管理经济学 原书第六版 课后答案
管理经济学 原书第六版 课后答案7
Chapter 7: Answers to Questions and Problems1. The four-firm concentration ratio is,4$175,000$150,000$125,000$100,0000.55$1,000,000C +++==.2.a. The HHI is222$200,000$400,000$500,00010,000=3,719$1,100,000$1,100,000$1,100,000HHI ⎡⎤⎛⎞⎛⎞⎛⎞=++⎢⎥⎜⎟⎜⎟⎜⎟⎝⎠⎝⎠⎝⎠⎢⎥⎣⎦. b. The four-firm concentration ratio is 100 percent.c. If the firms with sales of $200,000 and $400,000 were allowed to merge, the resulting HHI would increase by 1,322 to 5,041. Since the pre-merger HHI exceeds that under the Guidelines (1,800) and the HHI increases by more than that permitted under the Guidelines (100), the merger is likely to be challenged.3. The elasticity of demand for a representative firm in the industry is –1.5, since.5.16.09.09.06.0−=−=⇒−=F F E E .4.a. $100. To see this, solve the Lerner index formula for P to obtain11$35$100110.65P MC L ⎛⎞⎛⎞===⎜⎟⎜⎟−−⎝⎠⎝⎠. b. Since 11P MC L ⎛⎞=⎜⎟−⎝⎠, it follows that the markup factor is 1 2.8610.65⎛⎞=⎜⎟−⎝⎠. That is, the price charged by the firm is 2.86 times the marginal cost of producing the product.c. The above calculations suggest price competition is not very rigorous and that the firm enjoys market power.5.Managers should not specialize in learning to manage a particular type of market structure. Market structure generally evolves over time, and managers must adapt to these changes.6. To the extent that the HHIs are based on too narrow a definition of the product (orgeographic) market or the impact of foreign competition, the merger might be allowed. It might also be allowed if one of the firms is in financial trouble, or if significant economies of scale exist in the industry.7. As shown in the text, the HHI is⎥⎥⎦⎤⎢⎢⎣⎡⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛=⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛∑=222222112......000,10000,10T n T j T i T T n i T i S S S S S S S S S S S S . (1) When firms i and j merge, the HHI becomes ⎥⎥⎦⎤⎢⎢⎣⎡⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛222221......000,10T n T j i T T S S S S S S S S S . (2) The difference between (2) and (1) is that 22⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛T j T i S S S S becomes 2⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+T j i S S S .Thus, we can calculate how a merger between firms i and j will change the HHI by knowing only those two firms’ market shares. In general, since()22222⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛=⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+T j T j i T i T j i S S S S S S S S S S , we know that a merger between firms i and j will cause the HHI to increase by 210,000i j w w ×, where w i and w j are the pre-merger market shares of the two merging firms. Using the information in the problem,()()()800000,102.2.2= represents the increase in the HHI due to the merger.8. No. The conditions for perfect competition include:a. There are many buyers and sellers of products.b. The products are homogenous.c. Consumers and producers have perfect information.d. There is free entry and exit.9. The four-firm concentration ratios in Table 7-2 are likely to overstate the level of concentration in the U.S. Imported beers account for much of the sales in the U.S. It is likely that the brewing industry is much less concentrated than Table 7-2 leads us to believe.10.This industry is most likely monopolistically competitive. Monopolistically competitive industries have concentration measures close to zero, but since eachfirm’s product is slightly differentiated, the Rothschild index will be greater than zero (unlike perfectly competitive markets).11.Monopolistically competitive. In a monopolistically competitive market, there aremany firms, but each firm produces a differentiated product. According to the causal view, the structure of differentiated products causes firms to capitalize on the absence of close substitutes by charging higher prices and earning higher profit. Thus,structure causes conduct resulting in performance. According to the feedback critique, the conduct of firms may determine the market structure. Firms’ products may bedifferentiated because of firms’ conduct in the industry. Examples of such conductinclude advertising and other behavioral tactics that feedback into demand, causingconsumers to view products as differentiated. Thus, it is not at all clear thatdifferentiated products are a structural variable. The willingness of consumers to pay for product variety gives firms an incentive to offer different products (thin-and-crispy pizza, pan pizza, pizza delivery, etc.).12.Merger (a) is the only horizontal merger, and therefore the only merger that would bescrutinized under the Guidelines for horizontal mergers. Merger (b) is a conglomerate merger, while merger (c) is a vertical merger.13.While the pre-merger four-firm concentration ratio is 72 percent, the pre-merger HHIis only 1,535. The merger would increase the HHI by only 100 to 1,635. The merger is unlikely to be blocked based on the merger guidelines.14.If approved, the merger would raise the HHI by ()()()702000,1013.27.2= points (see the solution to problem 7). Since the pre-merger HHI is 3,025, which is greater thanthe Guidelines (1,800), and the HHI increases by 702 (which is greater than the 100points permitted in the Guidelines), it is unlikely that the merger will receiveunconditional approval.15.See Table 7-1.O w n P rice Elasticity of M arket Dem andO w n P rice E lasticityof D em and forR epresentative Firm'sP roduct R othsc hild IndexA griculture-1.8-96.20.019C onstruction-1.0-5.20.192Du rable m anufacturing-1.4-3.50.400No ndu rable m anufacturing-1.3-3.40.382Transportation-1.0-1.90.526Com m unication and utilities-1.2-1.80.667W holesale trade-1.5-1.60.938R etail trade-1.2-1.80.667Finance-0.1-5.50.018S ervices-1.2-26.40.045Table 7-1Based on the Rothschild indices in Table 7-1, wholesale trade most closely resembles a monopoly, while finance most closely resembles perfect competition.16. The Lerner index is $3$0.300.9$3P MC L P −−===, which indicates the firm has considerable market power. This makes sense because the product that the firm sells is currently under patent protection, which essentially makes the firm a legal monopoly.17.Based on the information contained in Table 7-3 of the text, the food and apparel industries are most competitive and therefore probably represent the best match for the expertise of these managers.18. The market for color film in the U.S. is highly concentrated. The five-firmconcentration ratio is 100 percent and Kodak alone accounts for 67 percent of all rolls sold. Market demand for color film is relatively elastic at -1.75; indicating that a 10 percent increase in price leads to a 17.5 percent decline in quantity demand for color film. The Rothschild index indicates that market demand relative to the demand for Kodak color film is 875.0275.1=−−=R , indicating that Kodak’s demand is, roughly, as sensitive to price changes as is the entire market demand. The Lerner index for Kodak is 50.095.6$475.3$95.6$=−=L , indicating that Kodak’s markup factor is 2. For every $1 spent on color film, $0.50 is markup. Taken together, these things suggest that the color film industry in the U.S. closely resembles an oligopoly.19. Note first that a merger with Unilever or Tricor Braun is not a horizontal merger. Moreover, while a horizontal merger with either Dole or Goya is likely to enhance Del Monte’s profitability (profits as a percentage of sales are 8.7 and 7.1, respectively and the Lerner Indices are 0.14 and 0.32, respectively), the market for cannedtomatoes and canned pineapple are highly concentrated. The four-firm concentration ratio and HHI for the canned tomatoes market are, respectively, 86.3 percent and 3,297. Similarly, the four-firm concentration ratio and HHI in the canned pineapple industry are 94.2 percent and 5,457, respectively. This information suggests that potential mergers in these industries are likely to be scrutinized.20.On the surface the industry analysts’ suggestion