哈佛商业评论》精粹译丛知识管理
哈佛精粹
用战略思维管理人生个人管理和企业管理在很多方面都是相通的。
比如说，每个企业都要有自己的愿景和使命；每个人也都要问自己一个问题：我的人生目标是什么？又比如说，企业管理需要战略定位，将有限的资源分配到合适的位置上；个人管理也需要有战略思维，如何将有限的时间投入到不同的对象中去。
可以说，一个有战略思维的人往往更容易达成目标，获得成功。
令人遗憾（甚至是惊讶）的是，大多数人在个人管理方面并没有自己的战略思维。
哈佛商学院教授克里斯滕森指出，即便是在哈佛商学院这样的顶尖学府，在每年从全世界招收的最优秀的900名学生中，就有很多人没有认真考虑过生活的意义和目标。
一个没有认真思索生活意义和目标的人可能依然能获得事业上的成功，但很难说取得完整的人生的成功。
2010年春天，克里斯滕森在哈佛商学院的毕业班上发表演讲，主题是如何将管理理论运用在未来个人生活上。
他让每个学生问自己三个问题：1、怎样才能让自己在职业生涯中感到快乐？2、怎样才能让自己与配偶，与家人之间的亲密关系成为长久幸福的源泉？3、怎样才能保证自己永不违犯法律？这三个问题看似简单，但要回答得好并不简单。
第一个问题最为关键。
每个人都要为自己制定一个终生战略，这将决定他如何分配自己的时间和资源，并最终决定他将成为怎样的人。
这是很多人容易犯的一个错误，他们以为人生目标就是如何选择一门职业，事业上如何取得成功。
其实，选择一项职业，并取得事业上的成功，只是实现人生目标的一种工具。
生活如果没有目标，就会变得很空洞。
当一个人有了人生目标后，就应该根据这个目标去分配个人的时间、精力和才能，这将决定他的生活策略。
喜欢拼搏的人，通常会在不经意之间在事业上过度投入，而在家庭上投入不足。
结果往往是他们在事业上成功了，但家庭生活并不幸福，这样的人生很难说是成功的。
他们在分配资源时，需要记住与家人的亲密关系才是最强大、最持久的幸福来源。
要拥有美满幸福的家庭，正如企业需要企业文化一样，每个家庭也有自己的家庭文化。
以行业关键成功因素开发胜任特征模型的案例探讨
表" 品质特征 强烈的事业心 一贯的自我激励
中层经理胜任品质特征表 （节选） 品质描述 不断进取的成就欲望； 执着认定的目标； 精益求精。 自觉学习以更新自我， 持续钻研以改进工 作 ， 而 不考虑有无相应回报。 眼光长远， 不计较一时得失； 顾全大局， 注重集 体利益。 发展亲和力； 正直公道， 可信可靠； 既有原则性 又有灵活性。 乐于尝试新方法， 改变惯例， 打破 “不可能” 的预言。
!"
中国人力 资源开发
征的管理。 那么， 如何确认获取胜 任特征呢？ 是以职位为据， 还是以 绩效为据， 或者是以战略为据？ 本 文认为最根本的是以行业关键成 功因素为据，因为企业的一切管 理职能归根到底在于获取行业关 键成功因素。 企业无论是要确保“基业长 青” ， 还是要 “追 求 卓 越 ” ， 抑或是 要实 现 “从 优 秀 到 卓 越 ” ， 甚或是 要创 造 “卓 越 的 神 话 ” ， 都必须要
开发技术
以行业关键成功因素 开发胜任特征模型的案例探讨
! 张发均
内容摘要 由于社会经济环境的变化， 为准确地发现每个员工的能力， 最大限度地开发和利
用每个员工的能力， 并唤起他们的主体意识， 从而进一步提高生产率， 提高新技术、 新产品和新市场 开拓的效率， 增强企业持续竞争优势， 确保企业繁荣和员工的发展， 越来越多的企业日益重视对胜 任特征进行科学系统的管理， 关注重开发 “人员胜任特征库” 。 如何界定适合本企业战略需要与业务 发展的胜任特征， 成为当前人力资源管理的重点工作之一。 本文在简要分析目前流行的胜任特征构 建方法的基础上， 结合案例探讨以行业关键成功因素开发胜任特征模型的实际操作方法与流程。
&) 中层经理最主要的三项绩
(KM知识管理)哈佛商业评论KM合作专刊
（KM知识管理)哈佛商业评论KM合作专刊哈佛商业评论――知识管理专刊内容主题：知识管理:点亮组织智慧。
内容:刊首语（哈佛的声音）…………………………………………………………….。
理念和观点1、知识创造型企业(野中郁次朗)2、知识管理是一种处事态度（徐霞）3、知识管理的体系思维（杨健伟）4、后ERP时代的EKP应用（夏敬华）5、解决方案专页实战和案例1、像经营媒体一样经营知识——具有中国特色的知识管理持续建设（陈利华）2、知识化协同工作平台推动中的变革智慧（孙榕璟）3、高管门户支撑企业战略管控知识化（周伟）4、智慧的项目——K化的项目运营（孙榕璟）5、创新梦工厂支撑创新2.0落地（刘向华,夏敬华）6、门户应用中的热点问题（蓝凌研究院）研究和方法K运营（陈利华）知识型工作评估模型（蓝凌研究院）知识管理，你准备好了吗？（夏敬华）刊首语知识管理,点亮组织智慧凡是不同行业、不同地域能持续成长和长盛不衰的组织，能够经历时间和竞争的洗礼傲然屹立，总有一种非常坚韧的DNA(组织智慧)存在, 这种由组织根据前人经验、结合自身的特点，经长期的实践而提炼出规律性的精华，在组织内部经过固化、共享和传承后，成为组织长盛不衰的核心基因, 它如同组织的导航塔，指引着组织中的每一个员工沿着正确的方向前进，并不断挑战环境和市场的变化，引领组织穿越时空隧道，实现可持续快速发展！虽然中国的经济增长在全球赢得了广泛的尊敬和赞赏，但中国企业也面临从制造向创造的转变, 这个转变客观上要求更多的中国企业转型为知识化组织，把如同大自然稀世珍品钻石一样蕴藏在组织中的智慧充分挖掘出来,让组织智慧在此大时代背景下呈现钻石般的价值。
作为中国知识管理高端解决方案引领者的蓝凌,深刻认识到这一行为对中国企业的价值,联合哈佛《商业评论》和IBM,旨在中国掀起一轮点亮组织智慧的行动。
《知识管理-点亮组织智慧》专刊的出版也是此行动中的一个环节。
正如您打开这本精美的专刊所看到的，蓝凌人和蓝凌伙伴们正尽力挖掘和呈现智慧化之旅中的观点、故事，期望通过哈佛《商业评论》这个高端平台抛砖引玉，把多年来在知识管理领域的最新思考和鲜活实践，呈现给高质量的读者。
哈佛商业评论 读后感
哈佛商业评论读后感第一篇：《决策》——《哈佛商业评论》译丛读后感《决策》《哈佛商业评论》精粹译丛读书笔记诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、决策理论学派奠基人赫伯特·西蒙有句名言“管理就是决策”。
虽然这个解释过于宽泛，但却可以显示出决策的重要性。
管理是管理者运用各种资源达成某既定目标的过程。
在这一过程中，管理者为了更有效的运用有限的资源以更高水平达到目标，必须不断地做出各种决策。
可以说，管理的过程就是不断进行各种决策的过程。
在当前对有效管理的讨论热潮中，决策是不能忽视的一个热点。
《决策》收录了《哈佛商学评论》数十年间在决策方面的八篇经典文章。
创刊于1922年的《哈佛商业评论》是哈佛商学院的标志性杂志，始终致力于发掘和传播工商管理领域中最前卫的思想理论、观点和方法，帮助管理者们不断更新理念、开阔视野、适应变化，与时俱进。
《哈佛商业评论》刊登的不是普通的新闻，而是具有创新性的管理思想和理念，它持久的权威性和前瞻性，影响并推动着全球管理实践的发展。
本书精选的八篇文章内容精辟，编排独具匠心。
出发点不尽相同，但前后呼应。
本书可以分为三个层次，层层递进，浑然天成。
第一个层次的重点是理解决策。
彼得·f·德鲁克在《有效决策》中指出管理者需要做出的风险决策并不频繁，但却十分关键。
有效的管理者应该把决策过程看成是一个有明确定义的要素和清晰的顺序步骤的系统过程。
从问题分类、定义问题、详细说明问题答案、为满足边际条件而做出正确决定到整合决策的实施行动、可行性与有效性的检验，循序渐进地进行这几个步骤以保证决策的质量。
一般而言，有能力做出对整个组织及其绩效和结果具有显著和积极作用的决策，是有效决策者的标志。
《平等互换：一种理性的取舍方法》由约翰·s·哈蒙德、拉尔夫·l·基尼和霍华德·莱法合著，为了填补理性取舍方法的空白，而介绍了一个被称为平等互换的系统。
平等互换的方法不仅不会使复杂的决策变得容易，而且还要在所设定的价值和取舍之间做出困难的选择，它提供的是一种可靠的取舍机制和用以做取舍的清晰框架。
哈佛商业评论之德鲁克：管理自己
德鲁克：管理自己2011-04-24 22:48:11管理自己——彼得·德鲁克本文是《哈佛商业评论》创刊以来重印次数最多的文章之一。
作者彼得·德鲁克，自1971年后长期在美国加利福尼亚州克莱尔蒙特研究生大学任教。
该文首次发表于1999年，节选自其著作《21世纪的管理挑战》（Management Challenges for the 21st Century，HarperCollins出版社，1999）。
本文有删节。
我们生活的这个时代充满着前所未有的机会：如果你有雄心，又不乏智慧，那么不管你从何处起步，你都可以沿着自己所选择的道路登上事业的顶峰。
不过，有了机会，也就有了责任。
今天的公司并不怎么管员工的职业发展；实际上，知识工作者必须成为自己的首席执行官。
你应该在公司中开辟自己的天地，知道何时改变发展道路，并在可能长达50年的职业生涯中不断努力、干出实绩。
要做好这些事情，你首先要对自己有深刻的认识——不仅清楚自己的优点和缺点，也知道自己是怎样学习新知识和与别人共事的，并且还明白自己的价值观是什么、自己又能在哪些方面做出最大贡献。
因为只有当所有工作都从自己的长处着眼，你才能真正做到卓尔不群。
历史上的伟人——拿破仑、达芬奇、莫扎特——都很善于自我管理。
这在很大程度上也是他们成为伟人的原因。
不过，他们属于不可多得的奇才，不但有着不同于常人的天资，而且天生就会管理自己，因而才取得了不同于常人的成就。
而我们当中的大多数人，甚至包括那些还算有点天赋的人，都不得不通过学习来掌握自我管理的技巧。
我们必须学会自我发展，必须知道把自己放在什么样的位置上，才能做出最大的贡献，而且还必须在长达50年的职业生涯中保持着高度的警觉和投入——也就是说，我们得知道自己应该何时换工作，以及该怎么换。
○ 我的长处是什么多数人都以为他们知道自己擅长什么。
其实不然，更多的情况是，人们只知道自己不擅长什么——即便是在这一点上，人们也往往认识不清。
哈佛商业评论2008年50大管理智慧字典
50大管理智慧字彙.indd 2
2009/5/21 2:05:20 PM
2008ϋx50大管理智慧字彙
式管理會用到許多科技，例如「視訊會議」；但協 同式管理不只是視訊會議，而是一種深層的組織變 革。可以說，協同運作模式要成功，流程變革與科 技創新同樣重要。其中的重點之一，是匯集一大群 相互溝通順暢的人，致力於一個共同目標。另一個 重點則是，你要領導整個團隊走過協同工作流程， 但一旦團隊達成共識，領導人就要驅策部屬進入執 行階段，不能再以協同模式運作，否則整個團隊就 會停擺。
——摘自2008年11月〈讓決策皆大歡喜〉
ॎᕸ௴อdisruptive innovation
可重新塑造市場，只不過通常是透過負面誘因，形 同昭告：「不立刻改變既有的方法，就等著被邊 緣化，甚至死亡。」近期策略研究喜歡引用的經 典案例，像是戴爾（Dell）與西南航空（Southwest Airlines）等，都屬於成功的破壞性創新。這些策 略奏效時固然威力十足，但也很可能讓風險都集中 在形塑者一家公司上，變成該公司的孤注一擲。
——摘自2008年9月〈誰把母語外包了？〉評論2：思考要更寬廣
