安全工程专业中英文文献翻译-煤炭自燃

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安全专业外文文献(中英文对照PDF)

安全专业外文文献(中英文对照PDF)

附录A动态可靠性和安全性评价人为因素技术系统:一个现代科学扎根人类的起源P. Carlo Cacciabue收稿日期:2010年1月7日/接受日期:2010年2月27日施普林格出版社有限公司于2010年在伦敦摘要:本文讨论的要求是人机实际执行互动模式。

前瞻性的回顾分析了设计和安全评估。

对Hollnagel理论能够运用“联合认知”制度全面和详进行分析,鉴定出人为因素的根本原因和潜在的复杂评价中偶然的情况。

然而,死板的应用这些做法有时是过于武断,或根本不可能改善缺乏数据的缺点或构建复杂性建模架构。

本文介绍了两个可行的方法,整体安全性分析是对整个工厂进行控制。

另一种方法是,当明确任务和具体行为需要进行研究,提出的方法Hollnagel被认为是最先进和可以应用种最准确的工具。

关键词:人类认知;可靠性建模;安全评估;根本原因分析1 介绍15年前,在1994年,我对埃里克Hollnagel在我的博士学位论文等这些方面的帮助表示感激。

当然埃里克Hollnagel已成为了我的导师并帮我解除了、试图将机器正规化的权威心理的影响。

我一开始就很尊重博士Hollnagel,很多年前,当我遇到他,他拯救了我,从一些同事之中保护了我将要被他们毁灭的最初想法,这种想法是试图寻找和谐科学和心理学的之间的基础,这是我研究活动的最后25年的方向。

感谢埃里克!我永远不会忘记你,在世界许多角落陪伴着我,并通过头脑帮助我。

(Cacciabue 1994年)。

在那些日子里,需要建立必要的,明确的和无误的模式在人类管理的系统中,这导致许多研究人员严厉批评,它没有和解的可能性,所有的方法和在人类的贡献,旨在简化技术对系统的控制和事故。

第一,集中在行为上,即实际的行动表现。

这种批评的主要依据是一个没有模型的认知,使审议过程和人类精神的典型功能和行为表现影响到他们的上下文相关条件(Hollnagel 1994年),第二,缺乏对审。

在同一年内,制定的概念“第二代人的可靠性的方(Cacciabue和Hollnagel 1993年)和“微型的macrosimulation认知”(Cacciabue和Hollnagel 1995)随着各种技术的发展,在许多情况下是从航空运输和核医学出发,目的在于评估人类的贡献,评估安全系统和安全组织。

安全工程专业英语part1翻译.【模板范本】

安全工程专业英语part1翻译.【模板范本】

1 Why Do We Need Safety Engineering?我们为什么需要安全工程?It is difficult to open a newspaper or turn on the television and not be reminded how dangerous our world is.Both large-scale natural and man-made disasters seem to occur on an almost daily basis.只要打开报纸或电视,很难不让我们想到(无不在告诉)我们这个世界是多么危险。

大规模的自然灾害和人为灾害几乎每天都在发生。

An accident at a plant in Bhopal,India, killed over 2,500 people。

印度博帕尔市的一家工厂发生的事故造成了2500多人死亡A nuclear power plant in the Ukraine exploded and burned out of control, sending a radioactive cloud to over 20 countries,severely affecting its immediate neighbors’ livestock and farming.乌克兰的一座核电站爆炸,并引发了火灾,形成的放射云覆盖了20多个国家,严重影响了邻国的畜牧业和农业。

Keeping safety is responsibility of safety engineers。

Are you ready to struggle for human safety and happiness in your whole life?做好安全工作是安全工程师的责任,你准备好了为了人类的安全和幸福而奋斗终生吗?A total of 6。

安全工程专业英语

安全工程专业英语

一、专业词汇翻译mine n. 矿山,矿井。

v. 采矿colliery n. 矿井coal mining 采煤coalfield n. 煤田strike n. 走向dip n. 倾向roadway n. 巷道mining district 采区coalface n. 采煤面working face工作面ventilation n. 通风bolt v. 打锚杆;n. 锚杆immediate roof 直接顶;floor 底板;gas,methane 瓦斯outcrop 露头,露出地面的岩层fault n. 断层occurrence 赋存coalfield 煤田air shaft风井surrounding rock 围岩Mine ventilation 矿山通风internal combustion engine 内燃机dilute冲淡, 变淡, 变弱, 稀释contaminant 污染物noxious 有害的exhaust shaft 出风井colliery 煤矿trap door 通风门moisture content 湿度rank 品级bituminous 烟煤anthracite 无烟煤igneous[地]火成的natural fracture原生裂隙cleat【地质】割理porosity 多孔性sorptive吸附的Permeability渗透性free gas游离状态瓦斯adsorbed gas吸附状态瓦斯voidage孔隙度adsorption isotherm吸附等温线Methane drainage 瓦斯抽放Borehole 钻孔★Accident Causation Models:事故致因模型★System safety:系统安全★Hazard analysis:危害分析★Hazard identification:危险源辨识★Ergonomics process 人机工程过程★Hazard Identification 危险源辨识★safety culture 安全文化★corporate culture 企业文化★Accident Investigation:事故调查★mine fire 矿井火灾二、句型翻译★1、Rasmussen and Jensen have presented a three-level skill-rule-knowledge model for describing the origins of the different types of human errors.Rasmussen和Jensen提出了一种技能—规范—知识的三级模型,用来描述不同类型的人为失误的来源。

