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企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Measuring the quality of earnings1. IntroductionGenerally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) offer some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and give the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alternatives. Earning management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the firm (Ortega and Grant, 2003).In other words, earnings management is manipulating the earning to achieve a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献predetermined target set by the management. It is a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain (Schipper, 1989).Levit (1998) defines earning management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company.The popular press lists several instances of companies engaging in earnings management. Sensormatic Electronics, which stamped shipping dates and times on sold merchandise, stopped its clocks on the last day of a quarter until customer shipments reached its sales goal. Certain business units of Cendant Corporation inflated revenues nearly $500 million just prior to a merger; subsequently, Cendant restated revenuesand agreed with the SEC to change revenue recognition practices. AOL restated earnings for $385 million in improperly deferred marketing expenses. In 1994, the Wall Street Journal detailed the many ways in which General Electric smoothed earnings, including the careful timing of capital gains and the use of restructuring charges and reserves, in response to the article, General Electric reportedly received calls from other corporations questioning why such common practices were“front-page〞 news.Earning management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Whalen, 1999).Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that abusive earnings management and fraudulent practices begins by engaging in earnings management schemes designed primarily to “smooth〞 earnings to meet internally or externally imposed earnings forecasts and analysts’ expectations. Even if earnings management does not explicitly violate accounting rules, it is an ethically questionable practice. An organization that manages its earnings sends a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献message to its employees that bending the truth is an acceptable practice. Executives who partake of this practice risk creating an ethical climate in which other questionable activities may occur. A manager who asks the sales staff to help sales one day forfeits the moral authority to criticize questionable sales tactics another day.Earnings management can also become a very slippery slope, which relatively minor accounting gimmicks becoming more and more aggressiveuntil they create material misstatements in the financial statements (Clikeman, 2003)The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three staff accounting bulletins (SAB) to provide guidance on some accounting issues in order to prevent the inappropriate earnings management activities by public companies: SAB No. 99 “Materiality〞, SAB No. 100 “Restructuring and Impairment Charges〞 and SAB No. 101 “Revenue Recognition〞.Earnings management behavior may affect the quality of accounting earnings, which is defined by Schipper and Vincent (2003) as the extent to which the reported earnings faithfully represent Hichsian economic income, which is the amount that can be consumed (i.e. paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period.Assessment of earning quality requires sometimes the separations of earnings into cash from operation and accruals, the more the earnings is closed to cash from operation, the higher earnings quality. As Penman (2001) states that the purpose of accounting quality analysis is to distinguish between the “hard〞 numbers resulting from cash flows and the “soft〞 numbers resulting from accrual accounting.The quality of earnings can be assessed by focusing on the earning persistence; high quality earnings are more persistent and useful in the process of decision making.Beneish and Vargus (2002) investigate whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality using earning persistence as a measure for the quality of earnings, they find that income-increasing accruals are significantly more persistent for firms with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms with abnormal insider selling, relative to firms which there is no abnormal insider trading.Balsam et al. (2003) uses the level of discretionary accruals as a direct measure企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献for earning quality. The discretionary accruals model is based on a regression relationship between the change in total accruals as dependent variable and change in sales and change in the level of property, plant and equipment, change in cash flow from operations and change in firm size (total assets) as independent variables. If the regression coefficients in this model are significant that means that there is earning management in that firm and the earnings quality is low.This research presents an empirical study on using three different approaches of measuring the quality of earnings on different industry. The notion is; if there is a complete consistency among the three measures, a general assessment for the quality of earnings (high or low) can be reached and, if not, the quality of earnings is questionable and needs different other approaches for measurement and more investigations and analysis.The rest of the paper is divided into following sections: Earnings management incentives, Earnings management techniques, Model development, Sample and statistical results, and Conclusion.2. Earnings management incentives 2.1 Meeting analysts’ expectations In general, analysts’ expectations and company predictions tend to address two high-profile components of financial performance: revenue and earnings from operations.The pressure to meet revenue expectations is particularly intense and may be the primary catalyst in leading managers to engage in earning management practices that result in questionable or fraudulent revenue recognition practices. Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that improperrevenue recognition practices were the cause of one-third of all voluntary or forced restatements of income filed with the SEC from 1977 to 2000. Ironically, it is often the companies themselves that create this pressure to meet the market’s earnings expectations. It is common practice for companies to provide earnings estimates to analysts and investors. Management is often faced with the task of ensuring their targeted estimates are met.企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献Several companies, including Coca-Cola Co., Intel Corp., and Gillette Co., have taken a contrary stance and no longer provide quarterly and annual earnings estimates to analysts. In doing so, these companies claim they have shifted their focus from meeting short-term earnings estimates to achieving their long-term strategies (Mckay and Brown, 2002).2.2 To avoid debt-covenant violations and minimize political costs Some firms have the incentive to avoid violating earnings-based debt covenants. If violated, the lender may be able to raise the interest rate on the debt or demand immediate repayment. Consequently, some firms may use earnings-management techniques to increase earnings to avoid such covenant violations. On the other hand, some other firms have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too profitable. For example, if gasoline prices have been increasing significantly and oil companies are achieving record profit level, then there may be incentive for the government to intervene and enact an excess-profit tax or attempt to introduce price controls.2.3 To smooth earnings toward a long-term sustainable trendFor many years it has been believed that a firm should attempt to reduce the volatility in its earnings stream in order to maximize share price. Because a highly violate earning pattern indicates risk, therefore thestock will lose value compared to others with more stable earnings patterns. Consequently, firms have incentives to manage earnings to help achieve a smooth and growing earnings stream (Ortega and Grant, 2003).2.4 Meeting the bonus plan requirementsHealy (1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction that is consistent with maximizing executives’ earnings-based bonus. When earnings will be below the minimum level required to earn a bonus, then earning are managed upward so that the minimum is achieved and a bonus is earned. Conversely, when earning will be above the maximum level at which no additional bonus is paid, then earnings are managed downward. The extra earnings that will not generate extra bonus this current period are saved to be used to earn a bonus in a future period.。