Άุɷԑᔥcorporate millipede
3M自1902年創立以來，就依循一個明確的成長公 式：努力開發創新產品，這些產品在工業方面的應 用足以讓產品居於高檔地位，等到這些市場成熟之 後，再大步邁向下一個商機。這個策略就叫「企業 千足蟲」，意思就是「生產一些，賣掉一些，再多 生產一些」。由於採行這個策略，到了1970年代 初，產品已經多達六萬餘種（其中大多數產品的營 業額不足一億美元），而且公司總營業額的25％ 以上，來自上市不到五年的產品。隨著各事業部將 重點放在愈來愈狹窄的利基市場商機上，公司整體 成長開始下滑。
哈佛MBA精粹42条(doc 32页)
哈佛MBA精粹42条?精粹1：弱音板在弹钢琴时，有时你必须如此做。
同样在公司里也不例外。
任何一个公司都有它的优点和缺点，但不停地张扬它的缺点是无济于事的。
强调它的优点，防止它的缺点，如此才能鼓起工作中的士气。
精粹2：扬在先批判人之前应该如此做。
先把他的优点提出来，确实是基本展平了批判的道路。
切记：即使最有涵的人，也不喜爱指出他做错了事。
先进行表扬，让他明白上级是赏识他的，他就会诚心同意批判，否那么，他就会憋一肚子怨气。
精粹3：以身做那么上级的言行举止、外表衣着、私人一辈子活，以及如何对待妻子儿女等，都会成为下属谈论的话题。
有时你会觉得情况怪得非常，但确实是好事不出门，坏事传千里。
“听讲了吗？他上星期把妻子打了。
〞类似丑闻非常快会传出往。
因此，身为领导，必须做出典范，要言行一致。
领导的行为值得模拟，下级就会做得好；反过来，领导的行为不佳，下级也可不能有好行为。
精粹4：无旁贷在一单位里，人际关系是最令人头疼的事。
今天的咨询题解决了，改日又产生新的咨询题，而且类似的咨询题过几个月后还会出现。
这确实是基本领导者天天所面临的咨询题，但他必须正视它，因为这是他的本职工作。
精粹5：象盖房子应不断培养人才。
下级明白你诚心给他们锻炼时机，擢升他们，他们会自觉为你出力。
尚且每个单位都要求上级要不断培养人才。
必须让下级对工作精益求精，如此做你自己也有被提升的时机。
精粹6：能断章取义搞好人事关系不仅要读工商治理课本中的某一章，应该读整本书。
要使合作者都心情愉快地合作，不仅是治理部门的工作，而且也是领导者要用全力往做的事。
不能够把这方面的工作交给不人做，或认为这只是人事部门的工作，它恰恰是你自己份内的工作。
因为人事关系理不顺，你的全部方案也就无法实现。
精粹7：抉择在一个村庄里，住着一位睿智的老人，村里有什么疑难咨询题都来向他请教。
有一天聪慧又调皮的小孩，想要成心为难那位老人。
他捉了一只小鸟，握在手掌中，跑往咨询老人：“老爷爷，听讲您是最有聪明的人，只是我却不相信。
迈克尔 波特在哈佛商业评论上发表的一篇关于战略的经典文章
What Is Strategy?ContentsOperationalEffectiveness:Necessary butNot SufficientII. StrategyRests onUniqueActivitiesIII. ASustainableStrategicPositionRequiresTrade-offsIV. Fit DrivesBothCompetitiveAdvantage andSustainabilityV.RediscoveringStrategyJapaneseCompaniesRarely HaveStrategiesFinding NewPositions: TheEntrepreneurialEdgeThe Connectionwith GenericStrategiesAlternativeI. Operational Effectivene ss Is Not Strategy For almost two decades, managers have been learning to play by a new set of rules. Companies must be flexible to respond rapidlyto competitive and market changes. They must benchmarkcontinuously to achieve best practice. They must outsourceaggressively to gain efficiencies. And they must nutture a few corecompetencies in the race to stay ahead of rivals.Positioning-once the heart of strategy-is rejected as too static fortoday's dynamic markets and changing technologies. According tothe new dogma, rivals can quickly copy any market position, andcompetitive advantage is, at best, temporary.But those beliefs are dangerous half-truths, and they are leadingmore and more companies down the path of mutually destructivecompetition. True, some barriers to competition are falling asregulation eases and markets become global. True, companieshave properly invested energy in becoming leaner and morenimble. In many industries, however, what some callhypercompetition is a self-inflicted wound, not the inevitableoutcome of a changing paradigm of competition.The root of the problem is the failure to distinguish betweenoperational effectiveness and strat egy. The quest for productivity,quality, and speed has spawned a remarkable number ofmanagement tools and techniques: total quality management,`benchmarking, time-based competition, outsourcing, partnering,reengineering, change management. Although the resultingoperational improvements have often been dramatic, manycompanies have been frustrated by their inability to translate those gains into sustainable profitability. And bit by bit, almost imperceptibly, management tools have taken the place of strategy. As managers push to improve on all fronts, they move farther away from viable competitive positions. Operational Effectiveness: Necessary but Not Sufficient Operational effectiveness and strategy are both essential to superior performance, which, after all, is the primary goal of any enterprise. But they work in very different ways.A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it can preserve. It must deliver greater value to customers or create comparable value at a lower cost, or do both. The arithmetic of superior profitability then follows: delivering greater,value allows a company to charge higher average unit prices; greater efficiency results in lower average unit costs. Views of StrategyThe Origins Strategic P ositions Types of Fit Fit and Sustainability The Failure to Choose The Grow th Trap P rofitable Growth The Role of Leadership The Implicit Strategy Model of the P ast Decade Sustainable Competitive AdvantageUltimately, all differences between companies in cost or price derive from the hundreds of activities required to create, produce, sell, and deliver their products or services, such as calling on customers, assembling final products, and training employees. Cost is generated by performing activities, and cost advantage arises from performing particular activities more efficiently than competitors. Similarly, differentiation arises from both the choice of activities and how they are performed. Activities, then, are the basic units of competitive advantage. Overall advantage or disadvantage results from all a company's