Diversification and Corporate Strategy
职业经理人必备的英文单词
职业经理人必备的英文单词-- 职业经理人必备的英文单词目标 mission/ objective集体目标 group objective内部环境 internal environment外部环境 external environment计划 planning组织 organizing人事 staffing领导 leading控制 controlling步骤 process原理 principle方法 technique经理 manager总经理 general manager行政人员 administrator administration 行政agent 代理人executive (1)行政，(2)行政人员;执行人员expert power 权威权力expertise (1)专才，(2)专门知识;专家经验export 出口主管人员 supervisoraccountant 会计人员;会计主任;会计师企业 enterprise商业 business产业 industry公司 company效果 effectiveness效率 efficiency企业家 entrepreneur权利 power职权 authority职责 responsibility科学管理 scientific management现代经营管理 modern operational management行为科学 behavior science生产率 productivity Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijin hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiang Liu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than amonth. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiologyrespiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and GynecologyClinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:激励 motivate动机 motive法律 law法规 regulation经济体系 economic system管理职能 managerial function产品 product服务 service利润 profit满意 satisfaction归属 affiliation尊敬 esteem自我实现 self-actualization人力投入 human input盈余 surplus收入 income成本 cost资本货物 capital goods机器 machinery设备 equipment建筑 building存货 inventory(2)经验法 the empirical approach人际行为法 the interpersonal behavior approach集体行为法 the group behavior approach协作社会系统法 the cooperative social systems approach 社会技术系统法 the social-technical systems approach 决策理论法 the decision theory approach数学法 the mathematical approach系统法 the systems approach随机制宜法 the contingency approach管理任务法 the managerial roles approach经营法 the operational approach人际关系 human relationhuman relations 人际关系human resources 人力资源human resources management 人力资源管理human resources planning 人力资源规划心理学 psychology态度 attitude压力 pressure冲突 conflict招聘 recruitLippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijinhospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:鉴定 appraisal选拔 select培训 train报酬 compensation授权 delegation of authority协调 coordinate业绩 performance考绩制度 merit system表现 behavior下级 subordinate偏差 deviation检验记录 inspection record误工记录 record of labor-hours lost 销售量 sales volume产品质量 quality of products先进技术 advanced technology顾客服务 customer service策略 strategy结构 structure(3)领先性 primacy普遍性 pervasiveness忧虑 fear忿恨 resentment士气 morale解雇 layoff批发 wholesale零售 retail程序 procedure规则 rule规划 program预算 budget共同作用 synergy大型联合企业 conglomerate资源 resource购买 acquisition增长目标 growth goal专利产品 proprietary product竞争对手 rival晋升 promotion管理决策 managerial decision商业道德 business ethics有竞争力的价格 competitive price供货商 supplierLippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijin hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, ShanghaiChangzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:小贩 vendor利益冲突 conflict of interests派生政策 derivative policy开支帐户 expense account批准程序 approval procedure病假 sick leave休假 vacation工时 labor-hour机时 machine-hour资本支出 capital outlay现金流量 cash flow工资率 wage rate税收率 tax rate股息 dividend现金状况 cash position资金短缺 capital shortage总预算 overall budget资产负债表 balance sheet可行性 feasibility投入原则 the commitment principle 投资回报 return on investment生产能力 capacity to produce实际工作者 practitioner最终结果 end result业绩 performance个人利益 personal interest福利 welfare市场占有率 market share创新 innovation生产率 productivity利润率 profitability社会责任 public responsibility董事会 board of director组织规模 size of the organization组织文化 organizational culture目标管理 management by objectives评价工具 appraisal tool激励方法 motivational techniques控制手段 control device个人价值 personal worth优势 strength弱点 weakness机会 opportunity威胁 threatLippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijinhospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:个人责任 personal responsibility顾问 counselor定量目标 quantitative objective定性目标 qualitative objective可考核目标 verifiable objective优先 priority工资表 payroll(4)策略 strategy政策 policy灵活性 discretion多种经营 diversification评估 assessment一致性 consistency应变策略 consistency strategy公共关系 public relation价值 value抱负 aspiration偏见 prejudice审查 review批准 approval主要决定 major decision分公司总经理 division general manager 资产组合距阵 portfolio matrix明星 star问号 question mark现金牛 cash cow赖狗 dog采购 procurement人口因素 demographic factor地理因素 geographic factor公司形象 company image产品系列 product line合资企业 joint venture破产政策 liquidation strategy紧缩政策 retrenchment strategy战术 tactics(5)追随 followership个性 individuality性格 personality安全 safety自主权 latitude悲观的 pessimisticLippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijinhospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:静止的 static乐观的 optimistic动态的 dynamic灵活的 flexible抵制 resistance敌对 antagonism折中 eclectic(6)激励 motivation潜意识 subconscious地位 status情感 affection欲望 desire压力 pressure满足 satisfaction自我实现的需要 needs for self-actualization 尊敬的需要 esteem needs归属的需要 affiliation needs安全的需要 security needs生理的需要 physiological needs维持 maintenance保健 hygiene激励因素 motivator概率 probability强化理论 reinforcement theory反馈 feedback奖金 bonus股票期权 stock option劳资纠纷 labor dispute缺勤率 absenteeism人员流动 turnover奖励 reward(7)特许经营 franchise热诚 zeal信心 confidence鼓舞 inspire要素 ingredient忠诚 loyalty奉献 devotion作风 style品质 trait适应性 adaptability进取性 aggressivenessLippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijin hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiang Liu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai JiaoTong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:热情 enthusiasm毅力 persistence人际交往能力 interpersonal skills行政管理能力 administrative ability智力 intelligence专制式领导 autocratic leader民主式领导 democratic leader自由放任式领导 free-rein leader管理方格图 the managerial grid工作效率 work efficiency服从 obedience领导行为 leader behavior支持型领导 supportive leadership参与型领导 participative leadership指导型领导 instrumental leadership成就取向型领导 achievement-oriented leadership management n. 管理，管理部门middle management n. 中层管理人员senior management n. 高层管理人员managerial adj. 管理人员的，管理方面的manager n. 经理plant manager n. 工厂负责人line manager n. 基层负责人staff manager n. 部门经理助理management accounts n. 管理帐目matrix management n. 矩阵管理*management information system(MIS) n. 管理信息系统manning n. 人员配备manpower n. 劳动力manpower resources n. 劳动力资源manual adj. 体力的，人工的，蓝领的manufacture v. (用机器)制造manufacturer n. 制造者(厂、商、公司) manufacturing adj. 制造的manufacturing industry 制造业margin n. 利润gross margin n. 毛利率net margin n. 净利润mark-up v. 标高售价，加价market n. 市场;产品可能的销量market segmentation 市场划分market share n. 市场占有率，市场份额*mission n. 公司的长期目标和原则motive n. 动机Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijinhospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2ndyear visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:objective n. 目标，目的off-the-shelf adj. 非专门设计的 offer n. 报价，发盘offer v. 开价off-season adj./adv. 淡季的off-the-shelf adj. 非专门设计的 off-the-peg adj. 标准的，非顾客化的opening n. 空位operate v. 操作，经营，管理 operating profits 营业利润*operations chart n. 经营(管理)表 *operations scheduling n. 生产经营进度表 opportunity n. 机会*optimize v. 优化option n. 选择权share option n. 期权organigram n. 组织图organisation chart n. 公司组织机构图 orient v. 定向，指引orientation n. 倾向，方向;熟悉，介绍情况outcome n. 结果outlay n. 开销，支出，费用 overtime n. 加班overview n. 概述，概观owe v. 欠钱，应付outgoings n. 开支，开销overhead costs n. 营业成本*overheads n. 企业一般管理费用 p.a.(=per annum) n. 每年packaging n. 包装物;包装parent company n. 母公司，总公司 patent n. 专利pay n. 工资，酬金v. 付钱，付报酬take-home pay 实得工资payroll n. 雇员名单，工资表 personnel n. 员工，人员point of sale (POS) n. 销售点 plant capacity n. 生产规模，生产能力pie chart n. 饼形图pilot n. 小规模试验plot v. 标绘，策划position n. 职位potential n. 潜在力，潜势 Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijin hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiang Liu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year providesWeb departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:power n. 能力purchasing power 购买力PR=Public Relations 公共关系 *preference shares n. 优先股 price n.价格market price 市场价，市价 retail price 零售价probation n. 试用期product n. 产品production cycle n. 生产周期 production schedule n. 生产计划 product life cycle n. 产品生命周期 product mix n. 产品组合(种类和数量的组合) productive adj. 生产的，多产的 *profile n. 简介形象特征 profit n. 利润operating profit n. 营业利润 profit and loss account n. 损益帐户project v. 预测promote v . 推销promotion n. 提升，升级 proposal n. 建议，计划prospect n. 预期，展望prospectus n. 计划书，说明书 prosperity n. 繁荣，兴隆prototype n. 原型，样品*publicity n. 引起公众注意 public adj. 公众的，公开的 go public 上市public sector 公有企业publicity n. 公开场合，名声，宣传 publics n. 公众，(有共同兴趣的)一群人或社会人士punctual adj. 准时的punctuality n. 准时purchase v. & n. 购买purchaser n. 买主，采购人QC(=Quality Circle) n. 质检人员 qualify v. 有资格，胜任qualified adj. 有资格的，胜任的，合格的qualification n. 资格，资格证明 quality n. 质量quality assurance n. 质量保证 quality control 质量控制，质量管理quarterly adj./adv. 季度的，按季度 Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijin hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiang Liu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content includingDermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-yearrotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:questionnaire n. 调查表，问卷 quote n. 报价，股票牌价 quotation n.报价，股票牌价 ,,, Research and Development 研究与开发radically adv. 根本地，彻底地 range n. 系列产品rank n./v. 排名rapport n. 密切的关系，轻松愉快的气氛rate n. 比率，费用fixed rate 固定费用，固定汇率 going rate 现行利率，现行汇率 rating评定结果ratio n. 比率rationalise v. 使更有效，使更合理 raw adj. 原料状态的，未加工的 raw material n. 原材料receive v. 得到receipt n. 收据reckon v. 估算，认为recognise v. 承认recruit v. 招聘，征募 n. 新招收的人员recruitment n. 新成员的吸收 reference n. 参考，参考资料 reference number (Ref. No.) 产品的参考号码reject n./v. 拒绝reliability n. 可靠性relief n. 减轻，解除，救济 relocate v. 调动，重新安置 remuneration n. 酬报，酬金 represent v. 代表，代理 representative n. 代理人，代表reputation n. 名声，声望reputable adj. 名声/名誉好的 reserves n. 储量金，准备金 resign v. 放弃，辞去resignation n. 辞职resistance n. 阻力，抵触情绪 respond v. 回答，答复response n. 回答，答复 restore v. 恢复result/results n. 结果，效果 retail n./v. 零售retailer n. 零售商*retained earnings n. 留存收益 Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijin hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiang Liu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people'sHospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-yearrotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:retire v. 退休retirement n. 退休return n. 投资报酬*return on investment (ROI) n. 投资收入，投资报酬revenue n. 岁入，税收 review v./n. 检查reward n./v. 报答，报酬，奖赏 *rework v. (因劣质而)重作 rival n. 竞争者，对手sack v. 解雇sales force 销售人员sample n. 样品v. 试验;抽样检验*saturation n. (市场的)饱和(状态)saturate v. 饱和save v. 节省，储蓄savings n. 存款scale n. 刻度，层次scapegoat n. 替罪羊scare adj. 缺乏的，不足的 *scrap n. 废料或废品seasonal adj. 季节性的section n. 部门sector n. 部门set up v. 创立share n. 股份shareholder n. 股东*shelf-life n. 货架期(商品可以陈列在货架上的时间) shift n. 轮班showroom n. 陈列室simulation n. 模拟shopfloor 生产场所shortlist n. ……供最后选择的候选人名单v. 把……列入最后的候选人名单 sick adj. 病的sick leave 病假sick note 病假条sick pay 病假工资sickness 生病skill n. 技能，熟巧skilled employee n. 熟练工人 *skimming n. 高额定价，撇奶油式定价slogan n. 销售口号spare part n. 零部件Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijinhospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third, during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:specification n. 产品说明split v. 分离spokesman n. 发言人sponsor n. 赞助者(为了商品的广告宣传) staff n. 职员stock controller 库房管理者structure n. 结构，设备*subcontract v. 分包(工程项目)，转包subordinate n. 下级adj. 下级的subscribe v. 认购subsidiary n. 子公司subsidise v. 补贴，资助summarise v. 概括，总结superior n. 上级，长官duty list 职责表duty roster 轮值表supervisor n. 监督人，管理人supervisory adj. 监督的，管理的 supply n./v. 供给，提供survey n 调查*SWOT analysis n. SWOT分析是分析一个公司或一个项目的优点、弱点、机会和风险*synergy n. 协作target n. 目标v. 把……作为目标TQC(=Total Quality Control) n. 全面质量管理 trade mark 商标trade union 工会trainee n. 受培训者venue n. 地点，集合地点viable adj. 可行的viability n. 可行性vision n. 设想，公司的长期目标vocation n. 行业，职业white-collar 白领阶层working conditions n. 工作条件work-in-progress n. 工作过程workload n. 工作量work order n. (包括原料、半成品、成品的)全部存货总量work station 工作位置asset 资产annual general meeting 周年大会;年会 annual report 年报brand 牌子;品牌brand image 牌子形象;品牌形象brand loyalty 对牌子忠诚brand name 商标;品牌名称;牌子名称 broker 经纪business enterprise 企业机构business entity 企业个体Lippincott Williams &Wilkins 2009 participate in modifying the rules for the implementation of personnel: review: Chen Shengdi Ruijinhospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiao Tong University Wang Xin Zhao Zhongxin, Zhongshan hospital affiliated to Fudan University, Shanghai Changzheng hospital, second military medical University Sun xiaojiangLiu Zhenguo sixth people's hospital affiliated to Shanghai Jiaotong University Xinhua Hospital wrote: Wang Shaoshi branch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University affiliated first people's Hospital Rule of Dermatology Dermatology clinical science is a covering a wide range of disciplines. Professional content including Dermatology, ... More than a month. Third,during the three-year rotation Department and schedule Web Department name 1th year provides Web departments: cardiology respiratory medicine ~ 2 months ~ 2 month obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic 2-4 Urology Clinic 2-4 weeks plastic surgeons or little operating room 1-2 months to choose Web-Department of General Surgery (more than 2) renal Endocrinology internal medicine 1 month 1 month rheumatic Rooms 1 month 1 month 2nd year visits: Ward 3-6 months: 3 years out of the 6-9 months: 1-3 months Ward: 3-6 months of emergency: independent, and 1 times per week or more than 1 skin Pathology:business organization 企业组织business registration certificate 商业登记证 certificate of incorporation 公司注册证 channel of distribution 分销途径;分销渠道comparative advantage 比较优势consumer goods 消费品consumer loyalty 消费者忠诚consumer market 消费者市场consumer survey 消费者调查contract 合约;契约;合同indenture 合约;契约 copyright 版权corporation 公司subsidiary company 附属公司;子公司 invested capital 投入资本investment 投资investment company 投资公司invoice 发票licence 许可证;牌照limited company 有限公司control chart 控制图control unit 控制部件controllable cost controlled company 分公司;受制公司 controlling company 总公司;控股公司 quotation 报价单transportation system 运输系统rail transport 铁路运输sea transport 水上运输water transport 水上运输 direct shipment 直接装运inland transportation内陆运输retail price 零售价wholesale price 批发价cost of production 生产成本cost-benefit analysis 成本收益分析;成本效益分析 cost-effectiveness analysis 成本效用分析;成本效能分析specialty goods 特殊品;特殊货品 warehouse 仓库;货仓assembling 装配assembly line 装配线basic salary 底薪merit rating system 考绩制度data 数据;资料data processing 数据处理data tansmission 数据传输。
战略管理和战略竞争力 (6)
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The Role of Diversification
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Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to:
1. Define corporate-level strategy and discuss its purpose.
• Diversification strategies play a major role in the behavior of large firms.
• Product diversification concerns:
– the scope of the industries and markets in which the firm competes.
bec商务英语高级单词
