会计信息披露外文文献翻译
文献出处：Ebimobowei A. A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in the Annual Reports of Nigerian Companies [J]. Asian Journal of Business Management, 2011, 3(3): 145-151.原文A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in theAnnual Reports of Nigerian CompaniesAppah EbimoboweiAbstract: Social accounting is concerned with the development of measurement system to monitor social performance. It is rational assessment of and disclosure on some meaningful domain of companies’ activities that have social impact. Thi s study examines the practice of social accounting disclosure in Nigerian companies. Forty companies from eight sectors quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were randomly sampled. Data were collected from the annual reports of the companies’ for the perio d 2005 to 2007 and the level of disclosure is measured using content analysis and descriptive analysis. The paper found that 82.5% of the companies sampled present social accounting information in their annual reports. The results show that Nigerian companies prefer to disclose social accounting information in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the Accounts in the form of short qualitative information. Human resources, community involvement and environment were identified as the most popular themes. Hence, the paper recommends among others that companies should take social accounting as a moral duty; legislation for all companies to disclose social accounting information in Nigeria; social indicators to be developed at the national level in the area of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health care etc and professional accounting bodies in the country should collaborate to expand research in social accounting.Key words: Annual reports, social accounting, social disclosure, NigeriaINTRODUCTIONThe increasing need for every organization to disclose in their annual reports the various activities that affect the society is becoming a very fundamental issue all over the world mostly in developed economies, but this is not the case in developing countries like Nigeria. This is because organizations are particularly more interested in the profit maximization objective to the detriment of the society. According to Iyoha (2010), in developing countries, the concern is about how efficient organizations are in terms of how much profits are made and how much dividends are paid. No serious thoughts are given to social issues in the annual reports of organizations such as environmental protection, energy savings, fair business practice, and community involvements etc. Asechemie (1996) stress that the absence of financial data relating to actions and arrangements for social concern in Nigeria is not in accord with the trend in the USA, Europe and Canada where companies are required to report on the effect of compliance with laws governing corporate social conduct on capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position.The objective of this paper is to examine the social accounting disclosures in the annual reports of Nigerian companies. Therefore, the content of annual reports must provide information to users relating to social factors. As Mathews (2002) suggested in his study, documenting and analyzing what is disclosed in the area of social accounting should be one of the feature of corporate social reporting. Hence, this study attempts to answer two main questions: (i) what are the most popular types of social accounting and how is social accounting disclosed in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria and (ii) where is the location of presentation of social accounting in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the theoretical and empirical literatures adopted for the study. Section three examines the methodology of the study; section four examines the findings and discussions while the last section deals with the conclusion and recommendations.Theories on corporate social accounting disclosure behavior:Gray et al. (1995) in Orij (2007) provided a much cited categorization of social accountingdisclosure studies. They talked about three broad classifications of decision usefulness studies, economic theory and social and political theory. The decision usefulness generally relates to the usefulness of accounting information, which is social accounting in this case. These studies are of two types, ranking of information on its perceived decision-usefulness in the financial community and investigations of information on effects on share prices. The economic theory studies are a periphery of agency theory and Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) research. The social and political theory focuses on legitimacy theory (LEGT) and stakeholder theory (STAKT). LEGT and STAKT are theories developed out of political economies. They are overlapping perspectives in a political-economic framework. In theoretical term, Guthrie and Parker (1990) also analyse their empirical evidence in relation to a socio-political economy theory of social disclosure and suggest that:a political economy theory of social disclosure is both viable and may contribute toward our understanding of observed developments in national reporting practices. Corporate social disclosures have appeared to reflect public social priorities, respond to government pressures, accommodate environmental pressures and sectional interests, and protect corporate prerogatives and projected corporate image.Prior empirical studies: A number of studies have been published on the subject of social accounting disclosure. A number of these rely on content analysis of annual reports. There are several different methods to the analysis of narratives in annual reports. Bettie et al. (2004) distinguish two categories: subjective (analyst ratings) and semi-objective (disclosure index studies, content analysis, readability studies and linguistic analysis). Content analysis has been selected for this study because it has been widely used in the accounting research, particularly in social accounting disclosure studies. Since this is the method of analysis in the present study, we limit our review to these studies. Table 1 summary the methodology, sample and main results of these studies.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONLevel of social accounting disclosure: Table 2 shows that 33 companies (82.5%) from various industry groupings made social accounting disclosures at least for oneyear in their annual reports. Analysis based on industry, showed that chemical and paints, construction and petroleum marketing had 100 percent disclosure of social accounting information. The lowest level of social accounting information was 66.7% contributed by Breweries and conglomerate while companies in the building materials (75%), food/beverages and tobacco (80%), and healthcare (83.3%) level of disclosure from year 2005 to 2007. Therefore, it can be deduced that there is a growing concern for companies reporting social performance in their financial statements.Form of social accounting disclosure: Table 3 shows that in 2005 75% of the companies disclose social accounting information using narrative/pictures and 25% disclose with monetary formats. The year 2006 81% used narrative and 19% used monetary format while in 2007 84% used narrative and 16% monetary format. However, there were also companies that used both narrative and monetary formats of disclosure. Many companies were also found to have used the monetary format to disclose human resource information and environmental contribution primarily related to retirement benefit, training and development and some community based projects such as adopting school, scholarships and donations.Location of social accounting disclosure: Table 4 shows that 4(12.12%) of the sampled companies (Appendix) disclose social accounting information in the chairman’s statement; 17(51.52%) disclose social accounting information in the directors report; 2(6.06%) in the statement of accounting policy; 10(30.30%) in the notes to the accounts. The paper discovers that Directors report is the most popular location where social accounting information is disclosed by companies in Nigeria and also the “notes to the accounts”. This result is also consistent with Mamman (2004) study that Directors report is the most preferred location of social accounting information.Quantification of amount of social accounting disclosure:This study used only number of disclosure as the approach of capturing data through content analysis. Almost all companies disclosed social accounting information in short qualitative discussion and some have extended qualitative discussion where they have sections to disclose the social accounting information especially on human resources andcommunity based projects.Trend of social accounting disclosure: Table 5 shows the trend of social accounting disclosures in Nigeria. Twelve (12) companies representing (36.36%) reveals that human resources is the trend of social accounting disclosure in the annual report; two companies representing (6.06%) says the trend is fair business practice; nine (9) companies representing (27.27%) suggests community development; three (3) companies representing (9.09%) reveals that the trend of social accounting is energy; five (5) companies representing (15.16%) in their annual reports disclosed that the trend is on the environment; and two (2) companies representing (6.06%) disclosed in their annual reports that the trends is on the organization’s products. The analysis therefore reveals that disclosure of social and environmental activities is specifically on the discretion of the companies.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONThe study examined social accounting disclosure for a three-year period from 2005 to 2007. The type of social accounting disclosure, form and location were identified in the annual reports of 40 companies. This covers eight sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study found that 82.5% of Nigerian Companies disclose one type or the other of social accounting information in their annual reports. These disclosures were voluntary in nature and largely qualitative; contrary to the developed and some developing countries. The most favoured places of disclosure are in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the account. The most popular theme that most companies disclose is human resources followed by community involvement and environment. Analysis done by industry found that the petroleum marketing, food/beverages and tobacco, chemicals and paints sectors provides a higher percentage of social accounting disclosure in Nigeria. Therefore, on the basis of the conclusion above, the following suggestions are provided by the researcher to improve the social accounting practice in Nigeria:﹒Companies should take social accounting disclosure as their moral duty; mere legislation would not solve the problem.﹒The government should provide some incentives like differentials in tax treatment, subsidies, rebates etc. so that companies can take social programmes.﹒Researchers should provide the basis and means of social accounting quantification as far as possible.﹒The government should put in place suitable legislation for all companies to compel them to make adequate disclosure of their activities to the society.﹒Professional institutes in the country like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria should work together for developing social accounting and reporting techniques.﹒Social indicators should be developed at the national level in the areas of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health education etc.译文会计信息披露，尼日利亚公司年度报告的实证研究阿帕·艾比莫泊威摘要：会计信息披露关系到对社会绩效监督的评估系统的发展。
会计外文翻译外文文献英文文献分析会计信息披露模式加强企业社会责任
会计外文翻译外文文献英文文献分析会计信息披露模式加强企业社会责任Company Document number：WUUT-WUUY-WBBGB-BWYTT-1982GT分析会计信息披露模式加强企业社会责任1摘要：企业社会责任(CSR)已经成为社会各界关注的焦点与压力的社会问题，因为我们都知道,会计报告和分析已成为加强企业社会责任的重要手段。
首先分析目前企业社会责任会计信息披露方面工作的现状和存在的问题的(CSRA)。
然后，提出外国可行的实践、内容、方法及未来的发展CSRA模式。
最后，构建适合中国企业社会责任信息披露的模式。
这个模式试图加强企业社会责任，促进中国企业的最终价值。
关键词：企业社会责任；会计信息披露；信息披露模式1、当前中国企业社会责任会计信息披露的现状及存在的问题随着我国经济建设的飞速发展，社会问题例如收入分配不公、日益增大的就业压力、资源浪费严重、环境恶化等日益突出。
特别是近年来，一些跨国公司要求中国企业在供应链环节中实施社会责任8000(SA8000)来加强中国企业的社会责任。
会计信息披露是一种加强企业社会责任的重要手段。
在中国，有关企业社会责任会计信息披露方面的研究始于1990年，但仍然没有比较完善的信息披露模式和系统的信息披露制度。
在实践中，一些公司试图披露社会责任信息。
但他们的内容不够完整、方式不够规范。
这使得无法通过企业社会责任会计信息披露来达到加强企业社会责任的目的。
我们可以看到，目前我国的社会责任会计信息披露模式研究还处在初级阶段，企业的社会责任会计信息披露还存在许多问题。
接下来会详细说明这个情况。
首先，企业披露的内容很不全面而且在不同企业之间差距较大。
现在很少有企业能全面披露社会责任信息。
许多公司只是说出自己对社会的贡献而不是不良社会影响。
此外，由于缺乏统一的标准，企业社会责任的内容差别很大。
在某种程度上大多数企业只是对企业社会责任信息披露敷衍了事以应对政策。
其次，企业社会责任会计信息披露方式单一。
会计准则外文文献翻译-财务会计专业
