上市公司盈余管理外文文献
盈余管理影响因素研究文献综述
盈余管理影响因素研究文献综述中文综述盈余管理（Earnings Management）指企业为达到某些目的而对会计资料进行的主动调整，这种行为被认为是一种财务欺诈。
近年来，随着会计准则的不断完善和业界对此现象的关注，盈余管理正逐渐受到广泛关注。
本文对盈余管理影响因素的相关研究进行综述。
首先，企业规模是影响盈余管理的重要因素之一。
Walther（1996）发现，规模更大的企业更容易出现盈余管理行为。
它们需要维持一定的盈利水平，以保持其公众形象和市场地位，因此有更大的动机和能力通过盈余管理来应对不利的财务情况。
Hou（2011）的研究也表明，相对较小的企业往往有更少的资源来进行盈余管理。
其次，行业特征也是影响盈余管理的因素之一。
Watts和Zimmerman（1986）认为，不同行业的盈余管理水平有所不同，这是由于行业规则和外部标准（如市场期望和政策规定）的差异。
Guenther和Young（2000）的研究发现，行业竞争加剧时，企业更容易进行盈余管理，因为其可能需要通过增加盈利水平来保持市场地位和竞争力。
第三，公司治理结构也是影响盈余管理的因素之一。
Chung和Watts（1990）认为，董事会规模和独立性是影响盈余管理的关键因素。
他们发现，当董事会规模较小、董事会成员相互关联时，企业更容易进行盈余管理。
而当董事会中独立董事比例较高时，公司更容易遵循会计准则，从而减少盈余管理的行为。
第四，公司业绩预测也是影响盈余管理的因素之一。
Healy（1985）发现，企业倾向于盈余管理，以满足分析师预估的盈利水平。
公司的盈利预测如果超出了分析师的预测水平，也会出现盈余管理的行为，以使企业的预测结果更接近分析师的预测。
最后，外部监管和规范也是影响盈余管理的因素之一。
监管机构规定的会计准则和外部标准的监督可以降低企业进行盈余管理的动机。
具体而言，严格的外部监管可以降低盈余管理的风险，推动企业遵守会计准则。
Gul和Fung（2010）的研究表明，会计师事务所的市场竞争也可以影响盈余管理的行为。
企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Measuring the quality of earnings1. IntroductionGenerally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) offer some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and give the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alternatives. Earning management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the firm (Ortega and Grant, 2003).In other words, earnings management is manipulating the earning to achieve a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献predetermined target set by the management. It is a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain (Schipper, 1989).Levit (1998) defines earning management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company.The popular press lists several instances of companies engaging in earnings management. Sensormatic Electronics, which stamped shipping dates and times on sold merchandise, stopped its clocks on the last day of a quarter until customer shipments reached its sales goal. Certain business units of Cendant Corporation inflated revenues nearly $500 million just prior to a merger; subsequently, Cendant restated revenuesand agreed with the SEC to change revenue recognition practices. AOL restated earnings for $385 million in improperly deferred marketing expenses. In 1994, the Wall Street Journal detailed the many ways in which General Electric smoothed earnings, including the careful timing of capital gains and the use of restructuring charges and reserves, in response to the article, General Electric reportedly received calls from other corporations questioning why such common practices were“front-page〞 news.Earning management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Whalen, 1999).Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that abusive earnings management and fraudulent practices begins by engaging in earnings management schemes designed primarily to “smooth〞 earnings to meet internally or externally imposed earnings forecasts and analysts’ expectations. Even if earnings management does not explicitly violate accounting rules, it is an ethically questionable practice. An organization that manages its earnings sends a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献message to its employees that bending the truth is an acceptable practice. Executives who partake of this practice risk creating an ethical climate in which other questionable activities may occur. A manager who asks the sales staff to help sales one day forfeits the moral authority to criticize questionable sales tactics another day.Earnings management can also become a very slippery slope, which relatively minor accounting gimmicks becoming more and more aggressiveuntil they create material misstatements in the financial statements (Clikeman, 2003)The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three staff accounting bulletins (SAB) to provide guidance on some accounting issues in order to prevent the inappropriate earnings management activities by public companies: SAB No. 99 “Materiality〞, SAB No. 100 “Restructuring and Impairment Charges〞 and SAB No. 101 “Revenue Recognition〞.Earnings management behavior may affect the quality of accounting earnings, which is defined by Schipper and Vincent (2003) as the extent to which the reported earnings faithfully represent Hichsian economic income, which is the amount that can be consumed (i.e. paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period.Assessment of earning quality requires sometimes the separations of earnings into cash from operation and accruals, the more the earnings is closed to cash from operation, the higher earnings quality. As Penman (2001) states that the purpose of accounting quality analysis is to distinguish between the “hard〞 numbers resulting from cash flows and the “soft〞 numbers resulting from accrual accounting.The quality of earnings can be assessed by focusing on the earning persistence; high quality earnings are more persistent and useful in the process of decision making.Beneish and Vargus (2002) investigate whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality using earning persistence as a measure for the quality of earnings, they find that income-increasing accruals are significantly more persistent for firms with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms with abnormal insider selling, relative to firms which there is no abnormal insider trading.Balsam et al. (2003) uses the level of discretionary accruals as a direct measure企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献for earning quality. The discretionary accruals model is based on a regression relationship between the change in total accruals as dependent variable and change in sales and change in the level of property, plant and equipment, change in cash flow from operations and change in firm size (total assets) as independent variables. If the regression coefficients in this model are significant that means that there is earning management in that firm and the earnings quality is low.This research presents an empirical study on using three different approaches of measuring the quality of earnings on different industry. The notion is; if there is a complete consistency among the three measures, a general assessment for the quality of earnings (high or low) can be reached and, if not, the quality of earnings is questionable and needs different other approaches for measurement and more investigations and analysis.The rest of the paper is divided into following sections: Earnings management incentives, Earnings management techniques, Model development, Sample and statistical results, and Conclusion.2. Earnings management incentives 2.1 Meeting analysts’ expectations In general, analysts’ expectations and company predictions tend to address two high-profile components of financial performance: revenue and earnings from operations.The pressure to meet revenue expectations is particularly intense and may be the primary catalyst in leading managers to engage in earning management practices that result in questionable or fraudulent revenue recognition practices. Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that improperrevenue recognition practices were the cause of one-third of all voluntary or forced restatements of income filed with the SEC from 1977 to 2000. Ironically, it is often the companies themselves that create this pressure to meet the market’s earnings expectations. It is common practice for companies to provide earnings estimates to analysts and investors. Management is often faced with the task of ensuring their targeted estimates are met.企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献Several companies, including Coca-Cola Co., Intel Corp., and Gillette Co., have taken a contrary stance and no longer provide quarterly and annual earnings estimates to analysts. In doing so, these companies claim they have shifted their focus from meeting short-term earnings estimates to achieving their long-term strategies (Mckay and Brown, 2002).2.2 To avoid debt-covenant violations and minimize political costs Some firms have the incentive to avoid violating earnings-based debt covenants. If violated, the lender may be able to raise the interest rate on the debt or demand immediate repayment. Consequently, some firms may use earnings-management techniques to increase earnings to avoid such covenant violations. On the other hand, some other firms have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too profitable. For example, if gasoline prices have been increasing significantly and oil companies are achieving record profit level, then there may be incentive for the government to intervene and enact an excess-profit tax or attempt to introduce price controls.2.3 To smooth earnings toward a long-term sustainable trendFor many years it has been believed that a firm should attempt to reduce the volatility in its earnings stream in order to maximize share price. Because a highly violate earning pattern indicates risk, therefore thestock will lose value compared to others with more stable earnings patterns. Consequently, firms have incentives to manage earnings to help achieve a smooth and growing earnings stream (Ortega and Grant, 2003).2.4 Meeting the bonus plan requirementsHealy (1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction that is consistent with maximizing executives’ earnings-based bonus. When earnings will be below the minimum level required to earn a bonus, then earning are managed upward so that the minimum is achieved and a bonus is earned. Conversely, when earning will be above the maximum level at which no additional bonus is paid, then earnings are managed downward. The extra earnings that will not generate extra bonus this current period are saved to be used to earn a bonus in a future period.。
清算企业的盈余管理【外文翻译】
外文文献翻译原文：Earnings Management Using Discontinued Operations When making firm-valuation decisions, investors place a higher value on items of income expected to be persistent in the future. Presumably to aid users’ valuation decisions, GAAP generally requires that material nonrecurring items be separately disclosed in the financial statements. However, the separation of net income into recurring and nonrecurring components also gives managers the opportunity to mislead investors, by misclassifying income and expense items. For example, a manager wanting to increase firm valuation can misclassify recurring expenses as nonrecurring, misleading investors as to the persistence of the income increase. In the accounting literature, this type of earnings management is called classification shifting.McVay _2006_ discusses two reasons why classification shifting can be a relatively low-cost method for managing earnings. First, unlike accrual management or real activity manipulation, there is no “settling-up” in the f uture for past earnings management. If a manager decides to increase earnings using income-increasing accruals, then, at some point, these accruals must reverse. The reversal of these accruals reduces future reported earnings. If a manager decides to increase earnings by managing real activities, such as reducing research and development expenditures, then this likely leads to fewer income-producing projects and reduced earnings in the future. In contrast, classification shifting involves simply reporting recurring expenses in a nonrecurring classification on the income statement, having no implications for future earnings. Second,because classification shifting does not change net income, it is potentially subject to less scrutiny by auditors and regulators than forms of earnings management that change net income.Discontinued operations represent the income and cash flows of a portion of a company that has been _or will be_ discontinued from the continuing operations of the company. Under SFAS No. 144, the gain or loss for discontinued operations is comprised of three amounts. The first amount is the operating income or loss from theoperations of the component being discontinued for the entire year in which the decision to discontinue is made. The second amount is the gain or loss from disposal, which is the net amount realized over the carrying value of net assets of the component. The third amount is an impairment loss on the “assets held for sale” if the component is not disposed in the same year as the decision to discontinue.5 The results of discontinued operations are reported on the income statement as a separate item _net of tax effects_ after income from continuing operations. The “below the line” reporting of disposals as discontinued operations is likely perceived to be desirable for investors, because it communicates to them the results of a firm’s operations on a “with and without” basis. However, it could be detrimental to investors if managers use their reporting discretion to manage earnings when reporting discontinued operations. For example, managers could allocate normal operating expenses to discontinued operations in order to report increased income from continuing operations. Managers have discretion over the allocation of joint costs between continuing and discontinued operations, and this information is not normally available to external investors. It is doubtful that auditors would detect this manipulation during their analytical review because the company’s financial ratios would be sim ilar to what they were previously.The ability of asset disposals to be classified as discontinued operations has varied throughout time. Under APB Opinion No. 30 _APB 1973_, only dispositions of business “segments” were able to qualify for reporting as discontinued operations. In general, business segments were defined as a major line of business or a customer class. The FASB believed that investors would benefit from expanded application of the accounting and disclosure rules of discontinued operations and issued SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets _FASB 2001a_. SFAS No. 