activities, not only a few.'Operational effectiveness fOE) means performing similar activities better than rivals perform them. Operational effectiveness includes but is not limited to efficiency. It refers to any number of practices that allow a company to better utilize its inputs by, for example, reducing defects in products or developing better products faster. In contrast, strategic positioning means performing different activities from rivals' or performing similar activities in different ways.GRAPH: Operational Effectiveness Versus Strategic PositioningDifferences in operational effectiveness among companies are pervasive. Some companies are able to get more out of their inputs than others because they eliminate wasted effort, employ more advanced technology, motivate employees better, or have greater insight into managing particular activities or sets of activities. Such differences in operational effectiveness are an important source of differences in profitability among competitors because they directly affect relative cost positions and levels of differentiation.Differences in operational effectiveness were at the heart of the Japanese challenge to Western companies in the 1980s. The Japanese were so far ahead of rivals in operational effectiveness that they could offer lower cost and superior quality at the same time. It is worth dwelling on this point, because so much recent thinking about competition depends on it. Imagine for a moment a productivity frontier that constitutes the sum of all existing best practices at any given time. Think of it as the maximum value that a company delivering a particular product or service can create at a given cost, using the best available technologies, skills, management techniques, and purchased inputs. The productivity frontier can apply to individual activities, to groups of linked activities such as order processing and manufacturing, and to an entire company's activities. When a company improves its operational effectiveness, it moves toward the frontier. Doing so may require capital investment, different personnel, or simply new ways of managing.The productivity frontier is constantly shifting outward as new technologies and management approaches are developed and as new inputs become available. Laptop computers, mobile communications, the Internet, and software such as Lotus Notes, for example, have redefined the productivity frontier for sales-force operations and created rich possibilities for linking sales with such activities as order processing and after-salessupport. Similarly, lean production, which involves a family of activities, has allowed substantial improvements in manufacturing productivity and asset utilization.For at least the past decade, managers have been preoccupied with improving operational effectiveness. Through programs such as TQM, time-based competition, and benchmarking, they have changed how they perform activities in order to eliminate inefficiencies, improve customer satisfaction, and achieve, best practice. Hoping to keep up with shifts in the productivity 'frontier, managers have embraced continuous improvement, empowerment, change management, and the so-called learning organization. The popularity of outsourcing and the virtual corporation reflect the growing recognition that it is difficult to perform all activities as productively as specialists.As companies move to the frontier, they can often improve on multiple dimensions of performance at the same time. For example, manufacturers that adopted the Japanese practice of rapid changeovers in the 1980s were able to lower cost and improve differentiation simultaneously. What were once believed to be real trade-offs- between defects and costs, for example- turned out to be illusions created by poor operational effectiveness. Managers have learned to reject such false trade-offs.Constant improvement in operational effectiveness is necessary to achieve superior profitability. However, it is not usually sufficient. Few companies have competed successfully on the basis of operational effectiveness over an extended period, and staying ahead of rivals gets harder every day. The most obvious reason for that is the rapid diffusion of best practices. Competitors can quickly imitate management techniques, new technologies, input improvements, and superior ways of meeting customers' needs. The most generic solutions- those that can be used in multiple settings- diffuse the fastest. Witness the proliferation of OE techniques accelerated by support from consultants.OE competition shifts the productivity frontier outward, effectively raising the bar for everyone. But although such competition produces absolute improvement in operational effectiveness, it leads to relative improvement for no one. Consider the $5 