bec商务英语高级单词Advanced Business English VocabularyIn the realm of business, mastering a comprehensive vocabulary is essential for effective communication and professional success. Here is a curated list of advanced business English words that can enhance your lexicon and facilitate more nuanced discussions in a corporate setting.1. Leverage - To use something to your advantage, often in the context of business strategy.- Example: "The company aims to leverage its strong brand to enter new markets."2. Synergy - The interaction of elements that individually are working well together to produce a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects.- Example: "The merger is expected to create significant synergy within the organization."3. Paradigm Shift - A fundamental change in approach or underlying assumptions.- Example: "The advent of the internet has brought about a paradigm shift in how we conduct business."4. Diversification - The strategy of an individual or organization spreading activities among different businesses or investments to avoid exposure to any one type.- Example: "The conglomerate's diversification strategy has helped it weather economic downturns."5. Turnkey Solutions - A fully functional, ready-to-use solution that requires minimal adjustment from the client.- Example: "We offer turnkey solutions that enable our clients to focus on their core business."6. Bottleneck - A point of congestion in a system or process.- Example: "The production line's efficiency was hampered by a bottleneck in the packaging department."7. Economies of Scale - Cost advantages that arise when you make more of something, increasing the efficiency of production as fixed costs are spread out over more units.- Example: "The company is looking to achieve economies of scale by expanding its operations."8. Vertical Integration - The arrangement where a company owns or controls several stages of the production or distribution process.- Example: "Vertical integration has allowed the firmto streamline its supply chain."9. Exit Strategy - A plan devised by a business or investor on how to best exit an investment, usually to cash out with a profit.- Example: "The venture capitalist is considering an IPO as a potential exit strategy for their stake in the startup."10. Intellectual Property (IP) - Creations of the mind, such as inventions, literary and artistic works, designs, symbols, names, and images used in commerce.- Example: "Protecting the company's intellectual property is a top priority for the legal department."11. Due Diligence - The process of conducting investigations and audits to evaluate a potential investment.- Example: "The team conducted thorough due diligence before making the acquisition."12. Scalability - The ability of a system, network, or process to handle growth.- Example: "The software's scalability is crucial for the company's expansion plans."13. Collateral Damage - Damage to people, property, or equipment that is not the main target of an attack or event.- Example: "The economic downturn caused collateral damage to many industries."14. Blue Ocean Strategy - A business strategy that focuses on creating new, uncontested markets rather than competing in existing ones.- Example: "The company's success is attributed toits blue ocean strategy."15. Market Penetration - The degree to which a product or service is known and used by a target demographic.- Example: "The marketing campaign was designed to increase market penetration."16. Liquidity - The ability of an asset to be converted into cash quickly and with little to no loss in value.- Example: "The company maintains high liquidity to manage its short-term obligations."17. Opportunity Cost - The loss of potential gain from other alternatives when one alternative is chosen.- Example: "The opportunity cost of investing in this project is the potential return from another investment."18. Value-Added Tax (VAT) - A type of tax that is levied on the value added to goods and services at each stage ofproduction or distribution.- Example: "The final price of the product includes the value-added tax."19. Monopoly - A situation in which a single company or group owns all or nearly all of the market for a given type of product or service.- Example: "Regulators are concerned about the potential for a monopoly in the tech industry."20. Stakeholder - A person, group, or organization that has a direct or indirect interest in a business.- Example: "All stakeholders must be considered when making strategic decisions."By familiarizing yourself with these advanced business English terms, you can communicate more effectively in a professional context and demonstrate a deeper understanding of business concepts.。
corporation strategy
03 Part Three How to add value
2-1 How to add value?
Improving individual business unit performance
Increasing the value of new business options
Financial restructuring/engineering
The capabilities which the parent in a corporation can transfer to other business within the corporation.
Possible capabilities Redefining the business Eliminating errors Sharing common capabilities Developing linkages Accessing special expertise Improving managerial quality Eliminating bureaucracy Providing better processes
Diversification is a corporate strategy to enter into a new market or industry which the business is not currently in, whilst also creating a new product for that new market.
International Diversification, Ownership Structure, Legal Origin, and Earnings Management
International Diversification,Ownership Structure,Legal Origin,and Earnings Management:Evidence from TaiwanC HEN-L UNG C HIN*Y U-J U C HEN**T SUN-J UI H SIEH***The primary objective of this study is to investigate the impact of corpo-rate internationalization on earnings management.We also explore themitigating roles of corporate ownership structure,as measured by diver-gence of controlling owner’s control and cash rights,and the proportionof firms that operate in common law countries on earnings management.Using a sample drawn from Taiwan,we find that greater corporateinternationalization is associated with a higher level of earnings man-agement,as proxied by discretionary accruals and the likelihood ofexactly meeting or just beating analyst forecast.Corporate internation-alization is measured by the ratio of foreign assets to total assets,foreign operational country scope,and the number of foreign investees,respectively.In addition,we find that companies can reduce the nega-tive effects of internationalization on earnings management by improv-ing their corporate ownership structures or investing in a higherproportion of common law countries where there is a better investorlegal protection environment and higher information transparency.1.IntroductionOver the past decade,a growing number of listed firms in developed and developing markets have substantially expanded their operations abroad.1Despite the prevalence of international diversification,there is surprisingly little evidence of its effect on earnings management.This paper explores the association between the extent of a firm’s international diversification and earnings *National Chengchi University**Providence University***Providence University1.For example,cross-border investments of U.S.firms have grown by more than700percent (World Trade Organization[2000]),and S&P500firms report that foreign sales account for more than24percent of total sales.In addition,of the ten largest panies listed on the NYSE, almost one-half of their revenues are generated from foreign operations(Meek and Thomas[2004]). In the case of Taiwan,the volume of international trade and foreign direct investment has approached 50percent of gross national product in recent years(Chang[2007]).233234JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE management.Furthermore,we investigate whether an effective corporate owner-ship structure plays a critical role in mitigating earnings management induced by corporate internationalization.The ownership structure is measured as the diver-gence between the ultimate owner’s voting rights and cash flow rights.Finally, we examine whether the association between corporate internationalization and earnings management is reduced when companies operate in a higher proportion of countries with better legal protections to investors.The first question to be addressed in this paper is whether corporate interna-tional diversification results in a higher degree of earnings management.First, while domestic earnings refers to a single country,foreign earnings encompasses countries from around the world differing drastically in terms of economic condi-tions,political stability,competitive forces,growth opportunities,governmental regulations,and so on(Thomas[2000]).With increased geographic dispersion of firm assets,corporate international diversification thus increases organizational complexity,and in turn increases information asymmetry between managers and investors.Managers may exploit these discretions to make self-maximizing deci-sion,which decreases firm value.For example,Hope and Thomas(2008)show that when information asymmetries induced by international diversification increase,managers are more likely to engage in foreign empire building.To mask the adverse effect of these suboptimal decisions arising from their discre-tion on firm performance,managers have the incentive to engage in aggressive earnings management.Second,expansion into international markets increases the complexity of information processing for investors(Thomas[1999];Callen,Hope, and Segal[2005])and analysts(Duru and Reeb[2002];Tihanyi and Thomas [2005];Herrmann,Hope,and Thomas[2008]).2These results,in conjunction with the findings that managers tend to engage in a higher level of earnings management as information asymmetry increases(e.g.,Dye[1988];Beatty and Harris[1999]; Richardson[2000]),lead to our expectation that managers exploit this additional level of information asymmetry to engage in earnings management.Next,we explore the association between ownership structures of multina-tional firms and earnings management.The primary agency problem in most countries outside the United States is reflected in the conflict of interest between controlling owners and minority owners(La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer[1999];Haw,Hu,Hwang,and Wu[2004];Francis,Schipper,and Vin-cent[2005]),and the former generally possess control rights in excess of cash flow rights via stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures.When control divergence increases,the controlling owner’s ability and incentive to expropri-ate minority investors increases also.3Insiders(such as controlling owners or2.For example,Duru and Reeb(2002)document that greater corporate international diversifi-cation is associated with less accurate analyst forecasts.3.Claessens,Djankov,and Lang(2000,84)cite La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer’s (1999)statement that,in East Asia,corporate control can be achieved while holding much less than an absolute majority of the stock.In that area,the probability that a single controlling owner holds less than20percent of the stock is very high.This held true in80percent of the cases,across the four East Asian countries.Claessens,Djankov,and Lang(2000)report that the average voting rights held by controlling shareholders in Taiwan is about18.96percent,while the average cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders in Taiwan is about15.98percent.managers)have incentives to conceal private control benefits from outsiders because,if these benefits are detected,outsiders will take disciplinary actions against them (Shleifer and Vishny [1997];Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003]).Therefore,controlling owners and managers tend to manage earnings in an attempt to mask true firm’s performance and to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders (Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003];Haw et al.[2004]),particularly in the context of internationalization.In this paper,we hypothesize that an effective corporate ownership structure,as measured by the divergence between controlling owners’cash flow rights and voting rights,plays a critical role in mitigating earnings management induced by corporate internationalization.We further examine whether the degree of earnings management decreases when companies invest in a higher proportion of common law countries.Prior studies (e.g.,La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer,and Vishny [1997,2000])show that the common law countries (e.g.,the United States and the United Kingdom)offer the best investor protection,while the French-based code law countries offer the least protection.Better law protection limits insiders’ability to acquire private control benefits and reduces their incentives to mask a firm’s performance and manage earnings (Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003]).Further-more,in market-oriented common law countries,the base of shareholders typi-cally is larger and more diverse,and information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through public disclosure.Hence,there is a larger demand for account-ing quality (Ball,Kothari,and Robin [2000];Ball,Robin,and Wu [2003]).Therefore,we expect that the pervasiveness of earnings management declines when companies invest in a higher proportion of common law countries.The motivations for using Taiwanese firms’data stem from the following four reasons.First,internationalization may become an indispensable strategy for a firm’s growth in the emerging countries.Taiwan is characterized by a heavy reliance on exports,smaller stock markets,higher ownership concentrations,weaker investor protections,and lower disclosure requirements.Therefore,the effect of internationalization on earnings management in Taiwanese firms should be more pronounced,providing a stronger test of our hypotheses.Second,the relationship between ownership structure and financial report-ing has not been studied in a concentrated ownership context like that in Taiwan,the dominant context outside the United States.In East Asian corpora-tions,the high concentration of ownership nullifies the principal-agent problem between owners and managers as well as the related role of accounting-based managerial contracts.It is interesting to see how the ownership structure of a multinational firm interacts with the extent of earnings management using Taiwanese data.Third,prior literature focuses primarily on the effects of legal protection on a company’s earnings quality and investigates how the legal protection in differ-ent regimes affects a firm’s earnings quality.Unlike prior studies,the current pa-per explores how the earnings quality of a multinational firm is affected by a proportion of foreign investees with better legal protection environment (i.e.,common law countries).We believe that using Taiwanese firms is appropriate to 235INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE236JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE examine whether foreign legal systems have an impact on firms’earnings management.4Finally,the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles(GAAP)in Taiwan are similar to those in the United States.In particular,Taiwan’s segment disclosure rule, Taiwan’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.20,Disclosure of Seg-ment Financial Information(hereafter TSFAS20),is almost identical to U.S.State-ment of Financial Accounting Standards No.131(SFAS131)5and International Accounting Standards No.14(IAS14).Thus,although not many countries require segment disclosures,our findings suggest the importance of these disclosures.Our evidence supports the prediction that in the context of an emerging mar-ket,such as the Taiwanese market,the pervasiveness of earnings management increases in aggressive internationalization.However,such earnings management behavior effects can be mitigated through specific mechanisms.These mecha-nisms include improving ownership structures of multinational firms or investing more heavily in common law countries.This paper contributes to several streams of literature.First,our study con-tributes to literature on the association between internationalization and earnings management.Unlike prior studies(e.g.,Bodnar and Weintrop[1997];Bodnar, Hwang,and Weintrop[2003])that focus on countries of Anglo-Saxon cultural derivation,we use Taiwan’s data and find that corporate internationalization exacerbates earnings management in the context of the code law system.Due to the fact that Taiwan’s GAAP for segment reporting is similar to the USFAS131 and IAS14,and that the nature of corporate ownership structures differs between Taiwan and the Anglo-Saxon countries examined in Bodnar and Weintrop(1997) and Bodnar,Hwang,and Weintrop(2003),our findings provide further under-standing of the impact of corporate ownership structure on earnings management outside the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries.64.With regard to the legal protection environment of Taiwanese firms engaging in internation-alization,in our sample,some50percent of investees were in common law countries,with the re-mainder in civil law countries.See the median of LAW in Table2.5.TSFAS20requires firms to identify their reportable segments;disclose operating perform-ance based on geographic area,industry classifications,and sales to critical customers and exports overseas classifications.Furthermore,additional reporting of both income statement and balance sheet data are required.This includes information on foreign investee revenue,sales to external customers, and intersegment sales or transfers when these equal or exceed10percent of the combined revenue of all reportable operating segments.These requirements are similar to those of SFAS131.However, SFAS131allows firms not to disclose earnings for nonoperating segments.According to Herrmann and Thomas(2000),only16percent of the companies in their sample continue to disclose geographic earnings after implementation of SFAS131.In addition,the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation stipulates that the publicly listed firms must disclose information about their overseas investments through the Market Observation Post System.The information to be disclosed includes the amount invested,foreign investee locations,and the profit or loss from these investments.6.Recent developments in the United States highlight the importance of understanding the quality of financial reporting using IFRS standards(e.g.,Reason[2005];Cook and Taub[2007]; Johnson[2007]).These developments include recent moves by the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission to allow foreign-private issuers to use IAS as the reporting scheme rather than requiring the use of U.S.GAAPs;joint standard development activities under way by the FASB and the IASB; and suggestions that even U.S.-based issuers may be required to abandon GAAP in favor of IFRS.Second,we contribute to the literature on internationalization and corporate ownership structure by exploring and documenting the effects of the controlling owner’s control divergence of a multinational firm on earnings management.The fundamental agency in most countries stems from the conflict of interest between controlling owner and minority.The results,in combination with the fact that multinational firms possess a higher level of information asymmetry,allow man-agers to engage in a higher degree of earnings management.Hence,it is impor-tant to understand the influence of corporate ownership structure,as measured by control divergence,on earnings management by multinational firms.Obviously,investing corporate assets overseas partially removes them from the domestic court system and judicial processes.Therefore,our third contribution is to exam-ine the effects of the legal regime governing investor protection in the investee companies on earnings management.Prior literature on internationalization im-plicitly assumes that the effects of expansion outside the home country are the same regardless of the countries into which firms expand (e.g.,Duru and Reeb[2002]).However,corporate internationalization may have a differential impact on the degree of earnings management across legal protection regimes within which foreign investees operate.Hence,a combination of better corporate owner-ship structures and foreign legal regimes that protect the investor may mitigate earnings management behavior.Furthermore,this study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulation in providing information valuable to investors.Regulation issues exist both within and across national boundaries,consistent with increasing levels of economic globalization of economic activities and investments.In that regard,there is an increasing emphasis on harmonization of accounting standards,with pressure growing for convergence between International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)and U.S.GAAPs.Our findings imply that segment disclosure seems to have great value to investors in understanding foreign operation and seems to decrease information asymmetry between managers and investors,as well as to further reduce earnings management.The rest of this paper is organized as follows.Section 2presents the hypoth-eses we test.Section 3describes our data,sample selection procedure,and research designs.Section 4presents the empirical results and some additional tests.Section 5presents our conclusions.2.HypothesesIt is well documented that expansion into international markets increases the overall organizational complexity and in turn the complexity of information proc-essing for investors (Thomas [1999];Callen,Hope,and Segal [2005])and analysts (Duru and Reeb [2002];Tihanyi and Thomas [2005];Herrmann,Hope,and Thomas [2008]).International expansion typically leads to an increase in overall organizational complexity and in turn hampers the firm’s information 237INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE238JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE environment.As mentioned above,in contrast to domestic earnings,foreign earn-ings encompasses countries from around the world differing drastically in terms of economic conditions,competitive forces,political stability,growth opportuni-ties,governmental regulations,and so on(Thomas[2000]).Thus,with increased geographic dispersion of firm assets,it is presumably more difficult for investors or even analysts to carefully scrutinize the firm’s earnings reports and make accurate assessment of foreign operations.For example,Thomas(1999)shows that investors underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings.Thomas posits that one possible explanation for the existence of market mispricing is that it is difficult for investors to understand fully the origin of firms’foreign earnings (Thomas[1999,265]).7Similarly,Duru and Reeb(2002)and Tihanyi and Thomas(2005)further find that international diversification leads to less accurate analyst earnings forecasts.Thus,the degree of information asymmetry increases with the extent of corporate international diversification.Analytical models(e.g.,Dye[1988];Trueman and Titman[1988])indicate that the level of earnings management increases as information asymmetry increases.In addition,empirical studies(e.g.,Schipper[1989];Warfield,Wild,and Wild[1995];Beatty and Harris[1999];Richardson[2000])further provide support-ing evidence that managers may exploit the informational asymmetry and engage in a higher degree of earnings management.For example,Schipper(1989)and Warfield,Wild,and Wild(1995)argue that when shareholders have insufficient resources,incentives,or access to relevant information to monitor manager’s actions,earnings management can also occur.Thus,we expect that managers of multinational firms may engage in a higher degree of earnings management,by exploiting this additional level of information asymmetry,than otherwise would be the case if listed firms were not internationally diversified.With increased geographic dispersion of firm assets,corporate international diversification leads to not only an increase in overall organizational complexity, but also an increase in managers’discretion over operating decision.Kogut (1983)argues that expansion into international markets increases firms’opera-tional flexibility and allows firms to change value by exploiting the increased uncertainty of the international environment.For example,global manufacturing gives managers additional opportunities to exercise discretion by shifting produc-tion to lower-or higher-cost locations.Bodnar,Tang,and Weintrop(1999)note that operating in multiple geographic locations creates additional options.Thus, corporate internationalization increases the possibility for managers to enjoy more discretion.Under this circumstance,it is presumably apparent that managers may exploit these discretions to make self-maximizing decision,which decreases firm value.For example,Hope and Thomas(2008)show that managers are more7.Khurana,Pereira,and Raman(2003)find that analysts fail to fully incorporate the higher persistence of foreign earnings.They argue that their findings help explain the market mispricing documented by Thomas(2000).likely to engage in foreign ‘‘empire building’’when information asymmetries induced by international diversification increase.Stulz (1990)also documents that increased information asymmetry between managers and investors,arising from international diversification,is likely to lead to overinvestment and misallo-cation of resources.To mask the adverse effect of their discretion and suboptimal decision on firm performance,managers of multinational firms may have strong incentives to engage in aggressive earnings management.The preceding arguments thus suggest a positive association between the firm’s international diversification and the extent of earnings management.These discussions and predictions lead to the first testable hypothesis:H 1:Greater corporate internationalization is associated with a higher degreeof earnings management.Widely dispersed ownership is not the most common form of ownership struc-ture in listed firms around the world.Despite some concentration of ownership in the United States,an even higher ownership concentration exits in other developed and developing countries (La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer [1999];Haw et al.[2004];Francis,Schipper,and Vincent [2005]).The fundamental agency problem for listed firms in these countries stems from the conflict of interest between minority shareholders and controlling owners.The latter typically exercise control power in excess of their cash flow rights via stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures.Because a smaller fraction of the firm’s cash flow rights rela-tive to voting rights fails to align controlling owner incentive with those of minor-ity shareholders,controlling owners thus possess incentives and the ability to extract private control benefits (expropriation of the firm’s assets and opportunities,and outright theft)that are not shared by minority shareholders in proportion to the shares owned.Extracting private control benefits,if detected,is likely to invite external intervention by minority shareholders,analysts,stock exchanges,or regu-lators (Haw et al.[2004]).The desire to avoid external monitoring and loss of rep-utation induces insiders to mask or conceal their private control benefits by managing reported earnings (Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003];Haw et al.[2004]).Haw et al.(2004)also document that earnings management increases as the control divergence of the controlling shareholders increases.In the context of multinational firms,where additional organizational com-plexity and a greater degree of information asymmetry exists between managers and investors,managers might have greater discretion over opportunistic behav-iors.In this paper,we thus hypothesize that a decrease in the degree of diver-gence between the controlling owner’s voting rights and cash flow rights mitigates the effects of international diversification on earnings management.Hence,we propose the second hypothesis as follows:H 2:The association between earnings management and corporate internation-alization is less pronounced when the control divergence of controlling owners decreases.239INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE240JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE An important difference between common law(e.g.,United States)and code law countries(e.g.,Germany)is the manner of resolving information asymmetry between managers and potential users of accounting information.In market-oriented common law countries,the base of shareholders typically is larger and more diverse,and information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through public disclosure.The demand for high-quality financial disclosure is enforced in a market system,so there is also a higher frequency and expected cost of share-holder litigation(Ball,Kothari,and Robin[2000];Ball,Robin,and Wu[2003]). On the other hand,in planning-oriented code law countries,information asymme-try is more likely to be resolved by‘‘insider’’communication with stakeholder representatives,so demand is lower for high-quality public financial reporting and disclosure(Ball,Kothari,and Robin[2000];Ball,Robin,and Wu[2003]). Consequently,it is well documented that common law countries typically have stronger protection for outside investors(both shareholders and creditors)(i.e., La Porta et al.[2000])8and better accounting quality(La Porta et al.