会计准那么外文文献及翻译-财务会计专业(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Buschhüter M, Striegel A. IAS 37 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets[M]// Kommentar Internationale Rechnungslegung IFRS. Gabler, 2021:955-974.英文原文Accounting Standard (AS) 37Contingent Liabilities and Contingent AssetsBuschhüter M, Striegel AThis International Accounting Standard was approved by the IASC Board in July 1998 and became effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.Introduction1. IAS 37 prescribes the accounting and disclosure for all provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets, except:(a) those resulting from financial instruments that are carried at fair value;(b) those resulting from executory contracts, except where the contract is onerous. Executory contracts are contracts under which neither party has performed any of its obligations or both parties have partially performed their obligations to an equal extent;(c) those arising in insurance enterprises from contracts with policyholders;(d) those covered by another International Accounting Standard. Provisions2. The Standard defines provisions as liabilities of uncertain timing or amount. A provision should be recognised when, and only when:(a) an enterprise has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event; (b) it is probable (i.e. more likely than not) that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation;(c) a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. The Standard notes that it is only in extremely rare cases that a reliable estimate will not be possible.3. The Standard defines a constructive obligation as an obligation that derives from an enterprise's actions where:(a) by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently specific current statement, the enterprise has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain responsibilities; (b) as a result, the enterprise has created a valid expectation on the part of those other parties that it will discharge those responsibilities.4. In rare cases, for example in a law suit, it may not be clear whether an enterprise has a present obligation. In these cases, a past event is deemed to give rise to a present obligation if, taking account of all available evidence, it is more likely than not that a present obligation exists at thebalance sheet date. An enterprise recognises a provision for that present obligation if the other recognition criteria described above are met. If it is more likely than not that no present obligation exists, the enterprise discloses a contingent liability, unless the possibility of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote.5. The amount recognized as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditu required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date, in other words, the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party at that time.6. The Standard requires that an enterprise should, in measuring a provision: (a) take risks and uncertainties into account. However, uncertainty does not justify the creation of excessive provisions or a deliberate overstatement of liabilities;(b) discount the provisions, where the effect of the time value of money is material, using a pre-tax discount rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current market assessments of the time value of money and those risks specific to the liability that have not been reflected in the best estimate of the expenditure. Where discounting is used, the increase in the provision due to the passage of time is recognised as an interest expense;(c) take future events, such as changes in the law and technological changes, into account where there is sufficient objective evidence thatthey will occur; and(d) not take gains from the expected disposal of assets into account, even if the expected disposal is closely linked to the event giving rise to the provision.7. An enterprise may expect reimbursement of some or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision (for example, through insurance contracts, indemnity clauses or suppliers' warranties). An enterprise should:(a) recognise a reimbursement when, and only when, it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the obligation. The amount recognised for the reimbursement should not exceed the amount of the provision; and(b) recognise the reimbursement as a separate asset. In the income statement, the expense relating to a provision may be presented net of the amount recognised for a reimbursement. 8. Provisions should be reviewed at each balance sheet date and adjusted reflect thecurrent best estimate. If it is no longer probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, the provisioshould be reversed.9. A provision should be used only for expenditures for which the provision was originally recognised.Provisions - Specific Applications10. The Standard explains how the general recognition and measurement requirements for provisions should be applied in three specific cases: future operating losses; onerous contracts; and restructurings. Contingent Liabilities11. An enterprise should not recognise a contingent liability. , unless the12. A contingent liability is disclosed, as required by paragraph 86possibility of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote.13. Where an enterprise is jointly and severally liable for an obligation, the part of tobligation that is expected to be met by other parties is treated as a contingentThe enterprise recognises a provision for the part of the obligation for which an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is probable, except in the extremely rare circumstances where no reliable estimate can be made.14. Contingent liabilities may develop in a way not initially expected. Therefore, theare assessed continually to determine whether an outflow of resources embodying probable. If it becomes probable that an outflow of economic benefits has become future economic benefits will be required for an item previously dealt with as a contingent liability, a provision is recognised in the financial statements of the period in which the change in probability occurs (except in the extremely rare circumstances where no reliable estimate can be made).Contingent Assets15. An enterprise should not recognise a contingent asset.16. Contingent assets usually arise from unplanned or other unexpected events that give rise to the possibility of an inflow of economic benefits to the enterprise. An example is a claim that an enterprise is pursuing through legal processes, where the outcome is uncertain. 17. Contingent assets are not recognised in financial statements since this may result in the recognition of income that may never be realised. However, when the realisation of income is virtually certain, then the related asset is not a contingent asset and its recognition is appropriate. 18. A contingent asset is disclosed, as required by paragraph 89 economic benefits is probable.19. Contingent assets are assessed continually to ensure that developments are appropriately reflected in the financial statements. If it has become virtually certain that an inflow of economic benefits will arise, the asset and the related income are recognised in the financial statements of the period in which the change occurs. If an inflow of economic benefits has become probable, an enterprise discloses the contingent asset.Measurement20. The amount recognised as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date.21. The best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation is the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party at that time. It will often be impossible or prohibitively expensive to settle or transfer an obligation at the balance sheet date. However, the estimate of the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle or transfer the obligation gives the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date. 22. The estimates of outcome and financial effect are determined by the judgement of the management of the enterprise, supplemented by experience of similar transactions and, in some cases, reports from independent experts. The evidence considered23. Uncertainties surrounding the amount to be recognised as a provision are dealt with by various means according to the circumstances. Where the provision being measured involves a large population of items, the obligation is estimated by weighting all possible outcomes by their associated probabilities. The name for thistatistical method of estimation is 'expected value'. The provision will therefore be different depending on whether the probability of a loss of a given amount is, for example, 60 per cent or 90 per cent. Where there is a continuous range of possible outcomes, and each point in that range is as likely as any other, the mid-point of thrange is used. 24. Where a single obligation is beingmeasured, the individual most likely outcome may be the best estimate of the liability. However, even in such a case, the enterprise considers other possible outcomes. Where other possible outcomes are either mostly higher or mostly lower than the most likely outcome, the best estimate will be a higher or lower amount. For example, if an enterprise has to rectify a serious fault in a major plant that it has constructed for a customer, the individual most likely outcome may be for the repair to succeed at the first attempt at a cost of1,000, but a provision for a larger amount is made if there is a significant chance that further attempts will be necessary.25. The provision is measured before tax, as the tax consequences of the provision, , Income Taxes. and changes in it, are dealt with under IAS 12,Income Taxes.Risks and Uncertainties26. The risks and uncertainties that inevitably surround many events and the best estimate of a circumstances should be taken into account in reachin the best estmeate of a provision.27. Risk describes variability of outcome. A risk adjustment may increase the amount at which a liability is measured. Caution is needed in making judgements under conditions of uncertainty, so that income or assets are not overstated and expenses or liabilities are not understated. However, uncertainty does not justify the creation of excessive provisions or adeliberate overstatement of liabilities. For example, if the projected costs of a particularly adverse outcome are estimated on a prudent basis, that outcome is not then deliberately treated as more probable than is realistically the case. Care is needed to avoid duplicating adjustments for risk and uncertainty with consequent overstatement of a provision. Present Value28. Where the effect of the time value of money is material, the amount ofa provision should be the present value of the expenditures expected to be required to settle the obligation.29. The discount rate (or rates) should be a pre-tax rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the liability. The discount rate(s) should not reflect risks for which future cash flow estimates have been adjusted. Future Events 30. Future events that may affect the amount required to settle an obligation should be reflected in the amount of a provision where there is sufficient objective evidence that they will occur.31. Expected future events may be particularly important in measuring provisions. For example, an enterprise may believe that the cost of cleaning up a site at the end of its life will be reduced by future changes in technology. The amount recognised reflects a reasonable expectation of technically qualified, objective observers, taking account of all available evidence as to the technology that will be available at the time of theclean-up. Thus it is appropriate to include, for example, expected cost reductions associated with increased experience in applying existing technology or the expected cost of applying existing technology to a larger or more complex clean-up operation than has previously been carried out. However, an enterprise does not anticipate the new technology for cleaning up unless it is supported by development of a completel sufficient objective evidence.32. The effect of possible new legislation is taken into consideration in measuring an existing obligation when sufficient objective evidence exists that the legislation is virtually certain to beenacted. The variety of circumstances that arise in practice makes it impossible to specify a single event that will provide sufficient, objective evidence in every case. Evidence is required both of what legislation will demand and of whether it is virtually certain to be enacted and implemented in due course. In many cases sufficient objective evidence will not exist until the new legislation is enacted.Expected Disposal of Assets33. Gains from the expected disposal of assets should not be taken into account in measuring a provision.34. Gains on the expected disposal of assets are not taken into account in measuring a provision, even if the expected disposal is closely linked to the event giving rise to the provision. Instead, an enterprise recognisesgains on expected disposals of assets at the time specified by the International Accounting Standard dealing with the assets concerned. Reimbursements35. Where some or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision is expected to be reimbursed by another party, the reimbursement should be recognised when, and only when, it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the obligation. The reimbursement should be treated as a separate asset. The amount recognised for the reimbursement should not exceed the amount of the provision.36. In the income statement, the expense relating to a provision may be presented net of the amount recognised for a