would represent a merger tomonopoly and the HHI before and after the merger exceeds the threshold for raising antitrust concerns. However, there are several reasons why the merger might beallowed. First, satellite radio may not be its own industry, but rather a smaller part of a larger market that include MP3 players, AM and FM radios, and the like. Their market shares in this more broadly defined market are trivial, and therefore themerger would not impact the HHI in the more broadly defined market. Additionally, the merger might be allowed if the (1) firms could show significant cost savings; (2) rapidly changing technology in the portable music industry would prevent anti-competitive behavior; (3) government viewed the firms as financially unstable; or (4) barriers to entry were low enough to allow competition from new entrants after the merger.21.With number portability, the services of the various providers are now closersubstitutes to each other. One implication is that the cost to consumers of switchingservice providers is not lower, which increases the likelihood that consumers wouldswitch for small price reductions. These factors make the demand for the individualcellular service providers more elastic (increase the price elasticity of demand). Local number portability, however, is unlikely to affect the elasticity of demand for theindustry as a whole. If the elasticity of demand increases for individual firms, butremains constant for the industry, the Rothschild index will decrease.。
管理经济学 原书第六版 课后答案8
Chapter 8: Answers to Questions and Problems1.a.7 units.b.$28.c.$224, since $32 x 7 = $224.d.$98, since $14 x 7 = $98.e.$126 (the difference between total cost and variable cost).f.It is earning a loss of $28, since ($28 -$32) x 7 = - $28.g.- $126, since its loss will equal its fixed costs.h.Shut down.2.a.Set P = MC to get $80 = 8 + 4Q. Solve for Q to get Q = 18 units.b.$80.c.Revenues are R = ($80)(18) = $1440, costs are C = 40 + 8(18) + 2(18)2 = $832, soprofits are $608.d.Entry will occur, the market price will fall, and the firm should plan to reduce itsoutput. In the long-run, economic profits will shrink to zero.3.a.7 units.b.$130.c.$140, since ($130 – 110) x 7 = $140.d.This firm’s demand will decrease over time as new firms enter the market. In thelong-run, economic profits will shrink to zero.4.a.MR = 200 – 4Q and MC = 6Q. Setting MR = MC yields 200 – 4Q = 6Q. Solvingyields Q = 20 units. The profit-maximizing price is obtained by plugging this intothe demand equation to get P = 200 - 2(20) = $160.b.Revenues are R = ($160)(20) = $3200 and costs are C = 2000 + 3(20)2 = $3200,so the firm’s profits are zero.c.Elastic.d.TR is maximized when MR = 0. Setting MR = 0 yields 200 – 4Q = 0. Solving forQ yields Q = 50 units. The price at this output is P = 200 – 2(50) = $100.ing the results from part d, the firm’s maximum revenues are R = ($100)(50) =$5,000.f.Unit elastic.5.a. A perfectly competitive firm’s supply curve is its marginal cost curve above theminimum of its AVC curve. Here, 25083i i i MC q q =−+ and232504504i i i i i i i q q q AVC q q q −+==−+. Since MC and AVC are equal at theminimum point of AVC, set MC i = AVC i to get 225083504i i i i q q q q −+=−+, or 2i q =. Thus, AVC is minimized at an output of 2 units, and the correspondingAVC is ()()25042246i AVC =−+= . Thus the firm’s supply curve is described by the equation 23850i i q q MC +−= if $46P ≥; otherwise, the firm produces zero units.b. A monopolist produces where MR = MC and thus does not have a supply curve.c. A monopolistically competitive firm produces where MR = MC and thus does nothave a supply curve. 6.a. Q = 3 units; P = $70.b. Q = 4 units; P = $60.c. ()()1$70$401$15.2DWL =−=7.a. The inverse linear demand function is P = 10 – .5Q.b. MR = 10 – Q and MC = –14 + 2Q. Setting MR = MC yields 10 – Q = –14 + 2Q. Solving for Q yields Q = 8 units. The optimal price is P = 10 – .5(8) = $6.c. Revenues are R = ($6)(8) = $48. Costs are C = 104 – 14(8) + (8)2 = $56. Thus the firm earns a loss of $8. However, the firm should continue operating since it is covering variable costs.d. In the long run exit will occur and the demand for this firm’s product will increase until it earns zero economic profits. Otherwise, the firm should exit the business in the long run.8.a. The optimal advertising to sales ratio is given by ,,0.10.052Q A Q P E A R E ===−. b.()(),,0.1.05$50,000$2,500$50,0002Q A Q P E A A A R E =⇒=⇒==−.9.Chastise the manager. Profit maximization requires producing where MR = MC.10.Since you are a perfectly competitive firm, the price you charge is determined in a competitive market. The two events summarized will result in a decrease in market supply and an increase in the market demand, resulting in a higher market price (from P0 to P1 in the graphs below). Your profit-maximizing response to this higher price is to increase output. This is because we are a price taker (hence P = MR = the demand for our product) and the increase in price from P0 to P1 means that MR > MC at our old output. It is profitable to increase output from q0 to q1, as shown below.11. It competes in a monopolistically competitive market. Short run profits may beearned by introducing new products more quickly than rivals. Over time, other firms will innovate too so in the long run Pizza Hut earns zero economic profits.12.Profit maximization requires equating MR and MC. Since11 2.5$1.25$0.752.5E MR P E +−⎛⎞⎛⎞===⎜⎟⎜⎟−⎝⎠⎝⎠and MC = $0.25, MR > MC. This meansyour firm can increase profits by reducing price in order to sell more pills.13.Notice that MR = 1,000 – 10Q, MC 1 = 10Q 1 and MC 2 = 4Q 2. In order to maximize profits (or minimize its losses), the firm equates MR = MC 1 and MR =MC 2. Since Q = Q 1 + Q 2, this gives us()()121122100010101000104Q Q Q Q Q Q −+=−+=.Solving yields 120022.229Q =≈ units and 250055.569Q =≈ units. The optimal price is the amount consumers will pay for the 1220050070077.78999Q Q +=+=≈ units,and is determined by the inverse demand curve:700$5,5001,0005$611.1199P ⎛⎞=−=≈⎜⎟⎝⎠. At this price and output, revenues are R = ($611.11)(77.78) = $47,532.14, while costs are()()()()221210,050522.225,000255.56$23,692.47C C +=+++=. The firm thusearns profits of $23,839.67.M arket Q uantityP14.College Computers is a monopolistically competitive firm and faces a downward sloping demand for its product. Thus, you should equate MR = MC to maximize profits. Here, MR = 1000 – 2Q and MC = 2Q. Setting 1000 – 2Q = 2Q implies that your optimal output is 250 units per week. Your optimal price is P = 1000 – 250 = $750. Your weekly revenues are R = ($750)(250) = $187,500 and your weekly costs are C = 2000 + (250)2 = $64,500. Your weekly profits are thus $123,000. You should expect other firms to enter the market; your profits will decline over time and you will lose market share to other firms.15.Your average variable cost of producing the 10,000 units is $600 (depreciation is a fixed cost). Since the price you have been offered ($650) exceeds your average variable cost ($600), you should accept the offer; doing so adds $50 per unit (for a total of $500,000) to your firm’s bottom line.16.Note first that overhead costs are irrelevant, as they are a fixed cost. Second, the explicit (accounting) MC is $2.75. Third, we must consider opportunity cost: By producing Type A bolts we lose the opportunity to produce type B bolts. Since each Type B bolt produced would net $4.75 - $2.75 = $2, the implicit MC is $2. Thus, the relevant MC is the sum of these explicit and implicit costs, or $2.75 + $2 = $4.75. To determine the profit-maximizing level of Type A bolts to produce, we must compare MR and MC. Given the marketing data, we can compute the MR as shown in the accompanying table. As shown in the table, MR > MC up to 3 units, so to maximize profits the firm should produce 3 units of Type A bolts.17.