采矿工程中英文对照外文翻译文献

采矿工程中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文:新技术和新理论的采矿业跨世纪发展摘要:煤炭产业需要更长远的发展,对工作中所讨论的热点在工业中出现新的理论和高科技成功使用在二十世纪末是最美好的,作为被关心的问题需要较快一步的发展,在20世纪中后期产生的新型、高速的新技术是最有吸引力和标志性的,即使在所有行业中不同的冲击变得起来越相关以及部门间彼此合作并明确地叙述许多新的理论,煤炭行业的新科技和新理论是不可避免的,并且包括一切的不可能性。

作者在这篇文章中阐述了他关于采矿学的发展问题的意见,举出了许多令人信服的事实,并对大部分新的情况予以求证。

关键字:采矿工程,矿业产业, 矿业经济学,新技术和高科技1.采矿在国民经济中的重要性今天,科技世界的发展已经引起了对采矿空前的不容忽视,空间工程,信息工程,生物工程和海洋工程的发展,新能源的发现和研究与发展以及新原料在目前和将来逐渐地改变着人类生活的每个方面。

“科学技术是第一生产力”指出了新科技在国民经济的中扮演了重要的角色。

在全球的一些大的国家中,互相竞争为的是努力探测外部的空间,我们不应该忘记基本的事实:有超过五十亿个人生活在地球上。

想要保住地球上的人类,我们必须做到以下四个方面:也就是营养物,原料,燃料和环境。

营养物主要是空气、水、森林、谷物和各种植物,它们都是来自于自然。

原料有铁、铁的金属,稀罕的金属,宝贵的化学的原料和建材的金属。

燃料如:煤炭,石油,天然气,铀,放射性金属元素和其他的发光要素。

这些也在自然界中发生。

最后一种是靠人类来维持的生态环境。

在上述中三个必要的物质中,原料和燃料从地球表面经过采矿学取出服务人类。

生态学的环境和采矿已及上述的三个必要的财产抽出有莫大的关系。

然而,随着新技术和它们进入煤炭行业成果的提高,逐渐使它由朝阳产业变成当日落业并逐渐地褪色消失。

如采矿产业是最古老的劳工即强烈传统的产业,因此,那里没落是在一个民族的特定部份需要的印象而且要再作任何的更高深的研究,并在此之上发展采矿。

安全工程英文文献

安全工程英文文献

安全工程英文文献随着工业化和技术的发展,安全工程在现代社会中发挥着越来越重要的作用。

以下列举两本安全工程方面的英文文献,涵盖了安全工程的主要领域。

一、《Introduction to Safety Engineering》内容简介:This text introduces students to the basic principles of safety engineering, including the identification and evaluation of hazards, risk assessment, safety design principles, and the management of occupational health and safety. It also covers incident investigation and root cause analysis, emergency planning and response, continuous improvement, and metrics.二、《Modern Safety Engineering: A Comprehensive Textbook and Reference Guide》内容简介:This book provides a comprehensive overview of modern safety engineering, covering a range of topics from the introduction to safety engineering to advanced techniques for risk assessment and management. It also delves into human factors, ergonomics, safety culture, and the role of information technology in safety engineering. The text also includes discussions on sustainability and environmental safety engineering, as well as the convergence of multiple disciplines in safety engineering.总结:这两本英文文献均涵盖了安全工程的主要领域,从基本概念到高级技术,为读者提供了全面的知识和指导。

安全工程专业英语(部分翻译)

安全工程专业英语(部分翻译)
Seniority资历、工龄
Local culture当地文化
Absenteeism rate缺勤率
Power relations权力关系
Status review状态审查
Lower-level management低层管理者
Business performance组织绩效
Most senior executive高级主管
Human errors人因失误
Accident-proneness models事故倾向模型
Munitions factory军工厂
Causal factors起因
Risking taking冒险行为
Corporate culture企业文化
Loss prevention损失预防
Process industry制造工业
unit2systemsafetyengineeringsystemsafetyengineering系统安全工程byproduct附带产生的结果engineeringpractice工程实践safetyproblem安全问题acceleratingtechnology快速发展的技术safetyeffort安全投入systemslifecycle系统的生命周期systemeffectiveness系统有效性logicalreasoning逻辑推理potentialaccident潜在事故accidentcause事故原因logicalprogramming合理的规划systemhazard系统危害safetyinput安全投入inherentlysafesystem本质安全系统scheduledelays进度拖延conceptphase初步计划阶段safetycriteria安全标准governmentregulations政府管制systemoperation系统运行systemanalysis系统分析systemdesign系统设计aidin有助于equipmentspecifications设备说明maintenanceplans维护计划safetyproblems安全问题developmentphase发展阶段operationphase运行阶段performancereviews绩效评估disposalphase处理阶段intuitiveprocess直觉过程makedecisions做决定hazardcontrol危险控制protectiveapparel防护服engineeringsolutions工程方法手段protectivedevices保护装置warningdevices报警装置incorrectinterpretation误解hazardousmaterial危险物质workarealayout工业区布局educationalsolutions教育方法手段trainingsessions培训会议safetypromotionprograms安全促进项目administrativesolutions行政方法手段personnelselection人员选择safetyshoes安全鞋safetybelt安全带safetyglasses防护眼镜accidentprevention事故预防tech