billion-plus U.S. commercial-printing industry. The major players- R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, Quebecor, World Color Press, and Big Flower Press-are competing head to head, serving all types of customers, offering the same array of printing technologies (gravure and web offset), investing heavily in the same new equipment, running their presses faster, and reducing crew sizes. But the resulting major productivity gains are being captured by customers and equipment suppliers, not retained in superior profitability. Evenindustry-leader Donnelley's profit margin, consistently higher than 7% in the 1980s, fell to less than 4.6% in 1995. This pattern is playing itself out in industry after industry. Even the Japanese, pioneers of the new competition, suffer from persistently low profits. (See the insert "Japanese Companies Rarely Have Strategies.")The second reason that improved operational effectiveness is insufficient- competitiveconvergence- is more subtle and insidious. The more benchmarking companies do, the more they look alike. The more that rivals outsource activities to efficient third parties, often the same ones, the more generic those activities become. As rivals imitate one another's improvements in quality, cycle times, or supplier partnerships, strategies converge and competition becomes a series of races down identical paths that no one can win. Competition based on operational effectiveness alone is mutually destructive, leading to wars of attrition that can be arrested only by limiting competition.The recent wave of industry consolidation through mergers makes sense in the context of OE competition. Driven by performance pressures but lacking strategic vision, company after company has had no better idea than to buy up its rivals. The competitors left standing are often those that outlasted others, not companies with real advantage.After a decade of impressive gains in operational effectiveness, many companies are facing diminishing returns. Continuous improvement has been etched on managers' brains. But its tools unwittingly draw companies toward imitation and homogeneity. Gradually, managers have let operational effectiveness supplant strategy. The result is zerosum competition, static or declining prices, and pressures on costs that compromise companies' ability to invest in the business for the long term.II. Strategy Rests on Unique ActivitiesCompetitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value.Southwest Airlines Company, for example, offers short-haul, low-cost, point-to-point service between midsize cities and secondary airports in large cities. Southwest avoids large airports and does not fly great distances. Its customers include business travelers, families, and students. Southwest's frequent departures and low fares attract pricesensitive customers who otherwise would travel by bus or car, andconvenience-oriented travelers who would choose a full-service airline on other routes.Most managers describe strategic positioning in terms of their customers:"Southwest Airlines serves price- and convenience-sensitive travelers," for example. But the essence of strategy is in the activities-choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals. Otherwise, a strategy is nothing more than a marketing slogan that will not withstand competition.A full-service airline is configured to get passengers from almost any point A to any pointB. To reach a large number of destinations and serve passengers with connecting flights, full-service airlines employ a hub-and-spoke system centered on major airports. To attract passengers who desire more comfort, they offer first-class or businessclass service. To accommodate passengers who must change planes, they coordinate schedules and check and transfer baggage. Because some passengers will be traveling for many hours, full-service airlines serve meals.Southwest, in contrast, tailors all its activities to deliver low-cost, convenient service on its particular type of route. Through fast turnarounds at the gate of only 15 minutes, Southwest is able to keep planes flying longer hours than rivals and provide frequent departures with fewer aircraft. Southwest does not offer meals, assigned seats, interline baggage checking, or premium classes of service. Automated ticketing at the gate encourages customers to bypass travel agents, allowing Southwest to avoid their commissions. A standardized fleet of 737 aircraft boosts the efficiency of maintenance.Southwest has staked out a unique and valuable strategic position based on a tailored set of activities. On the routes served by Southwest, a full-service airline could never be as convenient or as low cost.Ikea, the global furniture retailer based in Sweden, also has a clear strategic positioning. Ikea