144 reduced the threshold for recognition of discontinued operations treatment by introducing the “component of an entity” concept. A component of an entity is distinguishable from the rest of the entity because it has its own clearly defined operations and cash flows. A component of an entity can be a reportable segment, an operating segment _as defined by SFAS No. 131, FASB 1997_, a reporting unit _as defined by SFAS No. 142, FASB 2001b_, a subsidiary, or an asset group. Thisreduction in the threshold for discontinued operations has allowed for more asset disposals to be classified as discontinued operations. Consequently, the FASB may have inadvertently given managers more discretion to manage earnings, potentially reducing the quality of reported earnings.In addition to the “component of an entity” requirement, SFAS No. 144 mandated two other requirements for an asset disposal to qualify for treatment as a discontinued operation. The first requirement is that the operations and cash flows of the component being disposed are completely separable from the seller’s continuing operations. The second requirement is that the seller has no significant involvement with the component after the sale. In theory, the application of these requirements appears straightforward; however, SFAS No. 144 did not clearly define the meaning of significant involvement. In practice, many asset disposals involve contractual terms: seller financing, retained equity by the seller, royalties paid to the seller by the buyer, service agreements, etc. The inclusion of these terms in the asset-disposal contract could be interpreted as significant involvement by the seller. In order to provide better guidance on the meaning of the term “significant involvement,” the FASB issued EITF 03-13 _FASB 2004_ as a guide for determining whether an entity retains significant involvement or receives cash flows. In short, if a firm receives material direct cash flows from the discontinued operations or maintains significant continuing involvement, then the disposal does not qualify as a discontinued operation. EITF 03-13 took effect in 2005 but could be adopted as early as 2004. It should be noted that, while the recognition criteria for discontinued operations are well defined in GAAP, the costs to be allocated to the discontinued operations are not. Accounting treatment for discontinued operations is also a global accounting issue. Similar to APB No. 30, IFRS 5, Non-Current Assets Held-for-Sale and Discontinued Operations _IASB 2004_ defines a discontinued operation as a separate major line of business or geographical area of operations. IFRS 5 also requires detailed disclosure of revenue, expenses, pre-tax profit or loss, and the related income tax expense, either in the notes or on the face of the income statement. Currently, both the FASB and the IASB are working toward a converged accounting definition and treatment for discontinued operations, with bothboards issuing proposals amending SFAS No. 144 and IFRS 5, respectively.In closing, material asset disposals are reported on the income statement as discontinued operations if they meet the requirements of SFAS No. 144 _or APB No.30 for disposals prior to 2002_ and likely reported as special items if they do not. Either income statement classification gives managers the opportunity to engage in classification shifting. Prior research provides evidence that special items are used for classification shifting. Since the recognition criteria for discontinued operations are better defined in the accounting standards than for special items, this may give managers less flexibility to manage earnings using classification shifting. For example, it may not be possible for managers to time the recognition of discontinued operations to coincide with a period during which earnings management is desired. Consequently, whether managers use discontinued operations for earnings management purposes is an empirical.Earnings management is one of the most studied areas in financial accounting research.Previous studies document that earnings management can be carried out through accrual management_e.g., Dechow et al.1995; Payne and Robb 2000_, real activity management _e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006_,8 or classification shifting _Ronen and Sadan 1975; Barnea et al. 1976; McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010_. However, increasing current earnings using the former two methods has the potential of reducing future earnings. Since classification shifting simply moves certain revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to different line items on the income statement, it does not actually change net income. As a result, classification shifting is likely to be less costly and less scrutinized by auditors and regulators _Nelson et al. 2002_.9 Previous studies have largely focused on earnings management using accruals and real activity management. Relatively few studies have examined earnings management through classification shifting.Ronen and Sadan _1975_ contend that the dimensions and objects of income smoothing are closely associated. They also reason that, if the smoothing object is net income, then classification shifting is irrelevant. However, if the smoothing object is any income subtotal other than “bottomline”net income, then managers have anincentive to engage in classification shifting. This begs the question of which income subtotals interest investors. Lipe _1986_ documents that investors understand the future earnings implications between the different earnings components reported on the income statement. Bradshaw and Sloan _2002_ provide evidence of “street earnings” _i.e., modified-GAAP earnings with noncash and nonrecurring items excluded_ replacing GAAP earnings as one of the primary determinants of stock price. Together, these studies provide evidence of investors’ interest in recurring income subtotals rather than “bottom line” net income that includes nonrecurring items. If investors value recurring earnings higher than nonrecurring earnings, then managers have an incentive to misclassify operating expenses as nonrecurring expenses, to increase recurring income subtotals. Although one cannot observe which income statement subtotals investors use, we follow McVay _2006_ in assuming that core earnings is the managed subtotal. However, using discontinued operations to increase core earnings also increases income from continuing operations and other “above-the-line” earnings subtotals.One of the earliest studies in the area of classification shifting is Ronen and Sadan _1975_. They find evidence consistent with managers using extraordinary items to smooth earnings before extraordinary items. Barnea et al. _1976_ extend this line of research by providing evidence that managers also use extraordinary items to smooth operating income. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that managers are interested in managing multiple income statement subtotals, presumably because investors value various income statement subtotals differently. While the above studies provide evidence of earnings management using “below the line” income statement items, they do not examine the motivations behind classification shifting.Kinney and Trezevant _1997_ investigate whether managers use special items opportunistically to manage both earnings and investors’ perceptions. They find that income-decreasing special items are more likely to be reported as line items on the income statement, presumably to call attention to the transitory nature of the earnings decrease caused by these items. They also find that income-increasing special items are more likely to be reported in the footnotes to the financial statements, presumably toshift attention away from the transitory nature of the earnings increase caused by these items. Their findings suggest that managers behave opportunistically when disclosing special items. However, Riedl and Srinivasan _2010_ further examine managers’ reporting behavior regarding special items. They find that special items separately disclosed on the income statement have a lower persistence than special items disclosed in the financial statement footnotes. Their results are consistent with managers using financial statement presentation to assist investors in evaluating the persistence of special items. This evidence offers an alternative explanation for the managerial opportunism detected by Kinney and Trezevant _1997_.McVay _2006_ investigates whether managers engage in classification shifting, by reporting core expenses in income-decreasing special items. She uses an expectation model to separate core earnings, defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization, into expected and unexpected components. She finds special items are positively associated with contemporaneous unexpected core earnings and negatively associated with the unexpected change in future core earnings. These results are consistent with her hypothesis that managers shift operating expenses to special items. Sh e also provides evidence suggesting that managers’ motivation for classification shifting is to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. In addition, she finds a negative stock price reaction to the reversal of unexpected core earnings, indicating that investors do not understand _or are not able to fully undo_ the earnings management. One drawback to the core earnings expectation model used by McVay _2006_ is the use of contemporaneous accruals _including accruals related to special items_ as a control for firm performance. The inclusion of special item accruals in the expectation model creates a potential bias in favor of her hypotheses. She acknowledges the reliance on an imperfect model is a limitation of her study.Fan et al. _2010_ extends McVay’s _2006_ co re earnings expectation models by controlling for performance using returns and lagged returns rather than contemporaneous accruals, thus eliminating any potential bias. They confirm McVay’s _2006_ findings that managers shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items. Using quarterly data, they find that classification shifting using income-decreasingspecial items is more prevalent in the fourth quarter than in other quarters. They also find that classification shifting is more prevalent when managers are constrained from using income-increasing accruals.Source:Michael Power. Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of reliability[J]. Accounting and Business Research 2010.11(4) :197-210译文清算企业的盈余管理企业往往喜欢高估账面价值，吸引投资者对其投资。
盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]
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外文翻译Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish AbstractAn issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of these studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals.I trace the explosive growth in accrual-based management research to three likely causes. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if earnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actions intended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Consequently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypotheses that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are used to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Because extant models of expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in fact occur.Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I raise three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do researchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to raise external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along those lines, I have chosen to present the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increase and decrease earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increase or to decrease earnings, and in Section 6, I present conclusions and suggestions for future work.2. Earnings Management2.1 DefinitionsNotice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no consensus on what is earnings management. There have been at least three attempts at defining earnings management:(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).(2) Managing earnings is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).A lack of consensus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus useful to compare the above three definitions.All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within thecontext of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leases). However, the second definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the second definition arises if readers interpret any real decisions - including those implying that managers forego profitable opportunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.There are two perspectives on earnings management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, and the information perspective, first enunciated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), under which managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s future cash flows. Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information perspective.2.2 Incidence of earnings managementIf one believes former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), earnings management is widespread, at least among public companies, as they face pressure to meet analysts’ expectations. Earnings management is also widespread if one relies on analytical arguments. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that the existence of relative performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect competitor firms to manage earnings. Similar prisoner’s dilemma-like arguments for the existence of earnings management appear in Erickson and Wang (1999) in the context of mergers and Shivakumar (2000) in the context of seasoned equity offerings.At the other extreme, we can only be certain that earnings have indeed been managed, when the judicial system, in cases that are brought by the SEC or the Department of Justice, resolves that earnings management has occurred. While it is likely that earnings management occurs more frequently than is observed from judicial actions, it is not clear to me that earnings management is pervasive: it seems implausible that firms face the same motivations to manage earnings over time. Aslater discussed, much of the evidence of earnings management is dependent on firm performance, suggesting that earnings management is more likely to be present when a firm’s performance is either unusually good or unusually bad.3. Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings ManagementI discuss four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management:(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider trading. The first two sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory research and the last two sources are explicitly described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in the SEC’s accounting enforcement actions, and have been investigated in recent research.3.1 Debt CovenantsDebt contracts are an important theme in financial accounting research as lenders often use accounting numbers to regulate firms’ activities,e,g. by requiring that certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and financing activities.The linkage between accounting numbers and debt contracts has been used in studies investigation (i) why economic consequences are observed when firms comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash flow impact，(ii) the determinants of accounting choice and managers’ exercise of discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations.The results of economic consequences studies have generally been mixed and researchers recently turned to investigating accounting choice in firms that experience actual technical default (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994；and De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1994). The idea is to increase the power of the tests by focusing on a sample where the effect of violating debt covenants is likely to be more noticeable. While some of the evidence suggests that managers take income increasing actions delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), other evidence does not (Beneish and Press,1993; DeAngelo,DeAngelo and Skinner,1994). Further, it is not clear such actions actually are sufficient to delay default. Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large sample of private debt agreements, andmeasuring firms’ closeness to current ratio and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. They suggest that manag ers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant default.3.2 Compensation AgreementsStudies examining the bonus hypothesis (Healy, 1985；Gaveretal, 1995; and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan, 1995) provide evidence consistent with managers altering reported earnings to increase their compensation. Except for Healy (1985)，these studies provide evidence consistent with managers decreasing reported earnings to increase future compensation. In addition, Holthausen et al. (1995) finds little evidence that managers increase income and suggest that the income-increasing evidence in Healy (1985) is induced by his experimental design.3.3 Equity OfferingsA growing body of research examines managers’ incentives to increase reported income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between owners-managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public offerings, is recognized in prior research.Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. (1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to estimate managers’ exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security offerings.Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the puzzling behavior of post-issuance stock prices. Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) study earnings management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) do so in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of earnings management using Jones like models around the time of the security issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and returns performance. The results in these studies suggest that marketparticipants fail to understand the valuation implications of unexpected accruals. While the results are compelling, the conclusion that intentional earnings management at the time of security issuance successfully misleads investors is premature. Beneish (1998b, p.210) expresses reservations about generalizing such a conclusion as follows: “First, the conclusion implies that financial statement fraud is pervasive at the time of issuance. To explain; fraud is defined by the National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993, p.6) as one or more intentional acts designed to deceive other persons and cause them financial loss." If financial statement fraud at issuance is pervasive - e.g. managers are successful in misleading investors. I would expect that firms would fare poorly post-issuance in terms of litigation brought about by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), disgruntled investors, and the plaintiff’s bar. I would also expect managers to fare poorly post-issuance in terms of wealth and employment. I would find evidence of post-issue consequences on firms and managers informative about the existence of at-issue intentional earnings management to mislead investors and believe these issues are worthy of future research.译文盈余管理：一种普遍现象资料来源: 财务管理作者：Messod D. Beneish 摘要：会计研究的核心问题是在某种程度上管理者为了自己的利益而改变报表上的收入。
企业盈余管理的文献综述
企业盈余管理的文献综述企业盈余管理是指企业通过核算处理和调整财务报表上的盈余，以达到一定的目标或满足特定的需求。
它是企业财务管理的重要组成部分，对于企业的经营和发展起着重要的作用。
本文将综述一些关于企业盈余管理的文献，包括其定义、目标、方法和影响等方面的研究。
关于企业盈余管理的定义，文献中给出了不同的解释。
根据Brigham和Ehrhardt （2013）的观点，企业盈余管理是指企业通过调整营业收入和费用的计提方式，使得财务报表上的利润更好地符合预期的情况。
而Scott（2013）则将企业盈余管理定义为一种利用会计方法和政策来调整财务报表上的利润和盈余水平的行为。
在企业盈余管理的目标方面，不同的文献提出了不同的观点。
根据Roychowdhury （2006）的研究，企业盈余管理的主要目标是为了提高企业的股价和市值，从而为股东创造经济利益。
而Zang（2012）则认为，企业盈余管理的目标是为了满足不同内外部利益相关者的需求，包括股东、管理层、债权人等。
在企业盈余管理的方法方面，文献中提出了多种不同的方法。
其中一种常见的方法是调整盈余的计提时间和计提规模。
Watts和Zimmerman（1986）的研究发现，在公司退出IPO （首次公开募股）后，会计师会通过调整计提方式和时间，来降低盈余的波动性，并提高股价表现。
另一种方法是通过调整会计政策和估计来管理盈余。
企业可以选择更加保守的会计政策和估计，以降低盈余风险和波动性（Healy和Wahlen，1999）。
企业盈余管理对企业的影响也是研究的重要方面。
文献中发现，企业盈余管理既有可能带来正面影响，也有可能带来负面影响。
一方面，企业通过盈余管理可以使财务报表更准确地反映企业的经营情况和财务状况，提高财报的可靠性，有助于投资者和利益相关者做出更好的决策（Healy和Palepu，2001）。
过度的盈余管理可能会导致信息不对称和不可靠的财报，降低投资者对企业的信任度（Graham，2004）。