[1998]) than code law countries.9Prior studies show that strong shareholder protection in the marketplace should attenuate management opportunism(Jensen and Mecking[1976];Holmstrom [1979])and in turn reduce their incentives to mask private control benefits by manipulating earnings(Jensen and Mecking[1976];Hung[2001];Leuz,Nanda, and Wysocki[2003]).Stated differently,managers are less likely to behave oppor-tunistically and manipulate earnings in common law countries with strong protec-tion than in code law countries with weak protection.For example,there are many mechanisms for oppressed shareholders to make legal claims against directors in the United States,while there are few such mechanisms in Germany(La Porta et al. [1998]).U.S.managers who materially misstate earnings generally face shareholders’class-action suits and securities regulators’investigations,but German managers rarely face such consequences.As a consequence,U.S.managers are less likely to exhibit such behavior,compared with German managers,due to the higher cost of opportunistic behavior(La Porta et al.[1998];Hung[2001]).Recent research on the effect of legal origin system on earnings quality gen-erally lends support to the above arguments.For example,Hung(2001)finds that the use of accrual accounting negatively affects the value relevance of financial statements in civil law countries with weak shareholder protection.This negative effect,however,does not exist in common law countries.Haw et al.(2004) Porta et al.(1997)also examined legal rules associated with protection of corporate shareholders and the quality of their enforcement in forty-nine countries.In addition,compared with common law countries,civil law countries have the weakest investor protections and the least devel-oped capital markets.9.For example,strict,well-enforced laws that protect minority investors are more a feature of countries with common law traditions than those with civil law traditions.9Well-functioning legal and judicial systems limit insiders’private control benefits by making wealth expropriation legally riskier and more expensive(La Porta et al.[2000]),and shareholder litigation is a mechanism to enforce high-quality financial reporting in common law countries(Ball,Kothari,and Robin[2000]).indicate that earnings management influenced by control divergence is limited more in common law countries than in code law countries.10The stream of literature on cross-listing further shows that cross-listing in common law countries provides a credible commitment to higher-quality disclo-sure.For example,a U.S.cross-listing typically improves transparency by impos-ing disclosure requirements on firms that are more stringent than the disclosure requirements they face in their home country (e.g.,Coffee [1999,2002];Lang,Lins,and Miller [2003]).11As a consequence,firms listing on a U.S.exchange accept the consequence of being subject to an additional layer of monitoring by a variety of U.S.market intermediaries.12A firm’s willingness to be listed in markets with higher transparencies may be considered a signal to investors that the controlling owners will be less willing to exploit the minority owners’inter-ests (Doidge,Karolyi,and Stulz [2004]).In the same vein,companies with greater investments in common law countries are taking actions that render them less capable of exploiting minority investors and in turn are more likely to pro-vide accounting reporting of higher quality.In this paper,we expect,in the context of internationally diversified corpora-tions,that pervasiveness of earnings management declines when companies invest in a higher proportion of common law countries.Unlike the preceding research (Ball,Kothari,and Robin [2000];Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003];Haw et al.[2004]Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki ),13where the focus is exclusively on the association between a firm’s financial reporting quality and the legal protection of its home country,this study further examines,in the context of corporate international diversification,the association between the earnings10.In addition to managers’behavior,the legal origin system also has an effect on analysts’forecast behavior.Analysts play an increasingly important role of monitoring managers’behavior in capital markets.Khanna,Palepu,and Chang (2000)and Hope (2003)indicate that in common law countries stronger enforcement of accounting standards and higher quality of accounting are associ-ated with higher analysts earnings forecast accuracy (Hope [2003]).11.For example,cross-listing subjects them to enforcement actions initiated by the U.S.Secur-ities and Exchange Commission,to class action lawsuits filed in the U.S.court,and to scrutiny from U.S.media and analysts.Furthermore,if they raise funds in the United States,these firms are sub-jected to monitoring by underwriters.12.The extant evidence documents that firms listed in countries with better investor protection or transparency (e.g.,United States)experience positive abnormal returns (Foerster and Karolyi[1999]),that they subsequently raise more capital after listing (Lins,Strickland,and Zenner [2005]),that their cost of capital is lower (Hail and Leuz [2004]),that estimates of private benefits of control are lower (Doidge,Karolyi,and Stulz,[2004]),and that firms are valued more highly (Doidge,Karolyi,and Stulz [2004]).13.Haw et al.(2004)found that there was less apparent earnings management by firms when the controlling owner had more voting than cash flow rights in countries where the legal code pro-vided more protection to investors than in countries where the legal code did not so protect the investors.Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki (2003)found that earnings management was higher in countries where the legal system provided minority owners with fewer rights than in countries where the legal system provided minority owners with greater rights.This finding is consistent with Chin,Kleinman,Lee,and Lin (2006)in the context of the Taiwanese market.Finally,Ball,Kothari,and Robin (2000)reported that less timely and less conservative earnings reports tended to be issued in so-called civil law countries (called code countries by Ball,Kothari,and Robin [2000])than in common law countries.241INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE。
企业多元化经营外文文献翻译3000多字译文
文献出处：Gronum S. The research of small and medium-sized enterprise diversification [J]. Journal of Small Business Management, 2015, 10(2): 257-266. 原文原文The research of small and medium-sized enterprise diversificationGronum SAbstractCorporate diversification business success is based on the correct business strategy combination, specific diversification strategies related to the enterprise group management. Diversification strategy is a must be considered in the process of enterprise development, enterprise management direction and management structure determines the enterprise can fully use limited management resources and ability, to establish their own business advantages. Diversification is a kind of important enterprise growth and natural selection, small and medium enterprises to implement diversification, improve the understanding of diversity is the key, to create the conditions of diversified enterprise operation mechanism, relevant policies and regulations, such as diversification strategy will directly affect the effect of the small and medium-sized enterprises to implement diversification.Keywords: SME; Diversification; Core competence1 IntroductionDiversity as a kind of management strategy is widely adopted by modern enterprises. The famous American economist, money, thinks: generally speaking, whether the diversification, is one of the main difference between modern enterprises and traditional enterprises. Larger enterprises want to gain more market, establish the competitive advantage, the enterprise bigger and stronger, diversified management strategy has become an inevitable choice, which has become the consensus of economists and researchers. But as a large number of small and medium enterprises, how to choose appropriate diversification strategy and how to effectively implement the strategy of diversification, still under discussion, most researchers are also worth studying. So how to choose and large enterprise diversification strategy to make yourself strong rapidly, choose diversification strategy for small and mediumenterprises suitable or not and how to effectively implement the strategy of diversification, the problem is particularly important. Increasingly is the attention ofeconomists and managers.2 Theoretical backgroundReduce the management risk rapid growth is small and medium-sized companiesand enterprises to adopt diversification strategy are an important reason. Theeconomies of scale theory and portfolio theory are the basis of diversified choices. Small and medium-sized enterprise relative to the big enterprise itself has some disadvantages: small size, less assets, liabilities ability is limited, lack of good credit, credit line co., LTD., are susceptible to the influence of operating environment, variables, such as risk, caused the enterprise anti-risk ability is weak, the development of easy to hit, it is difficult to based on the original main business has a better development. So for small and medium enterprises, the diversification is important, but also wants to see your choice of business activities can bring benefit for you. Choose diversification strategy, small and medium-sized enterprises want to succeed must first eyes inward, to oneself have a clear understanding, to know what they lack. Such as the project itself does not have development potential, serious deficiency in the operation and management, capital waste, poor sales channels, etc., if the enterprise did not recognize these problems, even if he also is very difficult to solve the problem of development through diversification. At the same time, also want to see the core competitiveness of the enterprise itself or advantage, and the correlation of choice diversification, these are the key to choose or not.3 Summary of diversification3.1 DiversificationDiversification, also known as diversification or diversification management,refers to the enterprises in a number of related or unrelated industries at the same time, a number of different business strategies. Diversification as the securities portfolio theory, the theoretical basis of the portfolio can consist of a variety of securities, from the investor's point of view, the most important is not the returns and risk of individual securities, but the returns and risk of investment portfolio. Investors through differentsecurities holdings scatter risk implicit in the individual securities, the risk is called diversifiable risk, and it is the risk of special events caused by the company, but alsohas risk. It is by the war, such as inflation and recession of comprehensive factors,which affect the company.Securities portfolio theory has proved that composed of several kinds of stockportfolio, its revenue is the weighted average of the stock, but the risk is lower thanthe weighted average, and the portfolio will reduce the investment risk. Portfolio's ultimate goal is to improve the yield, scattered or weaken the investment risk, to really improve the level of portfolio returns. Securities portfolio theory application in the enterprise production and business operation activities is called diversification, according to the securities group theory; the enterprise will be in the same period to market extension of different industries, different products, hope to do long attack, a comprehensive victory. But here to make it clear that the business risk is the management risk and financial risk, rather than the securities portfolio of the system and non-system risk. Management risk refers to the enterprise profit changes caused by the reasons for the risks, the influencing factors of every enterprise management risk is not exactly the same; generally have a product price, product demand, product cost, fixed cost and price adjustment ability, etc. Financial risk refers to the change of debt ratio of total capital risk, namely refers to debt financing to investors on the risks of income level, factors affecting the profits and liabilities of the cost of capital and equity ratio, etc.3.2 Enterprise diversification and core competitivenessThe motivation of enterprise diversification is a risk dispersedly, enter the newindustry is faced with new risks, however, sometimes due to not adapt to the newrequirements at a competitive disadvantage. Into industry with relatively high capitalrequirements than into a bigger risk of low capital requirements of industry; Into the problem of high rate of product updates is lower than from entering the product update rate of industry risk. So for effective industry analysis and industry choice also is helpful for enterprises to evade the risk of diversification.Diversity means that companies will move into new areas, because of the newinformation in the field of master, incomplete and lack of corresponding expertise to bear than in their own familiar with the main business areas of higher risk, combinedwith the enterprise can't be in the new field rapidly to reap rewards to balance the highrisk, so if you want to succeed in new business areas and based, must have a mainbusiness provide stable funding and accumulated in main business on the basis of thefull development of diversification of necessary industry which the enterpriseexclusive management and general management skills. Enterprises should first focus on the enterprise to develop into industry with high visibility, with the core of the respect such as technology and marketing advantages, in the "market leader" status, fully enjoy the economic interests of the main business scale of enterprises, for the enterprise to the development of other industry gathered enough strength. If the main business, companies are not only the lack of adequate resources to build the advantage in the field of new, even can make original business areas are involved and direct threat to the enterprise survival.Enterprise core competitive ability is the enterprise formed for a long period oftime, contain in the essence of enterprise, enterprises unique, support the enterprisecompetitive advantage, and make the enterprise internal competitive environment fora long time can make active core competencies. It transcends the specific products and business units, to the enterprise competition gives a new meaning, that is not a simple enterprise resources and the strength of competition, but how to scheduling, allocating resources, greater competition to be effective. Focus on core competitiveness than confined to specific products and business unit strategy, which can more accurately reflect the enterprise long-term development objective