外文翻译--对股东财富影响的股利政策

外文翻译--对股东财富影响的股利政策

本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文:The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth1. IntroductionIn an ever-increasing Indian economy, globalization, liberalization and privatization together with rapid strides made by information technology, have brought intense competition in every field of activity. So, Indian companies at present are dazed, confused, and apprehensive. To maintain the competitiveness of, and add value to the companies, today’s finance managers have to make critical business and financial decisions which will lead to long-run perspective with the objective of maximizing the shareholders’ wealth.Shareholders’ wealth is represented in the market price of the company’s common stock, which, in turn, is the function of the company’s investment, financing and dividend decision. Managements' primary goal is shareholders' wealth maximization, which translates into maximizing the value of the company as measured by the price of the company’s common stock. Shareholders like cash dividends, but they also like the growth in EPS that results from ploughing earning back into the business. The optimal dividend policy is the one that maximizes the company's stock price which leads to maximization of shareholders' wealth and thereby ensures more rapid economic growth. The present study is intended to study how far the dividend payout has impact on shareholders' wealth in general; and in particular to study the relationship between the shareholders' wealth and the dividend payout and to analyze whether the level of dividend payout affects the wealth of the shareholders.2. Statement of the ProblemsIn India few studies have analyzed the relationship between the shareholders'wealth and dividend payment. Net earnings are divided into two parts –retained earnings and dividends. The retained earnings of the business may be reinvested and treated as a source of long-term funds. The dividend should be distributed to the shareholders in order to maximize their wealth as they have invested their money in the expectation of being made better off financially. Therefore, the present study mainly analyses how far the level of dividend payout affects the shareholders' wealth, particularly in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.3. Objectives of the Study• To study the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders' wealth.• To analyze the impact of variation in dividend policy on shareholders' wealth of dividend paying and non-paying companies in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies India.• To analyze the impact of retained earnings and past performance in the presence of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.4. Hypotheses• H1: “There is no significant difference in average market valu e relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”• H2:“There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”5. Methodology5.1. Sources of DataThe study used only secondary data which are collected from CMIE (Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy) prowess package. Analytical method is used for interpreting the data. The data collected from this source have been compiled and used with due care as per the requirements of the study.5.2. Sampling DesignOriginally the sample for this study has been planned to choose from the list of companies listed in National Stock Exchange (NSE). Since the number of companieslisted in the NSE is lesser in number (21 companies in Organic and Inorganic Chemical Industry), the sample of 28 companies in Chemical Industry (Organic-19 and Inorganic-9) has been chosen from 114 listed companies in BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange) using Multi-Stage Random Sampling Technique. The sample units have been chosen for the study based on the availability of required financial data like share price, DPS etc.6. Tools used for Analysis of DataThe equations and variables used for the study are given below:The subscript ‘i’ denotes the ith company in a sample of ‘n’ companies selected from a particular industry, and all variables are measured in the ith time period. Market price per share is the closing prices for the year. To analyze the data, the statistical tools that have been used are Mean, Standard Deviation, multiple regression technique and stepwise regression method to ascertain best fitted model for predicting the dividend policy impact on shareholder’s wealth. The significance of various explanatory variables has been tested by computing t-values. To determine the proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable, the coefficient of determination (R2) has been worked out. The significance of R2 has also been tested with the help of F-Value.7. Period of the StudyThe data used for the analysis are relating to the selected (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies for the period of Ten years (1997-2006).8. Analysis and Results8.1. Comparison of Shareholders’ Value between Dividend Payers an dNon-Payers among Organic CompaniesBefore going through evaluating the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth of selected (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India, it has been tried to compare the average wealth of investors between dividend paying and non-paying Organic and Inorganic companies in India. The comparison of mean shareholders’ wealth of companies of all types pooled under dividend paying and non-paying companies are also carried out. The mean values between two groups arecompared with t-values. The results of the analysis are shown from tables 1 – 3.Table 1: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic Chemical Companies in IndiaYear Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.89 1.55 1.00 1.88 1.13 ns1998 1.87 1.54 0.98 1.86 1.14 ns1999 1.90 1.56 0.97 1.83 1.19 ns2000 1.90 1.58 0.97 1.84 1.18 ns2001 1.87 1.53 0.99 1.89 1.12 ns2002 1.83 1.49 0.97 1.82 1.13 ns2003 1.84 1.50 0.95 1.82 1.16 ns2004 1.87 1.52 0.98 1.86 1.15 ns2005 1.82 1.41 0.97 1.89 1.11 ns2006 1.83 1.43 0.97 1.85 1.14 nsAll Years 1.86 1.44 0.98 1.76 3.81 0.01An examination of the results of year-wise comparison of market value of equity to its book value between dividend payers and non-payers of chemical companies in India (vide table 3) shows that the mean market value of equity relative to book value is well above 1 for all the years under study as well as for pooled years. It has been ranging from minimum of 1.53 in 2005 to 1.60 in 2000 with overall mean of 1.56 for all the years. This shows that the market value is well above the book value for the chemical companies which pay dividend. But the scenario has been slightly different in the case of dividend non-paying chemical companies in India.Table 2: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.04 0.56 -0.70 1.70 2.39 0.051998 1.03 0.54 -0.68 1.62 2.47 0.041999 1.05 0.58 -0.71 1.68 2.43 0.052001 1.10 0.72 -0.76 1.75 2.36 0.052002 1.07 0.65 -0.77 1.85 2.29 ns2003 1.07 0.66 -0.74 1.75 2.35 0.052004 1.07 0.63 -0.69 1.68 2.38 0.052005 1.05 0.59 -0.87 1.98 2.32 0.052006 1.06 0.60 -0.93 2.07 2.31 0.05All Years 1.06 0.58 -0.75 1.48 8.36 0.00An average market value relative to book value is <1, revealing marginal increase in wealth of the investors of these companies. The mean values vary between 0.50 in 2006 to 0.57 in 1997 and 1998. The decline in mean value in 2006 has indicated the decline in wealth of the investors during the period. However, comparison of mean values between dividend payer and non-payer under chemical sector (Organic and Inorganic) revealed that the wealth creation in each year does not show any significant difference. However, in the long-run, the difference is highly significant at 1 per cent level.H1: “There is no significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”Table 3: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity Between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic and Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.57 1.32 0.57 1.92 1.63 ns1998 1.56 1.30 0.57 1.89 1.64 ns1999 1.58 1.33 0.55 1.88 1.70 ns2000 1.60 1.35 0.55 1.89 1.71 ns2001 1.58 1.31 0.55 1.94 1.68 ns2002 1.54 1.27 0.54 1.91 1.68 ns2004 1.57 1.30 0.56 1.90 1.67 ns2005 1.53 1.20 0.51 2.00 1.67 ns2006 1.54 1.22 0.50 2.00 1.71 nsAll Years 1.56 1.25 0.54 1.85 5.49 0.00The H1 is rejected. Therefore, it is found that in the long-rum, wealth of shareholders of dividend paying chemical companies has increased significantly when compared to that of the dividend non-paying counterparts, which further shows the impact of dividend policy on wealth creation. Hence H1 stands: “There is significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”8.2. Relationship between Dividend Policy and Shareholders’ WealthDividend Paying Organic Chemical CompaniesTable 4: Results of Regression showing the Impact of Dividend Policy on Market Value of Equity of ALL DIVIDEND PAYING ORGANIC CHEMICAL COMPANIES in India.The impa ct of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of organic and inorganic chemical companies with adoption of dividend policy has been elicited using multiple regression analysis. The Dividend per share (DPS) has been used as proxy for measuring the dividend policy of the companies and Market value (MV) of equity of the companies under study is considered as proxy for measuring the shareholders’ wealth and used as dependent variable. Apart from DPS, Retained earnings (RE), lagged Price-Earning Ratio (PEt-1) and lagged Market value of equity (MVt-1) are also used as explanatory variables in order to know whether dividend policy of Organic and Inorganic chemical companies are dominated by these factors in influencing the creation of shareholders’ wealth. Table 4 shows the regression results for all selected organic chemical companies in India with regard to impact of initiating dividend payout on shareholders’ wealth. Perusal of the results indicates that the fit of all four models is significant at 1 per cent level (F = 23.77, p < 0.01 formodel 1, F = 11.77, p < 0.01 for model 2, F = 7.44, p < 0.01 for model 3 and F = 123.15, p < 0.01 for model 4). Among the four models, F value for model 4 is very high. Further, the coefficients of DPS in all four models are highly significant at 1 per cent level and positive in sign (β = 92.68, t = 4.88, p < 0.01 in model 1; β = 92.81, t = 4.84, p < 0.01 in model 2; β = 94.57, t = 4.66, p < 0.01 in model 3; and β = 32.34, t = 3.08, p < 0.01 in model 4). Also, from the perusal of adjusted R2 values, it is clear that the explanatory variables in the model 4 could together explain 80.46 per cent of the variance in market value, whereas explanatory variables in model 1, 2 and 3 could, together, explain 18.70 per cent, 17.87 per cent and 17.83 per cent respectively of the variance in dependent variable Hence, model 4 is the appropriate one for the final interpretation. Interestingly, the coefficient of DPS in model 4, though statistically significant, has declined considerably in the presence of RE and lagged MV, even though the coefficients of those variables are insignificant. Also, the intercepts, which are insignificant in the first three models, become significant in model 4, indicating that there are some factors inherent in the market dominated over dividend policy when market has started considering RE and lagged MV of organic chemical companies under chemical sector.H2: “There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies in I ndia.”9. Summary and Concluding RemarksGenerally, higher dividend increases the market value of the share and vice versa. Shareholders preferred current dividend to future income so, dividend is considered as an important factor which determines the shar eholders’ wealth. This is normally true in case of salaried individuals, retired pensioners and others with limited incomes. Dividend has information content and the payment of dividend indicates that the company has a good earning capacity. The wealth of the shareholders is greatly influenced mainly by five variables viz., Growth in Sales, Improvement of Profit Margin, Capital Investment Decisions (both working capital and fixed capital), Capital Structure Decisions, Cost of Capital (Dividend on Equity, Interest on Debt) etc. As far as the dividend paying companies are concerned, there is a significantimpact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies. Whereas, as far as the Inorganic Chemical Companies are concerned, the share holders’ wealth is not influenced by the dividend payout.Source: R. Azhagaiah, Sabari Priya.N. The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,2008(20) :P181-187.译文:对股东财富影响的股利政策1.简介印度经济不断发展,在全球化、自由化和私有化,特别是信息技术取得了迅速进展的情形下,带来了在各个活动领域的激烈竞争。

股利政策外文翻译(已处理)

股利政策外文翻译(已处理)