外文翻译--德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS 外文出处 European Accounting Review外文作者 Tendeloo, B.V., and Vanstraelen, A原文：Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS AbstractThis paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management.1. IntroductionThe International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards to be adopted inthe world’s major capital markets.Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. This paper contributes to this debate by examining whether the adoption of high quality standards like IFRS is associated with high financial reporting quality. In particular, we question whether IFRS are sufficient to override managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management and affect the quality of reported earnings.Previous research provides evidence that the magnitude of earnings management is on average higher in code-law countries with low investor protection rights, compared to common-law countries with high investor protection rights (Leuz et al., 2003). Hence, to assess whether firms that report under IFRS can be associated with higher earnings quality we focus on Germany, which is a code-law country with relatively low investor protection rights (La Portal et al.,2000). Moreover, a relatively large number of German companies have already voluntarily chosen to adopt IFRS prior to 2005. This allows a comparison between companies that have adopted IFRS versus companies that report under domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).The results of our research show that IFRS do not impose a significant constraint on earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. On the contrary, adopting IFRS seems to increase the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Our results further suggest that companies that have adopted IFRS engage more in earnings smoothing, although this effect is significantly reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor. However, hidden reserves, which are allowed under German GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely picked up by the traditional accruals measures. When hidden reserves are taken into consideration, our results show that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. Hence, our results indicate that adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management. This finding suggests that the adoption of high quality standards is not a sufficient condition for providing high quality information in code-law countries with low investor protection rights.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and provide the theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 provides an overview of the German accounting system. In Section 4, we formulate the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research design. The results of thestudy are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize our results, discuss the implications and limitations of our analysis and give suggestions for further research.2. Previous Literature2.1. Adoption of International Accounting StandardsThe International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was established in 1973 and now renamed as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), aims to achieve uniformity in the accounting standards used by businesses and other organizations for financial reporting around the world (IASB website). The benefits of the adoption of international accounting standards are considered to be the following. First, it should improve the ability of investors to make informed financial decisions and eliminate confusion arising from different measures of financial position and performance across countries, thereby leading to a reduced risk for investors and a lower cost of capital for companies. Second, it should lower costs arising from multiple reporting. Third, it should encourage international investment. Finally, it should lead to amore efficient allocation of savings worldwide (Street et al., 1999).The original International Accounting Standards were mostly descriptive in nature and contained many alternative treatments. Because of this flexibility and a continuing lack of comparability across countries, the standards came under heavy criticism in the late 1980s. In response to this criticism, the IASC started the Comparability Project in 1987. The revised standards, which became effective in 1995, substantially reduced the alternative treatments and increased the disclosure requirements (Nobes, 2002). In July 1995, the IASC and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) agreed to a list of accounting issues that needed to be addressed for obtaining IOSCO’s endorsement of the standards. The subsequent Core Standards Project led again to substantial revisions of IAS. In May 2000, the IASC received IOSCO’s endorsement subject to ‘reconciliation where necessary to address subs tantive outstanding issues at a national or regional level’ (IOSCO Press Release, 17 May 2000). The Core Standards Project has brought a wider recognition to IAS around the world. For example, the European Parliament has issued a regulation (1606/2002/EC) requiring all EU listed companies to prepare consolidated financial statements based on InternationalAccounting Standards by 2005. In a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italyand Switzerland, companies were already permitted to prepare consolidated financial statements under IFRS (or US GAAP) prior to 2005.Since German accounting standards and disclosure practices have been criticized in the investor community (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), a relatively large number of German firms have adopted international accounting standards such as IFRS or US GAAP. This switch is thought to represent a substantial commitment to transparent financial reporting for the following two reasons. First, IFRS adoption itself might effectively enhance financial reporting quality. Second, firms which adopt IFRS or US GAAP might do so because they have higher incentives to report transparently, such as high financing needs. In this case, IFRS serves as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. A study conducted by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) with Swiss data reveals that early adopters of IFRS ‘are larger, more internationally diversified, less capital intensive and have a more diffuse ownership’. They argue that the decision to apply IFRS is primarily influenced by political costs and pressures from outside markets. Murphy (1999) also used Swiss data to study the determinants of the adoption of IFRS. She found that companies that adopt IFRS have a higher percentage of foreign sales and a higher number of foreign exchange listings. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) found the same relationships using data from various countries. In addition, they concluded that being domiciled in an EU country and having a lower debt to equity ratio is positively associated with the adoption of IFRS. Other determinants of the adoption of international standards mentioned in the literature include a high profitability, the issuance of equity during the year of adoption, domestic GAAP differing significantly from IFRS or US GAAP and, related to the latter, being domiciled in a country with a bank-oriented financial system (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).Not all companies that seek the international investment status that comes with the adoption of IFRS are, however, willing to fulfill all of the requirements and obligations involved. According to a study by Street and Gray (2002) there is a significant non-compliance with IFRS in 1998 company reports, especially in the case of IFRS disclosure requirements. With the revision of IAS 1, effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, financial statements are prohibited from noting compliance with International Accounting Standards ‘unless they comply with all the requirements of each applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing Interpretations Committee’.All companies included in our IFRS sample mention IFRS compliance in their financial statements after the revised IAS 1 became effective. Nevertheless, adopters of IFRS that appear to be fully compliant might as well be falsely signaling to be of high quality. Ball et al. (2000) argue that firms’ incentives to comply with accounting standards depend on the penalties assessed for non-compliance.When costs of complying to IFRS are viewed to exceed the costs of noncompliance, substantial non-compliance will continue to be a problem. While the main objective of adopting IFRS is considered to be enhancing the quality of the information provided in the financial statements, Ball et al. (2003) further suggest that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information but not a sufficient condition. If the adoption of IFRS cannot be associated with significantly higher financial reporting quality, IFRS adoption cannot serve as a signaling instrument for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. This study addresses this issue empirically.2.2. Earnings Management: Incentives and ConstraintsOne way of assessing the quality of reported earnings is examining to what extent earnings are managed, with the intention to ‘either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for earnings management, either through accounting decisions or structuring transactions, are ample. Managers may be inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of explicit and impli cit contracts, the firm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the political and regulatory environment or several other specific circumstances (Vander Bauwhede, 2001).A number of studies suggest that the quality of reported financial statement information is in large part determined by the underlying economic and institutional factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives. According to Ball et al. (2000) the demand for accounting income differs systematically between common-law and code-law countries. In common-law countries, which are characterized by arm’s length debt and equity markets, a diverse base of investors, high risk of litigation and strong investor protection, accounting information is designed to meet the needs of investors. In code-law countries, capital markets are less active. Investor protection is weak, litigation rates are lower and companies are more financed by banks, other financial institutions and the government, which results in less need for publicdisclosure. Accounting information is therefore designed more to meet other demands, including reduction in political costs and determination of income tax and dividend payments (Ball et al., 2000; La Portaet al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more prevalent in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. The benefits (e.g.enhanced liquidity) of engaging in earnings management appear to outweigh the costs (e.g. litigation) more in countries with weak investor protection rights. Firms which adopt IFRS, however, can be expected to have incentives to report investor-oriented information and thus engage significantly less in earnings management than non-adopters. On the other hand, low enforcement and low litigation risk might encourage low quality firms to falsely signal to be of high quality by adopting IFRS. This study addresses the question whether adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management in Germany, which La Porta et al. (2000) classify as a country with low investor protection rights.Accounting rules can limit a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings. But the extent to which accounting rules influence reported earnings and curb earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz et al., 2003). Apart from clear accounting standards, strong investor and creditor protection requires a statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective sanctions.A number of studies have shown that Big 4 auditors constitute a constraint on earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, the results of Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002) and Francis and Wang (2003) document that the constraint constituted by a Big 4 auditor on earnings management is not uniform across countries. Street and Gray (2002) find support for the fact that being audited by a large audit firm is also positively associated with IFRS compliance, both in the case of disclosure requirements as in the case of measurement and presentation requirements. In this respect, we question whether adoption of IFRS by a company has a stronger effect on the quality of earnings of that company when audited by a Big 4 audit firm.Source: Tendeloo, B.V. and Vanstraelen, A. Earnings management under German GAAP versus IFRS [J]. European Accounting Review, 2005, 14(1): 155-180.译文：德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理摘要：这篇论文阐述的问题是盈余管理的降低是否与国际财务报告准则（IFRS）的自愿采用有关。
企业盈余管理文献综述与动机方法
企业盈余管理文献综述与动机方法企业盈余管理是企业为了改变其财务报表盈余水平而进行的策略性决策行为。
企业盈余管理对企业的财务状况、股价波动、投资者决策等都有重要影响，因此一直是财务会计研究的热点之一。
本文综述了相关的文献研究，并探讨了企业盈余管理的动机方法。
在盈余管理的文献研究中，有一些研究关注企业盈余管理的意义和影响。
DuCharme, H.C., Malatesta, P. H., & Sefcik, S. E. (2001)通过对股权结构的研究发现，拥有大量散户股东的公司更容易进行盈余管理，因为散户更容易被盈余信息影响。
Bernard, V. L., & Skinner, D. J. (1996)则发现，盈余管理对公司盈利性和股票回报率都有显著影响。
这些研究表明企业盈余管理在影响财务状况和投资者决策方面起到了重要的作用。
另一些研究则从动机的角度探讨企业为何进行盈余管理。
Healy, P. M. (1985)将企业盈余管理的动机分为两类：合规动机和管理层个人动机。
合规动机是指企业为了符合会计准则和规范进行的盈余管理，而管理层个人动机则是指管理层为了自身利益进行的盈余管理。
这些动机使得企业在报告盈余时存在一定的主观性和创造性，从而影响了盈余管理的结果。
盈余管理的具体方法也是研究的重点之一。
Jones, J. J. (1991)提出了一种常用的方法，即操纵公司账面盈余来达到盈余管理的目的。
他认为，企业可以通过调整收入确认时机、调整费用计提时机和调整会计估计等方式来操纵盈余。
还有一些研究探讨了盈余管理与公司治理、审计质量等因素的关系。
Francis, J. R., & Philbrick, D. R. (1993)发现，公司治理结构较差的公司更容易进行盈余管理。
盈余管理与董事会角色 会计学专业毕业设计外文文献翻译
盈余管理与董事会角色会计学专业毕业设计外文文献翻译外文翻译：盈余管理与董事会角色——以马来西亚公司为例马来西亚国民大学经济管理学院会计系43600 班吉译文正文：摘要马来西亚公司引入公司治理守则来改善董事会，审计委员会和外聘审计的监控职能，这项研究从他们的盈余管理动机角度评估了一些董事会特征对于监控管理行为的作用，我们发现可操纵应计利润作为盈余管理的“代理人”是跟管理权负相关的的，同时，它又在控制大小、杠杆、性能以后与CEO-主席双重性正相关。
结果表明多个董事因素与盈余管理代理仅仅在负未管理盈利上是负相关的。
这说明多个董事因素对于检测盈余管理实践以避免损失是能起到积极作用的。
数据研究还证明独立董事成员比例在二双重地位方面对盈余管理作用不大。