need.Diversification will greatly influence the enterprise's core competitiveness, if thediversification strategy is successful, will greatly improve enterprise's corecompetitive ability, help enterprise to maintain its competitive advantage: if diversification strategy fails, not only conducive to promotion enterprise's core competitiveness, may make the original core competitiveness drops instead, or even lose their competitive advantage. Diversified management can continue to find and improve the enterprise's core competition force and core competitive power should beunderstood as a dynamic concept. Such as scientific and technological progress, industrial structure upgrading, product life cycle and the consumption habits can leadto companies such as the change of the original core technology and core productsability of recession. So enterprises also need to continuous innovation, diversifiedroad, constantly find and improve the core competitiveness of the enterprise. The corecompetitiveness of ductile characteristics demand diversification to support, onlyprominent main business, strengthen the core business, formed its own unique advantages, in establishing the core competence on the basis of surrounding its implement diversification, to more efficient use of existing advantages, and ultimately achieve the success of diversification.4 Related diversification and unrelated diversificationCorrelation diversity refers to the enterprise to expand business activities to the original product, the market had a higher correlation industry, through combination between internal business units and sharing common resources, for the transplantation of core competence, thus reducing the production cost of enterprises, or enterprise related business department have relative to the competition of differentiation advantage. High correlation can make the enterprise in the field of a business to accumulate the expansion of the core competence or competitive advantage is more easily to the related business areas, so as to expand the scope of the enterprise the competitive advantage and strength, to improve the competitive advantage of enterprises on the whole. The correlation diversification is to point to in the process of implementing diversification, from industry; now entering has nothing to do with the products and markets now products and markets. It mainly has two forms: financial type, this kind of business to its various subsidiaries engaged in production and business operation activities of has nothing to do with each other to provide funds, perform strategic planning functions, but does not participate in strategic management decisions, and ultimately financial risk; Managed, such companies are not only undertake the financial and control function, but also to all economic entities responsible for the management decision-making and provide management consulting, staff training and other services. Either type, they have a common feature andcorrelation between the biggest differences is to focus on the financial management and capital appreciation value.译文译文中小型企业多元化经营问题研究中小型企业多元化经营问题研究Gronum S摘要摘要企业多元化经营成功基于正确的经营策略组合，具体多元化策略关系到企业集团经营命运。
战略管理双语资料范文(DOC 71页)
战略管理双语资料范文(DOC 71页)Chapter 1 Strateg ic Ma n a gem e nt a nd Str a tegic Com pe titiven e ss (7)1.1Strategic Management Process (8)1.1.1 The Rational Model (8)1.1.2 The critique of the rational model (11)1.2 The New Competitive Landscape (12)1.2.1The Globalized Competition (12)1.2.2Technological Changes (15)1.3The I/O model of Above-averageReturns (19)1.4The Resource-based Model ofAbove-average Returns (22)1.5Strategic Intent and Strategic Mission.261.6Stakeholders (28)1.7Organizational Strategists (30)复习题 (31)Chapter 2 The External Environment: Opportunities, Threats, Industry Environment, and Competitor Analysis (34)2.1External Environmental Analysis (35)2.2 Segments of the General Environment:The PEST Analysis (38)2.3 Industry Environment Analysis: TheFive Forces Model (40)2.4 Strategic Group Analysis (51)2.5 Competitor Analysis (52)复习题 (53)Chapter 3 The Internal Environment: Resources, Capabilities, and Core Competencies (56)3.1 The importance of Internal Analysis .. 573.2 Resources, Capabilities, and CoreCompetencies (60)3.2.1 Resources (60)3.2.2 Capabilities (64)3.2.3 Core Competencies (65)3.3 Steps in a Resource-based StrategicAnalysis (67)3.4 Value Chain Analysis (77)复习题 (79)Chapter 4 Business-Level Strategy (81)4.1 Customers: Who, What, and How (82)4.1.1 Who: Determining the customersto serve (83)4.1.2 What: Determining the customerneeds to satisfy (84)4.1.3 How: Determining corecompetencies necessary to satisfycustomers’ needs (84)4.2 Types of Business-level Strategy (85)4.3 Cost Leadership Strategy (87)4.4 Differentiation Strategy (92)4.5 Focus Strategies (97)4.6 Integrated Low-Cost/DifferentiationStrategy (99)复习题 (104)Chapter 5 Corporate-Level Strategy (107)5.1 Corporate-level Strategy and Levels ofDiversification (108)5.2 Reasons for Diversification (110)5.3 Techniques for Analyzing DiversifiedCompanies’ Portfolios (111)复习题 (115)Chapter 6 Acquisition and Restructuring Strategies (116)9.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 1549.2 Separation of Ownership andManagerial Control (158)9.3 Five Governance Mechanisms (165)9.3.1 Ownership Concentration (165)9.3.2 Board of Directors (166)9.3.3 Executive Compensation (169)9.3.4 The Multidivisional Structure 1719.3.5 Market for Corporate Control173复习题 (174)Chapter 10 Organizational Structure and Controls (177)10.1 Evolutionary Patterns of Strategy andOrganizational Structure (178)10.1.1 Simple Structure (180)10.1.2 Functional Structure (182)10.1.3 Multidivisional Structure (189)10.2 Implementing International Strategies:Organizational Structure and Control (200)10.2.1 Using the WorldwideGeographic Area Structure toImplement the Multi-domesticStrategy (201)10.2.2 Using the Worldwide ProductDivisional Structure to Implement theGlobal Strategy (204)复习题 (207)Chapter 11 Corporate Entrepreneurship and Innovation (208)11.1 Innovation and CorporateEntrepreneurship (209)11.2Internal Corporate Venturing (214)复习题 (222)Chapter 1 Strateg ic Ma n a gem e nt a nd Str a tegic Com pe titiven e ssLea r n i ng Objec t ivesAfter reading t h i s chapter, you should be a ble to·Defining strategic competitiveness, competitive advantage, and above-average returns.·Discuss the challenge of strategic management.·Describe the new competitive landscape and how it is being shaped by global andtechnological changes.·Use the industrial organization(I/O) model to explain how firms can earn above-average returns.·Use the resource-based model to explain how firms can earn above-average returns.·Describe strategic intent and strategic mission and discuss their value to the strategic management process.·Define stakeholders and describe the three primary stakeholder groups’ ability to influence organizations.·Describe the work of strategists.·Explain the strategic management process.1.1Strategic Management Process1.1.1 The Rational ModelStrategic competitiveness(战略竞争力) is achieved when a firm successfully formulates and implements a value-creating strategy. When a firm implements a value-creating strategy of which other companies are unable to duplicatethe benefits or find it too costly to imitate, this firm has a sustained or sustainable competitive advantage(持续的或可持续的竞争优势). The speed with which competitors are able to acquire the skills needed to duplicate the benefits of a firm’s value-creating strategy determines how long a competitive advantage will last. Understanding how to exploit its competitive advantage is necessary for a firm to earn above-average returns. Above-average returns(高于平均的或超额回报) are returns in excess of what an investor expects to earn from other investment with a similar amount of risk. Risk(风险) is an investor’s uncertainty about the economic gains or losses that will result from a particular investment. Firms that are without a competitive advantage or that are not competing in an attractive industry earn, at best, only average returns. Average returns（平均回报）are returns equal to those an investor expects to earn from other investments with a similar amount of risk. In the long run, an inability toearn at least average returns results in failure. Failure occurs because investors will choose to invest in firms that earn at least average returns and will withdraw their investments from firms that earn less.Dynamic in nature, the strategic management process (战略管理过程)is the full set of commitments, decisions, and actions required for a firm to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. It is used to match the conditions of an ever-changing market and competitive structure with a firm’s continuously evolving resources, capabilities, and competencies.Figure 1.1 The Strategic Management ProcessIdentifyAssess mega- AssessSWOTNotes: the letter S in SWOT denotes strengths, W weaknesses, O opportunities, T threats. 1.1.2 The critique of the rational model1.Setting objectives is the cornerstone of strategic planning. But, incentive un-compatibility （激励不相容） usually leads to inconsistency between objectives that the firm has stated and objectives that the managers are actually pursuing.2.The predictability of the environment is the core assumption of strategic planning. But, irreversibility and uncertainty （不确定性） usually lead to the unpredictability Strategic Formulation ·corporate Strategic Implementat ion Strategic Advantageof the environment.3.Another assumption of strategic planning is that strategists are rational. Virtually, strategists’ rationality is bounded (战略家的理性是有限的)and strategic formulation reflects the internal politics of the organization.1.2 The New Competitive Landscape1.2.1The Globalized CompetitionThe fundamental nature of competition in many of the world’s industries is changing. The pace of this change is relentless and is increasing. Even determining the boundaries of an industry or a firm（行业或企业的边界）has become challenging. Consider, for example, how advances in interactive computer networks and telecommunications have blurred the definition of the “television”industry. Conventional sources of competitive advantage(传统的竞争优势的源泉) such as economies of scale(规模经济) and huge advertising budgets(巨额广告预算) are not as effective in the new competitivelandscape. Moreover, the traditional managerial mind-set(传统的管理者心态) cannot lead a firm to strategic competitiveness in the new competitive landscape. In its place, managers must adopt a new mind-set——one that values flexibility, speed, innovation, integration, and the challenges that evolve from constantly changing conditions(看重灵活性、速度、创新、整合和从不断变化的环境中产生的挑战的心态). Strategic flexibility(战略的敏捷性) is a set of capabilities firms use to respond to various demands and opportunities that are a part of dynamic and uncertain competitive environments. Such flexibility means that a firm can match quickly its resources with an environmental opportunity(快速地使其资源与环境的机遇匹配).A global economy(全球经济) is one in which goods, services, people, and ideas move freely across geographic borders. It significantly expands and complicates a firm’s competitive environment. To achieve strategiccompetitiveness in the global economy, a firm must view the world as its marketplace.In globalized markets(全球化的市场) and industries, financial capital might be obtained in one national market and used to buy raw materials in another one. Manufacturing equipment bought from a third national market can be used to produce products that are sold in a fourth market. Thus, globalization increases the range of opportunities for firms competing in the new competitive landscape.The internationalization of markets and industries makes it increasingly difficult to think of some firms as domestic companies(本国公司). Global competition has increased performance standards(绩效标准) in many dimensions, including those of quality, cost, productivity, production introduction time, and smooth, flowing operations.The development of newly industrialized countries(新兴工业化国家) is changing the global competitive landscape and significantlyincreasing competition in global markets. The economic development of Asian countries outside of Japan is increasing the significance of Asian markets.In the new competitive landscape, firms are challenged to develop the optimal level of globalization(最优的全球化水平).1.2.2Technological ChangesThere are three categories of technological trends and conditions through which technology is significantly altering the nature of competition(竞争的性质).·Increasing rate of technological change and diffusion(不断上升的技术变迁率和扩散率) Both the rate of technology changes and the speed at which new technologies become available and are used have increased substantially over the last 20 years. Perpetual innovation(持续的创新) is a term used to describe how rapidly and consistently new, information-intensive technologies （信息密集的技术）replace older ones. The shorter product life cycles(产品生命周期) resulting from these rapid diffusions of new technologies place a competitive premium on being able to quickly introduce new goods and services into the marketplace. In fact, when products become somewhat indistinguishable because of the widespread and rapid diffusion of technologies, speed to market(产品进入市场的速度) may be the only source of competitive advantage. Some evidence suggests that after only 12 to 18 months, companies likely will have gathered information about their competitors’R&D and product decisions. Often, merely a few weeks pass before a new American-made product introduced in U.S. markets is copied, manufactured, and shipped to the United States by one or more companies in Asia.Today’s rate of technological diffusion stifles the protection firms possessed previously through their patents(专利). Patents are now thought by many to be an effective way ofprotecting proprietary technology(专利技术) primarily in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries only. Many firms competing in the electronics industry often do not apply for patents to prevent competitors from gaining access to the technological knowledge included in the patent application(包含在专利申请中的技术知识).·The Information Age(信息时代)Dramatic changes in information technology have occurred in recent years. Personal computers, cellular phones, artificial intelligence （人工智能）, virtual reality(虚拟现实), and massive databases are a few examples of how information is used differently as a result of technological developments. Someone believes that electronic mail (E-mail) systems are the first manifestation of a revolution in the flow and management of information in companies throughout the world. An important outcome of these changes is that the ability to access and effectively use information has become animportant source of competitive advantage in virtually all industries.