()(),,,,.065.065 4.50.29254.5Q A Q A Q A Q PE E A E R E =⇒=⇒==−. Thus, Gillette’sadvertising elasticity is approximately 0.29. Gillette’s demand is less responsive to advertising than its rivals; their higher advertising-to-sales ratio imply a greater advertising elasticity.18.When the per-ton price of scrap steel is $156, market equilibrium is reachedwhen 260$=P per ton and 6200=Q tons. When the per-ton price of scrap steel is $302, market equilibrium is reached when 580$=P per ton and 3000=Q tons. As the market price rises, the equilibrium market quantity falls. Competition implies that at an equilibrium market price of $260 per ton each representative minimill produces 13=Q tons ()MC P =. As the equilibrium market price increases, the amount produced by each representative firm increases to 29=Q tons. As the equilibrium market price rises, each representative firm supplies more to the market. The higher price of scrap steel causes some firms to drop out of the market. Therefore, each representative minimill that remains in the market can produce more output.19.When the two companies are permitted to maximize profit, the equilibrium price in each market will be €0.68 and produce 575 kilowatts per hour()105.0002.0255.1=−⇔=Q MC MR . Thus, the price elasticity of demand at theprofit-maximizing price-quantity combination is 18.157568.0001.1−=⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−=ε. Thisprice elasticity of demand makes sense because a monopolist with linear demand will never maximize profit on the inelastic portion of the demand function. Prior toprivatization the price-quantity combination was P = €0.105 and 1150=Q and profits are – €100.625 in each market. The state-owned facility is losing its fixed costs.Privatization will increase the price and reduce the amount of electricity generated in each market: P = €0.68 and 575=Q . Each firm will earn €230. Thus, each firm will earn €330.625 more in each market as a result of privatization; since €230 – (– €100.625) = €330.625.20.The increase in lease expense is a fixed cost. Therefore, it should not directly affect the prices that she charges in her restaurant. If the current prices are profit-maximizing, a change in fixed costs should not persuade her to change her prices. It may, however, determine whether or not the restaurant owner decides to exit or remain in the industry in the long run.21.Note that the information implies an advertising-to-sales ratio of 0.04, an own-price elasticity of -2 and an advertising elasticity of 5. Optimal advertising requires,,Q A Q PE A R E =−.In this case,15252<. To bring this equation into equality, the firm should increase its advertising, provided that the estimated elasticities of advertising and demand are correct.。
《管理经济学》课后习题答案
1.在厂商的股东财富最大化模型中，以下各个事件对厂商价值的预期影响是什么？解释原因。
a.新的外国竞争者进入市场。
厂商价值下跌；新的外国竞争者进入市场，预期市场份额变小，未来经济利润Π降低，总现值降低。
b.政府实施严格的控制污染要求。
厂商价值下跌；满足严格的控制污染要求，需要调整经营计划，预期生产成本增加，未来经济利润Π降低，实际期权价值也因此降低，总现值降低。
c.原先非工会工人投票赞成组织工会。
厂商价值下跌；工会的作用是通过与雇主谈判工资薪水，工作时限，工作条件，来提高工人福利。
非工会工人投票赞成组织工会，表达的是，对现阶段的待遇不满，需要工会组织帮助提高福利待遇的诉求，预期未来人力成本上升，未来经济利润Π降低，总现值降低。
d.通货膨胀率大幅度上升。
厂商价值下跌；通胀率大幅上升，预期股东要求的收益率大幅上升，用于贴现未来现金流量所要求的收益率k提高，总现值降低。
e.厂商取得一项重大的技术突破，降低了生产成本。
厂商价值上涨；生产成本降低，经济利润Π增加，实际期权价值因成本节约而增加，总现值增加。
2.2000年制药行为中的厂商赚取的净值平均收益为25%，而《价值线》中1400多家厂商的平均收益仅为15%。
你认为哪种利润理论最能说明制药行业的绩效？1）在我国，我认为利润的垄断理论最能说明制药行业绩效。
2000年7月，由于药品市场价格虚高，国家开始试点采取药品招标采购制度，同年10月，国家计委印发《关于改革药品价格管理的意见通知》，对医药流通体制进行深入改革。
结合当年的行业背景，综合来看，医院作为药品最主要的市场零售渠道，医生对病人有着绝对的权威，加之几十年的公费医疗制度，患者对药价的高低并不敏感，甚至以贵药为好。
药企通过给医院返还高额回扣，控制渠道资源，抬高药价销售药品，赚取高于正常水平的利润。
2）撇开国情的因素，利润的风险承担理论最能说明制药行业的绩效。
通过创新技术研发新药，从最初的化合物制成筛选，到动物实验，再到临床试验，到最终通过药监局批准，成功上市，往往需要好几年，甚至更久。
曼昆《经济学原理》第6版微观经济学分册第6章课后习题答案
曼昆《经济学原理》第6版微观经济学分册第6章课后习题答案曼昆《经济学原理》第6版微观经济学分册第6章课后习题答案曼昆《经济学原理》第6版微观经济学分册第5章课后习题答案P132-P134 第六章供给、需求与政府政策复习题1(举出一个价格上限的例子和一个价格下限的例子。
答:为了保障城镇中低收入居民的住房需求，国家对城镇居民中的安居工程售房制定最高限价。
为了保护农民种粮的积极性，对粮食的国家合同定购部分收购时制定最低限价，以保护农民的利益;。
2(什么引起了一种物品的短缺,是价格上限还是价格下限?用图形证明你的答案。
答:当价格上限低于市场均衡价格时会引起一种物品的短缺。
当价格下限高于市场均衡价格时会引起一种物品的过剩。
3(当不允许一种物品的价格使供给与需求平衡时，配置资源的机制是什么?答:当政府对竞争市场实行限制性价格上限时，就产生了物品的短缺。
卖者必然在大量买者中配置稀缺物品。
这时的配给机制可能是排长队，或者是卖者根据自己的偏好来配给物品。
当政府对竞争市场实行限制性价格下限时，就产生了过剩。
过剩会引起一些不合意的配给机制，例如那些也许由于种族或家族之故而受买者青睐的卖者能比那些没有受到青睐的卖者更好地出售自己的物品。
4(解释为什么经济学家通常总是反对价格控制?答:因为在市场经济中，价格对资源配置起着调节作用。
如果人为的控制价格，往往会造成某种物品的过剩或短缺，从而使生产者和消费者的利益受到伤害，破坏市场配置资源的有效性。
5(假设政府取消向一种物品的买者征税，而向这种物品的卖者征同样的税。
税收政策的这种变动如何影响买者为这种物品向卖者支付的价格、买者所支付的包括税在内的货币量、卖者扣除税收得到的货币量以及销售量,答:税收政策的变动对它们都不产生影响。
因为税收的归宿取决于供给和需求的价格弹性，而不取决于向买者征税还是向卖者征税。
6(一种物品的税收如何影响买者支付的价格、卖者得到的价格，以及销售量?答:一种物品的税收使买者支付的价格上升，卖者得到的价格下降，销售量下降。
管理经济学 原书第六版 课后答案12
Chapter 12: Answers to Questions and Problems1.a. The expected value of option 1 is()()()()()300100161200164500166200164100161=++++. The expected value of option 2 is ()()()()()11111801701,0001708030055555++++=. b. The variance of option 1 is()()()()().000,2530010016130020016430050016630020016430010016122222=−+−+−+−+−Similarly, the variance of option 2 is 124,120. The standard deviation of option 1 is 158.11. The standard deviation of option 2 is 352.31.c. Option 2 is the most risky.2.a. Risk loving.b. Risk averse.c. Risk neutral.3.a.$5. b.She will purchase, since your price is less than her reservation price. c.$6. d. She will continue to search, since the price exceeds her reservation price.4.a. ()().6$100.4$200$140Ep =+=.b. Set Ep = MC to get 140 = 1 + 4Q . Solve for Q to find your profit-maximizing output, Q = 34.75 units.c. Your expected profits are (Ep)Q – C(Q) = $140(34.75) – (34.75 +2(34.75)2)=$2,415.13.5.a. The expected value, which is $25.b. The maximum value, which is $50.6.a. With only two bidders, n = 2. The lowest possible valuation is L = $1,000, and your own valuation is v = $2,500. Thus, your optimal sealed bid is$2,500$1,000$2,500$1,7502v L b v n −−=−=−=. b. With ten bidders, n =10. The lowest possible valuation is L = $1,000, and your own valuation is v = $2,500. Thus, your optimal sealed bid is$2,500$1,000$2,500$2,35010v L b v n −−=−=−=. c. With one hundred bidders, n =100. The lowest possible valuation is L = $1,000, and your own valuation is v = $2,500. Thus, your optimal sealed bid is$2,500$1,000$2,500$2,485100v L b v n −−=−=−=.7.a. With 5 bidders, n = 5. The lowest possible valuation is L = $50,000, and your own valuation is v = $75,000. Thus, your optimal sealed bid is$75,000$50,000$75,000$70,0005v L b v n −−=−=−=. b. A Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to a first-price sealed bid auction (see part (a)). Thus, you should let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $70,000, and then yell “Mine!”c. $75,000, since it is a dominant strategy to bid your true valuation in a second-price, sealed-bid auction.d. Remain active until the price exceeds $75,000; then drop out.8.a. Hidden actions lead to moral hazard; hidden characteristics lead to adverse selection.b. Incentive contracts can solve moral hazard problems; screening and sorting can solve adverse selection problems.9. Since this is a common value auction, bidders will not bid their own private estimates because doing so would lead to the winner’s curse. Thus, there will be an additional incentive for bidders to shade their bids below their estimated valuations. The English auction format provides bidders the most information (therefore allowing them to pool information to some extent), mitigating this problem. For this reason, the English auction would generate the highest expected revenues in this case.10.Your expected inverse demand is E(P) = .5(200,000 – 250Q ) + .5(400,000 – 250Q ) = 300,000 – 250Q. Therefore, your expected marginal revenue is E(MR) = 300,000 – 500Q . Your marginal cost is MC = $200,000. Setting E(MR) = MC yields300,000500200,000Q −=. Solving, Q = 200. The price you expect is thus E(P) = 300,000 – 250(200) = $250,000. Your profits are thus ($250,000 -$200,000)(200) - $110,000 = $9,890,000.11. One would expect higher premiums on credit life, thanks to adverse selection. Peoplewho cannot pass physicals will select toward this type of insurance, resulting in higher premiums. Furthermore, people who are healthy and can pass a physical will be unwilling to pay the higher premiums, thus exacerbating this effect.12. The expected benefit from an additional search are 0.05($110,000 - $60,000) = $2,500, while the cost of another search is $5,000. Therefore, make her an offer. 