建筑防火中英文对照外文翻译文献

建筑防火中英文对照外文翻译文献

- 1 -中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文文献外文文献: :Designing Against Fire Of BulidingABSTRACT:This paper considers the design of buildings for fire safety. It is found that fire and the associ- ated effects on buildings is significantly different to other forms of loading such as gravity live loads, wind and earthquakes and their respective effects on the building structure. Fire events are derived from the human activities within buildings or from the malfunction of mechanical and electrical equipment provided within buildings to achieve a serviceable environment. It is therefore possible to directly influence the rate of fire starts within buildings by changing human behaviour, improved maintenance and improved design of mechanical and electricalsystems. Furthermore, should a fire develops, it is possible to directly influence the resulting fire severity by the incorporation of fire safety systems such as sprinklers and to provide measures within the building to enable safer egress from the building. The ability to influence the rate of fire starts and the resulting fire severity is unique to the consideration of fire within buildings since other loads such as wind and earthquakes are directly a function of nature. The possible approaches for designing a building for fire safety are presented using an example of a multi-storey building constructed over a railway line. The design of both the transfer structure supporting the building over the railway and the levels above the transfer structure are consideredin the context of current regulatory requirements. The principles and assumptions associ- ated with various approaches are discussed.1 INTRODUCTIONOther papers presented in this series consider the design of buildings for gravity loads, wind and earthquakes.The design of buildings against such load effects is to a large extent covered by engineering based standards referenced by the building regulations. This is not the case, to nearly the same extent, in the case of fire. Rather, it is building regulations such as the Building Code of Australia (BCA) that directly specify most of the requirements for fire safety of buildings with reference being made to Standards such as AS3600 or AS4100 for methods for determining the fire resistance of structural elements.The purpose of this paper is to consider the design of buildings for fire safety from an engineering perspective (as is currently done for other loads such as wind or earthquakes), whilst at the same time,putting such approaches in the context of the current regulatory requirements.At the outset,it needs to be noted that designing a building for fire safety is far more than simply considering the building structure and whether it has sufficient structural adequacy.This is because fires can have a direct influence on occupants via smoke and heat and can grow in size and severity unlike other effects imposed on the building. Notwithstanding these comments, the focus of this paper will be largely on design issues associated with the building structure.Two situations associated with a building are used for the purpose of discussion. The multi-storey office building shown in Figure 1 is supported by a transfer structure that spans over a set of railway tracks. It is assumed that a wide range of rail traffic utilises these tracks including freight and diesel locomotives. The first situation to be considered from a fire safety perspective is the transfer structure.This is termed Situation 1 and the key questions are: what level of fire resistance is required for this transfer structure and how can this be determined? This situation has been chosen since it clearly falls outside the normal regulatory scope of most build-ing regulations. An engineering solution, rather than a prescriptive one is required. The second fire situation (termed Situation 2) corresponds to a fire within the office levels of the building and is covered by building regulations. This situation is chosen because it will enable a discussion of engineering approaches and how these interface with the building regulations regulations––since both engineering and prescriptive solutions are possible.2 UNIQUENESS OF FIRE2.1 Introduction Wind and earthquakes can be considered to b Wind and earthquakes can be considered to be “natural” phenomena o e “natural” phenomena o e “natural” phenomena over which designers ver which designers have no control except perhaps to choose the location of buildings more carefully on the basis of historical records and to design building to resist sufficiently high loads or accelerations for the particular location. Dead and live loads in buildings are the result of gravity. All of these loads are variable and it is possible (although generally unlikely) that the loads may exceed the resistance of the critical structural members resulting in structural failure.The nature and influence of fires in buildings are quite different to those associated with other“loads” to which a building may be subjected to. The essential differences are described in the following sections.2.2 Origin of FireIn most situations (ignoring bush fires), fire originates from human activities within the building or the malfunction of equipment placed within the building to provide a serviceable environment. It follows therefore that it is possible to influence the rate of fire starts by influencing human behaviour, limiting and monitoring human behaviour and improving the design of equipment and its maintenance. This is not the case for the usual loads applied to a building.2.3 Ability to InfluenceSince wind and earthquake are directly functions of nature, it is not possible to influence such events to any extent. One has to anticipate them and design accordingly. It may be possibleto influence the level of live load in a building by conducting audits and placing restrictions on contents. However, in the case of a fire start, there are many factors that can be brought to bear to influence the ultimate size of the fire and its effect within the building. It is known that occupants within a building will often detect a fire and deal with it before it reaches a sig- nificant size. It is estimated that less than one fire in five (Favre, 1996) results in a call to the fire brigade and for fires reported to the fire brigade, the majority will be limited to the room of fire origin. Inoc- cupied spaces, olfactory cues (smell) provide powerful evidence of the presence of even a small fire. The addition of a functional smoke detection system will further improve the likelihood of detection and of action being taken by the occupants.Fire fighting equipment, such as extinguishers and hose reels, is generally provided within buildings for the use of occupants and many organisations provide training for staff in respect ofthe use of such equipment.The growth of a fire can also be limited by automatic extinguishing systems such as sprinklers, which can be designed to have high levels of effectiveness.Fires can also be limited by the fire brigade depending on the size and location of the fire at the time of arrival.2.4 Effects of FireThe structural elements in the vicinity of the fire will experience the effects of heat. The temperatures within the structural elements will increase with time of exposure to the fire, the rate of temperature rise being dictated by the thermal resistance of