1.概要在1997年亚洲金融危机以后，商界开始质疑公司治理机制在组织内部的作用。
继金融危机以后，两个有名的案例——2001年的安然事件和2002年的世通公司事件亦出现。
于是，很多人相信，现用的公司治理机制不足以通过盈余管理操作对管理者的效用最大化行为提供足够的控制作用。
为改善公司治理机制的监控作用，马来西亚公司于1999年起草了公司治理守则，并在随后的2000年得到财政部的认可。
该守则概述了一些董事会，审计委员会和外部审计师在维护股东的权益时在结构和运作过程中的必备条件。
这篇研究在马来西亚监管和商业环境下探讨董事会在减少盈余管理操作中的作用。
本文调查一些董事会特征并且评估这些特征是否与盈余管理操作相关。
与之前的研究相比，本文试图确定在何种程度上董事会可以限制在有双重角色地位的公司里盈余管理的发生率，而不讨论没有双重角色地位的公司情况。
在这里，我们采纳了黑利和沃伦（1999:368）对盈余管理的定义：“盈余管理是指管理者在财务报告和交易结构里使用判断来改变财务报告以达到误导一部分股东低估公司经济收益或者影响那些依靠报告的财务数据的合同结果之目的。
”在马来西亚，这方面的数据尚且匮乏。
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ReviewofAccountingStudies,3,7–34(1998)8ARYA,GLOVERANDSUNDER
Nevertheless,theRPisindirectlyusefulinstudyingearningsmanagement.WecanlooktoviolationsoftheRP’sassumptionstoclassifyearningsmanagementstories.Thesecondcontributionofourpaperistobringouttheinterrelationshipsamongvariousearningsmanagementstories.SincemultiplesimultaneousviolationsoftheassumptionsoftheRPareplausible,anysingleexplanationofearningsmanagement(includingourown)isunlikelytobetheexplanationofthephenomenon.Twoofthebetterknownformsofearningsmanagementare“smoothing”and“bigbath.”Forexample,inestimatingtheirbaddebtallowance,companiesmightbetemptedtoprovideagenerousallowanceingoodyearsandskimpinleanyearsinordertosmooththestreamofreportedearnings.3Incontrast,thebigbathhypothesissuggeststhatmanagersundertake
incomedecreasingdiscretionaryaccrualsinleanyears.Perhapsmanagersbelievethatoneverypoorperformancereportisnotasharmfulasseveralmediocreperformancereports.Ithasbeensuggestedthatbigbathsoftenoccurundertheguiseofrestructuringcharges(see,forexample,ElliottandShaw(1988))andmaycoincidewithtopmanagementtransition.Thepastthirtyyearshaveseenanintensiveefforttotrytodocumenttheexistenceandnatureofearningsmanagementinfielddataandtobuildformalmodelsinwhichman-agementofearningsarisesendogenouslyasaconsequenceofrationalchoicemadebyutility-maximizingeconomicagents.Datagatheredfromfinancialreportsofcorporationshavebeenscrutinizedforfingerprintsofopportunisticmanagerialmanipulationwithonlymixedresults(see,forexample,Archibald(1967),Bartov(1993),Copeland(1968),Cush-ing(1969),DeAngelo(1986),DeAngelo,DeAngelo,andSkinner(1994),Dechow,Sloan,andSweeney(1995),Gordan,Horwitz,andMeyers(1966),Healy(1985),LibertyandZim-merman(1986),LysandSivaramakrishnan(1988),McNicholsandWilson(1988),RonenandSadan(1981)).4Someofthereasonsgivenfortheweakandinconsistentempiricalresultsare:(1)useofunreliableempiricalsurrogatesformanagedandunmanagedportionsofearnings,(2)thefocusofmostempiricalstudiesononeaccountinginstrumentofearningsmanagementatatime,(3)anarrowinterpretationofearningsmanagement,and(4)managers’incentivestocovertheirtracks(Sunder,1997,pp.74–78).Ourpapersuggeststwomore:(5)ownersmayhaveincentivestomakeiteasyformanagerstohideinformationand(6)twoormoreindependentconditionsthatinduceearningsmanagementmayexistsimultaneously,causingstudiesthatfocusonasingleconditiontoyieldnoisyresults.Ourlimitedcommitmentexplanationforearningsmanagementisbasedontheideaof“at-will”employmentcontracts.Theirimplementationdependsentirelyonthewillingnessofthepartiestocontinuetosubjectthemselvestotheirterms.Eachemploymentcontractisbetweenanownerandamanager.Weassumetheownercannotcommittoapolicyregardingfiring/retentiondecisions.Also,themanagercannotcommittostayingwiththefirm.Thisisconsistentwithobservedemploymentcontractswhichoftenspecifybroadtermsandobjectives,butrarelyspecifytheexactcircumstancesunderwhichtheemployeecanquitorbedismissed(MilgromandRoberts,1992,p.330;Sunder,1997,p.40).Therearebenefitsandcostsassociatedwithdismissingamanager.Thebenefitstotheownerarethat(1)thethreatofdismissalforbadoutcomesprovidesthemanagerwithincentivestoreducetheprobabilityofbadoutcomesthroughhisactions,and(2)dismissalallowstheownertoreplaceamanagerwhoisknowntohaveperformedpoorlywithanotherEARNINGSMANAGEMENT9fromthepoolofcandidateswhoseexpectedproductivityisgreater.Becausetheownercannotcommittothedismissaldecision,shewillfirethemanagerwheneveritisinherownexpostbestinterest.Fromanexanteperspectivethiscanresultinthemanagerbeingfiredtoooftenandthecostofthefiringoptionreducingthewelfareoftheowner.5,6Wecomparetheowner’spayoffunderasystemofunmanagedearnings(theownerherselfdirectlyandcostlesslyobservesearnings)toherpayoffunderasystemofmanagedearnings(earningsreportsprovidedbythemanagerthatmayormaynotbetruthful).Apropositionestablishesconditionsunderwhichtheownerprefersmanagedearningstounmanagedearnings.Themanagermanipulatesearningstoretainhisjobforaslongaspossible,andtheownerfindsthecoarseninganddelayofinformationthatoccursunderearningsmanipulationbeneficialasadevicethateffectivelycommitshertomakingfiringdecisionsthatarebetterfromanexanteperspective.7Wealsopresentanexampleinwhichmanagedearningsarecomparedtootherbench-marks.Theintentistohighlighttheparticularwayinwhichearningsmanagementcoarsensanddelaysinformation.Earningsmanagementleadstoatime-additiveaggregationofper-formancemeasures,whichpreventstheownerfromlearningthefirm’sperformanceintheshortrunbutallowshertodetectpersistentlypoorperformance.8FudenbergandTirole(1995)presentastorycloselyrelatedtoours.Intheirmodel(andours)themanagermanipulatesearningsinordertoavoid(delay)dismissal.However,intheFudenbergandTirolesetting,theownerprefersunmanagedearnings(ifavailable)tomanagedearnings.Thisisbecause,intheirsetting,themanagerdoesnotsupplyaproductiveinputandthemanager’scompensationisnotmodeled.Thebenefittotheownerofbeingabletofirethemanageristhepossibilityofremovinganunproductivemanager;thereisnodiscipliningbenefittofiringandnocosttofiring.9Shadesofourstorycanalsobefoundinbusinesspress.First,managerssometimesfindearningsmanagementusefulasawayoflimitingownerintervention.Forexample,Germanexecutiveshavebeendescribedasviewingsecretreservesasusefulinkeeping“gimlet-eyedshareholders[from]callingtheshots”(TheWallStreetJournal,1998).Thetraditional(German)viewhasbeenthattheirreportingstandards,whichallowforsuchhiddenreserves,encouragemanagerstofocusonthelong-runratherthantheshort-runperformanceoftheircompanies.Second,placingsomeboundsonownerinterventionisdesirableforthecompanyasawhole,andfortheownersthemselves.AnarticleinExecutiveExcellence(1997)describesoneoftheboard’srolesasthatofprovidingautonomy:“Boardsmustgiveorganizationmemberstheautonomytodotheirjobs.”Thepresumptionhereisthat,withoutacertaindegreeofautonomy,managementisnotabletoperformatitsbest.Ourstorylinksthesetwoviewsandaddsatimingperspective.Earningsmanagementisasubstitutefortheownerscommittingexantetoresistanytemptationtheymighthavetointerveneexpost.Thisexantecommitmentisusefulinattractingandmotivatingmanagers.Inourmodel,theownerintervenesthroughherdecisiontoretainorreplacethemanager.Alternatively,theboardmayrespondtothefirm’sshort-termpoorperformanceby“backseatdriving”withrespecttodecisionsnormallylefttotheCEO.Byallowingforearningsmanagement,theboardgivestheCEOmoreroomtoworkthingsout.InSection2.5ofthepaperwepresentanumericalexamplethatillustratestheroleearningsmanagementcanhaveinpreventingsuchownerintervention.Intheexample,ownerinterventionrenders