13. In the absence of "guaranteed issue," an insurance company could choose to insure only those employees with a very low risk structure. In this case they offer lower rates because they experience fewer claims. But this leaves those workers with greater risk factors without insurance. By requiring insurers to offer coverage to all employees, the insurance company must take on employees that are less healthy and a greater risk. Why the controversy? By insuring those with greater health risks, the expected number of claims rises, thus increasing the cost of coverage. The workers with existing health problems benefit at the expense of healthy workers, who pay higher prices with "guaranteed issue." If the price rises high enough and healthy workers are free to drop coverage, this can result in adverse selection: The only people willing to pay the higher premiums are those in poor health.14. Brownstown Steel has better information about its financial situation than does its lenders, and is attempting to use this information advantage to enhance its bargaining position. If lenders gained full information about the financial situation of Brownstown Steel Corp., they would be in a position to squeeze the maximum amount from Brownstown Steel without fear of pushing it into bankruptcy. Absent the information, lenders will be more generous, since taking too much would increase the risk that Brownstown Steel goes bankrupt.15. The 30-day warranty and 10-point inspection. This not only reduces buyer risk from being duped by a used car dealer, but provides a costly signal about the quality of the used cars sold. An unscrupulous dealer would find it costly to mimic this strategy. Recognizing both of these facts, rational buyers will be more willing to purchase cars from the dealer.16. Offer two plans for customers with more than $1 million in assets. One plan (perhaps called the “Free Trade” Account) has an annual maintenance fee of $10,000 good for up to 400 “free” transactions (computed as $10,000/$25) per year (each additional transaction is priced at $25 each). The other plan (perhaps called the “Free Service” Account) has no annual maintenance fee but charges $100 per transaction. Given these two options, investors will sort themselves into the plans based on their individual characteristics.17.With 5 other bidders, n = 6. The lowest possible valuation is L = $5,000, and your own valuation is v = $12,000. Thus, your optimal first-price, sealed-bid is$12,000$5,000$12,000$10,833.336v L b v n −−=−=−=.18. A risk-neutral Oracle’s bid of $7 billion is low since the expected value of the presentvalue of the stream of profits is $7.6 billion. The public bidding process described most resembles an independent, private value English auction (each company places a different probability assessment on the value of the company that depends onpotential realized synergies). SAP’s expected value of the present value of the stream of profits is $8.4 billion. Since this is greater than Oracle’s expected value, SAP will win the “auction” and acquire PeopleSoft. SAP will pay just over $7.6 billion for PeopleSoft.19.The expected value of aggregate ten-year profits of a McDonald’s franchise is ()()()75.4$1$25.5$50.10$25.=−++million. Similarly, the expected value of a Penn Station East Coast Subs’ franchise is ()()75.4$)30$(025.5$95.30$025.=−++million. The variance and standard deviation of owning a McDonald’s franchise is()()()1875.1575.4125.75.4550.75.41025.2222'=−−+−+−=s McDonald σand 8971.31875.152''===s McDonald s McDonald σσ, respectively. Similarly, the variance and standard deviation for Penn Station East Coast Subs’ is()()()1875.4675.430025.75.4595.75.430025.2222=−−+−+−=Penn σand7961.61875.462===Penn Penn σσ, respectively. Since the expected values are thesame we can compare the standard deviations to determine the most risky investment. Since s McDonald Penn 'σσ>there is more risk associated with a Penn Station East Coast Subs’ franchise.20. There are several things for a student to consider in deciding to enroll in a traditionalMBA program or an online MBA program. It is likely that students with a spouse and family may be more attracted to online MBA programs, since these individuals are value stability and have others relying on them for income. In contrast, traditional MBA programs are more likely to attract singles who are willing to bear theopportunity cost associated with this form of education. Thus, there is an adverse selection issue. The individual who selects the traditional MBA program is likely to have a stronger signaling value regarding underlying characteristics.21.Market collapse is likely since “outsiders” will be unwilling to participate in equity (or other) markets since they know “insiders” will only sell a stock when they know the price is too high. Similarly, insiders will only buy when the price of a stock is known to be low. This is a losing proposition for outsiders, who would rationally choose not to participate in the market. This is an example of a moral hazard and is one of the primary reasons the SEC exists.。
管理经济学 原书第六版 课后答案6
Chapter 6: Answers to Questions and Problems1.When an input has well-defined and measurable quality characteristics and requiresspecialized investments, the optimal procurement method is a contract. A contractreduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and underinvestment by creating alegal obligation between the firms. One disadvantage of a contract is that it increasesa firm’s transaction costs. An example, Boeing contracting with an aluminummanufacturer.2.When a firm requires a limited number of standardized inputs that are sold by manyfirms in the marketplace, the optimal method of procurement is spot exchange. Oneadvantage of spot exchange is that they permit firms to specialize. A disadvantage isthat the firm may potentially face the hold-up problem. An example, a painterpurchasing paint from a local paint store.3.a.Contract.b.Vertical Integration.c.Spot exchange (or possibly contract if a specific investment in many motors isrequired).d.Spot exchange.4.Engine manufacturing involves specific investments and a complex contractingenvironment. By vertically integrating, the potential for opportunism is reduced.Mirrors are relatively uniform products that can be purchased by spot exchange orcontract.5.a.Human capital.b.Physical asset specificity; note that the assembly line was designed especially fora particular firm’s product.c.Site specificity.6.The manager prefers the compensation scheme that pays a fixed salary plus apercentage of the profits. Essentially, the manager is faced with a choice between twoconsumption bundles: (1) a $125,000 fixed salary plus 10 hours of on-the-job leisureand (2) $125,000 in salary plus bonus plus 3 hours of on-the-job leisure. Since theoriginal compensation package of a $125,000 and 10 hours of shirking is stillavailable, the fact that she chose to work 7 hours reveals that she prefers the secondpay scheme.1 Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 6e Page7.Spot checks and hidden video cameras are effective and relatively inexpensive toimplement initially. The disadvantage is that spot checks and hidden video camerasmay affect the morale of the workers. Moreover, implementing hidden camerasrequires more employees to monitor the cameras. The advantage of pay forperformance schemes is that it may be easier for a managers to observe individualworker (or group) performances. However, pay-for-performance schemes may becostly. In addition, when output is a function of group performance or its quality isdifficult to measure, an individual’s contribution to the output may not be observable. 