reimbursement.37. Sometimes, an enterprise is able to look to another party to pay part or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision (for example, through insurance contracts, indemnity clauses or suppliers' warranties). The other party may either reimburse amounts paid by the enterprise or pay the amounts directly.38. In most cases the enterprise will remain liable for the whole of the amount in question so that the enterprise would have to settle the full amount if the third party failed to pay for any reason. In this situation, a provision is recognised for the full amount of the liability, and a separate asset for the expected reimbursement is recognised when it is virtuallycertain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the liability.39. In some cases, the enterprise will not be liable for the costs in question if the third party fails to pay. In such a case the enterprise has no liability for those costs and they are not included in the provision.40. As noted in paragraph 29,severally liable is a contingent liability to the extent that it is expected that the obligation will be settled by the other parties.Changes in Provisions41. Provisions should be reviewed at each balance sheet date and adjusted to reflect the current best estimate. If it is no longer probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, the provision should be reversed.42. Where discounting is used, the carrying amount of a provision increases in each period to reflect the passage of time. This increase is recognised as borrowing cost.Use of Provisions43. A provision should be used only for expenditures for which the provision was originally recognised.44. Only expenditures that relate to the original provision are set against it. Setting expenditures against a provision that was originally recognised for another purpose would conceal the impact of two different events.Future Operating Losses45. Provisions should not be recognised for future operating losses.46. Future operating losses do not meet the definition of a liability in paragraph 10.the general recognition criteria set out for provisions in paragraph 1447. An expectation of future operating losses is an indication that certain assets of the operation may be impaired. An enterprise tests these assets for impairment under IAS 36, Impairment of Assets.Onerous Contracts48. If an enterprise has a contract that is onerous, the present obligation under the contract should be recognised and measured as a provision. 49. Many contracts (for example, some routine purchase orders) can be cancelled without paying compensation to the other party, and therefore there is no obligation. Other contracts establish both rights and obligations for each of the contracting parties. Where events make such a contract onerous, the contract falls within the scope of this Standard and a liability exists which is recognised. Executory contracts that are not onerous fall outside the scope of this Standard. 50. This Standard defines an onerous contract as a contract in which the unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the economic benefits expected to be received under it. The unavoidable costs under a contract reflect the least net cost of exiting from the contract, which is the lower ofthe cost of fulfilling it and any compensation or penalties arising from failure to fulfil it.51. Before a separate provision for an onerous contract is established, an enterprise recognises any impairment loss that has occurred on assets dedicated to that contract(see IAS 36, Impairment of Assets). Restructuring52. The following are examples of events that may fall under the definition of restructuring: (a) sale or termination of a line of business; (b) the closure of business locations in a country or region or the relocation of business activities from one country or region to another; (c) changes in management structure, for example, eliminating a layer of management; (d) fundamental reorganisations that have a material effect on the nature and focus of the enterprise's operations.53. A provision for restructuring costs is recognised only when the general recognition are met. Paragraphs 72-83 set out how criteria for provisions set out in paragraph 14the general recognition criteria apply to restructurings.54. A constructive obligation to restructure arises only when an enterprise:(a) has a detailed formal plan for the restructuring identifying at least: (i) the business or part of a business concerned;(ii) the principal locations affected;(iii) the location, function, and approximate number of employees whowill be compensated for terminating their services;(iv) the expenditures that will be undertaken;(v) when the plan will be implemented;(b) has raised a valid expectation in those affected that it will carry out the restructuring by starting to implement that plan or announcing its main features to those affected by it. . Evidence that an enterprise has started to implement a restructuring plan would be provided, 55for example, by dismantling plant or selling assets or by the public announcement of the main features of the plan. A public announcement of a detailed plan to restructure constitutes a constructive obligation to restructure only if it is made in such a way and in sufficient detail (i.e. setting out the main features of the plan) that it gives rise to valid expectations in other parties such as customers, suppliers and employees (or their representatives) that the enterprise will carry out the restructuring.56. For a plan to be sufficient to give rise to a constructive obligation when communicated to those affected by it, its implementation needs to be planned to begin as soon as possible and to be completed in a timeframe that makes significant changes to the plan unlikely. If it is expected that there will be a long delay before the restructuring begins or that the restructuring will take an unreasonably long time, it is unlikely that the plan will raise a valid expectation on the part of others that theenterprise is at present committed to restructuring, because the timeframe allows opportunities for the enterprise to change its plans.57. A management or board decision to restructure taken before the balance sheet date does not give rise to a constructive obligation at the balance sheet date unless the enterprise has, before the balance sheet date:(a) started to implement the restructuring plan;(b) announced the main features of the restructuring plan to those affected by it in a sufficiently specific manner to raise a valid expectation in them that the enterprise will carry out the restructuring. In some cases, an enterprise starts to implement a restructuring plan, or announces its main features to those affected, only after the balance sheet date. Disclosure may be , Events After the Balance Sheet Date, if the restructuring is of required under IAS 10 such importance that its non-disclosure would affect the ability of the users of the financial statements to make proper evaluations and decisions.58. Although a constructive obligation is not created solely by a management decision, an obligation may result from other earlier events together with such a decision. For example, negotiations with employee representatives for termination payments, or with purchasers for the sale of an operation, may have been concluded subject only to board approval. Once that approval has been obtained and communicated to the other parties, the enterprise has a constructive obligation to restructure, if theconditions of paragraph 72 are met.. 59. In some countries, the ultimate authority is vested in a board whose membership gement (e.g. employees) includes representatives of interests other than those of managment.or notification to such representatives may be necessary before the board decision is taken. Because a decision by such a board involves communication to these representatives, it may result in a constructive obligation to restructure.60. No obligation arises for the sale of an operation until the enterprise is committed to the sale, i.e. there is a binding sale agreement.61. Even when an enterprise has taken a decision to sell an operation and announced that decision publicly, it cannot be committed to the sale until a purchaser has been identified and there is a binding sale agreement. Until there is a binding sale agreement, the enterprise will be able to change its mind and indeed will have to take another course of action if a purchaser cannot be found on acceptable terms. When the sale of an operation is envisaged as part of a restructuring, the assets of the operation , Impairment of Assets. When a sale is only are reviewed for impairme-ent under IAS 36part of a restructuring, a constructive obligation can arise for the other parts of the restructuring before a binding sale agreement exists.62. A restructuring provision should include only the direct expenditures arising form the restrict-uring,which are those that are both:(a) necessarily entailed by the restructuring; and(b) not associated with the ongoing activities of the enterprise.63. A restructuring provision does not include such costs as:(a) retraining or relocating continuing staff;(b) marketing; or(c) investment in new systems and distribution networks.These expenditures relate to the future conduct of the business and are not liabilities for restructuring at the balance sheet date. Such expenditures are recognised on the same basis as if they arose independently of a restructuring.64. Identifiable future operating losses up to the date of a restructuring are not included in a provision, unless they relate to an onerous contract as defined in paragraph 10. , gains on the expected disposal of assets are not taken65. As required by paragraph 51into account in measuring a restructuring provision, even if the sale of assets is envisaged as part of the restructuring.Disclosure66. For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose:(a) the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period;(b) additional provisions made in the period, including increases toexisting provisions; (c) amounts used (i.e. incurred and charged against the provision) during the period; (d) unused amounts reversed during the period; and(e) the increase during the period in the discounted amount arising from the passage of time and the effect of any change in the discount rate. Comparative information is not required67. An enterprise should disclose the following for each class of provision:(a) a brief description of the nature of the obligation and the expected timing of any resulting outflows of economic benefits;(b) an indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those outflows. Where necessary to provide adequate information, an enterprise should disclose the major assumptions made concerning future events, as addressed in paragraph 48(c) the amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of any asset that has been recognised for that expected reimbursement.68. Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at the balance sheet date a brief description of the nature of the contingent liability and, where practicable:;(a) an estimate of its financial effect, measured under paragraphs 36(b) an indication of the uncertainties relating to the amount or timing of any outflow; (c) the possibility of any reimbursement.69. In determining which provisions or contingent liabilities may be aggregated to form a class, it is necessary to consider whether the nature of the items is sufficiently similar for a single statement about them to fulfil the requirements of paragraphs 85(a)and (b) and 86(a) and (b). Thus, it may be appropriate to treat as a single class of provision amounts relating to warranties of different products, but it would not be appropriate to treat as a single class amounts relating to normal warranties and amounts that are subject to legal proceedings.70. Where a provision and a contingent liability arise from the same set of -86 in a circumstances, an enterprise makes the disclosures required by paragraphs 84 that shows the link between the provision and the contingent liability.71. Where an inflow of economic benefits is probable, an enterprise should disclose a brief description of the nature of the contingent assets at the balance sheet date, and, where practicable, an estimate of their financial effect, measured using the principles set out for provisions in paragraphs 3672. It is important that disclosures for contingent assets avoid giving misleading ndications of the likelihood of income arising.73 In extremely rare cases, disclosure of some or all of the information required by paragraphs 84-89 can be expected to prejudice seriously the position of the enterprise a dispute with other parties on the subject matterof the provision, contingent or contingent asset. In such cases, an enterprise need not disclose the information, but should disclose the general nature of the dispute, together with the fact that, and reason why, the information has not been disclosed. Transitional Provisions74. The effect of adopting this Standard on its effective date (or earlier) should be reported as an adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings for the period in which the Standard is first adopted. Enterprises are encouraged, but not required, to adjust the opening balance of retained earnings for the earliest period presented and to restate comparative information. If comparative information is not restated, this fact should be disclosed. , Net Profit or Loss for the75. The Standard requires a different treatment from IAS 8requires Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting Policies. IAS 8comparative information to be restated (benchmark treatment) or additional pro forma comparative information on a restated basis to be disclosed (allowed alternative reatment) unless it is impracticable to do so.。
