It is also necessary to consider stakeholders and their objectives and tolerance for risk.Once a clear understanding of the risks emerges, appropriate strategies can be implemented in conjunction with risk management policy. For example, it might bepossible to change where and how business is done, thereby reducing the organization’s exposure and risk. Alternatively, existing exposures may be managed with derivatives. Another strategy for managing risk is to accept all risks and the possibility of losses.There are three broad alternatives for managing risk:1. Do nothing and actively, or passively by default, accept all risks.2. Hedge a portion of exposures by determining which exposures can and should be hedged.3. Hedge all exposures possible.Measurement and reporting of risks provides decision makers with information to execute decisions and monitor outcomes, both before and after strategies are taken to mitigate them. Since the risk management process is ongoing, reporting and feedback can be used to refine the system by modifying or improving strategies.An active decision-making process is an important component of risk management. Decisions about potential loss and risk reduction provide a forum for discussion of important issues and the varying perspectives of stakeholders.Factors that Impact Financial Rates and PricesFinancial rates and prices are affected by a number of factors. It is essential to understand the factors that impact markets because those factors, in turn, impact the potential risk of an organization.Factors that Affect Interest RatesInterest rates are a key component in many market prices and an important economic barometer. They are comprised of the real rate plus a component for expected inflation, since inflation reduces the purchasing power of a lender’s assets .The greater the term to maturity, the greater the uncertainty. Interest rates are also reflective of supply and demand for funds and credit risk.Interest rates are particularly important to companies and governments because they are the key ingredient in the cost of capital. Most companies and governments require debt financing for expansion and capital projects. When interest rates increase, the impact can be significant on borrowers. Interest rates also affect prices in otherfinancial markets, so their impact is far-reaching.Other components to the interest rate may include a risk premium to reflect the creditworthiness of a borrower. For example, the threat of political or sovereign risk can cause interest rates to rise, sometimes substantially, as investors demand additional compensation for the increased risk of default.Factors that influence the level of market interest rates include:1、Expected levels of inflation2、General economic conditions3、Monetary policy and the stance of the central bank4、Foreign exchange market activity5、Foreign investor demand for debt securities6、Levels of sovereign debt outstanding7、Financial and political stabilityYield CurveThe yield curve is a graphical representation of yields for a range of terms to maturity. For example, a yield curve might illustrate yields for maturity from one day (overnight) to 30-year terms. Typically, the rates are zero coupon government rates.Since current interest rates reflect expectations, the yield curve provides useful information about the market’s expectations of future interest rates. Implied interest rates for forward-starting terms can be calculated using the information in the yield curve. For example, using rates for one- and two-year maturities, the expected one-year interest rate beginning in one year’s time can be determined.The shape of the yield curve is widely analyzed and monitored by market participants. As a gauge of expectations, it is often considered to be a predictor of future economic activity and may provide signals of a pending change in economic fundamentals.The yield curve normally slopes upward with a positive slope, as lenders/investors demand higher rates from borrowers for longer lending terms. Since the chance of a borrower default increases with term to maturity, lenders demand to be compensated accordingly.Interest rates that make up the yield curve are also affected by the expected rate of inflation. Investors demand at least the expected rate of inflation from borrowers, in addition to lending and risk components. If investors expect future inflation to be higher, they will demand greater premiums for longer terms to compensate for this uncertainty. As a result, the longer the term, the higher the interest rate (all else being equal), resulting in an upward-sloping yield curve.Occasionally, the demand for short-term funds increases substantially, and short-term interest rates may rise above the level of longer term interest rates. This results in an inversion of the yield curve and a downward slope to its appearance. The high cost of short-term funds detracts from gains that would otherwise be obtained through investment and expansion and make the economy vulnerable to slowdown or recession. Eventually, rising interest rates slow the demand for both short-term and long-term funds. A decline in all rates and a return to a normal curve may occur as a result of the slowdown.财务风险管理尽管近年来金融风险大大增加，但风险和风险管理不是当代的主要问题。

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毕业设计（论文）外文文献翻译文献、资料中文题目：财务风险重要性分析文献、资料英文题目：文献、资料来源：文献、资料发表（出版）日期：院（部）：专业：班级：姓名：学号：指导教师：翻译日期： 2017.02.14财务风险本科毕业论文外文翻译财务风险重要性分析作者：Sohnke M. Bartram, Gregory W. Brown, and Murat Atamer起始页码：1-7出版日期（期刊号）：September 2009,Vol. 2, No. 4(Serial No. 11)出版单位：Theory and Decision, DOI 10.1007/s11238-005-4590-0译文：摘要：本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。

与此相反，隐含的财务风险普遍偏低，且比产权比率稳定。

在过去30年，我们对财务风险采取的措施有所减少，反而对股票波动（如独特性风险）采取的措施逐渐增加。

因此，股票价格风险的记载趋势比公司的资产风险趋势更具代表性。

综合二者，结果表明，典型的美国公司谨慎管理的财政政策大大降低了财务风险。

因此，现在看来微不足道的剩余财务风险相对底层的非金融公司为一典型的经济风险。

关键词：资本结构；财务风险；风险管理；企业融资1 绪论2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