8.a.Reduce the benefits of vertical integration.b.Reduce the benefits of vertical integration and lead firms to use contracts or spotexchange to procure inputs.c.Lead to contracts that are more detailed or vertical integration.d.Make spot exchange an unattractive method of procurement due to opportunismand possibly underinvestment.e.Make contracts a less attractive form of input acquisition.f.Lead to longer contracts, or in extreme instances, vertical integration.9.The environment in which computer manufacturers operate is very uncertain. The rateof technical progress among chip, and other hardware, manufacturers increases themarginal cost of signing long-term contracts.10. A contract decreases the problem of opportunism and still allows the firm tospecialize in production.11.Capping pension fund managers’ compensations would reduce the executives’incentives to maximize the value of the fund under their control, thereby reducing the overall return to the fund participants.12.Contracts requiring large specialized investments are expected to be longer thancontracts requiring relatively smaller specialized investments. The reason is thattransaction costs increase once the contract expires. By writing longer contracts, these costs can be avoided. Thus, large specialized investments increase the marginalbenefit of writing longer contracts.13.The first important point to make with shareholders is that restructuring the incentiveplan is designed to maximize shareholder value. This is achieved by givingemployees incentives to stay with the company longer, thereby reducing costlyemployee turnover and increasing the company’s profitability. Also, by restructuring the incentive plan, employees will want to find ways to work more productively andmake the company more profitable. The benefits to the shareholders and theemployees will be a higher stock price.14.The reduction in another supplier’s cost of producing airbags reduces GM’s marginalbenefit of contracting. Therefore, the 15-year contract that has been negotiated is too long; the optimal contract length is now less than 15 years.Page 2 Michael R. Baye15.The manager might pay a salesperson a base salary plus a percentage of the profits.This plan would penalize salespersons, to some extent, for excessive mileage.16.In the absence of an incentive contract, a manager may still choose to maximizeprofits in order to build a reputation in being a superb manager and increasing thepotential of future management opportunities. Furthermore, the threat of a takeoverby other investors and job loss also disciplines managers to maximize profits, even ifthey are paid a fixed salary.17.No.18.The principal-agent problem in this situation exists between on-duty police officers(the agent) and the city officials who hire them (the principals). On-duty policeofficers were supposed to prevent picket lines from blocking worker access. Membersof the police union appear to be engaging in opportunistic behavior to improve theirbargaining power. The city of Boston has committed to spending $14 million to hostthe DNC and the police union is attempting to take advantage of this specializedinvestment. Therefore, the city of Boston is facing the “hold-up problem” as definedin the book. The problem also illustrates the problem of writing contracts: when thecity of Boston wrote a contract with Shawmut Design and Construction there weremany unforeseeable events that may not explicitly be defined in the contract.19.Business-process outsourcing (BPO) is a contractual relationship with a third-partyfirm, whereas a firm that produces human resource services internally is verticallyintegrated. Contracting human resource services with a third party allows the firm tospecialize in activities related to its core business, which as the problem points outmay result in large cost savings. Contracts, however, are costly to write and oftenincomplete. These reasons provide justification for vertical integration. Contractingwith an international-based firm may be more costly since the contract must bewritten in a manner to protect the firm in a foreign country. This extra cost should becompared to the extra benefit (cost savings) that accrues from lower off shore labor.Furthermore, there may be cultural difference in hiring practices that may makeoutsourcing from human resources to an international firm less attractive.20.If partners in the law firm are paid an equal share of the overall profits of the firm,regardless of how much they contribute, lawyers nearing retirement will have anincentive to stay with the firm while doing as little work as possible. In this way, heor she can enjoy “semi-retirement,” but will continue to earn a share of the profitsfrom other’s hard work. For this reason, most law firms have mandatory retirement tomitigate incentive compatibility problems. Eliminating mandatory retirement isprobably not a good idea for your 30-year old client.21.The money the dealership pays to train workers in the form of time and expenses is aspecialized investment in human capital. The investment only has value to thedealership if workers remain with the dealership and the dealership maintains itsrelationship ADP. Once this is sunk, it faces a potential “hold-up” problem fromworkers and ADP: If either party decides to sever the relationship, the dealership willhave to sink additional funds into training new employees.3 Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 6e Page。
管理经济学原书第六版课后题答案,第三章答案
=
−2.36 .
Since
this
is
greater than one in absolute value, demand is elastic at this price. If the firm
increased its price, total revenue would decrease.
c. At the given prices, quantity demanded is 700 units:
Qxd = 1000 − 2 (154) + .02 (400) = 700 . Substituting the relevant information into
the elasticity formula gives:
EQx ,Px
= −2 Px Qx
= −2 154 700
= −0.44 . Since this is less
Qxd = 1000 − 2 (154) + .02 (400) = 700 . Substituting the relevant information into
the elasticity formula gives:
EQx ,PZ
=
.02
⎛ ⎜ ⎝
PZ Qx
⎞ ⎟ ⎠
=
.02
⎛ ⎜⎝
400 700
Price $14
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4
$2 Demand
$0
0
1
2
3 MR 4
5
6 Quantity
Figure 3-1
Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 6e
管理经济学原书第六版课后答案10
Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 6e Page 1 Chapter 10: Answers to Questions and Problems 1.a. Player 1’s dominant strategy is B. Player 2 does not have a dominant strategy. b.Player 1’s secure strategy is B. Player 2’s secure strategy is E. c. (B, E). 2. a. b. B is dominant for each player. c. (B, B). d. Joint payoffs from (A, A) > joint payoffs from (A, B) = joint payoffs from (B, A) > joint payoffs from (B, B). e. No; each firm’s dominant strategy is B. Therefore, since this is a one-shot game, each player would have an incentive to cheat on any collusive arrangement. 3.a. Player 1’s optimal strategy is B. Player 1 does not have a dominant strategy. However, by putting herself in her rival’s shoes, Player 1 should anticipate that Player 2 will choose D (since D is Player 2’s dominant strategy). Player 1’s best response to D is B. b. Player 1’s equilibrium payoff is 5. 