the structural element and the severity of the fire. The increase in temperatures within a member will result in both thermal expansion and,eventually,a reduction in the structural resistance of the member. Differential thermal expansion will lead to bowing of a member. Significant axial expansion willbe accommodated in steel members by either overall or local buckling or yielding of local- ised regions. These effects will be detrimental for columns but for beams forming part of a floorsystem may assist in the development of other load resisting mechanisms (see Section 4.3.5).With the exception of the development of forces due to restraint of thermal expansion, fire does not impose loads on the structure but rather reduces stiffness and strength. Such effects are not instantaneous but are a function of time and this is different to the effects of loads such as earthquake and wind that are more or less instantaneous.Heating effects associated with a fire will not be significant or the rate of loss of capacity will be slowed if:(a) the fire is extinguished (e.g. an effective sprinkler system)(b) the fire is of insufficient severity –– insufficient fuel, and/or(b) the fire is of insufficient severity(c)the structural elements have sufficient thermal mass and/or insulation to slow the rise in internal temperatureFire protection measures such as providing sufficient axis distance and dimensions for concrete elements, and sufficient insulation thickness for steel elements are examples of (c). These are illustrated in Figure 2.The two situations described in the introduction are now considered.3 FIRE WITHIN BUILDINGS3.1 Fire Safety ConsiderationsThe implications of fire within the occupied parts of the office building (Figure 1) (Situation 2) are now considered. Fire statistics for office buildings show that about one fatality is expected in an office building for every 1000 fires reported to the fire brigade. This is an orderof magnitude less than the fatality rate associated with apartment buildings. More than two thirdsof fires occur during occupied hours and this is due to the greater human activity and the greater use of services within the building. It is twice as likely that a fire that commences out of normal working hours will extend beyond the enclosure of fire origin.A relatively small fire can generate large quantities of smoke within the floor of fire origin.If the floor is of open-plan construction with few partitions, the presence of a fire during normal occupied hours is almost certain to be detected through the observation of smoke on the floor. The presence of full height partitions across the floor will slow the spread of smoke and possibly also the speed at which the occupants detect the fire. Any measures aimed at improving housekeeping, fire awareness and fire response will be beneficial in reducing the likelihood of major fires during occupied hours.For multi-storey buildings, smoke detection systems and alarms are often provided to give “automatic” detection and warning to the occupants. An alarm signal is also transm itted to the fire brigade.Should the fire not be able to be controlled by the occupants on the fire floor, they will need to leave the floor of fire origin via the stairs. Stair enclosures may be designed to be fire-resistant but this may not be sufficient to keep the smoke out of the stairs. Many buildings incorporate stair pressurisation systems whereby positive airflow is introduced into the stairs upon detection of smoke within the building. However, this increases the forces required to open the stair doors and makes it increasingly difficult to access the stairs. It is quite likely that excessive door opening forces will exist(Fazio et al,2006)From a fire perspective, it is common to consider that a building consists of enclosures formed by the presence of walls and floors.An enclosure that has sufficiently fire-resistant boundaries (i.e. walls and floors) is considered to constitute a fire compartment and to be capableof limiting the spread of fire to an adjacent compartment. However, the ability of such boundariesto restrict the spread of fire can be severely limited by the need to provide natural lighting (windows)and access openings between the adjacent compartments (doors and stairs). Fire spread via the external openings (windows) is a distinct possibility given a fully developed fire. Limit- ing the window sizes and geometry can reduce but not eliminate the possibility of vertical fire spread.By far the most effective measure in limiting fire spread, other than the presence of occupants, is an effective sprinkler system that delivers water to a growing fire rapidly reducing the heat being generated and virtually extinguishing it.3.2 Estimating Fire SeverityIn the absence of measures to extinguish developing fires, or should such systems fail; severe fires can develop within buildings.In fire engineering literature, the term “fire load” refers to the quantity of combustibles within an enclosure and not the loads (forces) applied to the structure during a fire. Similarly, fire load density refers to the quantity of fuel per unit area. It is normally expressed in terms of MJ/m2or kg/m 2of wood equivalent. Surveys of combustibles for various occupancies (i.e offices, retail,hospitals, warehouses, etc)have been undertaken and a good summary of the available data is given in FCRC (1999). As would be expected, the fire load density is highly variable. Publications such as the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) give fire load data in terms of the mean and 80th percentile.The latter level of fire load density is sometimes taken asthe characteristic fire load density and is sometimes taken as being distributed according to a Gumbel distribution (Schleich et al, 1999).The rate at which heat is released within an enclosure is termed the heat release rate (HRR) and normally expressed in megawatts (MW). The application of sufficient heat to a combustible material results in the generation of gases some of which are combustible. This process is called pyrolisation.Upon coming into contact with sufficient oxygen these gases ignite generating heat. The rate of burning(and therefore of heat generation) is therefore dependent on the flow of air to the gases generated by the pyrolising fuel.This flow is influenced by the shape of the enclosure (aspect ratio), and the position and size of any potential openings. It is found from experiments with single openings in approximately cubic enclosures that the rate of burning is directly proportional to A h where A is the area of the opening and h is the opening height. It is known that for deep enclosures with single openings that burning will occur initially closest to the opening moving back into the enclosure once the fuel closest to the opening is consumed (Thomas et al, 2005). Significant temperature variations throughout such enclosures can be expected.The use of the word ‘opening’ in relation to real building enclosures refers to any openings present around the walls including doors that are left open and any windows containing non fire-resistant glass.It is presumed that such glass breaks in the event of development of a significant fire. If the windows could be prevented from breaking and other sources of air to the enclosure limited, then the fire would be prevented from becoming a severe fire.V arious methods have been developed for determining