股利政策外文翻译外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Dividend policyProfitable companies regularly face three important questions: 1 How much of its free cash flow should it pass on to shareholders? 2 Should it provide this cash to shareholders by raising the dividend or by repurchasing stock? 3 Should it maintain a stable, consistent payment policy, or should it let the payments vary as conditions change?When deciding how much cash to distribute to shareholders, finance manager must keep in mind that the firm’s objective is to imize shareholder value. Consequently, the target pay rate ratio?define as the percentage of net income to be paid out as cash dividends?should be based in large part on investors’ preference for dividends versus capital gai ns: do investors prefer 1 to have the firm distribute income as cash dividends or 2 to have it either repurchase stock or else plow the earnings back into the business, both of which should result in capital gains? This preference can be considered in terms of the constant growth stock valuation model:If the company increases the payout ration, the raises.This increase in the numerator, taken alone, would cause the stock price to rise. However, ifis raised, then less money will be available for reinvestment, that will cause the expected growth rate to decline, and that will tend to lower the stock’s price. Thus, any change in payout policy will have two opposing effects. Therefore, the firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike a balance between current dividends and future growth so to imize the stock price. In this section, we examine three theories of investor preference: 1the dividend irrelevance theory, 2the "bird-in-the-hand" theory ,and3 the tax preference theory DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE THEORYIt has been argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. If dividend policy has no significant effects, then it would be irrelevance .The principal proponents of dividend irrelevance theory are Merton Miller and Franco ModiglianiMM.They argued that the firm’s is determined only by its basic earning power and its business risk. In other words, MM argued that the value of firm depends only on the income produced by its assets, not on how this income is split between dividends and retained earnings To understand MM’s argument that dividend policy is irrelevance, recognize that any shareholder can in theory construct his or her own dividend policy .If investors could buy and sell shares and thus create their owndividend policy without incurring costs, then the firm’s dividend policy would truly be irrelevant. Note, though, that investors who want additional dividends must incur brokerage cost to sell shares, and investors who do not want dividends must first pay taxes on the unwanted dividends and then incur brokerage cost to purchase shares with the after-tax dividends. Since taxes and brokerage costs certainly exist, dividend policy may well be relevant.In developing their dividend theory, MM made a number of assumptions especially the absence of taxes and brokerage costs. Obviously, tax and brokerage costs do exist, so the MM irrelevance theory may not be true. However, MM argued that all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and that the validity of a theory must be judged by empirical test, not by the realism of its assumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HAND THEORYThe principal conclusions of MM’s dividend irrelevance theory is that dividend policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, Ks. This conclusion has been hotly debated in the academic circles .In particular, Myron Gordon and John Lintner argued that Ks decreases as the dividend payout is increase because investor are less certain of receiving the capital gains which are supposed to result from retaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend paymentsMM disagreed .They argued that Ks independent of dividend policy,which implies that investors are indifferent between D1/P0 and g and, hence, between dividends and capital gains. MM called the Gordon-Lintner argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy because, in MM’s view, most investors plan to reinvest their dividends in the stock of the same or similar firms, and, in any event, the riskiness of the firm’s c ash flows to investors in the long run is determined by the riskiness of operating cash flows, not by dividend payout policy.TAX PREFERENCE THEORYThere are three tax-related reasons for thinking that investors might prefer a low dividend payout to a high payout: 1 Recall from Chapter II that long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20 percent, whereas dividend income is taxed at effective rates which go up to 39.6 percent. Therefore, wealthy investors might prefer to have companies retain and plow earnings back into the business. Earnings growth would presumably lead to stock prices increases, and thus low- taxed capital gains would be substituted for higher-taxed dividends. 2Taxes are not paid on the gains until a stock is sold. Due to time value effects, a dollar of taxes paid in the future has a lower effective cost than a dollar paid today.3 If a stock is held by someone until he or she dies, no capital gains tax is due at all-the beneficiaries who receive the stock can use the stock’s valu e on the death day as their cost basis and thus completely escape the capital gains tax.Because of these tax advantages, investors may prefer to have companies retain most of their earnings. IF so, investors would be willing to pay more for low-payout companies than for otherwise similar high- payout companies.There three theories offer contradictory advice to corporate managers, so which, if any, should we believe? The most logical way to proceed is to test the theories empirically. Many such tests have been conducted, but their results have been unclear. There are two reasons for this1For a valid statistical test, things other than dividend policy must be held constant; that is, the sample companies must differ only in their dividend policies, and2we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracy each firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtain precise estimates of the cost of equity.Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidenceand logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy Because we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: 1the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and2 The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’ reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements.The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of1brokerage costs,2the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and 3 a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy mightattract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise.In many ways, our discussion of dividend policy parallels our discussion of capital structure: we presented the relevant theories and issues, and we listed some additional factors that influence dividend policy, but we did not come up with any hard-and-fast guidelines that manager can follow. It should be apparent from our discussion that dividend policy decisions are exercises in informed judgment, not decisions that can be based on precise mathematical model.In practice, dividend policy is not an independent decision ? the dividend decisions is made jointly with capital structure and capital budgeting decisions. The underlying reason for this joint decisions process is asymmetric information, which influences managerial actions in two ways:1, In general, managers do not want to issue new common stock. First, new common stock involves issuance cost -- - commissions, fees, and so on-and those costs can be avoided by using retained earnings to finance the firm’s equity needs. Also, asymmetric information causes investors to view common stock issues as negative signals and thus lowers expectations regarding the firm’s future prospects. The end result is that the announcement of a new stock issue usually leads to a decrease in the stock prices. Considering the total costs involved, including bothissuance and asymmetric information costs, managers strongly prefer to use retained earnings as their primary source of new equity.2, Divi dend changes provide signal about managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future prospects, Thus, dividend reductions, Or worse yet, omissions, generally have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock priceSince managers recognize this, they try to set dollar dividends low enough so that there is only a remote chance that the dividend will have to be reduce in the future. Of course, unexpectedly large dividend increases can be used to provide positive signals. the actual payout ratio in any The dividend decision is made during the planning process, so there is uncertainty about future investment opportunities and operating cash flows. Thus, the actual payout ratio in any year will probably be above or below the firm’s long-range target. However, the dollar dividend should be maintained, or increase as planned policy simply cannot be maintained. A steady or increasing steam of dividends over the long run signals that the firm’s financial condition is under control. Further, investors uncertain is decreased by stable dividend, so a steady dividend stream reduces the negative effect of a stock issue, should one become absolutely necessary.In general, firms with superior investment opportunities should set lower payouts, hence retain more earnings, than firms with poor investment opportunities. The degree of uncertainty also influences thedecision. If there is a great deal of uncertainty in the forecasts of free cash flows, which are defined here as the firm’s operating cash flows minus mandatory equity investments, then it is best to be conservative and to set a lower current dollar dividend. Also, firms with postponable investment opportunities can afford to set a higher dollar dividend, because in times of stress investments can be postponed for a year or two, thus increasing the cash available for dividends. Finally, firms whose cost of capital is largely unaffected by change in the debt ratio can also afford to set a higher payout ratio, because they can, in times of stress, more easily issue additional debt to maintain the capital budgeting program without having to cut dividends or issue stock.Firms have only one opportunity to set the opportunity payment from scratch. Therefore, today’s dividend decisions are constrained by policies that were set in the past, hence setting a policy for the next five years necessarily begins with a review of the current situation. Although we have outlined a rational process for managers to use when setting their firms’ dividend policies, dividend policy still rema ins one of the most judgmental decisions that firms must make. For this reason, dividend policy is always set by the board of directors the financial staff analyzes the situation and makes a recommendation, but the board makes the final decision.Source: E ugene F. Brigham. Joel F.Houston, 2004. “Fundamentals offinancial” Aril,pp.648-671.二、翻译文章译文:股利政策盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题:(1)自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东?(2)怎么样吧这些现金分配给股东,是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票?(3)需要保持一个不变的股利支付政策,还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同?当财务经理决定应该付多少现金给股东时,他一定要记住,公司的目标是股东价值最大化,目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比,应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。