财务报告及补充自愿性信息披露【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文：Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary DisclosuresA standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager’s private information is a signal correlated with the firm’s liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager’s private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences du e to their effects on the manager’s willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures.1. IntroductionStandard voluntary disclosure models capture the effect of changes in mandatory disclosure on the voluntary disclosure of a private signal (cor related with firm value) as changes in the firm’s information environment. That is, an increase in mandatory disclosure is generally interpreted as either a decrease in the market’s prior variance of the firm’s liquidation value or, more recently, as the release of an additional signal correlated with the firm’s liquidation value. In either case, the first main result in this literature is that an increase in mandatory disclosure leads to a decrease in the probability of voluntary disclosure (i.e., mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes). The second main result is that the manager’s voluntary disclosure decision does not depend on the information in the mandatory disclosure (i.e., whether it contains good or bad news).The objective of this paper is to extend the voluntary disclosure literature by examining an alternative source of information asymmetry. Rather than assuming the manager knows a signal correlated with firm value, we assume that she has private information the market can use to better estimate the value implications of the contentof the firm’s financial reports. Thus, the manager explicitly determines whether tovoluntarily provide information that complements, rather than substitutes for, the information in financial reports. Structuring t he manager’s private information in this way allows us to examine how the content of the firm’s financial reports (whether they contain good or bad news) affects (1) the information the manager chooses to voluntarily disclose and (2) the likelihood she chooses to provide a voluntarydisclosure.In our model, each item in the financial statements (revenues, cost of goods sold,earnings, etc.) essentially consists of a permanent and a transitory component, and weendow the manager with better information about t he mix. Specifically, we assumethat the manager knows the variance of an item in the firm’s financial reports andselects a voluntary disclosure strategy to maximize the market price (the expectedliquidation value) of the firm.Our first main result is that the content of the financial reports affects what themanager voluntarily discloses. Specifically, if the reports contain sufficiently good(bad) news, the manager discloses small (large) values of her private information andotherwise does not provide a voluntary disclosure. Intuitively, when the managerknows the variance is small, she knows that the content of the financial reportspredominantly reflects permanent rather than transitory effects and vice versa. Thus, ifthey contain good news, she magnifies the ir value impact by voluntarily disclosingher private information when she knows that the variance is small; if they contain badnews, she minimizes their impact by disclosing her private information when sheknows that the variance is large. Interestingly, if the reports just meet marketexpectations, the manager does not provide any information about the permanent andtransitory components.Our second main result is that the probability of a voluntary disclosure also depends on the content of the financial reports. Intuitively, if the firm’s reported performance is close to market expectations, the benefits of amplifying or minimizing the news are small, whereas if the firm misses or beats market expectations by more, the benefits are much greater. Thus, mandat ory disclosures affect the voluntary disclosure of complementary information very differently than they affect the voluntary disclosure of substitute information.The structure of our model also allows us to highlight an important externality of changes in mandatory disclosure regulations. If the correlation in the transitory components is not too large in absolute value, requirements that lead to tighter linkages between the content of financial reports and firm value produce positive information externalities by increasing the probability of voluntary disclosure by management. Conversely, regulatory changes that weaken the link produce negative information externalities by lowering the probability of voluntary disclosure. However, if the correlation in the transitory components is larger, tightening or loosening the linkage can lead to either positive or negative information externalities depending in part, on whether the firm reports good or bad news and on the covariance structure between items in the firm’s financial reports.Our focus on supplemental disclosures that complement mandatory disclosures produces new, testable hypotheses. For example, our model suggests that supplemental voluntary disclosures are more likely the more extreme the news in the firm’s financial reports. In addition, relative to managers who do not provide supplemental disclosures, those who do are more likely to increase (decrease) the market response to a positive (negative) earnings surprise. We also expect a content analysis of manag ement’s supplemental voluntary disclosures to show that if the firm reports good news (bad news), the manager’s supplemental disclosure enhances (mitigates) the value impact of the news by indicating that performance is relatively permanent (transitory). Finally, our model suggests that cross-sectional variation in voluntary disclosures should depend on cross-sectional variation in the market’s level of uncertainty about how the content of the firm’s financial reports translates into firm value (as proxied by, for example, the variance in analysts’ target prices or the variation in analysts’s recommendations). Our approach also yields testable explanations for some existing empirical results. For example, we offer a testable explanation for the empirical finding that earnings response coefficients are larger when the firm reports good rather than bad news. We also offer a testable explanation for the apparent linkage between the increased usefulness of earnings announcements and increases in concurrent disclosures (Francis, Schipper,and Vincent [2002]).As noted earlier, our analysis complements standard voluntary disclosure models by examining a different type of information advantage for the manager. Thus, our paper is closely related to Hughes and Pae [2004], who focus on the acquisition of information about the precision of an estimate and management’s decision to disclose it. Our model can be viewed as a generalization and extension of theirs designed to examine the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure decisions and how it depends on (1) the mandatory disclosure of multiple items in the firm’s financial reports, each of which is used to estimate firm value; (2) the relationship between permanent and transitory components of the information in the firm’s financial reports and the firm’s liquidation value; (3) the relationship between the transitory components of the items in the firm’s financial reports; and (4) whether the firm missed or beat expectations of all of the relevant items reported in its financ ial statements. In addition, our model complements Einhorn’s [2005] examination of the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. In her model, there are two signals correlated with firm value, one of which must be disclosed. She shows that the manager’s voluntary disclosure decision depends on the correlation among the three variables (firm value and the two signals) and on their variances (i.e., on changes in the firm’s information environment associated with the mandatory disclosure) but not on the content of the mandatory disclosure itself (e.g., whether it contains good or bad news). Our analysis complements hers by focusing on the voluntary disclosure of a signal that only provides information that can be used to interpret the firm’s mandatory disclosure. More specifically, we show that whether the mandatory disclosure contains good or bad news affects both what the manager is willing to voluntarily disclose and the probability she offers a voluntary disclosure. As a result, our analysis extends our understanding of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure by highlighting how the voluntary disclosure depends on the content of the firm’s financial statements and, as a result, generates additional new, testable implications.Finally, our analysis complements prior work that focuses on the stewardship role of disclosure (Gigler and Hemmer [1998, 2001], Kwon, Newman, and Suh[2001], Venugopalan [2001]). These papers use a principal–agent model to examine how contractual incentives to motivate voluntary disclosure to the principal are affected by alternative mandatory disclosure regimes. Each shows that the costs incurred by the principal to motivate the manager to disclose (the agency costs inherent in the delegation problem) are affected by the different mandatory disclosure regimes.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains our voluntary disclosure model and the unique equilibrium disclosure strategy. In section 3, we analyze the interaction between the disclosure strategy and the content of the firm’s financial reports and derive empirical predictions. In section 4, we analyze the information externalities that arise from changes in financial reporting regulations and examine the impact of mandatory risk di sclosures on the manager’s voluntary disclosure strategy in section 5. We conclude in section 6.2. The Model and EquilibriumWe model the financial reporting system as providing information that is correlated with the unknown terminal value of the firm, v. We assume that the firm reports x = (x1, x2) and that, for simplicity, v, x1, x2 are joint normally distributed (v,x1, x2 ∼N(µ, )), where µ= (µv, µ1, µ2)is the vector of means and is the variance–covariance matrix with generic element σij .Investors are risk neutral and, after observing the firm’s financial report, value the firm at P = E[v | x] unless management provides additional, supplementary information that affects their interpretation of the firm’s financial report. A natural way to model this is to assume the manager has private information about the variance of an element of the firm’s financial reporting system. Without loss of generality, assume the manager knows the variance of x1, making her private information σ11. One interpretation is that x1 is made up of permanent and transitory components and the market has less information about the mix than does the manager. As a result, the manager’s private information permits her to interpret the firm’s historical performance as represented by the infor mation in its financial reports better than themarket.Before continuing, we should note that this private information structure differs from that in most of the extant voluntary disclosure literature in that the manager’s private information is not a sign al correlated with the firm’s liquidation value. The advantage of our structure is that the manager’s private information complements, rather than substitutes for, the information provided in the financial reports and allows us to highlight the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Specifically, whether firm value increases or decreases is determined by the content of the firm’s financial reports, and thus the content can be characterized as either good or bad news. All the manager’s voluntary disclosure can do is either enhance or mitigate the magnitude of the valuation impact of the news. Said differently, because her private information is the variance of an item in the firm’s financial reports, the manager’s voluntary disclosure only affects h ow sensitive the market’s estimate of firm value is to the content of the reports.Following Verrecchia [1983, 1990], the manager can voluntarily disclose her private information. If she does, she must disclose truthfully and incurs a cost c > 0. We assume that the manager is risk neutral and maximizes the market value of the firm less disclosure costs. If the manager discloses her private information, the market uses it when updating its estimate of the firm’s value conditional on the content of the financial reports. If the manager does not, the market uses that fact in updating its estimate. To represent this formally, assume that the market’s priors are represented by a family of log-concave densities of σ11, g(σ11; x) with support [a, b), 0 ≤a < b. 10 Thus, when the manager voluntarily discloses her private information, the market uses it to update its expectation of firm value conditional on the content of the financial reports yielding.P ≡E[v | x,σ11] = µv + β1(x1 − µ1) + β2(x2 − µ2), (1)where (β1, β2) are computed using the manager’s disclosed value of σ11. Note that the expectation is linear because of the normality assumption and depends on the “surprise” in the information provided in the firm’s financial reports (xi − µi ).Let D represent the set of σ11 the manager discloses and N represent the set themanager does not disclose. If the manager does not disclose her private information, the market uses this fact to update its expectation of firm value conditional on the content of the financial reports yie lding.PN ≡E[v | x,σ11 ∈N] = µv + E[β1 | x,σ11 ∈N](x1 − µ1)+E[β2 | x,σ11 ∈N](x2 − µ2). (2)Source: Mark Bagnoli，Susan G．Watts．Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosure[J]．Journal of Accounting Research，2007,45(5):885-913．译文：财务报告及补充自愿性信息披露在自愿性信息披露的文献中的标准是，当管理者的私人信息是与公司的清算价值相关的信号，是自愿性披露代替强制性信息披露的信号。