targets young furniture buyers who want style at low cost. What turns this marketing concept into a strategic positioning is the tailored set of activities that make it work. Like Southwest, Ikea has chosen to perform activities differently from its rivals.Consider the typical furniture store. Showrooms display samples of the merchandise. One area might contain 25 sofas; another will display five dining tables. But those items represent only a fraction of the choices available to customers. Dozens of books displaying fabric swatches or wood samples or alternate styles offer customers thousands of product varieties to choose from. Salespeople often escort customers through the store, answering questions and helping them navigate this maze of choices. Once a customer makes a selection, the order is relayed to a third-party manufacturer. With luck, the furniture will be delivered to the customer's home within six to eight weeks. This is a value chain that maximizes customization and service but does' so at high cost.In contrast, Ikea serves customers who are happy to trade off service for cost. Instead of having a sales associate trail customers around the stor e, Ikea uses a self-service model based on clear, instore displays. Rather than rely solely on thirdparty manufacturers, Ikea designs its own low-cost, modular, ready-to-assemble furniture to fit its positioning. In huge stores, Ikea displays every product . it sells in room-like settings, so customers don't need a decorator to help them imagine how to put the pieces together. Adjacent to the furnished showrooms is a warehouse section with the products in boxes on pallets. Customers are expected to do their own pickup and delivery, and Ikea will even sell you a roof rack for your car that you can return for a refund on your next visit.DIAGRAM: Mapping Activity SystemsAlthough much of its low-cost position comes from having customers "do it themselves," Ikea offers a number of extra services that its competitors do not. In-store child care is one. Extended hours are another. Those services are uniquely aligned with the needs of its customers, who are young, not wealthy, likely to have children (but no nanny), and, because they work for a living, have a need to shop at odd hours.The Origins Strategic PositionsStrategic positions emerge from three distinct sources, which are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. First, positioning can be based on producing a subset of an industry's products or services. I call this variety-based positioning because it is based on the choice of product or service varieties rather than customer segments. Variety-based positioning makes economic sense when a company. can best produce particular products or services using distinctive sets of activities.Jiffy Lube International, for instance, specializes in automotive lubricants and does not offer other car repair or maintenance services. Its value chain produces faster servic e at a lower cost than broader line repair shops, a combination so attractive that many customers subdivide their purchases, buying oil changes from the focused competitor, Jiffy Lube, and going to rivals for other services.The Vanguard Group, a leader in the mutual fund industry, is another example ofvariety-based positioning. Vanguard provides an array of common stock, bond, and money market funds that offer predictable performance and rock-bottom expenses. The company's investment approach deliberately sacrifices the possibility of extraordinary performance in any one year for good relative performance in every year. Vanguard is known, for example, for its index funds. It avoids making bets on interest rates and steers clear of narrow stock groups. Fund managers keep trading levels low, which holds expenses down; in addition, the company discourages customers from rapid buying and selling because doing so drives up costs and can force a fund manager to trade in order to deploy new capital and raise cash for redemptions. Vanguard also takes a consistent low-cost approach to managing distribution, customer service, and marketing. Many investors include one or more Vanguard funds in their portfolio, while buying aggressively managed or specialized funds from competitors.The people who use Vanguard or Jiffy Lube are responding to a superior value chain for a particular type of service. A variety-based positioning can serve a wide array of customers, but for most it will meet only a subset of their needs.A second basis for positioning is that of serving most or all the needs of a particular group of customers. I call this needs-based positioning, which comes closer to traditional thinking about targeting a segment of customers. It arises when there are groups of customers with differing needs, and when a tailored set of