企业利润分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业利润分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Profit PatternsThe most important objective of companies is to create, develop and maintain one or more competitive advantages in order to generate dividends for the shareholders. For a long time, it was simply a question of dominating the market, either by costs or by a policy of differentiation. As Michael Porter advised, it was essential to avoid being “stuck in the middle”. This way of thinking set up competitive rivalry in a closed world, and tended towards stability. This model is less and less relevant today for whole sectors of the economy. We see a multitude of strategic movements which defy the logic of the old system. “Profit Patterns” lists numerous strategies which have joined the small number that we knew before. These patterns often combine to give rise to strategic models which are better adapted to the new and changing needs of the consumer.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predict Valuemigration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major of managers have a talent for recognizing development market trends There are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context. This book proposes thirty strategic prediction models divided into seven families. Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in time! Managers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectives.For most of the 20th century, mastering strategic evolution models was not a determining factor, and formulas for success were fixed and relatively simple. In industry, the basic model stated that profit was a function of relative market share. Today, this rule is confronted with more and more contradictions: among car manufacturers for example, where small companies like Toyota are more profitable than General Motors and Ford. The highest rises in value have become the exclusive right of the companies with the most efficient business designs. These upstart companies have placed themselves in the profit zone of their sectors thanks, in part, to their size, but also to their new way of doing business – exploiting new rules which are sources of value creation. Among the new rules which define a good strategic plan are:1. Strong orientation towards the customer2. Internal decisions which are coherent with the overall activity, concerning the products and services as well as the involvement in the different activities of the value chain3. An efficient mechanism for value–capture.4. A powerful source of differentiation and of strategic control, inspiring investorconfidence in future cash-flow.5. An internal organization carefully designed to support and reinforce the company’s strategic plan.Why does value migrate? The explanation lies largely in the explosion of risk-capital activities in the USA. Since the 40’s, of the many companies that have been created, about a thousand have allowed talented employees, the “brains”, to work without the heavy structures of very big companies. The risk–capital factor is now entering a new phase in the USA, in that the recipes for innovation and value creation are spreading from just the risk-capital companies to all big companies. A growing number of the 500 richest companies have an internal structure for getting into the game of investing in companies with high levels of value-creation. Where does this leave Eur ope? According to recent research, innovation in strategic thinking is under way in Europe, albeit with a slight time-lag. Globalization is making the acceptation of these value-creation rules a condition of global competitively .There is a second phenomenon that has an even more radical influence on value-creation –polarization: The combination of a convincing and innovative strategic plan, strategic control and a dominant market share creates a terrific increase in investor confidence. The investors believe that the company has established its position of strength not only for the current, but also for the next strategic cycle. The result is an exponential growth in value, and especially a spectacular out-distancing of the direct rivals. The polarization process typically has two stages. In phase 1, the competitors seem to be level. In fact, one of them has unde rstood, has “got it”, before the others and is investing in a new strategic action plan to take into account the pattern which is starting to redefine the sector. Phase 2 begins when the conditions are right for the pattern to take over: at this moment, th e competitor who “got it”, attracts the attention of customers, investors and potential recruits (the brains). The intense public attention snowballs, the market value explodes to leave the nearest competitor way behind. Examples are numerous in various sectors: Microsoft against Apple and Lotus, Coca-Cola against Pepsi, Nike against Reebok and so on. Polarization of value raises the stakes and adds a sense of urgency: The first company to anticipate market changeand to take appropriate investment decisions can gain a considerable lead thanks to recognition by the market.In a growing number of sectors today, competition is concentrated on the race towards mindshare. The company which leads this race attracts customers who attract others in an upwards spiral. At the transition from phase 1 to phase 2, the managing team’s top priority is to win the mindshare battle. There are three stages in this strategy: mind sharing with customers gives an immediate competitive advantage in terms of sales; mind sharing with investors provides the resources to maintain this advantage, and mind sharing with potential recruits increases the chances of maintaining the lead in the short and the long term. This triple capture sets off a chain reaction releasing an enormous amount of economic energy. Markets today are characterized by a staggering degree of transparency. Successes and failures are instantaneously visible to the whole world. The extraordinary success of some investors encourages professional and amateurs to look for the next hen to lay a golden egg. This investment mentality has spread to the employment market, where compensations (such as stock-options) are increasingly linked to results. From these three components - customers, investors and new talent – is created the accelerating phenomenon, polarization: thousands of investors look towards the leader at the beginning of the race. The share value goes up at the same time as the rise in customer numbers and the public perception that the current leader will be the winner. The rise in share-price gets more attention from the media, and so on. How to get the knowledge before the others, in order to launch the company into leadership? There are several attitudes, forms of behavior and knowledge that can be used: being paranoiac, thinking from day to day that the current market conditions are going to change; talking to people with different points of view; being in the field, looking for signs of change. And above all, building a research network to find the patterns of strategic change, not only in one’s particular sector, but in the whole economy, so as always to understand the patterns a bit better and a bit sooner than the competitors.Experienced managers can detect similarities between movements of value in different circumstances. 30 of these patterns can be divided into 7 categories.Some managers understand migrations of value before other managers, allowing them to continually improvise their business plan in order to find and exploit value. Experience is an obvious advantage: situations can repeat themselves or be similar to others, so that experienced managers recognize and assimilate them quickly. There about 30 patterns .which can be put into 7 groups according to their key factors. It is important to understand that the patterns have three general characteristics: multiplicity,variants and cycles. The principle of multiplicity indicates that while a sector or a company may be affected by just one simple strategic pattern, most situations are more complicated and involve several simultaneously evolving patterns. The variants to the known models are developed in different circumstances and according to the creativity of the users of the models. Studying the variants gives more finesse in model-analysis. Finally, each model depends on economic cycles which are more or less long. The time a pattern takes to develop depends on its nature and also on the nature of the customers and sector in question.1) The first family of strategic evolution patterns consists of the six “Mega patterns”: these models do not address any particular dimension of the activity (customer, channels of distribution and value chain), but have an overall and transversal influence. They owe their name “Mega” to their range and their impact (as much from the point of view of the different economic sectors as from the duration). The six Mega models are: No profit, Back to profit, Convergence, Collapse in the middle, De facto standard and Technology shifts the board. • The No profit pattern is characterized by a zero or negative result over several years in a company or economic sector. The first factor which favors this pattern is the existence of a single strategic a plan in several competitors: they all apply differentiation by price to capture market-share. The second factor is the loss of the “crutch” of the sector, that is the end of a system of the help, such as artificially maintained interest levels, or state subsidies. Among the best examples of this in the USA are in agriculture and the railway industry in the 50’s and 60’s,and in the aeronautical industry in the 80’s and 90’s.• The Back to profit pattern is characterized by the emergence of innovative strategic plans or the projects which permit the return of profits. In the 80’s, the watch industry was stagnating in a noprofits zone. The vision of Nicolas Hayek allowed Swatch and other brands to get back into a profit-making situation thanks to a products pyramid built around the new brand.The authors rightly attribute this phenomenon to investors’ recognition of the superiority of these new business designs. However this interpretation merits refinement: the superiority resides less in the companies’ current capacity to identify the first an indications of strategic discontinuity than in their future capacity to develop a portfolio of strategic options and to choose the right one at the right time. The value of a such companies as Amazon and AOL, which benefit from financial polarization, can only be explained in this way. To be competitive in the long-term, a company must not only excel in its “real” market, but also in its financial market. Competition in both is very fierce, and one can not neglect either of these fields of battle without suffering the consequences. This share-market will assume its own importance alongside the commercial market, and in the future, its successful exploitation will be a key to the strategic superiority of publicly-quoted companies.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predictValue migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major managers have a talent for recognizing development market trendsThere are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context.Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in timeManagers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectivesSource: David .J. Morrison, 2001. “Profit Patterns”. Times Business.pp.17-27.译文:利润模式一个公司价值的增长依赖于公司自身的能力的预期,价值的迁移也只是从一个经济部门转移到另外一个经济部门或者是一个公司到另外一个意想不到的公司。