·Increasing Knowledge Intensity(不断提高的知识密度)Knowledge is the basis of technology. In the new competitive landscape, knowledge is a critical organizational resource and is increasingly a valuable source of competitive advantage. Because of this, many companies now strive to transmute the accumulated knowledge of individual employees into a corporate asset(把个体性员工积累起来的知识转变成公司的资产). Figure 1.2 The New Competitive LandscapeTechnological changes·rapid technological changes and diffusion ·dramatic changes in information technologies ·increasingThe global economy·People, products, ideasmove freely across borders·Significant opportunitiesemerge in global markets.·Markets and industriesbecome moreinternationalized. TheNew1.3The I/O model of Above-average ReturnsFrom the 1960s through the 1980s , the external environment was thought to be the primary determinants of strategies firms selected. The industrial organization model explains the dominant influence of the external environment on firms’strategic actions. This model specifies that the industry chosen in which to compete has a stronger influence on a firm’s performance than do the choices managers make inside their organizations. Firm performance is believed to be predicted primarily by a range of an industry’s properties(行业属性), including economies of scale（规模经济）, barriers to entry(进入壁垒), diversification(产品多元化), product differentiation(产品差异), and the degree of concentration(行业集中度).The I/O model has four underlying assumptions. First, the external environment is assumed to impose pressures and constraintsthat determine the strategies that would result in above-average returns. Second, most firms competing within a particular industry are assumed to control similar strategically relevant resources and pursue similar strategies. Third, it is assumed that resources used to implement strategies are highly mobile across firms. Because of resource mobility, any resource differences that might develop between firms will be short lived. Fourth, organizational decision makers are assumed to be rational and committed to acting in the firm’s best interests as shown by their profit maximizing behavior(利润最大化行为).The I/O model challenges firms to locate the most attractive industry in which to compete. Competitiveness generally can be increased only when firms find the industry with the highest profit potential(具有最高的利润潜能的行业) and learn how to use their resources to implement the strategy required by the structural characteristics in that industry(行业的结构特征所要求的战略). The five forces model of competition(竞争的五力模型) is an analytical tool used to help firms with this task. This model suggests that an industry’s potential profitability(行业的潜在的赢利性) is a function of interactions among five forces. A firm can use this model to understand an industry’s profit potential and the strategy that should be implemented to establish a defensible competitive position(可防卫的竞争位置). Typically, this model suggests that firms can earn above-average returns by implementing a cost leadership strategy(成本领先战略) or a differentiation strategy(差异化战略).Figure 1.3 The I/O Model of Superior Returns Study the externalLocate an industry withIdentify the strategyDevelop or acquireassets and skillsUse the firm’sAbove-ave1.4The Resource-based Model of Above-average ReturnsThe resource-based model(基于资源的模型) assumes that each organization is a bundle of unique resources and capabilities that providesthe basis for its strategy and is the primary source of its returns. According to this model, differences in firms’performances across time are driven primarily by organization’s unique resources and capabilities rather than by an industry’s structural characteristics(企业绩效的跨时差异主要是由组织的独特的资源的能力而非行业的特征驱动的).This model also assumes that over time, firms acquire different resources and develop unique capabilities. As such, all firms competing within a particular industry may not possess the same strategically relevant resources and capabilities. Another assumption of this model is that resources may not be highly mobile across firms. The differences in resources(资源上的差异) form the basis of competitive advantage.Resources (资源)are inputs into a firm’s production process, such as capital equipment, the skills of individual employees, patents, finance, and talented managers. In general, a firm’s resources can be classified into threecategories: physical, human, and organizational capital(实物资本、人力资本和组织资本). Individual resources alone may not yield a competitive advantage. In general, it is through the combination and integration of sets of resources that competitive advantages are formed(竞争优势是通过组合和整合资源集形成的). A capability(能力) is the capacity for a set of resources to integratively perform a task or an activity. Through continued use, capabilities become stronger and more difficulty for competitors to understand and imitate(通过持续的使用，能力变得更强和更加难以被对手理解和模仿). As a source of competitive advantage, a resource should be valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and non-substitutable. Resources are valuable(有战略价值的) when they allow a firm to exploit opportunities and or/neutralize threats in its external environment; they are rare（稀有的）when possessed by few, if any, current and potential competitors; they are costly to imitate（模仿代价高昂的）when otherfirms either cannot obtain them or at a cost disadvantage to obtain them compared to the firm that already possesses them; they are non-substitutable（不可替代的）when they have no structural equivalents.The resource-based model of competitive advantage suggests that a firm’s unique resources and capabilities provide the basis for a strategy. The strategy chosen should allow the firm to best exploit its core competencies(最佳地利用其核心竞争力) relative to opportunities in the external environment. Core competencies(核心竞争力) are resources and capabilities that serve as a source of competitive advantage.Figure 1.4 The Resource-based Model of Superior ReturnsIdentify the firm’sDetermine the firm’sDetermine the potentialLocate an attractiveSelect a strategy thatallows the firm to best1.5Strategic Intent and Strategic MissionStrategic intent(战略意图) is the leveraging of a firm’s internal resources, capabilities, and core competencies to accomplish the firm’s goals in the competitive environment. Strategic intent reflects what a firm is capable of doing as a result of its core competencies and the uniqueways they can be used to exploit a competitive advantage. The following examples are expression of strategic intent.“To become a high-performance multinational energy company——not the biggest, but the best.”“Its our strategic intent that customers worldwide view us as their most valued pharmaceutical partner.”“To be the top performer in everything.”“To catch up with and beat Caterpillar.”Strategic mission(战略使命) is a statement of a firm’s unique purpose and the scope of its operations in product and market terms. An effective strategic mission establishes a firm’s individuality and is exciting, inspiring, and relevant to all stakeholders(利害相关者). Together, strategic intent and strategic mission yield the insights required to formulate and implement the firm’s strategies(制定和执行企业战略所要求的洞见). When a firm is strategically competitive and earning above-average returns,it has the capacity to satisfy its stakeholders’interests(满足其利害相关者的利益).1.6StakeholdersStakeholders(企业的利害相关者) are the individuals and groups who can affect and are affected by the strategic outcomes achieved and who have enforceable claims on a firm’s performance(对企业绩效的可实施的要求权). Claims against an organization’s performance are enforced through a stakeholder’s ability to withhold participation essential to a firm’s survival, competitiveness, and profitability. Stakeholders continue to support an organization when its performance meets or exceeds their expectations. However, every stakeholder does not have the same level of influence. The more critical and valued a stakeholder’s participation is, the greater a firm’s dependency on it. Greater dependence, in turn, results in more potential influence for the stakeholder over a firm’s commitments, decisions, and actions.The stakeholders involved with a firm’s operations can be separated into three groups. Each of these stakeholder groups expects those making strategic decisions in a firm to provide the leadership through which their valued objectives will be accomplished(提供有助于实现他们看重的目标的领导). But these groups’objectives often differ from one another, sometimes placing managers in situations where trade-offs have to be made(有时置经理于必须作出二难选择的情形中). It is important that those responsible for managing stakeholder relationships in a country outside their native land use a global mind-set. A global mind-set(全球心态) is the capacity to appreciate the beliefs, values, behaviors, and business practices of individuals and organizations from a variety of regions and cultures.The firm’s st akeholders and their interestsCapital market stakeholders Goals and Objectives •Shareholders dividends, profit rate•Creditorssecurity of loanProduct market stakeholders:•Customers perceived value of the good or the service •Suppliers profitablesales,payment forgoods,long-termrelationship •Host communities pollution, employment, aids, taxinside-organization stakeholders•Employees monetary and non-monetary interests •Managers monetary and non-monetary interests1.7Organizational StrategistsSmall organizations may have a single strategist. In many cases, this person owns the firm and is deeply involved with its daily operations. At the other extreme, large, diversified firms(多元化的企业) have many top-level managers. Inaddition to the CEO and other top-level officials(e.g., chief operating officer and chief financial officer操作总监和财务总监), they have managers who are responsible for the performance of individual business units(个体性业务单位）.Typically, stakeholders have high expectations of top-level managers, particularly the CEO. Some believe that every organizational failure is actually a failure of those who hold the final responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of a firm’s decisions and actions.复习题1.解释下列概念：战略竞争力、高于平均的回报、平均回报、风险、战略管理过程、激励不相容、有限理性、战略的敏捷性、资源、能力、核心竞争力、战略意图、战略使命、企业的利害相关者2. 战略竞争力概念中所隐含的前提性假设是什么？企业获取可持续的战略竞争力的关键或曰前提是什么？什么决定着企业的战略竞争力可维持的时间的长短？3.战略管理过程的理性模型有何不足？为什么各国战略管理教材仍把它作为主要内容进行讲授？4.传统的企业竞争优势的源泉是什么？在新竞争情景中什么更重要？5.为什么说市场和行业的国际化使要把某些公司看成本国公司越来越困难？6.为什么说在技术快速扩散和传播的情况下，产品进入市场的速度或许是竞争优势的唯一源泉？7.为什么药品行业和化学行业的企业比较愿意申请专利，而电子行业的企业一般不愿意申请专利？8.为什么说获取和有效利用信息的能力已成为所有行业中的竞争优势的重要源泉？9.试述塑造新竞争情景的主要力量。
企业多元化经营的方案分析与总结
（1）多元化经营(1) diversification多元化经营最早是由美国学者安索夫于1957年在《哈佛商业评论》上提出的，他指出“多元化是用新的产品去开发新的市场，多元化经营主要是针对企业的产品数量而言”。
这种定义现在看来是不准确的，因为产品高度相关的企业和产品高度不相关的企业，即使两者的产品种类数量相同但两者的多元化程度肯定是不同的。
1959年彭罗斯在《企业成长理论》中提出“多元化是企业在原有产品生产的前提下扩展其生产活动，开发新产品的生产。
企业最终产品的增加，垂直一体化的增加都属于企业的多元化”。
他的理论弥补了安索夫的不足，但是却将企业一体化和多元化混为一谈。
随着多元化理论的不断完善和发展。
多元化经营出现了以下的定义：多元化经营是企业为了获得最大的经营效益或为了进行长期的经营，通过发开具有潜力的产品，合并其他的企业，从而丰富其产业结构的经营模式，是企业为了谋求发展的一种长期战略规划。
Diversification is the earliest scholar ansoff in 1957 by the United States in the harvard business review, he pointed out that \"diversification is to develop new markets with new products, diversification in terms of the number of products, mainly for enterprises\". This definition is now appears to be inaccurate, because the product is highly relevant enterprises and products highly relevant, even if the two products is the same number but the degree of diversification is certainly different. Penrose in 1959 in the enterprise growth theory, put forward \"under the premise of diversification is the enterprise in the production of original products to expand its production activities, production of new product development. Enterprise final product increases, the increase of the vertical integration\" belong to enterprise diversification. His theory made up for the inadequacy of ansoff, but the enterprise integration and diversification. With the constant improvement of diversification theory and development. Diversification appeared the following definition: diversification is one of the largest business companies in order to obtain benefits or for long term business, through hair open potential products, combined with other enterprises, so as to enrich its business model of industrial structure, is the enterprise in order to seek the development of a long-term strategic planning.多元化经营可以分为：相关多元化经营和非相关多元化经营。
The Cost of Diversity：the Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE•VOL.LV,NO.1•FEBRUARY2000The Cost of Diversity:The Diversification Discount and Inefficient InvestmentRAGHURAM RAJAN,HENRI SERVAES,and LUIGI ZINGALES*ABSTRACTWe model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allo-cation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm.The model predicts thatif divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities,funds willbe transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good op-portunities.When diversity in resources and opportunities increases,however,re-sources can f low toward the most inefficient division,leading to more inefficientinvestment and less valuable firms.We test these predictions on a panel of diver-sified U.S.firms during the period from1980to1993and find evidence consistentwith them.T HE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN THE THEORY of the firm,raised by Coase~1937! more than60years ago,is how decisions taken inside a hierarchy differ from those taken in the marketplace.Coase suggested that decisions within a hierarchy are determined by power considerations rather than relative prices.If this is indeed the case,why,and when,does the hierarchy domi-nate the market?A major obstacle to progress in this area has been the lack of data.Data on internal decisions made by firms are generally proprietary.Even when they are available to researchers,it is difficult to find a comparable group of decisions taken in the market.A notable exception is the capital allocation decision in diversified firms.Since1978,public panies have been forced to disclose their data on sales,profitability,and investments by major lines of business~segments!.An analysis of a small sample of multisegment firms reveals that segments correspond,by and large,to distinct internal *Rajan is from the University of Chicago,Servaes is from the London Business School and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,and Zingales is from the University of Chicago. Rajan and Zingales acknowledge financial support from the Center for Research on Security Prices at the University of Chicago.Servaes acknowledges financial support from the O’Herron and McColl faculty fellowships,University of North Carolina at Chapel ments from Sugato Bhattacharya,Judy Chevalier,Glenn Ellison,Milton Harris,Steven Kaplan,Owen La-mont,Colin Mayer,Todd Milbourn,Vikram Nanda,Jay Ritter,RenéStulz,Robert Vishny,Ralph Walkling,Wanda Wallace,two anonymous referees,and especially Mitchell