关于网络会计的研究--外文文献及翻译
文献翻译网络财务报告的经济后果过去的15年里，互联网有了巨大的发展，越来越多的人接受了它。
互联网的主要特征是可以随时随地访问想要的信息，而且通常可以以较低的成本获得最新的信息，并且用互联网搜索信息很少会限制数据的有效性。
互联网上的信息包括动态演示和多媒体，这有利于互动信息的需求和供给的全面提高。
这些事态的发展对信息的传播和对货物贸易，包括对股票以及一些经济活动的组织结构都有一定的影响。
他们还制造新的震惊的机会影响财务信息的披露状况和所有有关各方，特别是企业、投资者、审计师和信息中介。
多项研究显示，大多数上市公司在他们的网站上进行财务信息的披露，并且披露水平相较于几年前有所提高。
互联网可能成为为用户搜索企业财务报告的主要来源。
公司投入大量资源来发展其公司的网站，从而以创新的方式来呈现其财务信息。
虽然人们对互联网披露的信息的接受程度增加了，但其实互联网上的大部分信息的来源与从其他来源获得的信息大致是相同的，其实我们有很多机会来改变这种做法。
实证研究表明，传统的财务报告的价值在下降。
（列夫，塞若文，1999年）通过互联网提供的机会来减少产生和传播技术的信息，从而改变传统的财务报告模式的界限。
例如，艾略特认为，“信息技术（IT）正在改变一切。
艾略特（1999）和特里茨（2004）看到帕乔利范式到谷歌范式的转变。
随着可扩展商业报告（XBRL）作为标准化的数据描述格式财务报告的出现，有许多研究表明XBRL是有利于所有财务报告编制者和使用者的财务报告。
新信息技术对财务信息披露的影响已成为标准制定者和财务人员关注的问题。
（财务会计准则委员会2000年，莱蒙，1999年；特里茨，1999年；英格兰及威尔士特许会计师协会1998年）这些研究不仅是对未来信息披露发展潜力的探讨，而且对目前的财务报告模式的变化有着巨大的影响。
例如，他们的预测包括：“21世纪的年度报告不是一年一次，也不单单是一份报告，它将是一个最新的，内容丰富的，长期的对话。
会计学财务报表中英文对照外文翻译文献
会计学财务报表中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中美财务报表的区别(1)财务报告内容构成上的区别1)美国的财务报告包括三个基本的财务报表，除此之外，典型的美国大公司财务报告还包括以下成分：股东权益、收益与综合收益、管理报告、独立审计报告、选取的5-10年数据的管理讨论与分析以及选取的季度数据。
2)我国财务报告不注重其解释，而美国在财务报告的内容、方法、多样性上都比较充分。
中国的评价部分包括会计报表和财务报表，财务报表是最主要的报表，它包括前述各项与账面不符的描述、财会政策与变化、财会评估的变化、会计差错等问题，资产负债表日期，关联方关系和交易活动等等，揭示方法是注意底部和旁注。
美国的财务范围在内容上比财务报表更加丰富，包括会计政策、技巧、添加特定项目的报告, 报告格式很难反映内容和商业环境等等，对违反一致性、可比性原则问题，评论也需要披露的，但也揭示了许多方面，比如旁注、底注、括号内、补充声明、时间表和信息分析报告。
(2)财务报表格式上的比较1)从资产负债表的格式来看，美国的资产负债表有账户类型和报告样式两项描述，而我国是使用固定的账户类型。
另外，我们的资产负债表在项目的使用上过于标准化，不能够很好的反映出特殊的商业项目或者不适用于特殊类型的企业。
而美国的资产负债表项目是多样化的，除此之外，财务会计准则也是建立在资产负债表中资产所有者投资和支出两项要素基础上的，这一点也是中国的财会准则中没有的。
2)从损益表格式的角度来看，美国采用的是多步式，损益表项目分为两部分，营业利润和非营业利润，但是意义不同。
我国的营业利润在范围上比美国的小，例如投资收益在美国是归类为营业利润的而在我国则不属于营业利润。
另外，我国的损益表项目较美国的更加规范和严格，美国校准损益表仅仅依赖于类别和项目。
报告收可以与销售收入及其他收入相联系，也可以和利息收益、租赁收入和单项投资收益相联系；在成本方面，并不是严格的划分为管理成本、财务成本、和市场成本，并且经常性销售费用、综合管理费用以及利息费用、净利息收益都要分别折旧。
会计信息披露问题研究-英语论文
会计信息披露问题研究AbstractIn recent years, accounting information disclosure has been the major concern of various stakeholders. While some entities have embraced the significance of providing adequate and accurate information to investors and other stakeholders through accounting information disclosure, others have failed significantly in this aspect. This research aimed to identify the key issues concerning accounting information disclosure and recommend strategies to mitigate these challenges. The study found that lack of transparency, inadequate disclosures, incomplete information, and ineffective communication werethe significant issues surrounding accounting information disclosures. Therefore, it is essential for entities to improve their information disclosure process to ensure transparency and complete communication of critical information.IntroductionThe financial information provided by entities is essential in enhancing the decision-making processes of stakeholders, including investors, creditors, and suppliers. Therefore, accounting information plays a crucial role in the success of an entity in various ways, such as attracting investments and improving credit ratings. The process of disclosing accounting information ensures transparency and accountability, which is crucial for the success and growthof an entity. Lack of transparency and failure to disclose accurate and complete information is likely to affect thecredibility and reputation of the entity negatively.In recent years, there have been various concerns related to accounting information disclosure by entities. The inadequate or incomplete disclosure of financial information has resulted in legal and financial risks for the entity, affecting its reputation and credibility among stakeholders. Therefore, it is paramount to identify the challenges that entities face regarding accounting information disclosure and recommend solutions to mitigate these issues. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the critical issues concerning accounting information disclosure, followed by recommendations for entities to improve the information disclosure process.Key issues concerning accounting information disclosure Lack of transparencyTransparency is the cornerstone of accounting information disclosure. Investors and other stakeholders rely on financial information to make decisions concerning investments, continue with their economic relationships, or avoid financial risks. A lack of transparency, whether intentional or not, can lead to inadequate disclosure of significant information, leading to serious financial and legal implications for the entity. This lack of transparency can be caused by the following factors:- Lack of clear financial reporting standards: Entities may fail to disclose accurate and complete information because of the lack of clear reporting standards. Entities sometimes lack clear guidance on what information to disclose or how to disclose it, resulting in incomplete or inadequate disclosures.- Inadequate internal controls: Inadequate internal controlscan also affect transparency. Entities with weak internal controls may not be able to disclose important information or may include inaccurate information, which could negatively affect the company's reputation and credibility.- Inconsistent reporting methods: Inconsistent reporting methods in accounting information may result in incomplete information, making it difficult for investors to understand the company's financial position.Inadequate disclosuresAnother key issue surrounding accounting information disclosure is inadequate disclosures. Inadequate disclosures occur when entities fail to provide complete informationabout their financial position or performance, resulting in a lack of transparency. This can occur because of:- Incomplete financial statements: Incomplete financial statements occur when entities fail to disclose all of the relevant financial information that stakeholders need. For instance, entities may provide insufficient balance sheetsthat do not provide enough detail to allow stakeholders to assess the financial position of the company.- Insufficient footnotes: Lack of sufficient footnotes can make it difficult for stakeholders to understand thecompany's financial position or performance. Footnotesprovide additional information about the financial statements, including significant accounting policies and financial information, which assists stakeholders in interpreting financial information.Incomplete informationIncomplete information is another challenge within accounting information disclosures. It occurs when the entity fails to disclose both negative and positive informationaccurately; all of this information is significant to investors when making investment or disclosure decisions. Incomplete information can be caused by:- Selective disclosure: Selective disclosure occurs when entities provide financial information based on personal preferences or points of view. They may choose to highlight positive information and omit negative information, resulting in incomplete information that does not provide a complete picture of the company's financial position.- Non-financial information: Non-financial information like social responsibility and ethical practices is relevant to stakeholders when making investment or disclosure decisions. However, entities may not disclose this information, leading to incomplete information.Ineffective communicationIneffective communication is another issue surrounding accounting information disclosures. Companies with inadequate reporting methods have ineffective communication systems resulting in incorrect, insufficient or inconsistentfinancial reporting. The main causes of ineffective communication that affect accounting information disclosures are as follows:- Poor language: Financial reports with a lot of technical terms can be difficult for some stakeholders to understand. Entities should use clear and concise language that is easy for all stakeholders to understand.- Complex organizational structure: Complex organizational structures can lead to ineffective communication systems. A complex structure can make it difficult for the entity to disclose critical information to all stakeholders.Strategies to mitigate accounting information disclosurechallengesTransparent and effective disclosures of accounting information are crucial for the growth and success of an entity. Therefore, entities must adopt strategies to mitigate the challenges that they face when disclosing accounting information. These strategies include:- Implementing effective internal control systems: Entities should develop and implement effective internal control systems that ensure the accuracy, completeness, and transparency of accounting information. These control systems will help entities to identify critical financial information that needs to be disclosed and ensure that this informationis communicated effectively to all stakeholders.- Enhancing the reporting process: Companies can enhancetheir reporting process by implementing transparent and clear financial reporting standards. This will ensure that all stakeholders receive consistent and accurate financial information.- Encouraging broader and complete disclosure: Entities should make comprehensive disclosures that provide complete financial and non-financial information to all stakeholders. This will help to increase transparency, enhance the company's reputation and credibility among stakeholders.- Improving communication systems: Companies should improve their communication systems to ensure effective communication of critical financial and non-financial information to all stakeholders. They should use simple language that is easy to understand and ensure timely communication of all financial information to enhance investor confidence and reputation.ConclusionThe disclosure of accounting information is essentialfor the growth and success of companies. However, many entities face significant challenges when disclosing this information, including lack of transparency, inadequate disclosures, incomplete information and ineffective communication. It is essential for entities to adopt effective strategies to mitigate these challenges, ensuring transparency, completeness and accuracy.Therefore, entities should focus on enhancing their reporting process, implementing effective internal controls, encouraging complete and accurate disclosure, and improving their communication systems. These strategies will help to improve accounting information disclosure and provide stakeholders with vital information that will enhance their decision-making process. Eliminating these challenges will not only benefit the entity but will also benefit stakeholders and the economic ecosystem.。
会计学中英文对照外文翻译文献