毫无疑问，向金融机构的巨额举债和内部融资均有风险。

财务杠杆在非金融企业的作用不太明显。

迄今为止，尽管资本市场已困在危机中，美国非金融部门的问题相比金融业的困境来说显得微不足道。

例如，非金融企业破产机遇仅限于自20世纪30年代大萧条以来的最大经济衰退。

事实上，非金融公司申请破产的事件大都发生在美国各行业（如汽车制造业，报纸，房地产）所面临的基本经济压力即金融危机之前。

这令人惊讶的事实引出了一个问题“非金融公司的财务风险是如何重要？”。

这个问题的核心是关于公司的总风险以及公司风险组成部分的各决定因素的不确定性。

最近在资产定价和企业融资再度引发的两个学术研究中分析了股票价格风险利率。

一系列的资产定价文献探讨了关于卡贝尔等的发现。

（2001）在过去的40年，公司特定（特有）的风险有增加的趋势。

相关的工作表明，个别风险可能是一个价格风险因素（见戈亚尔和克莱拉，2003年）。

也关系到牧师和维罗妮卡的工作研究结果（2003年），显示投资者对公司盈利能力是其特殊风险还是公司价值不确定的重要决定因素。

其他研究（如迪切夫，1998年，坎贝尔，希尔舍，和西拉吉，2008）已经研究了股票，债券价格波动的作用。

然而，股票价格风险实证研究的大部分工作需要提供资产风险或试图解释特有风险的趋势。

与此相反，本文从不同的角度调查股票价格风险。

首先，我们通过在公司经营中有关的产品所固有的风险（即，经济或商业风险）来考虑为企业融资业务风险，和企业运营有关的财务风险（即，金融风险）。

第二，我们试图评估经济和财务风险的相对重要性以及对金融政策的影响。

莫迪利亚尼和米勒提早研究（1958）认为，财政政策可以在很大程度上与公司价值无关，因为投资者可以通过咨询许多金融公司最终以较低的成本入资（即，通过自制的杠杆）同时运作良好的资本市场应该可以区分金融危机和经济危机。

尽管如此，金融政策，如增加债务资本结构，可以放大财务风险。

相反，对企业风险管理最近的研究表明，企业通过发行金融衍生品也可以减少企业风险和增加企业价值。

然而，本研究的动机往往是与金融危机有关的巨额成本或其他相关费用和与财务杠杆有关的市场缺陷。

实证研究表明金融危机如何侵蚀一家典型上市公司的巨额帐户。

我们试图通过直接处理公司风险因素分析整体经济和金融风险的作用。

在我们的分析过程中，我们利用了美国非金融公司的大样本。

我们确定的股票价格风险的最重要决定因素（波动性）视为通过财务杠杆将资产转化为股权的财政政策。

因此，在整个论文中，我们考虑了连接资产波动和股权波动的财务杠杆。

由此可知，财务杠杆可以衡量资产和股权的波动性。

由于财政政策是由经营者（或经营者）决定，因此我们应该注意与企业资产和运营有关的金融政策的影响。

具体来说，我们研究了以前的研究表明的各种特点，并尽可能明确区分与公司运营有关的风险（即决定经济的风险因素）和与企业融资有关的风险（即财务风险的决定因素）。

然后，我们使经济风险成为利兰和托夫特（1996）模型或者是降低财务杠杆的模型中财政政策的决定性因素。

采用结构模型的优点是，我们能够考虑，无论是有关财务及经营问题的一些可能性因素（如分红），还是一般破产决定，且为财政政策内生性的可能性。

我们代理的公司风险是从股票每天回报率的标准差而得的普通股的收益波动性计算而来。

我们代理的经济风险是用来维护的公司的业务和资产，确定产生的现金流量的过程为公司的本质特征。

例如，企业规模和年龄可以衡量企业的成熟度；有形资产（厂房，财产和设备）代表一个公司的“硬件”；资本开支衡量资本密集度以及企业发展潜力。

营业利润及其波动性可以衡量现金流量的及时性和存在的风险。

要了解公司财务风险的影响因素，我们需考察总债务，债务期限，股息支出，以及现金和短期投资。

我们分析的核心结果是惊人的：一个典型公司经济风险的决定性因素可以解释绝大多数股票的波动性变化。

相应地，隐含的财务杠杆远远比看到的负债比率低。

具体来说，我们在涵盖1964年至2008年的样本中平均实际净财务（市场）杠杆约为1.50，而我们的估计值（根据型号不同规格，估计技术）在1.03和1.11之间。

这表明，企业可能采取其他金融政策管理金融风险，从而将有效杠杆降低到几乎可以忽略不计的水平。

这些政策可能包括动态调整财务变量，如债务水平，债务期限，或现金控股（见如阿查里雅，阿尔梅达，和坎佩洛，2007）。

此外，许多公司也利用诸如金融衍生工具，与投资者的合同安排（如信贷额度，债务合同要求规定，或在供应商合同应急费用），车辆特殊用途（特殊目的公司）使用明确的金融风险管理技术，或其他替代风险转移技术。

