哈佛公开课：公正该如何是好笔记
哈佛大学公开课《公正》课堂笔记.doc
哈佛大学公开课《公正》课堂笔记.doc公正是一个关键的理论和实际问题。
参加正义的追求，是大多数文化的一个中心问题。
公正是哲学、政治和法律学的重要主题。
在哲学中，公正是价值和道德基础的探究，而在政治科学中，则是权利和权力的探究。
公正是自治的标志。
自治有时显然是重要的，因为人们会认为，只有自主选择，才能使人们成为自己的主人。
课程注重分析公正所涉及的几个关键问题：1.分配公正（distributive justice）——财产、权利、机会分配的公正性。
2.修补公正（corrective justice）——如何修正不公正的分配，如何弥补由不公正引起的损失和伤害。
3.诉讼公正（judicial justice）——法律程序和司法制度的公正性。
我们如何理解正义？正义是一个广泛的概念。
在不同的情境下，正义有不同的含义。
正义包含以下几个要素：2.平等（equality）：平等可以有很多不同的含义，但是，基本上平等要求对待某个人或群体时不进行歧视，而且对待所有人时包括适当的地位和敬意。
3.尊重（respect）：尊重指的是对所有人的自由和权利的尊重，尊重他们的意志或决定。
在本意义上，正义与自由、尊重等价。
分配公正分配公正是指资源分配是公正、合理、合法和合法的问题，这个问题是至关重要的，因为这牵涉到人们的生活、权利和机会。
效用学派认为公正需要基于效用，也就是人类的福利最大化。
原则：最大化幸福，最小化不幸福。
资源主义认为资源应当按照人们所做的贡献进行分配。
自由主义者认为，重要的是人们能够获得自己选择的东西、自己的财产和自己的立场，重要的是不受不正当干涉和不当限制。
马克思主义强调，分配应基于不同的需求，而不是贡献，应该根据各个人的基本需要以均等的方式进行分配。
修补公正人们无法忽略的是，虽然我们都希望进行公正的资源分配，但有时它仍会失败。
此时，我们则需要进行一些修补，来纠正不正当的分配。
此时就涉及到了“修补公正”。
有两种基本的思路：1.撤销（restitution)：撤销原来有利的状态，消除不公正的结果。
哈佛公开课：公正该如何做是好Free Exercise and Religious Accommodations
Free Exercise of Religion1. What distinguishes Mill’s argument from Bentham’s?Mill and Bentham both endorse the harm principle. Utilitarians, they both rest their moral liberalism on an appeal to consequences. But they offer different accounts of the benefits that flow from a more tolerant society.Bentham emphasizes that abridging liberty frustrates people—thus causing them pain—by restricting the extent to which they can pursue their de facto desires. In the absence of harm to other people, the imposition of those pains is unprofitable, therefore wrong.Mill has a more complex utilitarian analysis of the grounds for moral liberty. Without disputing Bentham’s point, he also makes two others: that abridging liberties can stifle the development and exercise of human powers: that is bad for the person who is stifled, and bad for others as well, who lose the example and provocation. And, more deeply, censorship and moralistic regulation can produce a "despotism of custom" (3.17). In the despotism of custom, people do not “choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary” (3.6). The desire for self-development is a "tender plant." Stifle it, through suffocating conformity, and you may find people perfectly content in their confined conditions, without real opportunities for living better, self-governing lives. And that, too, is bad not simply for the individuals whose own lives are cramped, but for the society and for humanity generally. Mill, inshort, is defending toleration not simply because—taking desires and aspirations as given, it is on balance bad—but because of the effects on people’s aspirations themselves.Mill defends a right to personal liberty, then, but the basis of the right lies in its contribution to aggregate human improvement. His defense is neither skeptical about the best way to live, nor a pragmatic case for keeping the peace, nor a form of Benthamite cost-benefit analysis, founded on quantitative hedonism. Nor is he saying: “it is your life, and you have a right to do with it as you please, and waste it if you want.” We ought to care about how good others’ lives are. But we best express that concern by ensuring their liberties, not by coercing them into being better. Once people are “capable of being improved by discussion,” protections of liberty are the surest path to human improvement.This is a profound and important argument, connecting personal freedom to aggregate human improvement. But it also appears to be missing something important. To see what it might be missing, I want to explore some issues about religious liberty, focusing in particular on what—in constitutional law—are called “free exercise exemptions.”2. Establishment and Free Exercise.The first amendment to the American constitution contains two clauses that pertain to religion. Congress, it says, “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Much of the familiar controversy about the religion clauses