(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)中英文资料外文翻译文献Title:Future of SME finance（Background – the environment for SME finance has changedFuture economic recovery will depend on the possibility of Crafts, Trades and SMEs to exploit their potential for growth and employment creation.SMEs make a major contribution to growth and employment in the EU and are at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy, whose main objective is to turn Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. However, the ability of SMEs to grow depends highly on their potential to invest in restructuring, innovation and qualification. All of these investments need capital and thereforeaccess to finance.Against this background the consistently repeated complaint of SMEs about their problems regarding access to finance is a highly relevant constraint that endangers the economic recovery of Europe.Changes in the finance sector influence the behavior of credit institutes towards Crafts, Trades and SMEs. Recent and ongoing developments in the banking sector add to the concerns of SMEs and will further endanger their access to finance. The main changes in the banking sector which influence SME finance are:•Globalization and internationalization have increased the competition and the profit orientation in the sector;•worsening of the economic situations in some institutes (burst of the ITC bubble, insolvencies) strengthen the focus on profitability further;•Mergers and restructuring created larger structures and many local branches, which had direct and personalized contacts with small enterprises, were closed;•up-coming implementation of new capital adequacy rules (Basel II) will also change SME business of the credit sector and will increase its administrative costs;•Stricter interpretation of State-Aide Rules by the European Commission eliminates the support of banks by public guarantees; many of the effected banks are very active in SME finance.All these changes result in a higher sensitivity for risks and profits in the finance sector.The changes in the finance sector affect the accessibility of SMEs to finance.Higher risk awareness in the credit sector, a stronger focus on profitability and the ongoing restructuring in the finance sector change the framework for SME finance and influence the accessibility of SMEs to finance. The most important changes are: •In order to make the higher risk awareness operational, the credit sector introduces new rating systems and instruments for credit scoring;•Risk assessment of SMEs by banks will force the enterprises to present more and better quality information on their businesses;•Banks will try to pass through their additional costs for implementing and running the new capital regulations (Basel II) to their business clients;•due to the increase of competition on interest rates, the bank sector demands more and higher fees for its services (administration of accounts, payments systems,etc.), which are not only additional costs for SMEs but also limit their liquidity;•Small enterprises will lose their personal relationship with decision-makers in local branches –the credit application process will become more formal and anonymous and will probably lose longer;•the credit sector will lose more and more its “public function” to provide access to finance for a wide range of economic actors, which it has in a number of countries, in order to support and facilitate economic growth; the profitability of lending becomes the main focus of private credit institutions.All of these developments will make access to finance for SMEs even more difficult and / or will increase the cost of external finance. Business start-ups and SMEs, which want to enter new markets, may especially suffer from shortages regarding finance. A European Code of Conduct between Banks and SMEs would have allowed at least more transparency in the relations between Banks and SMEs and UEAPME regrets that the bank sector was not able to agree on such a commitment.Towards an encompassing policy approach to improve the access of Crafts, Trades and SMEs to financeAll analyses show that credits and loans will stay the main source of finance for the SME sector in Europe. Access to finance was always a main concern for SMEs, but the recent developments in the finance sector worsen the situation even more. Shortage of finance is already a relevant factor, which hinders economic recovery in Europe. Many SMEs are not able to finance their needs for investment.Therefore, UEAPME expects the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to strengthen their efforts to improve the framework conditions for SME finance. Europe’s Crafts, Trades and SMEs ask for an encompassing policy approach, which includes not only the conditions for SMEs’ access to lending, bu t will also strengthen their capacity for internal finance and their access to external risk capital.From UEAPME’s point of view such an encompassing approach should be based on three guiding principles:•Risk-sharing between private investors, financial institutes, SMEs and public sector;•Increase of transparency of SMEs towards their external investors and lenders;•improving the regulatory environment for SME finance.Based on these principles and against the background of the changing environment for SME finance, UEAPME proposes policy measures in the following areas:1. New Capital Requirement Directive: SME friendly implementation of Basel IIDue to intensive lobbying activities, UEAPME, together with other Business Associations in Europe, has achieved some improvements in favour of SMEs regarding the new Basel Agreement on regulatory capital (Basel II). The final agreement from the Basel Committee contains a much more realistic approach toward the real risk situation of SME lending for the finance market and will allow the necessary room for adaptations, which respect the different regional traditions and institutional structures.However, the new regulatory system will influence the relations between Banks and SMEs and it will depend very much on the way it will be implemented into European law, whether Basel II becomes burdensome for SMEs and if it will reduce access to finance for them.The new Capital Accord form the Basel Committee gives the financial market authorities and herewith the European Institutions, a lot of flexibility. In about 70 areas they have room to adapt the Accord to their specific needs when implementing it into EU law. Some of them will have important effects on the costs and the accessibility of finance for SMEs.UEAPME expects therefore from the new European Commission and the new European Parliament:•The implementation of the new Capital Requirement Directive will be costly for the Finance Sector (up to 30 Billion Euro till 2006) and its clients will have to pay for it. Therefore, the implementation – especially for smaller banks, which are often very active in SME finance –has to be carried out with as little administrative burdensome as possible (reporting obligations, statistics, etc.).•The European Regulators must recognize traditional instruments for collaterals (guarantees, etc.) as far as possible.•The European Commission and later the Member States should take over the recommendations from the European Parliament with regard to granularity, access to retail portfolio, maturity, partial use, adaptation of thresholds, etc., which will easethe burden on SME finance.2. SMEs need transparent rating proceduresDue to higher risk awareness of the finance sector and the needs of Basel II, many SMEs will be confronted for the first time with internal rating procedures or credit scoring systems by their banks. The bank will require more and better quality information from their clients and will assess them in a new way. Both up-coming developments are already causing increasing uncertainty amongst SMEs.In order to reduce this uncertainty and to allow SMEs to understand the principles of the new risk assessment, UEAPME demands transparent rating procedures –rating procedures may not become a “Black Box” for SMEs:•The bank should communicate the relevant criteria affecting the rating of SMEs.•The bank should inform SMEs about its assessment in order to allow SMEs to improve.The negotiations on a European Code of Conduct between Banks and SMEs , which would have included a self-commitment for transparent rating procedures by Banks, failed. Therefore, UEAPME expects from the new European Commission and the new European Parliament support for:•binding rules in the framework of the new Capital Adequacy Directive, which ensure the transparency of rating procedures and credit scoring systems for SMEs;•Elaboration of national Codes of Conduct in order to improve the relations between Banks and SMEs and to support the adaptation of SMEs to the new financial environment.3. SMEs need an extension of credit guarantee systems with a special focus on Micro-LendingBusiness start-ups, the transfer of businesses and innovative fast growth SMEs also depended in the past very often on public support to get access to finance. Increasing risk awareness by banks and the stricter interpretation of State Aid Rules will further increase the need for public support.Already now, there are credit guarantee schemes in many countries on the limit of their capacity and too many investment projects cannot be realized by SMEs.Experiences show that Public money, spent for supporting credit guaranteessystems, is a very efficient instrument and has a much higher multiplying effect than other instruments. One Euro form the European Investment Funds can stimulate 30 Euro investments in SMEs (for venture capital funds the relation is only 1:2).Therefore, UEAPME expects the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to support:•The extension of funds for national credit guarantees schemes in the framework of the new Multi-Annual Programmed for Enterprises;•The development of new instruments for securitizations of SME portfolios;•The recognition of existing and well functioning credit guarantees schemes as collateral;•More flexibility within the European Instruments, because of national differences in the situation of SME finance;•The development of credit guarantees schemes in the new Member States;•The development of an SBIC-like scheme in the Member States to close the equity gap (0.2 – 2.5 Mio Euro, according to the expert meeting on PACE on April 27 in Luxemburg).•the development of a financial support scheme to encourage the internalizations of SMEs (currently there is no scheme available at EU level: termination of JOP, fading out of JEV).4. SMEs need company and income taxation systems, which strengthen their capacity for self-financingMany EU Member States have company and income taxation systems with negative incentives to build-up capital within the company by re-investing their profits. This is especially true for companies, which have to pay income taxes. Already in the past tax-regimes was one of the reasons for the higher dependence of Europe’s SMEs on bank lending. In future, the result of rating will also d epend on the amount of capital in the company; the high dependence on lending will influence the access to lending. This is a vicious cycle, which has to be broken.Even though company and income taxation falls under the competence of Member States, UEAPME asks the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to publicly support tax-reforms, which will strengthen the capacity of Crafts, Trades and SME for self-financing. Thereby, a special focus on non-corporate companies is needed.5. Risk Capital – equity financingExternal equity financing does not have a real tradition in the SME sector. On the one hand, small enterprises and family business in general have traditionally not been very open towards external equity financing and are not used to informing transparently about their business.On the other hand, many investors of venture capital and similar forms of equity finance are very reluctant regarding investing their funds in smaller companies, which is more costly than investing bigger amounts in larger companies. Furthermore it is much more difficult to set out of such investments in smaller companies.Even though equity financing will never become the main source of financing for SMEs, it is an important instrument for highly innovative start-ups and fast growing companies and it has therefore to be further developed. UEAPME sees three pillars for such an approach where policy support is needed:Availability of venture capital•The Member States should review their taxation systems in order to create incentives to invest private money in all forms of venture capital.•Guarantee instruments for equity financing should be further developed.Improve the conditions for investing venture capital into SMEs•The development of secondary markets for venture capital investments in SMEs should be supported.•Accounting Standards for SMEs should be revised in order to ease transparent exchange of information between investor and owner-manager.Owner-managers must become more aware about the need for transparency towards investors•SME owners will have to realise that in future access to external finance (venture capital or lending) will depend much more on a transparent and open exchange of information about the situation and the perspectives of their companies.•In order to fulfil the new needs for transparency, SMEs will have to use new information instruments (business plans, financial reporting, etc.) and new management instruments (risk-management, financial management, etc.).外文资料翻译题目：未来的中小企业融资背景：中小企业融资已经改变未来的经济复苏将取决于能否工艺品，贸易和中小企业利用其潜在的增长和创造就业。
环境会计相关信息披露(英文版)(doc 12页)
