会计财务管理类中英文翻译、外文翻译、外文文献翻译

外文翻译

译文1

并购的收益来源

资本市场领域研究的另一个课题是收入的一般来源。当收入只是别人非盈利成果时，资本市场领域的研究人员还不能确认资产已被重新分配，使之创造财富的盈利回升。虽然金融经济学家不能合理解释为什么并购是别人的非盈利目标的成果，但是，研究人员推断，这些合乎逻辑的假设值的目标收益不仅是重新通过并购得到的，也是分配产生的结果。一些研究者认为，股东的利益是从债券持有人处得来的。丹尼斯和麦康奈尔（1986）不支持这个意见。另外一个观点是，利润是从目标公司的资源税操作衍生而来的。从学术上讲这个证据是存在的，但不明确。奥尔巴赫和雷苏斯（1987）推测，在可能情况下税款这个因素占好处的20%，说明是足够重要的，它将影响并购的决策。吉尔森（1988）等人却发现，众多有关税收优惠的定义问题，交易成本和信息费复杂化的说法，以及税前利润方面肯定是并购活动产生的原因，或者说并购是公司实现税收优惠的最合适方法。在一个几项研究中，贾雷尔（1988）等人发现，大部分的并购活动也不能归因于税收方面的原因。施莱弗和萨默斯（1988）声称，利润从并购产生，因为新的董事会违反嵌入。施莱弗和萨默斯（1988）声称，利润从并购产生，原因是新的董事会，违反了公司与利益相关者群体的嵌入式就业条件。链接并购目标公司管理不佳的表现研究是由施莱佛和维什尼（1988）审查的。他们的研究表明公司还没有建立完善的管理机制来制止执行者开展的活动，这个活动是不会为股东创造价值的。此外，莫克（1988）等分析这种敌意收购时声称，收购发生的过快，或者下属企业和管理当局不能尽快地减少相关程序或其他相匹配模型。结果验证了这一事实有代理成本，新股东们认为，这一成本将能够被减少。

收购公司的负面影响提出为什么并购活动能够开始进行的问题。鲁巴特肯（1983）提供了对这种有明显难度问题的一个可能解释。他认为与并购有关的行政上的困难会消除潜在的利润。他还断言，在使用该方法可能不足以发现利润，这与詹森（1986）并购投标人利润公司量化复杂性的观点一致。其结论解释了在投标人利润匮乏的情况下并购活动仍然活跃的原因。鲁巴特肯（1983）认为，只

有特定类型的并购战略才可能对购买公司的股东有好处。

除了这些论点，罗尔（1986）在同意有效率的市场假说的同时，声称在经验性地评估工作的目标和招标公司的集体价值后，并购是不能令人信服。他们没有办法估计投标人的假设。因此，他制定了“傲慢自大假说”的规定，即并购的总利润是确定的（罗尔1986）。换句话说，管理层继续对目标公司超值估价。这些结果显示金融界的研究人员是如何结合自由现金流假设，代理理论以及效率市场的事件研究方法，来解释并购活动的合理化的。然而，金融研究人员驳斥了金融经济学家中央假说以及一个市场公司控制权假设是约束经理的一个重要手段，这一事件的研究是创造价值的量化的有效方法，而股票市场则能够恰当地估价公司。学者们使用现有的数据事件研究方法之外的其他方法，提出有关并购的利润的特定减免。索罗弗斯克莱福特和谢勒（1987年（二）），例如，他们声称，长期的结果通常显示，相比国内市场标准，并购目标执行一般高于行业平均水平的8％左右。此外，它们的财政收入表现既不增加也不减少，与并购后相当。这些研究人员不相信股市场总是有效-一个基本假设-提出对并购相比于金融学者提供的不同表现的解释。谢勒（1988）推测，由于股市并不总是能够正确估计股票价值，一些企业将在任何特定时间被高估了，这使他们能够购买其他公司，但有些公司将被低估，这是他们感兴趣的目标。被高估的公司，会研究可能的的目标公司，了解他们是否有被低估，导致其股价上升。这个发现被低估的公司将被购买，他们的新股票价格只是表达了一种市场调整。企业在审查后没有低估的将不会被购买，在被并购的目标中它们的股票价格可能回归到以前的水平。