外文翻译--股利政策:一个综述

外文翻译--股利政策:一个综述

外文原文Dividend policy: a review1. IntroductionExplaining dividend policy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing financial economists. Despite decades of study, we have yet to completely understand the factors that influence dividend policy and the manner in which these factors interact. Allen and Michaely (1995) conclude that ‘‘much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of dividends is required before a consensus can be reached’’ (p. 833). The fact that a major textbook such as Brealey and Myers (2002) lists dividends as one of the ten important unsolved problems in finance reinforces this conclusion. The first empirical study of dividend policy was provided by Lintner (1956), who surveyed corporate managers to understand how they arrived at the dividend policy. Lintner found that an existing dividend rate forms a bench mark for the management. Companies’ management usually displayed a strong reluctance to reduce dividends. Lintner opined that managers usually have reasonably definitive target payout ratios.Over the years, dividends are increased slowly at a particular speed of adjustment, so that the actual payout ratio moves closer to the target payout ratio.2. Dividend irrelevance and tax clientelesWhile Lintner (1956) provided the stylistic description of dividends, the watershed in the theoretical modelling of dividends was almost surely the classic paper Miller and Modigliani (1961), which first proposed dividend irrelevance. Essentially, their model is a one-period model under certainty. Given a firm’s investment program, the dividend policy of the firm is irrelevant to the firm value, since a higher dividend would necessitate more sale of stock to raise finances for the investment program. The crucial assumption here is that the futuremarket valuewill remain unaffected by current dividends.The argument rests on the assumptions that the investment program is determined independently and that every stockholder earns the same return (i.e. thediscount rate remains constant). Miller and Modigliani’s dividend-irrelevance argument is elegant, but this does not explainwhy companies, the public, investment analysts are so interested in dividend announcements. Clearly, the observed interest in dividend announcement must be related to some violation of theMiller andModigliani ler and Modigliani, while formulating their famous dividend irrelevance propositions, observed that in the presence of taxation, investors will form clienteles with specific preferences for particular levels of dividend yields. This specific preference for dividends may be determined, inter alia, by the marginal tax rates faced by the investor. Altering the dividend level, according to Miller and Modigliani, leads only to a change in the clientele of shareholders for the firm. Part of the dividend puzzle arises from the fact that dividends are typically taxed at a higher rate compared to the income from capital gains. This has certainly been historically true although in recent years we have noticed a move to eliminate/reduce tax on dividends. We should, therefore, expect investors to prefer cash from capital gains over cash from dividends.Miller and Scholes (1978) provide an ingenious scheme to convert dividend income to capital gains income. Recently Allen et al. (2000) have advanced a theory based on the clientele paradigm to explain why some firms pay dividends and others repurchase shares. A variant of the clientele theory has also been advanced by Baker (2004) where they posit that dividend payments are in response to demands from investors for dividends.3. Informational asymmetry and signalling modelsDeviations from the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition is obtainable only when the assumptions underlying the setting of Miller and Modigliani are violated. The tax-clientele hypothesis uses the market imperfection of differential taxation of dividends and capital gains to explain the dividend puzzle. Bhattacharyya (1979) develops another explanation for the dividend policy based on asymmetric information. Managers have private knowledge about the distributional support of the project cash flow and they signal this knowledge to the market through their choice of dividends.In the signalling equilibrium higher value of the support is signalled by higher dividend. In other words, the better the news, the higher is the dividend. Heinkel (1978) considers a set up where different firms have different return-generating abilities. This information is transmitted to the market by means of dividends, or equivalently, from investing at less than the first best level. In the equilibrium of Heinkel’s model, the firm with less productivity invests up to its first best level and declares no dividend, while the firm with higher productivity invests less than its first best level of investment, and declares the difference between the amount raised and the amount invested as the dividend. The firm with higher productivity acts in this way in order to distinguish itself from the firm with less productivity. Dividends are still irrelevant in the sense that both firm types could raise an extra X dollars with a new issue to pay an extra X dollars as a dividend with no signalling effect. The signalling cost in this model comes from reduced investment from first best level. In contrast, the signalling cost in Bhattacharyya (1979) comes from taxation and non-symmetric cost of raising funds in the capital market. Bhattacharyya and Heinkel’s work was followed by a number of other papers which posited that dividends are used by managers to transmit information to the capital market.Notable works in signalling paradigm of dividend policy are those of Miller and Rock (1985), John andWilliams (1985) andWilliams (1988). These signalling models typically characterize the informational asymmetry by bestowing the manager or the insider with information about some aspect of the future cash flow. In the signalling equilibriums obtained in these models, the higher the expected cash flow, the higher is the dividend. In Miller and Rock (1985), the signalling cost is the opportunity cost of less than first best investment. In John and Williams (1985), and Williams (1988), the differential taxation of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains sustains the signalling equilibriums. In these papers dividends sustain a fully separating equilibrium. By contrast, Kumar (1988) demonstrates that dividends could also sustain a semi-separating equilibrium where the manager has private information about the productivity of the firm. Venezia (1991) set up a rational equilibrium expectation model. Bayesian investors expect that dividends will be proportional to cash flows.Managers have advance noisy information about the future cash flow. The investors observe the dividend and update their belief about the cash flow. Under these circumstances, Venezia show that the optimal dividend is proportional to the cash flow. Brennan and Thakor (1990) focus on a different question compared to the other signalling type papers on dividend policy. Most dividend policy papers model the dividend decision, as a decision about the amount to be distributed as dividends. In contrast, this paper views the amount of cash to be distributed as exogenously given. It consider three forms of disbursement: dividebd declaration, non-proportionate share repurchase through open market operation, and non-proportionate share repurchase through tender offer. Brennan and Thakor assume that there are two classes of shareholders –informed and uninformed. They show that in a tender offer, the uninformed shareholder always tenders, whereas the informed holds onto his/her shares. The situation is reversed in an open market operation, where the informed shareholder always sell his/her holding and the uninformed never does.4. Free cash flow hypothesisThe rich theoretical development in modelling dividends as signals of private managerial/entrepreneurial information also gave rise to empirical research seeking to determine the fit of the signalling theory to real world data. Typically, the empirical literature attempted to test the signalling paradigm counterpoised against an alternative rationale for dividends advanced by Jensen (1986), based on the principal- agent framework. According to this framework, dividends are used by shareholders as a device to reduce overinvestment by managers. The managers control the firm; therefore, they might invest cash in projects with negative net present values, but which increase the personal utility of the managers in some way. A dividend reduces this free cash flow and thus reduces the scope for overinvestment. The two most cited works in this genre are the papers by Easterbrook (1984) and by Jensen (1986). Unfortunately, neither of these papers try to model the situation; rather, they put forward plausible hypotheses. On the one hand, Easterbrook (1984) hypothesizes that dividends are used to take away the free cash from the control of the managers and pay it off to shareholders. This ensures that the managers will have to approach thecapital market in order to meet the funding needs for new projects. The need to approach the capital markets imposes a discipline on the managers, and thus reduces the cost of monitoring the managers. Additionally, Easterbrook hypothesizes that the imperative to approach the capital market also acts as a counterweight to the managers’ own risk aversion. Jensen (1986) on the other hand, contends that in corporations with large cash flows, managers will have a tendency to invest in low return projects. According to Jensen, debt counters this by taking away the free cash flow. Jensen contends that takeovers and mergers take place when either the acquirer has a large quantum of free cash flow or the acquired has a large free cash flow which has not been paid out to stakeholders. Although Jensen does not deal with the issue of dividends, empirical researchers of dividend policy often use Jensen’s article for motivating tests of the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend policy.The empirical evidence on the three hypotheses are mixed, as we observe in Table I. Dividend policy thus continues to remain a puzzle. We can however enumerate some interesting stylized facts. In Table II we compile the stylized facts as they emerge from a study of the empirical literature.5. ConclusionWe have seen that the empirical evidence is equivocal about the existing theories of dividend policy. Research has discovered a large number of stylized facts but the explanation of dividend policy in an integrated framework still eludes us. In his PhD dissertation, Bhattacharyya (2000) explains dividend policy by using the asymmetric information paradigm. However, unlike the signalling models (where the informed manager/insider uses the dividend as a signalling device), he posits dividend policy as a component of a screening contract set up by an uninformed principal. In signalling models, hidden information is the source of informational asymmetry. In the dissertation, he uses a richer source of informational asymmetry – that due to moral hazard (because the effort exerted by agent is not observable) and that due to hidden information (because the productivity of agent is not observable). He assumes that the manager wants to maximize his net wealth and the principal recognizes this and sets up a discriminating contract to utilize the skill of the agent in the productive enterprise.He finds that contrary to the findings of the dividend models based on the signalling paradigm, dividend – conditional on cash availability – bears an inverse relationship to managerial type. That is, for a given level of available cash, the manager with lower productivity declares a higher dividend than that declared by a manager with higher productivity. He concludes that his model can be used to explain many of the empirical findings obtained by other researchers. An interesting corollary of his model is that when we include costly private effort and differences in productivity, the relationship between dividend and managerial type shifts from being monotone increasing to monotone decreasing. This relationship shows that incorporation of costly effort and difference in productivity modify the result (Miller and Rock, 1985) obtained. Miller and Rock study a model which does not include managerial effort. Another interesting implication of this dissertation is that dividends can be shown to be relevant in the presence of moral hazard and hidden information, even when the agency contract is optimally chosen.The free cash flow conjecture posits that higher dividends are better because higher dividend removes free cash from the hands of the managers; consequently, the managers have less money to waste. According to this conjecture, announcement of higher dividends would also lead to higher abnormal return.The proof of the pudding, as the adage goes, is in eating, and the validity of a theory is the degree of its congruence with empirical reality. A properly conducted research will take into account the empirical implications of all the theories and test them simultaneously. This is the task for future.Source: N. Bhattacharyya, (2007) "Dividend policy: a review", Managerial Finance, V ol. 33 Iss: 1, pp.4 – 13.中文译文:股利政策:一个综述1、简介解释股利政策对财务经济学家来说已经是面临的最困难挑战之一。

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译(可编辑)

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译(可编辑)