activities can serve those needs best. Some groups of customers are more price sensitive than others, demand different product features, and need varying amounts of information, support, and services. Ikea's customers are a good example of such a group. Ikea seeks to meet all the home furnishing needs of its target customers, not just a subset of them.A variant of needs-based positioning arises when the same customer has different needs on different occasions or for different types of transactions. The same person, for example, may have different needs when traveling on business than when traveling forpleasure with the family. Buyers of cans-beverage companies, for example-will likely have different needs from their primary supplier than from their secondary source.It is intuitive for most managers to conceive of their business in terms of the customers' needs they are meeting.. But a critical element of needs-based positioning is not at all intuitive and is often overlooked. Differences in needs will not translate into meaningful positions unless the best set of activities to satisfy them also differs. If that were not the case, every competitor could meet those same needs, and there would be nothing unique or valuable about the positioning.In private banking, for example, Bessemer Trust Company targets families with a minimum of $5 million in investable assets who want capital preservation combined with wealth accumulation. By assigning one sophisticated account officer for every 14 families, Bessemer has configured its activities for personalized service. Meetings, for example, are more likely to be held at a client's ranch or yacht than in the office. Bessemer offers a wide array of customized services, including investment management and estate administration, .oversight of oil and gas investments, and accounting for racehorses and aircraft. Loans, a staple of most private banks, are rarely needed by Bessemer's clients and make up a tiny fraction of its client balances and income. Despite the most generous compensation of account officers and the highest personnel cost as a percentage of operating expenses, Bessemer's differentiation with its target families produces a return on equity estimated to be the highest of any private banking competitor.Citibank's private bank, on the other hand, serves clients with minimum assets of about $250,000 who, in contrast to Bessemer's clients, want convenient access to loans-from jumbo mortgages to deal financing. Citibank's account managers are primarily lenders. When clients need other services, their account manager refers them to other Citibank specialists, each of whom handles prepackaged products. Citibank's system is less customized than Bessemer's and allows it to have a lower manager-to-client ratio of1:125. Biannual office meetings are offered only for the largest clients. Both Bessemer and Citibank have tailored their activities to meet the needs of a different group of private banking customers. The same value chain cannot profitably meet the needs of both groups.The third basis for positioning is that of segmenting customers who are accessible in different ways. Although their needs are similar to those of other customers, the best configuration of activities to reach them is different. I call this access-based positioning. Access can be a function of cus, tomer geography or customer scale-or of anything that requires a different set of activities to reach customers in the best way.Segmenting by access is less common and less well understood than the other two bases. Carmike Cinemas, for example, operates movie theaters exclusively in cities and towns with populations un-der 200,000. How does Carmike make money in markets that are not only small but also won't support big-city ticket prices? It does so through a set ofactivities that result in a lean cost structure. Carmike,s small-town customers can be served through standardized, low-cost theater complexes requiring fewer screens and less sophisticated projection technology than big-city theaters. The company's proprietary information system and management process eliminate the need for local administrative staff beyond a single theater manager. Carmike also reaps advantages from centralized purchasing, lower rent and payroll costs (because of its locations), and rock-bottom corporate overhead of 2% (the industry average is 5%). Operating in small communities also allows Carmike to practice a highly personal form of marketing in which the theater manager knows patrons and promotes attendance through personal contacts. By being the dominant if not the only theater in its markets-the main competition is often the high school football team-Carmike is also able to get its pick of films and negotiate b etter terms with distributors.Rural versus urban-based customers are one example of access driving differences in activities. 