4.a. (A, C). b.No. c.If firms adopt the trigger strategies outlined in the text, higher payoffs can be achieved if 1.Cheat Coop Coop Ni ππππ−≤− Here, πCheat = 60, πCoop = 50, πN = 10, and the , and the interest rate is i = .05. Since . Since 605010.2550104Cheat Coop Coop Nππππ−−===−− < 1120.05i == each firm can indeed earn a payoff of 50 via the trigger strategies. d. Yes. Player 2 Strategy A B A $500, $500 $0, $650 Player 1 B $650, $0 $100, $100 ($0, $15)RightRightLeftLeft 12($200, $300)Not IntroducePrice WarIntroduceKmartStrategy Sale Price Regular Price Sale Price$1, 1 $5, $3Regular Price $3, $5 $3, $3Ford Strategy Airbags No No Airbags Airbags Airbags $1.5, 1.5 $2,-$1 No Airbags -$1, $2 $0.5, $0.5 PCRival Advertise No Yes No $8, $8 -$1, $48Kellogg’sYes$48,-$1$0, $0strategies if ππRival Strategy: Price Low High Low $0, $0 $9,-$1 High -$1, $9 $7, $7BakerPrice $10 $20$5 15, 16 15,18 Argyle$10 10, 16 10,18NetWorksStrategy 250 Units 500 Units250 Units $12500, $12500 $7500, $15000500 Units $15000, $7500 $10000, $1000018.The normal-form representation of this game is depicted in the following payoffmatrix.T-MobileStrategies CDMA GSMCDMA $16 b, $12 b $12 b, $8 bQualcommGSM $14 b, $7 b $13 b, $18 bThere are two Nash equilibria to this coordination game: (1) Qualcomm and T-Mobile adopt the CDMA technology and (2) Qualcomm and T-Mobile adopt theGSM technology. There are many ways to solve multiplicity of equilibria in thiscoordination problem. As the book points out, the firms could “talk” to each andagree on one technology. Alternatively, Iraq’s government could announce whichtechnology is to be used in the country.19.The normal form of this game is contained in the following payoff matrix (in billionsof U.S. dollars).JapanStrategies Tariff No TariffTariff $43.78, $4.76 $44.2, $4.66U.S.No tariff $43.66, $4.85 $44, $4.8The Nash equilibrium is for the U.S. and Japan to each impose tariffs. However, both countries achieve greater welfare by “agreeing” to impose no tariffs. Thesustainability of such an agreement to impose no tariffs is dependent upon the game being repeated infinitely, the countries using trigger strategies and the interest ratebeing sufficiently low.20.You should not recommend that the office manager invest more time monitoring. Theproblem is not that she is monitoring too little. Rather, her monitoring activities and strategies are predictable. Workers realize that once she leaves after the 9 a.m. check, she is unlikely to return until 11 a.m. Recognizing this, workers know they will not get caught “goofing off” (shirking). The manager best strategy is to randomize boththe timing and number of checks she does each day. That way, her monitoring is not predictable and workers will respond by spending less time shirking.Page 6 Michael R. Baye。
管理经济学原书第六版课后题答案,第二章答案
Chapter 2: Answers to Questions and Problems1.a. Since X is a normal good, an increase in income will lead to an increase in the demand for X (the demand curve for X will shift to the right).b. Since Y is an inferior good, a decrease in income will lead to an increase in the demand for good Y (the demand curve for Y will shift to the right).c. Since goods X and Y are substitutes, a decrease in the price of good Y will lead to a decrease in the demand for good X (the demand curve for X will shift to the left).d. No. The term “inferior good” does not mean “inferior quality,” it simply means that income and consumption are inversely related.2.a. The supply of good X will decrease (shift to the left).b. The supply of good X will decrease. More specifically, the supply curve will shift vertically up by exactly $1 at each level of output.c. The supply of good X will decrease. More specifically, the supply curve will rotate counter-clockwise.d. The supply curve for good X will increase (shift to the right).3.a. ()()500.550053050s x Q =−+−= units.b. Notice that although ()()500.550530175s x Q =−+−=−, negative output isimpossible. Thus, quantity supplied is zero.c. To find the supply function, insert 30z P = into the supply equation to obtain()500.55302000.5s x x x Q P P =−+−=−+. Thus, the supply equation is2000.5s x x Q P =−+. To obtain the inverse supply equation, simply solve thisequation for x P to obtain 4002s x x P Q =+. The inverse supply function is graphedin Figure 2-1.$0.0$200.0$400.0$600.0$800.0$1,000.0$1,200.0$1,400.0$1,600.00100200300400500Quantity of X Price of XSFigure 2-1a. Good Y is a substitute for X, while good Z is a complement for X.b. X is a normal good.c. ()()()()000,5000,55$10190$8900,5$41910,4$21200,1=+−+−=d x Q d. For the given income and prices of other goods, the demand function for good X is ()()()1111,200$5,9008$90$55,000,2410d x x Q P =−+−+ which simplifies to 7,4550.5d x x Q P =−. To find the inverse demand equation, solve for price to obtain 14,9102.d x x P Q =− The demand function is graphed in Figure 2-2.$0$2,982$5,964$8,946$11,928$14,910010002000300040005000600070008000Quantity of X Price of XDemandFigure 2-25.a. Solve the demand function for x P to obtain the following inverse demand function: 11154d x x P Q =−. b. Notice that when $35x P =, ()460435320d x Q =−= units. Also, from part a, weknow the vertical intercept of the inverse demand equation is 115. Thus,consumer surplus is $12,800 (computed as ()().5$115$35320$12,800−=). c. When price decreases to $25, quantity demanded increases to 360 units, so consumer surplus increases to $16,200 (computed as()().5$115$25360$16,200−=).d. So long as the law of demand holds, a decrease in price leads to an increase in consumer surplus, and vice versa. In general, there is an inverse relationship between the price of a product and consumer surplus.a. Equating quantity supplied and quantity demanded yields the equation150102P P −=−. Solving for P yields the equilibrium price of $40 per unit. Plugging this into the demand equation yields the equilibrium quanity of 10 units (since quantity demanded at the equilibrium price is ()504010d Q =−=). b. A price floor of $42 is effective since it is above the equilibrium price of $40. As a result, quantity demanded will fall to 8 units ()84250=−=d Q , while quantity supplied will increase to 11 units ()⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛=−=11104221s Q . That is, firms produce 11 units but consumers are willing and able to purchase only 8 units. Therefore, at a price floor of $42, 8 units will be exchanged. Since s d Q Q <there is a surplus amounting to 3811=−units.c. A price ceiling of $30 per unit is effective since it is below the equilibrium price of $40 per unit. As a result, quantity demanded will increase to 20 units ()203050=−=d Q , while quantity supplied will decrease to 5 units()⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛=−=5103021s Q . That is, while firms are willing to produce only 5 units consumers want to buy 20 units at the ceiling price. Therefore, at the price ceiling of $30, only 5 units will be available to purchase. Since s d Q Q >, there is a shortage amounting to 15520=− units. Since only 5 units are available at a price of $30, the full economic price is the price such that quantity demanded equals the 5 available units: 550F P =−. Solving yields the full economic price of $45.7.a. The shortage is 3 units (since at a price of $6, 413d s Q Q −=−= units). The full economic price is $12.b. The surplus is 1.5 units (since at a price of $12, 2.51 1.5s d Q Q −=−= units. The cost to the government is $18 (computed as ($12)(1.5) = $18).c. The excise tax shifts supply vertically by $6. Thus, the new supply curve is 1S and the equilibrium price increases to $12. The price paid by consumers is $12 per unit, while the amount received by producers is this $12 minus the per unit tax. Thus, producers receive $6 per unit. After the tax, the equilibrium quantity sold is 1 unit.d. At the equilibrium price of $10, consumer surplus is ().5$14$102$4−=. Producer surplus is ().5$10$22$8−=.e. No. At a price of $2 no output is produced.a. Equate quantity demanded and quantity supplied to obtain 1117242x x P P −=−. Solve this equation for x P to obtain the equilibrium price of 10x P =. Theequilibrium quantity is 2 units (since at the equilibrium price quantity demanded is ()171022d Q =−=). The equilibrium is shown in Figure 2-3.