focuses on the issue ofestablishment. School prayer, crèches in public squares, vouchers that can be used for religious schools, and what to teach in biology class: those are all establishment issues. The core of the establishment clause is the condemnation of a state church, but the clause is also read as condemning government support for any particular religion, or perhaps for religion generally, as well as excessive government entanglement with religion, and any official endorsement of religion. Several important political values are advanced by the establishment clause: keeping the peace, ensuring fairness in a religiously divided society, and protecting religion from politicization. But it also is partly about preserving religious freedom. Part of the reason for avoiding religious establishment is to ensure that there is not an authoritative and collective decision on religious issues that arguably transforms religion and undermines the autonomy of religious conviction and practice.In these concerns about preserving the autonomy of religious conviction and practice, the establishment clause overlaps with the free exercise clause. Protecting free exercise helps to ensure that individuals are able to form sincere religious convictions without undue collective pressure, and to express and practice those convictions without being subject to sanction.But why should we be so concerned about religious convictions? Is there something special about them that marks them out for special treatment? Why not say that Congress shall make no law respecting an artistic establishment, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof? Part of the reason may be historical: the experience of religious wars between Protestants and Catholics in early modernEurope underscored the importance of toleration. But the historical experience itself—of bloody conflict between people with competing religious convictions—may suggest something more intrinsic about religious convictions.3. The Problem of Religious ExemptionsTo see the force of this point, consider the case of Sherbert v. Verner. In this case, a Seventh Day Adventist was dismissed from her job because she was a Saturday sabbatarian and would not work on Saturday. Unable to find another job that did not also require working on Saturday, she applied for unemployment benefits. Those benefits were denied, because the South Carolina law required that recipients of unemployment compensation be willing to accept “suitable work when offered.” In effect, she was denied benefits because it was held that her unemployment was voluntary. Work was available, but she was unwilling to take it: not unable, but unwilling. The Court condemned the denial of benefits as a violation of the free exercise clause.As the dissent observes, “she was denied benefits just as any other claimant would be denied benefits who was not ‘available for work’ for personal reasons.” So the Court was in effect requiring that an exception be made for those whose personal reasons are religious. It was requiring in effect that the state—ultimately meaning, other citizens—subsidize some kinds of specifically religious choices. Indeed, you might think that that special treatment for religion runs up against the establishment clause. The majority proposes in effect that the government must “single out for financial assistance those whose behavior isreligiously motivated even though it denies such assistance to others whose identical behavior [is] not religiously motivated.” What grounds are there for this special exemption?I have mentioned the financial subsidy—and burdens on others citizens—but these may distract us from an answer to this question. Thus consider the case of Employment Division v. Smith. Smith and Black were working for a private drug rehab organization. Fired for ingesting peyote as part of a religious ceremony in a Native American church, they