'Serving small rather than large customers or densely rather than sparsely situated customers are other examples in which the best way to configure marketing, order processing, logistics, and after-sale service activities to meet the similar needs of distinct groups will often differ.Positioning is not only about carving out a niche. A position emerging from any of the sources can be broad.or narrow. A focused competitor, such as Ikea, targets the special needs of a subset of customers and designs its activities accordingly. Focused competitors thrive on groups of customers who are over-served (and hence overpriced) by more broadly targeted competitors, or underserved (and hence underpriced). A broadly targeted competitor，for example, Vanguard or Delta Air Lines- serves a wide array of customers, performing a set of activities designed to meet their common needs. It ignores or meets only partially the more idiosyncratic needs of particular customer groups.Whatever the basis- variety, needs, access, or some combination of the three- positioning requires a tailored set of activities because it is always a function of differences on the supply side; that is, of differences in activities. However, positioning is not always a function of differences on the demand, or customer, side. Variety and access positionings, in particular, do not rely on any customer differences. In practice, howeve r, variety or access differences often accompany needs differences. The tastes-that is, the needs-of Carmike's small-town customers, for instance, run more toward comedies, Westerns, action films, and family entertainment. Carmike does not run any films rated NC- 17.Having defined positioning, we can now begin to answer the question, "What is strategy?" Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities. If there were only one ideal position, there would be no need for strategy. Companies would face a simple imperative-win the race to discover and preempt it. The essence of strategic positioning is to choose activities that are different from rivals'. If thesame set of activities were best to produce all varieties, meet all needs, and access all customers, companies could easily shift among them and operational effectiveness would determine performance.III. A Sustainable Strategic Position Requires Trade-offsChoosing a unique position, however, is not enough to guarantee a sustainable advantage. A valuable position will attract imitation by incum bents, who are likely to copy it in one of two ways.First, a competitor can reposition itself to.match the superior performer. J.C. Penney, for instance, has been repositioning itself from a Sears clone to a more upscale,fashion-oriented, soft-goods retailer. A second and far more common type of imitation is straddling. The straddler seeks to match the benefits of a successful position while maintaining its existing position. It grafts new features, services, or technologies onto the activities it already performs.For those who argue that competitors can copy any market position, the airline industry is a perfect test case. It would seem that nearly any competitor could imitate any other airline's activities. Any airline can buy the same planes, lease the gates, and match the menus and ticketing and baggage handling services offered by other airlines.Continental Airlines saw how well Southwest was doing and decided to straddle. While maintaining its position as a full-service airline, Continental also set out to match Southwest on a number of point-to-point routes. The airline dubbed the new service Continental Lite. It eliminated meals and first-class service, increased departure frequency, lowered fares, and shortened turnaround time at the gate. Because Continental remained a full-service airline on other routes, it continued to use travel agents and its mixed fleet of planes and to provide baggage checking and seat assignments.But a strategic position is not sustainable unless there are trade-offs with other positions. Trade-offs occur when activities are incompatible. Simply put, a trade-off means that more of one thing necessitates less of another. An airline can choose to serve meals- adding cost and slowing turnaround time at the gate-or it can choose not to, but it cannot do both without bearing major inefficiencies.Trade-offs create the need for choice and protect against repositioners and straddlers. Consider Neutrogena soap. Neutrogena Corporation's Variety-based positioning is built on a "kind to the skin," residue-free soap formulated for pH balance. With a large detail force calling on dermatologists, Neutrogena's marketing strategy looks more like a drug company's than a soap maker's. It advertises in medical journals, sends direct mail to doctors, attends medical conferences, and performs research at its own Skincare Institute. To reinforce its positioning, Neutrogena originally focused its distribution on drugstores and avoided price promotions. Neutrogena uses a slow, more expensive。