对股票波动性产生影响的经济风险因素预测的迹象通常非常显著。

此外，影响的幅度也是巨大的。

我们发现，股权会随着企业规模和年龄的大小而波动。

这是直观的，因为大型和成熟的企业通常有反映资本报酬波动的较稳定业务范围。

资本支出的减少对股票的波动影响较弱。

与牧师和韦罗内西（2003年）的预测相一致，我们发现，具有较高的盈利能力和较低的利润波动性的公司股票的波动性较低。

这表明，有更高，更稳定的经营性现金流量的公司破产的可能性较小，因此存在潜在风险的可能性较小。

在所有的经济风险因素中，公司规模，利润波动及股利政策对股票波动性的的影响突出。

不像以前的一些研究中，我们对增加总公司杠杆风险的财政政策的内生性精心研究证实。

否则，金融风险与总风险存在不确定的关系。

鉴于大量关于财政政策文献的研究，毫不奇怪，至少部分金融变量由企业存在的经济风险决定。

不过，具体的调查结果有些出人意料。

例如，在一个简单的模型中，资本结构，股利支出会增加财务杠杆，因为它们代表了一个企业（即增加的净债务）的现金流出。

我们发现，股息与低风险有关。

这表明，分红没有金融政策和作为一个公司运营特点的产品那么多（例如，有限的增长机会成熟的公司）。

我们也估计不同的风险因素随时间变化的敏感性不同。

我们的研究结果表明，大多数关系都相当稳定。

一个例外是1983年之前企业年龄往往与风险是恒定的正相关关系，而之后一直与风险持续负相关关系。

这与布朗和卡帕迪亚（2007年）的调查结果相吻合，最新趋势是独特性风险与在股票上市的年轻、高风险公司密切相关。

也许最有趣的是我们的分析结果，过去30年，在隐含的金融杠杆下降的同时，股票的价格风险（如独特性风险）似乎一直在增加。

事实上，从我们的结构模型来看隐含的财务杠杆，在我们的样本中调停在近1.0（即无杠杆）。

这有几个可能的原因。

首先，在过去30年，非金融企业的总负债率稳步下降，，所以我们的隐含杠杆也应减少。

第二，企业显著增加现金持有量，这样，净债务（债务减去现金和短期投资）也有所下降。

第三，上市公司的构成发生了变化产生更多的风险（尤其是技术导向）。

这些公司往往在其资本结构中债务较少。

第四，如上所述，企业可以进行金融风险管理的各种活动。

只要这些活动在过去几十年中有上升幅度，企业将成为受到金融风险因素影响较少的对象。

我们进行一些额外的测试，我们的结果提供了实证研究。

首先，我们重复同一个简化式模型，估计强加的最低结构刚性，找到我们非常相似的分析结果。

这表明我们的结果是不太可能受模型假设错误的驱动。

我们也比较所有美国非金融公司的总债务水平与业绩的趋势，并找到与我们的结论相一致的证据。

最后，我们看看过去三年经济衰退的各地上市非金融公司破产的文件，并找到证据表明，这些企业正越来越多地受到经济危机而不是金融危机影响的观点。

总之，我们的结果表明，从实际来看，剩余的财务风险对现在典型的美国公司来说相对不重要。

这就是对财务成本水平预期问题，因为发生财务危机的可能性有可能低于大多数公司的一般可能性。

例如，我们的结果表明，如果不考虑隐含的财务杠杆（如迪切夫，1998年）的趋势，将会对风险债券的系统性定价水平估计可能有偏差。

我们的研究结果也质疑用以估计违约概率的金融模式是否恰当，因为，可能难以通过观察实施大幅降低风险的财政政策。

最后，我们的研究结果意味着，由资本产生的基本风险主要与资本的有效配置产生的潜在经济风险有关。

在开始之前我们先评论一下我们分析的潜在观点。

一些读者可能想将其解释为我们的结果表明财务风险并不重要。

这不是正确的解释。

相反，我们的结果表明，企业可以管理财务风险，使股东承担较低的经济风险。

当然，财务风险对企业来讲非常重要，只是选择承担高负债水平或缺乏管理风险的不同罢了。

相比之下，我们的研究表明，典型的非金融类公司选择不采取这些风险。

总之，财务总风险可能是重要的，但公司可以管理它。

与此相反，基本的经济和商业风险更难以（或不受欢迎）预防，因为他们可以代表机制，使企业赢得经济效益。

下面本文进行条理分析。

动机，相关文献，和假设在第2节进行回顾。

第3节描述了我们使用的模型，接着在第4节对其数据进行介绍。

利兰-托夫特模型的实证结果列在第5节。

第6节根据简化模型讨论了美国无金融因素的债务总额数据，以及在过去25年对破产申请的分析估计；并作总结。