applied to the Oregon Employment Division for unemployment benefits and were found ineligible because they had been fired for work-related misconduct. For complicated reasons, the case—which the Court heard originally in 1987—was back at the Court, this time to decide whether the state could criminalize the sacramental use of peyote. No one was challenging the permissibility of a general law banning peyote, and there was now no challenge to the permissibility of a denial of unemployment benefits as a result of a criminal violation. The question was whether the state could permissibly criminalize the sacramental use of peyote. In a decision that provoked lots of opposition, the majority upheld the ban and held that no exemption for sacramental use was mandatory.So here we have two examples of proposed free exercise exemptions. In both cases, we have a general rule that applies to everyone in a jurisdiction, and a proposal that some persons ought to be exempt from the rule because it unduly burdens their religious freedom. In assessing the case for such exemptions, four important points need to be taken into account. First, in neither case was thereany suggestion that the laws were purposefully discriminatory. This concern about intent was at issue in a 1993 case concerning a law banning animal sacrifice adopted by the city of Hialeah in response to the announcement that a Santeria church was opening there. Animal sacrifice is part of Santeria worship service. While the Hialeah regulation did not explicitly single out Santeria, it was held that suppressing Santeria practice was “the object of the ordinances,” which therefore violated the first amendment. The problem of free exercise exemptions emerges, then, not—as in Hialeah—because of the intent to impose a special burden. Instead, we have regulations that are assumed to be well-justified by a legitimate public purpose—say, ensuring that people do not exploit the unemployment insurance system or fighting a war on drugs—and a burden on religious exercise that is incidental to those regulations.Second, no one doubted the sincerity of the religious convictions in either case or the conflict between those convictions and legal compliance: so there was no question about the burden. Putting these first two points together: we have regulations, supported by good reasons, but that also impose substantial burdens on religiously-motivated conduct.Third, no one doubted that it would have been permissible for the legislature itself to carve out an exemption: because these were minority religions, concerns about religious establishment if there were such legislatively-constructed exemptions were attenuated. The question was whether the constitution’s free exercise clause mandated such exemption.But, fourth, there was no suggestion in either case that the minority religious group had the capacity to win the exemption through normal politics. Thus the frank acknowledgement (Scalia writing for the majority) that “It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”4. The Case for ExemptionsSo is there something objectionable about the burdens in these cases: of well-justified regulations, which incidentally burden religious exercise, with no clear prospect of the burden being alleviated through normal politics?To see why there might be—as a matter of political morality, and not only as a matter of constitutional law—put yourself for a moment into the shoes of the Seventh Day Adventist. Imagine her response to the suggestion that she is voluntarily unemployed: that she is unwilling, not unable. She might say that her unemployment is not voluntary at all. She did not choose the Saturday Sabbath: God made that choice, and she has a fundamental obligation to keep it. The burden on her imposed by the rules on unemployment compensation is not simply financial; it is not an inconvenience; she is being told that a condition