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译外文翻译Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from IsraelMaterial Source: Journal of Management and Governance Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky1.IntroductionFor many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprietorships, partnerships or closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the firm and shares its profits.However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corporation has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition, ownership is disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relievesfinancing problems, which enables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they the professional mangers do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money sell common stocks in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities of professional managers. This is why it is plausible to hypothesize that the modern diverse-ownership corporations perform better than the traditional “closely held” business forms.Moderating factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chance that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and it troubled many economists before e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen andMeckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983. The conclusion was that there needs to exist a monitoring system or contract, aligning the manager interests and actions with the wealth and welfare of the owners stockholdersAgency-type problems exist also in closely held firms becausethere are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely held firms seem in general less severe.The presence of agency problems weakens the central thesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases the advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, we maintain the hypothesis that diverse-ownership firms perform better than closely held firms. In our view, the trend towards diverse ownership corporations is rational and can be explained by performance gains.2. Ownership Structure and Firm PerformanceOne of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern corporations are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and control. Early theorists such as Williamson 1964 propose that non-owner managers prefer their owninterests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed firms.The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavior by the manager. Fama 1980, for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy 1985, suggest that executive compensation packages help align management interests with those of the shareholders by generating a link between management pay and firm performanceHence, non-owner manager firms are not less efficient than owner-managed firms. Most interestingly, Demsetz and Lehn 1985 conclude that the structure of ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value imization. That is, diverse ownership and non-owner managed firms emerge when they are more worthwhile.The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed see Short 1994 for a summaryPart of the diverse results can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlled firms. These criteria, typically based on percentage ownership by large stockholders, are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because, as demonstrated by Morck,Shleifer and Vishny 1988 and McConnell and Servaes 1990, the relation between percentage ownership and firm performance is nonlinear. Further, percent ownership appears insufficient for describing the control structure. Two firms with identical overall percentage ownership by large blockholders are likely to have different control organizations, depending on the identity of the large stockholders.In this study, we utilize the ownership classification scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach 1997. This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms controlled by a group of individuals partners. Obviously, the control structure in each of these firm types is different. Thus, some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance might emerge.3. DataWe employ data from a developing economy, Israel, where many forms of business organization coexist. The sample includes 280 public companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange TASE during 1994. For each company we collect data on the 1992?1994 net income profits after tax, 1994 total assets, 1994 equity, 1994 top management remuneration, and 1994 ownership structure. All data is extracted from the companies financial reports except for the classification of firms according to their ownership structure, which is based on the publica tions, “Holdings ofInterested Parties” issued by the Israel Securities Authority, “Meitav Stock Guide,” and “Globes Stock Exchange Yearbook”.The initial sample included all firms traded on the TASE about 560 at the time. However, sample size shrunk by half because: 1 according to the Israeli Security Authority the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC only 434 companies provided reliable compensation reports; 2 147 companies have a negative 1992?94 average net income, which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ; and 3 for 7 firms we could not determine the ownership structure.The companies in the sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nine percent of the firms do not have any majority owner. Among majority owned firms, individuals family firms or partnerships of individuals own 72% and the rest are controlled by concerns. About half 49% of the individually-controlled firms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest 51% are dominated by families. Professional non-owner CEOs are found in about 15% of the individually controlled firms.4. Methodology: Data Envelopment AnalysisIn this study, we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis DEA. Data Envelopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Operations Research for performance evaluations see Seiford and Thrall, 1990, and previous versions of it have been usedin Finance by Elyasiani andMehdian, 1992, for example.The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach. For each analyzed firm, DEA constructs a “twin” comparable virtual firm consisting of a portfolio of other sample firms. Then, the relative performance of the firm can be determined. Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric, that is it estimates a “production function” and assesses each firm performance according to its residual relative to the fitted fixed parameters economy-wide production function. We are not claiming that parametric methods are inadequate. Rather, we attempt a different and perhaps more flexible methodology, and compare its results to the standard regression methodology Findings.The equity ratio variable represents expectation that given the firm size, the higher the investments of stockholders equity, the higher their return net income. Finally, the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’ input. One of our central points is that top managers’ actions and skills affect firm output. Hence, higher pay mangers who presumably are also higher-skill are expected to yield superior profits. Rosen 1982 relates executives’ pay and rank in the organization to their skills and abilities, and Murphy 1998 discusses in de tail the structure of executive pay and its relation to firm’s performance.The DEA analysis and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets of firms: Investment companies, Industrial companies, Real-estate companies, and Trade and services companies. This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of the firms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure on firm performance.5.Empirical Results The main results of the empirical findings reviewed above are that majority Control by a few individuals diminishes firm performance, and that professional non-owner managers promote performance. The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two other findings. First, it appears that firms without professional managers and firms controlled by individuals are more likely to exhibit negative net income.Second, Table IV also presents results of regressions of net income, NET INC, on leverage, size, professional manager dummy, and individual control dummy.6. ConclusionsThe empirical analysis of 280 firms in Israel reveals that ownership structure impacts firm performance, where performance is estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given the firm’s inputs. We find that:Out of all organizational forms, family owner-managed firms appearleast efficient in generating profits. When all firms are considered, only family firms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than 30%, and when performance is measured relative to the business sector, only family firms with owner-managers have an average score of less than 50%.2Non-owner managed firms perform better than owner-managed firms. These findings suggest that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes performance Critical readers may wonder how come “efficient” and “less-efficient” organizational structures coexist. The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation. The lower-performing family and partnership controlled firms are likely, as time progresses, to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.A few reservations are in order. First, we do not contend that every company would gain by transforming into a disperse ownership public firm. For example, it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second, there remain questions about the methodology and its application Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance. Last, we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership public firm improves performances. Future research should further explore any performance gains from the separation ofownership and control.译文股权结构与公司业绩资料来源:管理治理杂志作者:贝尼?劳特巴赫和亚历山大?范尼斯基多年来,在许多经济体中的大多数商业活动是由独资企业、合伙企业或者非公开企业操作管理的。

股权分配方案英文

股权分配方案英文

股权分配方案英文Title: Equity Distribution Plan for a Startup Company Introduction:In any startup company, the allocation of equity is a critical decision that can have a significant impact on the success and sustainability of the business. An effective equity distribution plan is necessary to attract and retain top talent, provide incentives for performance, and ensure fairness among the founders and early employees. This article will outline a comprehensive equity distribution plan for a startup company, considering various factors such as roles, contributions, vesting periods, and growth projections.1. Equity Pool:To begin with, a certain percentage of the company's equity should be set aside as an equity pool. This pool will be used to grant equity to employees, advisors, consultants, and other contributors to the company's success. Typically, a range of 15-20% of the company's equity is reserved for this purpose, depending on the industry and growth potential.2. Founders' Equity:The founders of the startup should be allocated a significant portion of the equity as an incentive for their commitment and risk-taking in the initial stages. The distribution can be based on various criteria such as founders' experience, initial investment, and key roles. However, it is important to ensure that the distribution is fair and incentivizes continued dedication to the company's growth.3. Employee Equity:Equity should be allocated to employees based on their roles, contributions, and market rates. It is essential to develop a clear and transparent framework for evaluating performance and determining the equity allocation. This could include considering factors such as seniority, job responsibilities, performance metrics, and duration of service. Employee equity should be subject to vesting schedules to ensure retention and alignment with the company's long-term objectives.4. Vesting Schedule:A vesting schedule outlines the timeline by which individuals can exercise their equity. This schedule helps aligns the interests of the employees with the long-term success of the company. A typical vesting period is four years, with a one-year cliff. This means that an employee will only become eligible to exercise their equity after one year of service and, from there, vest their equity monthly or quarterly over the remaining three years.5. Performance-Based Equity:To incentivize exceptional performance, the equity distribution plan should consider performance-based grants. These grants can be tied to specific milestones or achievement of predetermined targets. Performance-based equity ensures that employees and key contributors are rewarded for their exceptional efforts and contribute to the overall success of the company.6. Advisor and Consultant Equity:Equity can also be allocated to advisors, consultants, and external partners who contribute significant value to the company. Theallocation can be based on their level of involvement and expertise. However, the equity grants should be subject to a vesting schedule and performance targets to ensure continued engagement and alignment of interests.7. Growth Equity:As the company grows and achieves significant milestones, additional equity can be allocated to key employees or external contributors. This growth equity can serve as a retention tool and further incentivize individuals to contribute to the company's success. The distribution of growth equity should be reviewed periodically to ensure equity dilution is managed effectively. Conclusion:An equity distribution plan is an essential element of any startup company. The plan should consider factors such as founder equity, employee equity, vesting schedules, performance-based equity, advisor equity, consultant equity, and growth equity. It is crucial to develop a fair and transparent system that aligns the interests of all stakeholders while incentivizing commitment, performance, and long-term growth. Regular reviews and adjustments to the equity distribution plan as the company evolves will guarantee its effectiveness and sustainability in a competitive business landscape.。

股利分配理论与政策-外文文献

股利分配理论与政策-外文文献

详细描述
由于股利所得通常被征收较高的所得税税率,而资本利 得税税率相对较低,投资者可能会更倾向于通过保留利 润进行再投资而非支付股利。因此,税负效应是影响公 司股利分配决策的重要因素之一。
05
股利分配的国际比较与借鉴
美国股利分配政策
慷慨的股利政策
美国公司通常采取慷慨的股利政策,向股东支付相对较高的股利,这有助于吸引投资者 并建立稳定的股东基础。
股利分配理论与政策-外文文 献
目录
• 股利分配理论 • 股利政策 • 股利分配的影响因素 • 股利分配的效应 • 股利分配的国际比较与借鉴
01
股利分配理论
传统股利理论
总结词
传统股利理论主张公司应该将盈余以股利的形式回报给股东,以降低代理成本,减少管理层和股东之间的利益冲 突。
详细描述
传统股利理论认为,股利政策是公司向股东传递信号的一种方式,通过支付股利,公司可以向市场证明其盈利能 力并提升公司的市场价值。同时,支付股利可以降低代理成本,因为管理层需要为股东的利益而努力工作,而不 是为了自己的私利。
详细描述
这种政策的优点在于它反映了公司的盈利能力,使股东能够更好地了解公司的财务状况。然而,过高 的股利支付率可能会限制公司的投资和扩张能力。
低正常股利加额外股利政策
总结词
详细描述
低正常股利加额外股利政策是一种混合策略, 公司支付较低的常规股利,并在盈利状况特 别好时支付额外股利。
这种政策旨在平衡公司的当前利益和未来发 展需求,同时向股东提供一定的财务激励。 然而,如何确定合理的常规股利水平以及何 时发放额外股利需要仔细考虑。
法律限制
公司法与证券法
公司法和证券法对公司的股利分配政策有一定的限制。例如,公司必须先弥补亏损,才能支付股利。此外,证券法还 规定了公司发放股利的条件和程序。
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股利分配企业利润分配外文翻译文献股利分配企业利润分配外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)译文:股利政策摘要:股利政策在股份制企业经营决策中占有重要地位,是企业的核心财务问题。

因而股利分配政策一直为股份公司的利益相关者所密切关注。

全文在对传统及现代股利政策理论的介绍和股利政策基本类型进行阐述的基础上,重点对上市公司的股利分配政策现状、选择股利政策应该考虑的因素进行了分析,并且针对存在的问题提出了相应的建设性意见。