Petersen are grate-fully ments from participants in seminars at AT Kearney~London!,the University of Chicago,Cornell University,the University of Georgia,the University of Florida, the University of Illinois,the London School of Economics,New York University,Northwestern University,Ohio State University,the College of William&Mary,Vanderbilt University,and Yale University were useful.3536The Journal of Financeunits of the firm.Since the investment decision is perhaps the most impor-tant of corporate decisions,these data allow researchers an opportunity to compare decisions taken by units within hierarchies with decisions taken by independent units in the same industry,and thus obtain insights on how hierarchies and markets differ.Previous research~Lamont~1997!and Shin and Stulz~1998!!has shown that resource allocation in diversified firms does appear different from that in focused firms and seems to ignore traditional market indicators of the value of investment such as Tobin’s q.Moreover,there seems to be a con-nection between resource~mis!allocation and the value of diversified firms. Berger and Ofek~1995!find that investment by diversified firms in seg-ments that have low q is correlated with the discount at which these firms trade.So perhaps such misallocation explains why diversified firms trade, on average,at a discount relative to a portfolio of single-segment firms in the same industries~Lang and Stulz~1994!,Berger and Ofek~1995!,Ser-vaes~1996!,Lins and Servaes~1999!!.But these facts simply heighten the puzzle.What is it in a hierarchy that makes diversified firms misallocate funds?Moreover,what accounts for the wide dispersion in diversified firm values,with fully39.3percent trading at a premium in1990?1To answer these questions,we first need a theoretical framework to un-derstand the phenomenon.At least three kinds of models have been pro-posed to explain how the divisions of diversified firms behave differently from stand-alone firms.Efficient Internal Capital Market models typically suggest that diversification creates value.By forming an internal capital market where the internally generated cash f lows can be pooled,diversified firms can allocate resources to their best use~e.g.,see Li and Li~1996!, Matsusaka and Nanda~1997!,Stein~1997!,Weston~1970!,and Williamson ~1975!!.2Clearly,these models do not explain the misallocation of resources to divisions with poor opportunities.Agency cost models have sometimes been offered as explanations for the potential investment distortions in diversified firms.Because top manage-ment in the diversified firm has greater opportunities to undertake projects, and potentially greater resources to do so if diversification relaxes con-straints imposed by imperfect external capital markets,it might overinvest1Also,the evidence on the value of diversification,as indicated by the stock price reaction to the decision to diversify,is decidedly mixed.Morck,Shleifer,and Vishny~1990!show that acquiring firms in the1980s experience negative returns when they announce unrelated ac-quisitions.John and Ofek~1995!find that announcement returns are greater when diversified firms in the late1980s announce asset sales that increase focus.By contrast,Schipper and Thompson~1983!document positive announcement period returns when conglomerates an-nounced acquisition programs in the1960s,and Matsusaka~1993!and Hubbard and Palia ~1999!find positive returns to announcements of diversifying acquisitions in the1960s and 1970s during the conglomerate merger wave.2Also see Billett and Mauer~1997!,Denis and Thothadri~1999!,Gertner,Scharfstein,and Stein~1994!,Milbourn and Thakor~1996!,and Harris and Raviv~1996,1997!for other recent papers on the costs,benefits,and workings of internal capital markets.The Cost of Diversity37 resources~e.g.,see Stulz~1990!and Matsusaka and Nanda~1997!!.Though we believe that agency theories could explain generic overinvestment—for example,the decision to diversify could be viewed as an attempt by the CEO to entrench herself~e.g.,Shleifer and Vishny~1989!!—it is more difficult to see how these theories could explain the internal misallocation of funds;the CEO should exploit all potential sources of value inside the firm,skimming her agency rents only from the overall pie.Inf luence cost models are a third class of models that attempt to explain the decisions of diversified firms.In Meyer,Milgrom,and Roberts~1992!, managers of divisions that have a bleak future have an incentive to attempt to inf luence the top management of the firm to channel resources in their direction.Of course,in the spirit of inf luence cost models,top management sees through these lobbying efforts.Thus,no resources are,in fact,misal-located to the divisions,though costs are incurred in lobbying activities.As a result,it is again hard to explain the evidence on misallocation with these models.3Since existing theories need substantial embellishment to explain the mis-allocation of funds in diversified firms and the cross-sectional variation in value,Occam’s Razor suggests a different approach.We develop a model of capital allocation under two basic assumptions.First,headquarters has lim-ited power over its divisions:it can redistribute resources ex ante,but it cannot commit to a future distribution of surplus.Second,surplus is distrib-uted among divisions through negotiations,and divisions can affect the share of surplus they receive through their choice of investment.4Questions of how the power to take decisions,or capture surplus,is distributed within the firm then become central to determining whether the firm does better or worse than the market.A brief description of our model may help fix ideas.We assume that the diversified firm consists of two divisions,each led by a divisional manager. Each manager starts with an endowment of resources that the headquarters can either transfer to the other division or leave in place.The retained re-sources can be invested in one of two projects:an“efficient”investment and a“defensive”investment.The former is the optimal investment for the firm in a world where all contracts can be perfectly enforced.The latter offers lower returns,but protects the investing division better against poaching by the other division.53Hard,though not impossible.The prospect of enhanced inf luence costs can lead to changes, ex ante,in real decisions like allocations or organizational structure.These ideas have been separately explored in Fulghieri and Hodrick~1997!,Scharfstein and Stein~1997!,and Wulf ~1997!.As we will argue later,the precise nature of the misallocation we document is hard to reconcile with inf luence cost models.4Our model is best characterized as a model of power-seeking,and is most related to papers by Shleifer and Vishny~1989!,Skaperdas~1992!,Hirshleifer~1995!,and Rajan and Zingales ~2000!.5That managers have a choice between investments that alter their power is well recognized in the literature;see Shleifer and Vishny~1989!and Stole and Zwiebel~1996!.38The Journal of FinanceDivisional managers have autonomy in choosing investments and are self interested.Even though the efficient investment maximizes firm value, a divisional manager may prefer the defensive investment that would ben-efit her more directly,especially when her resources and opportunities are much better than the other division’s.The reason is quite simple.Once the divisional manager makes the unprotected,albeit efficient,investment,she will have to share some of the surplus created with the other division.Of course,if the other division also makes the efficient investment,our man-ager will get a piece of the surplus created by the other division.If the surplus created by the other division is not too small relative to what she is giving up,the divisional manager will prefer the efficient investment. Thus appropriate incentives are created for both divisions only when they do not differ too much in the surplus—which is the product of resources and opportunities—they create.Diversity in resources and opportunities is costly for investment incentives.Clearly,the investment distortions would not arise if headquarters could design precise rules to share ex post surplus.In practice,sharing rules are likely to be determined by factors other than considerations of ex ante optimality—such as the ex post bargaining power of the divisions. Although headquarters cannot contract on how divisions will share the surplus ex post,it can transfer funds ex ante.Some transfers will certainly be made because one division has better opportunities than the other.If stand-alone divisions face imperfect capital markets and cannot borrow as much as they need,the transfers to deserving divisions~“winner-picking”in Stein’s~1997!felicitous language!is one way the diversified firm adds value.But transfers will also be made so as to improve the incentives to un-dertake the efficient investment.Since incentives are distorted away from the optimal because of diversity~of opportunities and resources!,transfers will be made in a direction that makes divisions less diverse—from divi-sions that are large and have good opportunities to divisions that are small and have poor investment opportunities.Thus,the diversified firm may misallocate some funds at the margin~relative to the first-best!to prevent greater average investment distortions.The more diverse a firm’s divisions are,the greater the need to reallocate funds in this way.Thus corporate redistribution may be a rational second-best attempt to head off a third-best outcome.We are not the first to argue that politics inf luences investment decisions in firms.6However,our simple model of internal capital allocation based on power considerations has the advantage of identifying a clear proxy for what6For example,Chandler~1966,p.166!describes the capital budgeting process at General Motors under Durand’s management in the following way:“When one of them@Division Man-agers#had a project why he would vote for his fellow members;if they would vote for his project,he would vote for theirs.It was a sort of horse trading.”The Cost of Diversity39 drives inefficient allocations:the diversity of investment opportunities and resources among the divisions of the firm.Moreover,it offers detailed test-able implications on the direction of f lows between divisions.We test the implications of the theory for a panel of diversified U.S.firms during the period1980to1993using the segment data on COMPUSTAT. Our theory suggests that whether a segment receives or makes transfers in a diversified firm depends not so much on its opportunities~proxied for by Tobin’s q)as on its size-weighted opportunities,and the way these are dis-persed across segments in that firm.We show that our theory has a greater ability to predict internal capital allocation than the Efficient Internal Mar-ket theory.Moreover,allocations toward the relatively low q segments of a diversified firm,on average,outweigh allocations to its relatively high q segments as the dispersion in weighted opportunities~which we call diver-sity!increases.Of course,this may simply ref lect the channeling of funds to low q seg-ments that are inefficiently being rationed by the market.For this reason, we test the relationship between diversity and value.We find the greater the diversity,the lower the diversified firm’s value relative to a portfolio of single-segment firms.This effect persists even after we correct for the ex-tent to which the diversified firm is focused in specific industries,so our measure of diversity captures something different from traditional measures of diversification.The empirical results,taken together,provide striking evidence that diver-sity in investment opportunities between segments within firms leads to dis-torted investment allocations and hence value differences between diversified firms.Diversified firms can trade at a premium if their diversity is low.As a case in point,General Electric,perhaps the most admired U.S.conglomerate, is at the8th percentile of our sample over the entire sample period in terms of diversity,and at the75th percentile in terms of relative value.More generally,we believe that our evidence sheds light on how decisions within firms can differ from decisions made in markets.A firm is a collec-tion of commonly held,and mutually specialized critical resources.7Though the common control of key resources gives certain agents in the firm the power to shape transactions that would otherwise not be possible in the marketplace~such as the transfer of resources!,the absence of a clear de-marcation to property rights within the firm can create inefficient power struggles~also see Rajan and Zingales~1998a!!.Thus,our finding that a measure of the distortions created by power~i.e.,diversity!relates to the discount diversified firms trade at suggests,first,that the use of power may indeed explain why transactions within firms are different from transac-tions in markets and,second,that neither hierarchies nor markets need dominate.Coase’s emphasis on power is far from empty!7See Kumar,Rajan,and Zingales~1999!for a more detailed exposition of Critical Resource theories of the firm.40The Journal of FinanceThe rest of the paper is organized as follows.In Section I we present the framework of our simple stripped-down model.In Section II we derive some testable implications from the model.Section III describes the sample,the tests,and the results.Conclusions follow.I.The ModelWe want to analyze resource allocation in diversified firms.Therefore,we focus on firms operating in different lines of business.For the purposes of our analysis,the distinction between vertically integrated divisions and un-related divisions is unimportant.In fact,the distortions we want to study may arise whenever different organizational units operate within the same hierarchy,so long as at least one dimension of their operations~e.g.,raising and allocating resources!is integrated.Our model,therefore,does not apply to a leveraged buyout fund,where each subunit is a firm that operates sep-arately from the other subunits on every dimension,including financing~see Jensen~1989!!.A.TimingConsider a world with four dates,0,1,2,and3.A firm is composed of two divisions,A and B,each of which is headed by a manager who,for simplicity, will be thought of as representing the entire human capital of her division. Each manager wants to maximize the surplus that accrues to her division at date2.We assume,by contrast,that headquarters maximizes the surplus created by the entire firm.8The two divisions interact on three dimensions.At date0,the headquar-ters can reallocate resources between the two divisions.At date1,divisions choose investments.The type of investment chosen affects the“property right”a division has on the cash f low produced