作者：托马斯施特劳布

国籍：德国

出处：并购频繁失败的原因

原文1

The Origins of earnings through M&As

Another of the capital market school’s field of study is the origins of earnings in general. When earnings are j ust the outcome of somebody else’s disprofit, the capital market school’s researchers cannot confirm that assets have been redistributed so as to create wealth by picking up profitability. However, although financial economists cannot reasonably explain the gains in

M&A targets as somebody else’s disprofits,researchers deduce that it is logical to suppose that value is not just re-allocated through M&As, but is produced.Some researchers believe that shareholder profits come from bondholders’ losses.Dennis a nd McConnel (1986) do not uphold this opinion. An additional perspective is that profits are derived from tax manipulations of the target firm’s resources. In the literature, the evidence for this is, however, ambiguous. Auerbach and Reishus (1987) surmised that in possibly 20% of cases tax benefits are sufficiently important to affect the M&A decision. Gilson et al. (1988) nevertheless found that a multitude of problems concerning definitions of tax benefits, transaction costs, and information costs complicate the claim that tax profits are definitely the reason for M&A activities,or that M&As are the most suitable method for companies to realize tax benefits. In an evaluation of several studies, Jarrell et al. (1988) found that much of the M&A activity could not be attributed to tax reasons.Shleifer and Summers (1988) claim that profits are derived from M&As because a new board breaches the embedded employment conditions between the company and the stakeholder groups. Studies that link M&As to poor target company management performance were examined by Shleifer and Vishny (1988c). Their study shows that firms have not succeeded in establishing controls to prevent managers from carrying out activities that do not increase the stockholder value.Moreover, Morck et al.’s (1988) analysis of hostile takeovers claims that such takeovers take place in swiftly changing or declining businesses and in firms wherethe management is not able to minimize procedures fast enough, or model other adaptations. The results verify the fact that there are agency costs that the new hareholders think they will be able to decrease.

The negative consequences of M&As for the buying companies raise the question why

M&A activities are undertaken at all. A number of potential explanations for this apparent puzzle are offered by Lubatkin (1983), who suggests that the administrative difficulties associated with

M&As could erase potential profits. His further assertion that the methods in use have possibly not been sufficient to uncover profits is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) argument of the complexity of quantifying profits for M&A bidder companies. As a concluding explanation for M&As’ permanence despite the lack of profits for the bidders, Lubatkin (1983) suggests that just specific types of M&A strategies might profit the buying company’s shareholders.

Besides these arguments, Roll (1986), while agreeing with the efficient market hypothesis, claims that the empiric work that evaluates the target and bidding companies’ collective value afte r an M&A is unconvincing. no way related to the bidders’ supposition that their estimations are He consequently formulated the “hubris hypothesis” which states that M&As’ aggregate profits are in correct (Roll1986). In other words: managements continue to over valuate target firms.These results demonstrate how the financial school’s researchers combine the ypotheses of free cash flow, a market for corporate control, the agency theory and efficient markets with the event studies method to improve the rationalization in respect of M&A activity. However, a number of financial researchers refute the financial economists’ central hypothesis as well as the hypothesis that a market for corporate control is a key instrument for disciplining managers, that event studies are a valid method of quantifying value creation, and that the share market is capable of precisely valuing firms.Scholars who use other methods than event studies of existing data make specific deductions with regard to M&A profits. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987(b)), for example, claim that long-term-based results usually reveal that M&A targets perform above the industry average - at around 8% - compared to their home market standards. Furthermore, their financial income performances neither increased nor declined considerably after the M&A.Those researchers who do not believe that the share market is always efficient – a basic assumption - suggest different explanations for M&A performance than the ones offered by financial scholars. Scherer (1988) hypothesizes that because the stock market does not always properly value stock, some firms will be overvalued at any given point in time, enabling them to purchase other firms, but some firms will be undervalued, which renders them interesting targets. Companies that are overvalued, will examine possible target companies to find out if they have been

underestimated,causing their share price to increase.Firms that are discovered to be underestimated are purchased and their new share price simply expresses a market correction. Firms that are not purchased after being examined were not underestimated, and their share prices return to the level prior to their being possible M&A targets.