环境会计相关信息披露(英文版)(doc 12页)Accordingly, it is logical that the public would want to know about the existence of any environmental issues for which a reporting entity might be held responsible. With this in mind, the underlying purpose for this manuscript is to provide an understanding of the magnitude of environmental issues in the United States, a brief history of the Environmental Protection Agency, environmental regulatory acts and methods of enforcement by the EPA, and current disclosure requirements for corporations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).Magnitude of Environmental PollutionEnvironmental pollution in the United States is a major issue. In assessing environmental pollution, specifically hazardous wastes, in this country, the EPA made the following statements:There are approximately 240, 000, 000 people in the United States. Try to imagine a ton of hazardous waste piled next to each of them, with another ton added each and every year.Hazardous waste is produced in this country at the rate of 700,000 tons per day. That's 250 million tons per year--enough to fill the Superdome in New Orleans 1,500 times over. (Environmental Protection Agency 1987, p. 14) Although it is true that the amount of hazardous waste is large, most of this waste is not dumped directly into the environment. Given sufficient incentives, most of the hazardous waste produced probably could be recycled as energy sources or be chemically stabilized.However, in the past, public corporations were not as knowledgeable about the impact of these hazardous wastes on humans as they are now. Additionally, they lacked sufficient incentives to, and were not required to, properly dispose of hazardous materials. Today, these companies are being forced to address their lack of foresight by acceptance of responsibility and, therefore, liability for past wastes. This liability ultimately leads to disclosure by public corporations. The EPA is the principal federal agency responsible for identifying the companies to be held responsible for these past wastes.History of the Environmental Protection AgencyPresident Richard M. Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an independent agency of the United States government by an Executive Order entitled "Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970." While most federal agencies have been created by Congress, the creation of an agency by executive order was unique and implied lack of legislative support.Designed to ensure the protection of national environmental health, the EPA has not always received meaningful support from Congress. Early budgets were meager, and the agency's main headquarters in Washington, D.C. was located in an old condominium。
企业会计信息化研究外文文献翻译最新译文
文献出处: T Vatuiu. The study of enterprise accounting information [J]. Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, 2015, 5: 201-208.原文The study of enterprise accounting informatizationT VatuiuAbstractThe development of information technology is accompanied by the rise and popularization of computer and the emergence and development, the original computer is applied to the finance department handling accounting business, enterprise information since birth is the accounting information into the center, that is to say, the success of accounting informationization construction is directly related to the success of the enterprise informationization strategy. In the enterprise implementation of accounting information system is conducive to further standardize the operation of the enterprise funds, for the enterprise management decision makers to provide real and effective reference data, in a rapidly changing market competition to accurately grasp the market changes, better management combined with the actual enterprise decision-making, to achieve the optimal allocation of resources and benefits.Keywords: enterprise; Accounting informationization; ERP1 IntroductionWith the development of computer information technology and penetration in the social each domain, the information technology is more and more attention, so information technology is also naturally become the important driving force of economic development. At present, the world has become a global village, networking and globalization has become the main trend of world development, starting in the 1980 s, countries began to make the informatization development strategy adjustment and as an important support power, promote the development of national economy, also took to the formal information construction development road, national policies, the informationization construction as an important part for a period of time in the future of the country's development goals, and to promote and facilitate the process ofthe country's enterprise information construction, to lay a solid position in the market competition.Enterprise as the important pillar of national economy growth, closely related to the development and growth of the national economy informatization as the subsystem of the national informatization, is the surest way to achieve modernization of the enterprise, therefore, only to promote the enterprise information, to better promote the national economic information.2 The concept and related theories of enterprise informatization2.1 The meaning of enterprise informationAccounting information is the wide application of information technology in the accounting work, the development of information resources, the use of information technology to promote enterprise to develop the economy and improve the economic benefit, and to provide comprehensive information services to various aspects of the process. The main content of the accounting information is to establish a system of accounting information and accounting information system is the main part of enterprise information system, the basic law of development is consistent with the enterprise information system. Accounting informationization is popular in recent years a noun, it is different from the accounting computerization, is to cater to the information society and the application of a new word, it has realized the accounting and the integration of information technology, is the enterprise management in the new period of main channel of information for policy makers, and effectively solve the accounting computerization existence island phenomenon is an important way, is conducive to standardize the procedures of accounting management and enhancing the market competitiveness of the enterprise. Accounting information is the key of enterprise informatization construction and most important, to the enterprise overall information-based construction and implementation plays an important role in success.2.2 ERP concepts and related theoriesERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) refers to an Enterprise Resource Planning system, it is GartnerGrouP companies in the United States in 1990.It will enterpriseplanning, management, marketing, finance, purchasing set at an organic whole, to the customer's needs and the activities of the enterprise goal to unify, to all the enterprise resources integration into a dynamic complete supply chain. The core of the ERP is the management of the enterprise is an organic whole, emphasized the ERP is an enterprise's lean management and lean production, realized the unity of advance planning and afterwards. Use of ERP software system to realize the coordination and control of each department, make the business process tends to rationalize, to better achieve department the input for the optimization of the reconstruction to lay the work, is the enterprise continuously self-assessment and important way to improve management.ERP has experienced four stages of development, its core is to realize the management thoughts of the entire supply chain comprehensive dynamic effective management and control. In particular, mainly includes three aspects of thought. One is reflect of the whole supply chain resources comprehensive management thoughts. Today is the era of win-win cooperation, enterprise competition is, in fact, to a certain extent has evolved into a competition between the supply chain and another supply chain problems, enterprises should not only know the optimal configuration of their resources, also need to coordinate the advantage of other resources, such as with suppliers, customers, and the relationship between the sales network and so on, thus to the all-round development of the enterprise into a dynamic system, and to effectively implement the management of the enterprise supply chain is a dynamic and control. Tt is to embody the lean production, concurrent engineering and virtual manufacturing management thinking. The core of the ERP system shown above all is lean production. Is all supply chain partners into the overall production process, to establish the enterprise and the interests of customers, suppliers and other partners sharing mechanism, form an integral part of the supply chain. Followed by agile manufacturing, when there is new on the market opportunities and business partners can't meet, can rapidly form a virtual factory, thus realize products in the limited time and resources optimization configuration, enterprise in market activity, high quality and diverse and flexible. Then, it is reflected in advance plan to control the overallmanagement of thoughts later. ERP enterprise production planning, logistics demand plan, sales plan, budget and human resources plan integrated into a whole system, and successfully realized the centralization and unification of various plans for formal management. In addition, the ERP system of the transaction to the relevant accounting synchronous records, ensure the cash flow and logistics of synchronization and consistent, can understand the ins and outs of money thus to control and management in a timely manner.3 Enterprise informatization development present situationFrom the perspective of the development of accounting information system, the early of the accounting information system is mainly the financial and reporting software, solve and manage the daily accounting and report processing, the financial department are introduced corresponding accounts receivable and payroll data system. But the period of the establishment of the accounting information system often do not pay attention to economic benefits, in the process of actual operation on data processing is also a lack of control, as a result, the user for the accounting information system is still in the stage stay at a respectful distance from sais the further development of the computer in the world and popular, wins initial success in accounting information system in the financial sector, then gradually developed, and the accounting information system in other department managers also begin to pay close attention to the information system of investment benefit, at this point, an enlarged the scope of information system, in addition to the accounting information system, also including the personnel information system, marketing information system and logistics information system, after that, the accounting information system to the widespread popularity and spread of development stage, the stage by the managers convene the different functions of the overall planning, and set up a special information management center of internal control activities, to start the project management system, since then, the accounting information system on the right track.3.1 Accounting network systematization degree is lowAccounting information is the premise of accounting network, according to relevant data shows: enterprise all serious resource waste. This is mainly because thenetwork degree applied in enterprise accounting system is too low. Enterprise data submitted too many mistakes. This is mainly because the typing errors in the process of data transmission, computer fault, and other factors. Enterprise cannot very good coordination between different departments. Only in the financial sector, mainly because the accounting software applications cannot be good coordination with other departments.3.2 Insufficient understanding of ERP systemFirst, many enterprise ERP system is regarded as the common office software, rather than use it as an integral part of the management system to run, the myth has led to many enterprises will be the construction of the ERP investment focus in ERP software system, and neglect to personnel training and the adjustment of the system process. Second, insufficient understanding of ERP's return on investment. Many small and medium-sized enterprise knowledge of ERP system there is a big deviation, either the ERP system is considered to be the panacea to solve the problem of enterprise all, don't think it's not much value to the enterprise, can objectively evaluate the value of the ERP system makes the ERP investment return expectations appeared larger gap. Third, the lack of understanding of the function of ERP system, think that ERP system is the simple use of inventory, logistics and financial system, not the whole development of the enterprise management planning together, through the system dynamic adjustment to realize the unification of the whole enterprise management.3.3 The accounting business process is not standardEnterprise accounting information system from accounting subject classification, the accounting information collection, selection, summary, but the current implementation, accounting information system provides information far cannot satisfy the needs of corporate decision makers, so that the accounting activities became independent departments in operation, the data generated by the natural and the business sector has been out of line. Enterprise after the implementation of accounting information system, simply by using the computer instead of manual accounting, and failed to change from the whole enterprise accounting businessprocess, did not realize the fundamental process reengineering. And in practice, enterprise capital is seriously lagging behind the logistics information, thus causes the enterprise business process can't satisfy the need of real-time control in time, nature of accounting information and enterprise management state of point-to-point statistics, provide to the enterprise information management and the policy makers also loses the relative authenticity, the reliability of the information quality decline.4 ConclusionAccounting informationization is the enterprise informatization of the central nervous, many enterprises in the construction of informatization, often based on accounting information into a breakthrough, the accounting information is the core of enterprise informatization enterprise accounting information is an ongoing process, the goal is to set up the enterprise decision support system, decision-making for real-time, accurate and complete the production and transmission of information, realize the optimal allocation of resources, the rational flow of value; Help enterprises to quickly make the right decisions, in the harsh competition environment to survive and continue to grow stronger. Companies must also be on the outer and inner risk of the enterprise effective management and control, only through the implementation of the strategy analysis in the process of small and medium-sized enterprise accounting information system analysis, and can effectively deal with accounting information, accounting information system, internal control and external risk management, and to better promote the small and medium-sized enterprise accounting information system to realize healthy and sustainable development.译文企业会计信息化问题研究T Vatuiu摘要信息化的发展是伴随着计算机的兴起和普及而出现和发展的，最初计算机是应用于财务部门处理会计业务的，企业信息化从诞生开始就是以会计信息化为中心的，也就是说会计信息化建设的成功与否直接关系到企业信息化战略的成功。