关键词:股利理论;股利分配;政策建议1 引言盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题:(1)自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东?(2)怎么样把 这些现金分配给股东,是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票?(3)需要保持 一个不变的股利支付政策,还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同?当财务经理 决定应该付多少现金给股东时,他一定要记住,公司的目标是股东价值最大化,目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比,应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。

投资者是偏好(1)以现金股利形式分配收益;还是偏好(2)回购股票或者吧收益重新投资到公司?这两者都会导致资本利得。

这方面的偏好可以通个稳定增产的股票价值评估模型来考虑:gD S -K =P 1^ 如果公司 增加了股利支付率 就增加1D ,单独分子可能会导致股票价格上升。

然而,如果1D 提高了,就会减少钱用在再投资,会引起预期 增长率下降,那就有可能降低股票的价格。

因此,股利政策有任何改变将有两个相反的结果。

所以,公司最优股利政策是必须在现在行 使的股利和未 来增长之间取得一个平衡,使股票价格达到最高。

在这一部分文献中,我们将分析评价了投资者偏好的三个理论:(1)股利无关理论;(2)“一鸟在手”理论;(3)税收偏好理论。

2 股利理论2.1股利无关理论有很多人认为,股利分配政策对公司股票价值和资本成本都是没有任何影响。

如果股利政策没有显著的影响,那这个股利政策就是不相关。

股利无关理论的主要提出的人是默顿•H •米勒和佛朗哥•莫迪哥 莱尼。

公司价值只是由于基本盈利能力和经营风险所决定。

换一句话说,MM 理论作者认为,公司价值只是由其资产所创造的收益来决定的,而不是由于股利和留存收益之间是如何分割来决定的。

要如何理解MM 理论关于股利政策无关的观点,我们需要认识到,一个股东在理论上都是能构建自己的股利政策。

但是如果投资者能够随意的购买或者卖出股票,他就能够实现他所期望的鼓励政策,而不用支付额外的费用。

因此,鼓励政策是不相关的。

要注意的是,那些想要得到额外股东在卖掉股票是必须支付一定的费用;而那些不想要额外股利的股东不想为那部分鼓 励交税而且用税后股利购买额外的股份还得支付交易费用。

既然税收和交易费用的存在是必然的,那么鼓励政策也很可能是相关的。

在建立股利理论时,MM理论作了一系列的假设,尤其是关于不存在税收和交易费用的假设。

显然,税收和交易费用是确实存在的,因此MM股利无关理论可能是不正确的。

但是MM理论提出,所有的理论都是基于简化了的假设,理论的正确与否必须经过实践的检验,而不是其假设的真实性。

2.2“一鸟在手”理论MM股利无关理论的主要结论是:鼓励政策不影响要求的权益收益率Ks。

该观点在学术界引起广泛争论。

迈伦•林特纳就认为,随着股利支付的增加,Ks会下降,因为虽然可以假定留存收益会带来相应的资本利得,但是与得到支付的股利相比,投资者获得收益的确定性要小。

MM理论对这有反对意见。

他们认为,Ks与股利政策是没有关系的,这就说投资者对于D1∕P和资本利得是没有偏好。

MM理论认为,高顿和林特纳为“一鸟在手”理论的假象所迷惑,因为在MM理论看来,大部分投资者都打算将其股利所得再投资于同一家或类似的企业。

而且在任何情况下,对于投资者来说,从长远来看,公司现金流量的风险是由该公司的经营现金流量风险来决定的,却不是由股利政策决定的。

2.3税收偏好理论从所得税方面来考虑,投资者可能会偏好较低的股利支付率,这样说的理由有三个。

(1)第二章说到长期资本利得要缴纳20%的所得税,而股利收益的税率却高达39.6%。

所以,有钱的投资者可能会更加偏好于公司留存收益而且将其投资于公司业务,而不是将收益用于发放股利。

股利收益增长会导致股价上涨,从而较低税负的资本利得会替代较高税负的股利。

(2)资本利得直到股票被卖掉以后才需要支付所得税。

由于资金时间价值的作用,未来所支付的一美元的所得税比现在支付的一美元的所得税的价值更加低。

(3)如果某人持有股票直到死亡,那就根本不会有资本利得税。

接受股票受益人可以把股票原持有人去世那天的股票价值作为其成本基础,从而可以完全避免资本利得所要交的赋税。

由于这种税收优势,投资者会愿意保留公司其绝大部分收益。

如果是这样,那么相对于其他方面类似而支付率高的公司而言,投资者将更加愿意支付率低的公司的股票付更加高的价钱。

这三个理论为公司经理人提供了有矛盾的建议,因此,如果理论可信的话,我们应该相信哪种理论?最合理的方法是利用经验来检测这3个理论。

这方面的研究已经展开,但他们的结果还不太清楚。

有两个原因(1)为一个有效的统计来说,除了股利政策,其他事情必须保持不变;也就是说,样本公司必须只是股利政策方面有所差异。

(2)我们必须能够准确地测量每个公司的资本成本。

这两种情况没有一个能够成立:我们不能发现一家上市公司只在股利政策方面有差异,也无法得到准确的公司资本成本的估计。

因此,没有人能建立了一个股利政策和资本成本间清晰的关系。

投资者作为一个整体,不能看出统一的选更高或更低的股利偏好。

然而,个人投资者就有较强的喜好。

一般投资者喜欢高额股利,而另一些则喜欢所有的收益都是资本利得。

这些差异有助于解释为什么很难达成任何确切的最优股利支付率的结论。

甚至,证据和逻辑显示,投资者喜欢投资于一个稳定、可预测股利政策的对公司。

3 相关建议在碰到现实中如何制定股利政策之前,我们必须考虑另外两个理论问题,因为这会影响我们对待股利政策的观点:(1)信息内容假设;(2)委托人效应。

MM认为投资者对股利政策的反应并不能够表明投资者更喜欢通过股利来获得收益。

而他们认为,股价随着股利波动仅仅表明,在宣布股利政策时有重要的信息,或者信号内容。

委托人效应一定意义说,股东可以选择公司的。

从一个股利政策转变到另一种股利支付政策时,允许不喜欢这项新政策的股东卖股票给其他投资者。

然而, 频繁的转换会导致无效率。

因为:(1)存在破产成本,(2) 销售股票的股东可能必须要缴纳资本利得税,(3) 可能喜欢公司新的股支付利政策的投资者出现短缺。

所以,管理层在改变公司的股利支付政策要慎重,因为这变化可能会导致对现有股东出售所持有的股票,迫使股票价格下降。

这样的价格下降可能暂时,但它可能也被永久,如果一少部分投资者被新股利支付政策的吸引,那么股票价格仍将持续低落。

当然,新政策也可能吸引比公司更大的委托人,在这种情况下,股票价格会上升。

在很多方面,我们关于股利政策的讨论与资本结构的讨论是分不开的:我们会陈述相关的理论和问题,也会列出其他一些影响股利政策的因素,但是我们不会给出管理层可以遵循的任何硬性指标。

显然,在我们讨论中可以看到,股利政策决策时根据众多信息进行判断的活动,而不是能够基于精确的数学的模型来制作的决策。

在现实中,股利政策不是一个独立的决策——股利政策的制定与资本结构和资本预算决策时密不可分的。

造成这个原因是不对称的信息,信息的不对称在以下两个方面影响管理决策:1、一般来说,管理者不愿意发行新股,首先,新股会导致发行费用——佣金、薪酬等——通过留存收益增加公司的权益资本,就可以避免这些费用。

其次,不对称的信息使投资者认为,发行新股是一种负面信号,从而降低他们对公司未来前景的预期。

最终的结果是宣布发行新股通常会导致股价的下跌。

考虑到相关的成本,包括发行费用和不对称信息的成本,经理更偏向于使用留存收益作为新权益资本的主要来源。

2、股利变化是一种信号,反映了经理对公司未来前景的看法。

因此,股利减少,或者更严重的是不支付股利,通常对公司的股价产生重大的负面影响。

由于管理者认识到这一点,他们往往努力将股利保持在一个足够低的水平,这样在将来不得不降低股利的可能性就会相当地小。

当然,出乎众人意料地大幅度提高股利可以作为一种正面信号。

股利政策市在计划过程中制定的,因此未来的投资机会和经营现金流量存在不确定性。

因而,每年实际的股利支付率很可能会低于或者高于公司的长期目标。

但是,分配的股利额应当维持在一定水平或按计划增长,除非公司的财务状况恶化到不能维持的程度。

长期保持稳定或稳步增长的股利支付额意味着公司的财务状况控制得很好。

进一步说,稳定的股利可以缓解投资者的不确定心里预期,因而可以减少发行新股的负面影响,因此绝对是必需的。

一般来说,公司有优良的投资机会应该降低股利支付率,因此,留存收益会比那些投资机会差的公司多。

不确定性程度也影响这一决定。

如果自由现金流量预测有很大的不确定性,在这里自由现金流量是公司的经营现金流量减去强制性的权益资本投资,最好是要保守一些,即设定较低的股利支付额。

同时,公司稳定的投资机会是可以延期的,那么公司可以设定较高的股利支付率。

因为在困难时期,投资可能延期一年或两年,从而增加可供股利的现金。

最后,如果公司的资本成本会受到负债比率很大程度上影响,公司可以提出了更高的股利支付率,因为他们在受到压力下,更容易更多的债务资本来维持资本预算项目,而不是削减股息或发行股票。