Author:Prof. Dr. oec. Thomas Straub

Nationality:Germany

Originate from: Reasons for Frequent failure in Mergers and Acquisitions

译文2

评价成功的客观标准

客观的措施是建立在公开信息之上的。容易获得信息是因为利用了外部信息的优点。由于外部信息不受到答辩人的偏见，基于外部数据就可以比较不同的研究成果。同时，外部信息也苦于缺乏差异。如外部经济波动的影响，工业企业的具体因素，以及其他收购等具体因素，或各种因素对结果影响很大，从而限制了外部信息的解释力。运用客观成功措施，研究人员研究了使并购成功的两个方面：战略上的成功和财务上的成功。

并购财务上的成功已经在不同的研究中被标准化。最后，创造价值是公司的核心目标。因此，在财务上价值创造的成功是并购成功的一个标准。有两种在财务上成功的数据源已被用于确定兼并和收购成功：股票的市场数据和公司的会计数据。股市会响应公司合并和收购的公告。这意味着股东估计将收购公司的创造价值，或评估已收购公司的销毁价值。如果他们希望收购能够增加收购公司的的价值创造，股票价格将上涨。如果他们希望收购能够摧毁收购公司的价值，股票价格将下跌。当然，这只有与股票价格的发展无关的行业或特定的股票市场的发展可以考虑。这些不相关的影响即所谓不正常的股市反应。不同时期使用了前后公告。例如，阿格拉瓦尔（1992）等调查股市的影响公布在前，其结果直到5年后才宣布。其他的，如哈布利安，芬克尔斯坦（1999）测量5天的异常收益率在合并后的前5天。然而，这种假设是建立在能够正常地反应公布及预计并购的所有可能产生的影响之上的。虽然长期收购具有捕捉长期发展的优势，但是它们会受到合并后发生事件的影响。阿格拉瓦尔（1992）等在765项收购研究中发现，与去年同期研究相比，收购的累积异常收益率在5%?10％之间，芬克尔斯坦（1999）则发现没有任何影响。同样，鲁巴特肯（1987）在439项有关公司收购

的研究中发现，没有重大的股票在不同的市场有时间效应（18-64个月后的兼并与收购）。鲁巴特肯，斯里尼瓦桑，曼切尔特（1997年）也发现并购后的第2天，第16天以及第56天无异常收益。布赫纳（1990）调查的90个公司的股票的市场表现，也认为是无相关联系的。其结果表明，收购没有使抽样公司的市场价值增加（1990a ：自己的译本）。在另一项研究中，布赫纳（1990）发现封闭后12个月的平均异常收益率恢复到-10%（布赫纳 1990c：300）。在对波士顿咨询集团（2004）的研究中，作者发现，在收购平均创造价值表现上，大多数并购是失败的。因为高风险活动，所以这是异常现象。但是，如果一家公司从事很多兼并和收购，就平均而言，实际上是可能创造价值的。根据有关财务执行情况的调查结果，鲁巴特肯，奥尼尔（1987）发现，并购交易显着增加公司的非系统风险，而减少系统性风险。该系统风险下降，是因为兼并和收购遵循一种产品或市场推广的目标，这降低了系统行业在大多数情况下的市场风险。但是，非系统性风险，取决于公司大力增加的特性，一些公司在并购后表现得非常好，但另外一些现象是并购后变得松散。然后，这大大增加了非系统性风险。对股市信息使用相应的金融理论，假设市场能够正确地估计公司的价值与战略。根据这个假设，收购将正确地评估股市，从而代表其有潜在的价值。

衡量并购成功的与否在建立在合并前的会计数据和合并后的会计数据的基础之上的。常用的尺度是资产回报，股本，息税前利润，销售或收购公司的利润回报。库斯维特（1985）在3500项大规模收购的研究中发现，一年后公司获得了5.33%的平均增长居留权。库斯维特（1985）还认为，，一年后，收购企业将增加3.40%的市场回报。同样，布赫纳（1990）探讨了110项德国并购事件，发现在并购交易3年后才能得到资本回报以及股本回报。他发现，平均而言，收购公司会恶化财务性能。

作者：弗洛里弗伦施

国籍：美国

出处：从社会角度看并购

原文2

Objective success measures

Objective measures are based on publicly available information. The advantage of using external information is that the information is readily available. As external information does not suffer from respondent’s biases, it is possible to compare results from different studies based on external data. At the same, external information suffers from a lack of differentiation. External effects such as economic fluctuations, industry specific factors as well as firm specific factors such as other acquisitions, or divestures strongly affect the result and thus limit the explanatory power of external https://www.360docs.net/doc/ef9065835.html,ing objective success measures, researchers have studied the success of mergers and acquisitions in two different dimensions: strategic success and financial success.