of her holding a job, and to that extent being a full member of the society, is thatshe violate obligations that she did not voluntarily undertake, but that are, for her, fundamental. The law seems to make, in O’Connor’s words, “abandonment of one’s own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the civil community.”And the same is true for Smith and Black. The ritual ingestion of small amounts peyote is a sacrament of their religion, which also forbids any sale of peyote and any use of it outside the ritual setting. They are being told that they may not do something that they think they are under the strictest requirement to do. For them, the ban on peyote is comparable to a ban on alcohol consumption that prevents its use in the sacrament of the Eucharist.The case for free exercise exemptions, then, is founded on the idea that religious reasons—or at least some kinds of religious reasons—have an especially fundamental role in the ethical outlook of believers. Given their content—as fundamental requirements—the believer does not think ofhim/herself as having any option but to follow them. Whether you endorse or reject such exemptions, it is essential to understand the particular severity of the burdens on individuals that exemptions are intended to alleviate: they are being told that they ought to do something that they think they must not do, or ought not to do something that they think they must do.Now I am not suggesting here that religious convictions are the only sources of reasons for exemption. What makes the case for the exemptions is that the reasons for engaging in the conduct that the regulation addresses have a particular weight or significance for a person. So suppose that I am a pacificist,and give every evidence from the conduct of my life that this is a sincerely held conviction, and part of a larger system of moral convictions that I live by. Then I arguably have a case for an exemption from combat service, not because my convictions are religious but because I would be compelled to violate my fundamental moral obligations if I was required to serve.5. Grounds for HesitationNow the fact that there are strong reasons for the exemptions does not settle the question about whether such exemptions are required as a matter of law or as a matter of right. There are three reasons for resisting them.First, we might find a religious group that claims an exemption for just about anything: the baby torturing religion, or the human sacrifice religion. But this first objection is not compelling. We should not conclude from the fact that some conduct is unacceptable, no matter what the reasons for it, that the weight of the reasons in support are always irrelevant: I am suggesting that the reasons matter, not that they decide the question. The disagreement between O’Connor’s concurrence and the dissent in Employment Services is instructive on this point. They agree that the war on drugs is an important policy, and if conducting that war required a blanket ban on peyote, then the use of peyote in worship would have to give way. They disagree about whether such a ban is required, but they all acknowledge that the government needs to find a very strong reason—a compelling interest—for burdening religious exercise. If the war on drugs is sucha reason, then certainly protecting babies from torture is a good enough reason. There is no reason to think that free exercise exemptions will multiply like rabbits.Second, you might worry that if exemptions are permitted, then each person will claim a right to follow only the regulations that he or she approves of: that “each conscience is a law unto itself.” But once again, this conclusion is unwarranted. The essential point, once more, is the need to draw distinctions: making a claim based on sincerely held, core religious convictions, particularly a conviction about fundamental requirements that would