公司只有一次机会设定股利支付额。

因此,现在的股利政策受过去制定的政策的限定,因此要设定设置接下来的5年的政策,一定首先回顾相关现状开始。

尽管我们描绘了经理设定他们时所使用的公司的红利政策的合理过程,股利政策仍然是公司必须做的最需要判断力的决策。

因为这个原因,股利政策总是由董事会决定,财务人员进行了分析现状后提建议,但是会由董事会作出最后的决定。

原文:题目:Dividend policy作者:Eugene F. Brigham. Joel F.Houston刊物:Fundamentals of financial ,2004,(8):23-25.AbstractDividend policy p lays an important role in business decision-ma king in the stock is the company's core financial issues. Thus the dividend distribution policy has been the company's stakeholders shares are closely watched. On the basis of the text of the introduction and dividend policy basic types of traditional and modern theories of dividend policy elaborate on, focusing on the status of the dividend distribution policy of listed companies, the dividend policy choice should consider factors were analyzed, and deal with the problems raised corresponding constructive comments.Keywords : Dividend theory; dividend distribution; policy recommendations1. IntroductionProfitable companies regularly face three important questions: (1) How much of its free cash flow should it pass on to shareholders? (2) Should it provide this cash to shareholders by raising the dividend or by repurchasing stock? (3) Should it maintain a stable, consistent payment policy, or should it let the payments vary as conditions change?When deciding how much cash to distribute to shareholders, finance manager must keep in mind that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder value. Consequently, the target pay rate ratio —define as the percentage of net income to be paid out as cash dividends —should be based in large part on investors’ preference for dividends versus capital gains: do investors prefer (1) to have the firm distribute income as cash dividends or (2) to have it either repurchase stock or else plow the earnings back into the business, both of which should result in capital gains? This preference can be considered in terms of the constant growth stock valuation model:gD S -K =P 1^ If the company increases the payout ration, the raises 1D .This increase in the numerator, taken alone, would cause the stock price to rise. However, if 1D is raised, then less money will be available for reinvestment, that will cause the expected growth rate to decline, and that will tend to lower the stock ’s price. Thus, any change in payout policy will have two opposing effects. Therefore, t he firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike abalance between current dividends and future growth so to maximize the stock price. In this section, we examine three theories of investor preference: (1)the dividend irrelevance theory, (2)the "bird-in-the-hand" theory ,and(3) the tax preference theory.2.dividend theoryDIVIDEND IRRELEV ANCE THEORYIt has been argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. If dividend policy has no significant effects, then it would be irrelevance .The principal proponents of dividend irrelevance theory are Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani(MM).They argued that the firm’s is determined only by its basic earning power and its business risk. In other words, MM argued that the value of firm depends only on the income produced by its assets, not on how this income is split between dividends and retained earnings.To understand MM’s argument that dividend policy is irrelevance, recognize that any shareholder can in theory construct his or her own dividend policy .If investors could buy and sell shares and thus create their own dividend policy without incurring costs, then the firm’s dividend policy would truly be irrelevant. Note, though, that investors who want additional dividends must incur brokerage cost to sell shares, and investors who do not want dividends must first pay taxes on the unwanted dividends and then incur brokerage cost to purchase shares with the after-tax dividends. Since taxes and brokerage costs certainly exist, dividend policy may well be relevant.In developing their dividend theory, MM made a number of assumptions especially the absence of taxes and brokerage costs. Obviously, tax and brokerage costs do exist, so the MM irrelevance theory may not be true. However, MM argued that all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and that the validity of a theory must be judged by empirical test, not by the realism of its assumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HAND THEORYThe principal conclusions of MM’s dividend irrelevance theory is that dividend policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, Ks. This conclusion has been hotly debated in the academic circles .In particular, Myron Gordon and John Lintner argued that Ks decreases as the dividend payout is increase because investor are less certain of receiving the capital gains which are supposed to result from retaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend paymentsMM disagreed .They argued that Ks independent of dividend policy, which implies that investors are indifferent between D1/P0 and g and, hence, between dividends and capital gains. MM called the Gordon-Lintner argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacybecause, in MM’s view, most investors plan to reinvest their dividends in the stock of the same or similar firms, and, in any event, the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows to investors in the long run is determined by the riskiness of operating cash flows, not by dividend payout policy.TAX PREFERENCE THEORYThere are three tax-related reasons for thinking that investors might prefer a low dividend payout to a high payout: (1) Recall from Chapter II that long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20 percent, whereas dividend income is taxed at effective rates which go up to 39.6 percent. Therefore, wealthy investors might prefer to have companies retain and plow earnings back into the business. Earnings growth would presumably lead to stock prices increases, and thus low- taxed capital gains would be substituted for higher-taxed dividends. (2)Taxes are not paid on the gains until a stock is sold. Due to time value effects, a dollar of taxes paid in the future has a lower effective cost than a dollar paid today. (3) If a stock is held by someone until he or she dies, no capital gains tax is due at all-the beneficiaries who receive the stock can use the stock’s value on the death day as their cost basis and thus completely escape the capital gains tax.Because of these tax advantages, investors may prefer to have companies retain most of their earnings. IF so, investors would be willing to pay more for low-payout companies than for otherwise similar high- payout companies.There three theories offer contradictory advice to corporate managers, so which, if any, should we believe? The most logical way to proceed is to test the theories empirically. Many such tests have been conducted, but their results have been unclear. There are two reasons for this(1)For a valid statistical test, things other than dividend policy must be held constant; that is, the sample companies must differ only in their dividend policies, and(2)we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracy each firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtain precise estimates of the cost of equity.Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidence and logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy.3.the relevant recommendationsBecause we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: (1)the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and(2) The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements.The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of(1)brokerage costs,(2)the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and (3) a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy might attract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise.In many ways, our discussion of dividend policy parallels our discussion of capital structure: we presented the relevant theories and issues, and we listed some additional factors that influence dividend policy, but we did not come up with any hard-and-fast guidelines that manager can follow. It should be apparent from our discussion that dividend policy decisions are exercises in informed judgment, not decisions that can be based on precise mathematical model.In practice, dividend policy is not an independent decision – the dividend decisions is made jointly with capital structure and capital budgeting decisions. The underlying reason for this joint decisions process is asymmetric information, which influences managerial actions in two ways:1, In general, managers do not want to issue new common stock. First, new common stock involves issuance cost -- - commissions, fees, and so on-and those costs can be avoided by using retained earnings to finan ce the firm’s equity needs. Also, asymmetric information causes investors to view common stock issues as negative signals and thus lowers expectations regarding the firm’s future prospects. The end result is that the announcement of a new stock issue usually leads to a decrease in the stock prices.Considering the total costs involved, including both issuance and asymmetric information costs, managers strongly prefer to use retained earnings as their primary source of new equity.2, Dividend changes provide signal about managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future prospects, Thus, dividend reductions, Or worse yet, omissions, generally have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock price . Since managers recognize this, they try to set dollar dividends low enough so that there is only a remote chance that the dividend will have to be reduce in the future. Of course, unexpectedly large dividend increases can be used to provide positive signals. the actual payout ratio in any.The dividend decision is made during the planning process, so there is uncertainty about future investment opportunities and operating cash flows. Thus, the actual payout ratio in any year will probably be above or below the firm’s long-range target. However, the dollar dividend should be maintained, or increase as planned policy simply cannot be maintained. A steady or increasing steam of dividends over the long run signals that the firm’s financial condition is under control. Further, investors uncertain is decreased by stable dividend, so a steady dividend stream reduces the negative effect of a stock issue, should one become absolutely necessary.In general, firms with superior investment opportunities should set lower payouts, hence retain more earnings, than firms with poor investment opportunities. The degree of uncertainty also influences the decision. If there is a great deal of uncertainty in the forecasts of free cash flows, which are defined here as the firm’s operating cash flows minus mandatory equity investments, then it is best to be conservative and to set a lower current dollar dividend. Also, firms with postponable investment opportunities can afford to set a higher dollar dividend, because in times of stress investments can be postponed for a year or two, thus increasing the cash available for dividends. Finally, firms whose cost of capital is largely unaffected by change in the debt ratio can also afford to set a higher payout ratio, because they can, in times of stress, more easily issue additional debt to maintain the capital budgeting program without having to cut dividends or issue stock.Firms have only one opportunity to set the opportunity payment from scratch. Therefore, today’s dividend decisions are constrained by policies that were set in the past, hence setting a policy for the next five years necessarily begins with a review of the current situation. Although we have outlined a rational process for managers to use when setting their firms’dividend policies, dividend policy still remains one of the most judgmental decisions that firms must make. For this reason, dividend policy is always set by the board of directors the financial staff analyzes the situation and makes a recommendation, but the board makes the final decision.谢谢下载,祝您生活愉快!。

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