$0$2$4$6$8$10$12$14$16$18$200123456Quantity of XPrice of XDemandFigure 2-3b. A $6 excise tax shifts the supply curve up by the amount of the tax.Mathematically, this means that the intercept of the inverse supply function increases by $6. Before the tax, the inverse supply function is S Q P 42+=. After the tax the inverse supply function is 84s P Q =+, and the after tax supplyfunction (obtained by solving for s Q in terms of P) is given by 124s Q P =−. Equating quantity demanded to after-tax quantity supplied yields117224P P −=−. Solving for P yields the new equilibrium price of $12. Plugging this into the demand equation yields the new equilibrium quantity, which is 1 unit.c. Since only one unit is sold after the tax and the tax rate is $6 per unit, total tax revenue is only $6.9. A technological breakthrough that reduces production costs will lead to a rightwardshift in the supply curve for RAM chips, resulting in a lower equilibrium price of RAM chips. If in addition, income increases, the demand for RAM chips will also increase since they are a normal good. This increase in demand would tend to increase the price of RAM chips. The ultimate effect of both of these changes in supply and demand on the equilibrium price of RAM chips is indeterminate.Depending on the relative magnitude of the increase in supply and demand, the price you will pay for chips may rise or fall.10. The tariff reduces the supply of raw sugar, resulting in a higher equilibrium price of sugar. Since sugar is an input in making generic soft drinks, this increase in input prices will decrease the supply of generic soft drinks (putting upward pressure on the price of generic soft drinks and tend to reduce quantity). Coke and Pepsi’s advertising campaign will decrease the demand for generic soft drinks (putting downward pressure on the price of generic soft drinks and further reducing the quantity). For these reasons, the equilibrium quantity of generic soft drinks sold will decrease.However, the equilibrium price may rise or fall, depending on the relative magnitude of the shifts in demand and supply.11. No. this confuses a change in demand with a change in quantity demanded. Higher cigarette prices will not reduce (shift to the left) the demand for cigarettes.12.To find the equilibrium price and quantity, equate quantity demanded and quantity supplied to obtain 1752200P P −=−. Solving yields the new equilibrium price of $125 per pint. The equilibrium quantity is 50 units (since 17512550d Q =−= units at that price). Consumer surplus is ()250,1$50125$175$21=×−. Producer surplus is ()625$50100$125$21=×−. See Figure 2-4.$0.0$25.0$50.0$75.0$100.0$125.0$150.0$175.0$200.00102030405060Quantity Price Demand SupplyFigure 2-413. This decline represents a leftward shift in the supply curve for oil, and will result inan increase in the equilibrium price of crude oil. Since oil is an input in producing gasoline, this will decrease the supply of gasoline, resulting in a higher equilibrium price of gasoline and a lower equilibrium quantity. Furthermore, the higher price of gasoline will increase the demand for substitutes, such as small cars. The equilibrium price of small cars is likely to increase, as is the equilibrium quantity of small cars. 14. Equating the initial quantity demanded and quantity supplied gives the equation: 25054110P P −=−. Solving for price, we see that the initial equilibrium price is $40 per month. When the tax rate is reduced, equilibrium is determined by the following equation: 2505 4.171110P P −=−. Solving, we see that the newequilibrium price is about $39.25 per month. In other words, a typical subscriber would save about 75 cents (the difference between $40.00 and $39.25).15. Dry beans and rice are probably inferior goods. If so, an increase in income shifts demand for these goods to the left, resulting in a lower equilibrium price. Therefore, G.R. Dry Foods will likely have to sell its products at a lower price.16.Figure 2-5 illustrates the relevant situation. The equilibrium price is $2.75, but the ceiling price is $0.75. Notice that, given the shortage of 12 million transactions caused by the ceiling price of $0.75, the average consumer spends an extra 12minutes traveling to another ATM machine. Since the opportunity cost of time is $20 per hour, the non-pecuniary price of an ATM transaction is $4 (the $20 per hour wage times the fractional hour, 12/60, spent searching for another machine). Thus, the full economic price under the price ceiling is $4.75 per transaction.Quantity (Millions of Transactions)ATM Fee$4.75$0.75Figure 2-517. The unusually cold temperatures have caused a decrease in the supply of grapes usedto produce Chilean wine, resulting in higher prices. These grapes are an input in making wine, so the supply of Chilean wine decreases and its price increases. Since California and Chilean wines are substitutes, an increase in the price of Chilean wine will increase the demand for Californian wines causing an increase in both the price and quantity of Californian wines.18.Substituting 940=desktop P into the demand equation yields memory d memory P Q 809060−=. Similarly, substituting 100=N into the supply equationyields memory S memory P Q 201100+=. The competitive equilibrium level of industry outputand price occurs where S memoryd memory Q Q =, which occurs when industry output 2692*=memory Q (in thousands) and the market price is 60.79$*=memory P per unit. Since 100 competitors are assumed to equally share the market, Viking should produce26.92 thousand units. If 1040$=desktop P , memory d memory P Q 808960−=. Under thiscondition, the new competitive equilibrium occurs when industry output is 2672 thousand units and the per-unit market price is $78.60. Therefore, Viking should produce 26.72 thousand units. Since demand decreased (shifted left) when the price of desktops increased, memory modules and desktops are complements.19. Mid Towne IGA aimed to educate consumers that its contract with Local 655 unionmembers was different than its rivals, so it engaged in informative advertising. Mid Towne IGA’s informative advertising increases demand (demand shifts rightward) resulting from (1) Local 655 union members locked out of rival supermarkets (2) consumers who are sympathetic to the Local 655 union, and (3) consumers who do not like the aggravation of picketing employees and other disruptions at thesupermarket. This shift is depicted in Figure 2-6, where the equilibrium price and quantity both increase. It is unlikely that demand will remain high for Mid Towne IGA. As contracts are renegotiated and Local 655 union members are back to work, demand will likely settle back around its original level.Figure 2-6 20. The price gouging statute imposes an effective price ceiling on necessarycommodities during times of emergencies; legally retailers cannot raise prices by a significant amount. When a natural disaster occurs, the demand for necessarycommodities such as food and water can dramatically increase, as people want to be stocked-up on emergency items. In addition, since it can be difficult for retailers to receive shipments during emergency periods, the supply of these items is often reduced. Given the simultaneous reduction in supply and increase in demand, one would expect the price to increase during times of emergencies. However, since the price gouging statute acts as a price ceiling, the price will probably remain at its normal level, and a shortage will result. Quantity212P 1P 221.While there is undoubtedly a link between unemployment and crime, the governor’splan is likely flawed since it only examines one side of the market. Raising theminimum wage will make the prospect of working more appealing for teenagers, but it will also have an effect on business owners and managers in the state. Theminimum wage is a price floor. Raising the minimum wage will reduce the quantity demand for labor within the state, and result in a labor surplus. More teenagers will seek jobs, but fewer businesses will hire teenagers. In all likelihood, the governor’s plan will result in greater juvenile delinquency.。
管理经济学 原书第六版 课后答案11
1
NEM + NEM
⎞ ⎟ $75 ⎠=来自⎛ 2 (−1.5) ⎞
⎜ ⎝
1
+
2
(
−1.5)
⎟ ⎠
$75
=
(1.5) $75
=
$112.50 .
c.
P
=
⎛ ⎜ ⎝
1
EF + EF
⎞ ⎟ MC ⎠
=
⎛ ⎜ ⎝
1
NEM + NEM
⎞ ⎟ $75 ⎠
=
⎛ ⎜ ⎝
1
20 (−1.5) + 20 (−1.5)
⎞ ⎟ ⎠
$75
=
⎛ ⎜⎝
30 29
⎞ ⎟⎠
$75
=
$77.59 .
2. a. P = $60, Q = 4, and profits = 4($60 – $20) = $160. b. Charge the maximum price on the demand curve starting at $100 down to $20 for each infinitesimal unit up to Q = 8 units. Profits are 8($100 – $20)(.5) = $320. c. Charge a fixed fee of $320 and a per-unit charge of $20 per unit to earn total profits of $320. d. Create a package of 8 units and sell the package for $480. Total profits are $320.
8. No. This would provide managers an incentive to maximize divisional profits, which would lead to double marginalization.