be burdened by a regulation, is different from claiming an exemption in the name of less weighty considerations, about preferences, or customs, or personal aspirations, or cultural practices. Thus O’Connor’s claim that the right way to think about claims for exemption is to “decide each case on its individual merits,” by determining “whether the burden . . . is constitutionally significant and whether the particular criminal interest asserted by the state . . . is complelling.”6. UtilitarianismWhether any particular exemption is warranted, then, is a complicated matter: we need to reflect on the nature of the burden on the convictions and conduct of the believer and on the rationale for imposing it. And it is here that we come back to the concern I want to raise about utilitarianism generally—a concern that applies to Mill’s utilitarianism as well as Bentham’s. I emphasized in the discussion of Mill’s that his case for the harm principle, and for religious and moral toleration, turns on the idea that such toleration brings large social benefits: his case forfreedom of expression, for example, turns not on the burdens that restrictions impose on the speaker, but on the costs of conformity to society and humanity generally. His case for individuality turns principally on the benefits of “experiments in living” for the general welfare, and not on the burdens that restrictions imposed by restrictions on tastes and pursuits.The issue for religious exemptions suggests that something important is missing from this way of thinking about issues of political morality. Even if you think that such exemptions are rarely required, the case for them brings out the importance in our political morality of something other than the aggregative thinking characteristic of utilitarianism, even in its Millian form. What is missing is an appreciation of the nature of the burdens on individuals that regulations impose: a case for religious liberty does not depend solely on the benefits that flow from its protection, but on an appreciation of the special burdens that its restriction imposes, and the need for a particularly compelling rationale for imposing those restrictions.The underlying problem is that utilitarianism is insufficiently attentive to how the life of each person goes. What the case of exemptions brings out is that when it comes to justice, the separate lives of individuals matter in a way that aggregation fails to acknowledge: as Rawls puts it, utilitarianism neglects the moral importance of the separateness between persons. If we find the implications of utilitarianism unacceptable, then we should be motivated to look for an alternative doctrine that is more attentive, in its underlying structure, to the lives of individuals.Justice, Spring 2006—11。
哈佛公正课的详细笔记及思考
哈佛公正课的详细笔记及思考迈克尔•桑德尔（Michael Sandel）第一讲：杀人的道德侧面【案例引子】电车刹车失灵，正高速行驶在轨道上。
如果继续往前，会撞死五个工人。
转弯开向侧轨，会撞死一个工人，此时你的方向盘并没有坏。
何为正确的选择？你会怎么做？→大部分人选择开向侧轨，这样做的原则是“牺牲一人保全五人”。
更换案例的条件：假如我不是电车司机，而是站在桥上的旁观者，身边正有一个大胖子，我只要把他推下去，也能阻止电车撞向前面的五人。
这时，我会怎么做？→绝大部分人都拒绝这一行为。
同样是“牺牲一人保全五人”，这个原则出现了什么问题？【争论的本质】我们在特定的情况下作出判断，然后试图阐明作出这些判断的理由或原则。
当我们面临新的情况时，我们重新检验这些原则，根据新的情况修正这些理由或原则，然后我们发现，要在特定案例之下自圆其说我们的判断，校正我们一再确认的原则，难度越来越大，我们也注意到了这些争论的本质：两种不同的道德推理：1、结果主义（Consequentialist）：取决于你行为所导致的后果。
2、绝对主义（Cateorical）：取决于特定的绝对道德准则，个人的权利与义务。
两种不同道理推理的代表性思想家：边沁VS. 康德第二讲：食人惨案【功利主义哲学】核心观点：最大化功利。
“为最多的人谋求最大的幸福”。
道德推理：痛苦和快乐是我们至高无上的主人，所有人类均受这两大因素所支配。
人的本性是趋乐避苦，因此功利（utility）等于快乐减去痛苦，幸福减去苦难。
代表人物：边沁（1748-1832）英国政治哲学家。
【案例】女王诉达德利和斯蒂芬斯案真实案例简述：1884年7月5日，英国米格诺耐特号在好望角外1600英里公海上失事，水手达德利、斯蒂芬斯、布鲁克斯和客舱侍役爬上一条救生船，除两罐咸菜外没有任何给养。
7月24日，达德利提议，如果第二天早上仍看到不到船只，将杀了客舱侍役（此时已生病，且是孤儿）以挽救其他人，布鲁克斯表示不同意。
哈佛大学桑德尔教授“公平与正义”公开课笔记
哈佛大学桑德尔教授“公平与正义”公开课笔记第一课：谋杀的道德侧面——食人案件案例1：假设你是一名电车司机，你的电车以60英里/小时的速度在轨道上飞驰，突然发现在轨道的尽头有5名工人正在施工，你无法让电车停下来，因为刹车坏了。
你此时极度绝望，因为你深知如果电车撞向那5名工人，他们全都会死。
你极为无助，直到你发现在轨道的右侧有一条侧轨，而在侧轨的尽头只有1名工人在那里施工。
而你的方向盘还没坏，只要你想就可以把电车转到侧轨上去，牺牲一人挽救五个人的性命。
第一个问题：何为正确的选择？换成你会怎么做？绝大多数人都选择转弯：牺牲一个人，保存五个是最好的选择。