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《哈佛商业评论》精粹译丛——知识管理目录l新型组织的出现 (2)2知识创新型企业 (7)3建立学习型组织 (15)4教聪明人学会学习克里斯.阿吉里斯 (28)5充分发挥公司的智力 (37)6如何让经验成为最好的老师? (48)7再造公司的研究活动 (55)8优中取胜:专业智能的管理 (65)l.新型组织的出现彼得·德鲁克原文发表于《哈佛商业评论》1988年1/2.月号作者简介彼得·F.德鲁克，作家、教授、咨询专家，其9本著作已被翻译成多国文字，在世界各地出版。
他是彼得·F·德鲁克非营利管理基金的创始人，并曾为许多国家的政府.、公众服务机构和大型企业提供过咨询。
彼得·德鲁克《论管理》(哈佛商学院出版社)一书选编了他在哈佛商业评论上发表过的最优秀的论文。
内容提要20年后的典型大企业，其管理层级将不及今天的一半，管理人员也不及今天的1/3。
在这样的企业中，工作将由跨部门的专家小组来完成，协调与控制将更多地依赖雇员的自律意识。
为什么会发生这样的变化?根源在于信息技术。
计算机使企业的上下沟通速度更快、效果更好。
自然不再需要那么多中间管理人员。
同时，计算机的应用也要求员工知识丰富，能够将数据转化成信息。
那么，这种新型的、以信息为基础的组织应该怎样进行管理?答案来自于其他知识型的组织或群体，如医院和交响乐队。
首先，你需要一个“乐谱”，它简洁而明晰，告诉不同的人要做什么，达到什么目标。
其次，你需要建立恰当的结构，使每个人都担负应有的信息责任，使他们经常自问:谁需要我提供信息?需要我提供什么样的信息?我又需要谁提供信息?信息型组织的管理问题新颖而独特，例如怎样对专家进行激励和奖酬?怎样建立一个战略远景，把众多的专家团结在一起?怎样设计一个管理结构，使管理者和员工一道努力?怎样培养和检验高层管理人员，使高层管理人员的供应源源不断?这些问题就是我们在世纪末面临的管理挑战!20年后的典型大企业、其管理层级将不及今天的一半，管理人员也不及今天的1/3。
在组织结构、管理对象和控制范围上，这些企业将和50年代以后崛起的.、今天仍被教科书奉为经典的大制造业公司没有丝毫相似之处，而更可能接近于那些被现在的经理人员和管理学家所忽视的组织。
在我的脑海里，未来的.典型企业应该被称为信息型组织。
它以知识为基础，由各种各样的专家组成。
这些专家根据来自同事、客户和上级的大量信息，自主决策、自我管理。
企业，尤其是大型企业，将无可选择地要以信息为基础。
导致这种变化的原因有很多，其中一个是.人口统计学意义上的，即雇员队伍的重心从体力员工和文案员工迅速转向知识型员工。
知识型员工削弱了“命令-支配型”管理模式存在的基础，这种模式从100多年前军队的管理衍生而来。
导致这种变化的另一个原因是经济方面的，即大企业需要勇冒风险、不断创新。
不过，在众多的原因当中，最根本的还是信息技术。
当然，并非只有具备了先进的数据处理技术才能建立起信息型组织。
正如我将要介绍的，早在“信息技术”还只意味着鹅毛笔，而“远程通信系统”则由赤脚信使组成的年代，英国人就在印度建立了一个这样的组织。
但是，随着先进技术主导地位的不断加强，我们不得不更加强调分析和判断(也就是强调“信息”)，甚至冒着被我们自己所创造的数据淹没的危险。
迄今为止，大多数用户使用电脑时，仍然只是希望工作效率比以前高一些，能够迅速处理原始数据。
但是，当一家公司试着将这些数据转化为信息时，它的决策过程、管理结构乃至工作方式都会发生变化。
实际上，这种变化在全世界众多公司里已经迅速地出现了。
信息技术使决策过程发生了多大的变化?考察一下它对投资决策的影响就清楚了。
长期以来，进行投资分析没有任何捷径可走，人们必须在六个方面仔细权衡:预期回报率、投资回收期、投产后的预期寿命、投资回报期内所有收益的现值、不投资或迟投资的风险和投资失败的成本和风险、机会成本。
在先进的数据处理技术出现之前，财会专业的学生要费尽心血掌握这些概念，有经验的分析人员要花九牛二虎之力才能完成工作。
现在，在电子表格程序的帮助下，任何人完成这项工作都只需要几个小时。
这样，信息技术使企业更容易得到全面准确的信息，从而使投资分析从主观经验发展成为决策诊断，发展成为对备选战略假设的理性权衡。
以前，投资分析是机会主义的，纯粹是一种财务决策，关键在于数字的准确；现在，投资分析是理性主义的，关键在于备选战略假设发生的概率。
所以。
现在的投资分析既要预先设定一个战略，又要对这个战略及其假设提出质疑，它不再是编制预算，而是变成了政策分析。
新型的企业把数据处理能力的重点放在创造信息上，它的组织结构也将因此受到影响。
人们很快就会发现，企业的管理层级和经理.人数可以大大削减。
原因很明显:各个管理层级都既不必做出决策，也不再领导他人。
他们的主要作用(虽然不是惟一的作用)就是充当“信息传递员”-把组织的信号加以整合放大，并传递给他人。
在非信息型组织中，这种信号是微弱而零星的，往往起不了大的作用。
美国一家最大的国防承包公司发现了这个秘密。
那时，它正在考虑公司的高层及运作经理需要哪些信息才能完成工作，这些信息从何而来，蕴涵在什么样的形式中，如何流动等等。
不久，他们就发现，很多管理层级(在14个层级中大概有6个)之所以存在，是因为以前根本没有考虑过上面那些问题。
他们拥有丰富的数据，却总是将其用于监督控制，而非获取信息。
信息是有目的性和关联性的数据。
因此，把数据转化为信息需要知识。
而知识就其定义而言，总是专业性的。
(实际上，不管在哪个领域，真正有学识的人总是长期专注于自己的研究方向，因为学无止境，总是有更多的知识需要学习和了解。
)比起我们熟悉的“命令-支配型”企业，信息型企业需要更多的专家，而且这些专家主要在一线参与运作，而非在总部出谋划策。
实际上，未来的组织将会由各种各样的专家组成。
信息型组织仍然需要完成一些诸如法律顾问、公共关系、劳资关系之类的高层管理工作，这和现在并无二致，但是它对于参谋人员(没有业务职责，只做些建议、顾问及协调工作的人)的需求会急剧减少。
在信息型组织的高级管理层巾，将不再需要什么专家。
信息型组织的结构将更加“扁平”，看起来就像一个世纪以前的企业，与现在的大企业相去甚远。
不过，在一个世纪以前，知识都掌握在企业最高领导手里，其他人只不过是充当帮手和劳力，按照指令行事，做着重复性的工作。
在信息型组织中，知识却主要体现在基层，体现在专家的脑海里。
这些专家在基层从事不同的工作，自主管理、自主决策。
在今天的典型企业中，知识往往集中在介于最高管理层和操作层之间的参谋人员当中，也就是说，企业还处于这样一个阶段:拼命从上层灌输知识，而不是努力从下面获取信息。
最后，在信息型组织中，大量工作都将以不同的方式完成。
传统部门的职责将发生巨大变化，主要负责标准维护、人员培训和工作分配，而不具体处理业务。
业务工作由谁完成呢?主要由业务导向的团队完成。
这种变化已经在研究部门出现了，而研究部门是以前界定最清楚的部门。
在制药、远程通信和造纸业中，传统的研究-开发-制造-销售的顺序已经过时，被同步经营所取代:从开始研究到产品在市场中立足，都由同一个团队负责进行。
团队的成员是来自不同部门的专家，他们在一起同步工作。
怎样才能建立一个把握商机、解决难题的任务小组?这还有待于进一步的观察。
我想，企业是否需要任务小组，以及怎样建立和领导任务小组，要因地制宜，视情况而定。
未来的组织肯定要超越矩阵形式，而且有一点很清楚，它需要更高程度的自律，并更多地强调个人在人际关系和沟通交流中的责任.如果只是泛泛而谈，大讲信息技术正在改造着商业组织是很容易的事情，但要抬明它对公司和最高管理层的要求，则于分困难，就像是破解天书一样。
所以，我觉得，从其他一些信息型组织里寻找线索将大有裨益，如医院.、交响乐团和英属印度的统治机构。
一家中等规模的医院，大概有400个床位、几百名医生和1200名~1500名护理人员，并分成近60个医疗专科和护理专科，每个专科都有专门的知识、培训和术语。
这些专科，尤其像临床和理疗这样的护理专科，都有一个主任，他与其说是一个全天候的管理者，不如说是个业务专家。
每个专科主任都直接向院长汇报，没有其他中间管理层，医院的大部分工作都是由一些医疗组完成的，这些民疗组是根据病人的诊断需要临时成立的。
大型交响乐团的例子更具启发性。
在大的交响乐团中可能会有几百名乐手共同演奏。
根据传统的组织理论，就应该需要几个副总指挥和大约6个专业指挥。
而实际上呢?一个乐队只有一名总指挥，每个乐手都直接面对他表演，而无需通过任何中介，每位乐手都是高水平的专家，是真正的艺术家。
不过，大型信息型组织的最佳范例，却是英国设在印度的行政管理署，它没有任何中旬管理层，却运转得非常成功。
从18世纪中期，一直到第二次世界大战，英国人统治了南亚次大陆200年，却几乎没有对管理机构和管理政策做过大的改动。
这个组织管理着一个幅员辽阔、人口密集的次大陆，但其自身人员却从未超过1000人—只相当于在毗邻的中国管理着差不多的人口、尊奉教的清朝高级官员及宫廷太监的极小部分(至多为1/100:那里的英国人大多相当年轻，特别是在早期，30岁的是凤毛麟角。
他们通常独居在与世隔绝的堡垒里，即使离最近的同僚也要一两天路程。
而且，在开始的1000年里，还没有电报和铁路。
印度行署的组织机构非常简单，每个地区长官都直接向各省的Coo—总督汇报工作。
由于只有9个省，所以每个省的总督至少有l00人直接向他汇报，超过了“控制幅度理论”规定的许多倍。
尽管如此，印度行署的运行非常成功，这在很大程度上取决于它能确保每个成员都得到工作所需要的信息。
地区长官每个月都要花一天时间给总督写一份报告，洋细汇报每项工作—一共4项，但每一项都要求清晰明确。
他要详细记录每一项工作的预期目标和实际结果；如果二者不一致，他还要解释为什么会出现差异。
然后，他还要写下自己对下个月各项工作的预期，他自己将如何行事，询问有关政策问题，并评估“远期的机遇、威胁和需要”。
相应地，总督会精心批复每一份报告，给予详细的评价。
从这些例子看，信息型企业有什么样的特点，它会面临什么样的管理问题?让我们先来看看信息型企业的特点。
为什么几百名乐手能够和他们的总指挥共同演奏?因为他们有一份相同的乐谱，乐谱能告诉长笛手和定音鼓手演奏的旋律和时机，能告诉指挥何时应该听到哪个乐手什么样的演奏。
同样，医院里所有的专科大夫都有一个共同使命，那就是照顾、治愈病人，诊断书就是他们共同的“乐谱”，它对X光室、营养学家、理疗师和其他科室的行为提出厂统一的要求。
换句话说，信息型组织需要明确、简单的共同口标，以指导个人的行动。
同时，上面的例子也表明.信息型组织需要使命单一，致力于一个口标—最多几个。