the potential severity of a fire within an enclosure.These are described in SFPE (2004). The predictions of these methods are variable and are mostly based on estimating a representative heat release rate (HRR) and the proportion of total fuel ς likely to be consumed during the primary burning stage (Figure 4). Further studies of enclosure fires are required to assist with the development of improved models,as the behaviour is very complex.3.3 Role of the Building StructureIf the design objectives are to provide an adequate level of safety for the occupants and protection of adjacent properties from damage, then the structural adequacy of the building in fire need only be sufficient to allow the occupants to exit the building and for the building to ultimately deform in a way that does not lead to damage or fire spread to a building located on an adjacent site.These objectives are those associated with most building regulations including the Building Code of Australia (BCA). There could be other objectives including protection of the building against significant damage. In considering these various objectives, the following should be taken into account when considering the fire resistance of the building structure.3.3.1 Non-Structural ConsequencesSince fire can produce smoke and flame, it is important to ask whether these outcomes will threaten life safety within other parts of the building before the building is compromised by a lossof structural adequacy? Is search and rescue by the fire brigade not feasible given the likely extent of smoke? Will the loss of use of the building due to a severe fire result in major property and income loss? If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then it may be necessary to minimise the occurrence of a significant fire rather than simply assuming that the building structure needs to be designed for high levels of fire resistance. A low-rise shopping centre with levels interconnected by large voids is an example of such a situation.3.3.2 Other Fire Safety SystemsThe presence of other systems (e.g. sprinklers) within the building to minimise the occurrence of a serious fire can greatly reduce the need for the structural elements to have high levels of fire resistance. In this regard, the uncertainties of all fire-safety systems need to be considered. Irrespective of whether the fire safety system is the sprinkler system, stair pressurisation, compartmentation or the system giving the structure a fire-resistance level (e.g. concrete cover), there is an uncertainty of performance. Uncertainty data is available for sprinkler systems(because it is relatively easy to collect) but is not readily available for the other fire safety systems. This sometimes results in the designers and building regulators considering that only sprinkler systems are subject to uncertainty. In reality, it would appear that sprinklers systems have a high level of performance and can be designed to have very high levels of reliability.3.3.3 Height of BuildingIt takes longer for a tall building to be evacuated than a short building and therefore the structure of a tall building may need to have a higher level of fire resistance. The implications of collapse of tall buildings on adjacent properties are also greater than for buildings of only several storeys.3.3.4 Limited Extent of BurningIf the likely extent of burning is small in comparison with the plan area of the building, then the fire cannot have a significant impact on the overall stability of the building structure. Examples of situations where this is the case are open-deck carparks and very large area building such as shopping complexes where the fire-effected part is likely to be small in relation to area of the building floor plan.3.3.5 Behaviour of Floor ElementsThe effect of real fires on composite and concrete floors continues to be a subject of much research.Experimental testing at Cardington demonstrated that when parts of a composite floor are subject to heating, large displacement behaviour can develop that greatly assists the load carrying capacity of the floor beyond that which would predicted by considering only the behaviour of the beams and slabs in isolation.These situations have been analysed by both yield line methods that take into account the effects of membrane forces (Bailey, 2004) and finite element techniques. In essence, the methods illustrate that it is not necessary to insulate all structural steel elements in a composite floor to achieve high levels of fire resistance.This work also demonstrated that exposure of a composite floor having unprotected steel beams, to a localised fire, will not result in failure of the floor.A similar real fire test on a multistory reinforced concrete building demonstrated that the real structural behaviour in fire was significantly different to that expected using small displacement theory as for normal tempera- ture design (Bailey, 2002) with the performance being superior than that predicted by considering isolated member behaviour.3.4 Prescriptive Approach to DesignThe building regulations of most countries provide prescriptive requirements for the design of buildings for fire.These requirements are generally not subject to interpretation and compliance with them makes for simpler design approvalapproval––although not necessarily the most cost-effective designs.These provisions are often termed deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) provisions. Allcovered––the provision of emergency exits, aspects of designing buildings for fire safety are coveredspacings between buildings, occupant fire fighting measures, detection and alarms, measures for automatic fire suppression, air and smoke handling requirements and last, but not least, requirements for compartmentation and fire resistance levels for structural members. However, there is little evidence that the requirements have been developed from a systematic evaluation of fire safety. Rather it would appear that many of the requirements have been added one to anotherto deal with another fire incident or to incorporate a new form of technology. There does not appear to have been any real attempt to determine which provision have the most significant influence on fire safety and whether some of the former provisions could be modified.The FRL requirements specified in the DTS provisions are traditionally considered to result in member resistances that will only rarely experience failure in the event of a fire.This is why it is acceptable to use the above arbitrary point in time load combination for assessing members in fire. There have been attempts to evaluate the various deemed-to-satisfy provisions (particularly the fire- resistance requirements)from a fire-engineering perspective taking into account the possible variations in enclosure geometry, opening sizes and fire load (see FCRC, 1999).One of the outcomes of this evaluation was the recognition that deemed-to- satisfy provisions necessarily cover the broad range of buildings and thus must, on average, be quite onerous because of the magnitude of the above variations.It should be noted that the DTS provisions assume that compartmentation works and that fire is limited to a single compartment. This means that fire is normally only considered to exist at one level. Thus floors are assumed to be heated from below and columns only over one storey height.3.5 Performance-Based DesignAn approach