不转弯的人的理由：类似于种族灭绝的思维方式。
案例2：这次你不再是电车司机，只是一名旁观者。
你站在一座桥上，俯瞰着电车轨道，电车沿着轨道从远处而来，轨道尽头有5名工人，电车刹车坏了，这5名工人即将被撞死。
但你不是电车司机，你爱莫能助。
直到你发现在你旁边，靠着桥站着的是个超级胖子，你可以选择推他一把，他就会摔下桥，正好摔在电车轨道上挡住电车，他必死无疑，但可以挽救那5个人的性命。
现在，又有多少人会选择把胖子推下桥？（大多人不会这么做）一个显而易见的问题出现了，我们“牺牲一人保全五人”的这条原则，到底出了什么问题？第一种情况中大多数人赞同这条原则怎么了？两种情况都属于多数派的人，你们是怎么想的？应该如何来解释这两种情况的区别呢？学生1发言：第二种情况牵涉到主动选择推人，而被推的这个人本来跟这件事一点关系都没有，所以，从个人自身利益的角度来说，他是被迫卷入这种灾难的。
而第一种情况不同，第一种情况里的三方、电车司机以及两组工人，之前就牵涉进这件事本身了。
（在侧轨的那个人并不比那个胖子更愿意牺牲自己。
）学生2发言：在第一种情况中是撞死一个还是五个人，你只能在两者中选择，不管你做出的是哪一个选择，总得有人被电车撞死，而他们的死，并非是你的直接行为导致的，电车已经失控，而你必须在一瞬间做出选择。
公正：该如何是好听课笔记中
第五节Hired.Guns.&.For.Sale.Motherhood1、民主制度的“同意”特征洛克认为只要政府是民主的，不是专制的，就可以强制人们服兵役去战场。
这里又是涉及到“同意”的问题，民主制度给人的感觉，就是有一个大部分人同意的程序，再根据这个程序由大部分人同意来选出管理者，管理者制定出大部分人都同意的政策来执行。
从本质来说，这样的制度设置，本身的目的并不是保证社会管理达到一个最优化，最幸福的结果。
而是从心理学角度制造的认同感－－－－人只要认为某件事是自己“同意”过的，不论这件事是否被自己理解，都会导致更多的概率去维护它。
这种以“同意”为基础的制度其实无论在产生过程和执行的结果上，并不一定能够得到多数人的真正的认同。
因为这种同意并不是信息对等的情况下产生的，也就是说，很多人“同意”了这个程序或者管理者，但他或她其实不论对程序还是对领导者都不够了解。
并且，即便所有的人对这个民主程序都有足够的理解，但也很少有人能够保证这个程序运作出的结果会让人满意。
以民主最彻底的美国为例，美国在总统选举上的投票率也就刚好过半，而且还曾一度跌落到接近50%。
尽管有各种原因，但如此低的投票率还是体现了很多人对投票会产生什么样的结果没有办法预料，也就没有必要参与。
（美国的投票率远低于欧洲，主要是以下几点原因，一是选民登记手续需要自己办，比较繁琐。
二是美国人需要投票的事情太多，小到所在区郡县议员，大到国会的参众议员、总统，以及党派候选人、重大事件的公投等等，有些地区在四年一届的总统任期内需要投票过百次，也确实繁重。
但象英国的内阁民主制，民众投票次数不多，投票率也高，但这种民主一旦决定哪个党派当选，剩下的就都是政客集团内部协商，没有民众什么事。
也就更谈不到有多少“同意”基础。
）在洛克那个时代，是民族国家的发展期，英国做为民主制度的发源地，确实是摸索出了人们基于“同意”而认同所带来的好处，那就是有利于形成一个更紧密也更精密的共同体－－－－现代国家。
哈佛大学公开课听课笔记公正
哈佛大学公开课听课笔记：公正哈佛大学（harvard university），简称哈佛，坐落于美国马萨诸塞州剑桥市，是一所享誉世界的私立研究型大学…… 哈佛大学公开课听课笔记具体内容请看下文。
哈佛大学公开课听课笔记：公正课程：哈佛大学公开课——公正：该如何做是好主讲：michael sandel (迈克尔•桑德尔)时间：201X年8月14日晚8点半-10点笔记：迈克尔：第一个事例，你驾驶了一辆失控的电车即将撞到轨道尽头，而尽头的一侧有5名施工人员;如果电车转到侧面，则是一名施工人员。
如果只有这两种选择，怎么办?牺牲1人拯救5人?问题是：何为正确的选择?学生：绝大多数支持牺牲1人保全5人学生1(支持转向牺牲1人)：当可以只牺牲1人时，牺牲5人是不正确的。
学生2(同上)：这类似与911事件，那些让飞机在宾州坠毁的人，被称之为英雄。
因为他们选择牺牲自己，而不是让飞机撞向大楼牺牲更多的人。
学生3(支持电车不转向)：这是为种族灭亡以及极权主义正名，这是同样的思维模式，为了让一个种族生存下来而牺牲另一个种族。
迈克尔：修改一下条件，如果此刻你不是司机，而是一位旁观者，站在桥上目睹一辆失控的电车即将向尽头驶来，尽头是5名施工人员，面对这即将发生悲剧，你爱莫能助。
这个时候，你发现，在你旁边，靠着桥站着一位超级大胖子，你可以选择推他一把，他就会摔下桥，正好摔在轨道上挡住了电车，他必死无疑，但是可以拯救那5个人，现在，有多少人愿意将这个大胖子推下去?学生：无人举手同意。
迈克尔：一个显而易见的问题出现了，“牺牲一人来保全五人”的原则出现的问题，前一种情况中绝大多数人支持这个原则，但是在第二种情况中，却没有人支持。
如何来解释这两种情况下绝大多数人所作的这个选择?学生1(细眉细眼的亚洲裔boy)：我觉得第二种情况在于牵扯到主动推人。
公正该如何做是好读书笔记
公正该如何做是好读书笔记篇一：标题:公正该如何做是好读书笔记(创建与标题相符的正文并拓展)正文:公正是一个至关重要的品质,我们在阅读时也应该注重公正。
读书笔记可以帮助我们更好地理解书中的内容,因此公正地阅读读书笔记是非常重要的。
下面是一些关于如何公正地阅读读书笔记的建议。
1. 阅读完整本书:阅读完整本书是公正地阅读读书笔记的基础。
只有了解了整个故事,才能更好地评估作者的观点和结论。
因此,我们应该花时间阅读完整本书,并理解其中的情节和人物。
2. 评估作者的观点和结论:在读完完整本书后,我们应该评估作者的观点和结论。
了解作者的观点和立场,可以帮助我们更好地理解他们的立场和想法。
同时,我们也要了解作者的结论,并思考这些结论是否合理。
3. 考虑不同的观点:在评估作者的观点和结论时,我们应该考虑不同的观点。
通过了解不同的观点,我们可以更好地理解不同的观点之间的差异,并从中学习。
4. 批判性思维:在评估作者的观点和结论时,我们应该运用批判性思维。
这意味着我们应该考虑事实、证据和逻辑,并评估作者的观点和结论是否合理。
5. 分享笔记:读完完整本书后,我们可以分享我们的笔记。
通过分享我们的笔记,我们可以与其他读者交流我们的思考,并从中获得反馈和建议。
同时,我们的笔记也可以作为我们学习的重要工具。
公正地阅读读书笔记需要我们花时间了解作者的立场和观点,考虑不同的观点,并运用批判性思维。
通过公正地阅读读书笔记,我们可以更好地理解书中的内容,并从中学习。
篇二：标题:公正该如何做是好读书笔记(创建与标题相符的正文并拓展)正文:读书笔记是一种学习的方式,可以帮助读者深入理解所读书籍的内容。
公正是一个重要的价值观,在读书笔记中同样适用。
下面是一些关于如何做到公正的读书笔记的建议和拓展。
1. 了解作者的背景和观点:在阅读某本书时,了解作者的背景和观点是非常重要的。
这可以帮助读者更好地理解作者的意图和想法。
如果对作者的背景和观点感兴趣,可以在读书笔记中记录下来。
1200字关于哈佛大学公开课听课笔记：该如何做是好_应用文
1200字关于哈佛大学公开课听课笔记：该如何做是好哈佛是著名的常春藤盟校成员。
这里走出了8位美利坚合众国总统，上百位诺贝尔获得者曾在此工作、学习。
1200字关于哈佛大学公开课听课笔记具体内容请看下文。
1200字关于哈佛大学公开课听课笔记：该如何做是好课程：哈佛大学公开课——该如何做是好主讲：michael sandel (迈克尔?桑德尔)时间：2017年8月15日上午10点半-11点半笔记：迈克尔：上节课我们讨论了很多道德两难的问题。
首先我们在特定的情况下作出判断，然后试图作出这些判断的理由或者原则，当我们面临新的情况时，我们重新检测这些原则，根据新的情况来修正这些原则，然后我们发现，在特定情况下，自圆其说我们的判断，校正我们一再确证的原则，难度越来越大。
我们也注意到这些争论的本质已经初见端倪，我们注意到，有些时候，我们倾向于依据行为产生的后果，以及对外界的影响来判断其是否道德，我们称之为后果主义道德推理。
同时注意到，在某些情况下，不仅行为的后果会使我们动摇，有时候，我们中很多人认为行为的后果固然重要，但是行为的道德本质或者特性也同样重要。
有些人认为，某些行为反正就是绝对错误的，1 / 4即便它会产生好的后果，即便牺牲1人可以救活5人，从而对比的后果主义与绝对主义道德原则之间的差别，在未来的这些日子里，我们将会剖析后果主义道德理论中最具影响的一个版本，也就是功利主义哲学，jeremy bentham,英国政治哲学家，首次对功利主义道德作出了系统的定义，他的核心观点很简单，充满了道德上的直观感染力，他的观点如下：正确的选择，公正的选择，就是最大化功利。
what did he mean by “utility”? 他认为功利等于快乐减去痛苦(功利主义者认为快乐与痛苦都是可以计算的)，幸福减去苦难，在这个基础上他得出了功利最大化的原则。
他通过观察得出：所有人类均被两大至高无上的因素所支配，痛苦与快乐。