because,depending on it,a division may have the opportunity to poach on the surplus created by the other division.At date2,the divisions split the total surplus according to their relative power.Everything is predetermined at date3:Production takes place and surplus is shared according to the date2contract.So date 3is only for completeness.To summarize,the sequence of events is pre-sented in Figure1.We now detail the interactions on the previous three dates.8In Rajan,Servaes,and Zingales~1997!,we model this more precisely by assuming that headquarters controls the physical assets of the firm~which are crucial for production!,and thus gets a share of the total surplus in bargaining with the divisions.If we assume that headquarters first bargains with the divisions after which the divisions further subdivide the surplus,headquarters will always get a constant share of the surplus,and hence has an in-centive to maximize the surplus created by the firm.The Cost of Diversity41Figure1.Timing of the events.B.Resources and TransfersEach division j starts with an initial endowment of resources,l0j,that can be invested.We assume that these resources include any potential borrow-ing from outside.The initial level of resources could also be thought of as the resources the division would be able to invest if it were a stand-alone firm. The quantity of these resources are assumed to be limited despite unlimited investment opportunities~see later!because external capital markets are imperfect.For simplicity,we assume that headquarters can transfer all of a divi-sion’s resources to the other,though we will see that in equilibrium it will not always choose to do so.The total resources division A has available for investment at date1is then l1Aϭl0AϪt,and division B has l1Bϭl0Bϩt.C.InvestmentEach division can allocate its date1resources,l1j,to one of two kinds of investments.One investment is technologically efficient in that it maximizes returns;however,it leaves the surplus exposed to potential expropriation by the other division.Alternatively,the division could make a defensive invest-ment,which protects the surplus created at the cost of lower returns. Some examples are useful to fix ideas.The protective investment could be overly specialized~as in Shleifer and Vishny~1989!!so that only the division knows how to run it.This prevents the project from ever being turned over to the other division.Moreover,the durable resources employed on the project, such as employees,would also become so specialized that they could never be poached by the other division.Of course,the excess specialization would reduce the returns of such a project relative to a more general investment that could be subject to interference by the other division.The protective investment could reduce a division’s dependence on the other division.One of the authors once worked in a commercial bank with three subunits.One subunit had leased dedicated long-distance telephone lines to connect its representatives in each of the bank’s branches.The lines were barely used and since the subunits shared space in the branches,it would have been a simple matter for the other subunits to share access to the lines and also connect their representatives.Rather than spending resources to42The Journal of Financeaugment the common usage of the existing lines~efficient!,the other sub-units decided to lease their own lines~protective!because they felt their dependence on the first subunit would compromise their ability to bargain over issues such as transfer prices for funds.The protective investment could be one that stays within the well-defined turf of a division,even though it is efficient for the division to venture out.Bertelsmann,the German conglomerate,had separate divi-sions for publishing and new media.The development of book sales through the Internet provided a wonderful opportunity to the book division,as well as a substantial threat to its existing business.Yet the book division ig-nored the opportunity,preferring to focus on book sales through traditional channels,which were clearly its protected turf,and ignoring the efficient Internet investment that could well become part of the new media divi-sion’s empire.9Let the gross return at date3per dollar invested in efficient investment at date1be a j.Since defensive investments are wasteful of resources,the gross return to them is then a jϪg,where g is a positive quantity.To tie our hands,we assume that there are no savings or diseconomies from joint production.We only assume that if two divisions are under common ownership,resources can be reshuff led between the two.As we shall show,this reshuff ling has a positive side~the possibility that re-sources can be reallocated to their highest value use as in Stein~1997!! and a negative side~that a division may distort its investment in order to obtain“property rights”in the surplus it creates!.Thus,both the benefits and costs of a diversified firm spring from the same source:the use of power rather than arm’s length contracts to govern transactions within the firm.D.ContractibilityAccounting controls can ensure that the funds transferred to a division are invested,but a division~and the headquarters!cannot contract on the type of investment that is to be made by the other division.Myers~1977!has a detailed discussion as to why it is difficult to contract on investment;the nature of the“right”physical investment is based on the division’s judgment about the state,which is hard to specify ex ante or verify ex post.Also,much of the investment may not be in physical assets but may enhance the divi-sion’s human capital which,again,is hard to contract upon.We also make another assumption that is standard in the incomplete con-tract literature~see Grossman and Hart~1986!!:The surplus that is to be produced at the final date cannot be contracted on before date2because the state will be realized then and the state-contingent surplus that will be pro-9See the survey in The Economist,November211998,p.10.The Cost of Diversity43 duced may be hard to specify up front.As shown by Hart and Moore~1999!, this incompleteness of long-term contracts can be rationalized in a world where all contracts can be renegotiated.At date2,however,after the uncertainty about the state that will prevail is resolved,it is possible to strike deals,after bargaining,over the division of date3cash f low.Date3is separated from date2only for expositional convenience,and these dates could be thought of as very close together so that the deals could be thought of as enforceable spot deals.E.Date2PayoffsA divisional manager who chooses the defensive investment ensures that the surplus his division creates is well protected against any actions by the other division.Moreover,since the investment does not consume all his time and resources,he can attempt to poach on the surplus created by the other division if the other division made the efficient,albeit unprotected, investment.Thus,if each divisional manager chooses the defensive investment,there is no room for power seeking inside the firm and each division will retain its product—that is,~a jϪg!l1j.If one divisional manager,say A,chooses the defensive investment and B does not,then A will have the opportunity of trying to grab some of B’s surplus.If A attempts such a grab,B can defend himself,but at substan-tially greater cost than if he had chosen the defensive investment up front. Specifically,a fraction of the surplus produced by B is dissipated in ex post jockeying for advantage.The payoff B gets is then~a BϪu!l1B where u.g. For simplicity,we assume that the surplus division A grabs is almost fully matched by its cost of poaching,and it gets~a AϪg!l1Aϩe where e is a small number.Finally,if both divisional managers choose the technologically efficient investment,both are fully involved in productive activity,and neither has the time to poach.Of course,knowing this,neither bothers to defend.Thus, when both divisions choose the efficient investment,dissipation will be avoided and we assume the total surplus~a A l1Aϩa B l1B!is split equally between the two divisions.10The assumption of equal split is not crucial.We will discuss the robustness of the result to changes in this assumption in Section II.D.1110That headquarters does not get any of the surplus is only for simplicity.None of our results would be changed if headquarters gets a constant fraction of the surplus because of its control of the firm’s physical assets~see footnote7!.11It is possible to formalize all this.For example,let poaching consume real resources.Skaper-das~1992!shows that when the opportunity cost of poaching is high,cooperation~i.e.,no poach-ing!is an equilibrium.When division A makes the defensive investment and division B does not,A’s opportunity cost of poaching is low since the defensive investment has low returns.By contrast,when A makes the efficient investment,the opportunity cost of poaching is high,and both divisions would be content not to poach.44The Journal of FinanceF.First BestIdeally,all the resources should be transferred to the division with the highest return a j.12This division should allocate all the resources to the efficient investment.As we will show,resources may not all be transferred to the division with the highest use for them because such a transfer can destroy the division’s incentive to make the efficient investment.In what follows,we will examine how transfers and allocations are distorted away from the first-best.II.Equilibrium ImplicationsGiven the anticipated payoffs from date2bargaining,at date1division j ~jʦA,B!has the incentive to make the efficient investment if division k is expected to do so,and1Ϫ@a j l1jϩa k l1k#Ն~a1jϪg!l1j.~1!2Since a similar inequality should hold for division k also,both divisions have the requisite incentives if1Ϫ@a j l1jϩa k l1k#ՆMax@~a1jϪg!l1j,~a1kϪg!l1k#.~2!2It is easily checked that this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the efficient investment to be an equilibrium at date1.Now let us effect a sim-ple change of variables so that b jϭa jϪg.Furthermore,without loss of generality,let b j l1jՆb k l1k.Then the right-hand side of inequality~2!sim-plifies to b j l1j and the whole expression can be rewritten asg~l1jϩl1k!Ն~b j l1jϪb k l1k!.~3!For a fixed total amount of resources,~l1Aϩl1B!,this inequality implies that the product of resources and potential returns cannot be too diverse across divisions.The intuition is straightforward.Division j~which is the division that can contribute the most to surplus in the following period!will choose the effi-cient investment only if division k contributes enough surplus to make it worthwhile.Division k will not be able to contribute enough if its resource-weighted opportunities,b k l1k,are small relative to j’s.If so,division j will not make the efficient investment,and neither will k.Therefore,too much diversity in potential contributions to the common pool will lead to a break-12Of course,in practice,returns will not be constant with scale.Some resources will be retained by the division with lower a j so as to undertake essential investments such as maintenance.。
公司级战略讲义英文
Sharing Activities often lowers costs or raises differentiation
Example: Using a common physical distribution system and sales force such as Procter & Gamble’s disposable diaper and paper towel divisions
Incentive system that rewards more than just business unit performance
Alternative Diversification Strategies
Related Diversification Strategies
Sharing Activities Transferring Core Competencies
Financial Economies
Managerial Motives
Motives, Incentives, and Resources for Diversification
Resources
Incentives
Managerial Motives
Incentives and Resources with Neutral Effects of
Motives, Incentives, and Resources for Diversification
Resources
Incentives
Managerial Motives
Managerial Motives Causing Value Reduction
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means of entry
Initiate actions to boost combined
performance of businesses
Pursue opportunities to leverage cross-
Venture
5
Major Corporate Level Strategies
Single Business Dominant Business
Related Diversification
Unrelated Diversification
6
What is Related Diversification?
Cost saving opportunities Capture strategic fits Capture financial economies Spread business risk
Leverage brand name
3
Building Shareholder Value
business value chain relationships and strategic fits into competitive advantage
Establish investment priorities, steering
resources into most attractive business units
corporate level strategy
Diversified firms vary according to
Level of diversification Degree of relatedness
1
Four Main Tasks in Crafting Corporate Strategy
Ultimate justification for diversifying
A diversification move must pass three tests
The industry attractiveness test
The cost-of-entry test
The better-off test
Provides branded consumer goods products worldwide 3 GBUs
Beauty GBU
Beauty segment Grooming segment
Health and Well-Being GBU
Health Care segment Snacks, Coffee, and Pet Care segment
Products for baby care, skin care, oral care, wound care, and women’s health care fields, as well as nutritional and over-the-counter pharmaceutical products Products for anti-infective, antipsychotic, cardiovascular, contraceptive, dermatology, gastrointestinal, hematology, immunology, neurology, oncology, pain management, urology, and virology Products for circulatory disease management, orthopaedic joint reconstruction and spinal care, wound care and women’s health, minimally invasive surgical, blood glucose monitoring and insulin delivery, and diagnostic products, as well as disposable contact lenses
Diversification and Corporate Strategy
Corporate Level Strategy – the strategy for a
company and all of its business units as a whole
Diversification – the primary approach to
Involves diversifying into businesses whose
value chains possess competitively valuable “strategic fits” with the value chain(s) of the present business(es)
2
Why do Firms Diversify?
When they have excess resources, capabilities,
and core competencies that have multiple uses Diminishing growth prospects in present industryΒιβλιοθήκη Household Care GBU
Fabric Care and Home Care segment Baby Care and Family Care segment
8
Examples of Related Diversification?
Johnson and Johnson
Engages in the research and development, manufacture, and sale of various products in the health care field worldwide 3 segments Consumer segment
Capturing the “strategic fits” makes
related diversification a 1 + 1 = 3 phenomenon
7
Examples of Related Diversification?
Proctor and Gamble (distribution/marketing)
4
Making the Diversification Decision
Decision to Diversify Requires Two Additional Decisions:
Level and Degree of Diversification Number and Relatedness Mode of Diversification Acquisition, Internal Development, Joint