that offers substantial benefits for individual buildings is the move towards performance-based regulations. This is permitted by regulations such as the BCA which state thata designer must demonstrate that the particular building will achieve the relevant performance requirements. The prescriptive provisions (i.e. the DTS provisions) are presumed to achieve these requirements. It is necessary to show that any building that does not conform to the DTS provisions will achieve the performance requirements.But what are the performance requirements? Most often the specified performance is simplya set of performance statements (such as with the Building Code of Australia)with no quantitative level given. Therefore, although these statements remind the designer of the key elements of design, they do not, in themselves, provide any measure against which to determine whether the design is adequately safe.Possible acceptance criteria are now considered.3.5.1 Acceptance CriteriaSome guidance as to the basis for acceptable designs is given in regulations such as the BCA. These and other possible bases are now considered in principle.(i)compare the levels of safety (with respect to achieving each of the design objectives) of the proposed alternative solution with those asso- ciated with a corresponding DTS solution for the building.This comparison may be done on either a qualitative or qualitative risk basis or perhaps a combination. In this case, the basis for comparison is an acceptable DTS solution. Such an approach requires a “holistic” approach to safety whereby all aspects relevant to safety, including the structure, are considered. This is, by far, the most common basis for acceptance.(ii)undertake a probabilistic risk assessment and show that the risk associated with the proposed design is less than that associated with common societal activities such as using pub lic transport. Undertaking a full probabilistic risk assessment can be very difficult for all but the simplest situations.Assuming that such an assessment is undertaken it will be necessary for the stakeholders to accept the nominated level of acceptable risk. Again, this requires a “holistic” approach to fire safety.(iii) a design is presented where it is demonstrated that all reasonable measures have been adopted to manage the risks and that any possible measures that have not been adopted will have negligible effect on the risk of not achieving the design objectives.(iv) as far as the building structure is concerned,benchmark the acceptable probability of failure in fire against that for normal temperature design. This is similar to the approach used when considering Building Situation 1 but only considers the building structure and not the effects of flame or smoke spread. It is not a holistic approach to fire safety.Finally, the questions of arson and terrorism must be considered. Deliberate acts of fire initiation range from relatively minor incidents to acts of mass destruction.Acts of arson are well within the accepted range of fire events experienced by build- ings(e.g. 8% of fire starts in offices are deemed "suspicious"). The simplest act is to use a small heat source to start a fire. The resulting fire will develop slowly in one location within the building and will most probably be controlled by the various fire- safety systems within the building. The outcome is likely to be the same even if an accelerant is used to assist fire spread.An important illustration of this occurred during the race riots in Los Angeles in 1992 (Hart 1992) when fires were started in many buildings often at multiple locations. In the case of buildings with sprinkler systems,the damage was limited and the fires significantly controlled.Although the intent was to destroy the buildings,the fire-safety systems were able to limit the resulting fires. Security measures are provided with systems such as sprinkler systems and include:- locking of valves- anti-tamper monitoring- location of valves in secure locationsFurthermore, access to significant buildings is often restricted by security measures.The very fact that the above steps have been taken demonstrates that acts of destruction within buildings are considered although most acts of arson do not involve any attempt to disable the fire-safety systems.At the one end of the spectrum is "simple" arson and at the other end, extremely rare acts where attempts are made to destroy the fire-safety systems along with substantial parts of thebuilding.This can be only achieved through massive impact or the use of explosives. The latter may be achieved through explosives being introduced into the building or from outside by missile attack.The former could result from missile attack or from the collision of a large aircraft. The greater the destructiveness of the act,the greater the means and knowledge required. Conversely, the more extreme the act, the less confidence there can be in designing against such an act. This is because the more extreme the event, the harder it is to predict precisely and the less understood will be its effects. The important point to recognise is that if sufficient means can be assembled, then it will always be possible to overcome a particular building design.Thus these acts are completely different to the other loadings to which a building is subjected such as wind,earthquake and gravity loading. This is because such acts of destruction are the work of intelligent beings and take into account the characteristics of the target.Should high-rise buildings be designed for given terrorist activities,then terrorists will simply use greater means to achieve the end result.For example, if buildings were designed to resist the impact effects from a certain size aircraft, then the use of a larger aircraft or more than one aircraft could still achieve destruction of the building. An appropriate strategy is therefore to minimise the likelihood of means of mass destruction getting into the hands of persons intent on such acts. This is not an engineering solution associated with the building structure.It should not be assumed that structural solutions are always the most appropriate, or indeed, possible.In the same way, aircrafts are not designed to survive a major fire or a crash landing but steps are taken to minimise the likelihood of either occurrence.The mobilization of large quantities of fire load (the normal combustibles on the floors) simultaneously on numerous levels throughout a building is well outside fire situations envisaged by current fire test standards and prescriptive regulations. Risk management measures to avoid such a possibility must be considered.4 CONCLUSIONSificantly from other “loads” such as wind, live load and earthquakes in significantlyFire differs signrespect of its origin and its effects.Due to the fact that fire originates from human activities or equipment installed within buildings, it is possible to directly influence the potential effects on the building by reducing the rate of fire starts and providing measures to directly limit fire severity.The design of buildings for fire safety is mostly achieved by following the prescriptive requirements of building codes such as the BCA. For situations that fall outside of the scope of such regulations, or where proposed designs are not in accordance with the prescriptive requirements, it is possible to undertake performance-based fire engineering designs.However,。