Financial success of mergers and acquisitions has been measured in many different studies.Ultimately, value creation is the core objective of firms. Hence value creation respectively financial success is a useful success measure for mergers and acquisitions. There are two different sources of data for financial success that have been used to identify success of mergers and acquisitions: Stock market data and accounting data of firms.Stock markets react to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions. That means that stockholders evaluate the expected value creation or value destruction of acquisitions for acquiring firms and acquired firms. If they expect that an acquisition creates value for the acquiring firm, stock prices go up. If they expect that an acquisition destroys value for the acquiring firm, stock prices go down. Of course, only stock price developments that are unrelated to industry specific developments or stock market

developments can be considered.These unrelated effects are called abnormal stock market reactions. Different time periods have been used before and after the announcement. For example, Agrawal et al. (1992) investigate the stock market effect before the announcement until five years after the announcement. Others such as Haleblian, & Finkelstein (1999) measure abnormal returns from 5 days prior to the merger until 5 days after the merger. This, however, assumes that

stock markets react correctly to an announcement and anticipate all possible effects of an M&A. While long periods have the advantage of capturing long-term developments of an acquisition, they suffer from events happening after the merger.While Agrawal et al. (1992) find in a study on 765 acquisitions that cumulative abnormal returns of acquisitions are -10% over a 5-year period, Haleblian, & Finkelstein (1999) find no effect. Similarly, Lubatkin (1987) finds in a study on 439 acquiring firms that there is no significant stock market effect at different points in time (18 – 64 months) after the M&Atransaction.Lubatkin, Srinivasan, & Merchant (1997) also find over periods of 2, 16, 56 days after an M&A-announcement no abnormal returns.Bühner (1990a) investigates the stock market performance of 90 firms and finds that ummarized, the results indicate that acquisitions do not yield increase of market value of the firms in the sample“ ( 1990a: 45, own translation). In another study, Bühner (1990c) finds an average abnormal rate of return of -10% twelve months after the closing (Bühner 1990c:300).In a study of The Boston Consulting Group (2004), the authors find that while the majority of mergers fail, acquirers on the average create value. This is curious insofar, as the risk is seemingly high. But if a firm engages in many mergers and acquisitions, on the average, it might actually create money.Consistent with the findings about financial performance, Lubatkin, & O’Ne ill (1987) find that M&A-transactions significantly increase the unsystematic risk of firms, while the systematic risks decrease. The systematic risk decreases, because mergers and acquisitions that follow a product or market extension objective reduce the systematic industry, respectively market risk in most cases. However, the unsystematic risk, which depends on firm characteristics, strongly increases, because some firms perform very well after mergers and acquisitions and some significantly loose after mergers and acquisitions. This, however,increases the unsystematic risk strongly.The use of stock market information corresponds to financial theories that assume that markets correctly price the value of a firm and its strategy. According to this assumption,acquisitions will be evaluated correctly by stock markets, thereby representing the value potential.

Success measures based on accounting data use premerger and post merger accounting https://www.360docs.net/doc/ef9065835.html,mon measures are return on assets, return on equity, EBIT, sales or profit of an acquiring firm. Kusewitt (1985) finds in a large scale study on 3,500 acquisitions that one year after an acquisition, the average ROA of acquiring firms increased by 5.33%. Kusewitt (1985) also finds that the market return of acquiring firm increases by 3.40% one year after the acquisition. Similarly, Bühner (1990a) investigates in a study on 110 German mergers and acquisitions the return on capital as well as the return on equity 3 years after an M&A transaction.He finds that on the average, acquiring companies have deteriorating financial performance.

Author: Florian Frensch

Nationality:America

Originate from: The social Side of Mergers and Acquisitions