会计信息失真外文文献翻译2014年译文3300字
文献出处：Beck T. The Study of Accounting Information Distortion in Small and Medium Enterprise [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, 30(11): 30-43.（声明：本译文归百度文库所有，完整译文请到百度文库。
）原文The Study of Accounting Information DistortionIn Small and Medium EnterpriseAuthor: Beck T.AbstractSecurity market, in fact, is information market, and the timeliness, fairness and completeness of account information is the foundation of public confidence to the market. The falsehood of accounting information strongly influents whether security market can work well. With introducing Coherence Theory and Procedural Rationality, the article redefines fairness and falsehood of accounting information, then analysis the issue from perspective of Game Theory.As to the concept of fairness of accounting information, the article integrates Procedural Rationality with Coherence Theory. That is, the accounting information can be deemed true only if the procedure and institution of accounting rule-making are rational and the accounting information is produced and disclosed strictly according to the rules.From previous definition, the falsehood of accounting information can be defined as following two: if the procedure and institution of accounting rule-making are irrational, the accounting information is in falsehood even though it is produce according to rules and standards. Besides, if the rules and standards are of high quality, but not obeyed, the accounting information is also in falsehood.Keywords: Accounting Information, Game Theory, Procedural RationalityRationality is one of presumptions in economics, which means human beings always make decision which can maximum his or her interests. And the presumption restricts the areas, where the methods in economics can be used. Therefore, it is necessary to refine the study areas. The article is to study on the falsehood of accounting information induced by rule constitutors and executors who have incentive not to follow the procedure of rule-making and implementing when institution and procedure are irrational. According to categories of falsehood of accounting information, the article is foc used on player’s actions and strategies under irrational institution and procedure which lead to the institutional and intended falsehood. So the behavioral falsehood and falsehood led by humane-beings’ limited rationality are excluded.During the process of accounting rule-making, different game players have different claims for accounting information according to their own interests. They have their own payoff functions, and have different request for accounting standards. The parties will make the rules partial to themselves and advocate their own requests from their own position and interest. The ideal model for accounting rule making is cooperative game with Nash equilibrium of sub-game perfect-ness under dynamic and completely-informative environment. It is more costly for rational men to breaking the equilibrium than keeping under such circumstances. Then it becomes Pareto Perfection when nobody wants to break up. However, the ideal model is hard to attain. And conditions are needed to provide to get close to the ideal model. That is to say, a set of rational institution and procedure must be set up to guarantee all the decisions made by each player maximum the welfare of society. And the rationality of institution and procedure should be embodied by representation of rule-makers and independence of rule-making organization.The structure of corporate governess comes from the conflicts within stockholders and the ones between shareholder and management. Accounting information is the warranty for shareholder to split up profits, and thetrack record on management’s performance. In practice, it is common that management provides accounting information; controlling stockholders get more information at first place; and the potential investors decides their action by watching the movement of stock price and controlling shareholders. The features of the phenomenon are as follow: there is no perfect information between players, the game process is dynamic. Based on these features, the author builds up dynamic model with imperfect information, and makes the conclusion that minority only cares about the payoff of majority, the majority considers their own interest and the payoff of the management, the management needs to think of the payoff of the majority, the minority and their own. The factors influencing their actions are given. In reality, it is impossible for government regulatory department and the management to make a coalition. And the sequence of the game is not as clear as the one in the game between shareholders and management.Therefore, a static model with imperfect information is founded. Deducing from the model, government regulatory department can ensure the fairness of accounting information by enhancing efforts in supervising, raising the social benefits and rewards of effective efforts, increasing the punishment of disclosing false accounting information and so on.During the game between management and auditors, currently, the management provides information at first, and then auditor conducts auditing and present auditing statement. There is a clear sequence in the game. And a dynamic model with imperfect information is built up. We concludes that raising the punishment, enhancing the efforts in inspecting and other measures can be done to guarantee the quality of accounting information.By summing up theoretical analysis above, we can deal with the falsehood of accounting information in following ways: consummating the rulemaking procedures; nurturing mature market of controlling shareholders; construct all-round supervising system; enhancing functions of the board; and raising the independence and competence of auditors.The United States of Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and so on a series of accounting scandals, questions about accounting information distortion. The discussion of the rest of the world. The steady development of securities market, not only related to the current performance of listed companies, and investors more expectations about the future of the market development and the establishment of the relevant investment confidence. The key to ensure the stability of this information is the public company accounting information disclosed the question, namely disclosure information must ensure that the securities price timely, accurate and comprehensive to reflect the fundamentals of each listed company management and the risk of the securities market conditions. Only on this basis, the investors to make reasonable expectations about the future, and then make your own risk tolerance of investment options, buy securities for their own preference of the enterprise; Companies, in turn, from investors get the corresponding resource allocation, in this way, the financing costs and risk of the enterprise and the prospect of the business performance, to achieve the purpose of the securities market efficient allocation of resources. And on this basis, the regulatory agencies and governments to find problems in a timely manner, effectively protect the rights and interests of investors, and can prevent market system risks. So the stock market is, in fact, market information, accounting information disclosure is timely, accurate, comprehensive build public confidence in the securities market.Ensure the securities market information disclosure timely, accurate and comprehensive is a long-term and complicated system engineering, it is not includes only the securities regulator information disclosure regulation system is perfect, more depends on whether the corporate governance structure to improve the strengthening the supervision of the stakeholders, accountants and lawyers and other intermediaries can remain neutral and integrity to perform their duties, investment bank or brokerage, conscientious, and securities market regulation legislation whether complete, to ensure fair and effective exercise of judicial supervision, media and social supervision by public opinion effectively in time, the government and corporate relations is an embarrassment and a series of institutional arrangements.Famous economist professor Simon, Simon pointed out in his theory of "bounded rationality" due to the person's cognition is Limited, people grasp of the information is incomplete, inadequate understanding and application of information to the people, therefore, are Bounded Rationality (Bounded Rationality).On the basis of bounded Rationality, he make a clear distinction between the rational standard of Procedural and Rationality of new classical economics to Substantive standards, distinguish the Procedural Rationality (Procedural Rationality) and the rational (Rationality of outcome/product) which is also called the substantial Rationality (Substantive Rationality).If procedural rationality refers to the behavior is the result of the due consideration, then the behavior is procedural rationality.Therefore, the behavior of the program depends on its rational production process. Results rational is refers to the established conditions and, within the prescribed scope of when behavior is suitable for a given target it is the result of rational. Thus, emphasizes the procedural rationality of rational behavior mechanism, itself is not a behavior results, because the result is always the result of a certain behavior program, program so if behavior is rational, is properly considered, the result of the behavior is also acceptable; The reason, on the other hand, pay attention to behavior result should comply with the established goals, do not pay attention to produce this behavior results the behavior of the process. Classical economics refers to the rational, in fact, a kind of substantive rationality, is a completely rational, given the behavior hypothesis (complete information, unlimited computing power and zero information processing fees) and the behavior of the target (utility maximization), behavior would be natural to achieve its purpose. Simon thinks, under the environment of uncertainty, people could not accurately predict the future, thus unable to act according to the result of rational way, can only rely on adopting a rational procedures to reduce the degree of future uncertainty, therefore, and should take reason instead of the reason for studying the economics program.From the view of procedural rationality, emphasized the authenticity of accounting information is whether accounting information generation and disclosure process Rational, rather than the accounting information itself is in accordance withthe established goals, that is, if the disclosure of accounting information generation and is rational, the result of the accounting behavior, accounting information itself can be accepted, you can think of accounting information is true, on the other hand, argue that the accounting information is distorted, similar to follow under the theory of the concept of the accounting information authenticity. Under the rational process view, the focus of the authenticity of accounting information is transferred to the accounting behavior process, namely, the process of formation and disclosure of accounting information.译文中小企业会计信息失真研究作者：贝克摘要证券市场实际上是信息市场，会计信息披露是否及时、准确、全面是建立公众对证券市场的信心基础。