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Professor: Michael sandelClass 1: the moral side of murderFirst question: What is the right thing to do? Kill one instead of five?Backgrounds: Suppose that you are a trolley（电车） driver, your breaks don’t work, you still could control the steering wheel, and there are two tracks in front of youOne opinion: go straightSecond one: turn around to the track where only one people standingPrinciple: better to save five lives even if it means to sacrificing one 第一种观点：转弯牺牲一个人的做法和极权主义和种族主义（genocide and totalitarianism）的出发点一致第二种观点：你不能做出杀死五个人而放弃牺牲一个人就能救五人性命的选择。
（多数选择）场景转换：你变成了一个onlooker（旁观者）在桥上看着轨道，身边有一个胖子探出身子再看，你会把他推下桥从而救五个人的命吗？不会（多数选择）:推人是主观行动而且是你可控制的行为，而电车的情况你无法控制Moral principle: 1 what you should do depends on the consequences that will result from your actions. (consequentialist moral reasoning 结果主义道德伦理 locates morality in the consequence of an act) related to utilitarianism(功利主义)2 categorical moral reasoning 绝对主义道德伦理 locates morality in certain duties and rightsPhilosophy estranges us from the familiar by inviting and provoking usa new way of seeing哲学使得熟悉的事物变得陌生通过引进和启发我们一个看待事物的新方式Once the familiar turns strange is never quite same againImmanuel kant skepticism is a resting place for human reasonOne of the most important and influential versions of consequentialist moral theory: philosophy of utilitarianism, Jeremy bentham,english philosopher first gave this conceptUtilitarianism : Jeremy bentham idea is maximize the utility(效益最大化)，utility: Pleasure over pain, the slogan of it “the greatest good for the greatest number”故事：19世纪的英国法律案件，在所在帆船被风浪击毁，超过二十天在救生艇上飘荡的四名英国船员，三人因为生存的需要杀了他们奄奄一息的同伴并以他的血和肉生存下来并且最终得救，回到英国三人面临抹杀罪名的审判，他们的行为在道德上能否被接受？It still unaccepted to killing one for survival (vast majority): you don’t own this power to decide others’ fatesClass two: putting a price tag on lifeUtility logic :cost-benefit analysis(成本收益分析)，placing a value to stand for utility on cost and benefits of various proposalssmokeSavings from premature deaths $1227 per personRepairing the ford pinto(斑马)(a flawed car produced by ford who haveObjections to utilitarianism:1 fails to respect individual/minority rights2 not possible to aggregate(合计) all values into $-using a single measure like $-isn’t there is a distinction between higher and lower pleasureBentham says :“pushpin(图钉游戏) is as good as poetry”，which shows he just address the duration and intensity of pleasureWho to say their pleasures are higher、wealthier and nobler than othersAny want or satisfaction which exists exists in some account and therefore measurableA latter-day(近代) utilitarian John Stuart mill try to humanize utilitarianism accommodate humanitarian concerns(纳入人道关怀)The only test for distinguish higher and lower pleasure is whether someone who has experienced both would prefer it.“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than be a pig satisfied .”said by mill, because we would prefer higher pleasure that we know it can engages our higher human faculties(系，才能),and for receiving the higher pleasure need education、cultivation(培养)、appreciation.Bentham(who died in 1832) provided his body be preserved in embalmed and displayed in university of London where he still wore his actual clothes with waxed head in a glass case. He fulfills his concept of philosophy to maximize a body of a dead people.Class three: free to chooseQuestion one:are there theories of the good life that can provide independent moral standards for the worthy of pleasure, if so, what do they look like?Strong theories of rights say that individuals matter not just as instruments to be used for a lager social purpose or for the sake of the utility, individuals are separate beings with separate lives worthy of respect. And it is a mistake according to the strong theories that think about justice or law just by adding up preferences and values, which we talk about now is libertarianism (自由意志论)，it think the fundamental individual right is the right to be liberty. Provided we respect others”have the same right to choose freely and live our lives as please.1 no paternalist legislation (家长式立法)2 no moral legislation3 no redistribution (再分配) of income from rich to poor.Nozick : what makes income distribution just?1 justice in acquisition (initial holdings)2 justice in transfer (free marketNozick”s arguments against taxation:Taxation=taking of earningsTaking of earnings = forced laborForced labor=slaveryViolate the principle of self-possessionBut what if we don’t have self-possession cause we agree to live in a society ,which don’t allow you choose whatever you want to do.Class four: this land is my land.Under the law of nature, I’m not free to take someone else`s life or liberty, or property, nor am I free to take my own life or liberty and property. (nature`s constrains)Nature rights are unalienable and nontransferable for mankind, which means that the state of nature (we have it before state comes out) ask us to keep the rights to ourselves and not allow us to trade or give up them.Locker and other libertarians say that cause we own the property in ourselves furthermore we our own labor and from that to the further claim that whatever we mix our labor with that is un-owned becomes our property.Locker thinks that private property is raised without consent(同意)Problem: If the right to private property is natural, not conventional(协议性), if it is something that we acquire even before we agree to government, how does this right constrain what a legitimate(合法的)government can do? Furthermore, it rises what becomes our natural right once it enters society?We consent to be governed by a legitimate government and human laws just when it respects our unalienable natural rights to life、liberty and property. No parliament (议会)，no legislature(立法机构) can legitimate violate our natural roghts.Locker`s two big ideas, one is private property and another one is consent.With the idea of consent that everyone is an executer of the law of nature to punish the ones who against the law of nature, everyone can do the punishing in the state of nature, in this situation people tend to overreact use the punish power, which makes the inconveniences that every is insecure.So for escape the state of nature to protect themselves, they agree togive up the enforcement power to do whatever the majority decides. Question: what the majority can decide?First of all, the government limited by respecting and enforcing our fundamental natural rights, we didn`t give up the rights when we entered the society.Question: what is the work of consent? And meanwhile the consent is not the personal decision but based on the collective consent when we first entered into this society.(i.e. the taxation)Question :if we don`t have the power to give up our natural rights ,which is the limits of the government ,how can we agree to be bound(约束)by a majority that will enforce us to sacrifice our lives or the property(like the military conscription 征兵制度 and taxation)To answer this question that john locker actually support that only if the government or the authority not arbitrarily(蛮横、专制的) take individual`s life or property, but the majority according to fair procedure to make generally applicable law to require individual, that is not a violation, which justify the conscription and taxation..Class five: hired guns?Question: why is consent such a powerful moral instrument in creating political authority and obligation to obey?Us government is facing a huge difficulties meeting recruitment.Ways to increase recruitment for the force:1 increase the pay and benefit.2 shift to military conscription(a draft选择)强制征兵3 outsource: hire mercenaries(雇佣兵)During civil war, the union used a combination of conscription and market system to recruit solider. which means if you were chosen you could find a substitute (代替者)。