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安全工程专业文献翻译

Accident InvestigationsAlthough accident investigation is an after-the-fact approach to hazard identification, it is still an important part of this process. At times hazards exist, which no one seems to recognize until they result in an accident or incident. In complicated accidents it may take an investigation to actually determine what the cause of the accident was. This is especially true in cases where death results and few or no witnesses exist. An accident investigation is a fact-finding process and not a fault-finding process with the purpose of affixing blame. The end of any result of an accident investigation should be to assure that the type of hazard or accident does not exist or occur in the future.Your company should have a formalized accident investigation procedure, which is followed by everyone. It should be spelled out in writing and end with a written report using as a foundation of your standard company accident investigation form. It may be your workers’compensation form or an equivalent from your insurance carrier.Accidents and even near misses should be investigated by your company if you are intent on identifying and preventing hazards in your workplace. Thousands of accidents occur throughout the United States every day. The failure of people, equipment, supplies, or surroundings to behave or react as expected causes most of the accidents. Accident investigations determine how and why these failures occur. By using the information gained through an investigation, a similar or perhaps more disastrous accident may be prevented. Accident investigations should be conducted with accident prevention in mind. Investigations are not to place blame.An accident is any unplanned event that results in personal injury or in property damage. When the personal injury requires little or no treatment,it is minor. If it results in a fatality or in a permanent total, permanent partial, or temporary total (lost time) disability, it is serious. Similarly, property damage may be minor or serious. Investigate all accident regardless of the extent of injury or damage. Accidents are part of a broad group of events that adversely affect the completion of a task. These events are incidents. For simplicity, the procedures discussed in later sections refer only to accidents. They are, however, also applicable to incidents.1.Accident PreventionAccidents are usually complex. An accident may have 10 or more events that can be causes. A detailed analysis of an accident will normally reveal three cause levels:basic,indirect,and direct. At the lowest level, an accident results only when a person or object receives an amount of energy or hazardous material that cannot be absorbed safely. This energy or hazardous material is the DIRECT CAUSE of the accident. The direct cause is usually the result of one or more unsafe acts or unsafe conditions, or both. Unsafe acts and conditions are the indirect causes or symptoms. In turn, indirect causes are usually traceable to poor management policies and decisions, or to personal or environmental factors. These are the basic cause.In spite of their complexity, most accidents are preventable by eliminating one or more causes. Accident investigations determine not only what happened, but also how and why. The information gained from these investigations can prevent recurrence of similar or perhaps more disastrous accident. Accident investigations are interested in each event as well as in the sequence of events that led to an accident. The accident type is also important to the investigator. The recurrence of accident of a particular type or those with common causes shows areas needing special accident prevention emphasis.2.Investigative ProceduresThe actual procedures used in a particular investigation depend on the nature and results of the accident. The agency having jurisdiction over the lacation determines the administrative procedures. In general, responsible officials will appoint an individual to be in charge of the investigation. An accident investigation should use most of the following steps:·Defined the scope of the investigation.·Select the investigation. Assign specific tasks to each (preferably in writing).·Present a preliminary briefing to the investigating team.·Visit and inspect the accident site to get updated information.·Interview each victim and witness. Also interview those who were present before the accident and those who arrived at the site shortly after the accident. Keep accurate records of each interview. Use a tape recorder if desired and if approved.·Determine the following:·What was not normal before the accident.·Where the abnormality occurred.·When it was first noted.·How it occurred.·Determine the following:·Why the accident occurred.·A likely sequence of events and probable causes ( direct, indirect, basic ).·Alternative sequences.·Determine the most likely sequence of events and the most probable causes.·Conduct a post-investigation briefing.·Prepare a summary report including the recommended actions to prevent a recurrence. Distribute the report according to applicable instructions.An investigation is not complete until all data are analyzed and a final report is completed. In practice, the investigation work, data analyzed and report preparations proceed simultaneously over much of the time spent on the investigation.3.Fact-FindingInvestigator collects evidence from many sources during an investigation, gets information from witnesses and observation as well as by reports, interviews witnesses as soon as possible after an accident, inspects the accident site before any changes occur, takes photographs and makes sketches of the accident scene, records all pertinent data on maps, and gets copies of all reports. Documents containing normal operating procedures flow diagrams, maintenance charts or reports of difficulties or abnormalities are particularly useful. Keep complete and accurate notes in a bound notebook. Record pre-accident conditions, the accident sequence and post-accident conditions. In addition, document the location of victims, witnesses, machinery, energy source, and hazardous materials.In some investigation, a particular physical or chemical law, principle, or property may explain a sequence of events. Include laws in the notes taken during the investigation or in the later analysis of data. In addition, gather data during the investigation that may lend itself to analysis by these laws, principles, or properties. An appendix in the final report can include an extended discussion.4.InterviewIn general, experienced personnel should conduct interviews. If possible, the team assigned to this task should include an individual with a legal background. After interviewing all witnesses, the team should analyze each witness’statement. They may wish to re-interview one or more witnesses to confirm or clarify key points. While there may be inconsistencies in witnesses’statement, investigators should assemble the available testimony into a logical order. Analyze this information along with data from the accident site.Not all people react in the same manner to a particular stimulus. For example, a witness within close proximity to the accident may have an entirely different story from one who saw it at a distance. Some witnesses may also change their stories after they have discussed it with others. The reason for the change may be additional clues.A witness who has had a traumatic experience may not be able to recall the details of the accident. A witness who has a vested interest in the result of the investigation may offer biased testimony. Finally, eyesight, hearing, reaction time, and the general condition of each witness may affect his or her powers of observation. A witness may omit entire sequences because of a failure to observe them or because their importance was not realized.5.Report of InvestigationAs noted earlier, an accident investigation is not complete until a report is prepared and submitted to proper authorities. Special report forms are available in many cases. Others instances may require a more extended report. Such repots are often very elaborate and may include a cover page, title page, abstract, table of contents, commentary or narrative discussion of probable causes, and a section on conclusions and recommendations.Accident investigation should be an integral part of your written safety and health program. It should be a formal procedure. A successful accident investigation determines not only what happened, but also finds how and why the accident occurred. Investigations are an effort to prevent a similar or perhaps more disastrous sequence of events. You can then use the resulting information and recommendations to prevent future accidents.Keeping records is also very important to recognizing and reducing hazards. A review of accident and injury records over a period of time can help pinpoint the cause of view of accidents. If a certain worker shows up several times on the record as being injured, it may indicate that the person is physically unsuited for the job, is not properly trained, or needs better supervision. If one or two occupations experience a high percentage of the accident in a workplace, they should be carefully analyzed and countermeasures should be taken to eliminate the cause. If there are multiple accident involving one machine or process, it is possible that work procedures must be changed or that maintenance is needed. Records that show many accidents during a short period of time would suggest an environmental problem.Once the hazards have been identified then the information and source must be analyzed to determine their origin and the potential to remove or mitigate their effectsupon the workplace. Analysis of hazards forces us to take a serious look at them.事故调查尽管事故调查是一种事后危害识别的方法,它依旧是危害识别的一个重要组成部分。