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Chapter 7: Answers to Questions and Problems1. The four-firm concentration ratio is,4$175,000$150,000$125,000$100,0000.55$1,000,000C +++==.2.a. The HHI is222$200,000$400,000$500,00010,000=3,719$1,100,000$1,100,000$1,100,000HHI ⎡⎤⎛⎞⎛⎞⎛⎞=++⎢⎥⎜⎟⎜⎟⎜⎟⎝⎠⎝⎠⎝⎠⎢⎥⎣⎦. b. The four-firm concentration ratio is 100 percent.c. If the firms with sales of $200,000 and $400,000 were allowed to merge, the resulting HHI would increase by 1,322 to 5,041. Since the pre-merger HHI exceeds that under the Guidelines (1,800) and the HHI increases by more than that permitted under the Guidelines (100), the merger is likely to be challenged.3. The elasticity of demand for a representative firm in the industry is –1.5, since.5.16.09.09.06.0−=−=⇒−=F F E E .4.a. $100. To see this, solve the Lerner index formula for P to obtain11$35$100110.65P MC L ⎛⎞⎛⎞===⎜⎟⎜⎟−−⎝⎠⎝⎠. b. Since 11P MC L ⎛⎞=⎜⎟−⎝⎠, it follows that the markup factor is 1 2.8610.65⎛⎞=⎜⎟−⎝⎠. That is, the price charged by the firm is 2.86 times the marginal cost of producing the product.c. The above calculations suggest price competition is not very rigorous and that the firm enjoys market power.5.Managers should not specialize in learning to manage a particular type of market structure. Market structure generally evolves over time, and managers must adapt to these changes.6. To the extent that the HHIs are based on too narrow a definition of the product (orgeographic) market or the impact of foreign competition, the merger might be allowed. It might also be allowed if one of the firms is in financial trouble, or if significant economies of scale exist in the industry.7. As shown in the text, the HHI is⎥⎥⎦⎤⎢⎢⎣⎡⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛=⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛∑=222222112......000,10000,10T n T j T i T T n i T i S S S S S S S S S S S S . (1) When firms i and j merge, the HHI becomes ⎥⎥⎦⎤⎢⎢⎣⎡⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛222221......000,10T n T j i T T S S S S S S S S S . (2) The difference between (2) and (1) is that 22⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛T j T i S S S S becomes 2⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+T j i S S S .Thus, we can calculate how a merger between firms i and j will change the HHI by knowing only those two firms’ market shares. In general, since()22222⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛++⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛=⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+T j T j i T i T j i S S S S S S S S S S , we know that a merger between firms i and j will cause the HHI to increase by 210,000i j w w ×, where w i and w j are the pre-merger market shares of the two merging firms. Using the information in the problem,()()()800000,102.2.2= represents the increase in the HHI due to the merger.8. No. The conditions for perfect competition include:a. There are many buyers and sellers of products.b. The products are homogenous.c. Consumers and producers have perfect information.d. There is free entry and exit.9. The four-firm concentration ratios in Table 7-2 are likely to overstate the level of concentration in the U.S. Imported beers account for much of the sales in the U.S. It is likely that the brewing industry is much less concentrated than Table 7-2 leads us to believe.10.This industry is most likely monopolistically competitive. Monopolistically competitive industries have concentration measures close to zero, but since eachfirm’s product is slightly differentiated, the Rothschild index will be greater than zero (unlike perfectly competitive markets).11.Monopolistically competitive. In a monopolistically competitive market, there aremany firms, but each firm produces a differentiated product. According to the causal view, the structure of differentiated products causes firms to capitalize on the absence of close substitutes by charging higher prices and earning higher profit. Thus,structure causes conduct resulting in performance. According to the feedback critique, the conduct of firms may determine the market structure. Firms’ products may bedifferentiated because of firms’ conduct in the industry. Examples of such conductinclude advertising and other behavioral tactics that feedback into demand, causingconsumers to view products as differentiated. Thus, it is not at all clear thatdifferentiated products are a structural variable. The willingness of consumers to pay for product variety gives firms an incentive to offer different products (thin-and-crispy pizza, pan pizza, pizza delivery, etc.).12.Merger (a) is the only horizontal merger, and therefore the only merger that would bescrutinized under the Guidelines for horizontal mergers. Merger (b) is a conglomerate merger, while merger (c) is a vertical merger.13.While the pre-merger four-firm concentration ratio is 72 percent, the pre-merger HHIis only 1,535. The merger would increase the HHI by only 100 to 1,635. The merger is unlikely to be blocked based on the merger guidelines.14.If approved, the merger would raise the HHI by ()()()702000,1013.27.2= points (see the solution to problem 7). Since the pre-merger HHI is 3,025, which is greater thanthe Guidelines (1,800), and the HHI increases by 702 (which is greater than the 100points permitted in the Guidelines), it is unlikely that the merger will receiveunconditional approval.15.See Table 7-1.O w n P rice Elasticity of M arket Dem andO w n P rice E lasticityof D em and forR epresentative Firm'sP roduct R othsc hild IndexA griculture-1.8-96.20.019C onstruction-1.0-5.20.192Du rable m anufacturing-1.4-3.50.400No ndu rable m anufacturing-1.3-3.40.382Transportation-1.0-1.90.526Com m unication and utilities-1.2-1.80.667W holesale trade-1.5-1.60.938R etail trade-1.2-1.80.667Finance-0.1-5.50.018S ervices-1.2-26.40.045Table 7-1Based on the Rothschild indices in Table 7-1, wholesale trade most closely resembles a monopoly, while finance most closely resembles perfect competition.16. The Lerner index is $3$0.300.9$3P MC L P −−===, which indicates the firm has considerable market power. This makes sense because the product that the firm sells is currently under patent protection, which essentially makes the firm a legal monopoly.17.Based on the information contained in Table 7-3 of the text, the food and apparel industries are most competitive and therefore probably represent the best match for the expertise of these managers.18. The market for color film in the U.S. is highly concentrated. The five-firmconcentration ratio is 100 percent and Kodak alone accounts for 67 percent of all rolls sold. Market demand for color film is relatively elastic at -1.75; indicating that a 10 percent increase in price leads to a 17.5 percent decline in quantity demand for color film. The Rothschild index indicates that market demand relative to the demand for Kodak color film is 875.0275.1=−−=R , indicating that Kodak’s demand is, roughly, as sensitive to price changes as is the entire market demand. The Lerner index for Kodak is 50.095.6$475.3$95.6$=−=L , indicating that Kodak’s markup factor is 2. For every $1 spent on color film, $0.50 is markup. Taken together, these things suggest that the color film industry in the U.S. closely resembles an oligopoly.19. Note first that a merger with Unilever or Tricor Braun is not a horizontal merger. Moreover, while a horizontal merger with either Dole or Goya is likely to enhance Del Monte’s profitability (profits as a percentage of sales are 8.7 and 7.1, respectively and the Lerner Indices are 0.14 and 0.32, respectively), the market for cannedtomatoes and canned pineapple are highly concentrated. The four-firm concentration ratio and HHI for the canned tomatoes market are, respectively, 86.3 percent and 3,297. Similarly, the four-firm concentration ratio and HHI in the canned pineapple industry are 94.2 percent and 5,457, respectively. This information suggests that potential mergers in these industries are likely to be scrutinized.20.On the surface the industry analysts’ suggestion would represent a merger tomonopoly and the HHI before and after the merger exceeds the threshold for raising antitrust concerns. However, there are several reasons why the merger might beallowed. First, satellite radio may not be its own industry, but rather a smaller part of a larger market that include MP3 players, AM and FM radios, and the like. Their market shares in this more broadly defined market are trivial, and therefore themerger would not impact the HHI in the more broadly defined market. Additionally, the merger might be allowed if the (1) firms could show significant cost savings; (2) rapidly changing technology in the portable music industry would prevent anti-competitive behavior; (3) government viewed the firms as financially unstable; or (4) barriers to entry were low enough to allow competition from new entrants after the merger.21.With number portability, the services of the various providers are now closersubstitutes to each other. One implication is that the cost to consumers of switchingservice providers is not lower, which increases the likelihood that consumers wouldswitch for small price reductions. These factors make the demand for the individualcellular service providers more elastic (increase the price elasticity of demand). Local number portability, however, is unlikely to affect the elasticity of demand for theindustry as a whole. If the elasticity of demand increases for individual firms, butremains constant for the industry, the Rothschild index will decrease.。