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Spontaneous combustion of coalCoal undergoes slow oxidation on exposure to air at ambient temperatures,with the evolution of heat,gases and moisture, the heat generated, if not dissipated, gives rise to an increase in the temperature of the coal。

As the temperature of the coal rises, the rate of oxidation increases. If this is allowed to proceed unchecked it can eventually result in the ignition of the coal. This oxidation process is known as spontaneous combustion or spontaneous heating or self—heating。

Self-heating,therefore, occurs when the rate of heat generation exceeds the rate of oxidation。

During recent years there has been a renewed interest in the spontaneous combustion of coal in all coal mining countries particularly because of the use of caving methods and the thicker seams being mined. Large-scale bulk storage and bulk transport of coal have also become more important with the increase in coal trade。

Evaluation of the potential of coal for spontaneous combustionSeveral methods have been used to evaluate the potential of coal for spontaneous combustion but none is clearly superior。

The most common methods used are described blow.Oxygen absorptionIn this method, a coal sample is placed in a container and oxygen or air is added to it。

The amount of oxygen absorbed by the coal is estimated from the analysis of the gaseous reaction products。

The temperature increase per unit of oxygen consumed indicates potential of coal for spontaneous combustion.Heating rate/crossing—point temperatureIn this method,a coal sample is placed in a bath and heated at a constant rate. Initially,the temperature of the coal lags behind the temperature of the bath but as coal begins to self—heat,the temperature of the coal first coincides with and then exceeds the temperature of the bath。

The crossing—point temperature is known as the ‘relative ignition temperature'. Usually, the crossing –point temperature is used as a measure of the potential of coal for spontaneous combustion although the index based on the ratio of heating rate to crossing-point temperature is more suitable because the spontaneous combustion potential of coal not only depends on theignition temperature but also on the rate of heat generation.Adiabatic calorimetryIn this method,a coal sample is placed in an insulated bath,and the whole system is heated to a pre—selected temperature。

Oxygen or air is then added to it and oxidation of the coal raises its temperature. Since no heat is lost to the surroundings,the change in the temperature of the coal in a given time,the time needed to reach a pre-selected temperature,or the amount of heat generated per unit time indicates the potential of coal for spontaneous combustion.Isothermal calorimetryIn this method, a coal sample is placed in a large bath held at a constant temperature。

Heat generated in the coal sample due to spontaneous combustion is measured by thermocouples and dissipated in the relatively large heat sink. The amount of heat generated per unit time gives an indication of the potential of coal for spontaneous combustion。

Factors contributing to spontaneous combustionCoal characteristicsSome coals are more prone to spontaneous combustion than others。

The rate of oxidation of coal depends upon many factors,including rank, presence of pyrite,particle size,moisture content,temperature, extent of previous oxidation of coal and the composition of the ambient air。

It is generally accepted that as the rank of coal decreases, the risk of spontaneous combustion increases.The presence of pyrite increases the potential of coal for spontaneous combustion, particularly when the pyrite concentration exceeds 2 % and when it is very finely distributed. Pyrite accelerates spontaneous combustion by swelling and causing disintegration of the coal mass,thereby increasing the surface area available for oxidation。

The smaller the coal particle,the greater the exposed surface area and the greater the tendency toward spontaneous combustion. Friable coals which produce a considerable amount of fines when mined are more vulnerable to spontaneouscombustion。

The changes in moisture content of the coal affect the potential of coal for spontaneous combustion。

It has been found that the rate of oxidation increases with an increase in moisture content. Also, wetting is an exothermic process and drying is an endothermic process。

Airflow rateFor spontaneous combustion to develop, the rate of heat generation should be more than the rate of heat dissipation。

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